Abstract
In the wake of the financial crises and recessions of the new millennium, Congress realized it must take more action to avert future disasters. The Dodd-Frank Act provided the government with more oversight and tools to tackle new problems and securities violations. One of these tools was the Act’s whistleblower provisions, which provided monetary incentives to whistleblowers providing valuable inside information on violations in the financial sector.
This Article examines previous attempts by Congress to secure inside information from individuals as well as the Dodd-Frank Act’s own attempt. These prior attempts often created improper thresholds for whistleblowers, either barring good faith employees by setting too high a threshold or incentivizing bad faith employees to report minimal violations in hopes of garnering a quick bounty. This Article argues that, while the Dodd-Frank Act is a step in the right direction, more rules should be promulgated to ensure a proper threshold is created so that the government can obtain the inside information it needs while not promoting the self-interested actions of bad faith employees.
Recommended Citation
Neil Schonert,
A Fistful of Dollars: Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions,
36
S. Ill. U. L.J.
159
(2011).
Available at:
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/siulj/vol36/iss1/6