Abstract
Heller has required courts to grapple with the interaction between Terry stops and the right to bear arms in public. Core questions are (i) whether reasonable suspicion a person is armed is by itself sufficient to initiate a Terry stop and (ii) if so, whether such a stop inherently authorizes an accompanying frisk. This Article focuses on the second issue; Royce de R. Barondes, Conditioning Exercise of Firearms Rights on Unlimited Terry Stops, 54 Idaho L. Rev. 297 (2018), examines the former. If the stop is justified as a mere inconvenience, it is inconsistent to conclude the stop inherently authorizes pointing a firearm at the subject. And if a subject is treated as armed and dangerous—the criterion for authorizing the frisk—courts typically hold the subject can be frisked with weapons drawn.
Additionally, sketching the number of Terry stops that would be added by stops of persons, not police officers, who carry firearms daily suggests there would be a substantial increase in the most hazardous Terry stops. The controversy generated by the recent level of Terry stops suggests a substantial benefit would be required in any balancing finding reasonable an increase in the stops. Yet prior Supreme Court authority indicates the benefits of which a court may take cognizance are limited to the possession and transport itself, and exclude remote consequences prevented by the stops.
Recommended Citation
Royce d. Barondes,
Automatic Authorization of Frisks in Terry Stops for Suspicion of Firearms Possession,
43
S. Ill. U. L.J.
1
(2018).
Available at:
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/siulj/vol43/iss1/1