Abstract
This paper focuses on decision making in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and focuses on a measure of statutory constraint to examine how much discretion Congress provides in the statutes it enacts into law. The basic argument is that ideological decision making by Seventh Circuit judges is contingent upon the level of discretion afforded by the law. The greater the level of discretion incorporated into a statute by Congress, the less constraint judges encounter when they decide cases; consequently the more likely those judges will be to vote according to their individual ideologies. Conversely, more detailed statutes will reduce the level of discretion afforded to judges, and consequently they will be constrained from voting ideologically. Using data on Seventh Circuit decisions from 1960 2002, the empirical results support the theoretical conceptualization of judicial behavior. If everything else is held equal, the judges will render decisions according to their ideological preferences. Yet, all things are not equal and the presence of legal factors, such as statutory constraint, limits the ability of some judges to rule ideologically. The findings also demonstrate that the presence of detailed statutory language can also facilitate the expression of ideological voting among other judges.
Recommended Citation
Kirk A. Randazzo,
Statutory Constraint on the Seventh Circuit: Examining Congressional Influence,
32
S. Ill. U. L.J.
683
(2008).
Available at:
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/siulj/vol32/iss3/13