MORAL PROGRESS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

Much has been written lately about the imperative need of doing something in order that civilization may be saved or "salvaged." Humanity, we have been solemnly assured, is doomed, and our culture may perish, unless we accept this or that remedy for our social, economic and moral ills.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader of serious scientific literature dealing with social problems that the learned doctors disagree, as they have always disagreed in the past, concerning the nature and elements of the remedy required by the patient, civilized mankind. The patient would be deeply perplexed indeed were he, or it, to endeavor to follow the insistent advice of the physicians. However, the latter do agree that humanity is sick unto death. They shake their grave heads pessimistically. They are most anxious and depressed.

This mood of theirs does them credit, morally and emotionally speaking. They have the noblest of intentions. But are they justified in their pessimism? Is the patient as sick as they believe he is?

It is clear that an answer to these queries cannot be evolved out of one's inner consciousness. Freud and the subconscious cannot help us, either, to a sound, satisfactory answer. To find such an answer we must go to history, to the human record. Has humanity been in better health than now? If so, when, and when did it contract its present dangerous malady? What has happened to it?

Let us interrogate some one who has made an earnest and special study of our patient and knows the history of the case. Mr. H. G. Wells has given us his Outline of History for the very purpose of enabling us to draw comparisons and contrasts, to judge of the condition of humanity today in the light of its condition at various past stages of growth and development. We are in no wise obliged to accept Mr. Wells' own interpretation of historic events.
and phases. We are free to ignore his lessons and morals, and to study his facts and charts with an open mind.

Let us contemplate some of the facts. Let us, so far as possible, clear our minds of prepossessions, fixed ideas, uncritical notions, and permit the facts to speak for themselves.

In the first place, then, as Mr. Wells observes in many relevant connections, "no man today is more than four hundred generations from the primordial savage." Civilization, therefore, is still in its infancy when we compare it with the age of our planet or the beginning of animal life upon it.

And what were the ways, habits and notions of the primordial savage? There have not been wanting efforts of sentimentalists and political metaphysicians to idealize the savage or the "state of nature." But what are the facts? To quote Mr. Wells:

"The idea of property arises out of the combative instincts of the species. Long before men were men the ancestral ape was a proprietor. Primitive property is what a beast will fight for. The dog and his bone, the tigress and her lair, the roaring stag and his herd, these are proprietorship blazing. No more nonsensical expression is conceivable than the term "primitive communism." The Old Man of the family tribe of early Palaeolithic times insisted upon his proprietorship in his wives and daughters, in his tools, in his visible uniwere. If any other man wandered into his visible universe, he fought him, and if he could, he slew him. The tribe grew in the course of ages, as Atkinson showed convincingly in his Primal Law, by the gradual toleration by the Old Man of the existence of the younger men, and of their proprietorship in the wives they captured from outside the tribe, and in the tools and ornaments they made and the game they slew. Human society grew by a compromise between this one's property and that. It was largely a compromise and an alliance forced upon men by the necessity of driving some other tribe out of its visible universe. If the hills and forests and streams were not your land or my land, it was because they had to be our land. Each of us would have preferred it to have it my land, but that would not work. In that case the other fellows would have destroyed us. Society, therefore, is from its beginning the mitigation of ownership. Ownership in the beast and the primitive savage was far more intense a thing than it is in the civilized world today. In the natural savage and in the untutored man today there is no limitation to the sphere of ownership. Whatever you can fight for, you can own—women-folk, spared captive, captured beast, forest glade, stone pit or what not. . . . . Men found themselves born into a universe all owned and claimed—nay, they found themselves born owned and claimed."

So much for the idea or property as entertained by the savage
and the untutored man of our own day. One may dispute Mr. Wells' affirmation that the idea of property arises out of our combative instincts, for it is possible to maintain that the will to live and the instinct of self-preservation, which, as we know, may lead to mutual aid rather than to warfare, give rise to the idea of property. But of the passion for property, the intense devotion to it, the readiness to fight for it, there can be no doubt. Even the men who give very generously when appealed to in the name of humanity, and who cheerfully tax themselves for all manner of public and semi-public enterprises of a benevolent character, will fiercely resent the slightest suggestion that their property, that to which they have a legal and an acknowledged right, may be taken from them without their genuine consent.

Now let us glance at the picture drawn by Mr. Worthington Smith, an authority cited by Mr. Wells, of "the very highest life in the world some fifty thousand years ago." What kind of a life was it? "Bestial," says Mr. Wells, and we cannot demur to his strong adjective. To quote from Mr. Smith's *Man the Primeval Savage*:

"The primeval savage was both herbivorous and carnivorous. . . . Primeval man would not be particular about having his flesh-food over-fresh. He would constantly find it in a dead state, and if semi-putrid, he would relish it none the less—the taste for high or half-putrid game still survives. If driven by hunger and hard pressed, he would perhaps sometimes eat his weaker companions or unhealthy children who happened to be feeble or unsightly or burdensome. . . .

"The savages sat huddled close together round their fire, with fruits, bones and half-putrid flesh. . . . Man at that time was not a degraded animal, for he had never been higher; he was therefore an exalted animal."

What were the family relations of this savage? Mr. Wells, following several authorities, gives us the following picture:

"The Old Man is the fully adult male in the little group. There are women, boys and girls, but so soon as the boys are big enough to rouse the Old Man's jealousy, he will fall foul of them and either drive them off or kill them. . . . Some day, when he is forty years old perhaps, or even older, and his teeth are worn down and his energy abating, some younger male will stand up to the Old Man and kill him and reign in his stead. There is probably short shrift for the old at the squatting-place. So soon as they grow weak and bad-tempered, trouble and death come upon them."

But all this is true only of the primeval savage! Well, we take a leap across the ages and pause to glance at the ways and practices
of the Neolithic man seven, six, five and even four thousand years ago.

The Old Man had developed into a tribal god, who had to be propitiated by sacrifices, mutilations and magic murder. "Neolithic man"—to quote Wells—"under the sway of talk and a confused thought process killed on theory: he killed for monstrous and now incredible ideas, he killed those he loved through fear and under direction. They not only made human sacrifices at seed-time, but there is reason to believe that they sacrificed wives and slaves at the burial of chieftains; they killed men, women and children whenever they were under adversity and thought the gods were athirst. They practiced infanticide."

Another leap brings us to the "aristocracy of the human race," the Israelites of Judea and Palestine. What a revolting, sanguinary story is that of the Hebrew nation! Wars of aggression, melancholy failures, disasters, humiliations; then kingship, the intrigues of David against Saul, and the story of David, which, as Mr. Wells says, "with its constant assassinations and executions reads rather like the history of some savage chief than of a civilized monarch." Solomon's reign opened in as bloody a manner as his father's. He was a wasteful and oppressive ruler, concludes Mr. Wells, and in religion unstable and superstitious. After the brief glory of the Hebrew state under Solomon we have a "tale of wars, of religious conflicts, of usurpations, assassinations and of fratricidal murders to secure the throne"—a tale "frankly barbaric."

From the Jews we turn to the Romans. In 264 B. C. the first gladiatorial combat took place at Rome, but the taste for these horrible combats grew rapidly, and "until the time of Seneca, first century A. D., there is no record of any protest from moralists or statesmen against this cruel and brutal business. The gladiators at first were prisoners of war; later criminals under death sentence were used; then slaves were freely sold to the trainers of gladiators; finally, dissipated young men adopted the trade. Gladiators fought by the hundred, and those of them who objected because of fear or for any other and better reason "were driven on by whips and hot irons." The organization of murder as a sport and show speaks eloquently of the standards of Roman civilization.

Another measure of that civilization is supplied by the way in which the slave and gladiatorial uprising under Spartacus was suppressed. Six thousand of the captured followers of Spartacus
The Roman Empire was a vast and complex society, with a population of millions, and a social structure that was marked by a clear division between the upper classes, or the "nobility," and the lower classes, or the "commoners." The nobility, consisting of the wealthy landowners and the ruling class, enjoyed privileges and freedoms that were denied to the commoners. The commoners, on the other hand, were subjected to a variety of restrictions and restrictions, including limited voting rights and the lack of representation in the government. In addition, the commoners were often required to perform laborious and tedious tasks, such as farming and manual labor, in order to support the elite class. Despite these inequalities, the Roman Empire was characterized by a high level of political and economic stability, which allowed for the development of a culture that was rich in art, literature, and science. However, this stability was not without its costs, as the commoners were often subjected to harsh and oppressive conditions, and the empire was prone to frequent outbreaks of violence and crime. Overall, the Roman Empire represents a period of significant change and development in human history, marked by both progress and suffering.
corrupted by demagogues and selfish politicians; and outside vot-
ers, whenever they attempted to enter the city and claim their rights, could be, and were, intimidated and attacked and massacred on the pretext that they were conspiring against the republic.

Rome fell and nothing could save it. Sounder and better states and communities gradually grew up. But what shall we say of their moral and intellectual standards? A few facts and references will suffice to answer this question. To wars and civil wars is hardly necessary to allude even, any more than it is necessary to speak here of the corruption and cynicism of kings, diplomats and ministers, or of the oppression of the peasants andburghers by the privileged aristocracies.

In 1618 the civil or Thirty Years' War broke out in Germany. During that contest the looting of towns and villages was the rule rather than the exception. "The soldiers," writes Mr. Wells, "became more and more mere brigands living on the country, and not only plunder but outrage was the soldier's privilege. After the close of that contest "so harried was the land that the farmers ceased from cultivation, and great crowds of starving women and children became camp followers of the armies, and supplied a thievish tail to the rougher plundering." Central Europe "did not fully recover from these robberies and devastations for a century."

In 1791 the Jacobin revolution occurred in France. The terror soon followed, and the world shuddered at the excesses and horrors of that regime. But, to quote Mr. Wells:

"In Britain and America, while the terror ruled in France, far more people were slaughtered for offences—very often quite trivial offences—against property than were condemned by the revolutionary tribunal for treason against the state. A girl was hanged in Massachusetts in 1789 for forcibly taking the hat, shoes and buckles of another girl she had met in the street. Again, Howard, the philanthropist, found, about 1773, a number of perfectly innocent people detained in the English prisons who had been tried and acquitted, but were unable to pay the jailer's fees. And these prisons were filthy places beyond effective control. Torture was still in use in the Hanoverian dominions of his Britannic Majesty King George III. It has been in use in France up to the time of the National Assembly."

Humon slavery was not abolished till the middle of the nineteenth century. As for child labor, in 1819 the English factory act, the first of a series, prohibited the employment of children of nine
in such establishments and limited the working day of children above that age to twelve hours.

Let us conclude the examination of the human record with several fragmentary and detached citations.

"It is not more than five hundred years since the great empire of the Aztecs," says Mr. Wells in his summing up, "still believed that it could live only by the shedding of blood. Every year in Mexico hundreds of human victims died in this fashion: the body was bent like a bow over the curved stone of sacrifice; the breast was sliced upon with a knife of obsidian, and the priest tore out the bleeding heart of the still living victim."

Discussing the introduction of Negro slavery into New England, Mr. Wells, while noting that the conscience of the American colonists were never quite easy on that score, calls attention to the fact that all attempts to restrain the slave trade were checked by the great proprietary interests of the mother country. As to the sort of institution these proprietors, nominally Christian and humane, thus protected and defended, Mr. Wells writes:

"In some respects the new gang slavery was worse than anything in the ancient world. Peculiarly horrible was the provocation by the trade of slave wars and man-hunts in Western Africa, and the cruelties of the long transatlantic voyage. The poor creatures were packed on the ships often with insufficient provision of food and water, without proper sanitation, without medicines. Many who could tolerate slavery upon the plantations found the slave trade too much for their digestions."

These practices show how thin was the veneer of civilization and religion as late as the early 17th century. In the latter part of the 19th they would have been impossible in America, or in Europe. But what of Africa, of the Congo? To quote Mr. Wells again:

"By 1900 all Africa was mapped, explored, estimated, and divided between the European powers, divided with much snarling and disputation into portions that left each power uneasy or discontented. Little heed was given to the welfare of the natives in this scramble. The Arab slaver was indeed curbed rather than expelled, but the greed for rubber, which was a wild product collected under compulsion by the natives in the Belgian Congo, a greed exacerbated by the pitiless avarice of King Leopold, and the clash of inexperienced European administrators with the native populations in many other annexations, led to horrible atrocities. No European power has perfectly clean hands in this matter."

We complain, and with much reason assuredly, of the administration of law and justice in the courts, civil, criminal and equit-
able, that are maintained by all civilized states. The law's delays are proverbial. The bias of judges, the passion of juries, the influence of mob intolerance on the course of justice—all these things give us deep concern, as they should. Yet compare the administration of justice in our day with the State Trials of so recent a period as the Elizabethan in Great Britain! Read Macauley on these famous, or infamous, trials, and ponder the contrast! Judges spoke and behaved like bitter and ferocious prosecutors in those days. There was no pretense of impartiality or of judicial independence. The Crown dictated verdicts and packed juries.

Or, glancing at law and justice in earlier periods, before and after the Norman invasion and conquest of England, any good textbook on jurisprudence will give the modern reader a tolerably adequate idea of the "trials" of cases under primitive Anglo-Saxon and Norman law. We learn that those trials were never investigations of the facts and honest efforts to apply principles to issues. "Trial might be by compurgation, by witness, by charters, by record, by ordeal, or by battle." To quote from Prof. Roscoe Pound's Introduction to the Study of Law:

"Trial by ordeal took place by cold water, by hot water, hot iron or the morsel. Each was preceded by a solemn religious ceremonial in which the party was adjured not to undergo the ordeal unless in the right, and Heaven was invoked to decide the dispute.

"In the ordeal by cold water the party was cast into the water, which was asked to cast him forth if guilty, but receive him if innocent. If he sank there was judgment in his favor. In the ordeal by hot water the party plunged his arm into a vessel of hot water and brought forth a stone. His arm was then bandaged for three days. If at the end of that time his arm had healed, there was judgment in his favor. If it had festered, there was judgment against him. In the ordeal by hot iron the party was required to carry a hot iron for nine feet, when his hand was bandaged and the result determined as in the ordeal by hot water. In the ordeal by the morsel the party was required to swallow a bit of bread or cheese weighing an ounce. If he did so without serious difficulty, there was judgment in his favor; if he choked, there was judgment against him. In trial by battle the parties, if they were infirm or incapable of battle because of age or sex, their champions—that is, kinsmen or other appropriate persons who knew the case—fought with staves in a ring before the justices from dawn till the stars appeared or one of them yielded. If one were vanquished, or if the party having the burden of the issue did not prevail in the time fixed, there was judgment against him."

Trial by jury has been called the palladium of liberty, and Prof.
Pound writes that "it was the first thoroughly rational mode of trial to develop in the modern world." The evolution of trial by jury was not achieved fully until the 19th century.

Such, briefly, is the human record—the record almost to our own period. In the light of the facts thus recalled, what conclusion emerges? Is a belief in human progress justified? Does the past of mankind support it? Is there any actual basis for current talk regarding human decadence and degradation? Are the most advanced of human communities—notably the United States—rushing gaily to destruction?

The true answers to these queries can hardly be in doubt after a sober consideration and pondering of the evidence in the record. Whatever tests we apply—political, economic, social, moral, artistic—the result is the same. There has been progress in every direction. Some of us, in our impatience and haste, may complain of the rate of this progress. It has been slow, if we measure it with an arbitrary standard. Why, we cry, did not men and women follow, or remain loyal, to such seers and guides as Gautama Buddah, or the Hebrew prophets, or Jesus of Nazareth, or St. Francis? Why have all the great religions been corrupted and smothered in irrelevant and superstitious dogmas and empty ceremonies? We might as well ask why the average Englishman or American does not write like Shakespeare or Milton. Moral genius is as rare as poetic and literary. The human race has advanced at the only rate at which it has been able to advance. It is what it is, and we cannot help accepting it. The question is not what another species might have accomplished with like opportunities, but what our species has accomplished. And it has accomplished much.

Take property. We still cling to property, but many of us are collectivists, communists, syndicalists, Single-Taxers, advocates of equality of opportunity, champions of co-operative production. Most of us recognize the obligation to share our possessions with the destitute. Even the most selfish among us dare not denounce public and private charity. We frown on anyone who protests that he is not his brother's keeper. We take the ground that unemployment is a community problem, and that he who seeks work and cannot find it must be supported at the expense of the body politic and social. We have, in truth, traveled far from the notions and practices of the primitive savage in respect of property—its rights and sanctions.

Or take the life of the average community. Can we call it
"bestial?" We still have slums, homeless families, unclean and insanitary dwellings, indecent overcrowding. But for these conditions the mechanical and industrial revolution, which in so relatively short a time abolished the cottage and home industries, erected large factories, and reduced tens of thousands of artisans and craftsmen to the status of wage-workers in concentrated establishments, is largely responsible. The movement for better housing, for "garden cities," for individual and co-operative home-owning is world-wide and effective, though the great war naturally interrupted it.

We have unemployed at all times, and during "hard times" this evil becomes acute. But we also have, or are planning to provide, insurance against unemployment, local and central agencies for the relief of the destitute among the unemployed, and engineering and other bodies that are earnestly grappling with the questions of seasonal work, waste in industry, co-ordination of public and private measures designed to reduce unemployment to a minimum. And we have socially recognized the obligation to feed, clothe and shelter those who are willing to work but unable to procure it.

Still with us is the disgrace and evil of child labor, but who can compare the child labor of today with that of fifty years ago? Compulsory education laws, continuation schools, vocational schools, junior colleges and many other things of like purpose and design are the order of the day. Certainly public sentiment, religious and secular, condemns child labor and the lingering opposition to its eradication is felt to be futile.

In America, at any rate, according to recent figures, children are no longer sent to prison for any ordinary offence, either before or after trial and conviction. Detention homes have been established for children, and though they are far from perfect, no one will assert that they are physically or morally as pestilential as the jails and prisons of our cities and counties.

But, some may object, all these improvements are of slight consequence because fundamentally the wage-worker is still a serf and the average man is still oppressed and exploited by the privileged classes! Genuine progress means a constant increase in the freedom and opportunity of the average toiler.

Granted, and most heartily. But what are the signs, portents and tendencies in the industrial world so far as relations between employers and employed are concerned? There are some reactionary employers, of course, especially in industries that depend almost entirely on foreign, un-Americanized labor. But the trade unions
are stronger than ever; the campaign for the "open shop," or the shop closed to organized labor, has failed in America; machinery for adjudication of labor disputes is being fashioned and installed in many industries; "shop representation" and shop councils are being established even by powerful corporations in avowed recognition of the claims of "industrial democracy" and the principles of mutuality and justice; tens of thousands of employees are investing in industrial stocks and receiving dividends in addition to wages. The significance of all these and similar symptoms is unmistakable. Even the opponents of social and trade-union radicalism, so-called, are promoting radicalism unconsciously. They are helping to supplant the wage-system by some form of co-operation.

Meantime organized labor itself, long indifferent to voluntary co-operation and disposed to depend unduly on state aid and paternalistic legislation, is beginning to turn to co-operation, productive and distributive, as a partial solution of its problems. If labor leaders are wise, or if they become wise, trade union funds and workmen's savings will seek more and more direct competition with capitalism in the great fields of production and distribution. There is no reason why thousands of small factories should not spring up in every industrial country. Co-operation is more efficient than capitalism—and more equitable. Labor for decades has had to fight for its rights. Now it is beginning to think of its opportunities this side of Utopia, opportunities under capitalism and private property. Labor hopes to control the political state sooner or later. Numbers and organization may give it such control in certain countries. Why should it wait, however, for that consummation? Without controling parliaments and governments, labor can use its own capital and its own credit to build up co-operative industries and demonstrate their superiority both to monopolized or to excessively competitive industry. Capitalism could not prevent such development of co-operation if it would, and only very shallow persons imagine that it would deliberately seek to obstruct and prevent the development of co-operation if it could. Here and there, of course, short-sighted and greedy groups of local bankers, or of intrenched monopolists, have fought, and will again fight, co-operative enterprises, but the same thing is true of innovations essentially capitalistic. Ignorance and blind selfishness always resist improvements, even when they are not at all radical. The point is that capitalism would not rise in its might to fight and defeat co-operation.

It is idle to bewail the "degradation of labor." Labor in mod-
ern society is more independent, more militant, more intelligent, more cohesive than it ever was. Mr. John Galsworthy, a true and sincere humanitarian, who has arraigned many of the defects and vices of the present social-economic order in his novels, plays and essays, and who demands for labor more comfort and more beauty than it is now enjoying, is constrained to acknowledge, after a fresh indictment of society, that "in spite of everything this is still the best age, on the whole, that man has lived in."

In this connection a few sentences from Mr. Wells' Outline, contrasting the rôle of labor prior to the Industrial Revolution with its rôle since that momentous change are highly pertinent. "The power of the old world," writes Mr. Wells, "was human power: everything depended ultimately upon the driving power of human muscle, the muscle of ignorant and subjugated men. . . . A vast proportion of mankind in the early civilization was employed in purely mechanical drudgery. . . . Modern civilization is being rebuilt upon cheap mechanical power. For a hundred years power has been getting cheaper and labor dearer. . . . As the 19th century advanced human beings were wanted now only as human beings. The drudge, on whom all the previous civilizations had rested, the creature of mere obedience, the man whose brains were superfluous, had become unnecessary to the welfare of mankind."

Glancing for a moment at political relations of men, who can deny that the change from autocracy, monarchy, oligarchy to modern democracy, with its equal suffrage, direct primaries, frequent elections, initiative-referendum systems, recalls, popular assemblies, constitutional conventions, and the like, represents very real and great progress? We complain, and rightly, of the shifty opportunism, the cowardice and the subserviency of the majority of modern lawmakers and executives. But what is the implication in these complaints? Clearly, that representatives fear the voters and seek to please them, to feed their prejudices, to reflect their notions. The average legislator is alas, not very superior intellectually and morally to the average body of his constituents, but democracy should lead us to expect this and to accept it with resignation, or, rather, with the determination to elevate the electorate in order to elevate its public servants and delegates.

We have lately realized the weakness of territorial representation and are beginning to consider sympathetically the alternative of functional representation—of selecting men and women on the basis of their work and service rather than on that of accidental
residence. There may be much promise of improvement in this idea—as the writer thinks—or there may be little. But there is nothing to prevent modern democracies from experimenting with functional representation. Political changes are far less difficult of accomplishment than changes that directly affect property rights and vested interests. At any rate, whether we reorganize our legislative chambers or not, any considerable element in a modern community, if it is sufficiently intelligent and persistent, and if it takes the trouble to organize, can even now secure fairly adequate representation in most of these chambers.

No; history does not lend any real support to the pessimistic conclusion of those thinkers who hold that progress is an illusion or a dogma. On the contrary, history irresistibly forces on us the conclusion that the human race is essentially a progressive race, and that progress is in truth a law of its nature. The belief in absolutely continuous, uninterrupted progress was dogmatic. Lapses, interruptions, periods of stagnation there have been, and there will be. But these periods are becoming shorter and less frequent. Humanity is not Bourbon. It learns and it forgets—somehow. Acquired characters may not be inherited by the offspring of the beneficiaries of valuable acquisitions. Biology has rendered no final verdict on that important issue. But civilization, culture, improvements are handed down by generation to generation; the torch is never extinguished or lost.

The late Alfred Russell Wallace called the Nineteenth Century "the wonderful century." Wonderful it was, and not merely on account of mechanical and scientific achievement. The century of constitutional changes, of liberal reforms, of suffrage extension, of the establishment of popular and secular education, of trade unions, of factory legislation, of the rise and development of Socialism in its various forms, of cautious but important applications of science to punishment for crime, of the development of daily, weekly and monthly journalism, of the free and circulating libraries, of cheap editions of the most humanizing and elevating forms of literature; the century of Godwin, Fourierism, Owen, Comte, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Carlyle, Mill, Toynbee, Ruskin, Maurice, Kingsley, Morris, Marx, Mazzini, Emerson, Thoreau, Gladstone, Bright, Cobden, Henry George, and a host of other sincere and penetrating thinkers and critics of social maladjustments—that century was marvellous in a social, ethical and economic sense as well! And it planted seeds that have yet to yield rich harvests in many fields. True, the
present century seems so far to have brought only disillusionment, reaction, loss of faith and generous enthusiasm. The world war, utterly unnecessary, which the madness and lillleness of a few men clothed with brief but unlimited authority inflicted upon civilized mankind, has caused many to despair of humanity and pronounce the doom and fall of our proud culture. But these views are superficial. They are based on misconceptions and arbitrary assumptions. The world will ere long take a fresh start on the road to justice and righteousness, unity and peace. The problems that face civilized societies have never been so well understood as now. None of them are insoluble, and this means that humanity can and shall solve them—not in a decade, or even a century, perhaps, but within calculable time. To quote Mr. Galsworthy again, "There is in human nature, after all, the instinct of self-preservation, a great saving common sense." This instinct and this sense have not prevented catastrophes and tragedies, to be sure, but they have extracted moral profit from the catastrophes and tragedies. Because of them good has often come out of evil, and bitter experience has not been wholly wasted. Because of them, and only because of them, the golden rule in social and economic relations is not a mere dream or illusion. Human nature may not change; it does not need to change. Environmental and institutional changes will answer. There is enough intelligence and enough sympathy, imagination and right feeling in humanity to bring about the requisite changes in the institutions that have outlived, or are outliving their usefulness, or that offend the sense of justice and the reason of the average body of human beings. The seers, the guides, the interpreters of life must address unceasing appeals to justice and to intelligence. There is no other fountain of justice, of mercy, of solidarity.