A NEWLY DISCOVERED WORK BY THOMAS Paine
by Moncure D. Conway.

London, December 27, 1893.

On this day, the hundredth anniversary of Paine's imprisonment in the Luxembourg, I am able to announce, through The Open Court, my discovery of a very interesting production of his. It is without date, but clear internal evidence proves it to have been begun in April or May, 1791, and concluded in July of the same year. The first part of "Rights of Man" had appeared in London March 13, 1791, and Paine's friend Lauthenas's translation appeared in May. This new document shows that Paine (then in Paris) had already begun to write his Part II (which appeared February 17, 1792), for he alludes to a point dealt with in it, and adds, "it is being considered in a work of mine now in course of composition." Several points are made which were reproduced in Part II. This paper was evidently not written for publication. It was elicited by four questions put to Paine, probably by Condorcet, though perhaps by Lafayette, as to (1) whether the basis of the Constitution was good; (2) whether the legislative and executive powers were not unequally balanced in the Constitution submitted by the National Assembly; (3) whether the single chamber of legislature was best; (4) whether the system of administration was not so complicated as to tend to anarchy. The manuscript was kept by Condorcet until 1792, when he translated it, and it was printed in the Chronique du Mois (May, June, July), where it has remained buried and forgotten ever since. The Rights of Man being Paine's religion, the evolution of his Quakerism, he easily answers the first question. He says:

"The basis of the Constitution being no other than the rights of man, it rests on truths so well demonstrated that they can no longer be a subject of discussion. I will merely quote and apply to those who dispute them the well-known saying, 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.'"

With regard to the question relating to a balance between the executive and legislative powers, he maintains that there are really only two divisions of government powers: the making of laws, and their execution or administration. If they both have their source in the nation, they naturally co-operate for the national welfare.

"If any mutual invasion of these two powers be possible, it is as possible on the part of the one as of the other; and in this alternative I should deem the nation safer where an elected legislative body should possess itself of the executive, than where a non-elected executive should assume the power of making laws.

"Independently of these considerations, I own that I do not see how a government can, with any exactness, be compared to a pair of scales. What is there to balance? A balance suggests the idea of opposition. This figure of speech is, I think, borrowed from England, where circumstances had, at first, given it some appropriateness. The English government being a tyranny founded on the Norman Conquest, the nation has constantly sought a counterpoise to what it could not remove... But the metaphor of a pair of scales is inconceivable in a country where all the powers of government have a common origin."

With reference to the question as to the executive being too weak, Paine affirms that the legislature is equally interested with the executive that the administration should be adequate to enforce the laws passed. The difficulty is, he thinks, that monarchical power is still attached to the idea of executive power. On the third question,—the relative advantages of the single and the bi-cameral legislature,—he offers his scheme, afterwards elaborated in "Rights of Man," Part II, for dividing the House of Representatives, by lot, into two, which are to discuss each measure separately, and vote together. One division will have the advantage of listening to the debate of the other, without being committed to either side.

On the fourth question, whether so complex an administration may not lead to anarchy, Paine thinks that most of such defects may be amended by experience, if provision be made for periodical (seven-year) revisions of the Constitution. He much prefers this definite necessity of revision to a vague and general permission of amendment. The science of government, he says, is only beginning to be studied, and experience should be steadily brought to bear on it. Here is a characteristic passage:

"I am very decided in the opinion that the sum of necessary government is much less than is generally thought, and that we are not yet rid of the habit of excessive government. If I ask any one to what extent he thinks himself in need of being governed, he gives me to understand that in his case 'a little would be enough'; and I receive the same answer from every one. But if, reversing
the question, I ask the same man what amount of government he deems necessary for another, he then answers,—"a great deal." As that other person decides the question in the same way for everybody else, the result of all these answers is excess of government. I conclude therefore that the amount really necessary is to be found between these two. It is, namely, a little more than each wants for himself, and a good deal less than he thinks necessary for others. Excess of government only tends to incite to and create crimes which else had not existed."

This essay covers twenty-four folio pages, and I must consider the space of The Open Court. There is much sagacious criticism on the Constitution in question, but as that instrument soon expired, I omit that part, and quote the eloquent conclusion, which, in the perspective of a century, is a notable illustration of the rosy dawn of the Revolution that went down in blood.

"It is not impossible—nay, it is even probable,—that the whole system of government in Europe will change, that the ferocious use of war,—that truly barbarous cause of wretchedness, poverty, and taxation,—will yield to pacific means of putting an end to quarrels among nations. Government is now being revolutionised from West to East by a movement more rapid than the impulse it formerly received from East to West. I wish the National Assembly may be bold enough to propose a Convention elected by the different peoples of Europe for the general welfare of that portion of the world. Freedom for ourselves is merely happiness; it becomes virtue when we seek to enable others to enjoy it.

"A journey has prevented my finishing sooner this letter, begun more than five weeks ago. Since that time circumstances have changed in France, owing to the flight and arrestation of Louis XVI. Every successive event incites man to reason. He proceeds from idea to idea, from thought to thought, without perceiving the immense progress he is making. Those who believe that France has reached the end of its political knowledge will soon find themselves, not only mistaken but left behind, unless they themselves advance at the same rate. Every day brings forth something new. The mind, after having fought kings as individuals, must look upon them as part of a system of government; and conclude that what is called Monarchy is only a superstition, and a political fraud, unworthy of an enlightened people. It is with monarchy as with all those things which depend on some slavish habit of mind.

"Could we draw a circle round a man, and say to him: you cannot get out of this, for beyond is an abyss ready to swallow you up—he will remain there as long as the terror of the impression endures. But if, by a happy chance, he sets one foot outside the magic circle, the others will not be slow to follow."

Such was the man whom Washington’s Minister in France managed to get imprisoned, and under the impending guillotine for ten terrible months.

Having thus given a brief account of the document, the whole of which will appear in the second volume of Paine’s Works on which I am engaged, let me recall a few facts concerning his imprisonment, on the hundredth anniversary of which I am writing. Some weeks before Paine had been denounced in the Convention, of which he was a member, among other things because he would not attend its bloodthirsty sessions. This meant death. His friends, the Girondins, had all been guillotined, his English friends fled, and he was left alone in an ancient house in the Fanbourg St. Denis. Knowing that he would soon be arrested, he devoted himself to the work of writing the “Age of Reason,” which may thus be regarded as his dying bequest to mankind. He wrote on it night and day, and finished it in the night of December 26, 1793. On the following day the order for his arrest was issued, and on December 28 he was taken to the Luxembourg prison. In the course of the following year he was included in the list of prisoners who were to be taken before the revolutionary tribunal, which was certain death. He was ill at the time, and when the agent went through the prison corridor to mark the doors of the doomed, some physicians were with him, and his door was wide open against the outer wall. So the chalk mark was made on the inside of the door. Whether this was by connivance of some friendly official, or by accident, Paine thus escaped. These facts will add interest to the following letter, written by Sampson Perry, who was in Paris at the time, and which I have also just discovered. It has escaped all of Paine’s biographers.

"Mr. Paine speaks gratefully of the kindness shown him by his fellow prisoners of the same chamber through his severe malady, and especially of the skilful and voluntary assistance lent him by General O’Hara’s surgeon. He relates an anecdote of himself. An arrêt of the committee of public welfare had given direction to the administrators of the palace to enter all the prisons with additional guards, and dispossess every prisoner of his knives, forks, and every other sharp instrument; as also to take their money from them. This happened a short time before Mr. Paine’s illness; and as this ceremony was represented to him as an atrocious plunder in the dregs of municipality, he determined to divert its effects so far as it concerned himself. He had an English bank-note of some value and gold coin in his pocket; and as he conceived the visitors would rifle them, as well as his trunks, he took off the lock from his door, and hid the whole of what he had about him in its inside. He recovered his health,—he found his money,—but missed about three hundred of his associated prisoners, who had been sent in crowds to the murderous tribunal, while he had been insensible of their or his own danger."

THE STATE A PRODUCT OF NATURAL GROWTH.

[continued.]

THE MODERN STATE.

The State-ideal of classic antiquity (expressed in Plato’s books “On the State” and “On Laws”; in Aristotle’s “Politics,” and in Cicero’s fragmentary essay “On the State”) exhibits, alongside of a reverence for the State, a disregard for the weal of its citizens. The medieval conception, mainly represented by Thomas Aquinas’s work, “De Rebus Publicis et Principum Institutione,” and also by Dante’s “De Monarchia,” founds the State upon the theological thesis that the government’s authority is a divine institution: the last great representation of this view, in a modernised form, is Stahl’s “Philosophy of Law.” Against the oppressions which were sanctioned by a wrong enforcement of the absolute authority of the State arose another conception, which may be called...
the State-ideal of individualism. The individualistic conception represents the State as a social contract. Its most important advocates are Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, Puffendorf, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.

It is more than doubtful whether it is possible to realise a truly individualistic State, for the most thoroughgoing individualists deny all the essential rights of States and will inconsistently have to accept anarchism. The individualistic principle, nevertheless, introduces a new element which constitutes the very nerve of the modern State-ideal.

While recognising the authority of the State to make laws, (and no law is a law unless it is, when not willingly obeyed, enforced,) we do not advocate the old view of the State which splits the nation into two discrete parts, the government and its subjects, the rulers and the ruled. The modern State-ideal differs from the old conception. It knows no rulers, but only administrators of the common will. The modern State-ideal knows no sovereign kings, emperors, or presidents; it knows only servants of the State. And this ideal of the modern State was (strangely enough!) propounded and partly practised for the first time by a monarch on the continent of Europe at a time when monarchs were still recognised as possessing absolute power. This innovator is Frederick the Great, author of the famous book "Antimachiavelli," who, although born to a throne, was conscious of the duties of the throne and scorned the arrogant pretensions of the sovereigns of his time whose poor ethical maxim had been condensed by the French king, Louis XIV, into the famous sentence, L'état, c'est moi!

Frederick wrote to the young King Charles Eugene of Württemberg (1744):

"Do not think that the country of Württemberg is made for your sake, but the reverse; providence has made you in order to make your people happy. You must always prefer its welfare to your pleasure."

In the "Memoir of Brandenburg," 1748, he wrote:

"A prince is the first servant and the first magistrate of the State, and it is his duty to give account to the State for the use he makes of the public taxes."

The same idea is inculcated in his last will (written 1769):

"I recommend to all my kin to live in good concord, and if it need be to sacrifice their personal interests to the weal of the country and to the advantage of the State."

Frederick's idea does away with the personal sovereignty of rulers and makes the State itself sovereign; it abolishes rulers as such and changes them into administrators of a nation's public interests and into commissioned executors of the common will.

If this is true of monarchies, it is still more true of republics. The President of the United States is not the temporary sovereign, but the first servant of the nation, commissioned to attend to certain more or less well-defined duties.

The modern State-ideal has been matured by the individualistic tendencies of the eighteenth century. The reason is obvious: The modern State-ideal imposes the same obligations upon rulers as upon subjects, and elevates accordingly the dignity of the subject. It makes all alike subject to duty, thus recognising law simply as an expression of the superhuman world-order. Yet, although the modern State adopts the principle of individualism by recognising the inalienability, as it has been styled, of certain rights of its citizens, we cannot say that individualistic philosophers have succeeded in establishing a tenable philosophy of law or in shaping the true State-ideal either of their own times or of the future.

Rousseau, in his book "Le contrat social," makes a very keen distinction between the will of all and the common will, saying that the former is dependent upon private interests, while the latter looks to the common weal. The former is only "the sum of the individual wills." If Rousseau had consistently applied this distinction to his theories, his favorite error of the social contract would have been seriously endangered.

The common will is the product of social life, it is the will of establishing the solid foundations of peaceable interrelations among the members of a community, and this will can originate even though all single individuals may attempt to escape from its enactments. There being the stern necessity of social bonds under penalty of destruction to the whole community, the common will develops as a most powerful moral feature in every single member of the tribe as a kind of tribal conscience demanding universal obedience to certain general rules or laws. All the citizens of a community may agree in this, that everybody regards himself as exempt. Such a state of affairs would make a State very unruly without, however, necessarily annihilating the common will and therewith the State itself. For, we repeat, the common will is different from the sum total of all wills; and the enactments of the common will might on the contrary be, and usually are, in such anarchical conditions, only the more severely enforced. The more the execution of the common will is assured, the more leniency is possible; the more precarious its existence, the more relentless, ruthless, and cruel have been its enactments.

The individualistic philosophy always had trouble in accounting for such facts as States and other superindividual institutions. In explaining them they always fall back upon individuals, as if the individual members of human society had first existed singly as human beings and had created their language, laws, religions,
or any other interrelations by mutual consent, by a tacit contract, \( \text{Συνελεύσεις} \) not \( \text{κράτος} \), by designing artificial plans and not in the course of a natural growth. Thus Mr. Spencer, a chief representative of individualism, explains the evolutionary origin of institutions, customs, religious dogmas, etc., as follows:

"The will of the victorious chief, of the strongest, was the rule of all conduct. When he passed judgment on private quarrels his decisions were the origin of law. The mingled respect and terror inspired by his person, and his peerless qualities, then deemed supernatural by the rude minds that had scarcely an idea of the powers and limits of human nature, were the origin of religion, and his opinions were the first dogmas. The signs of obedience, by which the vanquished whom he spared repaid his mercy, were the first examples of those marks of respect that are now called good manners and forms of courtesy. The care he took of his person, his vestments, his arms, became models for compulsory imitation; such was the origin of fashion. From this fourfold source are derived all the institutions which have so long flourished among civilised races, and which prevail yet." *

This shows a palpable misconception of the real problem. In some of these primitive States and tribal principalities a chief rules supreme and commands, in certain affairs, absolute obedience. We say "in some," not "in all" of these States, for the savage States are as different among themselves as are the States of civilised mankind. There are perhaps as many democracies in darkest Africa as absolute monarchies. Mr. Spencer's view of the origin of religion, ceremonies, and fashions, is not correct. For although a chief may be omnipotent as a commander in war, he will be unable to bring about a change of the religious ideas of his subjects. A chief's power is not the creator of the common will in a tribe which makes institutions, religion, ceremonies, and fashions, but the reverse, his power as a chief is its product. The members of the tribe obey him, because the common will enacts obedience. Mr. Spencer, accordingly, puts the car before the horse. He is blind to the real problem. Instead of explaining the authority of the chief from the common will organised in a primitive State-institution, he explains the existence of the State-institution by the authority of the chief.

Individualism ought not to be made a theory of explanation, for it is utterly incorrect and explains nothing. But while it is a wrong theory it is nevertheless a correct principle; it stands for the rights of all individuals and demands the recognition of their dignity. As a principle it is a factor, and indeed a most important one in social life. But it is not its sole principle, and we fall into confusion when we use it as an explanation of the intricate phenomena of the development of society and of the State.

The modern State-ideal, viz., the individualistic State-conception preserves the truth of the ancient and mediæval conceptions, but together with them it embodies the principle of individualism. It limits the State authority by the moral purpose imposed upon State-administrations, but in doing so, it raises it upon a higher level and sanctifies its existence.

* * *

There is a notion prevalent concerning republics, that they can replace the royal government of monarchies only by a government of majorities. It is true that most republics, including our own country, are sometimes actually ruled by a majority. If, however, the State is to be the organisation of the common will, we see at once that a majority rule cannot as yet be the highest ideal of a State. Majorities can only be called upon to decide certain questions of expediency, they have no right, either to tamper with the inalienable rights of citizens, or to twist the moral maxims upon which the State institution has been raised, so as to suit their temporary convenience, or even to pass laws that stand in contradiction to them. Laws passed by the majority may be regarded as the legislative body's present interpretation of the moral laws that underlie, like a divine sanction, the existence of the State; but upon him who is convinced that the laws are immoral, the duty devolves to use all legal means in his power to have them repealed.

The most important legal means of abolishing immoral or unjust laws is agitation, so that the \( \text{pro} \) and \( \text{con} \) of a question can be openly discussed. Says Milton:

"Whoever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?"

Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of person are the corner-stones of free institutions. They are sacred rights which no majority government should dare to touch. The State has a right to levy taxes, provided they are justly proportioned and do not greatly exceed its necessary expenses. The State is also entitled to demand of its citizens the performance of a citizen's duties, which in times of need may grow into extraordinary sacrifices. For in cases of war we must be willing to offer even our lives for the welfare of the country. But the State has no right to pass laws in favor of certain classes, or to create monopolies, or to prescribe a peculiar kind of religious worship.

There are some questions in life, and also in the political life of nations, in which it is less important how they are decided, than \( \text{that} \) they be decided. Whether a travelling party shall take the seven o'clock train or the eight o'clock train is perhaps quite immaterial, the only requirement being that either the one or the other hour be decided upon, so that arrangements can be made that all may leave together. Such questions as whether a public enterprise should be aided

* Quoted from "Outline of the Evolution-Philosophy."
with one million dollars, or with two, or not at all; whether, for coast-defence, ten or twelve men-of-war should be built, etc., etc., are best decided by majority votes. They become actually right by being the pleasure of the majority. Real moral questions, however, are of a different nature. They are right or wrong, independently of majorities.

No majority vote, not even the consensus of all, can make a wrong law right. The majority can enforce bad laws, and put them into practice, but it can justify them as little as a ukase of the Czar. Even the formal legality of immoral laws may be doubted; for, even though it be the expression of the will of all, it may not be an expression of the common will, and we have learned that there is a difference between the two, and the authority of the State is founded upon the latter, not the former.

We do not intend to discuss problems of casuistry with reference to the practical politics of to-day, but we indicate that here is a field for it. There may be immoral laws which it is our duty to resist, and there are other immoral laws which it is our duty to suffer. Unequivocal questions of right or wrong are right or wrong eo ipso, but under special circumstances it becomes needful to have such questions endorsed by the legislative bodies, so that they shall bear upon them the stamp of legality and no wrong construction of them shall affect the order of the State. Doubtful questions of right or wrong, however, must be decided; as long as they are doubtful, they can only be decided provisionally, and we have as yet in republics as in monarchies no other means of deciding them than by a majority vote of the legal authorities. A wrong decision does not make right wrong, it only enforces it; but so long as we have no better means of testing right and wrong we must employ the insufficient method we have; we have to count votes, instead of weighing them.

The system of deciding questions by a majority vote is a mere expediency, we grant; but it is the only method of settling doubtful questions that must be settled, one way or another; and in certain public affairs it is better that such questions be wrongly settled, than not settled at all. We grant still more; we grant that this method does not prevent the passage of bad laws, and it may be very difficult to draw the line, where, for the sake of public peace, they should be obeyed, and where they should be met with resistance. This concession, however, is by no means an indictment of republican institutions and their methods; for the same objection must be made against the laws of monarchies; and in this respect monarchical State institutions have sinned in no less degree than republics. Monarchies have not only made the very same mistakes that republican authorities have made, but many additional ones, which will remain, as we hope, a peculiar feature of monarchies.

[to be continued.]

GOETHE AND SCHILLER'S XENIONS.

[continue.]

SCIENCE AND ART.

GENIUS A GIFT.

Born is the poet, 'tis said; and we add, the philosopher also. For, it is certain that Truth has to be formed to be seen.

THE LAW OF NATURE.

Thus it was always, my friend, and it will be so forever, that weakness claims in its favor the rule, yet it is strength that succeeds.

CREATION.

Good of the good, I declare, each sensible man can evolve it; But a true genius, indeed, good of the bad can produce. Forms reproduced are a mere imitation; but genius createth; What is to others well formed, is but material to him.

DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS.

Science to one is the Goddess, majestic and lofty,—to 'th other She is the cow that supplies butter to put on his bread.

THE POET AND THE NATURALIST.

Both of us search for the truth; you without, and I in the inner Heart of myself. And, thus, each one will find it at last.

Is clear-sighted your eye, it will meet out there the Creator. Is but healthy my heart, clearly it mirrors the world.

COLUMBUS.

Sail, O sailor courageous! Ne'er mind that the winds will deride thee.

And that thy boatswain will drop; tired of his work at the helm.

Sail, O sail on for the West: There the land must rise from the ocean,

As your vaticinal mind clearly perceiveth e'en now.

Trust to the God that leads thee, and cross the mysterious ocean.

If the land did not exist, now would it rise from the deep.

Truly with genius, Nature has made an eternal alliance.

What he has promised, forsfooth, she, without fail, will fulfill.

NATURE.

Myths have endowed her with life, but the schools disanimate Nature.

Yet her creative life rational insight restores.

THE SUBLIME.

Our astronomers say, their science is truly sublimest;

Aye; but sublimity, sirs, nowhere existeth in space.

FICTION.

"What is the purpose of poetry? Say!"—By and by I shall tell you.

First of the real, my friend, tell me the purpose and use.

TRUTH AND FORM.

Truth will be mighty although an inferior hand should defend it,

But in the empire of art form and its contents are one.

FOLLY AND INSANITY.

Wit, if it foolishly misses the point, is greeted with laughter,

But when a genius slips, furious, a madman, he raves.

ONENESS.

Beauty is always but one, though the beautiful changes and varies,

And 'tis the change of the one, which thus the beautiful forms.
THE OPEN COURT.

WISDOM AND PRUDENCE.

Will you attain, my dear friend, to the highest summits of wisdom, Risk it and don't be afraid, should you by prudence be scoffed. Prudence short-sightedsees of the shores but the one that reads. But she can never discern that one for which you set sail.

CRITICAL AND PERSONAL.

THE GREAT MOMENT.

This our century, verily, has produced a great epoch, But the great moment, alas! meets with a very small race. TO N. O. P.

'Tis a great pity, dear sirs, to espouse the right cause you are anxious, But you are void of good sense: reason and judgment are gone.

PHRASES AND THOUGHTS.

Truly you may for a time palm off your valueless counters, But in the end, my dear sirs, debts must be paid in good coin.

THE BROTHERS STOLBERG.

When you reviled the Olympian gods, threw angry Apollo You from Parnassus. You now enter the heavenly realm. [The Stolberg brothers had been liberal, but suddenly turned bigots.]

THE CONNOISSEUR.

Ancient vases and urns! Oh how easily live I without them! But a Majolica pot maketh me happy and rich. [The pious Stolberg, exaggerating the value of Christian art, while deprecating classic taste, said that he would give a whole collection of Greek urns for one Faience vase of Raphael.]

SENTIMENTALISTS.

Never thought I very highly of people who are sentimental, If an occasion arrives grossly their meanness appears. [The censure is true in its generality; but the Xenion is aimed at a man (Johann Heinrich Jung, whose von de plane was Heinrich Stilling) who did not deserve this-castigation.]

ARTIFICE.

Do you desire applause of the worldly as well as the pious, Paint ye licentiousness, but—paint ye the Devil beside. [This satirises the sensuous novels of Timotheus Hermes.]

THE PROPHET.

Pity 'tis, when you were born, that Nature created but one man! Stuff for a gentleman is, and for a scoundrel, in you. [A severe description of Johann Caspar Lavater.]

WOLF'S HOMER.

Seven Greek cities have boasted of being the birthplace of Homer. Since he is torn by the Wolf, every one taketh its piece. [Professor Wolf was the first to prove that the Iliad and the Odyssey consisted of a number of epic poems by different poets, which were collected under the name of Homer.]

A SOCIETY OF LEARNED MEN.

Every one of them, singly considered, is sensible, doubtless, But in a body the whole number of them is an ass.

TASTE IN A WATERING PLACE.

This is a singular country: the springs here have taste and the rivers; While it is not to be found in the inhabitants' minds.

NICOLAI.

Nothing he likes that is great; for that reason, O glorious Danube, Nickel traces thy course till thou art shallow and flat.

[This and the following three distichs are directed against Nicolai, who was a great publisher, but at the same time a mediocre author, shallow and conceited.]

THE COLLECTOR.

War he wages against all forms; he during his lifetime Only with trouble and pain gathered materials in heaps.

THE CRUDE ORGAN.

Can you not touch it with hands, then, O blind one, you think it chimeric! And 'tis a pity your hands sully whatever they touch.

A MOTTO.

Truth I am preaching. 'Tis truth and nothing but truth—unnderstand me. My truth, of course! For I know none to exist but my own.

TO THOSE IN AUTHORITY.

Don't be disturbed by the barking; remain in your seats, for the barkers. Eagerly wish for your place, there to be barked at themselves. [Goethe wrote this in criticism of Reichardt's praise of the French Revolution.]

THE HALF-BIRD.

Vainly the ostrich endeavors to fly: he but awkwardly saileth When he is moving his feet over the issueless sand. [Also directed against Reichardt.]

DILETTANTE.

Did your poem succeed in a language worked out and accomplished Shaping your verses and thoughts, don't think its poet is you. WANTED.

Wanted, a servant who writeth a legible hand and who also Fairly can spell, but he must leave the boxes letters alone TO AN AUTHOR.

If you impart to us that which you know, we'll be grateful to have it. But if you give us yourself—please, my friend, leave us alone. TO ANOTHER AUTHOR.

Please do not try to teach facts, for we care not a straw for the subject. All we do care for are facts as they are treated by you. [The first of these two distichs is addressed to Karl Philip Moritz, author of an interesting novel in the form of an autobiography, "Anton Reiser"; the second to F. H. Jacobi, who had written two philosophical novels, "Woldemar" and "Allwill." The difference of their natures is sufficiently characterised in the distichs.]

PUNY SCRIBBLERS.

Don't be so dainty, dear sirs. Are you anxious to heap on each other Honors and praise, you should rail one at the other with vim.

A DISCUSSION.

One, we can hear, speaks after the other, but no one replieth. Several monologues are, certainly, not a debate. [Directed against Flanner, whose philosophy was a declamation of platitudes. The distich is true of almost all the debates that take place in literary clubs after the reading of a paper.]

ALARMING ZEAL OF INVESTIGATION.

Gentlemen, boldly dissect, for dissection is greatly instructive. Sad is the fate of the frog who has to offer his legs.

A FLAW.

Let but an error be bid in the stone of foundation. The builder Buildeth with confidence on. Never the error is found.
THE OPEN COURT.

[Very good as a general criticism. Goethe, however, was on a wrong track, when directing this distich against Newton's theory of color.]

IN COMPARISON WITH SOCRATES.

Pythia dubbed him a sage for proudly of ignorance bragging.
Friend, how much wiser art thou? What he pretended, thou art.

NATURE AND MORALITY.

MISREPRESENTED.

Nature is holy and healthy! Yet moralists pillory Nature.
Reason's divinity is vilely by bigots debased.

ENTHUSIAST AND NATURALIST.

Had you the power, enthusiasts, to grasp your ideals completely,
Certainly you would revere Nature, for that is her due.
Had you the power, Philistines, to grasp the total of Nature,
Surely your path would lead up to ideal domains.

NATURE AND REASON.

Reason may build above nature, but finds there emptiness only.
Genius can nature increase; but it is nature it adds.

PHILOSOPHER AND BIGOT.

While the philosopher stands upon earth, eyes heavenward raising,
Bigots lie, eyes in the mud, stretching their legs to the skies.

OUR DUTY.

Always aspire to the whole, and can you alone independent
Not be a whole of yourself, serve as a part of the whole.

FRIEND AND ENEMY.

Dear is the friend, whom I love; but the enemy, too, is of value.
Friends have encouraged my skill, enemies taught me the ought.

MOTIVES AND ACTION.

"God only seeth the heart!"—Since the heart can be seen by
God only,
Friend, let us also behold something that is not amiss.

DISTINCTION.

There's a nobility, too, in the empire of morals. For common
Natures will pay with their deeds, noble ones by what they are.

PERFECTION.

No one resemble the other, but each one resemble the Highest!
How is that possible? Say! Perfect must ev'ry one be.

GOODNESS AND GREATNESS.

Only two virtues exist. Q, would they were always united!
Goodness should always be great; greatness should always be
good.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

CURRENT TOPICS.

A very interesting convention composed of dairymen from
different parts of the country, is now in session at Chicago, and its
purpose is to organise a Dairymen's National Protective Union.
It is intended to be a sanitary and patriotic society, not for the
benefit of the members, but for the protection of the people against
the appetite for oleomargarine. Adopting the ethics of all such
"Unions," the dairymen "want a law passed" for the suppression
of a rival industry, and for "the encouragement of high grade
dairy products." Although, at the demand of the dairymen, oleo-
margarine has been branded by the State Legislatures, and a tax
put on its head by Congress, it still gets a good deal of patronage
from the laboring classes, who are not able to buy "high grade
dairy products." In spite of hostile taxes, the sale of oleomarga-
rine has increased and is increasing, for the president of the Na-
tional Dairymen complained of the "constantly increasing manu-
facture and sale of bogus butter and oleomargarine"; and he urged
action that would "put an end to the traffic." In a like benevolent
spirit, the National Wool Growers' Association "wanted to have
a law passed" that would "put an end to the traffic in shoddy."
It does not yet appear to the National Dairymen that a man eats
butterine because he cannot afford to buy butter; nor to the Na-
tional Wool Growers that he wears a shoddy coat because he can-
not afford to wear clothing made of wool. The organisation of a
Dairymen's Protective Union comes at an opportune time; be-
cause, in Chicago at least, the people are profoundly thinking of
combining themselves into a Protective Union against the dairy-
men.

* * *

Last week I spoke of the ravenous raid made upon the new
Mayor by the brigade of patriots who called upon him to demand
the fulfilment of "election promises." Since then, the siege of
the City Hall has been pressed with so much vigor that the Mayor
has been compelled to evacuate it, and he has retreated to some
secret citadel where he is hiding himself away. As the papers ex-
press it this morning, "Mayor Hopkins has been driven from the
City Hall. The pressure of the office-seekers has become so strong
that the Mayor could not stand before it." His retreat is known
only to himself and his private secretary, "who bobbed in and
out of the City Hall all day. Each time he went to the Mayor's
office he took some roundabout way which baffled the attempts of
the enterprising and unrewarded politicians who hoped to search
out the Mayor by following his private secretary." From a mili-
tary point of view the strategy of the Mayor appears to be well
planned, but it will avail him nothing, even though he should hide
himself on Selkirk's Island. Had Robinson Crusoe been an Amer-
can civil officer of high rank, with "patronage" to give, he would
not have enjoyed the solitary quietness of his island for twenty-
eight years. The office-hunters would have discovered him in
twenty-eight days; and as for Mayor Hopkins, he will not be hid-
den for twenty-eight hours. It is dollars to cents that he will be
tracked to his hole in the ground as easily as the foxhounds find a
fox.

* * *

To a man fond of luxurious religion, the following advertise-
ment sent by a correspondent to the St. James's Gazette is as tempt-
ing as venison was to the fiar of orders gray. "Church Prefer-
ment.—A valuable living for sale in the suburbs of London. Sale
urgent. Prospect of early possession. Net income nine hundred
pounds. Light work. The best society. Practically no poor.
Beautiful modern church." Here is offered for sale a fine opportu-
nity to serve the Lord with comfort, and get for the service nine
hundred pounds a year. I wonder what the Twelve Apostles would
have thought of such a bit of "church preferment," even suppos-
ing that any of them had money enough to buy it, which, except-
ing Matthew, it is likely none of them had. If life is worth living
at all, this particular "living" is properly described as "valua-
able," and as the sale is "urgent" and the market rather dull, the
"preferment" may no doubt be had at less than the usual rates
for property of that kind. The religious hope that the present inc-
cumbent will soon die is gracefully thrown into the bargain as a
"prospect of early possession," but this cheerful promise is not at
all to be relied on, for longevity is very conspicuous in clergymen
whose benefices are coveted by men who have bought them in ex-
pectancy. I knew a case of that kind—in the suburbs of London,
too—where the incumbent whose early death had been stipulated
for, obstinately refused to die. The patron of the living being re-
proached by the purchaser of it for selling the "prospect of early
possession," excused himself by saying, "Well, he had a bad cough
and three doctors, and I was not expecting miracles." This old
parson held on to his "living" for more than twenty years after
that, and died at the age of ninety-three.
It is related of a bishop of London who was dying, that he called his servants to bid them farewell, and one of them, thinking to comfort him, said: "Your Lordship is going to a better place."
"No, John," said the bishop, "there is no better place than old England." He was right; there is no better place than old England—for a bishop, or for the incumbent of that "living" in the suburbs of London, advertised above. Think of it, nine hundred pounds a year and "light work"; hardly anything to do, because as the parishioners belong to "the best society," their souls are already cured. Then, the pleasure of preaching in a "beautiful modern church," for cold stone temple of the Gothic-rheumatic order, but a warm and well-ventilated house of worship, whose plums and mahogany give to the eucharist itself a fashionable tone! The spiritual delights of this coveted "living" would be very much impaired should Lazarus happen to call at the parsonage and sit on the steps; but, luckily for the parson, in that parish there is "practically no poor." I should like to know whereabouts in the suburbs of London that blessed paradise is. I have never found it, although those delectable suburbs are very familiar to me. A minister of the gospel who keeps the sacraments for the rich, may have a delightful time of it here below, but he will not wear a very dazzling halo up above, and I fear that when he tries to enter the celestial gates, he may be sent by St. Peter down to the lower dominions, where there are "practically no poor."

* * *

The tone and temper of the speeches made in Congress justify the opinion that the members would make excellent foot players; and a game between the Democrats on one side and the Republicans on the other would be very delightful—to the spectators; that is, if the honorable members worked their hands and feet as viciously as they exercise their tongues. A day or two ago, a member of the House classically alluded to the President of the United States as "the stuffed prophet of Buzzard's Bay"; and another, at the end of an exciting and vociferous "touch-down," said, "I have done up the Tammanny tiger, and I'd like to tackle the Kansas gopher." The tiger was Mr. Cochran, and the gopher was Mr. Simpson. Those complimentary arguments are very much in the style of the college debating-club, where the undeveloped youngsters learn statesmanship by the aid of object-lessons, as our members of Congress do. Last week Mr. Simpson, in order to show the difference between woolen goods and shoddy, found it necessary to display an old coat for the instruction of the members, and he tore it up in the presence of an awe-stricken assembly, in order to show how frail and feeble its texture was. Imitating the "gentleman from Kansas," Mr. Bowers, of California, pleading for a high tariff on raisins, actually distributed raisins among the members, as if their minds were too feeble to comprehend the argument without help from the visible subject of it, raisins. The report of the debate informs us that "there was great scrambling among the members, especially on the Democratic side, and soon half the House was complimentingly munching the fruit." Mr. Bowers thought that he might convince the appetite, if he could not enlighten the mind.

* * *

In his admirable essay on Tyndall, which appeared in The Open Court last week, Mr. Moncure D. Conway refers to the famous "prayer gauge" proposed by Tyndall several years ago, and rejected, curiously enough, by the very persons who not only believe in prayer, but who actually pray for health, wealth, rain, sunshine, good crops, good luck, and hundreds of other things. While I do not believe that prayer can have any effect on the laws of the material universe, I am not at all certain that as a subjective stimulant a prayer for virtue may not help to make a bad man good; and, perhaps, by the same quality, it may help to make a sick man well. The challenge," remarks Mr. Conway, "was wrathfully declined by the churches, but it had its effect." That the challenge was wrathfully declined by the churches is astonishing, because the prayer-test is frequently mentioned in the Bible, and, according to the Scriptures, many important theological disputes were decided by wager of prayer. Of this, the victory won by Elijah over the prophets of Baal at Mount Carmel is a memorable example. Besides, in England and America the "prayer gauge" is recognised and established in the laws appointing chaplains, whose official duty it is to pray. In his Thanksgiving proclamation, Governor Wallace of Colorado prayed for the free coinage of legal-tender silver at a ratio of 16 to 1, and at this very moment the prayer-test is called upon to settle the differences in the Legislature of that State. Here is what appears in the dispatches of yesterday from Colorado: "In the Senate this afternoon Parson Tom Uzziel prayed that there may be a giving way; and that the deadlock stopping legislation and causing a great deal of criticism may be lifted soon." All other agencies having failed, let us hope that the prayers of Parson Tom Uzziel may prevail.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

Monday next, the twenty-ninth of January, will be the one hundred and fifty-fourth birthday of Thomas Paine. Our readers will find Mr. Moncure D. Conway's article in the present number very appropriate reading on this occasion.

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