SUFFRAGE A NATURAL RIGHT.
BY ELIZABETH CADY STANTON.

The significance of suffrage and the power of the ballot have been idealized by statesman, poet, and artist alike, each in his own way. In the heated discussions on the enfranchisement of the Southern Freedmen, Charles Sumner, on the floor of the Senate, said:

"The ballot is the Columbiad of our political life, and every citizen who holds it is a full-armed monitor."

In the early days of the anti-slavery and temperance struggles, in urging reformers to use their political power at the polls to accomplish their objects, the Rev. John Pierpont said of the ballot:

"A weapon that comes down as still
As snow-flakes fall upon the sod;
But executes a freeman's will
As lightning does the Will of God."

At the birth of the third French Republic, in one of the open squares in Paris a monument was raised to commemorate the advent of universal suffrage. The artist had carved various designs and mottoes on three sides of the shaft, and on the fourth stood a magnificient lion, his paw on the ballot-box, with a sphinx-like questioning look as to the significance of this new departure in government. He seemed to say, the sacred rights of humanity represented here I shall faithfully guard against all encroachments while the Republic stands.

In our Republic to-day the social, civil, political, and religious rights of sixty-five millions of people all centre in the ballot-box, not guarded by a royal lion, but by the grand declarations of American statesmen at the foundation of our Government. In their inspired moments they sent their first notes of universal freedom echoing round the globe in these words: "All men are created equal." "All just governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed." "Taxation without representation is tyranny."

These are not glittering generalities, high-sounding platitudes with no practical significance, but eternal truths, on the observance of which depend the freedom of the citizen and the stability of the State. The right of suffrage is simply the right to govern one's self, to protect one's person and property by law. While individual rights, individual conscience and judgment are the basic principles of our republican government and Protestant religion, singularly enough some leading politicians talk of restricting the suffrage, and even suggest that we turn back the wheels of progress by repealing the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, that charter of new liberties, irrespective of race, color, and previous condition of servitude. It is well for such as these to consider the origin of rights.

In the early history of the race, when every man exercised his natural right of self-protection with the free use of the sling and the bow and arrow, it would have been the height of tyranny to deprive him of the rude weapons so necessary for his defence. It is equally cruel in civilised government to deprive the citizen of the ballot, his only weapon of self-defence against unjust laws and self-constituted rulers.

In the inauguration of government, when men made compacts for mutual protection and surrendered the rude weapons used when each one was a free lance, they did not surrender the natural right to protect themselves and their property by laws of their own making, they simply substituted the ballot for the bow and arrow.

Would any of these gentlemen who think universal suffrage a blunder be willing to surrender his right, and henceforth be subject to the popular will, without even the privilege of a protest?

Does any thoughtful man really believe that he has a natural right to deprive another of the means of self-protection, and that he has the wisdom to govern individuals and classes better than they can govern themselves? England's experiment with Ireland, Russia with Poland, the Southern States with Africans, the Northern States with women, all prove the impossibility of one class legislating with fairness for another.

The bitter discontent and continued protests of all these subject classes, are so many emphatic denials of the right of one man to govern another without his consent. Forbidden by law to settle one's own quarrels with the rude weapons of savage life, and denied their substitute in civilisation, the position of the citizen is indeed helpless, with his rights of person and property wholly at the mercy of others.

Such is the real position of all citizens who are denied the right of suffrage. They may have favors
granted them, they may enjoy many privileges, but they cannot be said to have any sacred rights.

But we are told that disfranchisement does not affect the position of women, because they are bound to the governing classes by all the ties of family, friendship, and love, by the affection, loyalty, and chivalry that every man owes his mother, sister, wife, and daughter. Her rights of person and property must be as safe in his hands as in her own. Does woman need protection from the men of her own family?

Let the calendars of our courts and the columns of our daily papers answer the question. The disfranchisement of woman is a terrible imputation of the loyalty and chivalry of every man in this nation. How few have ever penned one glowing period, or cast one vote for woman’s emancipation.

Speaking of class-legislation, George William Curtis said:

"There is no class of citizens, and no single citizen, who can safely be intrusted with the permanent and exclusive possession of political power. It is as true of men as a class, as it is of an hereditary nobility, or of a class of property-holders. Men are not wise enough, nor generous enough, nor pure enough to legislate fairly for women. The laws of the most civilized nations depress and degrade women. The legislation is in favor of the legislating class."

Buckle, in his "History of Civilization," says:

"There is no instance on record of any class possessing power without abusing it."

And even if all men were wise, generous, and honorable, possessed of all the cardinal virtues, it would still be better for women to govern themselves, to exercise their own capacities and powers in assuming the responsibilities of citizenship.

Whenever and wherever the right of suffrage has not proved beneficial, it has not been because the citizen had too many rights, but because he did not know how to use them for his own advantage.

We are continually pointed to the laboring masses and the Southern Freedmen to show the futility of suffrage. If our campaign orators in all the elections would educate the masses in the principles of political economy, instead of confusing them with clap-trap party politics, they would better understand their true interests and vote accordingly. Instead of repealing the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, multiply schools, teachers, lecturers, preachers in the South and protect the freedman in the exercise of his rights. Our mistake in the South, when we had the power, was not in securing to the blacks their natural rights, but in not holding those States as Territories until the whites understood the principles of republican government and the blessings of individual freedom for others as well as themselves.

George William Curtis says:

"There is no audacity so insolent, no tyranny so wanton, as the spirit which says to any human being, or to any class of human beings, 'you shall be developed just as far as we choose, and as fast as we choose, and your mental and moral life shall be subject to our pleasure!""

John Stuart Mill says:

"There ought to be no pariahs in a full-grown and civilized nation; no persons disqualified except through their own default. . . . . Every one is degraded, whether aware of it or not, when other people, without consulting him, take upon themselves unlimited power to regulate his destiny. No arrangement of the suffrage, therefore, can be permanently satisfactory in which any person or class is peremptorily excluded; in which the electoral privilege is not open to all persons of full age who desire it."

The distinctions lexicographers make between the elective franchise and suffrage, mark the broad difference between privileges and rights. While suffrage recognises the natural rights of the individual, the elective franchise recognises privileged classes. It is these contradictory definitions, of phrases some construe to mean the same thing, that has given rise to the theory that the suffrage is a political privilege.

Gratz Brown eloquently said, on the floor of the Senate in that memorable discussion on the District Columbia Suffrage Bill.

"Let this idea of suffrage as a political privilege that the few may extend or withhold at pleasure, crystallise in the minds of our people, and we have rung the death knell of American liberties."

The philosophy of suffrage covers the whole field of individual and national government. For the former it means self-development, self-protection, self-sovereignty. For the latter it means a rule of majorities: "the censurus of the competent," the protection of the people in all their public and private interests. I have always taken the ground that suffrage is a natural right, the status of the citizen in a republic is the same as a king on his throne; the ballot is his sceptre of power, his crown of sovereignty.

Whenever and wherever the few were endowed with the right to make laws and choose their rulers, the many can claim the same origin for their rights also. We argue the rights of persons from their necessities. To breathe, sleep, walk, eat, and drink, are natural rights, necessary to physical development. So the right to think, express one's opinions, mould public sentiment, to choose one's conditions and environments, are necessities for psychical development.

By observation, we decide the wants of animals, what they can do, their degree of intelligence and treat them accordingly. So in the study of human beings, we see their wants and needs, their capacities and powers and from their manifestations, we argue their natural rights. Children early show a determination to have their own way, a natural desire to govern themselves. Whoever touches their playthings without their consent arouses their angry resistance, show-
ing the natural desire to own property. From these manifestations in the human family, at all ages and in all latitudes, we infer that self-government, the protection of person and property against all encroachments, are natural rights.

Individual freedom comprises freedom in all departments of nature, the acknowledgment for every man of the full, free use of all his faculties. But it is the failure on the part of one individual to accord to others what he demands for himself, that causes the conflicts and disputes on all subjects. Each person strongly individualised maintains that his theories and line of action must be right, and those who differ from him necessarily wrong. Here comes in the great enemy of individual freedom: "the love of domination"; the strong hereditary feature of our animal-descent, which prevents the harmonious development of the oppressor as well as the oppressed.

The true use of this love of domination is in governing ourselves. Every person given to introspection is conscious of contending elements in himself, some urging him to the highest moral rectitude, under all circumstances, others tempting to a narrow selfish egotism to exalt one's self at the expense of his fellows. Here is the legitimate use of domination to control the evil in ourselves. As the chief business of life is character-building, we must begin by self-discipline, as thus only can we secure individual freedom. It is more hopeless to be the slave of our own evil propensities, than to be subject to the will of another.

This love of domination is the most hateful feature of human nature, antagonistic alike to the freedom of the individual and the stability of the State. Just as the love of domination retards the development of the individual, so it prevents the realisation of republican principles in government. Could this power find its legitimate exercise on the vices and crimes of society, on the fraud and corruption in high places, it would no longer be a dangerous element, but most beneficial in its influences and far reaching consequences on civilisation.

Herbert Spencer speaking of the nature of a new social science, says:

"It is manifest that so far as human beings, considered as social units, have properties in common, the social aggregates they form will have properties in common; so that whether we look at the matter in the abstract or the concrete, we reach the same conclusion. And thus recognising both a priori and a posteriori, these relations between the phenomena of individual nature, and the phenomena of incorporated human nature, we cannot fail to see that the phenomena of incorporated human nature form the subject-matter of a science."

In other words, the manifestations of the individual and of organised society being the same the interests of the individual and society lie in the same direction. We often hear of the necessity of sacrificing the individual to society, but no such necessity exists, as the rights of the individual and the citizen have the same origin and their public and private interests demand the same protection.

Individual freedom and self-government, citizenship and suffrage are synonymous. In demanding their own enfranchisement, have women been pursuing a shadow the last half century? In seeking political power do they abdicate that social throne where their influence is said to be unbounded?

No, no, the right of suffrage is not a mere shadow, but a substantial entity, that the citizen can wield for his own protection and his country's welfare. An individual opinion, counted on all questions of public interest is better than indirect influence, be it ever so far-reaching. Though influence, like the pure white light, is all-pervading, yet it is oftentimes obscured with passing clouds and nights of darkness;—like the sun's rays it may be healthy, genial, inspiring, though sometimes too direct for comfort, too oblique for warmth, too scattered for any given purpose. But as the prism by dividing the rays of light reveals to us the brilliant coloring of the atmosphere, and as the burning-glass by concentrating them in a focus intensifies their heat, so does the right of suffrage reveal the beauty and power of individual sovereignty in the great drama of national life,—while on a vital measure of public interest it unites the many voices of the people in a grand chorus of protest or applause.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOLUTION.

The existence of a common will in a tribe is a fact, and the existence of the State, as the consciously organised common will of a certain society, is also a fact. The question, however, arises, Is this power a usurpation? Is it not perhaps an unjustifiable and odious tyranny? And if it is to be recognised as a legitimate power, on what authority does it rest?

The old explanation of State authority is the Tory explanation, that royalty exists by the grace of God. The latest and perhaps (in Protestant countries, at least) the last defender of the Tory system was Friedrich Julius Stahl (born in 1802 of Jewish parentage, baptised in 1819, called to the University of Berlin in 1843 by the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV., became the leader of the ultra-conservative party 1848–1861, the year of his death; his main work was "Die Philosophie des Rechts," 3 vol.)

Stahl's criticism of the old jus naturale is poor; his Jewish-Christian conceptions of a supernatural revelation prevented him from seeing the truth, which in spite of some errors was contained in that idea of clas-
sic antiquity. His famous demand of "Die Umkehr der Wissenschaft," (viz., that science should return) is a sin against the Holy Ghost, who reveals himself in the progress of science. Rejecting the view of the ancients concerning the authority of the State, he founded it upon God's ordinance. The State, according to Stahl, is Gottes Weltordnung; it is a human institution founded upon divine authority; it is the establishment of a moral empire.

Stahl is a reactionary thinker; State authority (Ökonomie or Staatsgewalt), according to his view, stands absolutely opposed to the idea of popular sovereignty; the former represents the idea of legitimacy, the latter the principle of revolution. Stahl stood in conscious and outspoken opposition to the doctrine of Frederick the Great, in whose conception the sovereign had become a mere servant of the State. Stahl sees in the sovereign a representative of God; the sovereign rules over his subjects, whose sole business it is to obey. These are antiquated ideas, to refute which is almost redundant in Anglo-Saxon countries, the institutions of which are established upon successful revolutions. Stahl was a genius of great acumen and profound philosophical insight, yet his face was turned backwards, and so he had not the slightest inkling of the ideal State, which, it appears to us, it is the duty of the Anglo-Saxon races to realise.

Stahl is right, however, in so far as he maintains that the State is actually the realisation of a moral empire. That is to say, the State is, as the Roman sages thought, based upon the jus naturale; it is a natural product of evolution, and as such it reveals the nature of that All-power, which religious language hails by the name of God.

When we speak of God, we must be careful in defining what we mean, for it may either be an empty phrase or the cover under which oppressions mask their schemes for usurping the power of government.

When we grant that the State is a divine institution, we mean that its existence is based upon the unalterable laws of nature. All facts are a revelation of God; they are parts of God and reveal God's nature; but the human soul and that moral empire of human souls called the State are more dignified parts of God than the most wonderful phenomena of unorganised nature.

It is customary now to reject the idea of jus naturale as a fiction, to describe it as that which according to the pious wishes of some people ought to be law, so that it appears as a mere anticipation of our legal ideals appealing to the vague ethical notions of the people. Law, it is said, is nothing primitive or primordial, but a secondary product of our social evolution, and the intimation of a jus naturale is a fairy-tale of metaphysics, which must be regarded as antiquated at the present stage of our scientific evolution. It is strange, however, that those who take this view fall back after all upon nature as the source of law; they derive it from the nature of man, from the natural conditions of society, and thus reintroduce the same old doctrine under new names—only in less pregnant expressions. Most of these criticisms are quite appropriate, for there is no such thing as an abstract law behind the facts of nature; no codified jus naturale, the paragraphs of which we have simply to look up like a code of positive law. In the same way there are no laws of nature; but we do not for that reason discard the idea and retain the expression. If we speak of the laws of nature, we mean certain universal features in the nature of things, which can be codified in formulas. Newton's formula of gravitation is not the power that makes the stones fall; it only describes a universal quality of mass concisely and exhaustively. In the same way the idea of a jus naturale is an attempt to describe that which according to the nature of things has the faculty of becoming law. The positive law is always created by those in power; if their formulation of the law is such as would suit their private interests alone, if for that purpose they make it illogical or unfair to other parties, it will in the long run of events subvert the social relations of that State and deprive the ruling classes of their power; in one word, being in conflict with the nature of things it will not stand. If, however, the codification of rights properly adjusts the spheres of the various interests that constitute society, if it is free of self-contradictions and irrational exceptions, it will stand and enhance the general prosperity of society. The former is in conflict with the jus naturale, the latter in agreement with it.

Thus we are quite justified in saying that the positive law obtains, while the natural law is that which ought to obtain; the positive law has the power, the natural law the authority; and all positive law is valid only in so far as it agrees with the natural law; when it deviates from that, it becomes an injustice and is doomed. In a word, the jus naturale is the justice of the positive law and its logic. That its formulation is not directly given in nature, and that it is difficult to comprehend it in exact terms, must not prevent us from seeing its sweeping importance. If there were no such constant features in the nature of society which are the leading motives of all the historical evolutions of the positive law, our conceptions of right and wrong would have to be regarded as mere phantoms, and our ideal of justice would be merely a dream.†

† The problem is at bottom the same as the problem of reason, of logic, arithmetic, and all the formal sciences. There have been people who think that the world-reason is a personal being who permeates the world and inserts part of his being into rational creatures. In opposition to them, other philos-

* See Jodl's lecture Ueber das Wesen des Naturrechts, Wien, 1893.
The Open Court.

There are wrong conceptions of the *jus naturale*, but there is also a right conception of it. In the same way there are pagan conceptions of Christianity and there is a purified conception of it. Stahl did not see that the true conception of the *jus naturale* is the same as the purified conception of Christianity. For the purified conception of Christianity is monistic; it regards natural phenomena as the revelations of God, and the voice of reason as the afflatus of the Holy Ghost.

The State is a human institution, but as such it is as divine as man’s soul; the State should not consist of rulers and ruled subjects, but of free citizens. And yet we must recognise the truth that the State is a superindividual power, and that the laws of the State have an indisputable authority over all its members. * * *

When we say the State is divine, we do not mean to say that all the ordinances of government are, *a fortiori*, to be regarded as right. By no means. We might as well infer that because man’s soul is divine all men are saints, and their actions are *co ipso* moral. Oh, no! The State institution, as such, and the human soul, as such, are divine; they are moral beings and more or less representative incarnations of God on earth.

The State is truly, as Stahl says, a moral empire, or, rather, its purpose is the realisation of a moral empire on earth. The State is, religiously speaking, God’s instrument to make man more human and humane, to bring him more and more to perfect himself, and to actualise the highest ideals of which he is capable. But the State of Stahl’s conception can beget a bastard morality only; it represents the ethics of the slave, which consists in obedience; it does not represent the ethics of the children of the free, which alone can develop true and pure morality.

The State, in order to become a moral empire, must recognise the rights of the individual and keep his liberty inviolate.

The principle of individualism arose out of a revolt against the principle of suppression. The individualistic movement is a holy movement, beginning with Luther, represented by Kant, but breaking down in its one-sided application in the French Revolution. Individualism is the principle of the right to revolution, but the right to revolution is a religious right; it is a duty wherever tyranny infringes upon the liberty of its subjects, wherever it interferes with the natural aspiration of citizens for higher ideals, and wherever it prevents progress.

The old governments were class-governments. We cannot investigate here the extent to which this state of things was a necessary phase in the evolution of the State; but we maintain that the breakdown of these forms was an indispensable condition to a higher advance. The old State consists in the organisation of governments with subjects to be governed, the new State is the organisation of free citizens to realise the ideal of a moral community.

The old State is based upon the so-called divine right of kings, an organisation of a few rulers or of the ruling classes. The new State must be the organised common will of the people; and its authority is the divinity of the moral purpose which this common will adopts. The government should not do any ruling or mastering, the government should simply be an administration of those affairs which the common will, for good reasons, regards as public.

The ideal of the new State can be put into practice only where the common will is animated by a common conscience; and this common conscience should not be a tribal conscience justifying every act that would be useful to, or enhance the power of, this special people as a whole: the common conscience must be the voice of justice; it must recognise above the State-ideal the supernatural ideal of humanity, and must never shrink from acting in strict accordance with truth and the fullest recognition of truth.

If the State is to be based exclusively upon the principle of individualism, the State will break down, but if the State is recognised as an embodiment of the moral world-order, it will adopt the principle of individualism as a fundamental maxim, for without liberty no morality. The slave has no moral responsibility, the free man has.

From these considerations we regard the principle of individualism as the most sacred inheritance of the revolutionary efforts of mankind, which, becoming victorious in Luther’s time, still remain so. We do not reject the truths of former eras: on the contrary, we prove all things, and, discriminating between the evil and the good, we keep that which is true. In preserving the ancient idea that the State is founded upon the immutable order of nature, and the Christian idea that the purpose of the State is the realisation of moral ideals, we avoid the one-sidedness and errors which naturally originate when a man in controversy, as a method of effectually resisting his adversary, denies that there is any truth at all in his opponent’s views, and out of mere spite indiscriminately opposes all his propositions.
CURRENT TOPICS.

The National Farmers’ Alliance met in convention yesterday and passed the customary set of resolutions. The National Farmers, in the same patriotic spirit that animated the National Dairy-men and the National Woolgrowers, “wanted a law passed,” but they wanted it for the protection of the people against the adulteration of food and food products. The self-devotion shown in this demand is greatly to be praised, for if such a law should be rigidly enforced, it might go hard with some of the National Farmers. There must have been some h Balanced toward the Resolutions Committee, for after “demanding” about a dozen “impossible things, the platform “favors a course of reading for farmers on the Chautauqua plan.” In that resolution there is irony enough to make a plough, but nevertheless, the resolution is a good one, and if the Chautauqua plan should for any reason fail, the National Farmers will find themselves benefited by a course of reading on any earthly plan whatever. After demanding miraculous money “with stability as well as flexibility, and with value as well as volume,” the National Farmers called for a greater miracle still, the resignation of his office by Mr. Sterling Morton, the Secretary of Agriculture. Perhaps the most imbecile failure to be found in American politics is a resolution asking a man to resign such an exceedingly good thing as a seat in the Cabinet with a good salary for himself and unlimited garden-seeds to distribute among his friends. National Farmers who know so little about the genius of American politics as to expect that the lucky incumbent of such an office will resign it at their invitation, cannot apply themselves too soon to a “course of reading on the Chautauqua plan.”

All other means of relieving the garrison having failed, the small-pox alarm was turned in to frighten the legions of office-hunters and compel them to raise the siege of the City Hall. It availed nothing, and now the postmaster is trying another plan to scare away a similar host of besiegers from the post-office. He is trying to make it appear that men who accept a place in the post-office rush into mortal danger. He has had the atmosphere of the building analysed by expert chemists, and the report they make, though not so loud, is more alarming than guns in battle. They find “an excess of carbon dioxide in the air, and the amount of dust was marked.” The experiments were made at the most favorable time, when the air was unusually pure, but in spite of that, the report says, “In the basement the amount of dust was most marked, and Petri dishes four inches in diameter that were exposed here for three minutes showed 350 bacteria to have fallen upon them, while the amount of carbon dioxide estimated in parts per 10,000 was 12.28.” In some other parts of the building the bacteria were still more numerous, and the carbon dioxide thicker. Up to the present moment this poisonous report has made no impression on the applicants for office; and one of them having been assured that there were 15,000 bacteria in every cubic inch of the post-office, replied with reckless hardihood, “Well, I can stand it if the bacteriaers can. Work may be dangerous in the post-office or anywhere else, but it is not so dangerous as idleness.”

In the dialogue between the grave-diggers in Hamlet, one of them says to the other, “He that is not guilty of his own death shortens not his own life.” Doubtful of this, the second grave-digger says, “But is this law?” And to that his companion answers, “Ay, marry it’s, crown’er’s quest law.” This answer appears to be logically sound, but the question is up again, not in Denmark this time, but in the State of New York, where the grand jury has just indicted the leaders of several Christian science societies. “The occasion of the indictments,” as we are informed by the newspapers, was “the death of a woman while under the care of Christian scientists. She had been without the services of a regular physician. The coroner’s jury denounced the individuals whom she had engaged to treat her, and later the grand jury made out several indictments.” This new application of “crown’er’s quest law” will now be tested in the courts, and we shall soon find out whether or not we can lawfully die without the assistance of a “regular physician.” It is rather curious that when a man dies under metaphysical treatment the coroner is called in, but when he dies from “regular” physical medicine no surprise is manifested and no “crown’er’s quest” is held. It is a strange anomaly that the faith healers have been indicted in the State of New York, for in that State the people are supposed to know the dangers of the “regular” practice. Some time ago, Dr. Charles C. Bombaugh of Baltimore delivered a lecture before the New York Academy of Medicine, in which he said: “Of the eleven thousand medicaments on the list, it would be quite safe to dispense with ten thousand. And as to the remaining one thousand, most of us would still find on the roll a sufficient surplusage of sawdust to make the judicious grieve.” This confession was frank enough, but not prudent; because if those ten thousand pretended remedies are injurious and may safely be dispensed with, may not the doctors who prescribe them be dispensed with, too.

Simultaneously comes news from Ottawa, Illinois, to the effect that “the allopathic physicians, who, having some months ago formed the Ottawa City Medical Society, have now decided that no homeopathic physicians or others deemed ‘irregular’ shall henceforth be recognised by the society or its members as physicians or surgeons.” This action was deemed necessary because “not a few allopaths had fallen into the practice of inviting the homeopaths to be present at operations, and had repeated calls to consult with them in doubtful cases.” It was decided by a unanimous vote that “where a homeopath has been employed by a patient he must first be discharged before an allopath will consent to call.” At the first sight of it, this action looks monopolistic and intolerant, but it is not, for there is no law to prevent the homeopaths from adopting a like resolution against the allopaths and proclaiming them “irregular.” The homeopaths have a right under the Constitution of the United States to resolve that “where an allopath has been employed by a patient he must first be discharged before a homeopath will consent to call.” It is only when one “pathy” calls upon the law to persecute the other that it becomes tyrannical, when it “wants to have a law passed” for the suppression of rival “schools,” or when it calls upon the coroner or the grand jury to punish any doctor who kills a patient except in the “regular” way.

Among the persons of eminence whom I respect and cordially dislike is the unromantic learned man who drives out of his hospitable beliefs the genii and the fairies I have cherished there so long; the detective historian, for instance, who proves to me from the contemporaneous records and the authentic documents that there never was any Robinson Crusoe, nor William Tell, nor Jack the Giant Killer. If science goes on at the present rate there will soon be no poetry left. Worse than the historian is the learned antiquarian overgrown with ivy who shows me that my venerable examples, types, and symbols of a former age are false and counterfeit. Among the holy places where I like to wander as a pilgrim is the armory of the Tower of London, filled for the length of a street with mail-clad warriors of the olden time, wax-work effigies on wooden horses, lances in rest and visors down. With reverential awe I love to listen to truthful James the guide, as he describes the different ears and kings, and sentimentally remarks as if he made the poetry himself, “their bones are dust, their swords are rust, their souls are with the saints I trust.” Made eloquent by the prospect of a secret shilling which he thinks I am going to give him, he says, “This is Richard Coeur de Lion in the coat of mail.
which he wore when he overthrew Saladin the Saracen in single combat, as you may have read in history. This is Edward the Black Prince in the very same accouterments that he wore at the battle of Cressy. Next to him on the right is King Henry the Fifth, and the next on the right of him you behold Sir Lionel de Montmorency who commanded the Dragonos at the Battle of Hastings"; and so on through the catalogue. When I asked him if he could show me Sir Goliath de Gath, he said he could, and he did. Now comes the iconoclastic antiquarian and abolishes all that innocent enjoyment for evermore. Lord Dillon in the London Antiquarian shows that the ancient curiosities in the Tower are modern impositions; and that the suits of armor are ignorant anarchonisms, one piece belonging to the eleventh century and another piece of the same suit belonging to the fourteenth or fifteenth century, an exposure that makes the iron clad crusaders in the Tower of no more historic interest than the martial men in brass and iron who prance on fiery steeds in a circus parade. I am assured, however, that the collection in Lord Dillon's own castle is genuine, but how can I believe that, after I have been so basely deceived in the Tower? If there is nothing new under the sun, is there anything old?

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Following the fashion of every man for himself and against everybody else, the lawyers are now pleading for protection against the competition of brighter men. They, too, "want a law passed", making it more difficult than ever for aspiring genius to obtain admission to the bar. A magnificent guild of lawyers in Chicago proposes to put six additional obstacles in the way of ambitious young men who seek to earn a living at the lawyer trade; and the generous purpose of these new obstacles is to lessen competition, and make the lawyer business a more narrow and exclusive monopoly than it is now. The members of the Bar Association got inside when the fence was low, and now they want to make it high. They want to raise the standard of education and increase the time of study for everybody but themselves. They would not be willing to stand the examination and probation they propose for others. When the lawyers of Iowa asked the Legislature to improve the quality of the bar by requiring applicants for admission to pass a more severe examination they strangled their own bill as soon as an amendment was proposed requiring all the lawyers to pass the new examination or be stricken from the rolls, "and the subsequent proceedings interested them no more."

From the caste system of ancient England which made the professions the exclusive property of the rich we have borrowed the nonsense that hedges the bar in Illinois. Instead of putting new barriers up we should throw the old ones down. For every man or woman who wants to earn an honest living at anything, we ought to make the opportunities easier, and not harder. M. M. TRUMBULL.

GOETHE AND SCHILLER'S XENIONS.

[concluded.]

TRUTH AND ERROR.

DIFFERENCE IN ONENESS.

Truth is the same to us all; yet to each her appearance will vary. When she remaineth the same, different conceptions are true.

UTILITY.

Truth that doth injure is dearer to me than available error. Truth will cure all pain which is inflicted by truth.

HARM.

Whether an error does harm? Not always! but certainly erring Always does harm, and how much, friends, you will see in the end.

EDUCATION.

Truth will never do harm. Like a mother she sometimes will punish,

Lovingly rearing her child, but does no flattery brook.

COMFORT.

Error accompanies us, but constantly in us a yearning

Gently is leading our mind nearer and nearer to truth.

ANALYTICAL TRUTHSEEKERS.

Do you take truth for an onion whose layers you singly can peel off?

Never you'll draw out the truth save 'twas deposited there.

[Schiller was a disciple and follower of Kant. In this distich and also in the next following "Human Knowledge," he characterises Kant's view of truth, who finds the conditions of knowledge in the thinking subject, not in the object that is thought. A thinking being, according to Kant, does not acquire an insight into the laws of form by experience, but possesses them a priori. He thus produces truth out of his own being, and imports it into the objective world.

It is true that truth and the criterion of truth, viz., reason, develop together with mind; for indeed reason is a feature of mind. Things are real, not true, and truth can dwell in mental representations only. In this sense Kant would be entitled to say, as he did, that things have to conform to cognition and not cognition to things. But considering the fact that mind develops from and by experience which implies a knowledge of things, and that reason is but the formal elements extracted from experience and systematized,—a consideration which Kant did not make because he never proposed the problem of the origin of mind—we shall find that the nature of truth is not purely so subjective, as our distich on the Analytical Truthseekers indicates, but objective.


HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

When thou readest in nature the writing which thou hast inscribed there,

When its phenomena thou castest in groups for thine eye,

When thou hast covered its infinite fields with measuring tapes,

Dost thou imagine, thy mind really graspeth the All?

Thus the astronomer paints on the skies his star-constellations

Simply to find his way easily in their domain.

Suns that revolve at a measureless distance, how closely together

Have they been joined in the Swan and in the horns of the Bull!

But can the heavens be thus understood in their mystical cycles,

When their projections appear on planispherical charts?

REPETITION.

Let me repeat it a hundred, a thousand times: "Error is error."

Whether the greatest it says, whether the smallest of men.

NOT IRRELIGIOUS.

What religion have I? There is none of all you may mention Which I embrace.—And the cause? Truly, religion it is!

BOOK REVIEWS.


Mr. Mallock has already obtained some fame by writing "Is Life Worth Living?" a conundrum which he answers in the af-
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firmative by living; and if he lives as well as he writes, he lives well. In the hands of Mr. Mallock political economy is not a "dismal science," but a very attractive part of a political education. In this book the subject is made philosophically simple, as it ought to be, and the puzzling jargon of scientific and technical definitions is avoided. The argument is lightened by picturesque examples and the charms of a literary style admirable for its reading qualities. The book, of course, contains the usual quantity of arithmetic, adding, subtracting, and multiplying all the men, women, and children by the number of bushels of this or that, and afterwards dividing the whole wealth of the kingdom by the number of the inhabitants, and showing the proportion of hogs and cattle to each person at various periods of time, but the author never carrius us into the occult mysteries that lie beyond the rule of three. Algebra, diagrams, and logarithms are absent, a great merit in any work on economics.

The trinitarian doctrine, that material wealth is the result of Land, Labor, and Capital, is expanded by Mr. Mallock into the quadrupedal theory that wealth is the result of Land, Labor, Capital, and Ability, and on these four feet it stands. The quadrupedal theory is not complete, for a fifth ingredient must be added, the element of good luck. The economists have not yet recognised this proposition, but it can be proved by the testimony of the farmer who tells at the end of the season how much more he would have made from his Land, Labor, Capital, and Ability had it not been for the cut-worm, and the potato-bug, and the hog-cholera, and the lumpy jaw, and the late frost in the Spring, and the early frost in the Fall. Mr. Mallock maintains, and with plausible reasons, too, that of these agents Ability contributes to the material wealth of a nation twice or thrice as much as Labor.

The main purpose of Mr. Mallock in this book is the refutation of certain socialist theories which he thinks are erroneous altogether, or if partially correct are of little practical importance, because the amount involved is very small. For instance, he says that if all the rent exacted by the "titled and untitled aristocracy," was divided equally among all the families in England, it would give each man only two pence a day and each woman three halfpence. Very well, but this amounts to about a dinner a day, and Mr. Mallock ought to show that the "titled and untitled aristocracy" have a right to confiscate for their own use a dinner a day from every man and woman in the kingdom. So, referring to the cost of the monarchy, Mr. Mallock rather contemptuously says, "What does it come to a head? It comes to something like sixpence half-penny a year." This apology is worthless, if the monarchy is not worth sixpence half-penny; and if it is worth it, the excuse is not necessary.

The most interesting part of the book relates to the superiority of Ability over Labor in the production of material wealth, and the injustice of demanding an equal distribution of it. There is much valuable information in this part of the book, and the argument woven out of the facts is very strong.

M. M. T.

A Critical History of Modern English Jurisprudence, A Study in Logic, Politics, and Morality, by George H. Smith (San Francisco: Bevoon Publishing Co. 1893) is a concisely written pamphlet of eighty-three pages, which is deserving of the highest consideration of students of political questions. It is principally a refutation of Hobbes's and Austin's systems of theoretical jurisprudence, in connexion with which the author's own views are briefly presented. Aside from traditional legal doctrines, the science of jurisprudence scarcely exists in Anglo-Saxon countries; for there is no digest of the Common Law as there is of the Roman, nor is there any well-developed body of philosophical opinion on the subject. The scientific jurisprudence of England has hitherto been the system of Austin, which is deeply rooted in the English philosophical mind. In this theory law is the arbitrary will of an absolute Sovereign Power. Mr. Smith justly remarks, "if this theory be true, jurisprudence, as a science of right, can have no existence." Jurisprudence, thus, is made a philosophical discipline and is defined as "the science of the necessary conditions of rational social life." Mr. Smith's views are not new theories, but simply a logical analysis of jural facts, as this has been historically expressed in the idea of natural law, or Naturrecht. We cannot enter into a discussion of this subject here, which has a history strangely mixed with fallacies. We also forego the statement of differences as to details. The idea of the State and Law as products of natural growth might, we think, have been more distinctly stated. What Mr. Smith gives us is a metaphysics (in the Kantian sense) of right, such as it is given in latent law, or in the jural sense of mankind. Still, Mr. Smith is dealing with a problem of jurisprudence, and that English, and not specifically with a problem of natural history. It is a strange anomaly that at this late day of inquiry such a work should be needed. But it is. And it is very probable that it will be long before its conclusions are recognised.

NOTES.

We have just received from Tabor, Iowa, a descriptive circular of a new "Benefit" enterprise, which those of our readers who are interested in such questions may wish to bear of. The idea is that of an amendment to the constitution of local churches by which all the members of the church, by paying monthly fifty cents into a benefit fund, shall be entitled to the free sanitary inspection of their homes, free medical attendance and care during illness or disability from accident, a certain sum of money during such disability and also to the other usual benefits of such organisations. As we have not space for a full account of this new movement, it may be mentioned that full information on the subject can be obtained from Prof. T. Proctor Hall, Tabor College, Tabor, Iowa.

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