ANIMAL RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.

BY E. P. POWELL.

The acknowledgement of property rights among animals is as defined as are their habits of thrift. If you have ever been familiar with bees you will have learned, not only that they are curiously industrious, but that their social laws are very distinct as to property. No bee dares to interfere with the products of another's labor. Fifty hives placed alongside include fifty distinct families, without a case of interference. But when there is a famine in the bee-land, a colony will organise a raid; and, rushing out with intense ferocity, will attack another hive, and either kill or be killed. When the invasion is successful, the honey of the destroyed family is carefully transferred to the hive of the robbers. In this case the occupants of the other hives do not interfere, but go on with their daily occupations. The sting of a bee during one of these battles is peculiarly poisonous. I was myself nearly killed by a sting of this sort some years ago. It created a torpor and then an eruption over the whole body. The raids of this sort seem to be recognised by the bees as legitimate under stress of special hunger. But it is also true that the hives assaulted are weak ones, and probabilities are carefully taken into account. The bee-keeper, when a robbery is indicated by a vicious noise, instantly removes the hive that is attacked to a distance. Such wars, it is possible, may have a basis of provocation, hard to detect. But in either case we see that possession of property is recognised as giving a natural right; and that bees will not interfere with the established right, unless driven by extreme hunger, or possibly a cause not discoverable. The exceptions are few and rare. The open hive is slightly guarded; the owners are busy producers, without fear of marauders.

The bee stands in this respect as a fair example of a general acknowledgement of property rights among other creatures. If you have happened to brush against a dwarfed thorn-bush, or other plant on which green aphid is feeding in August, you have most probably been instantly assaulted by a number of ants. These belong to a black variety that in general is extremely peaceable and timorous. But in this one case they rush at you in a state of excitement, and bite with ferocious malignity. The fact is, you have come upon a bit of private property. These aphides are "ant-cows"; and, wherever found, are taken possession of by the ants and very highly prized. A sweet juice exudes from their sides, which the ants eat with avidity. Sometimes the glands are pressed by their mandibles to compel the exudation. These aphides are not seldom kept and fed by ants. You have intruded accidentally on ant property and broken ant-law. The severe punishment inflicted would be visited on any creature that had happened in your place. The recognition of property rights is exactly the same as with bees. Robbery is a recognised institution, but its existence establishes the full recognition of the rights of ownership.

Dogs and cats recognise all property as common, until in use, or in cache. When a piece of meat is once under a cat's paw, it does not matter that she is the weaker, her right of possession becomes a moral right, and will be recognised. The same is largely true of dogs; but peaceable possession is more often to be determined by a fight. Between dogs and cats the same idea of right holds. I had a curious instance recently; having set down a dish of milk and bread to my collie, she declined to touch it. But, noticing her distaste, I lifted the dish, and set it down before one of the cats, two feet away. The cat no sooner sniffed it than the collie, with an ominous growl, leaped after her property. She did not wish to eat it, but she, for the present, owned it. Even I had no rights over it. Do these domestic animals learn from us these notions of possession as the measure of property? I think not; for we do not hold them of many things. At the table, to be sure, we have a special claim over what has been placed on our plates. We have a special right of a temporary sort to tools in use. Communism is just along the edge of our individualism; but there is clearly a distinct feline sentiment displayed when three cats jump for a single tidbit, and evidently consider it open to all, until the teeth or claw of one is well in the piece of meat; when it is claimed with a defiant growl, and all the rest withdraw quietly, even though stronger.

If you look in your barn-yard for a verification of this principle you will find it greatly modified, or ab-
sent altogether. There is absolute communism in a flock of hens; only the cocks claim property rights. This is asserted, not only over the hens, but over food. The family moves in this case together. Food is grabbed for by each one, without the least consideration of any other. The sick are robbed, and picked, and kicked out of existence. This is the primitive human family in some respects, and seems to show the patriarchal system as fowls would have it. But occasionally individualism manifests itself. I saw a curious case in a small black top-knot hen some years ago. She assumed special rights to go with me into the corn house for rations, and these rights she enforced against much heavier fowls. On one occasion a stout bullying hen seized a mouthful from the tip of the bill of my little black friend. She immediately took in the situation. Retiring behind a wagon-wheel, she watched eagerly that insulting enemy. At last the foe's head came just in line, and quick as a flash the small hen flew out, and gave it a sound kick with both heels, and then, talking proudly, and with a satisfied air, went on with her dinner.

Cows, as near as I can discover, recognise no rights of property whatever, beyond what is enforced by strength; horses do. They are still fully in the communal state, accustomed to feeding at large, wherever pasturage can be secured. They will recognise slightly their own mangers, but have next to no regard for their neighbors' rights. The bull is the only individual. Horses, on the contrary, assert and allow quite a degree of property in possession. I have a very plain, quiet mare who will allow no one to meddle with her oats after they are once inside her stall. But she has her friendships; and some years ago would allow a pet sheep to jump into her manger and eat with her; each taking a mouthful, and then withdrawing the head for the other.

Spencer limits a dog's idea of property to a tangible object, like a coat or hat; but I have carefully tested the capacity of different animals to judge of the limits of my property, and of our associate rights. The dog, the horse, the cat, easily distinguish such property limits. I reside in the middle of nine acres. On some sides the fences have been entirely removed and there are no hedges there. But my horse, allowed to feed loosely about, respects the boundaries; unless tempted by the shortness of home forage. She is capable of temptation, but will course the nine acres, among hedges, gardens, shrubbery, with a degree of knowledge and honesty that is up to the average human. So it is with my collie. She has recognition of every boundary of my property; but never considers the highway in any sense unlike the human conception of it. My neighbor's hound had less intelligent recognition of limits when young, but has learned great accuracy as to his personal range and the limit of his duties. Who shall say that these creatures never think over these matters? When watching with defiance an intrusion, and resenting it, what is the operation of the dog's brain?

The blunders made in handling data, by as good authorities as Herbert Spencer, are often misleading. Undertaking to base morals on animal actions, he tells us that for a hen which refuses to sit upon eggs we have a feeling of aversion. Suppose Mr. Spencer were informed that we have purposely bred hens to be non-setters; that, economically, it is one of the highest achievements of poulterers to have secured the Leghorn, who will rarely attend to maternity? Again he says a dog which surrenders its bone to another without a struggle we call a coward, a word of reprobation. Yet I have repeatedly seen animals yielding the possession of acknowledged property evidently from motives very unlike cowardice. I had a cat that would not eat from a dish of milk until its mate was hunted up to eat with him. This was not owing to fear, because it was the stronger of the two. In more cases than one, I have seen cats bring mice or birds to younger cats, not their own kittens. I had a huge Maltese, who did not refuse to let a smaller cat take away some of his prey. This was not fear nor cowardice, but generosity and largeness of spirit. It was not apparently unlike the dog-sentiment that refuses to fight with a smaller animal. But at times the quiet dignity with which he yielded a mouse seemed to say, "I am so much more capable, and able, and strong, I can afford to be taxed for the community." I am not concerned about the ethical laws derived by Mr. Spencer from this presentation of data, but with the animal idea of property alone. I am sure not only of the recognition of property rights, but that these rights of possession are often waived for altruistic and communistic motives. "Justice," as we would term it, gives way to "humanity." The effect of such action on animals and animal life, if it could be conserved and taken advantage of, would be the evolution of advanced animal morals. In fact, we have something of this sort going on: for our admiration of a noble cat or dog is pretty sure to add to its days, while a clawing, selfish creature is equally sure to be hated, and probably killed. The result will not, in all cases, be to secure the survival of the fittest as dogs and cats, but the fittest as companions to human beings. The extent to which this moral selection has gone is shown in the fact that faithless wolves have given us a progeny that is above all faithful. The same is true of other animals.

Communal property underlies and precedes individual property, but it also follows the same. So we shall be exceedingly interested, if we can find among
lower creatures a large degree, or any degree, of associated property rights. Your mind reverts readily to the bees and ants. The storage of the squirrels and beavers is also largely of the same character. But we are not accustomed to look for anything of this kind among larger animals. The cat that gives her mouse away is evidently sympathetic, but does not recognise property as vested in her friend, without gift. A friend of mine tells me of a dog she knew that was peculiarly pugnacious, and especially allowed no other dogs near his kennel. One day he appeared with a very lame dog, which he led to his kennel, and kept there for several days, digging up his caches of food, and taking it freely to the invalid. Here is a recognition, as in the previous case of the cat, of a right over and above property possession: the duty of sharing property with the helpless. But this is individualism, and not communism, you say. It is the communitarian or socialistic development of individualism. It is sharing, not because all have a common right in the property by nature, but because they have a claim in ethics. This stage of sharing is slowly, very slowly, developed out of and beyond human individualism. Our communal stage was the common trough, common hall, common tools, common land, and in such communism the weaker went to the wall when there was a lack of abundance. Individualism looks forward to a claim of the weaker on our strength, our health, our wealth. It finally defines itself ethically in the Golden Rule. Its god is found in the poorest of our neighbors. Piety is neighborliness. This evolution of individualism is a necessity. A grand individual is grand only in his capacity to share. Socially the better must care for the worse; the stronger for the weaker. Our whole State system as well as Church system moves onward toward humanity, fellowship, unity, co-operation, internationalism, fraternalism. It is not without much pleasure that we find this ethical communism in animals. I have an authenticated report of a gander that took to a blind horse and accompanied him all day, leading him to the best pasturage and to water.

RELIGION IN JAPAN.
BY C. PFOUNDES.

Buddhism in Japan is too firmly implanted amongst the vast mass of forty odd millions of people to be lightly brushed away. With experience of official responsibility and the cares of government under the new transient conditions, wiser counsels prevailed; many of the best men of the old régime came into office, and a superior class of clansmen appeared in the van of the restoration, desiring progress and the betterment of their country. The power of the priesthood was felt and recognised, and whilst in politics their interference was very properly prohibited, the value of their good-will was felt. Mischiefous meddling ceased, and the people were left to follow their own inclinations, home or foreign, Shinto or Christian, Buddhist or what not.

Whilst individual foreign missionaries have made friends and gained some influence, yet as a body they are not held in high esteem. Their relations with the foreign colonics at the treaty ports, which consist of persons of many nations and various degrees of education, are not so cordial as to lead the natives to suppose that the class from which missionaries are recruited are held in high respect in their own lands.

At the same time the natives that visit the missionaries see something of foreign domestic life. The tone of the homes, the comfortable houses, the family relations of the Protestant missionaries, all contrast with the comparative wretchedness of the native home life (of the lower classes), and excites the envy of those who cannot imitate it. The missionaries' wives and their female domestics work in the girls' schools, gain some influence, and do some good in teaching the future wives and mothers and in busying themselves with match-making between the young people supposed to be favorably inclined towards Christianity.

With the aid of schools, medical mission work, and other institutions, numbers of foreign missionaries, representing many different sects of Christianity from various parts of Europe and America, still reside, on sufferance, throughout the islands.

"The bread cast upon the waters" does not always return; the seed spread broadcast does not give the harvest desired, more often bearing fruit other than that intended, for the native students have their own ideas and ways of applying what is presented to them.

One result is a reaction and consequent activity amongst the Buddhists, and a growing desire not to be left behind in the competition.

Out of the chaos of indigenous and foreign religious and philosophical literature perused, new ideas arise; no foreigner can foresee the end, and no two Japanese agree as to the ultimate outcome of it all. The "smart" writer or lecturer of the day is followed by another who, in his turn, gains transient notoriety.

The indigenous cultus, Shintoism and Buddhism, as modified by the Japanese during the dozen or more centuries of its existence in the country, are still closely allied and together form a very solid foundation for any superstructure of the future. Buddhism, in its entirety as a system, lends itself readily to the course of events from age to age, so that in the future there is no doubt of its adaptation to the needs, aspirations, and sentiments of the people.

With the proper education of carefully selected aspirants for sacerdotal office, a generation or so would
produce great advances in liberality and would regulate objectionable features to the limbo of oblivion.

There is a special feature of Japanese Buddhism that is unique and of sufficient importance to warrant notice, the more so as it probably forms an important factor of the future.

The Jodo Shin Shu sect, the new Jodo, now called Shin, or true, sect, consisting of several branches, the East and West, the Butsu-koji, Takada, and Koshoji, with several other smaller sects, include a large percentage of the temples and followers of Buddhism in Japan. Office is practically hereditary; failing male issue, a husband is adopted for the daughter, being almost invariably selected from the same order, to fill vacancies. As numerous progeny is common, many lay-families, well-to-do farmers and traders, by inter-marriage become closely related, and the position of incumbents in the temples of the sect occupy a somewhat parallel social position to the Church of England parson in aristocratic old England, where "blood is thicker than water," and family ties mean "taking care of Dowb."

Whatever objections there may exist, to a hereditary sacerdotal class, whether from the Asiatic, foreign, Christian, or Buddhist standpoint the facts still remain, that the greater respectability of the Shin-shu incumbents, their social position, family ties, and consequent greater influence are important points not to be lost sight of.

In other sects, scions of noble lineage, are "settled," and too numerous offspring of those by birth "near the throne," are got rid of and future legitimate offspring checked, by placing these, male and female, in the monasteries of one or other of the celibate sects, a policy that also binds the priesthood of these sects to the reigning dynasty.

In the Shin-shu the noble offspring of both sexes are adopted into or married to the heads of the sect or sub-sect, thus adding to the prestige thereof; and the children, when numerous, are "settled out" in the principal monasteries, the incumbents thus being linked by family ties.

The personal interest in the temple, the congregation, and the neighborhood is thus very strong, and continuous from parent to child; practical freedom from anxiety as to old age is removed and entire devotion to the sect secured.

The very best results may be hoped in the future from the young men of this sect, notwithstanding its sectarian narrowness and limitations of creed; the very simplicity of which makes it acceptable to the illiterate class of toilers, the laborer, agriculturist, etc., and popular.

The best and truest friends of Buddhism in general, and of this sect in particular, will do well to get a good knowledge of all the objections that may be advanced against the hereditary system, and to spread it as widely as possible amongst the future incumbents of office, so that one and all may carefully avoid those characteristics that arouse hostile feeling and give ground for antagonistic criticism, all of which readers of The Open Court are familiar with. Because a youth is sure to succeed his father upon death or retirement in old age, that is no reason he should be dilatory in his studies; or that he should "give himself" airs as a "person of superior birth," or look upon his position as a sinecure to which it has been his good fortune to be born, and therefore "take things easy" and go through his duties and the routine services in a half-hearted perfunctory spirit.

The sect has established schools; and sent some of its people abroad to study at a very considerable cost. These number among them such well known and scholarly names as B. Nanjio, M. A. Oxon., R. Akamatsu, and many others, through whose efforts the study of Sanskrit is, after many centuries, again being taken up in Japan.

Japan is undoubtedly at present the most important Buddhist centre; and in the future may become to Buddhism what Rome was to Christianity. As Japan has not suffered by foreign conquest as other lands have, Ceylon etc. for instance, the Buddhism received from the mainland still remains intact; the oldest temples still exist; and the teaching is yet unchanged and unalloyed. And as the bonzes are intellectually the superiors of those in other countries and far better taught, we may look upon the future as hopeful if proper attention be given to the education of the youths destined to become the officiating clergy in the temples and homes of the people.

In Japan may be seen "the meeting of the waters" from the east and from the west—the old and the new. Asiatic, Aryan, and Turanian, the European and later the American; education, science, philosophy, and religion.

America, too, has become the common meeting-ground for all the aspirations and ideals of the old civilisation and the progressive practical ideas of the new, as shown in its liberalism in religion and in its recent congresses. The general feeling is, to glean from all, to gather from all sources. The echo, and the counter echoes, east to west, and west to east resound about the globe. And who shall gainsay the truth that we can teach and learn, and impart fresh energy to the old that reciprocates by giving us the old-time wisdom; like ballast for the clipper, so that more canvas may be spread and more rapid progress attained. The platform has been made free to the Asiatic, Buddhist, Hindu, and Mohammedan alike; the pulpit is open to all, and every one who has a mes-
sage to deliver and is competent to set it forth, may do so. And nevermore can platform or pulpit be closed; hereafter it will be the narrow sectarian, the little-minded bigot, the pitiable fanatic alone who shall refuse the open hand of fellowship to all alike. And in the near future the true, liberal Buddhist, when weighed in the balance will not be found wanting.

**NAMES.**

"What's in a name?"—Shakespeare.

"In verbis sinum facile, dummodo conveniant in re."—Latin Proverb.

"In verbis sinum difficiles, ut conveniant in re."—Latin Proverb.

**ABOUT three months ago, Mr. John Maddock of Minneapolis sent me for publication in The Open Court a letter which accidentally remained unnoticed. My attention was only recently called to it by Mr. Maddock’s inquiry, whether or not I was willing to publish it. Finding that the letter contains a criticism of an editorial remark made in reply to a former letter of his, I deem it proper, for the sake of justice, to publish this belated rejoinder. The issues raised by Mr. Maddock deserve an elaborate discussion, for they involve principles of great importance.**

**This is the letter:**

"You say, ‘Names are not as definite as Mr. Maddock seems to think.’ If not, then what are we going to do in order to ‘develop Christianity and lead it on in the path of progress’? What form of Christianity must we develop? I can readily understand how you can stand for a religion of science and accept truths expressed by atheism, Buddhism, ‘modest agnosticism,’ and Christianity, but I fail to see how you can stand for truth and yet be called by another name. How can we ‘make it easy to our brothers who are lagging behind to reach truth,’ if we indulge in such confusion of words? Our brothers—atheists, agnostics, and unbelievers, so called—though no more so than millions who profess to know—are continually asking, ‘What is Christianity?’ Now would it not be just for a religion of science to give them a true definition of it, instead of taking the position that names need not be definite?

"You have had the courage and manliness to launch forth, in this age of conflict, a religion of science with truth for authority; and have been generous enough to invite criticism. How are we going to have a ‘correct, complete, invariable, and comprehensive statement of facts,’ if different things can be labelled alike? If truth is to be authority, we must have truthful labels for all things. There is a vast difference between allowing all men a right to their own opinions (which I do) and in allowing that all opinions can be labelled as truth. If Christianity is something definite, I cannot, from the position of truth for authority, conscientiously allow a Calvinist to take the name of Christian in a matter of doctrine. Such a one is simply a Calvinist. If some people have forged the name of Christ ‘to deceive many,’ it is the bounden duty of the assembly of science to expose the fallacy, not to bolster it up. It is a distinction between Christianity and all the isms (that possess the forgery) that this inquiring and demanding age demands, and must have, before there can be further progress. Instead of labelling our brothers ‘who are lagging behind’ atheists, agnostics, and unbelievers, it is our solemn duty to give them definitions which are clear and comprehensive. I respect-

fully ask, (though it is unpleasant to do so,) does the founder of the religion of science shrink from giving a clear-cut definition of Christianity? Washington must cross the Delaware in this regard. The assembly of science must have a solid place for its feet; it must have a truthful label; it cannot logically stand upon an indefinite definition. It is the absence of a fundamental truth (and this clears every man’s skirts of unbelief) which makes the atheist, the agnostic, and the unbeliever possible. The religion of science cannot be a witness for itself. There must be corroboration.”

"JOHN MADDOCK.

"P. S.—The ‘bruised reeds’ must be broken, ‘the smoking flax’ of this age must be fanned into life, so that truth will shine victoriously.

J. M.”

In the editorial note made in No. 369 of The Open Court in reply to Mr. Maddock’s letter, "The Names of the Disciples of Truth," I said:

"Names are not as definite as Mr. Maddock seems to think," but I did not say as he paraphrases my opinion:

"Names need not be definite.”

For, on the contrary, I believe in making names as definite as possible.

Mr. Maddock challenges me:

"I respectfully ask, (though it is unpleasant to do so,) does the founder of the religion of science shrink from giving a clear-cut definition of Christianity? Washington must cross the Delaware in this regard. The assembly of science must have a solid place for its feet; it must have a truthful label; it cannot logically stand upon an indefinite definition.”

Mr. Maddock’s request would be in place if I had proclaimed any intention of preaching Christianity; but as I have never attempted to do so, I do not understand why I shall be bound to define it any more than I should define Buddhism, or Confucianism, or anything else. I must confess that I do not understand the pertinence of the question in its relation to the “solid place for the feet of the assembly of science.” There are more than three hundred million Christians now living in the world, and it is an imposibility to make them agree on a definition of the essentials of their faith. All I can do is not to take the definition of the majority as binding and allow all of them the freedom of their conscience.

If Mr. Maddock wants to know whether or not I call myself a Christian in the sense in which the name is commonly used, I say ‘No; I am not a Christian. I am neither a member of any Christian church, nor do I believe that the Christian Scriptures are either the sole or an infallible guide to truth.”

Nevertheless, I reserve my right to call myself a Christian, or a Buddhist, or a Freethinker, or anything else, if these various names are not used in a sense that is exclusive. I have no objection to being called a Christian, because certain ideas or habits, commonly regarded as typically Christian, have become part of my soul, provided I may at the same time be entitled to call myself a Buddhist, or a Freethinker, or a Kantian, or an Aristotelian, or what not.
The label which I have adopted for my religion is not Christianity, but the Religion of Science, and I have laid down my definitions without equivocation in editorial articles as well as in other publications, especially The Primer of Philosophy, The Religion of Science, Homilies of Science, and The Ethical Problem.

Mr. Maddock's zeal for the name of truth and his hostility toward any other name that might contain either an aspiration after the truth or a pretense of its possession, implies, in my opinion, a great danger—the danger of narrowness. The Religion of Science should be broad, its representatives must be just towards others, and the movement ought to come as a fulfilment of all religious aspirations, not as their destruction.

My whole contention, made in my discussion with Messrs. Martin, Thurtell, and Maddock, has been and is still that the name "Christian" is used in various senses, and the right or wrong usage of the name depends upon the meaning which is attached to it. We have no right to brand a Unitarian who has ceased to believe in miracles and in the Godhead of Jesus as either inconsistent or a hypocrite for calling himself a Christian, because we happen to define Christianity forsooth as "a belief in the supernatural."

Mr. Maddock asks:

"How are we going to have a correct... statement of facts, if different things can be labelled alike?"

I do not say that different things should be labelled alike, but the fact is they are sometimes labelled alike by many different people, and our endeavor must be to understand what people mean. Not the words and names lead to truth, but a right comprehension. Nothing is gained by calling ourselves disciples of Truth, or adherents of the Religion of Science, if we do not know what truth is and how it can be acquired. Nor is any harm done by calling ourselves disciples of Christ, Buddha, Plato, or anybody else, if we trust that our selected master represents and teaches the truth—unvarnished and pure. A Calvinist calls himself a Christian, because he trusts not only that Calvin's interpretation of Christianity is correct but also that Christianity is the truth. Why shall we not give credit for honest intentions to people who differ from us?

When I meet old-fashioned orthodox Christians I always have trouble in convincing them that Freethinkers are honest about their convictions; and when I meet Freethinkers I again find a deep-seated suspicion that all religious people are hypocrites. I wish to state here for the benefit of Freethinkers that I have not as yet met a serious Christian who did not honestly believe his sectarian conception of Christianity to be the truth.

So much about the unequivocal right of everybody to call himself a Christian or a Mohammedan, as he thinks best, and to define his creed by stating what he regards as its most essential doctrine.

Our own advice for the use of names is to employ them appropriately as the case may be but always in such a way that no ambiguity can arise. The word "Christian" as defined by the dictionaries means:

1. "A believer in and followor of Jesus Christ; a member of a Christian Church.

2. "One who exemplifies in his life the teachings of Christ.

3. "A member of a nation which as a whole has adopted some form of Christianity.

4. "A civilized human being as distinguished from a savage or a brute" [Colloq., Eng.].

Such are the commonly adopted definitions of the word Christian. Mr. Maddock is no Christian according to definition 1, but he is unequivocally a Christian according to definition 3. I grant that definition 4 is an imposition, which, however, is not without a flavor of humor.

When the pious monk in Lessing's grand drama of Nathan the Wise hears the story of the Jew, he exclaims:

"Nathan, you are a Christian."

And Nathan very appropriately replies:

"That which makes me to you a Christian, makes you to me a Jew."

Subhadra Bhikshu, the author of a Buddhist Catechism, writes:

"Whoever lives according to the Buddha doctrine is a Buddhist whether or not he belongs to a Buddhist congregation."

Who will deny that what to the Buddhist is specifically Buddhist, to the Jew, Jewish, and to the Christian, Christian, is much more alike than most of them imagine?

To properly define Christianity and to distinguish the essential from the accidental is a task which has been done over and over again by every generation, and to give a fair exposition of the red thread which connects all the various definitions and of the causes which govern their changes, would be to write a history of Christianity. The language which we use is not made by us, by you or by me, or by any single man; but it is inherited, and the usage of names is but one small part of language. The name Christian has not been chosen by the various individual Christians of to-day, but has been received by tradition. The first Christians called themselves "disciples," by which name they meant nothing short of what Mr. Maddock calls "disciples of truth." The name Christian, first used in Antioch (Acts xi, 26), was a nickname which was proudly adopted, as the outlawed Dutch when rebelling against Spanish oppression accepted the contemptuous name Gueuses (beggars), or as freethinkers of to-day call themselves infidels (the faithless).

Every Christian philosopher has tried his hand at the
problem of what constitutes the fundamental truth that called Christianity into existence, and their endeavors together with the changes they wrought in the minds of the Christian peoples are the material of what we call the evolution of Christianity. Any one who takes the trouble to study the history of Christianity will find that it has grown and developed as a child does from infancy into boyhood and youth; that there is a continued aspiration which is a yearning for truth with definite moral ideals, such as an all-comprehensive charity including the love of enemies and a readiness of resigning personal ambition and worldly pleasures. This evolution of Christianity is not as yet at an end but continues. The truth is, the same evolution takes place in all other religions, and all of them develop with more or less consciousness of their aim toward the common goal of a Religion of Science.

Herder, himself a prominent Christian clergyman in Germany (he was Superintendent-General of the Lutheran Church in the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar), said of Christianity in his "Ideas for the History of Mankind" that it appeared at once with the pretension of being a cosmic religion, but contained at the time of its origin many ingredients which had to be discarded. It went slowly through all the stages of childhood, barbarism, idolatry, and sensuality, it became more and more matured, but we have as yet seen only the beginning of its career. He says:

"The doctrine of Christianity must become like a clear stream, which precipitates and deposits all those national and particular opinions which cling to it like sediments held in its waters. Thus the first Apostles of Christianity dropped their Jewish prejudices when they prepared the idea of the Gospel for all the nations; and this purification of Christianity must be continued in this century. Many forms have been broken; others will have to go too, not through external violence but through an inner thriving germ."

What is commonly called the Christian civilisation is the sum total of the culture produced by those nations who have adopted Christianity and recognise Jesus Christ as their teacher and moral authority. Mr. Maddock is as much as I myself and all freethinkers a product of this so-called Christian civilisation, and we can as little cut loose from it as from our physical ancestry. We cannot begin the world over again but must continue the work of the civilisation at the point on which we stand. It will be wise to mind the lesson of Goethe's poem, who, on analysing his own personality, finds that personality consists of tradition. He says:

"Would from tradition free myself,  
Original I'd be!  
Yet great the undertaking is  
And trouble it heaps on me."

"Were I indigenous, I should  
Consider the honor high,  
But strange enough! 'Tis the truth,  
Tradition myself am I."

Christianity contains still great possibilities, and I for one am not as yet prepared to regard it as dead simply because it does not grow with the rapidity which Mr. Maddock's and my own impatience requires. If I see Christians endeavoring to purify their Christianity, I do not feel that their undertaking is hopeless because, as some freethinkers think, Christianity is in its very nature bigotry and superstition, but I tell them what their Christianity must be in order to be the Religion of Truth. I tell them, to denounce science is irreligious, for science is the method of finding the truth; science is holy, and if there is any revelation that is trustworthy, it is the revelation of science.

When Mr. Maddock asks, "What forms of Christianity must we develop?" I reply, "We must encourage all aspirations of scientific inquiry. The light of science will purify Christianity, for science is the furnace in which the ore is melted, so as to separate the dross of error from the pure gold of truth; and I hope that Mr. Maddock is not blind to the facts, first, that Christianity contains many seeds of truth and noble aspirations, and, secondly, that there are innumerable Christians who search for the truth in an honest spirit, and they will find it. I only remind the reader of the noble-hearted band of scholars who represent what is commonly called the Higher Bible Criticism. If some searchers for truth express the truth in the language which tradition imposes upon them, while others break loose from tradition and declare that they can no longer call themselves Christians, who will blame them? Not I, for one.

The two Latin maxims which are placed as mottoes at the head of this article seem to contradict one another, and yet they are both good rules, and it is quite possible to obey both at the same time. The one is: In verbis simus faciles dummodo convenientius in re. The other: In verbis simus difficiles, ut convenientius in re. In English: "Don't let us quarrel about words if we but agree in substance," and "Let us carefully weigh our words, so that in the end we may agree in substance."

These two maxims are good principles to guide us in our investigation of truth and in the comparison of our own views with those of others. On the one hand, we must be scrupulously exact when defining the words which we use and also when recapitulating or discussing the propositions of others; we must never lose sight of the meaning which the speaker intends to convey. On the other hand, we must not be sticklers for words, or peculiar definitions of words; for very frequently those who use the same words agree by no means as to the substance of their respective propositions, while others, whose nomenclature or methods of presentation varies, may very well be of the same
opinion, and would at once join hands, if each one took the trouble to translate the other's modes of speech into his own language.

THE SECRET OF SUCCESS.

Sir Edwin Arnold attributes the triumph of the Japanese in the present war to their religion. The Chicago Evening Journal quotes from an article of his in the Chautauqua the following passage:

"Sir Edwin Arnold attributes the triumph of Japan to her religion. In the fortunes of the present war the world beholds—if it will look deeper than to what satisfies shallow critics—the immense significance of leading national ideas. We have suddenly found ourselves gazing upon a prodigious collision between powers founded on Confucianism and Buddhism respectively—since behind the disgraceful defeat of the troops and ships of Peking are the unspirituality, narrowness, and selfishness of the old agnosticism's philosophy; while behind the success of Japan are the glad and lofty tenets of a modified Buddhist metaphysic, which has mingled with Shintoism to breed reverence for the past, to inculcate and to produce patriotism, loyalty, fearlessness of death, with happiness in life, and above all, self-respect. It is this last quality which is the central characteristic of the Japanese men and women, and round about which grow up what those who do not love the gentle and gallant race called "vanity," and many other foibles and faults. Self-respect, which Buddhism teaches to every one, and which Confucius never taught, makes the Japanese as a nation keep their personal honor—except perhaps in business affairs—as clean as they keep their bodies; and has helped to give them the placid and polite life, full of grace, of charm, and of refinement, which contrasts so strongly with the ill-regulated, struggling existence of the average Chinese. Self-respect—nizubora amonzeru—has also largely given them their brilliant victories of this year; that temper of high manhood which Confucianism has taken away, by its cold and changeless disbelief, from the otherwise capable, clever and indescribable Chinamen."

"In a word, the picture passing before our eyes of unbroken success on one side and helpless feellessness and failure on the other—which was numerically the stronger—is a lesson for the West as well as the beginning of a new era in the East. It teaches trumpet-tongued, how nations depend upon the inner national life, as the individual does upon his personal vitality."

The doctrine of anatman which is the denial of the metaphysical soul-entity naturally makes mankind ready to accept new ideas. In peace it favors progress and in war it makes men more courageous.

CORRESPONDENCE.

INDIA AND JAPAN.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I read with great pleasure Mr. Nobuta Kishimoto's letter relating to the present war between Japan and China, published in your Open Court, Nov. 1. We Hindus are taking great interest in the affairs of Japan—the Great Britain of Asia. The progress the Japanese nation has made, in so short a time, is quite startling. The Japanese people have set one of the grandest lessons to the world in the history of civilization in this their present war. We are eager to learn something more about their history of national progress than what we have already learned from stray newspaper articles. The people here greatly appreciated Mr. Kishimoto's articles on Buddhism which appeared from time to time in The Open Court. We Hindus take great interest in Japan's national improvement, we admire them, and our sympathies are with them in this present war; and we eagerly look into the daily papers for fresh news. There is no paper in India which is not admiring the Japanese.

KEDARNATH BASU.