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TYNDALL.*

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

The younger generation in this South Place Society can hardly realize the brave and noble services rendered by John Tyndall in making intellectual liberty a religion. He sowed much of the harvest we are reaping. His widow, with whom in her calamity the hearts of all sympathise, who with her mother formerly attended South Place Chapel, has, I believe, dedicated her life,—as indeed it was always dedicated,—to her husband, and is gathering his letters. She will, no doubt, give to the world a faithful record of his life. Many a sufferer, wrestling with slow death, might envy him his release by a mistake of the hand of love while ministering to him. His own last thought was for his "poor darling," for whom his release must leave a tragical memory. But we will trust that, in the depths of a sorrow hardly imaginable by others, she will find the strength and inspiration to bring him, as it were, to life again, and by her loving portraiture, her thorough appreciation of his scientific genius, restore him to the world from which he had long been much withdrawn by invalidism.

There was in Tyndall a large-heartedness, a poetic fineness of spirit, which only a loving and cultured wife can fully interpret. My own friendship with him began more than a quarter of a century ago. His courage opened to me the theatre of the Royal Institution, where among other lectures those afterwards enlarged into my "Demonology" were given. He was an enthusiastic admirer of Emerson, my early master, whom he often quoted, and at whose death he invited me to give an address at the Royal Institution. What he especially loved in Emerson was his perfect faith in science, and his "fluidity," to remember Tyndall's own word, which, like a tide, followed the star of truth whatever confines of creed or theory might be overpassed or floated. I learn from Mrs. Tyndall that only a few weeks ago her husband was desired to choose from his writings, for an Anglo-American magazine, a motto for the new year. He selected from his "Fragments of Science" (p. 231) these words: "I choose the nobler part of Emerson, where, after various disenchantments, he exclaimed, 'I covet truth!'" The gladness of true heroism visits the heart of him who is really competent to say this."

At the same time, Tyndall was tenderly reverent towards the sentiment represented in the shrines of human faith. There were points at which superstition was harmful to mankind, and therein Tyndall calmly but crucially probed it. Such was what used to be called "Tyndall's Prayer-gauge." There was a widespread notion, and even a sect, founded in the biblical prescription of prayer for disease; and Tyndall proposed that there should be two hospitals, one under prayer cure, the other exclusively under medical science, so that the percentage of recoveries might decide which was the more effectual treatment. The challenge was wrathfully declined by the pulpits, but had its effect. That superstition lingers, but has had to ally itself with medical agencies, and calls itself "Christian Science."

But Tyndall dealt very tenderly even with what he conceived superstition when he met with it in any form that involved human hope and aspiration. The Brahmo minister, Mozoomdar, desired me to arrange an interview with Tyndall, and in the conversation, at which I was present, the Hindu poured out his soul with fervor, his faith being a devout theism, and human immortality. Mozoomdar was evidently anxious to carry back to India some confession from Tyndall of a faith so simple. I shall never forget how modestly and almost affectionately, yet shrewdly, Tyndall said: "You must feel that one with my views, and in my position, could enter upon any statement relating to such vast subjects only with such precautions, reservations, and exact definitions, as, I fear, would render it of little interest to you." I made notes of the conversation, but have them not in this country, and must trust to the strong impression left on me of Tyndall's conscientiousness as well as his sympathy. He loved to select the good and true from any environment of error, and did his best to preserve continuity with the religious life of his country. He was an earnest pleader for a more rational Sunday, and did much to influence the London clergy in that cause. At a large public meeting for opening the Museums, at which Dean Stanley presided, a number of clergymen being on the platform, Tyndall made an admira-

* From a discourse given in London, December 24, 1893.
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ble speech; one memorable also for an inadvertent remark, in which he said, "We only ask a part of the Sunday for intellectual improvement." This caused much amusement, especially among the preachers present, and Dean Stanley, I believe, thought it the best thing said. Tyndall had meant no satire, but, as it was taken good naturally, made no apology except a smiling bow to the clergy.

In the congress of liberal thinkers, which sat for several days in this Chapel, a good many years ago, Tyndall was much interested, and consented to act on a permanent Council which was proposed. That, however, was never completely constituted, it being found, after a number of meetings, that there was danger of our being understood as establishing some kind of new sect. The discussions that went on in that Council were of great interest and made clear to us all the conviction that freedom of religious thought could not be really advanced by any general organisation. It must act as levain, and could not be diffused if lumped in any way that might separate it from the "measures of meal" it should raise. And in this connexion I may say that I perhaps owe, at least in part, to Tyndall's influence a change in my feeling towards public teachers associated with creeds and traditions.

I will recall one more incident. On the day of the burial of Sir Charles Lyell in Westminster Abbey, I could not help some rebellion, while listening to the service, that it should be read over that great man, who was in sympathy with South Place and often came here (though he more regularly listened to Martineau). I walked from the Abbey with Tyndall, and mentioned to him, I think, that not long before I had, with Sir Charles, listened to a characteristic discourse from Martineau, and he had expressed his wonder that people should crowd other churches whilst such sermons as that could be heard. I also said that there appeared to me something hollow in parts of the funeral service when read over such a man as Lyell. Tyndall stopped, turned, looked on the Abbey and its towers, and, after some moments of silence, said: "When I think of that Abbey, of the ages that built it, and all the faith, hopes, and aspirations that have gone into it, and even into the service, I can remember only what it all means, not what it says. The ancient faults and phrases are merged in a golden mist, and the Abbey is a true monument for my old friend."

Tears started to his eyes. I had my lesson, which I have never forgotten. Or, I should say, my lessons; for, although one of them tended to give me a more catholic feeling towards institutions that embody, however imperfectly, the spiritual history of humanity, another lesson impressed on me a conviction that, were the church of to-day faithful to its own history, such men would not merely find in the Abbey their sepulchre, but their pulpit. When Dean Stanley remonstrated with the Rev. Stopford Brooke against his leaving the English Church, Mr. Brooke, so he told me, asked him, "Could James Martineau ever be Archbishop of Canterbury?" "Never," said Stanley. "Then," said Mr. Brooke, "the church is no place for me." For myself, I do not feel certain that the Dean was right. That historic sentiment, united with free thought, the natural fruit of culture, though it now draws scholars out of the Church, may presently draw them into it, over lowered bars of creed and formula, and make it once more the organ of the religious genius of England. And should that happy era come, those who enjoy it will owe more than they can ever know to the high standard of intellectual honor, the fidelity to truth, the absolute integrity of heart, and the reverential spirit, of our beloved John Tyndall.

THE STATE A PRODUCT OF NATURAL GROWTH.

We have answered the question "Does the State exist?" in the affirmative; for the social relations between man and man are actual and important realities. How a number of citizens are interrelated, whether in the form of a patriarchal community, or of a monarchy or of a republic, is by no means a matter of indifference; these interrelations are real; and they are a vital factor in the concatenation of causes and effects. They may be compared to the groupings of atoms and molecules in chemical combinations. The very same atoms grouped in two different ways often exhibit radically different phenomena; so that we naturally incline to believe that we are dealing in such cases with different chemical substances. In like manner, the same race of men will exhibit different national characteristics if combined under different systems of society and State-organisation.

But there are other problems connected with the idea of the reality of social relations. The questions arise: What is a State? What difference obtains between society and State? And, granted that society has a right of existence, is not perhaps the State a tyrannical institution which must be abolished?

State is obviously a narrower concept than society. The State is a special form of social relations. Society is the genus and State is a particular species. Social relations are first, and out of them States develop. States are more fixed than the primitive social conditions from which they come.

As animals of definite kinds are more stable in their character than the amoeboid substance from which they have taken their common origin, so States are a further step forward in the evolution from primitive social relations. This is the reason why the absence of State-

* See The Open Court, No. 972.
institutions is commonly regarded by anthropologists and historians as a symptom of extraordinary immaturity in a people. And justly so, for no civilised nation exists whose citizens are not united by the social bonds of State-life, and only the lowest savages are without any form of State-institutions.

The State has frequently been called an artificial institution while primitive society is supposed to be the natural condition of mankind. In this sense Rousseau regarded all culture and civilisation as unnatural. This view is ridiculous and absurd. All progress on this supposition would have to be branded as an aberration from nature. We think that on the contrary every advance in evolution denotes a higher kind of nature; man's progress is based upon a clearer comprehension of nature and consists in his better adaptation to surrounding conditions. Thus these nature-philosophers in their efforts to be natural, reverse the course of nature and become unnatural in the highest degree. The State is as little artificial (i.e. unnatural) in comparison with the so-called natural condition of savage life, as the upright gait of man can be said to be artificial as contrasted with the walk of quadrupeds. The State is of natural growth not less than the other institutions of civilised society. We might as well decry (as actually has been done) the invention of writing and the use of the alphabet as unnatural.

What is the nature of the State?
The State briefly defined is "the organisation of the common will of a people."

The common will of the people may be poorly, disproportionately, or even unjustly represented in the State-organisation. It is a frequent occurrence that large classes do not assert their will, either because they do not care to assert it or because they are too timid to do so, so that the State is little influenced by them. But that is another question. In defining the nature of the State, we do not say that all states are perfect, nor do we defend the evils of their inferiority.

Every horde of wild animals possesses certain common interests, for it is these very interests which make them a horde. A horde of talking animals, however, will soon become aware of their common interests. They will, in discussing the problems of their tribal life, more and more clearly understand the situation and regulate the means of attending to the common interests according to their best experience. Common interests create a common will, and as soon as this will becomes consciously organised by habits, traditions, and the ordinances of those who have the power to enforce them, by written or unwritten laws, by acts of legislatures, or similar means, the primitive social life enters a higher phase of its evolution: it changes into a State.

The State-relations do not cover all the social relations of a people, but only those which are created or animated by their common will. All the other relations among the single citizens of a State, that is those which are of a private nature, stand only indirectly in connexion with the State-relations.

The State is not constituted by laws and institutions alone; the State is based upon a certain attitude of the minds of its members. The existence of a State presupposes in the souls of its citizens the presence of certain common ideas concerning that which is to be considered as right and proper. If these ideas were absent, the State could not exist.

That our life and property in general is safe, that we buy and sell, marry and are given in marriage, that the laws are observed, and that in ordinary circumstances we hold intercourse with one another mutually trusting in our honest intentions; that, also, we struggle and compete with one another and try our best to maintain our places in the universal aspiration onward:—all this is only possible because we are parts of the same humanity and the children of the same epoch, possessing the same ideas of right and wrong, and bearing within ourselves in a certain sense the same souls.

Could some evil spirit, over night, change our souls into those of savages and cannibals, or even into those of the robber-knights of the Middle Ages, all our sacred laws, all our constables, all the police-power of the State would be of no avail: we should inevitably sink back to the state of civilisation in which those people existed. But could a God enoble our souls, so that the sense of right and wrong would become still more purified in every heart, then better conditions would result spontaneously and much misery and error would vanish from the earth. And the God that can accomplish that, lives indeed—not beyond the clouds, but here on earth, in the heart of every man and woman.

It is the same power that has carried us to the state of things in which we now are; it is the principle of evolution, it is the aspiration onward, the spirit of progress and advancement.

The State is based upon certain moral ideas of its members; and Staté-institutions, such as schools, laws, and religious sentiments, exist mainly for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the moral ideas of the present and future generations.

We do not intend to discuss here the evolution of the State. Nor do we propose to estimate the moral worth of its present phase. The ideals of the various existing States are just emerging from a barbarous world-conception, and we are working out a nobler and better future. Should this better future be realised, let us hope that our posterity will still feel the need of future progress as much as we do now. We simply
wish to elucidate the nature of the State so as to understand the purpose and the laws of its evolution.

The objects upon which the common will of a people is directed are, (1) protection against enemies, (2) the administration of justice among its members, (3) the regulation of common internal affairs; which last point, in higher developed States, consists of two distinct functions, (a) of establishing the maxims according to which the commonwealth is to be administered, and (b) of executing these maxims and enforcing them.

The need of protection against foreign enemies has created our armies and navies, which, in their present form, are quite a modern invention. That powerful State-communities were not satisfied with defending themselves, but frequently became aggressive, either for the sake of a more effective defence or from a pure desire of aggrandisement, is a fact which has nothing to do with our present subject. Warfare is the main, but not the sole, external function of the State. It has been supplemented in modern and more peaceful times by commercial treaties and other international adjustments.

The internal functions of the modern State are performed by the judiciary, by the legislative bodies, and by the executive government. All these organs of the State have become what they are in quite a natural course of evolutionary growth simply by performing their functions, like the organs of animal bodies.

A certain want calls for a certain function, and the performance of this function develops the organ.

The State has been compared to an organism, and this comparison is quite admissible, within certain limits.

True enough that the historical growth of our modern States is within reach of our historical tradition, and we know very well that one most important factor of this growth has been the conscious aspiration of individuals after their ideals—a factor which is either entirely absent from or only latent in the development of organs in animal organisms. The assumption that the cells of the muscles, the liver, or the kidneys, are conscious of the work they perform, that they have notions of duty and ideals, is fantastical. Moreover, there is no need of resorting to this explanation, since the theory that function develops organs, together with the principles of selection and of the survival of the fittest, sufficiently accounts, if not for all problems connected therewith, yet certainly for the problem of their existence in general.

As a factor in the development of States the conscious aspiration of individuals for their ideals even, in practical life, cannot be estimated high enough; for this factor has grown in prominence with the progress of the race, and it is growing still. In the explanation of the origin of States, however, this very factor can most easily be overrated, and it has been overrated, in so far as some savants of the eighteenth century, the great age of individualism, have proposed the now obsolete view that States are and can be produced only by a conscious agreement among individuals, which, however, they grant, may be tacitly made. And this theory found its classical representation in Rousseau's book, "Le contrat social," in which the existence of the State is justified as a social contract. This is an error: States develop unconsciously and even in spite of the opposition of individuals; and it is a frequent occurrence that the aspirations of political or other leaders do not correspond with the wants of their times. Thus it so often happens that they build better than they know, because they are the instruments of nature. The growth of States is as little produced by conscious efforts as the growth of our bodies. Conscious efforts are a factor in the growth of States, but they do not create States.

A State grows solely because of the need for its existence. Certain social functions must be attended to; they are attended to, and thus the State is created as the organ of attending to them.

Conscious aspirations, although they do not build States, are indispensable for properly directing the State-creating instincts of a social body. In like manner, an intelligent observation of hygienic rules is not the creative faculty that produces the growth of organs, but it is an indispensable condition keeping the organs in good health. The more clearly the common wants of a nation are recognised, the better will be the methods devised to satisfy them. The more correctly the nature of society and of its aims is understood, the more continuous will be the advance of civilisation.

The social instincts which have created the State, the love of country, and of the country's institutions and traditions, are so deeply ingrained in individuals that in times of need they come to the surface, (sometimes timely, sometimes untimely,) even in spite of contrary theories. Let the honor of a country be attacked and you will see that hundreds and thousands of the people, who from their individualistic point of view deny the very right of existence to our national institutions, will clamor for war.

When, on the 14th of July, 1870, the King of Prussia was officially and ostentatiously afforded by the French ambassador, Benedetti, the most peaceful citizens of Germany were ready to make the greatest sacrifices in resentment of Napoleon's insolence, and the democratic party dwindled away in the general excitement. The effect in France was similar; the King's refusal to receive the French plenipotentiary was so generally resented, that the Emperor's opposition, al-
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though very strong before, disappeared at once in the almost unanimous cry for vengeance.

The social instincts, and among them the State-forming instincts, are much stronger and more deep-seated than most of us are aware of. They do not on every occasion rise into consciousness, but slumber in our hearts, and even in the hearts of our anarchists and individualists; these instincts form part of our unconscious selves and will assert their presence, if need be, even in spite of our theoretical selves, which are only superficially imposed upon our souls.

* * *

It may be objected that sometimes States have been artificially established with conscious deliberation by mutual agreements which were fixed in laws. This is quite true: conscious efforts are made and have to be made to give a solid shape to a State. The Constitutions of the United States, of Belgium, and of the German Empire are instances of this.

Conscious efforts indeed serve and should serve to regulate the growth of States; they determine the direction of its advance, and bring conflicting principles into agreement. Thus struggles are avoided, and questions which otherwise would be decided by the sword, are settled in verbal quarrels, more peacefully, quicker, and without loss of life.

When the fathers of our country came together to form a bond of union, they did not create the nation as a federal union, or, so to say, as a State of States, they simply regulated its growth and helped it into being by giving obstetrical assistance. The union agreed upon by the representatives of the thirteen colonies was not, however, the product of an arbitrary decision, but the net outcome of several co-operating factors, among which two are predominant: (1) the ideas which then lived in the minds of the people as actual realities, and the practical wants which, in the common interest of the colonies, demanded a stronger unity and definite regulations as to the methods of this unity. The representatives themselves were not mentally clear concerning the plan of the building of which they laid the foundation. The political leaders of the time (perhaps with the sole exception of Hamilton, who, on the other hand, fell into the opposite mistake of believing that a State ought to be a monarchy) were anxious to make the union as loose as possible, for they were imbued with the individualistic spirit of the eighteenth century. So they introduced (and certainly not to the disadvantage of the union!) as many and as strong bulwarks as possible for the protection of the so-called inalienable rights and liberties of individuals. The United States developed, and developed necessarily, into a strong empire, although its founders were actually afraid of creating a really strong union.

In those times it was thought that a State-administration could be strong only through the weakness of its citizens. Weakness of government was regarded as the safest palladium of civic liberties. We now know that a powerful administration is quite reconcilable with civic liberty. In fact, experience shows that weak governments, more than strong governments, in the interests of self-preservation, resort and cannot help resorting to interference with the personal rights of its citizens.

The Belgians, after having overthrown the Dutch government, shaped a new State exactly in agreement with the ideas they held. If they had not previously possessed social instincts and lived in State-relations, they would not have been able to form a new State so quickly.

The idea of a united Germany developed very slowly; it was matured in times of tribulation and gradually became quite a powerful factor in Germany's national life. The foundation of the Empire would remain unexplained, were we only referred to the debates of the Reichstag and the resolutions finally adopted. The resolutions drawn up after a longer or shorter deliberation form only the last link in a very long process of concatenations. Yet these last conscious efforts, although of paramount importance, presuppose already the conditions for the constitution of the Empire in its main features.

The existence of Empires and States does not rest upon the final resolutions passed at the time of their foundation, but upon the common will of the people, which, such as it is, has been shaped in the history of national experiences.

The United States developed in spite of the individualistic clauses of its founders; and in the same way Luther, the prophet of religious individualism, advocated principles, the further evolution of which in such minds as Lessing and Kant, he from his narrow standpoint would never have consented to. He was the har- binger of a new epoch, but he was still the son of the old theories. Like Moses, Luther led the way to the promised land, but he never trod upon its ground. His actions, more than his ideas, were the reformatory agents of his life, and we may well say now that he himself little appreciated the principles that underlay his reformatory and historical actions.

The philosophers of the eighteenth century, especially Rousseau and Kant, recognise the State only in its negative rights. The State, according to their principles, is a presumption, and its existence is only defensible as protecting the liberties of its members. The rights of the State are supposed to be negative. The liberty of each member of a society is limited by the equal amount of liberty of all the other members, and the State's duty is to protect their liberties. If this principle were the true basis of the State's right
to existence, the State would not be justified in levying taxes or in passing laws which enforce any such regulations as military or juror’s service. Appropriations for the public weal would be illegal, and all executive officers would have to be regarded as a band of usurpers. As a matter of fact, States have constantly exercised their positive rights, interfering greatly with the liberties of their citizens. They have taxed them, they have passed and enforced laws. And the State could not exist without having this authority. The State is actually a superindividual power and has to be such in order to exist at all.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

GOETHE AND SCHILLER’S XENIONS.

[CONTINUED.]

THE PHILOSOPHERS IN HADES.

THE POET SPEAKS: ‘Well met! I come here to question concerning the one that is needed.’

That, philosophical friends, made me descend to this place.

ARISTOTLE.

Question right out, my dear sir, for we read philosophical journals.

Whatsoever happens on earth, we keep instructed on all.

URGENT.

Gentlemen, listen! I’ll stay here until you propose me a statement. Universally true, one that we all can accept.

DESCARTES.

Cogito ergo sum: I am thinking and therefore existing. If but the former is true, there’s of the latter no doubt.

BERKELEY.

True is the opposite, let me declare. Besides me there is nothing. Everything else, you must know is but a bubble in me.

LEIBNITZ.

Two things are, I admit, the world and the soul, of which neither knows of the other; yet both indicate oneness at last.

KANT.

Naught do I know of the thing, and naught of the soul know I either.

Both to me only appear; but by no means are they sham.

DAVID HUME.

Do not speak to those folks, for Kant has thrown all in confusion. Me you must ask; for I am, even in Hades, myself.

FICHTE.

I am I, and I posit myself; but in case I don’t posit Me as myself—very well: then the not-me is produced.

REINHOLD.

Surely conception exists. This proves the existence of concepts, And of coneyvers, no doubt; which altogether make three.

MY ANSWER.

Those propositions, my friends, are good for nothing I tell you; Make me some statement that helps, and let it be to the point.

K. CH. F. SCHMIDT, THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER.

In theoretical fields, no more can be found by inquirers. But the practical word holdeth, “Thou canst” for “Thou shalt.”

MY ANSWER.

Well, I expected it so: For if they have nothing to answer, Then these people at once will to our conscience appeal.

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS.

FOR SALE.

Since Metaphysics of late without heirs to her fathers is gathered Here at the auctioneer’s are, “things of themselves” to be sold.

KANT AND HIS INTERPRETERS.

One rich man gives a living to hosts of indigent people; Kings that are building; provide teamsters with plenty of work.

TELEOLOGY.

Worship, O man, the Creator! when I create the cork tree Kindly suggested the art, how we might bottle our wine.

NATURAL LAW.

Years and years I’m employing my nose; I employ it for smelling. Now our question is this: Have I a right to its use?

PUFFENDORF.

Well! ‘Tis a critical case! But possession is strong in your favor. Since you’re possessing your nose, use it in future, I say.

A MORAL PROBLEM.

Willingly serve I my friends; but ‘tis pity I do it with pleasure. And I am really vexed, that there’s no virtue in me!

DECISION.

There is no other advice than that you must try to despise friends, Then what your duty demands, you will perform with disgust.

[Kant declared that the man who performed his duty because it gave him pleasure, was less moral than he who attended to it against his own inclination.]

THEORETICAL HEDONISTS.

Folks who seek pleasure in all, will munch and relish ideas; Spoons and forks will they bring up to celestial repasts.

EMPIRICISTS.

On the nicestest of paths you have started, and no one denies it. But on the straightest of roads blindly you grope in the dark.

THEORETICISTS.

You are obedient to rules, and, doubtless, your well-joined conclusions, Would prove reliable, sure, were but your premises true.

LUST REFUGE.

How disdainful you speak, how proud of the specialist’s blindness! But in emergency, he comes to the rescue alone.

NATURAL SCIENCE AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Enmity be between both, your alliance would not be in time yet. Though you may separate now, truth will be found by your search.

THE SAME.

Both have to travel their ways, and the one should not know of the other. Each one must wander on straight, yet in the end they will meet.
I have received a melancholy pamphlet entitled "The Reason why the Colored American was not in the World's Columbian Exposition," and the reason appears to be nothing worth mentioning; nothing but the old race prejudice manifested in a persecution, of which slavery, lynching, chain gangs, and "Columbian" proscription are all consistent and harmonious parts. This pamphlet is "The Afro-American's contribution to Columbian Literature," and the sarcasm, though sorrowful, bites hard. There is an introduction by Frederick Douglass, eloquent, of course, and a plaintive appeal to conscience where there is no conscience, nothing but a savage pride, a tyrant sense of superiority. Although the colored people paid their share of the public money given to the Exposition, they were denied a place in its management, and this wrong diminishes the glory of the Fair. Although his action made the nation look morally diminutive, President Harrison refused to place any colored men among the two hundred and four commissioners appointed by him and authorized by Congress; and this magnanimous policy was imitated by all the other Columbian dignitaries from the commanding generals down to the subordinate captains of the Columbian guards. The spirit of caste excluded the colored people, and the only right allowed them was the privilege of paying fifty cents to see the show.

While the rights of citizenship are withheld from the colored man, he is not relieved from any of its obligations. On the contrary, more civic duties are demanded of him than are expected of the white man. Last week the colored people of Chicago held a festival to honor the abolition agitators who created a national conscience fifty years ago. Among the speakers was Mr. Stead of London, who patronised the company by taking a few extra conditions upon their freedom. Like a schoolmaster advising little boys, he said: "You who vote in Chicago and other northern cities should show that you know how to exercise the right of suffrage with wisdom, and that you value the privilege." Mr. Stead, as a foreigner, did not know that this bit of good advice was borrowed from the apologetic jargon of slavery which assumed that the negro was unfit for either freedom or the ballot, and which threw the burden of proving the contrary upon him. Luckily for the white man, it is not required of him that he vote "with wisdom," and why should such perfection be demanded of the colored man? Forty-five years ago, I found prevailing in the South, an ominous fear that somehow or other the negro might get "wisdom," and therefore the law made it felony to teach him to read. In Chicago the colored man votes with as much "wisdom" as the white man, which is not saying much in his favor; but he will improve, as the white man improves, whenever he gets fair play. Considering that equal opportunities are denied them, it is amazing that the colored people show as much "wisdom" as they do; and their patience is more amazing still.

A painful bit of news from Washington tells about a breach of etiquette there that has given society a palpitation of the heart. The offence is more trying to the feelings than it might otherwise be, because two persons are implicated in it, and both delinquents are from the State of New York. Those who know anything about it are in such a state of nerves that a coherent story is not easy to be had, but the Evening Star of Washington, which, we are assured, is "a very reliable and conservative paper," announces with becoming grief that the President invited Senators Hill and Murphy to dine with him at the White House on Thursday evening, and that they both declined the invitations. Senator Hill was depraved enough to spend the evening at the theatre, but, says the "reliable and conservative" Star, "Senator Murphy's whereabouts on that evening have not been ascertained." This lack of information shows that the Washington detectives have not been vigilant, or they certainly would have tracked Mr. Murphy to his

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"fair," Jenkins, the reporter who telegraphs all this from Wash-ington, further informs us that "hitherto invitations to the Presi-dent's dinner parties have been regarded as imperative, like the commands of the Queen, and etiquette has required all previous engagements to be cancelled in order to accept them." Here is a selfish rule, where etiquette violates good manners and compels a man to break an engagement and disappoint his friends to gratify the President. When the President becomes King, it will be time enough to regard his invitations as imperative, "like the commands of the Queen."

Notwithstanding the authority of Shakespeare to the contrary, there appears to be something in a name. A gentleman by the name of Hornblower, having been appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the nomination was referred to the proper committee of the Senate, and that committee, by a majority of six to three, recommended that the appointment be not confirmed. A Senator, in answer to a question, explained the reason for this, as follows: "It was all due to his name. I understand that the committee did not think the word 'Hornblower' would look well on the records of the court." Although this was very likely said in jest, there was a trifle of earnest in it after all. Had the appointment been to the office of chief stamp-ordinator for the party, the name would have been valuable as a recommendation, but it was a disadvantage to a candidate for the dignified office of Justice of the Supreme Court. To be sure, the name is only an accident, but accidents are potent in the affairs of men. I have a friend, a very effective stump-speaker, who was at one time Governor of Iowa, and on the occasion of a big "rally" at Marbletown he was the "ordinator of the day." After some of the supernumeraries had made a few remarks, the chairman arose and said: "We will now have a tune from the band; after which we will have a speech from the Governor," whereupon the band immediately struck up. "Listen to the mocking-bird." This tune is very pretty in its place, but it was inappropriate there, and the unintentional sarcasm of the band effectually baffled the argument and eloquence of the Governor. Names, as well as tunes, must fit the time and the occasion. However, in spite of his name, there is yet a chance that the nomination of Mr. Hornblower will be confirmed; but think how the name weighted him down.

In the Nineteenth Century for January is an article on Tyndall by Professor Huxley, the only man who knew him like a brother these forty years and more. The tribute is written in language graceful as poetry, and yet symmetrical and strong. The scientific side of Tyndall is very well known, but the full moral and spiritual strength of him was known only to his intimate friends, and Professor Huxley gives us that. Tyndall stood for truth, immovable as Mont Blanc, whose glaciers, and rocks, and storms were his own familiar friends. To him the "Revealed Word" was written in the sciences, and his translations and commentaries on that Scripture will not perish until "the great globe itself and all which it inhabit still shall dissolve," and there shall be no more use for commentaries. "I say once more," declares Huxley, with emphatic repetition, "Tyndall was not merely theoretically but practically in all things sincere." The value of a man of genius with qualities like that is great in any age, but how priceless was it fifty years ago, when, in the language of Professor Huxley, "the evangelical reaction, which, for a time, had bridged English society was dying out, and a scum of rotten and hypocritical conventionalism clogged art, literature, science, and politics." So true was Tyndall to the lessons he learned from nature, that, and again I quote from Huxley, "he saw, in a manner, the atoms and molecules, and felt their pushes and pulls." To Tyndall, wherever he found it, a lie was a lie. It might be socially respectable, but no conventional etiquette could persuade him to give it any toleration; nor was he ever imposed upon by the homeopathic principle that a lie might be sometimes useful as a cure for some other lie. Without the advantages of high birth, patronage, or fortune, he fought his way upward against an army of errors, and the truth is clearer to us because of him.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

We have received from the Messrs. George Bell & Sons, of London, through A. C. McClurg & Co., "The Revelation of St. John the Divine, with Notes Critical and Practical," by the Rev. M. F. Sadler, Rector of Honiton and prebendary of Wells. (Pp. 298 Price, 1.75.) This book constitutes the last volume of the "Church Commentary on the New Testament," by Mr. Sadler. The commentaries on the four Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles have already appeared. The notes are practical enough, but can hardly be classed as "critical."

Professor Haackel writes us that his brochure, "Monism, A Scientist's Confession of Faith," which was discussed in No. 282 of The Open Court, is now "polizeilich verfolgt." The pamphlet has run through five editions in five months.

We have received from Wilhelm Engelmann, of Leipsic, a four-paged table of the integral

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cmpiled by Bruno Kämpfe. It is from Meyer's "Wahrsccheinlich-keitsrechnung." (Price, 60 pf.)

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