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HOME RULE FOR INDIA.

BY SUDHINDRA BOSE.*

It is a happy omen that straight-thinking, clear-headed men are everywhere anxious for world peace. But so long as one nation is kept in subjection to another, there can be no peace.

Of the many wars waged by England during the last century, the greater number have had their genesis in England’s desire to rule India. “No one can understand,” says Dr. Gibbons in The New Map of Asia, “the foreign policy of Great Britain, which has inspired military and diplomatic activities from the Napoleonic Wars to the present day, who does not interpret wars, diplomatic conflicts, treaties and alliances, territorial annexations, extensions of protectorates, with the fact of India constantly in mind.” The British foreign policy with regard to Turkey, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia, as well as Russia, has had one supreme object: the domination of India. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance doubtless had the same ultimate purpose in view. Looked at from this angle, the Indian problem is a great world problem which no man interested in the well-being of humanity can afford to ignore.

Whatever might have been the reasons in the past for holding India as a subject nation, the declared intentions of the Allies to let every country “make its own laws and choose its own allegiance” renders it morally imperative to revise the political status of India—India which contributed so magnificently to the triumph of the Allied cause. For it should not be forgotten that the first colonial troops to come to the rescue of France in the darkest hour of

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1914 were those which arrived from India. She furnished over a million and a half men to the war—more than all other British dominions put together. She contributed, out of her meager resources, over a hundred million pounds in money—more than any other possession of Britain. In acknowledging England’s debt to India in “the war of civilization,” Mr. Lloyd George was moved to say in Parliament: “As to India, by her remarkable contribution to our triumph, notably in the East, she has won a new claim to our consideration—a claim so irresistible that it ought to overpower all prejudice and timidity which might stand in the way of her progress.” Now that the crisis is over, it is pertinent to inquire if the claims of 318,000,000 of human beings of India who constitute one fifth of the human race are being considered without “prejudice and timidity.”

It is the purpose of the writer to pursue the discussion of the problem along three basic lines: economic, educational and political.

From the economic point of view, the hundred and fifty years of English rule in India may be roughly divided into two eras. “In the first era,” says the gifted editor of the Indian journal, Marhatta, “we see the British ruler in India aggressive and militant in spirit and crude in his methods, but then he had the frankness of manners in his doing. He imposed unconscionably high import duties in England upon Indian manufacturers and even practised social boycott of his fellows for the sin of wearing foreign wares. But he knew what he was doing and he owned the deed. In the succeeding era the ruin of India’s manufactures had been complete, and it was convenient and profitable for the British economic man to preach and practice free trade. Laissez-faire was the word. . . . Freedom was there for India—yes, to mind her agricultural toil and the development of her love of foreign manufactures. Freedom was there for England—yes, from the competition of the Indian manufacturers, and the development of home manufactures with the help of machinery.”

What was the result of such a policy in India? It paralyzed the economic life of the nation and set it on the road to bankruptcy. To-day one of the most serious problems of India is the appalling poverty of the masses and the middle classes. “Even as we look on,” writes Mr. Hyndman, a noted British student of Indian affairs, “India is becoming feebler and feebler. The very life-blood of the great multitude under our rule is slowly, yet ever faster, ebbing away.” Curzon, when viceroy of India, remarked: “Of poverty, misery and destitution there is abundance in India.” And the esti-
mated income from all sources during his viceroyalty was three fourths of a penny per head per day. Sir William Digby in his monumental work, "Prosperous British India," has shown that the average annual income of the people of India is not in excess of seventeen and a half rupees, which is about six dollars. Considering a rupee to be equal to thirty-three cents in American money, it means that the average income of a man in India is about two cents a day. Economically Hindustan has been steadily on the down grade. The poor are desperately poor, while the rich are neither very rich nor are they very numerous.

India was not, however, always so poor. Says Thornton in his Description of Ancient India: "Ere yet the Pyramids looked down upon the valley of the Nile, when Greece and Italy, those cradles of European civilization, nursed only the tenants of wilderness, India was the seat of wealth and grandeur. A busy population had covered the land with the marks of industry; rich crops of the most coveted productions of nature annually rewarded the toil of husbandmen; skilful artisans converted the rude produce of the soil into fabrics of unrivalled delicacy and beauty; and architects and sculptors joined in constructing works, the solidity of which has not, in some instances, been overcome by the evolution of thousands of years... The ancient state of India must have been one of extraordinary magnificence."

The question that at once comes to one's mind is, What has brought about such a tremendous change in the present condition of the country? Who is responsible for it? A partial explanation is to be found in the policy of the government. Take for example agriculture, upon which eighty per cent. of the population has now to depend for a living. The government theory of the land tax is based upon the assumption that the Crown is the sole proprietor of the soil, the exclusive owner of the land. This has prevented India from becoming a nation of peasant proprietors, a nation of small landowners. With the exception of the Province of Bengal, there is no permanent land settlement. The peasant has to rent his land from the government for a period of not more than twenty or thirty years. Moreover, he has to pay a high rate of taxes, which run from fifty-five to seventy per cent. of the rental.

In this connection one must not forget the system which extracts from India year after year an amount not less than thirty million pounds sterling without any economic return. I refer to the tribute India has to pay England in the shape of "dividends" to the defunct East India Company, furlough allowances and pensions, costs of
quartering British troops in India for imperial purposes, and such other items. The British imperialists defend this economic drain by calling it a compensation for services performed; but Indians maintain that many of the charges are not legitimate, and they represent an enormous profit which England makes from her political supremacy in India. At all events, no country in the world, however rich, can withstand such a drain permanently. This huge revenue of thirty million pounds which flow annually from India to England, under one name or another, is apt to give a rude shock to the naive and comfortable doctrine of the "white man's burden." It seems that though imperialism may be dressed up on occasions as altruism, ultimately it succeeds in deceiving no one—except perhaps the most unsophisticated.

The violations of fundamental economic laws are as grievous as they are many. One of the most distressing results of foreign rule is the perennial famine with which the country is afflicted. It is estimated that from forty to fifty million people in India live at present in a state of starvation. And millions of Indians have died for the lack of sufficient food and clothing during the last few years. Doubtless, in some ways, England has given India a strong government: but for men dying by inches of starvation, no strong government, any more than the "greatest show on earth," can make them forget the agonizing pangs of hunger. Then, too, the Indians may not always choose to die quietly. If the alternative is between death by starvation and the change of the present régime, men will not be lacking who will make desperate efforts to satisfy the impulse to live.

Without a doubt the most crying need of India to-day is education. The percentage of illiteracy is incredibly high. After a hundred and fifty years of English rule one finds that among adults only 106 men and 10 women in a thousand are literates, that is, can read and write. Compare the state of education in India with that of the Philippines which have been under the control of the United States less than twenty-five years. In the American insular possession, no less than seventy per cent. of the Filipino people above ten years can read and write. Why has not education made as rapid a progress in India as it has in the Philippines? The explanation is to be found in the fact that the government of India, unlike that of the Philippines, has made no attempt to provide instruction for the masses. As there is no compulsory educational system, so neither is there any free elementary school. On an average, for every four villages there is only one school.
While education is being neglected in British India, there is a different situation in the great Native States like Baroda, Mysore and Travancore—States directly under Indian rule. In Baroda, for instance, since 1906 elementary education has been made free and compulsory for both boys and girls. What is the outcome?

"In 1909 nearly 8.6 per cent. of the total population was at school, as against 1.9 in India directly under British rule, or nearly 78.6 per cent. of the male school-going population, as against 21.5 per cent. in British India; 47.6 per cent. of girls in school-going age was under instruction as against 4 per cent. in British India.

"At the end of 1914-15 each town or village had at least one institution and 100 per cent. of the boys of school-going age and 81.6 per cent. of the girls of school-going age were under instruction.

"The state of Baroda spends nearly 15 cent per capita for education; while the English Government does not allow to be spent more than two cents per capita in British territories."

Although technological institutes and agricultural and industrial schools are a prime necessity in the economic uplift of the country, there is, as yet, no adequate provision for their creation. Had India had, like Japan, a national government free to rule its own destiny the situation would have been very different. Fifty years ago Japan was industrially no better than India. At that time Japan was a feudalistic agricultural country with a strong aversion for trade and commerce. The nation was sharply divided into many classes and subclasses of which the Samurai, the warrior class, was the most powerful faction. With the advent of Commodore Perry, Japan turned over a new leaf. The Japanese government decided to make Nippon the leading industrial country of the Orient. And how did the Japanese government go about it? Japan had no modern industrial experiences. "It was entirely without models for organization, without financial machinery, and without the idea of joint-stock enterprise." At this juncture the government took a hold of the situation. It established schools and colleges where all branches of applied science were taught. There were "official excursions," writes Baron Kikuchi in his informing article on Japan in The Encyclopædia Britannica, "into the domains of silk-reeling, cement-making, cotton and silk-spinning, brick-burning, printing and bookbinding, soap-boiling, type-casting and ceramic decoration..." Domestic exhibitions were also organized, and specimens of the country's products and manufactures were sent under government auspices to exhibitions abroad. On the other hand, the effect of this new departure along Western lines could not but be injurious
to the old domestic industries of the country, especially to those which owed their existence to tastes and traditions now regarded as obsolete. Here again the government came to the rescue by establishing a firm whose functions were to familiarize foreign markets with the products of Japanese artisans, and to instruct in adaptations likely to appeal to Occidental taste. Steps were also taken for training women as artisans, and the government printing bureau set the example of employing female labor, an innovation which soon developed into large dimensions. In short, the authorities applied themselves to educate an industrial disposition throughout the country, and as soon as success seemed to be in sight, they gradually transferred from official to private direction the various model enterprises, retaining only such as were required to supply the needs of the State.

"The result of all this effort was that whereas in the beginning of the Meiji era, Japan had virtually no industries worthy of the name, she possessed in 1896—that is to say, after an interval of twenty-five years of effort—no less than 4595 industrial and commercial companies, joint stock or partnership, with a paid-up capital of forty million sterling."

Is it surprising that Japan is to-day the most prosperous industrial country of Asia? Is there any room for doubt that if India had a national government of its own like that of Japan, Hindustan, too, with her boundless natural resources and almost unlimited labor supply would have fared as well as, if not better than, Nippon?

Of the recent volumes on India, the one by William Archer has attracted considerable attention on account of its staunch British point of view. The author has had the candor to say that the government of the English viceroy is "absolutely autocratic in its relation to the people of India." Moreover, he observes that the British communities in India "as a whole care no more for the swarming brown multitudes around them, than the dwellers on an island care for the fishes in the circumambient sea." Mr. Archer adds that the most noticeable feature about the government of the English viceroy is "its undisguised and systematic foreignness." This single phrase—"undisguised and systematic foreignness"—furnishes the real key-note to English rule in India.

Let it be remembered at the outset that India is administered by a highly organized civil service, the chief places in which are the preserves of the British aristocracy. Take for instance the Indian Medical Service. It has been recently announced by the Indian government that there are 204 vacancies to fill in this Ser-
vice. Out of this number, it is stated that 136 will be filled by Englishmen and the rest by Indians, that is, 68. In other words, two thirds of the vacancies in the Medical Service will be filled by the members of the ruling race and only one third by Indians. Again, in the Imperial Service of the Indian Public Works, there are now 78 vacancies. In filling these positions only 3 persons—that is, one twenty-sixth of the total—are to be Indians and the remainder, Englishmen.

Naturally India is most unhappy under this system of government. And in an attempt to conciliate the Indian people during the war, a liberal administration was pledged to her by the Westminster Parliament: and a program of reform has been formulated. These reforms, which will be introduced next year into the governance of India, have been characterized by Lord Sydenham, an ex-governor of Bombay, as "most dangerous" and sure "to endanger the peace of India": while Lord Curzon, the ex-viceroy, spoke of the reforms as "the boldest experiment in the history of the British Empire." Apart from the opinions of their lordships, it is evident from even a cursory examination of the new scheme of reforms that it confers no sort of real self-government upon India.

To be sure, the Government of India Act, the official title of the new reform legislation, does grant certain nominal powers, does open a little more the door which has hitherto been kept tightly closed to Indians. Nevertheless, the Act does not alter the despotic character of the government. That the suffrage is still regarded as the exclusive privilege of a microscopic minority rather than the inherent right of all is clear from the fact that it enfranchises only 1.5 per cent. of the Indian male population. That, by the way, affords another striking contrast to the liberal United States policy in the Philippines, where 17 per cent. of the population can vote. The overwhelming mass of public opinion in India demanded that women, possessing the same qualifications and subject to the same conditions as men, should be admitted to the suffrage. Two women delegates, Mrs. Hirabai A. Tata and Miss Mithibai A. Tata, were sent to England as representatives of forty-three different branches of the Women's Indian Association which demanded equal suffrage for women, whether that suffrage be based upon property or education, or both. The issue squarely presented by Indian women to the Parliamentary Joint Committee in Westminster was successfully dodged when the committee contented itself with a pious expression of hope that in due course the question would be solved by the Indian provincial legislative councils.
Now the legislative councils, which will be composed of both elected members and hand-picked government appointees, will be little more than debating societies. Almost every power of any importance which the Indian people wished to keep in their hands is reserved to the viceroy. It is true that a number of local subjects is to be transferred to the Indian ministers of the provincial governments; but these ministers, who are the government nominees, will in no way be responsible to the provincial legislatures. These ministers will be under official control. In fact, they will be more or less the rubber stamps of the provincial governors.

Again, the Indian people will have no control over the national budget; neither will they have any power to regulate the tariff. For years India has been asking for a moderate measure of protection to build her nascent industries. This is now definitely refused to her. The new Act categorically denies to India the right to fix her own tariff—a right which has already been conceded to Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. When all are members of the same empire, why should there be one law for India and another for the other colonies? Is it possible that England has forgotten the lessons of the Boston "Tea Party"?

Under the new scheme of reform the control of all vital national affairs remains with the viceroy. Even the meager powers which the provincial legislatures may exercise are contingent absolutely upon the sanction of the ruler of the province. Moreover—and the point seems in Indian judgment very significant—the viceroy himself reserves the right to stop the progress of a bill in the legislature and even to prevent the discussion of the whole or any part of the bill at any time he sees fit. Then, too, every bill passed by the provincial legislature may be set aside either by the ruler of the province or the viceroy of India, against the unanimous decision of the entire legislative body.

The reforms have not introduced the smallest iota of responsible government. The viceroy, now as ever, is as absolute as Jove. Popular sentiment, public opinion and national representation need not be heeded in reaching a decision or adopting a measure—in which even Louis XIV, Czar Nicholas or Kaiser William would have used more formality. The viceroy is the government. Well might he say: "The State—it is I." Under the new law, the viceroy will reserve as a general thing an absolute veto. He will still remain the prosecutor of public meetings, the proscriber of books and the jailor of the press. The Government of India Act, unlike the organic act of the Philippines known as the Jones Law, provides for no
charter of national or personal rights; it does not grant freedom of speech, freedom of press, right of trial in open court, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or any other essential rights and privileges which are the solid foundation of justice, liberty and law. He who runs can read from this that the present scheme of reforms is not based upon any principle of self-determination. "The Reform Bill," declared The Amrita Bazar Patrika, a leading Nationalist daily paper of Calcutta, "is the contemptible product of bankrupt statesmanship."

To destroy the indigenous industries of India in order to make it a land of raw material; to tax the people into poverty; to drain millions of money out of the country; to withhold the education of the masses; to obstruct commercial and industrial progress; to deny the people effective control in the making of laws, levying of taxes, and in the spending of their own public money—these are a few outstanding marks of the government of the bureaucracy and by the bureaucracy. It is worth while to recall, however, that in the minds of the millions of India whom the last European war called to pour forth their blood and treasure, there was a well-defined hope that at bottom they were fighting for democracy against despotism, for self-determination against absolutism. That hope, alas, seems to have dwindled almost to the point of death! At this moment there is in India a wide-spread economic discontent, a seething political unrest, similar in magnitude to that of Ireland. The sober public opinion of Hindustan is disposed to the view that the only way to cure the unhappy situation is through root and branch reforms—to borrow a phrase from John Milton of other days. India has now earned the clear title to self-determination. "There can be no justification whatever," says the President of the India Home Rule League of America, "for withholding the application of this principle to India. The plea of unfitness, usually advanced by ignorant people or vested interests, is untenable and untrue. The civilization of India is admittedly much more ancient and venerable than that of Rome or Athens. British statesmen themselves have often declared that India was civilized centuries before the modern nations of Europe emerged from barbarism. Indian society has been held together for thousands of years without foreign aid or intervention. Peace, order and good government existed in India for hundreds of years, and its annals compare favorably with any period of European history. Even democratic forms of government flourished in various parts of India centuries before Alexander
came to measure his strength with the *ganas* or republics of the northern Punjab."

In the learned *Oxford History of India*, just published by Vincent A. Smith, it is shown that the Maurya empire of India (B.C. 322-185) was in size and area the Roman empire of Europe at its height during the second and third centuries A. D., that the Gupta empire of the fifth century, the Vardhana empire of the seventh century and the Chola empire of the eleventh century were hardly equaled in splendor and magnificence by the empire of Charlemagne. Coming to more recent times, we find that neither the European possessions of Charles V nor those of Napoleon ever reached the proportions of the Tughlak empire of the fourteenth, or the Moghul empire of the seventeenth, or the Maharatta empire of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the Indian historians may justly claim that "there is no European institution of any importance from Diocletian to Frederick the Great of which a counterpart is not to be found in India from B.C. 322 to 1300."

India stands four-square upon the immutable principles of justice: to-day she demands home rule. This does not mean an immediate attempt to break away from the British Empire; it does not imply an endeavor to drive the English out of India, as the Moors, let us say, were driven by the Spaniards. The leaders of the home-rule movement are willing to leave the army and the navy as well as foreign affairs in the hands of England. They demand, however, complete control of administration, of commerce and industry, of taxation and the economic development of the country. India simply wishes to be the mistress in her own house—to run her domestic affairs in her own way. India is not opposed to remaining an integral part of the British Empire; but she insists that hers must be the status of a self-governing dominion rather than a dependency. Indians cannot remain a subject people: they must be conceded the status of citizens with equal rights of other citizens of the British commonwealth. Indeed, India is not thinking of separation. The Indian home rulers are frankly of the opinion that the best thing for both England and India is not separation, but union. This union must, however, be of copartners, of friends. "India," said Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, the poet-patriot, the matchless leader of the Indian equal suffrage movement, "India would go with England only as a comrade and not as a slave."

If history teaches anything it is this: until India is freed from bureaucratic control and is allowed home rule, she will know neither peace, nor prosperity, nor good government. Mailed fists, police
raids, arrests, deportations, machine guns, tanks, bombing aeroplanes will disappear only when the nation has effective control over its rulers.

This contention is no mere theory. It is based upon the facts of experience. As a most recent illustration of the policy of absolutism which has characterized English rule in India, mention should be made of the Rowlatt Act and the tragedy which followed upon its heels. The repressive character of the Rowlatt Act, which was enacted last year and is still in force, may be judged from some of its important provisions. They are:

1. The sudden arrest without warrant of any suspected person, and detention without trial for an indefinite duration of time.
2. Conduct of proceedings in secret before three judges, who may sit in any place, and who may not make public their proceedings.
3. The accused is kept ignorant of the names of his accusers or of witnesses against him.
4. The accused is not confronted with his accusers or the witnesses against him.
5. The accused has only the right of a written account of the offenses attributed to him.
6. The accused is denied the right of defending himself with the help of lawyers.
7. No witnesses allowed in his defense.
8. Usual legal procedure may be disregarded.
9. The right of appeal is denied.
10. Any one associating with ex-political offenders may be arrested.
11. Ex-political offenders must deposit securities.
12. Ex-political offenders may not take part in any political, educational or religious activities.

The passage of this Act, which took away the last vestige of some of the most elementary rights of the individual and subjected him to the terrors of Star Chamber proceedings, was vigorously protested throughout the length and breadth of the continent; but to no avail. At length the resentment of the Indians against the Rowlatt legislation took the more practical form of a national haratal (complete suspension of business) on March 30, 1919, at Delhi, and on April 6 all over India. Moreover, a large number of
the followers of M. K. Gandhi, a leading spirit of Constitutional Nationalism, took the pledge of passive resistance or satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act. This led to violent repression on the part of the viceroy’s officials in many parts of the country, especially in Delhi, Lahore, Gujranwala, Kasur and Amritsar. As the space limits will not permit a full account of the reign of terror, I will confine myself to only a few typical instances of its manifestations.

Various were the indignities, bodily and other punishments inflicted upon the people, including even college students and school-boys. At Lahore, the students of the Dyal Singh College were made to march ten miles twice a day in the hot summer sun for days between their college and a muster-place where an English officer called the roll. The Medical College students were made to walk from twelve to sixteen miles a day in the scorching sun and sultry wind. Many a student fainted.

In Gujranwala, the Royal Air Force commanded by Captain Carberry indulged in bombing from aeroplanes and firing from machine guns upon helpless people. One of the bombs was dropped in a school dormitory full of small boys. The manner in which the bombs were dropped upon the defenseless people may be imagined from Lieutenant Dodkin’s statement. He said, “I saw twenty or thirty people in a field talking to one another and dropped bombs on them. I did not know who they were, whether they had assembled for unlawful purpose, but I bombed.” The result of this air attack upon Gujranwala, which was treated as if it were a fortified belligerent city in Flanders, was twenty-seven wounded and eleven killed.

The most horrible act of the bloody tragedy was enacted at Amritsar in the Province of Punjab. In this place an open-air mass meeting was being held on the afternoon of April 13. And to this unarmed and peaceful gathering, which included old men, women and children, came a dashing brigadier general named Dyer. He came not merely with a body of troops with rifles in hand, but with armored cars with machine guns. The result of the general’s visit is briefly told in the following paragraph from The Manchester Guardian:

“When General Dyer arrived on the scene he proceeded through a narrow entrance at the northern extremity. The crowd facing him was estimated at more than five thousand. The crowd was not asked to disperse. Within thirty seconds he had ordered fire to be opened. A huge roar went up from the crowd, and they
struggled madly to get out.... The firing was not in volleys, but each man took his own time. General Dyer subsequently said that he went on firing until they ran short of ammunition. Altogether 1650 rounds were fired, and it lasted about ten minutes.

"The number of killed was between four and five hundred, and the wounded were estimated at three times that number. As regards the wounded, General Dyer said his force was not in a position to render medical aid. *It was not his job to go and aid the wounded*, but the hospitals were open and they could have gone there."

After the massacre, General Dyer issued a proclamation ordering the people to keep off the street on pain of severe punishment. The consequence was that hundreds of dead and dying, maimed and wounded were left alone in the field for twenty-seven hours with no one to look after them.

Later on at a Commission of Inquiry, Justice Rankin, a member of the investigating body, asked General Dyer: "Excuse me putting it this way, general, but was it not a form of frightfulness?"

General Dyer: "No, it was not.... I thought that I should shoot well and strong, so that I or anybody else should not have to shoot again. If I had the right to fire one shot, I had the right to fire a lot of rounds...."

When asked what reason he had to suppose that the crowd would not have dispersed without firing he said: "I think it is quite possible I could have dispersed the crowd without firing, but they would have come back again and laughed, and I should have made what I consider to be a fool of myself."

One of the members of the Commission then read out a telegram from Lahore to the General, which said: "Your action correct. Lieutenant Governor approves"....

Terrible as was this massacre, General Dyer did not stop there. On April 15—two days later—martial law was proclaimed in Amritsar; and then followed another chapter of despotism. All Indians in the city were ordered to alight from vehicles and salute any English officer whom they met. Nor was this all. Hundreds of people, practically without any trial, were stripped and flogged in public. There was also a "crawling order" which required Indians passing through a certain street to get down on their knees and
crawling on all fours. Whom the gods desire to destroy, they first make mad.

One may ask: What has the British nation had to say about this terrorism? What has the British Parliament done about the Punjab massacre? While all India was shocked and convulsed, all information relative to these outrages was carefully prevented from reaching the Parliament for nine long months. The press was rigidly censored, and cablegrams dealing with the disturbances were withheld from transmission. This method of procedure by the viceroy, it is almost needless to point out, is typically illustrative of the fiction of the "responsibility of the government of India to Parliament." At all events the Parliament has not yet called any one to account. In the meanwhile Judge Rowlatt, the father of the Rowlatt Act, has already been decorated by his Imperial Majesty, King George, with the insignia of the Knight Commander of the Star of India. And Dyer has been promoted, in recognition of his "services," to an important command. In fact he has been hailed in England by the champions of British imperialism as a great hero.

The Morning Post (London) declared that Dyer "has done the highest credit to the British Empire's rule of subject nations," and The New Statesman, also of London, which has at least the quality of frankness, stated in commenting upon the affair that "we hold India by the sword" and will hold it by the sword alone. Briefly, the British imperialists said in effect that order could only be maintained in India by massacres, and massacres must go on. To this an answer was, however, returned by The Manchester Guardian in these terms: "It is also exactly what the partisans of Abdul Hamid declared to be the state of things in Constantinople when he caused his agents to massacre crowds of Armenian civilians in the streets. The Sultan's friends pleaded that if he was not to be free to do such things the game of law and order would be up." Is it any wonder then that the Indians believe their rulers have gone beyond Prussian methods and have resorted to the practices of the Turks? And who knows that the inevitable consequences of such acts will not again be writ large in blood and fire across half the world?

As might be expected, the application of the ruthless policy of the viceroy has caused a wildfire of passionate moral indignation to sweep over the whole continent. The well-known Hindu poet Rabindra Nath Tagore, recipient of the Nobel Prize, in asking the viceroy to relieve him of the title of English knighthood, gave voice to what Indians felt when he said in part:
“The enormity of the measures taken by the government in the Punjab for quelling some local disturbances has, with a rude shock, revealed to our minds the helplessness of our position as British subject in India. The disproportionate severity of the punishments inflicted upon the unfortunate people and the methods of carrying them out, we are convinced, are without parallel in the history of civilized government. barring some conspicuous exceptions, recent and remote. Considering that such treatment has been meted out to a population, disarmed and resourceless, by a power which has the most terribly efficient organization for destruction of human lives, we must strongly assert that it can claim no political expediency, far less moral justification. . . . Knowing that our appeals have been in vain and that the passion of vengeance is blinding the noble vision of statesmanship in our government which could so easily be magnanimous as befitting its physical strength and moral tradition, the very least that I can do for my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of the millions of my countrymen, surprised into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges of honor make our shame glaring in their incongruous context of humiliation, and I for my part wish to stand, shorn of special distinctions, by the side of those of my countrymen who, for their so-called insignificance, are liable to suffer a degradation not fit for human beings.”

Modern India which has absorbed the political teachings of Mill and Mazzini, of Jefferson and Lincoln, cannot long be held down by bayonets and machine guns, by deportations and massacres. The system of absolutism has been tried in Germany, Austria, Russia, and it has been found wanting. The same is also true in India. The government of the viceroy must come to an end. If India is to be saved for the Empire, she must have complete self-government. If India is to be made a strong bulwark of the British commonwealth, a potent force for world progress, she must have home rule. “Can India play her proper part,” asks Dr. Rutherford, an ex-member of the British Parliament in his Commonwealth or Empire, “a useful and glorious part, in human evolution, while in bondage to Britain? In refusing India freedom and self-government is not England a great barrier to freedom and justice in the world? If India were under the iron heel of Prussia or Russia, would not Britons be the first to cry out ‘intolerable iniquity!’ ‘insufferable crime against liberty!’ and in the event of India fighting for her freedom, would not Britons lend their aid, as they are now doing to free Belgium or Serbia? British government of India may be
good of its kind, but 'good government is no substitute for self-government,' as Campbell-Bannerman wisely said....The atmosphere of subjection is poisonous, crushing all that is virile and worthy, and fostering all that is vile and ignoble. I am prepared to please British imperialists by confessing that I think British over-rule is better than Prussian or Russian over-rule, but at the same time I must remind my countrymen that Britons have stooped to Prussian and Russian methods in the government of India."

The new Government of India Act will not be able to protect India from a repetition of the Rowlatt Act and the Punjab atrocities. The only solution of the Indian problem, which is after all a vast world problem, is autonomy. The India of to-day is not the India of two or three decades ago. Within the last few years India has traversed the track of centuries. Events in that land are now marching with increasing rapidity. The rising flood of Nationalism has changed India almost as completely as the Revolution of 1789 changed France. India will not "stay put." Indian statesmen may make mistakes—and what statesmen do not and have not? On the other hand, Indians, because they are Indians, because of the faith that is in them, are likely to rule their own country far better than any foreign bureaucrat can ever hope to. The unqualified opinion of the Indian intelligentsia is that England has made a mess of things, and had the country been in charge of the Indians instead of the English administrators whom Edmund Burke in his day called "birds of passage and beasts of prey," affairs could have gone no worse. Indians, therefore, are now asking, Why cannot England do for India what the United States has done for Cuba? In any event, India, filled with profound political and economic discontent, cannot be kept indefinitely under an autocratic administration. The time has come when India should be given a determining hand.

In conclusion, there is no affectation in saying that the writer as a student of political science has great respect for the British form of government in Great Britain, has great personal admiration for the liberty-loving individual Briton. At the same time none of us can forget that the people of India are now pleading before the bar of the world's conscience for a great cause. That cause—home rule for India—is as great as the cause of Belgium, Servia, Bohemia, Poland or Armenia. That cause—the reclaiming of one fifth of the human race for self-government—is as sacred as the cause of justice, as the cause of humanity.