•  
  •  
 

Abstract

When a convicted defendant dies while her direct appeal is pending, federal courts today unanimously agree that the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio requires that the defendant’s conviction be “abated,” meaning the conviction is vacated and the case remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. But the courts have historically disagreed about what, exactly, is abated along with the conviction, particularly in the restitution context. Those focusing on the “punishment” rationale favor abating the conviction, but not any associated restitution payments, while those favoring the “finality” rationale argue that due process concerns require that restitution payments be abated along with it.

This view has the better argument. Part I examines the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio and its historical practice, the advent of the victim’s rights movement in the 1980s, and the subsequent passage of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). Part II identifies and discusses the circuit split in how to treat restitution in the abatement context, and in particular how federal courts have wrestled with the “finality” and “punishment” rationales that underpin the abatement doctrine. Finally, Part III argues that the recent Second and Fourth Circuit decisions, which relied on Nelson v. Colorado to abate restitution payments following the death of defendants appealing their criminal convictions, rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the defendant’s “right to appeal” and the civil nature of restitution payments. Once the text, history, and purpose of the MVRA are given proper consideration, it becomes clear that Congress has already spoken on this issue: While convictions should abate, restitution should not. New legislation, and new common law doctrine, are unnecessary. The statute controls.

Download

Share

COinS