WHY WAR?

BY T. SWANN HARDING.

REASON is the noblest faculty of man; at its highest stage of development it differentiates him most clearly from the brute. But reason is also a recently acquired faculty and is far from evenly distributed among men. It is present to the greatest extent in the abnormally developed human mind but shades down through the normal, the dull normal and the moron to the lower types of imbecility and idiocy where it can scarcely be said to exist at all. Consequently the mental line of demarcation between man and the lower animals is indistinct and overlapping; many hold that animals reason, while it can scarcely be insisted that the idiot and the low-grade imbecile go through the process.

Reason, being a recently acquired faculty, is all too readily slipped off in moments of emotional tension, and, just as a foreigner reverts to his native language under stress of anger, so we all tend to revert to impulse and instinct in the presence of emotionally exciting ideas. It is only reason at its highest—_sui compon_, as James tells us—that enables a man to view things tolerantly, rationally and cosmically when his lower and more purely animal instincts are aroused. Moreover, many men capable of true reasoning when alone become victims of what is called “mob psychology” when in groups and the flames of emotion kindle them wholesale; they become utterly deaf to the voice of moderation and woe unto him who shall bravely stand forth to rebuke them in the day of their madness. The fact that scientific tests have shown that at least one third of our population will test below the moron grade on an approved mental scale demonstrates the reason for this, at least in part. It would seem that more of the higher-grade minds should be able to withstand the assaults of the impulsive masses, but many factors enter in here, and even the man who thinks rationally in private
finds it expedient in emergencies to cater to the herd instinct in public.

It is perfectly possible for waves of irrational emotion to sweep nations off their feet at peace. Such a wave struck France during the celebrated Dreyfus affair when millions of people ceased altogether to reason and gave themselves up to emotion and impulse. So prevalent is this tendency, even at normal times, that philosophers of the cast of Bertrand Russell question the fact that reasoning exists in the sense usually postulated, but are rather inclined to think that each individual is the battlefield of conflicting impulses of which the strongest finally wins and rules.

Certain it is that there is more emotion and habit in the world than reason. The average man would rather do almost anything under heaven than think; it is so much easier to adopt the opinions that are vouched for by those who want him to think as it is to their purpose to have him think. For there is always a cunning group ready and waiting to take advantage of man’s weakness, to gorge him with one side of a case and suppress the other, thus to whip him into a fury for or against some pet idea. Whether the ultimate desire is rational or not matters little; whether the projected end to be attained ever is attained matters less; once arouse the emotion and it will carry on automatically till discharged, whereupon the individual feels a wholesome sense of righteous relief that repays all effort with interest.

To-day we find ourselves for all practical purposes at the end of a great war which was fought ostensibly for ideals by all nations engaged therein. Viewed in a large sense, one must inevitably conclude that the ideals espoused by one side were infinitely superior to those espoused by the other. Whether we believe in cosmic progress or no, in absolute values or no, we must admit that the theoretical contentions of the Allied nations stood upon a higher plane than did those of the Teutonic powers. We cannot think otherwise without ignoring the lessons of history altogether.

In spite of this fact we find ourselves possessed of a peace that is no peace in the sense that we meant to have it; and that we have been duped and disappointed just as war always dupes and disappoints us. In spite of what the past told us we set out to uphold idealism by force of arms and failed miserably, just as the reflective man foresaw that we must inevitably fail at working such a miracle. And now come the halting, stammering apologies of the liberals who went wildly war-mad; who forgot their reasoned doctrines of other
days and, intoxicated with emotion, promised us everything if we would but gird our loins and draw the sword for "democracy."

Had we kept our lofty ideals all would have been different; but just this it is utterly and forever impossible to do in the welter of conflict. While armies meet opposing armies in battle array there is waged continually the conflict between reason and emotion, and in war, emotion invariably wins, however much restraint be preached. The ethics of civilized life cannot be reversed and good come therefrom; the morals of peace cannot be disregarded and conflict remain on a high moral plane; and, most important of all, war is not constructive and is powerless to bring about a reign of justice, truth and brotherhood.

These melancholy facts are not due to man's intellectual insincerity, to the machinations of capitalists or diplomats, or to any one of a number of other things so much as to the fact that mass psychology is so consummately mismanaged, the lower emotions are so violently aroused and played upon by different agencies, violence and slaughter are so unanimously lauded and all rational considerations are so bitterly denounced and so ruthlessly suppressed that no nation, while in a state of war, can act upon high ideals.

This is not to say that war can always be avoided at the present stage of world progress: it is not necessarily to preach the doctrine of non-resistance. The desire is to direct attention to the tremendous fallacy—the greater illusion—that the noblest purposes and the highest duties may somehow be miraculously accomplished by the magic power of war; the doctrine is really and simply that Might can make Right, the doctrine that it was our misfortune gradually to absorb from Prussia to our great disaster.

We do not need labored explanations to tell us why Mr. Wilson failed at Paris: certainly he did not fail on account of old-world reaction. This may have been an immediate cause but it was not the ultimate cause. America began the war in a novel and unusual manner—she began it without any desire to gain material things, without rancorous hatred and in a high spirit of altruism. We had a matchless opportunity to deal militarism a death-blow by obliterating its worst pest spot—Potsdam. Russia had disintegrated, and, if ever, war had an opportunity to accomplish something of value.

Instead of this we soon became mad with emotion; a vicious propaganda was started to lend the white heat of fury and no story was too absurd to be told solemnly in order to deprive us of more reason and to give in its stead the most degraded instincts. We
even welcomed a new democracy with sneers and went madly on and on until man's noblest faculty was submerged in the conflict and only a wild and incoherent mêlée of emotion and impulse remained. In the effort to defeat autocracy in the field we ourselves adopted more and more of the hateful institutions of autocracy; so much so that, spiritually, Germany really won the war.

In the midst of this raging animalism the Germans suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed and we reaped the whirlwind of our blocked neuron paths; inhibited from annihilating the Teuton race to the last babe, we discharged our emotions first in a mendacious and predatory peace and ultimately in mad forays against our own selves in lieu of foreign enemies to damage.

Yet there were and are occasional voices of reason raised in this rude storm of passion. In the Atlantic Monthly of December, 1919, A. Clutton-Brock dared protest that we could put no nation outside the pale: that we were really not gods after all, but men, with the sins and shortcomings of men: then he promulgated that rank heresy that we should forgive even as we desire to be forgiven and, in the broader sense, actually love our enemies. While these dubious doctrines from that most dangerous and radical of books, the New Testament, may be looked upon with proper trepidation, this trepidation would perhaps be less if we dared contemplate the war cosmically and in its true relationships.

When we turn to consider the prime question of why men fight one is led to wish that all people mentally capable of reasoning might read at least three books: it would seem that the perusal of these three books would be the best preventive for wars of the future—so trivial, so childish and so absurd are the common incentives to collective homicide. And yet the average man could doubtless read these books without changing his opinion a whit, so enslaved is he by habit and so impervious to cold logic by reason of emotional bias. The three books to which we have reference are How Diplomats Make War by Francis Neilson, What Is National Honor? by Leo Perla and Why Men Fight by Bertrand Russell.

Neilson's book does precisely what the title indicates and that most effectively; Russell's book carries out its title in similar manner but necessarily on broader lines: Perla dissects and analyzes national honor or prestige and makes very clear the childish inconsistencies and errors into which our entire lack of any inter-

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national consciousness leads us. A more complete logical demonstration of the emotional and irrational character of national honor would be hard to find than this clear and concise work of Perla.

To this brief list might well be added Thorstein Veblen’s fine treatise on the Nature of Peace. In the first two chapters of this book will be found a masterly exposé of the imbecilities of what goes under the name of patriotism, containing also the following excellent paragraph:

“It is, at least, a safe generalization that the patriotic sentiment never has been known to rise to the consummate pitch of enthusiastic abandon except when bent on some work of concerted malevolence. Patriotism is of a contentious complexion, and finds its full expression in no other outlets than warlike enterprise; its highest and final appeal is for death, damage, discomfort and destruction of the party of the second part. There is, indeed, nothing to hinder a bad citizen from being a good patriot; nor does it follow that a good citizen—in other respects—may not be a very indifferent patriot.”

With an emotion of such character as this nurtured and encouraged the transition to armed conflict is sooner or later inevitable. And until this sectarian orthodoxy is replaced by a more universal philosophy we shall have nationalistic wars just as we had religious wars until sectarianism—without being annihilated by any means—gained a catholic viewpoint and the tolerance that goes therewith.

Some years ago James Hopper told in an article in Collier’s how wars come about. It was at the time we had gone into Mexico after Villa: hereupon the Mexicans decided that we wanted not so much to take Villa as to take Mexico, and Carranza said “Get out!” We replied that we would get out when Carranza properly policed the border. Carranza dispatched troops for this purpose. Thereupon we shook our heads and wisely said, “Why are these troops in Chihuahua? D—n funny business. Going to attack us, eh?” And Hopper commented—“Such is human nature—and thus wars come.” And it is alas true. About just such microscopically trivial things do men fight.

Men fight because they will be realists: because they postulate nations as personalities and not as aggregations of individuals like unto themselves. They will revert to the universalism of old Albertus Magnus and look askance at nominalism. “What is honor? A word. What is that word honor? Air—a trim reckoning.” Hear that incorrigible nominalist Falstaff: but do we usually agree with him? Or with stoic Brutus who in deep despair cried “Alas! I
have found thee. Virtue, but an empty name." Virtue had been to
him a reality and he had seen it so in the same positive fashion as
he had seen his own wife.

It is the unconscious realism of humanity that makes up the
glory and the heroism of life, and that makes war possible. "Men
die, not for a statement of fact, but for the Truth: not for a name,
but for an ideal reality! not for a territory with its inhabitants, but
for a country: not for a piece of colored cloth on a staff, but for
a flag!" What is honor? Air? Indeed! Men fight because of their
profound, quite scholastic, realism.

Here might be quoted with profit satirical Dean Swift's delicious
remarks entitled A Digression on the Nature, Usefulness and Necess-
sity of Wars and Quarrels. Therein may be found the following
pithy sayings which help still further to show why men fight. "War
is an attempt to take by violence from others a part of what they
have and we want.... Every man fully sensible of his own merit,
and finding it not duly regarded by others, has a natural right to
take from them all that he thinks due to himself.... Wise princes
find it necessary to have wars abroad, to keep peace at home....
Most professions would be useless if all were peaceable." To read
this is to laugh, and yet we should be careful how we laugh; for
when we come right down to brass tacks it is just such silly and
absurd things as these that start wars.

Arthur Ponsonby\(^2\) declared that "the inevitable clamor which
arises on the outbreak of war is construed as popular approval." He
explains that the people are kept in ignorance of foreign affairs
and of diplomacy generally, but that things are so explained to them
and news is so colored at the outbreak of war that the part of
diplomacy in bringing it about is obscured. He remarks that the
London Times of November 23, 1912, admitted that diplomats
alone caused war. Imagine what would have happened had the
Times dared print such an opinion in 1915! In 1912 it was safe to
reason about such matters: in 1915 it was unsafe to do anything
other than to cater to the wild emotions of the blood-intoxicated
populace.

Roland Hugins\(^3\) repeats the old story of how England was in
1906 secretly committed to act in concert with France in any case
of war with Germany, though Lord Grey repeatedly denied such a
fact when interrogated in the Commons. He declared further that
the London Times of March 12, 1915, said "Herr von Bethmann-

\(^2\) Arthur Ponsonby, Democracy and Diplomacy.

\(^3\) Roland Hugins, Germany Misjudged.
Hollweg is quite right. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor and interest would have united us with France.” It seems more than probable that England was diplomatically bound to her allies more stringently than her people or her parliament for a moment suspected: that a small coterie of diplomats can so bind over an entire nation is absolutely wrong, regardless of the merits and demerits in this particular instance.

It is also to be remembered that the Crimean War is said to have been partly brought about by Lord Stratford de Redclyffe who boasted to Lord Bath that he would get back at the Czar for a personal grudge by fomenting a war! How easily the man in power can foment a war is demonstrated by Bismarck’s faked telegram which placed the foolish and bellicose Napoleon III in such a position that he could not avoid a conflict. However, there were two sides to this war, as to any other: the emperor is known to have shouldered the entire blame for the conflict of 1870 in a letter to a friend. W. Morton Fullerton, a good apostle of militarism,\(^4\) absolves France for 1870 on the theory that Napoleon III did not truly represent her; this appears to be dangerous doctrine because it would absolve the Germany of 1914 on the theory that the Kaiser did not represent his people—though emotionalists have proven both that William II was and was not a power in his empire—in either case entirely to their own satisfaction. The words written by Napoleon III to the Comtesse de Mercy-Argenteau just after Frankfort nevertheless remain: they are—“I admit, we were the aggressors.” We are willing to admit that this paragraph proves neither side of the case; what it does prove is the utter triviality of the causes which often lead to wholesale murder.

In the case of the Boer War we have a conflict which is now viewed apologetically and with shame by the more clear-thinking and equitable inhabitants of the victorious nation. In *The War in South Africa* J. A. Hobson very clearly analyzes this predatory struggle, showing first how lies, carefully used, can cause a war, and then how they were used in this instance. He declares that his nation scorned arbitration and that a letter from President Steyn of the Orange Free State was mutilated for public consumption in a way strikingly Bismarckian, for Sir A. Milner omitted from its contents anything that would have tended toward peaceful sentiment and made it appear exaggeratedly bellicose. The chapter entitled “A Chartered Press” is a classic exposé of the diabolical activities of this institution when set to war-making. In another

\(^4\) W. Morton Fullerton. *Problems of Power.*
volume Hobson explains how imperialism and colonialism connived together to cause this unfortunate war and to put the Boer States under the British flag.

Sydney Low is quoted as saying that Cecil Rhodes admitted all British grievances could have been solved without war, but that he wanted the territory from the Cape to the Zambesi, a suzerainty to which the Boer States could not agree. While the Boers were, during the war, described as most inferior people, immediately after the war was won they were praised extravagantly as virile additions to the empire by their former defamers—Grey, Froude, Geo. Colley, Hercules Robinson, Bishop Colenso, Kitchener and the London Standard. The amount of reasoning in such procedure could scarcely be detected microscopically. Furthermore, England hastened to adopt the same harsh attitude toward the native for which she avowedly went into the war to chastise the Boers, and the Boers themselves were permitted to mistreat British Indian subjects as much as they liked. So much for the ultimate moral value of war: for once the aroused emotion has its psychological discharge there is utter indifference to the ideals which were used as a cloak of self-righteousness to camouflage simple aggrandizement.

Alfred Hoyt Granger says England now admits that the famous Kruger telegram was not written by the Kaiser and that while France and Holland rapturously received Kruger on his European visit, he was spurned by William II. Hobson furthermore declares that Rhodes "used the legislature of Cape Colony to support and strengthen the diamond monopoly of the De Beers, while from De Beers he financed the Raid, debauched the constituencies of Cape Colony, and bought the public press in order to engineer the war, which was to win him full possession of his great 'thought,' the North." It is plain that men fought in this instance for very uncertain ideals at least, if not purely for material gain and the love of fight.

We American have had our own unnecessary wars, there being the Mexican debase, which General Grant himself condemned as unnecessary, and the Spanish war. In the latter instance Spain was apparently willing to grant our every contention and McKinley was quite as anxious to avoid war as Spain, but propaganda had succeeded so admirably in inflaming the ill-controlled emotions of

5 J. A. Hobson, Diplomacy After the War.
6 E. D. Morel, Germany and Morocco.
7 Alfred Hoyt Granger, England's World Empire.
8 David Starr Jordan, War and Waste.
the masses that armed conflict was inevitable. Individuals sadly lack "the power to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting idea"; what can we expect of emotions *en masse* where intellect is necessarily at the low, average level? William Graham Sumner uses this war to demonstrate the fallacies of militaristic philosophy; he also calls attention to the fact that we blandly forced our "civilization" on the Phillipines although we fought Spain for forcing hers upon them, and that the ideas of the nations for the betterment of the "uncivilized" are mutually antagonistic.

David Starr Jordan holds that the Italo-Turk War was largely fomented by the Bank of Rome, that it was tolerated both by Britain and Germany because each of them hoped to win Italy to their Alliance; and that the real victors were the French bankers who finally stepped in and, with a wave of the hand, stopped the war to prevent Turkey from being too badly beaten! Prof. Francis Delaisi of Paris admitted that France was vitally interested in the Balkan War and this "vital interest" was, of course, pecuniary: French money helped both sides in the contest. Nor was this "France" considered abstractly and in a sense in which no country exists: it was individual French investors who thus cheerfully prolonged war when it was at a distance: and these were the same French who wailed so miserably when exposed to it at close range.

It is well known that while internationalistic labor is looked upon as most wicked, the internationalism of armament trusts was accepted quite amiably. In 1913 Turkey, an ally of Germany, contracted with the English firm of Armstrong-Vickers to reorganize her naval yards. Krupp and Schneider-Creusot were partners in developing the Algerian iron fields while the British arms trust had branches in Italy, which country stood in enemy alliance. Furthermore, the celebrated Mulliner scare, formulated by a munition's man to the effect that Germany was secretly constructing battleships, helped the armament men increase their dividends and made war more inevitable in 1914.

Again, it is almost impossible for us to realize that it was an actual fact that England's phrase "Mistress of the Seas" appeared quite as menacing to Germany as did Germany's "place in the sun" doctrine to England. Never will we see ourselves as others see us. Even our Monroe Doctrine, demurred of the extenuating associations with which we habitually surround it in our own minds, appeared

9 William James, *Psychology*.
10 William Graham Sumner, *War*.
formidable and perplexing to Europe generally. As W. L. Grane said, however much England felt that her fleet was for purely defensive purposes (and she largely did feel so), Germany could not, in the very nature of things, view it otherwise than as a menace. And W. Morton Fullerton quotes Mr. Goshen as declaring in 1898 that this navy must be increased against Russia and might even be needed against the United States. Certainly men imbued with big navy ideas fight about trivialities quite as readily as do men of big army ideas; and while it is not intended to minimize German militarism in the least, it is apparent that we have studiously ignored our own side of the case while giving the other side pitiless publicity.

A commercially unimportant piece of territory like Morocco, which would be more valuable to all nations concerned if it were internationalized, has been made a test of prestige between two proud countries presumably inhabited by adults and not by boasting boys in their early teens. Should any one care to investigate the deplorable morals of the powers generally in regard to this celebrated affair, their infinitely petty bickerings with one another, their endless machinations and trickeries, their wholesale lies to the world and their underhanded dealings in secret, their disregard for treaties and for their solemn word of honor, their flagrant neglect of all that is good—and just and true and rational and honorable—let him peruse Germany and Morocco by E. D. Morel. A more terrible exposé of the shamelessness of governments could scarcely be written.

Then too, purely faked causes can bring about war. At Algeciras France pledged herself faithfully to respect the independence of Morocco. Subsequently the Sultan was deliberately encouraged in extravagance and France repeatedly expanded her police zone, always backed up by England. In spite of the fact that France needed money at home she made a loan of $10,000,000 to the Sultan with a "rake-off" to her bankers of $2,500,000. Clashes with the natives were repeatedly provoked—one in particular by deliberate French violation of a native cemetery—and each clash resulted in further French seizures. More money was continually forced on the Sultan; enormous bills were presented to him for damage inflicted upon French troops (sic); French writers faked stories of the dangers Europeans underwent in Fez, and finally, when public opinion was sufficiently inflamed, Fez was seized—and Germany protested French aggression in violation of her agreement. Such

12 Cf. Max Eastman, Understanding Germany.
13 W. L. Grane, The Passing of War.
was French morality when desirous of more territory. Of the morality of protesting Germany we have subsequently had nauseating evidence.\textsuperscript{15}

We must remember here and always that "France," "Germany," etc., are purely abstract terms frequently representing nothing more than the private opinions, grudges and ambitions of a small group of men who have managed to collect power into their own hands: a plebiscite on any question—with all the facts known—might result very differently. The Social Democrats, for instance, might really have represented Germany since they were her most numerous party. There are always antagonistic elements within a state and there is no nationalistic boundary-line to the ills of the downtrodden. When a few unscrupulous men are no longer able to throttle a country, to diffuse and to repress facts as they see fit and to play upon mass psychology in order to attain whatever end—good or bad—they may have in mind: more certainly when men begin to reason and cease to be herded like impulsive animals, an international consciousness of race solidarity will take the place of petty fratricidal bickerings and human life will become vastly more pleasant, and obviously more rational.

The unthinking masses are quite bad enough without giving them any particular incentive to slaughter. It may be remembered that American sentiment, aroused by unscrupulous public men, once demanded war with England over absolutely nothing. In 1896 Cullom was denouncing Britain roundly: Dickinson was calling her a sinister intriguer; Lodge was declaring we must strike her: Jos. Hawley saw her as our natural enemy; Rear-Admiral Belknap insisted that her growing navy must be crushed; John B. Wilson lauded war as a good thing and would have seen the Stars and Stripes over the whole of North America; Ambrose Bierce advised that we pray for war with England, and the dear, old blind Chaplain of the House furnished the required prayers while the press howled in rage: President Cleveland stepped into the mass brainstorm with a totally unnecessary and extremely bigoted ultimatum, and those who counseled moderation were, as is usual, denounced as traitors and pro-enemy.

Fortunately, there were sane and intelligent men guiding the destinies of England at the time, and a silly and disastrous war was averted in spite of our contentiousness. In a short while Spain felt the glowing ardor of our patriotism, this time deflected toward Cuba, for ulterior motives certainly, because the infinitely worse

\textsuperscript{15}Cf. John Haynes Holmes, \textit{New Wars for Old}. 
sufferings of other American republics under cruel dictators had failed to move us. This time public men, the press and the pulpit prevailed in bringing about a war which was, in the usual fashion, demonstrated to be necessary, righteous and forced upon us. Yet, be it noted, we found similar bellicose strutting most abominable and most tremendously menacing in pre-war Germany!

For Germany was vastly misunderstood by outsiders, just as any nation is so misunderstood.\textsuperscript{16} Dr. Labberton has called them a contemplative nation of poets and thinkers whose devotion to the inner life rendered them easily misjudged and certainly peculiar. Perhaps this explanation is as good as any other. The central point is that no nation sees facts relating to itself other than in a halo of meaningful associations and interpretive limitations which are unknown to any other people. To us "America for Americans" is wholesome and reasonable; to the Japanese "Asia for Asiatics" is the same; yet each nation finds the phrase of the other at least perplexing if not positively irritating. Pile these misunderstandings together, add thereto armaments in equal quantity, garnish with diplomatic subterfuge and underhanded dealings, season with the most acrid emotions and you invariably produce war.

In the case of the Great War we at first adopted a holier-than-thou attitude and deplored the insanity of Europe: public men, pulpit and press agreed here. With the events culminating in the "Lusitania" a wave of emotion swept pulpit, press and public, and war seemed inevitable; but Mr. Wilson—then against preparedness—did not wish our country an armed camp, and Mr. Daniels "refused to lose his head because some people were nervous"—in short, the government, for some reason, saw fit to avert war. Mass emotion at its very height was held in leash, demonstrating again how easily war can be prevented if an intelligent and reasoning government desires to prevent it.

Ultimately a change came about: precisely why it is too early to predicate, nor are the facts available. Eventually the Senate declared for war in almost the same terms that had ornamented Reichstag debate for years, and Roosevelt matched Treitschke in truculence. At the time when a friendly gift of a billion or of five billions to the sufferers from the war would have done more to demonstrate that one nation at least stood for the highest things, the vacillate ministry was forsaking a peace-loving Christ as too

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. J. H. Labberton, \textit{Belgium and Germany}; also \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12 and Sigmund Freud's very rational little volume \textit{Reflections on War and Death}. 
idealistic and demanding blood and destruction. In short, we finally forsook the hard and bitter path of idealism and nobility and took what seemed to appear the easy way to a New World—that which led by paths of glory through fields of gore.

And, "since the ethical values involved in any given international contest are substantially of the nature of after-thought or accessory, they may safely be left on one side in any endeavor to understand or to account for any given outbreak of hostilities. The moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel is to be taken for granted, as being the statesman's chief and necessary ways and means of bringing any warlike enterprise to a head and floating it to a creditable finish. It is a precipitate of the partisan animosity that inspires both parties and holds them to their duty of self-sacrifice and devastation, and at its best it will chiefly serve as a cloak of self-righteousness to extenuate any exceptionally profligate excursions in the conduct of hostilities."  

We went in ourselves. We should not be criticized for the plunge if half the things we claimed that we could thus attain could have been thus attained. The incidence of regret falls upon the fact that we were not sufficiently reflective and reasoning animals to then postulate how miserable our failure would be. That it was a failure the results demonstrate, and any good that came after the war and after the efforts of the inept Supreme Council of Paris, came in spite of these agencies and in no sense because of them.