Abstract
Experience and Nature proposes a naturalistic empiricism emphasizing continuity. This paper will argue that this continuity is threatened by Dewey’s anthropocentric in its account of meaning, which is only found in humans but is necessary for the perception of objects, communication, and social existence. Given contemporary research in ethology, Dewey’s denotative method requires a modification of this account. I will propose Merleau-Ponty’s notion of sense or the neuroscientific theory of enactivism as supplements preserving embodiment and social communication while being more continuous. Finally, I examine some recent applications of Dewey’s naturalism and show how they modify this account of meaning.
Recommended Citation
Jackson, Harrison S. "The (Dis)Continuity of Meaning in John Dewey’s Experience and Nature." John Dewey’s Contemporary Continuities: Working Papers from the Center for Dewey Studies Essay Award 1 (Jun 2025): 75-91.