It is usual to notice that Western Philosophy, from Ionian speculation to the genetic thought of our modern day, is an evolution upward from a vague materialism to a rationally intelligible idealism. But with India it has been almost a reverse process, Hindu thought having first been engaged in a vague religious idealism and then passing through various philosophical speculations, has ended (i.e. in the classical age at least) in systems which are primarily materialistic. Thus, and quite apart from chronological difficulties, the genetic course of Hindu thought in its most prominent points was through the Samkhya, Nyaya, Purva Mimamsa, Vaiseshika, and the Vaiseshika schools. The strong psychologism which runs through all of the Hindu's intellectual operations always valued principles and methods of inquiry above the mere subject-matter with which they dealt, and in a system which proposed to lay before us the plan and purpose of Reality's construction, they could not help but give primary attention to the method of presentation.

A. Kapila's Samkhya Philosophy.

The first thinker who seems to have given any orderly expression of philosophical method was Kapila, the Monkey-colored, who flourished during the sixth century B.C. and developed a sort of primitive common-sense philosophy in regard to individual psychic reality. The soul, according to him being a real existent having the particular function of purity and intelligence, is eternal in its universal continuity of being, but does not always have a corporeal body connecting it with physical Nature and by which it may manifest its presence in the world of life and action. Kapila's Samkhya philosophy derived its name from its enumeration of twenty-five scientific and metaphysical principles called tattva, twenty-four of
them being material through objective physical manifestation, and one being of an immaterial nature through subjective application and psychic control. In the theology which he constructed on the basis of these principles Kapila stood in opposition to Vedic doctrine by denying a special creator's existence or a god who had any intelligent purpose in mind at the time of the so-called creation of the Universe; and also in denying that the existence of pain and misery in the world makes no difference to our affirmation of the reality and knowability of a Supreme Being, or to our belief in the divine origin of the world. He anticipated by twenty-four centuries the Kantian dictum that the subjective can never be objective and hence what we know of one cannot reasonably be used to "prove" anything about the other. A further degree surely of Buddha's theory of individuality and mental finitude.

Another difference or opposition to Vedic doctrine was Kapila's premiss of the Prakriti, an objective reality corresponding to what we call physical Nature and conceived, as existing independently of both Brahma and the Purushas or created souls. And yet, while thus allowing a dualism of material Nature and immaterial Spirit, he did not in any way approach so decided an atheism as was later charged against Buddhism or the Vedanta. His enumeration of the philosophical principles was not advocated in any absolute negation of the Deity nor of any possible element of the divine whatsoever, even though there was in his day a great diversity of opinion regarding the proper interpretation of the Veda and its Sruti or revelation. Rather was he more concerned to place a more strict emphasis and a purer reverence upon the philosophical knowledge which could be had of the Supreme Ruler by means of the triune possibility of acquiring that knowledge: through spiritual perception, logical inference, and Aptsaruti or trustworthy revelation.

But, after all that we may read of Brahmanical counter-claims (and not a little priestly invective), the psychological fact remains that Kapila's divergence from strictly Vedic ideas arose chiefly through his thinking that the Veda was not a non-human expression of divinity and truth, but was merely a product of Aptsavakanā or human historical authority, or literally, trustworthy utterance. Even in his notion predicating concreteness of Astitva or Nature-Reality, he is directing his thought more in favor of objective existence and a sort of experiential method of deriving philosophical
criterions than he is of the Purusha, the soul-self advocated in the Upanishads and their later exposition known as the Vedanta. It was his objectivism of method and subjectivism of metaphysical ground which gave to the subsequent Charvakas their best weapon for championing a sceptic materialism, to the atomism of Kanāda its (perhaps) only real value as a philosophy of Nature, and to the jnana-yoga of Pātanjāli its main argument for the unity or rather unification of the human soul with Nature through perfect knowledge. It was truly a vital proposition at that time to claim that men require a twofold measure of truth so as to cover both the inner and the outer processes of Reality, no one being rationally able to deny the actual existence of either domain of activity.

B. GŌTAMĀ AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC.

There is one other value which may be further interpreted as having obtained in the Samkhya system, and that is the fact that it served as a forerunner of preparatory culture for a subsequent rational attitude proposed as being more adequate to the need for finding more intelligible principles, self-consistency and unity of experienced operation at the basis of Reality and Truth. For the specifically avowed purpose of getting behind the vague and too-cumbrous mysticism of the Vedic wisdom, while at the same time to render philosophical aid to the emancipation-thinkers, the Nyaya or in-going philosophy of insight and logical induction was founded. Its reputed founder, Gōtamā Akshapāda, “the Biggest Ox in the Thorny Path”, composed the Nyaya-Sutras about the fifth or second centuries B. C. according to the various accounts, but certainly before the time of Yoga development because the latter’s Jnana depended on the prudent principles established by Gōtamā’s Pramāna or the proper methods of securing knowledge. To Gōtamā the Nyaya method of philosophizing was a source of delight as well as of instruction, a truly “precious refuge” Para Santi from the fallacies of delusion and personal motive, while to us it is one of India’s most valuable contributions to the methodology of human aspiration. But like practically all the other Hindu systems it proposed no more than a negative ideal of the supreme good which is possible of human achievement, although it did embrace more positive elements than either Buddhism or the Upanishads could offer. Hence, in its own sphere this ideal was by no means a passive item of men’s moral inertia even though negative in content, for it was not only the resigned blessedness of Freedom, but also the very
positive hardihood and morally sustained effort to achieve the wis-
dom so requisite to this Freedom and the inward bliss which places
the wearying soul safely beyond the desires and anxieties of earthy
life.

With Gôtamâ this Apavarga or spiritual deliverance from
worldly evil was to be secured by means of the practical and order-
ly use: to which we must put the sixteen Padarthas or paths of
righteous conduct both mental and moral. In the order of their
importance and degree of required attention they are Pramāna, the
principles of or proper methods for securing knowledge; Prameya,
the proper object of knowledge; Samsāya, the nature and effects of
doubt; Prayōgana, the purpose or intention of our every thought and
action; Drishtānta, instances or examples (including metonymy and
anagogy); Siddhānta, those truths or maximus which are already
established; Avayāva, premises or assumptions of fact; Tarka, rea-
soning; Nirnaya, logical conclusion; Vada, argumentation; Galpa,
sophistry; Vitanda, eristic wrangling; Hetvabhasa, fallacies both
material and verbal: Kahala, quibbles; Gati, false or unstable
analogy; and Nigrāhāstānta, the unfitness resulting from these last
five erroneous practices.

It is easily seen that this list is composed of both positive and
negative elements, and so did Gôtamâ accordingly divide these
Padarthas into two series: the first or positive series, 1 to 9 in-
lusive, is to be used for verifying the facts of experience and in
vindication of the principles of human knowledge; while the sec-
ond or negative series, 10 to 16 inclusive (although 10 is a sort of
borderland character covering arguments of possibility), is for the
guidance of dialectic discussion and logical procedure. Both a
theoretical and a practical code of intellectual wisdom is developed
as the primary requisite to any attempt at gaining philosophical de-
 deliverance either of knowledge or of oneself from the wheel of ex-
istence. And so, according to Gôtamâ, a clear understanding and
an honest practice of these sixteen topics will enable anyone to
attain the heights of spiritual purification, the calm of true wisdom,
and the freedom of eternal beatitude. The soul must be exalted
above the crude foibles and sorbid anxieties of its worldly life be-
fore there can be any true understanding, any real drama of virtue
and love.

However, this philosophizing on the theory and utility of hu-
man knowledge was not introduced as a theological instrument, but
only as an abutment to our moral faith. It did not pretend to discover any new process of getting at the origin of Truth and Reality, but only served humbly as a credological or irenical device for harmonizing the numerous sectarian oppositions regarding variations of Vedic doctrinal interpretation. Though the Nyaya, as practiced and taught under the directions laid down in Gōtama's Sutras, was not specific in denying the existence of a personal god with certain spiritual capacities, it did directly deny that such a god could have created the material Universe. It was the Naiyāyikas or logician-followers of Gōtama who were led by their interpretation of his terms to deny that any of the six pramānas were adequate to a proof of that existence, nor were they even sufficiently valid as means toward a proof of the most personally conceived of all gods, Iswara. He, quite independently of all our predications, might yet be in act and in fact the Supreme Creator and Ultra-Intelligent Ruler of the Universe (with material creation a function of lesser beings or forces); but this possibility must not be permitted in any way to interfere with the proper application of these six principles of knowledge, for they are properly adequate only to advise us in the belief or faith, Bhakti, we have in such a being conceived as Creator and Governor.

C. BADARĀYANA AND THE VEDANTA.

In the mythical age of much of India's religious thought historical records were unknown and we are at a loss to know the exact time of any particular beginning; but so far as internal evidence counts meagre and allusional as it is, it does not seem that we would be far wrong to say that the Vedanta or "end of the Veda" took its first step toward systematic form with the editorial work of the semi-mythical sage Vyasa the Arranger who is also reputed to have been the author-compiler of the Purānas and the Mahabhārata. On the same ground it is reasonable to believe that he lived about the time immediately preceding Saunaka, when the demand was becoming felt for a more permanent formulation of the mnemonic Vedism and the crude metaphysic of the Upanishads, and when the popular Hindu mind was beginning to make inquiries for itself into the natural as well as the supernatural constitution and causes of things.

The compilation made by Vyasa then was the official formulation recognized by the priests of Brahmanism during the century or two which elapsed between Vyasa's time and the advent of
Buddhism. It was some years after Buddha’s powerful onslaught, but before the birth of Moggallāna, that Badarāyana “the one born of (or under) the jujube tree” arose to the rescue of the Vedanta and the somewhat modulated Brahmanism of its devotees. And he it was who made the distinction in the terms applied, holding that the early conclusions arrived at and compiled by Vyasa were now grown too antiquated and inadequate to the philosophical maintenance of Brahmanical theory, and that he should, somewhat after the manner pursued by Kapila’s Sankhya, pick out and systematize the philosophical instruction embodied and remaining yet unmined in the Upanishadic writings. To this selectivism he gave the name of Uttara Mimamsa or “secondary investigation”; that is, it was considered secondary in importance to the Vedic Sruti or revelation of truth which was a subject of faith (Bhakti) and not a matter of intellectually acquisitive knowledge or power to understand (Tārkikajñāna.)

Bādarāyana entertained a negative notion in epistemology and developed the positive agnosticism which took as its basis the experiential inference that Truth and Reality cannot be specifically known as so-and-so, but rather as not-this, not-that. Both negative and affirmative reasoning are considered faulty, and as their fallibility arises from the finite sanction of their aims, so are we urged to realize that a hyper-individual sanction is the prime necessity to true wisdom and that this is what makes the Sruti or Vedic revelation a reliable source of knowledge. This was the substantial result of his Secondary Investigation and served as the foundation for the further philosophical result incorporated into the later Vedantism, according to which the principal doctrines are that the external material world is an illusion (Maya), that the human Soul-self is in its inmost nature identical with the Supreme Self of Brahma, and that Brahma is the only true self-existent Reality. Being the Supreme Cause of the whole infinite Universe, Brahma is therein conceived to be greater than the Christian God or manifested Creator of this world, which is merely one in a million. And yet in sacrificial practices, prayers and ceremonies attending political or economic supplications, Brahma was not beyond calling distance, for with all his Supreme Infinity, Brahma was still considered the attentive divinity who generously harkened to priestly supplication and ceremonial formality.

However, the elevation of the Soul-self up to an equal qualita-
tive rank with the Supreme Causal Reality was itself tantamount to an urgent recognition of the original divinity of man showing through and surviving the incrustations of Maya and Avidya, illusion and ignorance, which have grown up about him, perhaps through his unwarranted trust in the universal adequacy of the intellect to (supposedly) see into the nature of all things. It was pure Vedanta to announce that "Thou art that", meaning that the individual self or human soul is fully one with God, for as the Soul-self is indivisible and not known as a made-up-of-parts entity, so is it to be known as one with the indivisibility of Brahma, equally eternal and infinite. Kapila's Sanākhya philosophy had held that the individual souls (purushas) were plural and existed separately and independently of each other, but the Vedanta orthodoxy ruled that they were quite thoroughly unified and homogeneous, and that they constituted the oneness of the World-Soul (Kaivalya Parāmatman).

As a general doctrine this construction which Bādarāyana had placed on the Vedanta metaphysic and theology remained intact, as we might reasonably judge apart from quondam heresies here and there, until the time of his famous commentator, Sāṅkara Achārya of Malabar who lived about 788-880 A. D. Sāṅkara diverged from the early doctrine by claiming that Brahma, being infinite and unconditioned, cannot be known as one with the individual soul of man, which is personal, particular and finite; that the world is not the direct result or effect of Brahma's creative will, but is merely a product of the cosmic Nescience or Avidya which is fostered by a human subscription to the illusions and delusions of finite incarnated life. It was allowed, however, that the true solution of this life's problem still remained the same; Moksha or emancipation was to be secured only by means of Triya Dvara the three gateways of quiet meditation, virtuous attention to duty, and spiritual knowledge.

Sāṅkara founded a school at Sṛṅgagiri and while there composed his Brāhmaśutrabhāṣya or vernacular commentary on Badarāyana's Brahmaṇa; he later became one of the greatest exponents of Vedantism and, according to the evidence supplied in the Sāṅkara-dig-Vijaya or Sāṅkara's World Conquest, he was also a great controversialist and held devoutly that both materialism and personal spiritism are figment of the individual soul's imagination and ignorance; that the material world is not a theoretically true
reality, but is real only in the sense of supporting corporeal life; that even the so-called creator, Iswara, is merely the ignorant soul's obstructed view of the Supreme Brahma; and that nothing is or can be created (in the sense of an absolute beginning from nothing) and that all things and the laws of their preservation are eternal. In his commentary Sankara was the first to fully elaborate the notion of Maya or cosmic illusion, and show that it is an illusion of the intellect in prospect of the external world of physical nature; that we posit the false panorama of external objects upon the true Reality of the Infinite Soul-Principle and thereafter are never at rest until we have rationalized an explanation of this fallacious and unwarranted position. He thought also that it is altogether unnecessary to admit the full import of Jaimini's doctrine of the Sphota as being the eternity of the spoken sound as well as the meaning of words, but held rather that it was philosophically sufficient to recognize the eternity of the words themselves, not as mere sound but as formal sound, which must be vocally produced if the meaning or communicative intelligibility which words convey is to be expressed. It was thus he drew up the reductio ad absurdum that with no letters (i.e., no alphabetical sounds) no words can be formed; with no words, no Sphota; and with no Sphota, there is no eternity of conveyed intelligence. Unknown to him the principle of this Sphota-problem was one of a homogeneous language-education, for if a group of people have not received the same instruction as to the intelligible meaning of words and their uses, all expression would be a Babel of confusion and Futurist rhetoric. It seems to me to have been a poor attempt to make metaphysical capital out of an exaggerated item of psychology.

Another powerful and devoted Vedantist was Mādhava Acharya, who flourished about 1300-1350 A.D., and whose name has been immortalized to us by his prodigious work entitled the "Sarva-Dārshana-Samgrāha," which was composed sometime during the second quarter of the fourteenth century and summarizes all the Dārshanas or "demonstrations", a general name applied to all philosophical systems primarily derived from the classical Upanishadic literature. This work has for nearly seven centuries served as the foundation for native as well as Western interpretations (from the Vedantist point of view) of the several Hindu religious and speculative philosophies. It was in this work that the Vedanta ofVyasa, as well as its successor, the Uttara Mimamsa
of Bādarāyana's Sutras, was drawn out and perfected in what is generally now considered to be the orthodox form. In short it is now an exalted sort of monism harmonizing and unifying several eclectic elements, for it is found to embrace the ideals of the universal sacredness of all real things, the eternal and immutable existence of a cosmically conscious Being called Paramatman, and of the all-pervading beneficience of this spiritual principle in its capacity as Governor of the Cosmos. With the great Mādhava this Supreme Soul-Principle is not only the composite oneness of all purushas or individual souls, but is also the sum and summit of all Intelligence, Wisdom, Love and Truth; not only the plural separateness of the Samkhya doctrine, but also the universal connectedness of the cosmic continuum. It becomes the most subtle and thorough monism of all philosophies and all possible realities; it is surely the ultimate "conclusion and end" of the Veda's speculations and aspirations; and in a few generations it was like a tidal wave sweeping over the break-water of sectarian Buddhism, its devotees holding it superior to all philosophies, all books, all external attractions and disciplines: the Vedanta was the only life!

D. JAIMINI AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF DUTY.

As Bādarāyana had given his attention to the inquiry which he considered to be secondary in importance and authority only to the Vedic Revelation and which he developed as a sort of verifying theory of its speculative truth, so did it seem to Jaimini that there should be a primary investigation into the exact conduct and aspirational effort (Ashrāma) which are the prerequisites to an adequate recognition of that Revelation and to any valid theory of its truth. Accordingly he laid out the plan and structure of this inquiry, as well as an elaborate analysis of these two prerequisites, in a work which he named as above, the Purva Mimamsa, composed in twelve books about the middle or latter half of the fourth century B. C. Basing the structure of this inquiry on the practical interpretation that may be made from the Vedic instructions, Jaimini drew up thereon those beautiful ethical arguments which have been developed separately in the Dharma Sutras and which dealt with exhortations to public duty, maxims of ethical law, and programs of religious regulation. They composed a foundation quite suitable for establishing a practical philosophy of our proper duties and sacrifices, of our proper desert for reward or punishment; and with the equation that Buddha's Dhammapāda is identical in moral tone
and teaching with his own Dharmapāda, he proved himself well-worthy of moral leadership. That is, if the eightfold path (Asthampāda) is constitutively the same as the path of Duty (Dharmapāda), then Dharma becomes the supreme ethical law and through our proper conduct in keeping this law we are enabled to see the religious value of duty and personal obligation.

There was another distinction emphasized by Jaimini and used as a furtherance of his exhortation to ethical rectitude; it was a negative anticipation of the “mouth to ear” principle adopted later by Pāṇini in constructing his famous Grammar and by Sankara in composing his vernacular commentary on the Brahmasutras. It was a distinction basic to the doctrine of the Sphota, already mentioned. Properly stated, this distinction was all that gave the Sphota its reality and actual or applicative truth. It was developed by Jaimini into the grammatical argument that as the meaning is inherent in the constitution of words, so is the instruction to be derived from hearing or reading words also inherent in the order and intelligible use of their meanings; that as this inherent meaning of orderly sounds is eternal, so is the derivative instruction likewise eternal and immutable, and does not depend upon cultural conventions, not even on any special grammatical education for its growth or recognition as was popularly supposed by the Lōkayātikans and by implication assumed by the Nyaya and Vaiseshika philosophies in their Pramāṇa treatment of the problem of knowledge.

Somewhat similar to Gōtamā’s valuation of the first Padārtha, Jaimini in his scriptural epistemology taught that there were five instead of six Pramāṇas or legitimate sources (or principles) of knowledge, namely: Sabdasruti scriptural revelation; Aptāvakanā trustworthy oral communication; Bhakti, faith; Tarka, legitimate (i. e., not only logical but honest) reasoning; and Samādhi, meditation without a seed (i. e., without any ulterior motive such as personal desire, self-aggrandizement, etc.). And yet in that necessarily personal process which alone can secure an adequately practical degree of knowledge of the Dharma, he considered that the first or scriptural Vedic source (the sacred Sabda revelation of Truth and Right) was sufficient; it revealed not only the true ethical law but also indicated the proper manner of its conduct and keeping. In thus seemingly rating the practical over the theoretical, the human need over the divine abundance in Vedic speculation and exhorta-
tion, Jaimini was not an atheist, as was often charged; but strove manfully instead to more clearly justify the ways of God to man, and to show Him far less aloof from human affairs than had been shown by the Brahmancial priests, pseudo-philosophical Vedantists, Buddhists and Karma-theorists. His defense on this score is very ably pointed out and analyzed by Max Müller in his monumental work on the "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" (London, 1899).

E. PĀTANJĀLI AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF UNITY (YOGA).

While the Vedanta belongs, independently of its religious revival and under proper classification as an eclectic afterthought, to that series of Hindus systems which aimed at a theory and solution of the problem of illusion and ignorance, the Yoga philosophy sprang up as an attempt to vindicate the superiority of Karma the law of works, both of the individual soul and of the evolutionary process, over Mimāmsa or the mere theoretical investigation of Reality. The Yoga was specifically a system of action as well as of knowledge, contemplation as well as passive perception; for was its very foundation not that greatest of all principles: the unity and identity of Soul and Nature, of Mind with Reality, and of man's spiritual intelligence with the Cosmic Intelligence of the Supreme World-Soul? As Kapila’s Samkhya had made a thorough enumeration of the principles of human knowledge, so was it Pātanjāli’s ambition to make of the highest human wisdom a theological argument in favor of the Divine. Thus it was that Pātanjāli’s Karmayoga, unity through the eclectic laws governing spiritual evolution, was, as a theory of practice, put forth on the presupposition that the prospective Yogi-devotee had already finished the development prescribed in the Samkhya, which Pātanjāli renamed Jñānayoga or unity through knowledge, as also that laid down in Jaimini’s Dharma inquiry, renamed by Pātanjāli as Dharmayoga or unity through obedient performance of ethical duty. It took for granted the required accomplishment of secular talents, that we have already prepared ourselves in the way of knowledge and ethical construction before resorting to spiritual works and beneficence. Spiritual unity was an aspiring function, an ascending mode of life and evolution, not a mediocre affair of mere experience and weary livelihood.

The foundation of the Yoga philosophy was contained in the Yogasutras, most of which were very probably composed or first taught orally by Pātanjāli about the early part of the second cen-
tury B.C., (one account has it that he left no written record of his thoughts). This foundation was the instruction relating to the most efficient methods for controlling the thinking principle through patient practice and non-attachment to things either physical or intellectual. The most obstinate problem of human life is how to render oneself independent and secure from the attractions and distractions of material reality or worldly life, which is conceived to be nothing but a series of modifications of name and form (nāmarūpa-prātyatājyeta); for where there are five constituents out of which all objects whatsoever can be made, the three highest—Being, Wisdom, Bliss—compose Spirit, while the inferior two remaining—name and Form—made up the material world. The former are eternal and immutable while the latter are fickle, changeable and ephemeral,—nay, they are the subtle instruments of our illusion and ignorance.

The law of our life is that whatever we think and do, that we will surely become; and the problem arises on the question of what is the best and noblest possible of human attainment. This best-in-life is held to be Samadhi, spirituality or the pure intuition of universal Being; but as a constant human effort it is silent contemplation and the immutable preservation of one's inner tranquillity of soul. All material thinking is to be put aside by the complete identification of this silent bliss with the spiritual intuition of the supremacy of universal Being; personal, finite and particular reality becoming altogether negative and illusory in the calm security of Chidakāsa or cosmic consciousness. The fool is one who retains this material thinking and hence is confounded in the labyrinth of sense attraction and attachment. But the man of holy wisdom, even though he lives what we usually call "an active life", holds himself above these bonds of finite distraction, and goes peacefully and clear-souled on the identical journey which is so hazardous to the fool. It is a world-old contrast between wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance; even though one's previous course of evolution (Karma) makes his present action limited to the degree of perfection attained, yet it does not alter the Jñānayoga principle of Kshetrākshetrajñayānājan yat tajnān matān mamā so emphasized in the Bhagavād Gita that "only that knowledge knows which knows the known by knowing the knower". The mind is so surely an ocean that it must very similarly and equally of necessity to our safety be charted, sounded, proper courses laid out and traversed,
for no one, not even a sudra or an idiot, is born without a share in this ocean of mind both its elements of conscious and subconscious activity.

As a theological complement of the Samkhya system Pātanjāli's Yogasutras interpreted Kapila's single immaterial principle as being identical with Iswara, the devotional and disciplinary god who is, in the Yoga philosophy, thereafter called Tāraka or ferry across the ocean of mind and the world of bodily life. But the original leading tenet of the Yoga system was that of the Samatva, a sort of Stoic practice of persistently holding oneself in equanimity, control, and meditative quiet. It was the exceptional goal aimed at by the triune Yoga method of Hatha, Jnana, and Raja, or physical, mental, and spiritual preservation and self-control. Thus it was then, that Pātanjāli's individualism and psychology of character-building outran the theology which it formally perfected. The devotional services offered up to Iswara became, accordingly, not the supreme attention; they were recognized only as means whereby the human soul could attain Kaivalya and Moksha, aloneness and freedom. The study of the appurtenances of self-control and contemplative calm became more and more exacting than the problem of Iswara's vague existence, and the personal item of mental tranquility and virtuous conduct took on the aspect of our only true function in the world, it was the summum bonum and the finis nobilis of our individual life.

Iswara is to all intents merely another name for Brahma; he is equally aloof and unconcerned about the way the world is going. He is obscurely conceived to be a purely spiritual God supreme over all the Universe, but not in any sense its Father, Creator, or Protector, for He is considered absolutely independent and unconnected with any of the names and forms which the human intellect recognizes as making up material things, animals, men, or even the earthly powers of external Nature. Nevertheless, Pātanjāli's constant ideal is the unification of the individual soul with the evolutionary process of Nature. It is a gradual but eternal progress of the human spirit up toward the highest goal of aspiration—Perfection; and human perfectibility is by no means considered impossible, no more so than divine perfectibility. This progress is not to be secured through mere theoretical speculations on the nature of God or Truth or their respective reality in the Universe, but rather
by means only of a ceaseless effort, an indefatigable industry in the purification and ennoblement of one's mind and character.

Of course, this effort cannot be an efficient one upon immediate wish or intention; it must first be perfected itself before any higher accomplishment can be made. It is an effort that must be made habitual, and therefore must be built up gradually from the lesser to the greater function, one's spiritual structure altering for better or for worse in the same proportion and quality of one's habitual practice. The various methods and their proper spheres of application must be mastered in the proper order; thus, in the Hathayoga, rhythmic breathing (Prānayāma) and posturing (Asana) are important; in Jnanayoga, the sources of practical knowledge (Kārmavidyapramāna) and the non-duality (Advaita) of the monistic Vedanta are given primary attention; while in the Rajayoga, the Karma of devotion ( Bhakti) and mental emptying (Bodhisunya-tana) as well as introspection (i. e. subjective attention, Prātyāhara) and impersonal meditation (Samadhi) are among the principle items of Yogi practice. Although later adepts of this philosophy usually make a separate Yoga out of Bhakti and Karma, Pātanjāli taught them only as important steps in applying the "royal method" described in the Rajavoga. The ability to empty the mind is one of the Yogi's rarest accomplishments, and can be brought about only by a long-continued practice in losing the seed of the thinking principle. This seed as an innumerable variety of forms and fascinations: sometimes it is the desire for fame, wealth, power; often it may be the hope of the moralist to decide between what is good and what is evil; sometimes it is our sense of joy or the prospect of some future event; at other times it may be the philosopher's inquisitiveness into the nature of things, or the mystic's wrapped-up self-consciousness that he has a detached mind or an existence apart from the rancour and strife of the external world. In any case where personal affections are concerned we have no trouble finding some sort of "seeded thought".

Therefore, with the adept Yogi devotee the ability to lose at will this "seeded mediation" (Sāvijasamādhi) is the one high road to spiritual perfection; it is a form of pure being. It unifies one with the disinterestedness of Nature and identifies the human soul with the Supreme Spirit of Iswara. It makes for a severing of the cord of transmigration and frees the soul from its bondage of personal individual existence. The external material world and the
evils which append to our finite existence therein are no more; they are swallowed up in the infinite capacity of a new, regenerated being, a reborn soul.

These instructions were laid down either directly or by philosophic implication in the famous Yogasutras (supposedly written by disciples who wished to preserve Pātanjālis teachings), and if reports are true they became useful to a very rare severity of pursuit in the Karma of his own life's virtue and conduct.

F. KANĀDA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTICULAR REALITY.

About the beginning of the first century B. C. a thinker who had a reserved patronage for the Lokayatikan notions was heard advocating a specific philosophical method aiming at a more rationally intelligible conception of the material universe, its exact composition, its true nature, and even its possible destiny. This man's name was very probably not the one we have learned to call him, or at least it seems that the name Kanāda or "small eater", usually considered as arising because of his theory of atoms, but far more likely because of his rigid habit of fasting, is no more than a nickname used in default of the true one.

However this may be, he had sufficient ability to found the school of the Vaiseshika or specific method, a philosophy of the atomic construction of all material things, and a basic system of argument supporting the eternal truths of Nature. This Vaiseshika philosophy flourished for more than two centuries contemporary with the flourishing of Stoicism in Rome, and was developed to the noteworthy extent that its atomic theory and evidential theology served the two respective purposes: first, to refute the nihilism of the Lokayatikan materialists by disproving their argument of the *regressus ad infinitum* in the endless divisibility of matter; and second, to establish a logical ground for conceiving the eternity of matter along with that of Nature and Truth and Wisdom.

With Kanādas specific method there could be reached a cosmological proof of God's existence, made obvious and conceptually intelligible through the universal manifestation of His Work and Word, i. e., through the universe of Nature and the eternity of Truth. It therefore becomes Man's highest business in life to seek to know and recognize these attestations of the Divine Reality that is. But this search does not become efficient under any but very specific, if not very rare circumstances. Kanāda revived Jaimini's
ethical law by teaching that a strict attention to clean, righteous living will always lead to its natural consequence, its merited reward—a pure as well as a practical conception of Dharma, the law of righteousness and of a good and worthy life. From the practical application of this conception may next be derived (or experienced) an exact knowledge of the seven epistemological Padārthas or righteous paths, somewhat similar to Gōtama's first series in the Nyaya system, except that the seventh, Abhāva (the un-premised, as in distinction from the Avayāva or premises of the Nyaya), claims that the logical treatment of the problem of knowledge should also include a consideration of privation, negation, and absence as being of an importance equal to that of affirmation and inclusion. This exact knowledge, together with its proper use, serves in its turn to show us the structure both of material Nature (Astitva) and of the sacredness of Divine Truth (Siddhānta). All the possibilities, all the potential capabilities of the Atman or individual soul-self, developed to their highest and noblest perfection constitute Iswara the Paramātman, the Supreme Soul of the Cosmos. In this form all human nobility and aspiration to perfection is one with the Divinity of Nature, while those who are content to keep the lesser development of their individual selves make up the Many of a finite, worldly life.

(To Be Continued)