Abstract
Even in the face of blatant jury misconduct that can result in an improper guilty verdict, the Federal Rules of Evidence, with few exceptions, prohibit testimony from a juror that such misconduct took place. Rule 606(b) specifically forbids such evidence, and the rule is seemingly based in a historic common law tradition.
Despite its lengthy tradition, history actually demonstrates that the rule embodied by Rule 606(b) is an anomaly that fails to comport with prior precedent and the holistic principles surrounding trial by jury. Furthermore, the policy of finality that supporters now use as the rationale for maintaining this rule at the cost of allowing blatant jury misconduct fails to find support in the common law tradition. As argued in this Article, Rule 606(b) should be amended to allow juror testimony of juror misconduct when such misconduct is not a part of the juror’s subjective deliberative process of reaching a verdict.
Recommended Citation
Andrew J. Hull,
Unearthing Mansfield’s Rule: Analyzing the Appropriateness of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) in Light of the Common Law Tradition,
38
S. Ill. U. L.J.
403
(2014).
Available at:
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/siulj/vol38/iss3/2