PYTHAGORICS.

BY C. S. PEIRCE.

The catholic kindness of the philosopher who conducts The Open Court gives me a hearing before its bar, to present the claims of certain ideas. I accordingly purpose to submit some reflections upon various methods of reasoning,—as well methods in vogue which I undertake to show faulty, as methods neglected or discarded the use of which I shall advocate. These pleadings will make up a series of briefs, or articles, to be entitled “The Critic of Arguments,” the word critic here meaning an art, like logic, etc. But I shall beg leave to intersperse among these essays others relating to points in the history of human reason, treated mostly with special reference to the practical lessons they suggest.

"Many loved Truth, and lavished life's best oil
Amid the dust of books to find her,
Content at last, for guerdon of their toil,
With the cast mantle she hath left behind her."

So sang James Lowell. But he knew, as well as anybody, that no dryasust could ever have expected anything more from his plodding than the "cast mantle" of truth. The individual scholar looks upon himself as only one of a vast army of ants who are collectively building up something which no one of them can comprehend in advance or is destined ever to see, but which is to be the solace, stimulus, and strength of future generations. The student’s life would lack something of its proper dignity if he did not well know, at the outset, that, in embracing it, and thus surrendering the ordinary joys of life, he has to look forward to no personal compensation, whether material or sentimental. I mean this of the American student, only, for of course all is very different in continental Europe, where learned men are sought after by universities, and have an honorable status, instead of being counted as cranks. What is a bit discouraging in his prospect, to a young man who contemplates devoting himself to intellectual affairs, is the assurance that all his life long he will be prevented from doing his work thoroughly well, and from competing with European rivals, owing to the impossibility of procuring the necessary books. True, there are a few great libraries in the expensive cities, open at stated hours. But to study one must burn the midnight oil, and must have many books always at hand. No poor grub will, in any of the dreams that inanition brings, ever fancy that, among all the rich Grolier clubs, a single bibliophile could be found who would deprive himself of half a dozen rare volumes, in order, with the proceeds of their sale, to purchase a thousand works of value to be loaned to one who would actually use them for the world’s good!

In these days, we have seen all sorts of artisans and manual laborers associating themselves to enforce the respect of those with whom they deal; but it was only a little while ago that I heard of the actual existence of a secret society of scientific students, called the Pythagorean Brotherhood.

It is a beautiful name. I would it were given to me to write the life of Pythagoras; for it is not only the sublimest of all human biographies, but the task would also afford a unique opportunity of showing how a true logic would deal with a great mass of weak testimony, and of putting in a clear light the futility of the canons which historical critics are now in the habit of applying to such cases. Open any modern history of philosophy and you will find that the story of Pythagoras,—except in a few colorless outlines,—is erased altogether, on the ground that it rests upon very late authorities, to follow whom would not be "safe." Can anybody explain what that word means? The Latin saliens sum means: I have come out without loss; and so when an insurance company judges a risk "safe," they mean that they will take a thousand like it and that what they lose on some of them will be made good on others. If this is the sense in which historical beliefs are said to be "safe" or otherwise, one essential factor in determining whether they should be so regarded must be their value to us in case they are true. One would risk more for the sake of knowing that the ideal Pythagoras lived, than he would for the sake of knowing that the Platonic Socrates lived. The best of the story should be true, to judge by the elevated character of all the Pythagoreans we hear of; and when we remember how intensely secretive they were, and how they refrained from so much as naming their master, the late divulgement of
the facts is noway surprising. But be the story true
or false, it remains one of the most precious of biogra-
phies; because it inspires and inflames the heart of
the reader with a great and lofty ideal of humanity.
In this light, the suppression of it in modern books
shows the queer earth-worship of our day. Are ideals
unembodied of no account? I wot they must be reck-
oned with, even in computing the active forces of this
world.

At any rate, it is certain that Pythagoras really
lived, and that in the sixth century before Christ, the
Tarquins then reigning in Rome, he established in the
great city of Crotona, at the southernmost point of the
Gulf of Tarentum, a scientific secret society, one main
purpose of which was to control the policy and con-
duct of the government, and to sway the minds of the
citizens.* There is no reason to doubt that full mem-
ers of this brotherhood surrendered their property;
and they must have supported themselves by means
of their superior knowledge, probably in mathematics.
This was not publicly understood; for only the initiated,
by means of secret signals, could tell who were and
who were not Pythagoreans. That they made great
advances in mathematics is an established fact. If
there are those who disbelieve their master’s having
discovered the forty-seventh proposition of the first
book of Euclid (which commonly bears his name),
and the thirty-first proposition of the third book, their
disbelief comes from the use of canons that embody a
sceptical temper, but not a sane logic. Indeed, there
are men who seem to conceive that the less they be-
lieve the more highly scientific they are. The Pythag-
oreans attached significance to numbers. They had a
number of justice, 4 or, perhaps 3, or 5; a number of
health, 6 or 7; a number of marriage, 5, 3, or 6; and
a number of light, 7 or 6. One was the origin; two,
stalwart resistance; three, mediation and beauty; four,
the key of nature; five, color; six, life; seven, the
lucky time; eight, the Cadsman number; etc. But
pre-eminent above all was ten, the sacred number, the
principle and guide of human life, the number of
Power. There was some great secret attached to ten,
and the Pythagorean oath made special reference to
it. The testimony of antiquity is unequivocal that the
Pythagoreans kept their mathematical discoveries se-
cret. But the sapient modern critic sees fit to reject
this statement. Do you ask why? Simply, because it
is not “probable.” But since I do not myself carry
about in my breast any such unerring and heaven-born
sense of the “probable,” there is nothing for me to do

* Critics pronounce the statement that he publicly exhibited his golden
theb as an absurd fiction. But Aristotle is the witness to it; and his testi-
mony cannot be lightly put aside. Crotona was a commercial city; and prob-
ably the Crotomates were so eager for gold that at the sight of it they lost their
reason, and Pythagoras deemed it wise to turn that madness to the service of
philosophy.

but to believe that the Pythagoreans did keep their
mathematical discoveries to themselves; and all the
testimony there is in favor of this fact fails to rouse in
me an impulse to deny it. That is where, I suppose,
I am wanting in the true critical spirit. But since
they must have earned their living by the practice of
the mathematical arts,—computation, book-keeping,
mensuration, surveying, etc,—it would plainly be to
the interest of the guild that this mystery should re-
main a mystery to outsiders. When Boethius, about
A. D. 500, gives an account of a sort of abacus, con-
sisting of a table ruled in columns for the decimal
places, in which columns characters substantially the
same as our Arabic figures, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
were written, he says that this table and these digit-
characters were used by the Pythagorics. True, the
genuineness of this passage has been much disputed,
notwithstanding one of the manuscripts dating from
the tenth century, long before the introduction of the
Arabic notation into Europe. But these doubts are
now given up, at any rate by the best authorities.
Still, I hardly need say that every self-respecting critic
rejects the statement of Boethius that these figures
were used by the Pythagoreans. For how could Boe-
thius, A. D. 500, know anything about the secrets of a
club, of which we, we ourselves, even WE, hear little,
subsequent to A. D. 200? Yet certain singular facts
call for explanation. The figures which we have seen
were known to a few persons in Rome A. D. 500, but
had never before been publicly spoken of throughout
the widest limit of the Roman Empire, (unless perhaps
in Egypt, where some hieratic characters are fancied
to resemble them,) are modifications of the letters of
an old Bactrian alphabet, at that time for centuries
disused. Nor, after that time, were these figures
heard of again until Muhammad ben Musa brought
them once more from Khiva in the ninth century, at
the summons of the Arabian Khalif. When, in the
twelfth century, they first appear again in Europe,
they are strangely attributed, not to Arabians, Turks,
Parthians, Bactrians, Egyptians, nor Pythagorics, but
to the Chaldees; and they bear these outlandish names:

1. igne. 6. 3alitis.
2. 2Andras. 7. 7ebis.
3. 3Ormis. 8. 3tenemias.
4. 4Arbas. 9. Celentis.
5. 55Quimsa. 0. 3ipos.

M. Lenormant, the Assyriologist, recognised five of
these words as corruptions from the Sumerian speech
of Babylonia, viz.—igne = ishitin; arbas = arba; qui-
mas = khamsa; zebis = shibit; temenias = shumannu.
The other 5 do not at all resemble any numerals of
the old Turanian language of Babylonia, so far as now
known; but two of them are like the allied Magyar,
in which tongue 3 is harum, a little like ornis, and 9
is kalents, like celentis. At any rate, if we were to
suppose that the use of these figures was known to Chaldean priests, and communicated by them to Pythagoras, who in ancient times was always held to have been a great traveller, and to have spent many years in Babylon, and if we suppose that it was by means of the use of these figures that the Pythagoreans gained their livelihood, then we can understand how the knowledge of them, though not general, crops out here and there, at distant times and places, with wonderfully little change.

I have been led into this chiefly to illustrate the fact that, sincerely devoted to pure science as Pythagoras and his school assuredly were, yet their secret association by no means neglected practical objects, nor failed to pursue them in a thoroughly practical way.

This brings me back to the modern Pythagorean brotherhood, the rumor of which has reached my ears. I understand that it is composed of three hundred men and women whose lives are solemnly consecrated to science. They obey implicitly a general. Celibacy is strictly enjoined for the present; although, in the fulness of time, the intention is to recruit their numbers mainly by careful selections from among their own offspring, in the light of biological laws which they hope to make out. But the first forty years of the new life of the Pythagoric rule is regarded by all of them as a probationary period, during which they must practice a degree of self-abnegation and submit to a rigor of discipline which at a later time can be relaxed. Meantime, the corporation will be husbanding its resources and gathering strength for the great work that lies before it. This work, as these people conceive it, is no mere picking up of the "cast mantel" of truth, though that is indispensable, too; it is no less than the reception by man of all that he has to learn. To this end, the first step is to make their own body not only the most exquisitely virtuous society ever on earth, but also, what is far higher in their eyes, the wisest of all the race of men. The next step will be to subject the rest of mankind to the governance of these chosen best. This is to be accomplished by pitting their superior virtue, science, and wisdom, against the wickedness, the vanity, the credenciveness, and the cowardice of the common herd. In this conduct, they will not be handicapped, like the Church, by being committed to a mass of lies.

This is all that I have heard; but I can picture to myself a good many more details. I shall not ask anybody how these devotees will succeed; for me the facts of human nature and of history answer that question, plainly. The movement has been on its way to sure accomplishment, since the day on which three hundred gifted men and women gave up their lives and all their individual hopes to that great end.

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS.

BY THOS. C. LAWS.

[concluded.]

Upon a scientific treatment of the subject we may note five phases of moral evolution. We have first animal morality; in the second stage the morals may be called primitively savage; a collateral phase, developed under certain conditions, is primitively industrial; the remaining two are militant and mercantile. It may be objected to this classification that we have entirely ignored the time-honored division of humanity into savage and civilised. We do so intentionally: we are not able to give sufficiently definite meanings to these words to allow us to make use of them in scientific classification. They resemble greatly the legal term "felony" —a word without a definition. Originally felony was a crime punishable with forfeiture of goods. But other offences have now come to be classed as felonious, and the penalty of forfeiture has, generally speaking, been abolished. One can give merely a negative or a categorical definition. One may say (an assertion of little value, since it applies equally to crimes other than felonious) that a felony is an illegal act, the performance of which is punishable by law; or one may recount the names or natures of all the various deeds reckoned by lawyers as felonious. A civilised nation was originally one possessing civil institutions similar to those of ancient Greece and Rome. All others were heathens or barbarians. But Greece and Rome have long since fallen from their high estate in matters philosophical and political, and the word "civilised" has been left without a definite meaning. We may point to a European, a Hindu, and a Chinaman, and call each and all of them civilised; we may point to a Fijian, a Toda, or a Fuegan, and speak of him as savage. These are wide contrasts, and it is to such contrasts that we usually apply the terms. It is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to use the words in any way which will not give the reader or hearer the idea of contrast. Contrast, however, and classification are very different. Orders of classification merge more or less into one another; objects contrasted must be widely diverse. A way out of the difficulty has been suggested, and that is to use the word "civilised" to denote such peoples as possess a literature. Would those who so strenuously advocate this use of the word regard as civilised the Battas of Sumatra, who, notwithstanding that they have a written language and a literature of their own, yet possess political institutions inferior to those of Dahomey, and still practice cannibalism to some extent? In our use of the word "savage" as above, we shall signify such societies as exhibit normally actions which, judging from the standard of higher races, usually called civilised, would be looked upon as violent, ferocious, and vicious.

Objection may also be raised to the word "animal" and "primitive" as applied to savage humanity. It may be denied that there exist at present any truly primitive or original races. It may be maintained that the peoples so called are degenerations from a higher order, or that they have been modified by subsequent experience. We do not deny it. Evidence upon either side is extremely scant. But such men in the former case are undoubtedly what Darwin would call "reversions to type." They do not necessarily exhibit the traits of any particular race of early man, but they possess his general characteristics.

Animal morality is exhibited by a few races, for the most part forest-dwellers, such as the Obongo (the dwarf tribes of Equatorial Africa), the Veddas of Ceylon, the Andamanese, and the Fuegians. The Obongo are in stature about four and a half feet, their legs are short in proportion to their bodies, and their breasts are covered with tufts of hair. They live in caves or on the boughs of trees, and wear no clothing. Their food consists principally of roots and herbs. Little is known about them save that they live in tribes of males and females, and in that they are endogamous, marry-
THE OPEN COURT.

ing only within their own horde. Hence the Ashongos, a neighboring and more highly developed race, informed Du Chaillu that among them marriages between brothers and sisters are permitted. The Obongos are very timid, and fly like wild animals to the thickets or their caves at the sight of strangers. The Wood Veddas live in small isolated communities in the depths of the forests, sleeping at night in caverns or on the boughs of trees. They live from hand to mouth on roots, herbs, and snails. They are reputed to be ignorant of crime. Yet much of the little we know of them was derived from a Vedda imprisoned for murder. They do not possess property, and there is therefore little occasion for disputes among them. In its wild state the monkey does not steal, neither does he commit murder. But, like the Vedda, he has no idea of the meaning of property, or of the value of life. He is attracted by something bright and shining, which, ignorant of its being valuable jewelry, he appropriates. It is not the worth of the thing which attracts the monkey, but its brilliance, its glitter. He is irritated; incapable of calculating the consequences, he flings a stone at his persecutor, who is killed thereby. What judge and jury nowadays would try an ape for manslaughter? The Vedda is but little removed from the simian, but being classed as human, he has the misfortune to come under an obsolete system of jurisprudence, which regards a man as criminal, unless he comes under certain formal inaquies, drawn up centuries ago by legislators but little acquainted with human nature. As Dr. Letourneau has remarked of the Veddas, "their wandering life, in little monogamic groups, after the manner of certain animals, does not easily lend itself to the development of criminality, which almost necessarily supposes a somewhat numerous society, and consequently conflicting desires and needs among the various individuals."* The Obongos and the Veddas inhabit warm regions; the Fuegians dwell in one of the coldest inhabited countries in the world. Yet they wear no clothes, although almost within the Antarctic Circle. They are, however, acquainted with the use of fire. They have no distinct social organisation. Each man acts arbitrarily, and lex talionis prevails. A Fuegian has been seen to dash a child to pieces upon the rocks for overturning a basket of molluscs. Theft is punished by restitution, if the victim have sufficient power or influence upon his side; murder, by killing the murderer or one of his relations. Of personal property there is little, and should a man have the misfortune to possess more than his neighbors, they take good care speedily to deprive him of the surplus. Generally speaking, the virtues among these races are purely negative; the vices are either such as are normal among the lower animals, or are of a savage character.

The primitively savage races are warlike, and chiefly remarkable for their contempt of human life. Murder, wars of extermination, and cannibalism largely prevail amongst them. In the preceding group cannibalism is not unknown. The natives of the Andaman Isles are anthropophagists, whilst the Fuegians hold their women—particularly if they be old—in reserve in case of famine. It is, however, in Polynesia that we find this trait most developed. In Fiji, the god Cagawalu was the patron of murder and cannibalism. There both sexes regaled themselves with human flesh, and there, as also in New Zealand, not only were captives of war eaten, but likewise slaves and children reared for that purpose. In the Marquesas Isles, Radiguet, thirty years ago, found cannibalism practised. It is now rapidly dying out. In Tahiti, even before the time of Cook, anthropophagy was completely extinct. The women, Radiguet tells us, were excluded from the cannibal feasts, of which they had acquired the greatest horror, and for some days they fled with repugnance from the men suspected of having partaken in them. It is thus, from the selfishness of their masters, that there has arisen a feminine sense of delicacy, handed down by heredity mainly to their own sex, but indirectly to the other also. Among such tribes as these, harassed as they are by continual wars and famines, infanticide largely prevails. The child is regarded as the absolute property of its parents, and may be killed at their pleasure. The Tasmanians practised infanticide, as do the natives of New Guinea, the Bajumenes, the Kamstchadales, and the Sandwich Islanders. Formerly, it was practised also by the Todas, a peaceful and comparatively settled race. In China, it is restricted to a portion of the female children. Passing now to domestic morals, we may note that in these races generally, women are regarded as mere property; and adultery, when not authorised, as a form of theft. As regards public morals, despotism and frequently avaricious reign supreme. In New Zealand it is used to be said by the Maoris that a chief could not steal. In other words, he could take what he pleased. In Tahiti, if a chief asked the owner, "Whose tree is this?" the reply was "Ours; yours and mine." In Uganda, in Central Africa, King M'tesa used frequently to shoot a man, or order one to be shot, to test a new gun given him by an Arab trader or a European. Actions among these races are spasmodic, violent, and generally unbalanced.

The primitively industrial races may be regarded as savage races which have become isolated. They are, for the most part, almost inaccessible, living in small communities among the mountains. Their virtues, like those of the Veddas, are negative, and are owing to their isolation, not only from the rest of mankind, but also from other of their own communities. They are peaceful, frequently agricultural, and show some approach to order by stable political institutions. The Todas of the Neighberry Hills settle disputes by arbitration, or by a jury of five elders. This jury system exists also among the Puharris of the Rajmahal Hills of Bengal. Although the Puharris will unhesitatingly rob the tribes of the plain, yet among themselves their honor is of the strictest character. They have a horror of lying, and are said by Bishop Heber never to break their word with any man. So averse are they to shedding blood that they will not even slay a tiger save when required by lex talionis. Polygamy prevails among the Puharris, and polyandry among the Todas. The Naga of Assam is, when left alone, peaceful, kindly and sociable; but when irritated he is vindictive and cruel. Even the Bhils of Guzerat, the terrible Indian robber-tribes, are neither vindictive nor inhospitable to the stranger who puts himself in a friendly way into their hands. They are more frank and lively than the Hindu; their word is more to be relied upon; their women are comparatively well treated, and are without influence in the family and tribal councils.

The fourth phase is illustrated by the Dahomeyans (who, by their close racial and social kinship with the Fantis and Ashantis, mark the connection between this and the savage stage), the ancient Mexicans, Peruvians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans, and the peoples of feudal Europe. The morals of these peoples are the morals of war—not battles between petty tribes or hordes, but those of settled communities or huge states. It is among these races that the nation really comes into being, and patriotism becomes a cardinal virtue. In Dahomey every man is a slave to the king, and no woman is allowed to leave the country. The king alone has the power of life or death. In all these nations slavery of some kind existed, and in Dahomey, as in ancient Mexico, slaves are sacrificed as messengers to the gods and departed relatives. In Mexico slavery was not hereditary, but in the early days of feudal Europe it was. In the former country even the murder of a slave was punished by death. Theft and prodigality were punished by slavery or death. It was a capital offence also to remove the boundaries of land. Among the Peruvians the death penalty was inflicted for murder, manslaughter, and adultery, for burning a bridge or house, or for turning upon one's own field the water intended for a neighbor's. In Peru freedom was unknown; every man was practically a slave to the Inca. Among the ancient Ro

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mans slaves were regarded as a kind of human cattle, whose masters had absolute right of life and death. In Greece, as in China and in India, the woman in all things submitted herself to her parents as daughter, to her husband as wife, and to her sons as widow. In Rome, even at the time of Justinian, a woman was but just becoming thought fit to take care of her own children. At the time of Augustus repudiation of a wife was no uncommon occurrence. In early times, both in Rome and in Greece, children were regarded as the property of their father. Even in the declining days of the Roman Empire the law treated adult sons as it treated slaves, cattle, or furniture.

The development of morality from militiament, through feudalism and mediaval commercialism, into mercantilism cannot here be dealt with. To do so would be to write a history of the intellectual development of Europe. The morality of mercantilism is the morality of industry—that morality which springs from a growing equalisation of rights, of duties, and of interests. Social and political castes, theological prejudices, and social disadvantages due to differences of sex are being levelled to the ground, and in their place is growing up a greater freedom of human intercourse and a wider sphere of just human action. But mercantilism has its disadvantages. Primitive societies struggle for life, for bare existence; militant societies struggle for power; in mercantile societies the struggle becomes a war for wealth. Is the amassing of wealth, after all, to be the sole end of human existence?

We may roughly classify the phases of formal morality as three: the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific or rational. In the first, men look upon well-being as obedience to the dictates of the deities; in the second, as a deduction from certain metaphysical principles; and in the third, as bounded by laws akin to those already known to govern in the domain of life, of mind, and of society in general. All early formal ethics is theological. The Hebrew code of morals is bound up with the canon and ceremonial law, religious dogmas, and sacred history. That of ancient Egypt may be gathered from rituals and similar ecclesiastical papyri. In Greece, Sophocles makes Antigone declare that the deities of men cannot prevail against “the unwritten laws, the unchangeable work of the gods,” as he looked upon the fundamentals of morality. In Eastern thought Manu stands forth as part priest and partly philosopher. In the West, Thales is said to have been the first to throw off the priestly character and to take one purely philosophic. From Aristotle and Confucius to Kant, Bentham, and Mill, there stretches a long line of metaphysical thinkers, gradually merging, in the latter writer, in Comte, in Spencer, and in Bain, into the scientific school.

Advertizing once again to our former question, let us see whether a scientific account of the origin and function of morality be possible. We have said that actions are regarded as good which are habitual. But habit is not a matter of caprice: how then comes it? Darwin, in discussing the institutions of ants and bees, suggested that such as existed were probably of service to the species in general, and had hence been transmitted from generation to generation. We must regard this as but part of the truth. It is indeed true that in every race there is a tendency to perform such actions as are necessary for its own preservation—but simply because it is composed of many individuals. The actions which tend to the preservation of the race are the resultants of the actions of the widely diverse and oftentimes contradictory actions of its various members, who have been led to perform them, not, as Mr. Spencer naively supposes, because they argue that “if life be justifiable, there will be a justification for the performance of acts

essential to its preservation,” but because the conditions of life as the balancing between internal and external relations, make self-preservation not only necessary but inevitable. Ultimately, however, all morality must be judged by its effects upon individuals, proximately by its effects upon all aggregates into which the individual enters, as the unit of composition—the family, the society, and the race. Such actions as tend to preserve the integrity of all these, and to bring about the welfare of the individual at the same time, are relatively the best; and they are more or less good in so far as they approximate nearer to, or recede farther from such result. Thus, by the habitual association of well-doing with physical well-being—less complete in individuals, but more perfect in the society and race—there has grown up little by little a code of morals in every human association. In each individual this recognition is brought about partly by heredity, partly by training, and partly by social environment. The two latter factors will, perhaps, be denied by nobody. The former, however, (owing to an inevitable reaction against the exaggerated importance given to heredity by the earlier evolutionists) is not so universally admitted among the more recent men of science. They would find in environment the adequate cause of all traits alleged to be inherited.

They seem to forget that what is claimed as inherited is, not the actual traits themselves, but slight organic divergences, which, under certain conditions, bring those traits into being. Handwriting is not inherited as such, but is defined by the shape of the hand, the length of the fingers and slight nervous peculiarities. As these are hereditary it may easily be seen how a son's caligraphy may come to resemble—it may be only generally, it may be even in particulars—that of his father. Lucas tells us that at Mettray—a sort of French agricultural reformatory—in 1843 there were thirty-four youths whose parents had been in prison. Ribot instances a female criminal, of eighty of whose descendants in a direct line, twenty-five per cent. had been convicted of crime, whilst the remainder were either idiots, insane, drunkards or beggars. We have already instanced a lady of good social position, but whose family was, as Maudsley forcibly puts it, "saturated with insanity," as being incapable of moral control. Drunkenness is undoubtedly individually contracted; but inebriety—that insatiable, uncontrollable, and almost incurable craving for drink—is as undoubtedly inherited. And inebriety may, in different generations, alternate with paralysis, epilepsy, insanity, or crime. Sometimes, indeed, as our legal records only too terribly show, when the craving for drink is upon him, the disomaniac may exhibit an irresistible longing to commit crime, however high may be his moral status at other times.

It remains but to ask what will be the progress of morality in the future? To answer this question fully and systematically it will be necessary to take many matters into consideration. We should require to discuss the general characteristics of the race, the physical conditions, and intellectual, political, and social development of the society under consideration, as well as of particular individuals composing that society. Allowance would have to be made in individuals for abnormalities of organisation, whether progressive or retrogressive, such as genius, criminality, or idiocy. Climate, too, has some effect upon the morals both of individuals and of peoples. That irritability is experienced by many persons during change of weather or at the approach of a thunder-storm is well known. The characteristic laziness of African tribes is explicable, perhaps, when we remember that they live under a climate which, as a lately deceased English diplomat, who had seen years of active service in the Dark Continent, once remarked, is too hot to do anything, too hot to keep awake, and too hot even for sleep; where, as Dr. Griffon de Bellay has put it, "the wearied body grows depressed, without being able to find repose in a state

* Locke, who, in his celebrated Essay (bk. 1, c. iii.) denied the existence in the mind of any innate moral principles, refused to write a work on Ethics because he considered that "the Gospel contains so perfect a body of ethics that reason may be excused from the inquiry, since she may find man's duty clearer and easier in revelation than in herself."*

* Cited by Le Bourgeois, Evolution de la Morale, p. 66.
of inactivity, or renewal of the strength in sleep;" where "every one alike becomes sensible of the feeling of languidness for which he can hardly account, with its accompaniments of pain without obvious cause, and a sense of weariness which he cannot shake off." Spring, the season of which the poets have sung so much, is likewise the period of the year at which revolutions, murder, suicide, burglary and seduction are most prevalent. The illegitimately-rate in Great Britain is lowest on the shores of the English Channel, rising gradually over England and the Scottish Lowlands, and reaching its maximum in the Highlands. So Mayo, washed by the genial waters of the Gulf stream, stands at the bottom of the same scale, which rises over the rest of Ireland and over Scotland, reaching its highest point amid the snows of Sweden.

Generally speaking, we may say that the progress of morality in the future will be towards a more adequate compromise between egoism and altruism; a more perfect dispensation of justice, both public and private. Men will recognise better than they now do the correlation between rights and duties, and between actions and their inevitable consequences. Doubtless it will be long before any man ceases to advantage himself at the expense of another, but even for this may we yet hope. Politically, we may hope for an increase of individual liberty, and a clearer definition between the duties of the individual and those of the State. We must remember that there is being at the present time carried out a new redistribution of power, not in one country alone, but throughout the whole civilised world. That power which princes, barons, and pontiffs once wielded has now largely descended to trades-unions. These are the uncrowned kings of the nineteenth century, at whose behest even Parliaments themselves are expected to bow down in homage due. Such a power may be used for good, but unfortunately it may as easily be put to evil uses. When we see how a frivolous quarrel between two trade societies may throw out of work 20,000 men for three long months, as recently in the North of England; how a strike among coaliers may bring to the brink of starvation some thousands of workers in a neighboring district; how, as recently in New Zealand, a quarrel between a union and a single firm may cause the boycotting of several ports, and threaten to paralyse the entire foreign trade of a nation, we may well exhibit some alarm. The locomotive, with its boiler full of pent-up energy and its eighty miles an hour, is a dangerous toy, would be a terrible master, but is a most useful servant, so long as its boiler remains intact and its brake under control. So the power of organisation, if abused, may convulse a continent; but, rightly used, may bring benefits unnumbered to untold generations.

Turning now to domestic morality, individual liberty will rule even home life. The wife and the child will cease to be mere chattels or beasts of burden, and become human beings—integral units in the social system. It has been argued that women cannot exercise legislative functions because they cannot fight. The argument is fallacious: in the politics of to-day militarism takes quite a second place. Being mercantile nations, as we are, the objection should read that a woman cannot legislate because she is incapable of engaging in business. But women have long been engaged in business matters on a small scale; and the principal reason that they have not entered into greater enterprises is their want of opportunity, and the strength of popular prejudice. Even had the opportunity been a priori basis, it would still be false as a matter of history. There was one Queen of England whose diplomacy was more than a match for that of the statesmen of all Europe. But Elizabeth did not become the Admiral of the Fleet in the attack upon the Armada. Jeanne d'Arc fought bravely the battles of her country, but had she been crowned at Reims and the Dauphin burnt in the market place of Rouen, there can be little doubt that her mad career would have brought about the ruin of France. No man, perhaps, in our century has equalled in skill or in popularity the Duke of Wellington as a military commander. Yet the Duke's attempt to guide as Prime Minister the affairs of his country was, although short, an ignominious failure. His victory at Waterloo brought him the thanks of Europe, to which he had given a season of peace; his ministerial reign brought the brickbats of a London mob through the windows of his house. We do not intend to imply that there is an antithesis between military and governmental genius, but we wish simply to show that in nations that have developed beyond a certain stage of social organisation there is no necessary connection between them. Even Russia has had a Tsarina upon its throne; and, if we are to believe ancient travellers, in the palmy days of the Congo Empire a woman ruled over that warlike State. Nevertheless, though there be effeminate men and masculine women, they are but an insignificant minority, and that broad social distinction which rests upon physical differences cannot but be maintained throughout all time. But this in no wise affects the matter of co-citizenship and of the right of women to compete with the stern sex so far as their capabilities will allow. The question is one of equalisation, not of function—for that is manifestly impossible—but of opportunities.

**CURRENT TOPICS.**

The death of George William Curtis falls heavily upon literature and politics. We can hardly afford to lose him now. Ripe in wisdom, eloquent in speech, he wrote with a magnetic pen up to a reformer's ideal of what his country ought to be. In the roar of trade, the whirl of politics, and the delirious excitement of the social war, it seems that not any one man is big enough to be missed, and yet we shall all miss Curtis. He was one of the great journalists who make ideas for statesmen to set in laws and senatorial speech. He was never the servant of public opinion, but he was one of its masters and makers. He was something of a puritan in politics, but never the worse for that, and to him the arena of debate was always Naseby field, and his fight, like that of Cromwell, the battle of the Lord. Wherever he moved in party conflict he gave it a classic tone, and with him politics was a scheme of national ethics, building a mighty commonwealth on justice, purity, and honesty. He was a gentleman in private life, and we admired him for that; but when he proved himself a gentleman in public life, we said he was a man milliner and a dude. There, we like to wear our morals loose. In the British Museum, and in the gallery of the Louvre, I have seen ancient Gods in marble, with their limbs and features damaged; Hercules with his ear gone, and Jupiter without a nose; and this is the condition in which Mr. Curtis has left that venerable idol which we call the "Nominee." He voted for the nominee, provided the nominee was worth voting for, but not otherwise. So many of his countrymen followed his example in that matter that the nominee is not so mischievous and arrogant a deity as he was. We shall miss George William Curtis from his editorial pages, and we shall miss him from his "Easy chair." There was a moral finish on his work that will surely prove contagious; an inspiration to other pens, now that his own is dead.

* * *

The depravity of the Chinese was exposed at Ocean Grove a few days ago, by a Doctor of Divinity who ought to know what he was talking about, for he had served as a missionary in China for more than twenty years. I believe his testimony was correct, for it was what I have often heard before; and very much like that of the man who complained that he could not make his wife love him, though he beat her every day. The reverend gentleman complained of the Chinese prejudice against foreigners, and said that it was very hard to make any religious impressions on the natives. Considering the tolerant, magnanimous, and humane treatment the Chinese have received from the Christians, especially Americans and English, their prejudice against foreigners appears to be irrational. They ought, in common gratitude, to believe and
be baptised. I am now reading that under a recent law every Chinaman in the United States must register at the office of the Collector of Internal Revenue his name, age, occupation, and three proof-sheet photographs of his face. On failing to comply with this law he is to be sent back to China. Also I find a letter in the paper from a Chinaman complaining that some of his countrymen visiting the World’s Fair to gaze upon the wonders of Christian civilization were hooted at by the workmen there, pelted with mortar, and driven from the grounds. We try to make religious impressions upon the Chinese with chunks of mortar, and then wonder that they are not converted. The Christian Doctor of Divinity had been a missionary in China for twenty years; he had been allowed to proselyte the people and preach against the national religion, yet he complains of the Chinese prejudice against foreigners. A Chinese missionary to America preaching Buddha, would not have a dozen of us converted before his forehead would be radiant with a martyr’s crown. He would not be tolerated here for twenty days.

There is trouble between Post No. 323 of the Grand Army and the methodist minister at Tuscola, Illinois; and the newspapers gravely says that the affair has caused such a stir in the village that the minister may be forced to leave. His offense was not a serious one; he merely proclaimed at a camp meeting that during the late war “the officers issued whiskey mixed with gunpowder to soldiers to make them more courageous, and inspire them to fight.” It seems to me that Post No. 323, G. A. R., is unnecessarily sensitive, and that instead of denouncing the minister for saying that, the members ought to thank him for his valuable contribution to physiological science. If a mixture of whiskey and gunpowder will make soldiers more courageous it ought to be issued as rations every morning; and any officer neglecting to give this liquid inspiration to his men ought to be tried by court martial. For my own part, I doubt the moral potency of gunpowder punch, for such whiskey courage as I saw in the army appeared to be nearly akin to cowardice. An army inspired by sulphuric torch would be easily defeated by an equal number of sober men. Let the reverend preacher try a few drinks of it and see if it will enable him to fight the angry veterans of Post 323. He has been imposed upon by military legends like that of the miraculous ram’s horn, and the donkey’s jaw bone. The Grand Army, instead of denouncing him, and driving him out of town, should kindly have shown him that he was wrong.

Folstaff complained that his liquor was adulterated, and that “nothing but roguery was to be found in villainous man.” As it was with him, so it is with us; nearly everything we eat and drink is adulterated, and we must protect ourselves from poison as we can. Considering the moral standard of the time I can excuse the adulteration of every thing but milk, but I must draw the line of pardonable rascality there. That is the food of children and infants who cannot protect themselves, and I think the adulteration of their food must be that unpardonable sin concerning which there has been so much theological doubt and speculation. That the children of a great city should be poisoned every day by dairymen is another proof that legal statutes are powerless to make an artificial conscience. In spite of the laws forbidding the adulteration of milk, we have official evidence that nearly all the milk sold in Chicago is impure; “adulterated,” says Dr. Christopher, with “chemical preparations, so-called expanders, preservative acids, and other foreign and deleterious substances.” And Dr. Hamilton says, “I do not care to discuss what has been discovered by our committee, for it has not completed its report. But the intelligence will be startling. Adulteration of milk in this city has been carried on to an extent almost beyond belief.” And the babies are dying day by day, while the papers are filled with indignation against the adulterated politics of the opposite party, and the wickedness of Harrison or Cleveland. The crime is not confined to Chicago; it is general throughout the country; and I find by the report of the dairy commissioners of New Jersey, that many of the popular “infant foods” are adulterated with unwholesome substances. I know that my coats and hats and shoes and stockings, and other things are adulterated; but I can stand that, for it is only a fraud upon the pocket, and not upon the health; but what ought to be done to the man who adulterates “infant foods,” and to his accomplice in manslaughter, the dairyman who poisons milk?

The London Times, like an affectionate Brutus feeling with his dagger for the ribs of Caesar, smiles upon Chicago. Beguiling the susceptible young city with cooing praises of its brick-and-mortar greatness, it wounds us in a form of words like these: “Chicago has hitherto been too feverishly busy piling up money and population to give to the world even one conspicuous man of letters.” If this is true, Chicago has given comparatively nothing to the world. If the genius of art, poetry, and eloquence has never sprinkled his torch over this great city, then, right here, morally speaking, is the Great American Desert we have read of in the books. If Chicago is only a triumph of money making and muscle, the John L. Sullivan of cities, we are entitled to a spiritual rank no higher than that given to the Prairie-dog city in Lincoln Park. That we are steeped in literary poverty is a taunt that falls not upon our authors only, but upon all the citizens; for a city with intellect enough to create a thought worth hearing, will not lack a man with eloquence enough to speak it. A city capable of divine ideals can produce a poet by spontaneous generation. A city with an inspired message in its brain will easily find a prophet. Out of their own souls must come the literature of a people, for Nature does not waste her Miltons and her Schillers on the Hottentots. With becoming humility, we will accept the patronage and the pity of the Times, and strengthen ourselves with a little of that spoon-fed comfort which promises that “perhaps the time may come when the diversion to mental pursuits of a percentage of Chicago’s exuberant energy may give to the world an intellectual type.” This amounts to saying that Chicago, by mental application and hard study, may blossom like the century plant, and “give to the world a conspicuous man of letters,” through the weary travails of a hundred years.

Some forty years ago, when trying to civilize Northwestern Iowa, while yet the buffalo lingered on the prairies between the Des Moines river and the Boone, I had the honor to number among my personal friends an Indian savage of the Winnebago tribe. One day he sent me an invitation to come and play a game of euchre with him in his tent, and a very good player he was, although he did not always follow suit according to law. When I arrived he was ready to receive company, and I found him gorgeously arrayed in the barbaric regalia of his order, breech-cloth and mocassins, and, by way of a grotesque solemnism, a plug hat upon his head. The owner had no longer any use for it, as my friend had scalped him a few days before, and wore the hat as a trophy with becoming pride. To make the incongruity more emphatic, he had stuck a lot of feathers in the hat, and these made him resemble a Knight of Pythias of the 33rd degree. Like a plug hat on a Winnebago Indian would be a “man of letters” in Chicago, a solemnism. What could we do with him if we had him? He would be out of harmony with our manners, and it would not be easy to adapt him to our style. To make him “conspicuous,” we might imitate the methods of my Indian friend; not the scalping, but the feathers; and it really seems to me that some London “men of letters” have made themselves “conspicuous” in that artificial way. And they do some literary scalping there. Authors, like certain birds, absorb the color that surrounds them, and fix it
THE OPEN COURT.

3382

upon their own plumage. It may be that of living grass, dead leaves, or dazzling snow. Literature, like music, may be a Beethoven symphony, or a hurdy-gurdy drone, according to the education and refinement of the people for whom it is made. Perhaps, after all, the literary taste and genius of Chicago are underrated because the city has not a literary reputation. Perhaps a fair comparison between Chicago "men of letters" and those of present London might not be altogether to the glory of the older city. It is not safe to sneer at Nazareth, and say that no good thing can come out of it.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

BOOK REVIEWS.


In this pamphlet of twenty-nine pages the author seeks to establish, that Schopenhauer was indebted to the philosophers of India for his pessimistic views. He points out the analogy between the system of the German writer and that of the Vedantists, whose central idea is that of "salvation." This is the case also with the teaching of Gautama Buddha, which has influenced alike the philosophy of Schopenhauer and the thought of Tolstoi. M. Ottramare remarks that pessimism has had the most depressing effect on Hindoo character, which is, however, good and perfect. The Brahmins have a dignity of life, which renders them truly venerable. This statement must, however, have a restricted application, seeing that the semi-arctic life popularly ascribed to the Brahmins as a caste is adopted by comparatively few of them.


The author of this essay, remarks that, although it is only an adjustment of the observations and thoughts of others, it is intended to be "a serious contribution to natural science where it merges into metaphysics and philosophy." It is a really a criticism of the opposing views of Professors Max Müller, Romanes, and Mivart, as stated in The Monist and elsewhere, as to the evolution of mind in man. The author's explanation, which involves a modification of the notion of evolution as presented by those writers, ought, he thinks, to satisfy each of them. It is based on the nature of self-consciousness, for which term Mr. Medlicott would, following in the footsteps of Professor T. H. Green, substitute "knowledge." This knowledge consists of relations, which are taken hold of by language, and in this way mind is introduced into the organism, and the brute changed into man. This supplies a natural account of "the advent of self-consciousness," since primary distinctions or relations, rather than concepts, form the simplest elements of thought. The change from animal feeling to human consciousness and moral perception is thus merely a branch of knowledge. The author after considering the religious bearings of the question, suggests that the process he has sketched out will reconcile the opposing "empirical" and "transcendental" schools. This may be hoped for when it is really admitted, as he asserts to be the case, "that the immutable relations that underlie phenomena transcend in such manner the variable elements known as matter and force." As a serious, although necessarily owing to its conciseness an inadequate, attempt to effect such a reconciliation we cordially recommend Mr. Medlicott's pamphlet to the perusal of our readers. Its spirit may be shown by his remark "the metaphysician is an agnostic without knowing it."


We are apt to associate with works from the Truth Seeker press the ideas of impetuosity of language and great fervor of thought. Probably this arises from the fact that works of that character have attracted particular attention, and undoubtedly those of Mr. Longshore do not come within that category. His present work is written in a spirit of critical fairness, and, although it cannot be acceptable to the upholders of the views he assails, it undoubtedly contains much that is true. We agree with him that no question of delicacy or sacredness should deter from canvassing religious belief with the most rigid criticism, although we think that the cherished beliefs of others should be treated with delicacy and a spirit of reverence. It is seldom such beliefs do not contain at least a germ of truth, and this is Mr. Longshore's opinion. It is not so much religion as theology he objects to, as appears not only from his essays in general, but from his revised "Christian's Creed." The sources of his inspiration are to be found in The Journal of George Fox and the other standard literature of the friends, where, as he states in his preface, "the authority of the light and the truth is emphasised as guides for conduct," and which "developed the impulse for further investigation, to rediscover the light and truth" as revealed in the present work. The essays on reform contain remarks worthy of serious consideration. In connection with the subject of nationalism the author says truly "the contest and struggle of the immediate future will be as to whether nineteenth century civilisation or socialism can coalesce with twentieth century light, evolved from a fuller discussion and a revision of the doctrine of human rights as expounded and formulated by the new school of politics and the new interpretations of religion." What the immediate issue of the contest will be no one can tell, but in the long run it must be advantageous to the human race.

41.

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CONTENTS OF NO. 263.

PYTHAGORICS. CHARLES S. PEIRCE. 3375

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS. (Concluded.) THOMAS C. LAWS. 3377


BOOK REVIEWS 3382