POWER ON NORMS OF CLIMATE CONTROL COST DISTRIBUTION

Author

• Rongling Tang, Southern Illinois University CarbondaleFollow

Date of Award

5-1-2026

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Department

Political Science

First Advisor

Shulman, Stephen

Second Advisor

Bloom, Stephen

Abstract

This dissertation examines who shapes the rules in global climate governance. It askswhose preferences determine the substantive norms of climate agreements under conditions of power asymmetry and sustained contestation over burden sharing. The theoretical framework is power-centered: it integrates realist and constructivist insights to argue that material capabilities dominate contested bargaining, while normative claims and soft power structure discourse but rarely determine outcomes. The argument is evaluated through comparative process tracing of three United Nations bargains—Kyoto (1997), Copenhagen (2009), and Paris (2015)—linking shifts in actors’ capabilities and coalitions to distributive design choices and compliance architectures. The analysis shows that norm content consistently aligns with great-power interests: convergence among major powers enabled a durable and flexible architecture at Paris, whereas discord or hegemonic resistance produced deadlock or diluted commitments at Copenhagen and in the post-Kyoto period. Coalitions of weaker states, secretariats, and transnational advocates influenced language, framing, and review mechanisms but seldom shifted core allocation rules against leading powers’ preferences. These findings advance international relations scholarship by specifying how capabilities structure norm formation, thereby bridging realist accounts of power with constructivist work on norms and diffusion. The framework clarifies variation in climate agreement design and provides portable leverage for understanding the politics of rule-making in other areas of global governance.