HAPPINESS AND THE GOSPEL OF WORK.

By Victor Yarros.

Emile Zola's address to the "youth of France" on the subject of the "new spirit" has received more attention and critical consideration than either its substance or form would seem to warrant. But the reception of Zola's confessions and exhortations by the press of Europe and America is significant, and confirms the belief that the success of a movement or utterance depends more on the mental and moral state of those to whom the appeal is directed than on the intrinsic merit of the new message. Zola's message was not new, and there was nothing irresistible in the manner of its expression; yet it seems to have produced a deep impression.

That Zola's reference to his own literary career should have provoked animated and eager discussion is not to be wondered at. Everybody realised that there was a reaction in France against the realism of which Zola has so long been the chief exponent and exemplar, and his opinion on the new departure all were curious to know. It should be borne in mind that Zola never regarded himself as a realistic novelist merely, as one of those artists who produce what Mr. Marion Crawford has called "intellectual artistic luxuries." Such a definition of his novels Zola doubtless repudiates with considerable heat. Zola regarded himself as a man of science who carried the methods of science into the sphere of the novel. His stories were "human documents," intended not merely (if at all) for amusement, but for use in sociological inquiries. Zola, in short, claimed to be the scientific historian of modern French life. And what did he say with reference to these pretensions of his while characterising the new spirit? This: "What I will concede is that in literature we brought the horizon too near, and personally I regret having endeavored to limit art to proved verities. . . . I confess that, by trying to bring into the domain of letters the scientist's rigidity of methods, I proved myself a narrow sectary, but who does not, while the battle is on, go further than is wise, and who, when victorious, does not compromise his victory by undue insistence?" Zola is eminently right in intimating that in the heat and stress of struggle and controversy we are all apt to be carried into extremes and wild exaggeration; but this common failing is utterly inadequate as an explanation of his own theory and practice.

However, Zola is to be congratulated upon the fact that his bias is not strong enough to prevent him from recognising and justifying the revolt and reaction against naturalism or realism. But surely he makes a vicious and groundless assumption when he identifies the dissatisfaction with so-called "scientific art" with the alleged dissatisfaction with science at large. "Scientific art" is repudiated because it is a detestable mongrel, not because of any prejudice against science. On the contrary, it is love of science which prompts a final condemnation of the absurd "scientific novel." Doubtless the dissatisfaction with science is a real phenomenon, but Zola signally fails to comprehend its nature and true causes. We shall presently see that Zola confounds the individual with the social point of view, and that this fundamental confusion renders his conclusions, with regard to both origin and remedies, lame, impotent, and worthless.

It is said, begins Zola, that the new generation has ceased to believe in science. It has been resolved to revert to the past and from the debris of dead beliefs fashion a living one. Science is to be a thing quite apart from faith, and is to be relegated to its old position,—that of a simple exercise for the intelligence, an inquiry permissible only so long as it refrain from touching the supernatural. And Zola declares that he is not at all surprised at this reaction. It is born of a misconception and delusion, but it is not unnatural. It was expected, he says, that science, after ruining the old world, would make a new one modeled upon our ideals of justice and happiness. Since it has done nothing of the kind, people are questioning the power of science, knowledge, to yield happiness. Nature is unjust and cruel; and science ends in the monstrous law of the survival of the strongest. A despairing appeal for happiness rises on every side, and the helplessness of science leads people to seek a dream and to turn to faith. According to Zola, however, science never really promised happiness. It promised the truth, "and it is questionable if happiness can be
made out of facts." As for the tendency to resuscitate old faiths, Zola, while recognising that it is certainly a great joy to repose upon the assurance afforded by any faith, points out that one cannot believe by willing to do so. "Faith is a wind that blows where it listeth, and there only."

Even in these few comments Zola's philosophical incapacity and lack of information are painfully manifest. Instead of attacking the ignorant proposition that science ends in the "monstrous law of the survival of the strongest," he makes the doubtful statement that science never promised happiness and adds the meaningless remark that happiness can hardly be made out of truth or facts. Truly, if people are really disappointed with such science and philosophy as Zola represents, the fact is the reverse of depressing! In spite of the disappointment of some philosophers (Renan, for example, whose views on science as a social motor were ably set forth in The Open Court some time ago), it remains true that science can and will yield happiness. It has already accomplished something, and only the narrowest view of the subject can dispute the fact. Zola at bottom shares the vulgar misconceptions of science and religion, and the attempt on his part to defend science is necessarily ludicrous. Take his avowment that "faith is a wind that blows where it listeth." He evidently fancies this to be a corollary of the truth that we cannot believe by willing to do so, but his error scarcely needs pointing out. Faith is determined by facts, by knowledge; and the progress of science, the increase of knowledge, involves the progress of faith. The present state of science makes it impossible for us to revert to dead faiths, since it is this very knowledge which deprived them of their vitality.

It is true that there is a despairing appeal for happiness arising from every side, but the science of society must teach us how to respond to that appeal, while the social instincts and sentiments will impel us to answer the call and undertake the work of social improvement. Science does not immediately and directly create the desire to labor for the welfare of humanity, but given the altruistic feelings,—and they are as naturally developed in associative life as the egoistic feelings,—science shows us what to do and how to do it.

In his attempt to afford the new generation something that might take the place of a living faith and inspiring ideal, Zola is more unfortunate than ever. Seeing that he cannot hope to unravel the knot, he boldly tries to cut it. "Let me," he says, "offer you a creed : the creed of work. Young men, work! . . . Work is the law of the world, the guide that leads organised matter to its unknown goal. Life has no other reason for being, and each of us is here only to perform his task and disappear. Calm comes to the most tortured, if they will accept and complete the task they find under their hands. This, to be sure, is only an empirical way of living an honest and almost tranquil life, but is it nothing to acquire moral health and solve through work the question of how to secure on earth the greatest happiness? I have always distrusted chimeras. Illusion is bad for a man or a people. . . . The only strong men are the men who work. Work alone gives courage and faith; it alone is the pacificator and the liberator."

Now, this advice is excellent as far as it goes, and a great deal of healthy and sound meaning may be read into it. But the question is here, what Zola's own meaning is. Had one of his hearers ventured to ask him to explain more clearly and intelligibly the object and purpose of the "work" recommended, he would have been nonplussed and silenced. In the light of all his antecedent remarks, the concluding exhortation is susceptible of but two interpretations. Either work is recommended as a sort of anaesthetic, as a means of driving away unpleasant reflections and insoluble problems, or it is regarded as a mission, duty, and way out. The vital and radical difference between these two interpretations is manifest. It is one thing to tell us, after sadly admitting that science has failed as a happiness-generator and that faith is impossible for us; that the only way to find peace is to work incessantly without thinking of ultimate questions; and it is quite a different thing to tell us that work is a solution of the ultimate questions. Which of these two interpretations shall we impute to Zola? Most of his critics proceed on the supposition that Zola recommends work as an anaesthetic; and this supposition completely accords with the purport of the entire address. But these critics overlook certain strange expressions in the final verses of the gospel of work. "Work is the law of the world."—"Life has no other reason for being, and each of us is here only to perform his task and disappear."—"Work gives courage and faith."—Through work we acquire "moral health." These pregnant affirmations are utterly inconsistent with the supposition that work is regarded as an anesthetic. A whole system of philosophy and metaphysics underlies them. To speak of a "task," of a "law of the world," of "faith," is not to silence questioning, but to stimulate and encourage it. What do you mean by "our task"? What "faith" is it work is said to yield?

The probability is that Zola used these significant expressions as glittering generalities, attaching no definite ideas to them and expecting no persistent searching for any such ideas from his auditors. But how unsatisfactory such an irrational gospel of work must be to the students Zola addressed! These future physi-
cians, lawyers, engineers, writers, artists, and teachers, anxious to learn whether there is anything higher, nobler, finer in life than the narrower cares and interest of physical existence, are told to "work!" Why, even the bourgeois French morality will teach that work is better than idleness and dissipation; but what has this first-reader wisdom to do with the question of the "new spirit"?

Here we approach the secret of Zola's failure. He seems to have wholly forgotten the social sphere, the great and wide questions of social life. When he told the students that work is good for them, he meant simply that each should devote himself to his particular field and work faithfully and steadily. Let the teacher teach, the writer write stories or newspaper articles, the lawyer argue or settle disputes, etc. This is the individual point of view exclusively. But suppose the "worker" desires to know something about the educational, legal, or literary ideals? Suppose he aspires to serve society, humanity? How is he to distinguish between truth and falsehood in education, politics, economics, ethics, art? To pass a protection measure, is work; to repeal it is also work. To oppress the people by unjust legislation and excessive taxation is work; to ameliorate their condition is also work. Writers of reactionary and filthy "literature" work as hard as writers of progressive and inspiring literature. How shall the young worker work, and what shall he labor to promote and strengthen? Zola is dumb. Having started out with a false view of science, he discovers himself in a vicious circle.

Preach the gospel of work, by all means, but always insist on following the light of science. Without such light, the result of your work is pure accident, and is more likely to be evil than good. It is this light of science and philosophy that the "new spirit" craves, for it realizes that faithful work (for which it is ready) directed by science is certain to lead to social happiness and the triumph of justice.

SCIENCE A RELIGIOUS REVELATION.*

A French author of great repute has written a book entitled L'irreligion de l'avenir, "The Irreligion of the Future," in which he declares that religion will eventually disappear; and he whose opinion is swayed by the diligent researches of such historians as Buckle and Lecky will very likely endorse this prediction. Theological questions which formerly occupied the very centre of interest now lie entirely neglected, and have ceased to be living problems. Who cares to-day whether God the Son should be called ὁμοιός or ὁμοούσιος, alike or similar to God the Father? What government would now wage a war for the interpretation of a Bible passage?

No schism will ever again arise over the question whether τὸν ἄνδρα ἐστιν means "this is my body," or "this represents my body!"

It is quite true, as Buckle and Lecky assert, that theological questions, or rather the theological questions of past ages, have disappeared, but it is not true that religion has ceased to be a factor in the evolution of mankind. On the contrary, religion has so penetrated our life that we have ceased to notice it as an independent power. It surrounds us like the air we breathe and we are no longer aware of it.

It was quite possible for our forefathers to preach the religion of love and at the same time to massacre in ruthless cruelty enemies who in righteous struggle defended their own homes and tried to preserve their separate nationality. Our moral fibre has become more sensitive; we now resent the injustice of our own people, although we no longer call love of justice religious, but humane or ethical.

The famous blue laws that imposed penalties on those who did not attend church have become obsolete. We no longer burn infidels and dissenters, for we have become extremely heretical ourselves; that is to say, our most orthodox clergymen would in the days of our forefathers have appeared as infidels, and every one of us, if he had spoken his mind freely, might have been condemned to the stake, for all of us have adopted, more or less, the results of scientific inquiry. Truly religious men now believe in such things as the Copernican system and evolution, which when first proposed were deemed heretical, and dangerous. These theories have not, however, destroyed religion, as the clergy predicted, but only certain theological interpretations erroneously identified with religion. Our religious views have not lost, but gained in depth and importance. Those scientific innovations, which were regarded as irreligious, have become truly religious facts; they have broadened our minds and deepened our religious sympathies. Our religious horizon, which in the time of Samuel was limited to Palestine, and in the Middle Ages mainly to Europe, has been extended over the whole cosmos. Judaism, the national religion of the Israelites, became human, and the humanitarianism of Christianity became cosmical. Sacrifices of goats and lambs have been abolished, and by and by we shall have to give up all the other paganism that attaches to some of our religious views and institutions. But religion itself will remain forever. That which appears to men like Buckle, Lecky, and Guyau as a progress to an irreligious age is an advance to a purer conception of religion; it is a gradual deliverance from error and a nearer approach to truth.

Religion is indestructible, because it is that innermost conviction of man which regulates his conduct.

* Address delivered at the World's Congress of Religions, Sept. 19.
Religion gives us the bread of life. As long as men cannot live without morality, so long religion will be needful to mankind.

Some people regard this view of religion as too broad; they say religion is the belief in God; and I have no objection to their definition provided we agree concerning the words belief and God. God is to me not what he is according to the old dogmatic view, a supernatural person. God is to me, as he always has been to the mass of mankind, an idea of moral import. God is the authority of the moral ought. Science may come and prove that God can be no person, but it cannot deny that there is a power in this world which under penalty of perdition enforces a certain conduct. To conceive God as a person is a simile, and to think of him as a father is an allegory. The simile is appropriate, and the allegory is beautiful; but we must not forget that parables, although they embody the truth, are not the truth. The fact is, God is not a person like ourselves; he is not a father nor a mother like our progenitors; he is only comparable to a father; but in truth he is much more than that; he is not personal, but superpersonal. He is not a great man, he is God. He is the life of our life, he is the power that sustains the universe, he is the law that permeates all; he is the curse of sin and the blessing of righteousness; he is the unity of being: he is love; he is the possibility of science, and the truth of knowledge: he is light; he is the reality of existence in which we live and move and have our being; he is life and the condition of life, morality. To comprehend all in a word, he is the authority of conduct.

Such is the God of science, and belief in God must not mean that we regard as true whatever the Scriptures or later traditions tell us concerning him. Belief must mean the same as its original Greek ἀδελφός which would be better translated by trust or faithfulness. It must mean the same as its corresponding Hebrew word אָמֹנָה, which is derived from the verb āman to be steady. Ammunah, generally translated "belief" means firmness of character. Belief in God must be an unwavering obedience to the moral law.

Science, i. e., genuine science, is not an undertaking of human frailty. Science is divine; science is a revelation of God. Through science God communicates with us. In science he speaks to us. Science gives us information concerning the truth; and the truth reveals his will.

It is true that the hieroglyphics of science are not easy to decipher and they sometimes seem to overthrow the very foundations of morality, as it appeared, for instance, to Professor Huxley. But such mistakes must be expected; they are natural and should not agitate us nor shake our confidence in the reliability of science. Reason is the divine spark in man's nature, and science, which is a methodical application of man's reason, affords us the ultimate criterion of truth. Surrender science and you rob man of his divinity, his self-reliance, his child-relation to God; you make of him the son of the bondwoman and the slave of tradition, to inquire into the truth of which he who allows his judgment to be taken captive has forfeited the right. By surrendering science you degrade man; you cut him off from the only reliable communication with God, and thus change religion into superstition.

There are devotees of religion who despise science and object to its influence in the sphere of religion. They not only deny that science is a revelation, but they also claim that religion has a peculiar revelation of her own. Religion, they say, has been revealed once; this special revelation must be blindly accepted; and no criticism of it should be tolerated.

Men of this type are as a rule very pious, faithful, and well-meaning, but they are narrow-minded and without judgment. While all life on earth is growth, their religious ideal is a fossil. To be and remain stationary is with them a matter of principle. They are blind to the facts that religion, too, has to develop; that intellectual and moral growth is an indispensable condition of its life and health; and that science, far from being its enemy, is its sister and co-worker. Science will help religion to find the true path of progress.

Some of the schoolmen who were, or tried to be, orthodox theologians and philosophers at the same time, carried the consequences of this dualism to the extreme, and made a distinction between religious truth and scientific truth, declaring that a proposition might be true in religion which is utterly false in philosophy, and vice versa. This view is not only logically untenable, but it is also morally frivolous; it is irreligious.

What is truth?

Truth is the congruence of an idea and the fact expressed in it. It is a correct statement of that which the statement represents. Thomas Aquinas defines it as adaequatio intellectus et rei.

What is scientific truth?

A statement may be true, yet may be vaguely or awkwardly expressed; it may have an admixture of error, it may be misleading; one man might understand it right, while another might not. Again, a statement may be true and well formulated, yet he who makes it cannot prove it. It may rest upon hypothesis and be a mere assumption arrived at by a happy guess. All such truths are imperfect. They are not scientific. Scientific truths are such statements as are proved by undeniable evidence or by experiments and formulated in exact and unequivocal terms.

What is religious truth?

By religious truth we understand all such reliable statements of fact or doctrines, be they perfect or im-
perfect, as have a direct bearing upon our moral conduct. Statements of fact, the application of which can be formulated in such rules as, “Thou shalt not lie,” “Thou shalt not steal,” “Thou shalt not envy nor hate,” are religious.

Scientific truths and moral truths, accordingly, are not separate and distinct spheres. A truth becomes scientific by its form and method of statement, but it is religious by its substance or contents. There may be truths which are religious yet lack the characteristics that would render them scientific, and others that are religious and scientific at the same time. But certainly, there is no discrepancy between religious and scientific truth. There are not two kinds of truth, one religious and the other scientific. There is no conflict possible between them. The scholastic maxim, that a statement may be perfectly true in religion and false in philosophy, and vice versa, is wrong.

The nature of religious truth is the same as that of scientific truth. There is but one truth. There cannot be two truths in conflict with one another. Contradiction is always, in religion not less than in science, a sign that there is somewhere an error. There cannot be in religion any other method of ascertaining the truth than the method found in science. And if we renounce reason and science, we can have no ultimate criterion of truth.

The dignity of man, his sonship, consists in his ability to ascertain, and know, the truth. Reason is that which makes man the image of God, and science is the exercise of the noblest human faculty.

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Religion has often, in former ages, by instinct, as it were, found truths, and boldly stated their practical applications, while the science of the time was not sufficiently advanced to prove them. The religious instinct anticipated the most important moral truths, before a rational argumentation could lead to their recognition. This instinctive or intuitive apprehension of truth has always distinguished our great religious prophets. Their statements were, with rare exceptions, neither founded upon scientific investigations nor formulated with any attempt at precision. Their exhortations were more oratorical than logical, adapted to popular comprehension, and abounding in figures of speech.

Almost all religions have drawn upon that wondrous resource of human insight, inspiration, which reveals a truth not in a systematic and scientific way but at a glance, as it were, and by divination. The religious instinct of man taught our forefathers some of the most important moral truths, which, with the limited wisdom of their age, they never could have known by other means.

Science has done much of late, especially since Darwin, to explain instinct in the animal world. Instinct is an amazing faculty, prodigious and life-preserving, and it plays an important part also in the evolution of mankind.

In almost all practical fields men made through a fortunate combination of circumstances, aided by imagination, important inventions which they were unable to understand. Their achievements were frequently in advance of their knowledge.

Prof. Ernst Mach says in his excellent book, "The Science of Mechanics":

"An instinctive, irreflexive knowledge of the processes of nature will doubtless always precede the scientific, conscious apprehension, or investigation, of phenomena. The former is the outcome of the relation in which the processes of nature stand to the satisfaction of our wants. The acquisition of the most elementary truth does not devolve upon the individual alone: it is pre-affected in the development of the race.

"In point of fact, it is necessary to make a distinction between mechanical experience and mechanical science, in the sense in which the latter term is at present employed. Mechanical experiences are, unquestionably, very old. If we carefully examine the ancient Egyptian and Assyrian monuments, we shall find there pictorial representations of many kinds of implements and mechanical contrivances; but accounts of the scientific knowledge of these peoples are either totally lacking, or point conclusively to a very inferior grade of attainment. By the side of highly ingenious appliances, we behold the crudest and roughest expedients employed—as the use of sleds, for instance, for the transportation of enormous blocks of stone. All bears an instinctive, unperfected, accidental character.

"So, too, prehistoric graves contain implements, whose construction and employment imply no little skill and much mechanical experience. Thus, long before theory was dreamed of, implements, machines, mechanical experiences, and mechanical knowledge were abundant."

The instinctive wisdom of man is remarkable. This is true not only in its relation to liberal arts and manufactures, but also in the regulation of the moral life of man. Centuries before Christ, when ethics as a science was as yet unknown, the sages of Asia taught men to love their enemies. The preachings of Christ appeared to his contemporaries as impractical and visionary, while only recently we have learned to understand that the fundamental commands of religious morality are the only correct applications to be derived from the psychical and social laws of human life. Spinoza was the first among European philosophers to prove by logical arguments that hatred can be conquered by love only.

As the instinctive inventions of prehistoric ages show "by the side of highly ingenious appliances the crudest and roughest expedients," so our religions, too, often exhibit by the side of the loftiest morality a most lamentable lack of insight into the nature of ethical

* We quote one instance only selected from the Dhammapada, one of the most ancient books of the Buddhist canon: "Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time: hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule."—Sac. Bks. of the East, vol. v, p. 5.
THE OPEN COURT.

truth. Take, for instance, Jehovah's direct and undisguised command, given by Moses to the children of Israel, to steal gold and silver vessels from the Egyptians. Or take Jael's treacherous murder of Sisera, an infamous deed, excusable only as being in consonance with the general barbarity of the age, yet it is highly praised in song by Deborah and declared worthy of imitation.*

To mention one more instance only, take St. Paul's view of marriage. Advising the unmarried and widows not to marry, he states one exception only to those who cannot contain, saying, "it is better to marry than to burn." Is this a truly religious view of marriage? The holiest instincts that would induce men and women to join their fates in a sacred alliance are utterly ignored. Nothing is said of the mutual sympathy and friendship that bind soul to soul much more closely than sexual appetites. No consideration is taken of the children to be born, and the very lowest desires alone are given as an excuse for entering into the state of matrimony, the holiness of which he does not understand. St. Paul's view of marriage proves that he had no right conception of the ethics of human sex-relations. Speaking of man as of the lower animals he was not able to fathom the importance of the subject.

We admire St. Paul in many respects, but we must say that his view of marriage is un-Christian; it is unworthy of his sacred office as an apostle; it is a blemish in our Bible; it is irreligious and should have no place in religion.

Who is orthodox enough still to defend such imperfections and shortcomings in our otherwise sacred traditions? Who would shut out from them the light of a rational and scientific inquiry, so as to preserve the blemishes of religion together with its noble sentiments?

A scientist, like Ernst Mach from whom we have quoted above the passage on the evolution of mechanics, knows that the science of mechanics does not come to destroy the mechanical inventions of the past, but that on the contrary, it will make them more available. In the same way a scientific insight into religious truth does not come to destroy religion; it will purify and broaden it.

The dislike of religious men to accept lessons from science is natural and excusable. Whenever a great religious teacher has risen, leaving a deep impression upon the minds of his surroundings, we find his disciples anxious to preserve inviolate not only his spirit, but even the very words of his doctrines. Such reverence is good, but it must not be carried to the extreme of placing tradition above the authority of truth. Religious zeal must never become sectarian, so as to see no other salvation than in one particular form of religion. The great prophets of mankind, such men as Zarathustra, Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, Moses, and, foremost among them, He who wore the thorny crown and died on the cross, are distinguished by breadth and catholicity.

We read in the eleventh chapter of Numbers, 27-29:

"And there ran a young man, and told Moses, and said, El-dad and Medad do prophesy in the camp.

"And Joshua, the son of Nun, the servant of Moses, one of his young men, answered and said, My lord Moses, forbid them.

"And Moses said unto him, Enviest thou for my sake? would God that all the Lord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put his spirit upon them!"

Our great religious leaders are decidedly broader than their disciples. The apostle St. John showed a love for his great master, Jesus of Nazareth, like that shown by Joshua for Moses, and also the same lack of discretion when he reprimanded the man who cast out devils in the name of Christ. John forbade him, but Christ did not approve of the well-intentioned zeal of his most beloved disciple and said:

"Forbid him not!...

"For he that is not against us is on our part."—Mark ix, 39-40.

The spirit of Joshua and John, prompting them to forbid others to teach or prophesy except by the special permission of their masters, has produced that sectarian attitude of our religions, which detracts so much from their catholicity, establishing the authority of tradition as the highest court of appeal in questions of religious faith and truth.

Reverence for our master makes us easily forgetful of our highest duty, reverence for an impartial recognition of the truth. The antipathy of a certain class of religious men toward science, although natural and excusable, should nevertheless be recognised as a grievous fault; it is a moral error and an irreligious attitude.

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I have myself suffered from the misapplication of religious conservatism, and I know whereof I speak. I have experienced in my heart, as a faithful believer, all the curses of infidelity and felt the burning flames of damnation.

Our religious mythology is so thoroughly identified with religion itself, that when the former is recognised as erroneous, the latter also will unavoidably collapse. A man is commanded to accept and believe the very letter of our codified dogmas or be lost forever.

Ye, who preach such a religion, can you fathom the tortures of a faithful and God-loving soul, when confronted with ample scientific evidence of the untruth of his religious convictions? A man who could

imagine no higher bliss than to die for his religion and in the performance of his duties, who loves his God and is anxious to believe in him, to rely on him, to trust in him, feels himself dragged down into the pit of unbelief.

Do you think the voice of science can be hushed? Science may be regarded for a long time as a temptation; but it is too powerful, too convincing, and too divine to be conquered. Wherever there is a soul distorted by a conflict between religious faith and scientific insight, the latter will, in the long run, always be victorious. And what a downfall of our noblest hopes must ensue! The highest ideals have become illusions; the purpose of life is gone, and desolation rules supreme.

When a faithful Christian turns infidel, it is an act, the boldness and significance of which cannot be overrated. The man himself is too much occupied with the anxieties of his own troubled mind to judge himself whether it will lead him to hell or by the road of evolution heavenward, to higher goals. He is in the predicament of Faust when he dared to make the pact with the Devil. Titan-like, he decides to brave the storm and to challenge the powers that shape his fate. Faust, when cursing Hope, Faith, and Patience, is conscious of the situation which is characterised in these lines:

"Woe, woe!
Thou hast destroyed,
The beautiful world,
With powerful fist:
In vain 'tis harried,
By the wind of a demigod shattered!
The scattered
Fragments into the Void we carry,
Deplored
The Beauty perish'd beyond restoring,
Mightier
For the children of men,
Brighter
Build it again,
In thine own bosom build it anew!
Bid the new career
Commence,
With clearer sense,
And the new songs of cheer
Be sung thereto!"

When a faithful Christian turns infidel, the world in which he lived breaks down. He sees the errors which form its foundation-stones, and he hastens to destroy the whole structure. Depict in your mind the earnestness, the severity, and the terror of the situation, and you will no longer think that the bitterness of infidels is an evidence of their irreligious spirit; irreligious acrimony is the expression of disappointment and indicates very frequently a deep religious sentiment, which unfortunate circumstances have curdled and turned sour. Therefore, do not look upon the rabid Freethinkers as enemies of religion. Learn to regard them as your brethren who have passed into a phase of the religious development which may be necessary to their higher evolution. They have recognised, in their search for truth, that the old dogmatism of religion is found wanting, but they are as yet unable to build up again another and a better world in place of the one they have destroyed.

The destruction of dogmatism appears as a wreck of religion itself, but, in fact, it is a religious advance. Says Tobit in his prayer:

"God leadeth down to hell and bringeth up again."—Tobit, xiii, 2.

We must pass through all the despair of infidelity and of a religious emptiness before we can learn to appreciate the glory and grandeur of a higher stage of religious evolution.

When infidelity is the result of a sincere love of truth, do not look upon it as irreligious. Any one who dares to have views of his own and is honest in his convictions is a religious man. And the Proverbs say: "God layeth up sound wisdom for the upright." He who is sincere, will, even when erring, find in the end the right way.

Bear in mind that all truth is sacred and you have the clue to a reconciliation of the conflict between science and religion. There is a holiness and a truly religious import about science which has not yet been sufficiently recognised, either by the clergy or by scientists.

Science, it is true, comes to destroy the old dogmatism, it discards blind faith, and rejects the trust in the letter. But he who sees deeper will soon perceive that no harm is done, for science preserves the spirit of religion; it enhances truth.

We all know that religious truths are expressed in allegories; Christ spoke in parables and St. Paul says in his first epistle to the Corinthians (iii, 2):

"I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able."

If Paul were among us to-day, would he still say,

"Neither yet now are you able?"

And to the Hebrews he writes (v, 12):

"For every one that uses milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness, for he is a babe."

Is there any doubt that all our dogmas are truths figuratively expressed? Why should we not take the consequences of this truth? Very few, indeed, do take them; for we have become so accustomed to parables that our so-called orthodox believers denounce as heretics those who do not believe them verbatim.

A religious truth, symbolically expressed is called mythology, and he who accepts the mythology of his religion not as a parable filled with meaning but as the truth itself, is a pagan. Now we make bold to say, that no conflict is possible between genuine science and true religion. What appears as such is a conflict between science and paganism.

Religious parables, if taken in their literal mean-
ing, will somehow always be found irrational. Says an old Roman proverb, *Omne simile claudicat*, every comparison limps; it is somewhere faulty. Why should religious similes be exceptions?

Let us not forget that our religious preachings and teachings are a mere stammering of the truth. They show us the truth as through a glass, darkly. The traditional expressions of religious aspirations are based more upon the intuitive instinct of the prophets of former ages than upon a rational and scientific insight. The former is good, but it should not exclude the latter. The assuredness of our religious sentiments must not tyrannise over or suppress our scientific abilities.

* * *

Man's reason and scientific acumen are comparable to the eyes of his body, while his religious sentiments are like the sense of touch. The simplicity and immediateness of our feelings of touch does not make it advisable to dispense with sight.

There are religious teachers who advise us to rely entirely upon our religious feelings and distrust the eyesight of science. Ye blind leaders of the blind, do you not know that if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness? The snail that creeps on the ground may from necessity be obliged to rely alone on its sense of touch in its feelers, but man with his higher possibilities and in his more complicated existence needs his eyes and cannot make firm steps without them. Ye adversaries of free inquiry are like the blind man who groping about finds an even and smooth path which, he feels assured, is the highroad that leads him home. Having no eyes to see he is not aware that he is walking on a railway embankment and that the train is already approaching that will complete the tragedy of his fate.

That conception of religion which rejects science is inevitably doomed. It cannot survive and is destined to disappear with the progress of civilisation. Nevertheless, religion will not go. Religion will abide. Humanity will never be without religion; for religion is the basis of morals, and man could not exist without morals. Man has become man only through his obedience to the moral law. Every neglect of the moral law lowers him; every moral progress raises him. And who in the face of facts will say, that the authority of moral conduct is not a reality in the world, that God in the sense that science understands his nature and being does not exist, and that religion, the religion of scientific truth, is error?

Religion will undergo changes, but it can not disappear; while it will free itself of its paganism, it will evolve and grow. Religion may even lose its name, for the old reactionary dogmatists may continue to identify religion with their erroneous conceptions of

**SCHOPENHAUER.**

*BY CHARLES A. LANE.*

Peace, stormy soul, Nirvana's peace to thee!
With thunderbolts of thought, ill poised but keen,
Thy might assailed the mystery between
The life that is and That which bade it be.

A sense that recked but Maya's cruelty,
And vision wide to ken her utmost spleen;
Black, bitter blood and lust of carking teen
Were thine of Karma's stern delivery.

But peace! such peace as waits for Being's heart
When mutability exhausted sleeps
Enfold thee now, unknowing till or calm.

For Doom (Nay, not that maniac will, whose art
Nor memory thou taught'st nor vision keeps!)
Is loving kindness, surely, and a balm.

**NOTES.**

L. Prang & Co., of Boston, have just published a fac-simile color-print of a painting of J. G. Tylers in their possession, entitled "Columbus's Caravels in Sight of Land." The print is a beautiful one: it preserves the fine effect and suggestion of relief of the original, and is worthy of the high artistic reputation of the publishers.

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