THE MONISTIC METHOD.

BY W. STEWART ROSS.

The small but truly fraternal prandial meeting in Anderton's Hotel, London, to welcome Dr. Carus was not in anything special in regard to somatic comestibles but has certainly proved remarkable as a feast of reason and a flow of soul—to this day the reason is to the fore, and the soul is still flowing.

My capable friend F. J. Gould reported for The Agnostic Journal the speeches of Dr. Carus and myself on the festive function at Anderton's. Dr. Carus reproduced Mr. Gould's transcript in the columns of his excellent hebdomadal, The Open Court; and my gifted friend, Amos Waters, has contributed an illuminative article on "Agnosticism vs. Monism" to that journal; and now Dr. Carus himself has cogently and courteously traversed the report of my speech which he had reproduced. It is with one or two of the learned Doctor's comments and strictures upon my position, or his conception of it, I now propose to briefly deal.

1) Dr. Carus, joining issue with my thesis that philosophy is not dependent upon natural science, contends that it is dependent; and, in support of his contention, observes:

"Aristotle was a first class naturalist. Familiarity with the results of science is less important to a philosopher than to be versed in the methods of inquiry. Yet who would deny the great influence of natural science upon Aristotle's philosophy."

I fear the appeal to Aristotle is not altogether fortunate. The less stress laid upon Aristotle's natural science the better. Lewes, in his "Aristotle," fully exploits the character of the "Science" of the Stagirite. Even giving full weight to Dr. Carus's pertinent observation that "familiarity with the results of science is less important to a philosopher than to be versed in the methods of inquiry" hardly renders his appeal to Aristotle more valid, unless the Doctor contend that astrology involves the scientific "method" and that alchemy and the pursuit of the elixir of life and the philosopher's stone involve the exact and positive research and codification implied in modern scientific inquiry.

But in support of my contention that philosophy owes little or nothing to natural science, Aristotle's philosophy proper is not obsolete, but significantly existent. His physics is abrogated; but what essential advances have been made upon his metaphysics, his ethics, or his logic, which is the most perfect analysis of thought of which human mentality is capable! Many have dealt with, but no one has as yet actually developed the logical system with which he dowered the world. And scientist or not, in his general world-conception, Aristotle arrived only at the same result as the non-scientific Socrates with his "deific intuition." The God of Aristotle is only that of Socrates and Plato arrived at by another venue; God is with him the logical completion and unity of his system of thought, the One, the Totality in which the multiplicity of ideas reach their necessary consummation in Unity, in the Monos of the school of Dr. Carus, in the Unknown the Unconditioned Absolute of the agnostic. Even grant that Aristotle was the first scientific philosopher, in his world-synthesis he did no more than endorse the finding of his unscientific predecessors. So much for the evidence that philosophy is dependent upon science.

2) I am reported as having said: "Where science and philosophy break down, we require religion." To this proposition Dr. Carus writes: "Here I must respectfully differ." And here I must respectively ask for information. Dr. Carus's monism is ostensibly "devoted to the work of conciliating religion with science." Truly a most laudable work to be devoted to. But what has hitherto restrained me from unreservedly endorsing the monistic doctrine is, I have never been able to clearly discover where the "religion" came in, although of the "science" we have had quantum suff. To me, but if I am wrong I earnestly desire to be put right, Dr. Carus's reconciliation of religion and science is the proverbial reconciliation between the lion and the lamb, effected by the latter lying down inside the former. If religion does not come in where science and philosophy can minister no further to intuitional aspiration, I much want to know where it does come in. Dr. Carus must, perfice, admit that it comes in somewhere or he would not devote his able journal to the task of reconciling it with science.

3) Dr. Carus states: "God in my opinion is the reality which surrounds us and of which our very being
consists." Granted. This is all very well in a Hegelian regard. But how does the learned Doctor who challenged my statement of the inadequacy of the five senses find this God? Is, with him God the obverse of his brain-processes? He tells what, in his opinion, God is, but how, by his method, does he reach him?

4) Evidently it is by no third faculty, apart from sense and reason, as posited by Max Müller that Dr. Carus finds God; and yet, from the following in his stricture upon my speech he alleges that he cannot only find the infinite, but "understand" it.

"Even the infinite is a conception which is as plain or even plainer than anything finite. Ask a mathematician whether man possesses besides sense and reason a third faculty, 'the faculty of apprehending the infinite.' The mathematician will inform you that reason is quite sufficient to understand the nature of the infinite; and that if such a third faculty existed its reality should be doubted if indeed it were in a certain sense contradicted by sense and reason. If reason were contradicted by sense, or sense by reason, in what a sorry plight would science be?"

Is it possible that my learned friend is more concerned for his darling 'science' than for truth? If the inevitable conclusion of the eternal verities go against 'science' who cares whether she 'is in a sorry plight' or not? If reason aspire to "understand" the infinite, the reasonable will expect to find her in "a sorry plight."

5) Since reason is so potent it is important to know what Dr. Carus means by reason. His definition we may gather from the following:

"Mr. Ross mistakes my position when he says that I 'would exclude ... everything which does not appeal to the five senses and approve itself to the sensational school.' Mathematics is a science from which all sense elements have been excluded, and logical arguments appeal to reason, not to the five senses."

Now this "reason" is, according to Dr. Carus the faculty by which we can, not apprehend, mark you, but "understand" the infinite. Reason evolves the processes of mathematics "a science from which all sense elements have been excluded." Dr. Carus thinks that at last he can proceed independently of the five senses upon which I opined he laid undue stress. Even here I doubt if the learned Doctor has shaken himself clear of his besetting incubi, the senses. It has been pointed out by Bain that all reach marches of deduction are material, and that even the highest mathematical symbols themselves are more or less material, in their way. Pure form is unthinkable. Surely any student of the living processes of thought as worked out by Spencer or Bain, who talks of reason operating "upon the basis of the laws of form" speaks for the study, not for the world of reality. The "laws" are, at best, only verbal formulae.

6) To me there is, near the end of Dr. Carus's criticisms upon my position, a passage from which I have derived much satisfaction. The Doctor writes:

"The ultimate aim in which all feelings may be represented to find satisfaction, may be sought in infinity it may be called God or Theos, it may be characterised as an illusion or an ideal, that much is certain that the elements of our soul, the feelings out of which the human mind grows, are yearnings. Reason does not create these yearnings; they are facts; they are the data of our soul-life."

This, after all, from the pen of Dr. Carus, the Monist, looks like a forcible expression of a statement I, the Agnostic, have insisted upon, in varying forms, times without number. The five senses, however, and the scientific method he advocates, do not form the entire basis for the "feelings," to which the Doctor here refers, and which in disregard of his own set processes, he introduces per saltum, over his own head, as it were, to complement his own monistic world-theory. It seems to me that, after pursuing an incorrect method, his intuition, which he would fain ignore, is so keen that he abandons his incorrect method and at a bound reaches the correct result. If "reason does not create these yearnings," then there is, as Max Müller contends, something beyond reason after all; and Dr. Carus himself uses it for a purpose much akin to Dr. Müller's apprehension of the infinite.

To show that in this last quotation I do not unfairly catch Dr. Carus making an inadvertent admission, let me give his corollary:

"There is a truth in Saladin's position which I do not wish to deny, and there is a truth too in the sentences quoted from Max Müller and from Tyndall; but I should express it differently. I should say: The religious sentiment is now the same as it was in the days of Job; we feel attracted by a power that, mystically speaking, loves us with an everlasting love and therefore with loving kindness is drawing us. The yearning of our soul, which is unlimited, unfathomable, infinite, is a power 'independent of sense and reason,' and 'neither sense nor reason are able to overcome it, while it alone is able to overcome both reason and sense.' For this yearning is the master, sense and reason are his servants. Sense and reason stand in the service of the will. They are his torch-bearers and illumine his path.

"Monism, as it is upheld in The Open Court, does not exclude the sacred promptings of the religious instinct; on the contrary, it includes them; nay, more so, The Open Court is the work of these promptings. The founder of The Open Court, in spite of all the accusations of narrow-minded bigots who call him a pagan and an infidel, because he carries the torch of reason into the dark chambers of religious dogmatism, is of a deeply religious nature."

"The religion of The Open Court, however, (mine no less than Mr. Hegeler's,) does not originate in the breakdown of science and philosophy, but it permeates and is permeated by science and philosophy. The more science we have, the purer, the grander, the truer will be our religion. If science and philosophy should break down, our religion would break down with them. Science and philosophy are inseparable from religion, and religion could not exist without them."

Of course religion, from its ethical side, may run pari passu with science and philosophy, as indicated by Dr. Carus; but religion in the unity of its force, as the yearning and passionate at-one-ment of the soul with the All, comes in with its solution where, as I
contended, science and philosophy break down. I do not hold that if "science and philosophy should break down, religion would break down with them"; although, of course, if civilisation were to break down, the expressions and symbolisations of the religious sentiment would degenerate.

Dr. Carus arrives at what are essentially my own conclusions; but, it appears to me, he so arrives not by his scientific method, but in spite of it. He leaps out of the chariot of his choice and outruns it. He says philosophy "inquires into the subjective and objective conditions of cognition." But, if philosophy do so, in the very act it becomes metaphysic, as now understood by our advanced thinkers. The study of the conditions of knowledge is metaphysic, as Von Hartmann himself observes. Even Dr. Carus's study is metaphysical, as he so far transcends the phenomenal as to believe in extra subjective material objects, which subsist whether perceived or not. A true positive thinker must not soar beyond his data. The Doctor gets to what I submit is the proper goal, but only through treason to his own positive method.

I am grateful to my critic for the, for him, rather ample formulation of the "religion" he seeks to reconcile with science. But I earnestly invite him to say more, and I assure him, if he will do so, he will be better understood, on this side of the Atlantic at least. I submit that discursive thinking, with its conceptual abstractions, has nothing to do with the pure religious feeling. Religion, in one aspect, is akin to poetry, and the art-emotions generally. It is not thought, but felt. But besides its emotional, it has its intellectual side or aspect, and here I am willing to concede to my acute critic that philosophy may intervene. Religion in this aspect has been defined as "philosophy speaking naively." Schelling argued for a coming creed which should weld religion, poetry, and philosophy into one. Dr. Carus, in one or two points he has touched, has, by suggestion, opened up so wide a field that I have had to place myself under considerable restraint to prevent my being drifted away into regions only remotely bearing on the discussion at issue. I have not been able to do more than honestly try to touch upon and elucidate one or two salient headings, with a view to letting my esteemed critic and myself respectively know for certain what we respectively mean. And it does seem that after all, though we do work out the proposition with a different nomenclature and with a different diagram, we arrive at practically the same result, the same monistic and divine solution of the Problem of Existence.

I have been encouraged to write freely by the consciousness that I was dealing with a thinker, who, despite his philosophic reputation and his recognised acuteness as a dialectician, is above all a simple, earnest, and unprejudiced truth-seeker, independent of school or cult; and with the view that truth may be elicited, and utterly oblivious of any considerations of either personal triumph or defeat. I have written as freely and fraternally as I spoke when I was by his side at the festive board at which this friendly comparison of opinions originated.

THE HARMONY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

IN REPLY TO MR. W. STEWART ROSS.

Says the esteemed editor of The Agnostic Journal in his rejoinder concerning religion:

"Besides its emotional, it has its intellectual side or aspect, and here I am willing to concede to my acute critic that philosophy may intervene. Religion in this aspect has been defined as 'philosophy speaking naively.'"

This, it appears, is the main difference between him and myself. He says may while I say must. Philosophy, science, experience, reason, all the best methods of inquiry at our command must be called upon to guide our feelings and our religious enthusiasm. Religion is not identical with science; religion is the enthusiasm of applying that knowledge, of whose truth and potency we are unwaveringly convinced, to practical life. Science is in many respects opposed to and very different from religion; for science is of the head and religion is of the heart. Yet science and religion should keep abreast with each other. They should be allied. One should be the complement of the other.

Schiller says in his "Philosophical Letters":

"Lasst uns heilig denken, so werden wir feurig thun.

There is a close connection between thought and feeling, so close that the tenor of our feelings will also have its effects upon our thought and vice versa. Only he whose heart is hopelessly chilled by ill will or egotism, will be little benefited by the enlightenments of science. Science may help to show him the futility of ill-will and the irrationality of egotism, and thus slowly cure him of his irreligious disposition. But upon the whole Faust's words will remain true:

"Wer's th's nicht fühlt, der werden's nicht rühren."

. That this, my view of religion comes in per saltum is new to me. I see no break in my logic; I have made no use in the least of intuitive faculties; I have simply employed the usual methods of reasoning.

* * *

The question of the relation of religion to science is the salient feature of our controversy. There are, however, a few additional points of minor interest, concerning which a few remarks will not be out of place.

* Italics are ours.
1) No doubt Aristotle's physics is abrogated. But can there be any doubt that Aristotle acquired his insight into the methods of science by actually pursuing scientific studies? Aristotle's physics are not abrogated in the sense that his investigations in natural science were never of value. On the contrary, they were of great value; and later inquirers used them, modified them, added to them, and sifted them.

2) The daimon or daimonion of Socrates is historically not well ascertained, and of course for the present issues it matters little whether or not Socrates claimed to have special informations through a daimon and also whether or not Plato believed he had received any knowledge by a deific revelation.

3) Concerning the adequacy or inadequacy of the five senses, I should say that our senses are quite adequate to our present purposes. We might have acquired other senses, an electrical sense, etc., and might be better off if we had it. I doubt it, but I gladly concede the possibility.

Sensation is the beginning of all experience; but our experience contains other elements besides the sensuous. The world of things consists not only of matter, but matter appears in definite forms, and these forms make the things what they are. The analogous world of sensations also does not consist of feeling alone. The various feelings possess certain forms and present various inter-relations. Man is able to view the formal element of his experience apart from the feeling element. He can think in abstracts, and can acquire an insight into the mechanism of his thought. Reason is nothing but a name for this mechanism of combining and separating, and recombining, the various elements of our experience. Reason accordingly is not an additional sense; reason is something quite different from the purely sensuous. Reason is the method of handling our ideas.

4) Reason, as practically applied, deals with material objects, but pure reason so called is engaged with purely formal concepts. Thus, in pure mathematics the material element is excluded by abstraction; its object being purely formal. Pure form is not unthinkable, although we grant that pure forms as such have no real and separate existence.

5) Science being the search for truth, how is it possible that truth can come in conflict with science? Should we find out that the results of our scientists are wrong, their science so called would be proved to be a pseudo-science, and we shall have to establish another and truer science upon better foundations. From my standpoint eternal verities can never go against science or flourish upon the wrecks of science.

6) The term metaphysics is used in various senses. I do not use it in the sense in which Mr. Ross does.

If it is metaphysical to soar above the data which we have, every logical inference leading us by the laws of thought from the known to the unknown, from given facts to other facts, viz. to the facts inferred, and thus widening our sphere of knowledge, would also be metaphysics. This is certainly not the accepted usage of the term.

As to my belief in extra-subjective material objects, I do not reach them in any metaphysical way. First, I deny that the data of experience are purely subjective. The data of experience are subject-object relations; and thus, secondly, I maintain that both ideas, the subjective as well as the objective, are reached by abstraction. I do not assume the reality of objects, but I define a certain quality of my experiences as real or objective. This may appear to the old-fashioned idealist as an evasion of the problem. But in fact it is simply the recognition that the idealistic problem is a self-made puzzle.*

The last point I have to make is a short reply to the question:

"He tells what, in his opinion, God is, but how, by his method, does he reach Him?"

God (as I conceive God) is not a concrete thing or an individual being. Thus, God cannot be recognized by sense-experience. God is a certain quality of existence, being that feature of reality which enforces a definite conduct. The idea of God, accordingly, is a very abstract and complex thought. Briefly defined, God is the ultimate authority of what is generally called moral rules. Being an abstract idea, God can be reached only by reason. Take away a man's reason, and he loses the faculty of thinking God.

Must I add that the ability of thinking God is different still from the religious sentiment of loving God and doing his will? The will of God is, in our opinion, only a religious way of speaking of "the moral commands." It is not sufficient that we understand the moral commands, we must also comply with them, and the more we comply with them willingly, unhesitatingly, and with our whole heart, the better it will be for us.

I conclude by expressing my sincerest thanks to Mr. W. Stewart Ross for the interest he takes in The Open Court and for the amiable inclination he shows, in spite of our difference of standpoint, to appreciate and understand our work. This disposition, I can assure him, is mutual.

P. C.

HOLY DAYS
BY THE REV. FERRY MARSHALL.

"The sabbath was made for man."—Mark ii: 27.

In the Bible are two accounts of the origin of the sabbath. Genesis, second chapter, tells us that the seventh day was made a sabbath, because Elohim, the

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Deuteronomy, or the second law, fifth chapter, tells us that it was instituted and to be observed in commemoration of the deliverance from Egyptian bondage; and it appears that no trace of its Hebrew observance can be found from Moses to Josiah, a thousand years after the escape from Egypt; and the book of Deuteronomy, according to the best Bible scholars, was written in Josiah's time. This was undoubtedly the book mentioned in II Kings, xxii: 8-12, where Hilkiah, the high-priest, says: "I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord." The book doubtless had its origin at that time.

If neither of these disagreeing accounts of the origin of the sabbath are to be taken literally, can others be suggested?

Astronomy is the oldest of sciences, and some of the planets, as well as "Orion, Arcturus, and the Pleiades," were early known by the shepherd ancestors of the Jewish people. And the phases of the moon, which take place weekly, could not have been unnoted. The division of time into years, months, days, and also into weeks, is a natural division, and so the sabbath is a nature day, to which we, who hold a natural and not an artificial religion, may, if we will, lay special claim, as we may to summer, autumn, and other nature festivals.

And, observe, the fourth commandment does not require observance of the seventh day of the week, but the "seventh day" after six of labor upon which a community had previously practically agreed. It does not say the seventh day of the week, and we now observe the first, needing no authority for taking a different day from that observed by the Jews. The sabbath was long used as a day for sacrifice and special service to Yahveh. It was his day and not man's.

Since the Reformation two views, one the stringent, puritanical view, and a second, more liberal one, have obtained on the continent throughout Europe. According to the strict view children must put away all playthings Saturday night and not touch them on Sunday; nor hardly might they smile that day. They must go to church twice and endure two long, dry sermons. The day, interpreted in accord with the legendary idea that the Lord once struck a man with instant death for gathering a few sticks thereon, was the gloomiest of all the days, dreaded by the children, and even good deacons were glad when it was gone.

Jesus held the more liberal views, which were the first to get him into trouble with the sabbatarians. They said: "We know this man is not of God, for he keepeth not the sabbath."

Then he enunciated a new principle, saying: "The sabbath is not God's day more than others; the sabbath was made for man." Had it been God's day, "man" had been made "for the sabbath," as they supposed. The sabbath view that oppresses man must be wrong.

Sabbath means rest, and our labor agitators may take comfort in the idea that perhaps it originated in a labor movement for fewer days! Certainly the laboring man who does not defend it, does not know the right use of it.

It certainly should be a day of rest for all who toil and can therefore appreciate rest. This rest is not secured alone by sleep. Rest comes by change—change of clothing, change of scene,—and by seeing worthy sights, in museums or in fields, and by hearing discourses properly presented. Some people excuse themselves from church attendance, because they want rest, but are more weary after a day of lounging. They forget that ideas,—if there chance to be any in the sermon,—and interchange of friendly greetings are restful. Even the shaking of hands is restful.

The sabbath is a day for every good work. It is a day to inspire men, and for men to be inspired by discussion of the great and important subjects connected with every branch of reform. It is a day to forget our care and remember our neighbor who needs us. There remains, therefore, for us a keeping of the sabbath. All religions have their holy days, and we of the nature religion have ours.

We also have our holy days, and indeed we have more than others. Have you one holy day in every week? I have seven. Paul says, (Rom. xiv: 5): "One man esteemeth one day above another; another esteemeth every day." All the days are holy. Have you fifty two holy days in a year? I have three hundred and sixty-five or six, in which I may not think any impure or dishonest thought, much less do any impure or dishonest deed. Have you six days, or one day, one hour, or one minute in which you may,—I will not say do the unholy thing,—but even think the unholy thought? That one minute may be your ruin; for it is in those little beginnings of the minutes, sheltering shallow and unseemly thought, that the work of ruin gets its starting place. But for that one unholy minute in the start, the note had not been forged. the theft had not been committed, virtue had not been seduced. The burglary, the arson, the murder, all had their origin in an unholy minute.

He who is not content with a religion of tradition, but aspires to the religion of nature, must have all days holy.

Remember, "the sabbath was made for man."

CURRENT TOPICS.

Stimulating as a drink of morning bitters, the scheme to annex Hawaii excites American politics, and our statesmen, intoxicated by patriotic ambition, get ready to steal and fight. A dozen
residents of Hawaii, men of money, interested in the American sugar bounty, enter into a conspiracy with outside speculators and make a revolution in Liliput. They depose the queen, declare themselves a provisional government, and beg the powers at Washington to steal the Sandwich Islands, and then annex them politically to the American republic. Without waiting for the ambassadors, or caring to hear the case, our Jingo politicians hurriedly sanction the revolutionary plan, under the plea that "if we do not seize this opportunity, England will." How comes it that when territory is likely to be stolen, the suspicion of the civilized world immediately falls upon two Englishmen, the Englishman of the United States, and his kinsman in Great Britain? It is corroborative evidence against both of them that they instantly suspect each other. Neither of them fears that a larceny of the Sandwich Islands will be attempted by Russia, Japan, China, Germany, or France. By signs of mutual distrust they justify the opinion of mankind that if the islands are to be stolen at all, the stealing will be done by one of those Englishmen or the other. Before the spark that brought the revolutionary news was cold, Mr. Chandler offered a resolution in the Senate, looking to annexation, and he was eagerly assisted by Mr. Dolph, of Oregon, who said: "The time has arrived for a well-defined aggressive American policy." Why should we be "aggressive"? Aggressive persons are a neighborhood nuisance. One of them is enough to impair the comfort of a whole block, while three of them can depress the value of a street. Mr. Dolph thinks that "the time has arrived" for the American republic to make itself "aggressive" and a universal nuisance, the champion prizefighter among nations.

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The ethics of international piracy is now advocated with religious fervor by the politicians and the press. In this morning's paper I find a sermon on that subject, preached by a moralist who has for a long time lived in the Sandwich Islands, and, speaking with authority, he says: "The natives are incapable of self-government." This argument is inevitable; it has always been the excuse of strong governments for the oppression of the weak; and in the present instance it ignominiously fails. The depravity of the "natives" is additional proof that their country ought to be taken from them, and their wickedness is thus described: "The 'Kanakas' are a clever, interesting, gentle people. They are not lazy exactly, but act as though the earth belonged to them by right, and that others lived on it by sufferance." The latter part of this description applies more correctly to some other people than to the "Kanakas," for those poor natives have never claimed that any part of the earth excepting the Sandwich Islands "belonged to them by right," and certainly that much of their claim is good. If we take their country from them, that bit of the earth will belong to us by wrong. Another reason for abolishing their nationality is this: "If they think you want something very much, they will charge extravagant prices for it." This weakness has a strong resemblance to the English and the American way of doing business, and it is excellent evidence that the "Kanakas" are not "incapable of self-government." "But," says the moralist, "if you admire that self-same thing and comment on its beauty, they will give it to you." This courtesy never was learned from the English or the Americans, but it suggests a plan worth trying. Instead of stealing the country, or buying it, let us admire it and "comment on its beauty." Then, perhaps, those "clever, gentle, interesting people" will give it to us for nothing.

* * *

I am well aware that in discussing the World's Fair Sunday closing question I am throwing some old straw over again; but as the threshing still goes on in spite of me, I think that I have as much right as anybody else to take a hand at the flail. My text will be found in the testament according to Charles Dickens, "Little Dorrit," Chapter III. Arthur Clennam has just returned from France to London. It happens to be Sunday evening, and as there is no place open that he cares to go to, he sits in a desolate room at the tavern and hearkens to the clang-clang of the church bells, calling the people to prayer. Listening wearily, he translates the language of the chimes as the tramp Whittington did when, resting on the mile-stone, he heard the very same bells talking to him like poetry, and saying, "Turn again, Whittington, Lord Mayor of London":

"Mr. Arthur Clennam sat in the window of the coffee house on Ludgate Hill, counting one of the neighboring bells, making sentences and burdens of songs out of it in spite of himself, and wondering how many sick people it might be the death of in the course of a year. As the hour approached its changes of measure made it more and more exasperating. At the quarter it went off into a condition of deadly impatience, urging the populace in a voluble manner to Come to church, Come to church, Come to church. At the ten minutes it became aware that the congregation would be scanty, and slowly hammered out in low spirits, They won't come, They won't come. At five minutes it abandoned hope and shook every house in the neighborhood for three hundred seconds with one dismal swing per second as a groan of despair."

Not altogether of despair, for the bells had sweet revenge. They had the power of saying to the laggard people, "If you will not come here, you shall not go there. We have closed all the good places in the city except the churches, because we fear not the competition of evil, but only the rivalry of good." That is the sentiment of the churches in Chicago now; and up there in the steeples we can hear the threat of discordant theologies warning us that if we will not come to church we shall not go to the Exposition. One step farther backward brings us to the law that compelled the people to go to church whether they would or no. During the war I had in my command a regiment of colored soldiers, and amongst them was a sergeant who had been a baptist minister. While we were stationed at Fort Smith he started a revival that lasted several days. He got many converts from the negroes round about, and he baptized them in the river. Among them was a zealous woman who did good service in singing, praying, and exhorting; but her own son, George Washington, was obdurate. Either he would not, or he could not get religion. Out of all patience with him at last, his mother made a loud appeal to the minister, and said, "Sergeant, take that good for nuffin George Washington by de scruff o' de neck and baptise him anyhow." I cannot help thinking that if the man who will not allow me to go to the Exposition on Sunday could have his own way, he would coax me to church "by de scruff o' de neck" and baptise me anyhow.

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A motion for a rehearing of the Lake Front case has been filed in the Supreme Court of the United States by the Illinois Central Railroad Company, which motion will very likely be denied, not on its merits at all, but for the insurmountable reason that the Supreme Court never grants a rehearing unless one of the judges who concurred in the decision expresses a doubt as to his own wisdom; and this of course he never does. Whether the property in dispute was owned by the city of Chicago or by the Illinois Central Railroad was the question, and it conspicuously seems as if seven "distinguished jurists" ought to have easily agreed in solving so simple a conundrum; but no, four of them thought it belonged to the city; and the other three decided that it belonged to the Railroad; as nearly a tie vote as you could get without cutting one of the judges into two halves; in which case, no doubt, one half of him would have decided for the city, and the other for the railroad. The motion offers many "legal" grounds for a rehearing, but carelessly enough, the common sense reason that the court was as evenly divided as it is possible for seven men to be, was not presented at all. In the Solomon-like wisdom of the law, the opinions of the minority count for nothing; all the property in dispute goes to the city, and ethically, this appears to be unfair. I once tried a case in Maribetown concerning a kiln containing one hun-
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dred thousand brick, the ownership of which was disputed by two men. The jury after being out all night, came into court and reported that they were unable to agree; that they stood seven to five, and would stand that way until the burning lake froze over. I then proposed that as my client had a majority, we divide the one hundred thousand brick between the litigants, seven twelfths for my man, and five twelfths for the other. This was agreed to and when the division came we had another law suit over the fraction, because neither of the claimants would accept a broken brick, and it was mathematically necessary to break a brick in order to make the division arithmetically exact. I merely mention the celebrated Brick-Kiln case to illustrate a principle which ought to govern in the Lake Front case. As there were seven judges, four on one side, and three on the other, equity requires that the property in dispute be divided according to the judicial ratio, four sevenths to the city, and three sevenths to the railroad.

In spite of evidence to the contrary, envious persons, and even some of the Chicago papers, persist in slandering the city by retailing the stale calumny that the gambling houses are running "wide open," and that gambling in all its "hydra-headed" forms is flourishing in Chicago with the assistance and connivance of the police. It is a pleasure to contradict that libel, the falsity of which is proved by the following item which I quote from the Herald of to-day. "Officer Steve Rowan raided a crap game last night in the east corridors of the city hall. Twenty-five Italian newsboys, fifty cents in coppers and a "come-seven-eleven" outfit were the results of the raid." The success of this courageous raid upon a formidable gang of gamblers procures the vigilance and efficiency of the police. Not only that, it is hardly more than a month since a dashing raid was made by the police on a den of Chinese laundrymen. On that occasion the guardians of the city morals caught no less than ten Chinamen down in a cellar in the very act of playing "bung loo," for stakes amounting to as much as thirteen cents. All this proves that gambling in Chicago has been effectually "stamped out," because it stands to reason that the police would not suppress "come-seven-eleven" or "bung loo," and allow the gilded bells of the city to flourish on the profits of poker, faro, and roulette.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

ANNEXATION AND INTERNATIONAL STEALING.

International stealing is as bad as private stealing, but I cannot help thinking that there is somewhere a flaw in the idea that the annexation or conquest of a country is to be regarded under all circumstances as robbery, and that aggressiveness is once for all to be condemned.

Taking possession of a country may be robbery, but it need not be. Those who hold property without a perfect title become in time real owners, "by right of prescription," as the phrase runs, on the condition that they do so in good faith. But stolen goods can never become the legal property of the thief. If conquest or annexation were to be classed as stealing, the thieves would be obliged to give up their stolen possessions.

What a confusion would arise from this maxim! To begin with ourselves, we should have to rehabilitate the redman in the possession of this country. The Norman aristocracy of England would have to give their titles and lands to their Saxons tenants. The Saxons again would have to yield their claims to the Britons, whom they providentially exterminated. That, however, is apparently no reason for leaving the lands in the possession of the Saxons, unless we accept the rule (sometimes adhered to in practical life) that the more paltry the offence, the severer the punishment, the greater the crime the higher the reward.

If General Trumbull's idea were correct, and if humanity had always acted according to the rules of peaceful and inoffensive morality, where would civilisation be to-day? The hunter would probably never have yielded his rights to the tiller of the soil, and progress would have become an impossibility.

The fact is that struggle is an essential factor of progress, and the power of holding one's own is an indispensable attribute of the right of possession. The claim of the Indian to this country amounts to about the same thing as the claims of the Bourbons to France, or the Guelphs to Hanover; that is, their claims are simply ridiculous so long as they lack the power to uphold them.

The better man has to prove his right of existence by survival. He must not only be better in his own eyes, or from some ideal standard of a lamb-like, goody-goody morality, which avoids offence and keeps peace for the sake of peace, he must also be stronger. This is true of inventions of new institutions, of whole civilisations, of world-conceptions—in brief, it is true generally. Every step in advance must be struggled for and has often to be made under great sacrifices, not only of those who identify themselves with the cause of progress, but also of those who advocate conservatism and are destined to be losers in the fight.

Whether or not Hawaii is to be annexed, whether or not we have a right to either annexing or conquering it, whether or not annexation would only promote the interests of a few private persons, we do not presume to decide, for we are not sufficiently informed about all the details of the problem. We only wish to state that the grounds upon which our friend and contributor condemns an aggressive policy are, in our opinion, insufficient.

And truly if aggressiveness were reprehensible, how divided would the sentiments of those be who, like ourselves, are delighted with the undaunted, vigorous spirit which we are wont to find in General Trumbull's "Current Topics." If aggressiveness were a sin in international politics, would it not be a sin also in the world of authors and journalists? Are not General Trumbull's remarks so pungent, pithy, and invigorating because he himself is a staunch wrangler for progress, freedom, and justice? The truth is that the combative nature of the Saxon is extraordinarily strong in him, and it would be a great pity to eradicate it together with the aggressive spirit of international politics.

BOOK REVIEWS.


Despite the jests of newspaper paragraphers, the solemn warnings of the clergy, and the conservatism of courts, the rights of women remain a living issue. It must be met, and it cannot be adequately met by jokes, protests, or judicial appeal to precedents. Rights are radical, and the plea for them must therefore be made from a thorough radical standpoint. This is the great advantage of the plea made for women by Karl Heinzen in his book above mentioned. The character of the author appears in his writing, and what that was may be known from his motto: "Learn to endure everything, only not slavery; learn to dispense with everything, only not with your self-respect; learn to lose everything, only not yourself. All else in life is worthless, delusive, and fickle. Man's only sure support is in himself, in his individuality, resting in its own power and sovereignty." Here, then, was a man who had little respect for authority in matters of opinion. What he thought he said with directness, and with indifference to the prejudices which might be offended. "Besides, he was a writer who knew how to wield his pen as none of his German contemporaries in this country; who as none else, knew how to express his thoughts in the most pregnant, incisive, and energetic form—a master of pure classical style," quoting the words of the publisher of the book.

He opens up his subject with an historical review of the legal position of women from the age of savagery, and in this illustrates
the origin of the circumstances which have hedged them round and kept them in one degree of slavery or another ever since.

From this review of the history of woman the author passes into the heart of his subject and discusses the nature of marriage, what constitutes it, etc. He is dealing with obstinate vices, and he goes at them with energy, convinced that the first thing to do is to destroy them. Consequences he would leave to take care of themselves. He believes that nature will take care of itself if left alone. He denies that it is inherently bad, and holds that it has been made so because of the restraints upon it.

Summing up his teachings, Heinezen says, women must see that "'their degradation is founded on the rule of force, the rule of money, the rule of priests. It must, therefore, have become clear to them that they cannot depend on an improvement of their lot before the liberty and right of all men have been attained, the existence of all men have been secured, and the essence and dignity of all men have been recognised in purely human conceptions.

Everything that they can be and can wish for depends on these three points: their liberty, their rights, their dignity, their social position, their marital happiness, their love, their education, their everything.

Women must enter the ranks of the revolution, for the object is the revolution of humanity.'"

NOTES.

An interesting article in the Century for February entitled "Preliminary Glimpses of the Fair," by C. C. Buel, makes reference to the part played by cranks in life. Mr. Buel says:

"As was to be expected, the fair has attracted the ingenious and numerous American "cranks," as well as foreign persons with mental and moral crotchets. These, and also youthful geniuses, have besieged, personally and by letter, the Ways and Means Committee. A few examples will indicate how much of human nature as it really is will not be on exhibition at the fair: An American was early in the field with a divine revelation of the site which had been foreordained for the fair when the foundations of the world were laid, and an Englishman has desired to be put on exhibition as the Messiah. Two boys "of respectable parentage" in western New York have offered to walk to Chicago, and to camp on the Exposition grounds with the purpose of illustrating the life of tramps, and of lecturing on its vicissitudes. Another boy of sixteen recommended that a number of nickel-in-the-slot phonographs fixed to repeat amusing fish stories might be placed in the Fisheries Building and about the grounds; he urged that a royalty on the suggestion would enable him to help his widowed mother. An enterprising dealer in cosmetics asked space to exhibit an old woman, one half of whose face was to be smoothed out with his preparation and the remainder left with its mortal wrinkles until the end of the fair, when he would smooth out the other half in the presence of the multitude. The parents of a "favorite orator" of six years offered his services as introducer of the chief orator at the dedication ceremonies, which would, they thought, lend emphasis to the portentous importance of the occasion. A mathematician [sic!] asked for standing-room where he might show the world how to square the circle. Out of Indiana came a solver of perpetual motion; he was informed that space could not be allotted for the exhibition of an idea, so he would have to bring on his machine; later he informed the committee that his self-feeding engine, which had been running a sewing-machine, had unfortunately broken down, "but the principle remained the same." A Georgian asked for a concession to conduct a cockfight, and another son of the South knew of a colored child which was an anatomical wonder, and could be had by stealing it from its mother; for a reasonable sum he was willing to fill the office of kidnapper. Innumerable freaks of nature have been tendered; and the pretty English harmaid has in several instances inclosed her photograph with an offer of assist-

ance to the fair. A very serious offer came from a Spaniard, who had been disgusted with the weak attempts to give bull-fights in Paris during the recent exposition. He offered to fill the brutal void at the Columbian fair if he could be assured the privilege of producing the spectacle "with all his real and genuine circumstances.

Whether or not the managers have succeeded in keeping the crank out, remains to be seen; for there are voices heard in Chicago that some cranks have even been smuggled into the headquarters of the fair, and that especially the World's Fair Auxiliary is full of them.

The February New England Magazine opens with an excellent description, by William Morton Payne, of the literary awakening in Chicago, with a commentary upon the most notable literary characters who have made their reputations there. The article is well illustrated. "There are many indications of an intellectual development near at hand that will give to Chicago a prominence proportioned to her wealth and population," writes Mr. Payne. "Two causes in particular are going to operate powerfully in bringing about this result. Within a very few years Chicago will be the second, if not the first, literary centre of the country. The Public Library, the Newberry Library, the Crerar Library, and the University Library will be four of the largest and richest collections of books in the United States, and their combined influence will attract scholars of all sorts from all directions. The new University of Chicago, just opening its doors to the public, begins its career with an equipment of men and means that place it at once in the front rank of educational institutions, and it cannot fail to have a levelling influence upon the whole community. It does not seem unreasonable to think, in view of these facts, that Chicago, having sufficiently astonished the world by her commercial prosperity, is preparing a final astonishment in the form of an intellectual development that will overshadow her material achievements, until of her, in Mr. Ruskin's phrase, 'It shall not be said, 'see what manner of stones are here,' but 'see what manner of men.'"

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