Abstract
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court established that any finding that increases a defendant’s potential maximum sentence is an element of the offense that must be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that concept in Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court found Florida’s death-sentencing scheme, which required a judge rather than a jury to make the ultimate factual findings to impose a death sentence, unconstitutional. The Court held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.” Hurst did not, however, address whether its holding applies retroactively to death-sentenced individuals.
In federal-habeas review and some states’ post-conviction review processes, this inquiry centers on applying the federal-retroactivity analysis announced by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane. This Article argues Hurst is retroactive to all death-sentenced prisoners seeking post-conviction relief under Teague. First, this Article asserts Hurst is retroactive because Hurst’s holding included a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt issue—an issue the Supreme Court has traditionally applied retroactively. Second, the Court’s application of Teague to Miller v. Alabama in Montgomery v. Louisiana indicates that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to hold cases retroactive under Teague may be eroding or that the Court is considering retroactivity under a “contextual approach.”
Recommended Citation
Angela J. Rollins & Billy H. Nolas,
The Retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) to Death-Sentenced Prisoners on Collateral Review,
41
S. Ill. U. L.J.
181
(2017).
Available at:
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/siulj/vol41/iss2/1