Abstract
Presidential historians, scholars of judicial appointments, and observers of the political process frequently point to the composition of the federal courts as an important legacy of any presidential administration. We argue here that several factors limit the ability of presidents to "remake" the federal judiciary in their image. In particular, we note that political factors, including composition of the Senate and the composition of any state's Senate delegation, as well as institutional factors, including new judgeships, the incentives judges face to remain in office or depart, are factors over which the president has, at best, limited influence, play a role in limiting the president's ability to shape the federal judiciary. Beyond these factors, the individual departure decisions of federal judges, over which the president has no direct control, also play a critical role in when vacancies are created which the president can fill. We explore the impact of these factors on the district courts of the Seventh Circuit and argue for a more limited reading of the president's ability to shape individual courts or the judiciary more broadly.
Recommended Citation
Kevin M. Scott & Rory S. Solberg,
Remaking the Bench: An Exercise in Futility?,
32
S. Ill. U. L.J.
493
(2008).
Available at:
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/siulj/vol32/iss3/2