A MERE enumeration of the trends of thought, of sects of reli-gions, of schools of philosophy, prevailing in Japan at the present time, would form a long list.

Japan was once geographically a cul de sac of races and tribes that traversed the Asiatic continent, and there were mingled all the races of Eurasia as well as those who migrated from the South Seas. The racial mixture prepared the mental field for the adoption of the most opposed ideas of mankind. However, for a long time after the beginning of her historic period European ideas did not penetrate the Farthest East—or if they did, they did so only after passing through many modifications which were made during the march across two continents and among many tribes. Hence alien ideas that reached Japan in historic times were almost always confined to Asia in origin. If there is discernible Hellenic influence in the old art of Japan, it has likely come through Bactria or Persia, tinged with colors of these countries.

Of the continental influences from Asia, the most prominent are the religious system of Buddhism and the ethics of Confucius. The former, however, was not introduced in its primitive simplicity—if it was ever simple—but it was propagated by various preachers, Hindu, Chinese, and Japanese, in various ways, much like the creeds of Protestant denominations. The same is true with Confucian doctrine, though on a more restricted scale. If, however, Confucian ethics had a smaller number of differing groups, there were many systems outside the pale of the Sage’s school—what his orthodox followers called jado, evil ways, heresies. The ideas imported from the Continent were conflicting and confusing enough; but they were made still more so by native schools which were started to give new interpretation to them.

When to all these schools and doctrines of oriental origin, there were added those newly imported from the West in the last seventy years, one can imagine the infinite variety of thought that is struggling for recognition, if not for supremacy, in contemporary Japan.
Thus, Japan is a veritable hotbed of ideas, where all kinds of seeds are sown and encouraged to germinate and each plant is given a chance to thrive. Geographical conditions, as I have said, explain this phenomenon, since Japan is situated on the highway between the East and the West: but there is also a racial reason as has already been suggested.

Whether due to the great mixture of blood or to other causes, the Japanese are susceptible to the reception of alien ideas. Her history shows the welcome accorded to all harbingers of thought. Chronicles mention the arrival of Korean envoys who brought the works of Confucius in the middle of the sixth century. They were received with honor by the Emperor's court, and very soon after, we see the young men at the court writing Chinese verses and discussing Chinese philosophy. The country was at that time without any culture worthy of mention. Very likely there were as yet no letters. Popular songs and incantations and prayers upon the occasion of religious ceremonies had not been given definite form and were, of course, not written down. It is probable that they consisted more in pantomimic rituals than in oral rites. As to any philosophical demonstrations or any theme of life, there evidently was nothing of the sort. We shall have to speak of this subject later. What I do wish to emphasize here is that at the time when Chinese literary influence found its way into Japan, there seems to have existed no counter influence. Confucian and other teachings found a virgin land to open and to cultivate. Hence politics and ethics and what sciences were then in vogue in China, were eagerly received. This unimpeded sinification process was facilitated by the fact that the Confucian classics contained little that was strictly religious and emotional. They consisted largely of mundane precepts and political maxims and these were by no means radical or subversive of the royal governmental régime then in existence in the country.

The experience through which Buddhism had to pass in Japan, upon first treading her soil was quite a different story. Its doctrines were perhaps considered dangerous to the social order and upsetting to the political institutions and traditions of the country. In any case, we see Buddhism espoused by one noble family and opposed by another. This religion of universal peace was made a cause of family feuds: but on account of its intrinsic superiority to any system of ideas prevailing at the time, it gained final triumph and was installed as a state religion to be officially promulgated. Under the
A GENERAL VIEW OF HORYUJI
The original center of Buddhistic culture in Japan
patronage of the court, a large number of monasteries were built
where thousands of monks and nuns were sheltered and educated.
It is only natural, under these circumstances, that controversial sub-
jects were hotly discussed with the result that a religious order was
split and went on splitting, until at present there are twelve main
divisions, each with many subdivisions.

As Buddhism has been the most powerful spiritual agency in
Japan and is still the greatest intellectual force, let me devote a
little more time to its consideration. When it was first introduced,
in the Nara Period in the eighth century, there were six great
branches already well established in China; but not all survived in
our atmosphere. Three of them withdrew in the course of a few
decades, though their history and doctrines are by no means dead.
The three surviving sects—Hosso, Kegon, Ritsu—fostered as they
were by the assiduous effort of the court and by saintly devotees
and profound advocates, did not completely satisfy the yearnings
of Japanese converts, to whom some of the doctrines and precepts
looked outlandish. There was need for popularization and adapta-
tion to the national psychology of the Japanese, and early attempts
in this direction were made by the founders of the Shingon and
tendi sects, which appealed to the nationalistic sentiments of the
devotees. This amalgamation of ideas started the movement for
the reconciliation of Hindu religious philosophy with Japanese na-
tionalism, and gave rise to several sects subsequently established by
eminent patriotic sages and saints.

In all the intellectual movements, indigenous or imported from
abroad, whether they are within the domain of literature, philoso-
phy, or religion, or even of art, one is impressed with the strong
race-consciousness of our people. Where this strong consciousness
has come from, nobody has yet clearly explained. A long secluded
life on small islands may account for it. It may be that the individ-
uals and tribes who drifted to the islands in prehistoric times were
just the kind of people who could not live with their fellows or who
were driven out of the land of their origin. Whatever may be the
reason, a sense of national unity is a trait that marks our people
more strongly than it does any other. We see this in our adaptation
of cultural elements from abroad. Everything, be it an idea, be it
a machine, be it an institution, that is of alien origin, undergoes in
a few decades modification in character or quality. Such an eclec-
ticism may be wrought by a sheer concoction of different elements
in varying proportions and may claim no originality. Such is indeed most frequently the case, and such will probably continue to be the case.

Eclecticism should not summarily be despised. Out of the wedding of ideas of diverse origins something fruitful may come, and the impact of the West upon the East, or of the East upon the West may be fecund of vast results. Or, may it not also be possible that the impact may strike fire and consume both western and eastern ideals, bringing forth something entirely new which, like a Phoenix, may rise from their ashes.

Japan offers such a bridal chamber or a crematory. We have there the representation of all schools of thought, not only because of her geographical position, as has been suggested, but also because of the mental proclivity of her sons. Like other oriental races, though perhaps in a somewhat less degree, the Japanese have a keen avidity for philosophical pursuits. They like to engage themselves in a dialectical scuffle. Young men are fond of indulging in abstract contemplation, trying to catch a glimpse of the eternal veritas. Usually their attempts and efforts are abortive; they cannot long bear the strain of concentrated thought. It is much cheaper and quicker to resort to reading treatises written for novices. A smattering of knowledge is greatly encouraged by all sorts of compendiums and popular essays. A few years ago, a lad of eighteen or nineteen, not a genius either, was arrested on the ground of his communistic activity. In the account he gave of himself, he said that he studied first Kant and was his follower for some time, but finding many flaws in the Critique, he took up Hegel and found satisfaction for his soul in this system; but again he discovered that Hegel did not exhaust truth, so he went over to Marx. Accounts of mental struggle like this are by no means rare. Only the systems of these masters are studied, not in the original—as a rule—not even in Japanese translations, but in excerpts and quotations. Utter ignorance may not be bliss for youthful minds, but a little knowledge seems to satisfy intellectual hunger and spiritual vanity. Let it be noted that I am speaking of the general mass of so-called intelligentsia and not of professors and other well-educated classes; though even among these I doubt whether there is a large number who can read Kant and Hegel in the original. None the less the fact is true that the oriental youth is exceedingly fond of abstract reasoning, which he sometimes carries to a ridiculous extent. Like ancient
Greeks they are xenophiles. Their thirst for the odd, the strange, the outlandish is insatiable, and yet in their heart of hearts, they remain characteristically national.

Patriotism is innate and instinctive in the Japanese people. We need no artificial prodding. The only exceptions to the general patriotic sentiment are perhaps the "professional patriots." Their loud denunciation against absence of patriotism shows that they can conceive such a possibility in their compatriots. This strong *amour propre* of the nation must always be kept in mind in unravelling the complicated situation in the field of intellectual activity. For some years past it has been growing steadily and naturally becomes particularly audible when there is foreign complication. Of late there has been heard the political slogan, "Back to Asia," by which is meant that we have been deserting the old tradition imported mainly from China, grown and cultivated in our own soil, and that we have been betrayed into western ideas.

This anti-western reaction has taken a reasonable form in Japan, in that it consisted in the revival of the study of old classics and in the remodeling of art along old lines; but in China it has been taking a more dangerous course in the so-called revolutionary diplomacy and education, as is manifest in the unilateral abrogation of "unequal treaties" and in anti-foreign ideas systematically inculcated in schools. Fortunately, Japan has been very much more liberal in politics; but the recent rise of the sentiment, "Back to Asia," may assume an attitude similar to the revolutionary diplomacy of China. Such a retrogression (at least the "liberals" so consider it) in our foreign relations, is to be attributed to the sense of injustice which Japan feels has been done her in the general attitude of the League of Nations and of America regarding her action in Manchuria.

The aggressive form of patriotism has been accelerated by the increase of contacts with foreign powers. It is highly interesting to study the growth of the ideal of patriotism of the Japanese people. That they are highly patriotic nobody denies; but as to what patriotism implies, there has been a great change in the last sixty years. The term *aikoku, amor patriae*, is of Chinese origin and is found in an ancient Chinese history. In Japan one finds the same expression in the *Nihongi*, written early in the eighth century. The two words, *ai* (love) and *koku* (country) are there, but they have not been put into general use. It may seem a little strange that a sentiment that is so widely spread among the people should not have
found an adequate term. This may be due to the fact that in the
earliest days of our history, when communication between Japan
and China or Korea was quite frequent, there was little need to
emphasize the difference of these nations and no occasion to arouse
or assert the emotional consciousness of one people as against an-
other. On the contrary, as far as Japan was concerned, she placed
herself in the position of a pupil to the continental nations. Though
in political respects she always proudly maintained her indepen-
dence, she willingly admitted her inferiority in matters of culture.
It was largely for this reason that another term, signifying the love
of country, also of Chinese origin, came into general vogue. The
word, yukoku, literally meaning "lamenting" or "sorrowing" or
"grieving" for the nation, was for many centuries the popular word
for patriotism. It is the part of reformers to mourn for the short-
comings of their fellows. Yukoku men bewailed the imperfections
of their nation. The old Hebrew prophets were men of yukoku
rather than of aikoku inclination. The founders of New Japan,
seventy years ago, were men who thought most of the weak points
of their country and were ready to mend them. It is unnecessary
to add that they took this view not simply to criticize, but in order
to improve. Their readiness to adopt western civilization came from
this motive. The sense of national sin and shortcomings has a sub-
duining and deepening effect, in contrast to the buoyant and exultant
feeling which accompanies the love of one's country. It is not only
love of a woman but of a country as well, that expands man and
gives him a sensation, as Emerson says, of being "twice the man,"
and makes him "walk with arms akimbo." There is elation in
aikoku, but a man of yukoku walks with bowed head and folded
arms.

The term aikoku did not find its way into common use until
about fifty-eight years ago, when Itagaki Taisuke founded his Pa-
triotic Society. English-Japanese dictionaries did not give such a
concise term as aikoku for "patriotism." Many of them explained
what "patriotism" meant, because no concise term was invented.

One hears little nowadays of yukoku. The school books are
full of aikoku. And the present generation knows little of that deep
solitude for the nation's future which mothers feel for their off-
spring, and which Jesus Christ felt for the fate of Jerusalem when
he uttered his concern—"How often would I have gathered thy
children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her
wings and ye would not." This is patriotism, but not of the usual type. More suitable would it be to call it matriotism.

We may notice in this change of emotional attitude of our people towards their country, a change from the negative to the positive love of the country, necessitated by the constant contact which they now have with other nations. This change is an indication of the growth of self-consciousness and of the need of self-protection. In it is contained the germ of self-assertion, urged partly by an inferiority complex. Our fathers were matriotic; they were anxious about their children, because they were weak. It is this sense of weakness at which the present generation rebels. They will not own that they are in any way inferior to other countries. Clutton Brock once defined patriotism as the pooling of self-esteem. Individuals who compose a nation delight in feeling their own importance or superiority; but a modicum of modesty prevents them from saying so. If, however, they speak of national superiority, racial virtues, their country's greatness—in other words, if the individual citizens pool their self-esteem—they can satisfy their vanity without each looking vain. Patriotism thus becomes self-assertive, arrogant, and possibly aggressive. In Japan, too, as in other countries, it is not impossible that patriotism may overdo itself at the hand of zealots and professional nationalists. It is highly to be desired that in this age of internationalism, nationalism should not interpret growing patriotism in too narrow a sense and so exclude cooperation with other countries as being in any way subversive of loyalty to one's own country.

Of the three kinds of patriotism which Heine mentions, it has been questioned which is characteristic of the Japanese. He wrote of the English as loving their country as they love their wives, of the French, as they love their mistresses, and of the Germans as they love their grandmothers. Might not one add that the Americans love their country as they love their daughters? And as to the Japanese, they love their country as they love a goddess—with passion, mingled with emotions of awe and reverence.

When patriotism is made the highest virtue and the highest duty and is placed above the category of the commonplace virtues of honesty and kindness, tolerance and generosity, and when it is urged through public education and by government authorities, fear may reasonably be entertained of a possible reaction.

There are two categories of ideas opposed to patriotism—in-
dividualism and cosmopolitanism—and both of these are represented among us. The former is most frequently seen among decadens and those artistically inclined, while the latter makes itself audible by the proletarians and communists. As all these types are usually highly emotional, they easily make themselves heard in propagandist literature. The Communists in particular are adepts in this line. They have already succeeded in creating a literary school of their own, with an outlandish vocabulary full of neologisms introduced from German and Russian. Thanks to the assiduity of their labor and to the publicity given to them by the sensational arrests of their members, the Communist brotherhood is making remarkable headway among the youth of Japan. There is no denying the fact that Communistic ideas are undermining the present social structure, and among the pioneers in that cause are some of the brightest minds of both sexes—well-meaning and sincere in their belief that the only way to establish social justice is by the abolition of the present capitalistic system of society and the abolition of private property. They object, too, to the existing system of our government, which they would eliminate by force. Until a few years ago, the Emperor, in the ideology developed in Moscow, was no more than a large landowner and as such an arch-capitalist; hence he was made an object of severe attack and plot after plot was discovered against his life. More recently two reasons contributed to weaken this theory. One was that Moscow discovered that the prestige of the sovereign in Japan is so unique, that it is poor tactics to make any disparaging remarks about it, as this would only wreck the whole soviet propaganda work. The other reason lay in the awakening of the race consciousness, of which the respect and affection for the Sovereign is a prominent trait. There is a third reason which contributed to the weakening of the anti-Emperor idea. Much as the Communist ideologists despise the past, history and ideas based on history cannot be ignored. Every nation has its ghosts. Old ones have most. Nations, newly created, create new ghosts. Without the ghosts of the great and the dead a nation cannot live. Heroes long gone, but still idealized, lead their worshipers to battle-fields, to scaffolds, or to council chambers. An old and compact country like Japan has an extensive Pantheon, and even the protagonists of a new régime cannot escape a hero-worshiping mentality. Russia herself is setting an example of this by the reverence she pays to the memory of Lenin. Not a few of the communists have espoused the cause
of communism from love of their country, and when they once per-
ceive that their principles endanger its welfare and existence, they
abandon these. This has lately been frequently illustrated by some
who have been professing cosmopolitan sentiments turning bigoted
nationalists, because of the possible danger to their country result-
ing from the Sino-Japanese dispute.

It is, of course, their very sense of nationality that imparts a fas-
cistic coloring to some of the movements of a reactionary nature.
Here the extreme left and the extreme right meet. The reaction-
aries, entertaining unbounded faith in the old régime and yet imbi-
bing some of the newest socialistic notions, believe that social justice
can be carried out by a strong executive, even to the extent of
confiscation of private property and the extinction of an accumula-
tion of wealth in the hands of a few capitalistic firms. Looking back
upon Japan's past history, they are convinced that the drastic legis-
lation of the Taika (645 A.D.) and Taiho (701 A.D.) periods was
socialistic in principle, though they did not go far enough. The legis-
lation referred to had in view the equitable—and indeed equal—dis-
tribution of land and the elevation of the lowest classes of society.
The laws regarding the division of farm land into small squares of
two *tans* (one *tan* is equal to about one-fourth of an English acre)
as a sufficient size for the yearly support of a human being, was actu-
ally put into practice. Even yet in several localities in Japan we see
traces of this institution. Every male above the age of five was en-
titled to a lot. The laws provided other divisions for the families
of the nobility and for awards to be given for public service, and
thus, the socialistic ideas of those periods were not as thorough-
going as modern communists would desire. None the less, it must be
admitted that the reforms were radical and were accomplished by
a strong central, dictatorial government.

Why cannot it be done again? The inequality of wealth in the
twentieth century is not any better than in the seventh, and the
only way to remedy it is by the exercise of a power that stands for
the whole nation and is above the suspicion of self-interest. Such
a power in Japan is the Imperial House. By this process of argu-
mentation the communists and the reactionaries have arrived at a
rallying point. How far such a wedding of ideas—starting from
opposite directions—can be fruitful, is still doubtful. If the pro-
ponents of both are sincere and if each maintains his position, their
union may not be barren, but it will not last long.
The socialistically inclined nationalists may be small in number as compared with the followers of soviet communism, but their influence is stronger on account of the fanatic fervor with which they stick to their faith. They have a twofold reason for zeal—one to spread communistic ideas, and the other to maintain old traditions. The recent incidents which shocked Japan and the world—I mean the succession of assassinations—have largely been the work of young men imbued with a double ideology such as I have been describing.

Ideologically less complex, and perhaps for that reason less influential and mentally more indolent, are the liberals, who in politics try to maintain an equilibrium by taking a middle course between the two main political parties, the Seiyukai and the Minseito, and who in social questions try to improve the condition of the laboring class by the tried method of trade unions, cooperation, insurance, and so forth. They are usually well-educated people, moderate and reasonable, and socially respectable. They have no great ideal to strive for, no noble cause for which they would sacrifice themselves, no deep philosophy which they would defend with their life. Their function in the state will largely consist in adjusting differences and in keeping an even balance in public opinion. Their general influence in society will consist in educating common sense and in preventing a resort to violence.

We owe our liberal ideas to Anglo-Saxon leaders. The study of English literature is largely responsible for them. Of all the foreign influences on modern Japanese thought, English literature, disseminated by English and American teachers, missionaries and government employees, was by far the most wide-spread and vivid. Through the English language, taught compulsorily in all schools of secondary and higher grades, the liberal ideas of Bentham, Mill, Austin, and Spencer early penetrated the thought of the country. Sure enough there were contemporaneously a few French thinkers, notably Voltaire, Rousseau, Auguste Comte, and Guizot, whose works found their way into Japan. But the French writers were considered rather radical and the Government exerted its influence toward the spread of English thought.

It was after the eighties of the last century that German political ideas were encouraged by the state. The leading statesmen of the country suddenly jumped from the English to the German saddle. Prior to this time the German language had been studied chiefly
for medical purposes. In pre-Restoration days, when the Dutch and the Chinese were the only foreigners permitted to reside in the country, there had grown up through Holland a deep respect for German medical science, and this continued after the knowledge of other nations was cultivated. But when, in the early eighties, Prince Ito was despatched to Europe for the study of the constitutions of the different countries, and when he selected the German constitution as the most suitable model for Japan, Japanese students of politics began to flock to Germany and all at once German scholars—Gneist, Ihering, Erdmann, Loening, von Stein and a host of others—became the formative influences of our political thought. In other branches of knowledge than medicine and politics, German science became popular. All advanced students had to make a pilgrimage to Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, Heidelberg, before they could be acknowledged as fit to teach in Japanese colleges. Thus, for some time it seemed as though the domain of knowledge was divided into two camps. English and German, the latter endowed with government sanction and standing for accuracy, exactness, control; the former advocating individual liberty and representing the rights of the people. The strictness and efficiency of our administrative machinery may be attributed to German influence. The broader conception of progress and liberty are the gift of the Anglo-Saxon race. Of all modern peoples, the Japanese are under the greatest obligation to the Germans and the English, and to the Americans. The French
may claim a certain share of our gratitude. There was a time when Russian literature exercised a strong and fascinating power through the writings of Turgenev, Tolstoi, Gorky, Dostoievski and others—and for a time, Scandinavian writers, particularly Ibsen, Strindberg, and Björnson were read and studied. Italy enjoyed representation through the writings of D'Annuncio and Mazzini, as well as by the reputation of Cavour and Mussolini.

While thus fitfully playing with, and not infrequently seriously meditating upon, the typical writers of all countries, the intellect of youthful Japan is not free from the grasp of its local ghosts. I have already spoken of national ghosts: but besides these there are Lares and Penates, that form the subject of evening talks at the family hearth or of high-voiced orators in school rooms. Children are told of great men who fought on a spot familiar to them, of heroes who were killed in such and such a place, within a stone's throw of their dwellings, and so forth and so on. In many provinces, regional studies are rightly encouraged and one of their features is to raise admiration, love, and respect for the local heroes. Few, even among the teachers who give instruction in local history, realize how deeply this sometimes penetrates into juvenile minds. The recent series of assassinations is the best illustration of what I mean. Of all the men involved in the atrocious deeds—there were no less than thirty names marked for victims—the man who was most responsible was a native of Mito, which supplied no small number of "patriots" in the Meiji Restoration. Most of these were distinguished for sincerity and decision of character. They were ready to act from the noblest of motives. They were usually conservative in temperament and often totally ignorant of the progress of the world or of Japan's relations with other nations. Their ability did not match their patriotism. In their eyes, those who got into power were rascals, and the shortest way to deliver the country from their mischievous acts lay in putting them out of existence. This very simple solution was repeatedly resorted to by the Mito men.

Mito is a town of some 40,000 population, a couple of hours distant from Tokyo, and was the seat of a scion of the Tokugawa family. It has always enjoyed a reputation for a proud and critical spirit, as well as for the stern and nationalistic temper of its leaders. Now, the band of assassins was educated in the same spirit and temper, not necessarily in public schools—sometimes in private conserv-
atories with their friends or indirectly by stories narrated by their parents.

I have hinted over and over again that no single idea or theory imported from abroad will for long remain pure and unaltered among the Japanese. It is either transformed into something quite different from the original, or it is so mingled with some inherited notions that when it appears in practice, one would scarcely recognize the separate ingredients. The man to whom I referred as the source of inspiration for the assassin group, was a great admirer of Tolstoi and was for several years engaged in putting Russian socialistic theory into practice in his village. Who would have thought the sage of Yasnaya Polyana to be an accomplice in murder! The most ardent follower of Kant will admit that his "Pure Reason" is as often as not so adulterated with emotion, individual or collective, that one is at loss to see how much reason really plays in the behavior of man.

The influence of ghosts in the affairs of man is naturally hard for Americans to understand; but unless they do understand how strong this is among peoples with long histories behind them, they will never be able to get at the root of their social phenomena or political movement or ethical behavior; for a nation, even the newest, is what the past has made. There is no such thing as spontaneous generation and even the so-called "sports" have an evolutionary background.

When we take a bird's eye view of the ideas prevailing in Japan at present, we are struck by their diversity and confusion. We see no immediate prospect of any one school of thought asserting its hegemony. We have no one great leader to whom the public pays homage. The Japanese public is critical. It is hypercritical. It is quick to find logical flaws or personal imperfections. If a man is good, he is not clever enough. If he is both good and clever, he does not know enough. If a man is learned, clever, and good, he is not this or that, or he does not speak clearly enough. Notwithstanding the predominance of hero-worship, no man is a hero to the living generation. To put it in other words, the mentality of the living generation is that of a valet. Jealousy and sarcasm play a large rôle in the estimate of man. In this connection some remarks must be made about the press and its influence in Japan; for the press is undoubtedly chiefly responsible for changing the mentality of the people.
Thanks to the wide-spread literacy—the result of fifty years stringent enforcement of compulsory education laws—the reading public of Japan embraces the most diverse sorts and conditions of men. And it takes a large press work to cater to their differing tastes. There are no less than 1,150 daily papers (1928), 577 weeklies and a larger number of monthlies, besides books, of which about 30,000 are published every year. Of the dailies, some are not even worth mentioning by name. Ephemeral papers, published for black-mailing or for self-advertisement, or so-called dailies that are printed once a week or once a month, go to swell the number. These and other small papers, even of local importance, are ruthlessly eliminated by the steadily increasing circulation of a few large papers. Of these there are five, and among them two are of such extensive circulation that their influence on the public mind is worthy of special attention. They have their offices both in Tokyo and Osaka, respectively the political and business centers of the Empire. They have each a daily circulation of over 2,000,000. One is the Asahi, with its Tokyo and Osaka editions; the other bears the title Nichi-Nichi for the Tokyo edition, and Mainichi for the Osaka edition. The rest of the dailies, even the Big Five, though each has a special point of merit, total a far smaller circulation. It is a fortunate feature of the Japanese press that the large papers have no political affiliation and as a rule express their opinions quite freely. A conservative estimate of the daily volume of circulation of newspapers in the country gives five million copies, which means a copy for every twelve of the population.

The moral tone of the daily press has greatly improved of late and its influence (I am speaking of larger papers) has been beneficial. But in a sense the moral and educational influence of family and women's magazines has been tremendous. A large number of these are issued in tens and hundreds of thousands and contain articles from the pen of the best writers.

In the domain of the press, as in all other fields, though the newest method and fashion is initiated from abroad, none of them can be really successful for any length of time without being assimilated into the Japanese habit of thought. Manners and customs, such as the mode of living, of clothing, of architecture, have been largely modernized of late—by which is meant that they have assumed the western mode. It may well be questioned what intellectual significance this contains—whether it shows the desire to fol-
low the West in every way, or merely in outward forms, or whether the change marks progress or a mere adoption of foreign customs. The question is easy to answer.

Economic reasons, in one word, utility, makes the change in the mode of life necessary. To put it in plainer terms, it is cheaper to dress in the foreign manner. Especially is this true for women. As in genuine Japanese life much time is devoted to "useless" etiquette and formalities, so in the daily requirements of food and clothing, and in the standards of building, artistic labor is wasted in places where only experienced eyes will penetrate. Art has been absorbing the attention of the race at the expense of time and money. It is much less expensive to live in a painted frame house, where the grain of the wood need not be matched in fitting together. It is much less expensive to dress in durable woolen goods than in soft silken garments. It is much less expensive to use chairs which spare the muscular exercise of sitting on one's heels, and which can dispense with the more graceful movements of the body.

As utilitarianism now dictates social customs and manners, so will pragmatism gain in ascendancy in the sphere of moral conduct. Nationalistic ideas themselves are pragmatic. Even the old mysticism, or doctrine allied with it, will be interpreted in terms of pragmatism—or, conversely, modern pragmatism will be interpreted in terms of mysticism and nationalism, of Buddhism and Shintoism. The Japanese intellect cannot bear plurality, or even duality. It finds its satisfaction in unity and uniformity, and the present chaotic conflict of ideas and ideals will not long be tolerated.