Cybersecurity of Energy Hubs in Smart Grids

Author

Samaneh Pazouki, Southern Illinois University CarbondaleFollow

Date of Award

12-1-2023

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Department

Electrical and Computer Engineering

First Advisor

Asrari, Arash

Abstract

Smart grid is about integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the energy systems, especially electricity grid. DERs include renewable energy resources such as wind and solar, energy storages such as electrical and thermal energy storage, demand response programs, smart homes, and electric vehicles with their charging stations. DERs have significant advantages such as reduction of operation costs, emission, and peak as well as the increase of reliability, resiliency, stability, and voltage profile in smart grids. They also prevent establishment of fossil fuel power plants and expansion of transmission lines by locating in electricity distribution grid and transmission lines. The advantages approve the financial, technical, and environmental effects of the DERs in smart grids. An operation/planning approach such as EHs/IEHs is required to utilization of DERs in the Smart Grid. EH is a super node in electricity power system which connects different energy networks such as gas, electricity, heating, or cooling. The EH can be developed by DERs for operation and planning purposes. The EHs can be located in different parts of the energy networks to form IEHs. Despite the significant advantages of utilization of DERs in EHs of Smart Grids, they should be utilized by information and communication technologies (ICTs), which results in Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPSs) vulnerable to different cyberattacks. The vulnerability of DERs in EHs of Smart Grid leads to jeopardizing the reliability, stability, and resiliency of power systems since integrity, confidentiality, or availability cyberattacks might bypass the detection systems to take control of DERs for malicious purposes such as congestion, cascading failure, blackout, undervoltage/overvoltage, or costs. In this research, some cyberattacks are modeled on DERs in EHs and IEHs of Smart Grid, and the vulnerabilities of DERs to the cyberattacks in the developed EHs/IEs are approved: First, an integrity cyberattack is modeled and applied to the DR program (time/incentive-based) in the developed EH in electricity distribution grid in order to control the performance of the EH and its negative effects on the grid. The attacker aims to manipulate the system by both raising peak demand and lowering customers' energy bills simultaneously. This strategy is designed to deceive customers into participating in falsified Demand Response (DR) programs, ultimately leading to an increase in the overall peak demands of the system which jeopardizes the reliability of the system. Second, an integrity FDI cyberattack is modeled and applied on the developed IEHs in transmission lines in order to control the performance of the IEH and its negative effects on the transmission lines. This cyberattack is modeled to manipulate the transmission lines energy demands in order to threaten reliability and stability of the system by bypassing detection systems. Finally, the attacker targets the developed EHs integrated by DERs by maximizing the costs associated with operation, emission, and energy not supplied costs. The attacker objective is to adversely affect the financial, technical, and environmental advantages of integration of DERs to the system. Hence, powerful remedial actions are required to alleviate the adverse effects of DERs, manipulated by attackers, in the developed EHs. Therefore, a remedial action is designed by min-max formulation in order to mitigate the adverse effects of DERs on financial, technical, and environmental terms. The remedial action reduces the imposed costs by changing the status of EH devices. The results highlight the role of DERs in reducing costs and emphasize the need for their proactive security measures in cyber-physical power systems.