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This edition is a photographic reproduction of the edition de luxe which was printed in Leipsic in 1913 and ready for shipment in time to be caught by the embargo Great Britain put on all articles exported from Germany. Luckily two copies of the above edition escaped, and these were used to make the photographic reproduction of this latest edition. While the Buddhist Bible could not in any way be considered a contraband of war yet the publishers were forced to hold back many hundred orders for the book on account of orders in council of Great Britain.

When the book was first published His Majesty, the King of Siam, sent the following communication through his private secretary:

"Dear Sir: I am commanded by His Most Gracious Majesty, the King of Siam, to acknowledge, with many thanks, the receipt of your letter and the book, The Gospel of Buddha, which he esteems very much; and he expresses his sincerest thanks for the very hard and difficult task of compilation you have consideredately undertaken in the interest of our religion. I avail myself of this favorable opportunity to wish the book every success."

His Royal Highness, Prince Chandradat Chudhadharn, official delegate of Siamese Buddhism to the Chicago Parliament of Religions, writes:

"As regards the contents of the book, and as far as I could see, it is one of the best Buddhist Scriptures ever published. Those who wish to know the life of Buddha and the spirit of his Dharma may be recommended to read this work which is so ably edited that it comprises almost all knowledge of Buddhism itself."

The book has been introduced as a reader in private Buddhist schools of Ceylon. Mrs. Marie H. Higgins, Principal of the Musaeus School and Orphanage for Buddhist Girls, Cinnamon Gardens, Ceylon, writes as follows:

"It is the best work I have read on Buddhism. This opinion is endorsed by all who read it here. I propose to make it a text-book of study for my girls."
THE VIRGIN MARY BY HUBERT VAN EYCK.
From the altarpiece of Ghent.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.
The peace of Münster in 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years' War in Germany, also brought an end to the eighty years of war between the Dutch republic and Spain. By it the independence of the seven provinces, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overyssel, Friesland and Groningen, long an established fact, was acknowledged by Spain, which had by this time sunk to the level of a second-rank power, while the formerly insignificant provinces had become the strongest maritime power in the world and the pivotal state in European politics. Its commerce was world-wide, and it was the carrier of Europe; its possessions were found in all continents, and its flag floated on every ocean; it was the seat of industry, the center of learning, the mart of finance, and the home of art and science. It produced a galaxy of names still famous, as Huyghens, De Groot, Vondel, Rubens, Rembrandt, John De Witt, Tromp, De Ruyter, and many others of lesser fame. Spinoza was born in Holland, Descartes found an asylum there, as did later many Huguenots and other refugees. The Netherlands were the United States of Europe, and had proportionately as many immigrants, furnishing a haven for the oppressed of all other countries.

During the brilliant administration of John De Witt the nation was often at war but gained in power and prestige. Two wars were fought with England for trade reasons. France under Louis XIV was checkmated, and Sweden defeated in a naval battle in defense of Denmark. A medal was struck with the following inscription: "The laws made secure, religion reformed, kings assisted, protected and conciliated, the peace of the seas maintained, a splendid peace arrived at by force of arms, and the security of the Euro-
pean world established." This was in 1668, but in 1672 a different story was related. In this year a coalition of France, Great Britain and some German states made an attack on Holland which all but succeeded, as all the land provinces but one were conquered by the enemy. In this emergency, in which Amsterdam itself was threatened, John De Witt, the masterful opponent of the house of Orange, was deposed, and William III, the young prince, restored to his hereditary rights as stadtholder and commander-in-chief.

The prince displayed an extraordinary energy. An alliance was made with Austria and Brandenburg, the French were threatened in their lines of communication, Groningen was defended against the bishop of Münster, and the safety of Holland secured by an inundation. The navy fought a number of brilliant engagements against superior fleets, till finally Great Britain deserted France, with Münster and Cologne likewise coming to terms. The Dutch republic now became the center of a powerful alliance against France, but this was not sufficiently cohesive to be fully effective. Under the changed circumstances, however, France was put on the defensive, and was obliged to forego part of her ambitious designs, but by reason of her strong army and efficient organization was still a very formidable enemy. The republic, accordingly, unequally assisted by its allies, and moved by the strong party of the aristocratic regents, the hereditary opponents of the princes of Orange, made a separate peace with France, in which it itself lost nothing, but which was nevertheless indicative of the changed positions of the powers of Europe, as France from now on (1678) had become a most disturbing factor of the peace and balance of power of the continent. A period of unrest followed, in which the French sought to round out their kingdom by extending its borders, and in which the crafty Louis XIV tried to get internal unity as well by revoking the concessions and privileges of the French Protestants. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was followed by a general exodus of the French Huguenots to Holland and Germany, England receiving but few refugees on account of itself being in danger of a second Romanization at the hands of James II.

The danger to Europe from this impending Romanization under French supremacy was especially patent to Protestant England and Holland, thus far the chief strongholds of Protestantism. As William of Orange was the son of an English mother and was married to Mary, the daughter of James, all eyes were fixed on him to prevent the coming Catholic recrudescence. The English revolution of 1688 was the answer of endangered Protestantism to the
Catholic menace, and placed William on the English throne, thereby uniting England and Holland in a common cause. From now on until the fall of the Dutch republic the interests of these two countries were merged for purposes of common defense and mutual objects, and as long as the policy of William III was followed the United Netherlands flourished, their decline being contemporaneous with a reversal of that policy.

The second French war, from 1689 to 1697, which followed the accession of the Prince of Orange to the English throne, was costly and exhausting to the Dutch provinces, as it was to England also. The Grand Alliance, in which nearly every European power was embraced, was unwieldy and heterogeneous in composition, and hardly a match for the compact and efficient power of France, which excelled on land, although not equal to the naval strength of the Dutch and the English. At the conclusion of peace, however, the Protestant powers of Europe had mastered the situation: they had the supremacy of the seas, and the greatest part in the control of European politics. Once more, nevertheless, France threatened the world with her dominion when the Spanish succession was about to pass under the Bourbons, thereby securing a united France and Spain with their vast possessions.

The renewed dangers brought about the so-called war of the Spanish Succession, in which the initiative was taken by the Dutch. They were in especial danger now that the Spanish Netherlands were garrisoned by French troops, which destroyed the security of the republic. The gigantic struggle which ensued was carried on in all continents and on all seas just like the present world conflict. The energy and determination which were shown by the Dutch republic in the early stages of the war were not kept up, however, being too exhausting for the resources of the small state. England, now fully committed to the policies of William III, took the principal role in the war and gained the most substantial benefits, thereby arousing old animosities. The French were finally, although not decisively, beaten, the republic becoming the guardian, if not the possessor, of the Southern Netherlands. This province now passed from Spanish to Austrian control, thus constituting the famous barrière which it was thought would both confirm the security of the republic and at the same time rid it of a possible commercial rivalry. England obtained Gibraltar and Minorca, Hudson Bay, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland besides trading monopolies, thus strengthening her commercial power and her hold upon the seas, meanwhile assuming the part formerly played by the Dutch
in the affairs of the European continent. France, although exhausted, had politically gained her ends: Spain and her colonies were won for the Bourbons, but with the provision that the two crowns should not be united. Thus ended the great war of the Spanish Succession, which was to be the last in which the Dutch republic took a prominent and decisive part. Indeed, it was the beginning of the end.

The French envoy Polignac rightly interpreted the peace of Utrecht in 1713. "On traitera de la paix chez vous, pour vous et sans vous," he said with regard to the Dutch republic, which now was compelled to accept what England and France prescribed for it. As Professor Blok says in his History of the People of the Netherlands: "With a neglected navy, an army weakened by the campaigns and losses of the last years, an almost exhausted treasury, the republic for many years would have to give up its importance as a great power; its commerce had suffered seriously and would hereafter, in the world's markets under less favorable circumstances, have to meet its powerfully developing rival on the other side of the North Sea. In the opinion of its best statesmen its only hope for the future lay in a close alliance with this fortunate competitor and in following the chariot of victory."

The United Netherlands, however, were still rich and powerful, and were now to profit by a long and protracted peace. The incessant wars gave place to a long-needed peace. While external conditions of trade and foreign affairs were in many respects changed, it was nevertheless the internal condition of the republic which caused its gradual decay and final overthrow. Its weak constitution was that neither of a republic nor of a monarchy, but of a loose alliance in which one province, Holland, and in that province one city, Amsterdam, had a preponderating influence, deciding often for selfish purposes the foreign policy of the commonwealth. It was furthermore divided by the opposition between the land and the sea provinces, the former wanting a strong army and the latter a powerful navy, with the result that the country usually got neither. The internal dissension was often of such a character that the States General were powerless, the provinces furnishing neither their quota of troops nor their required number of ships, failing besides to provide adequately for the general expenses of the government, weak and inefficient as it was by its very nature. In this century the city regents gained complete ascendancy, making each city an independent unit, a local autonomy with a strong aversion to a higher or more central authority, whether of the states or of the
stadtholder. The stadtholdership, again hereditary in the house of Orange, lost prestige and power, partly because the eighteenth-century representatives of that house were weak and vacillating men, lacking the vigor and decision of their illustrious forebears. Thus the once puissant Dutch republic drifted slowly but inevitably to its certain destruction, and became the prey of political strife, internal disorganization, foreign weakness and excessive love of peace.

While the school of William III was still living, there was a lively appreciation of his policies and aims. Heinsius and Van Slingelandt were exceedingly able diplomats, fit to cope with the complex problems of European politics, patriotic and high-minded men. But they were overwhelmed in a flood of narrowness and pettiness by the peace-at-any-price party, which looked at every question from a purely commercial standpoint. Trade and commerce were paramount to national interests—one of the reasons for the fall of the Dutch republic. The much-desired barrier against French aggression proved a delusion and a snare; it neither protected Holland nor barred France, as subsequent events were to show. Austria, now owner of the southern Netherlands, was embittered by the treatment from the states, while France was encouraged by the patrician oligarchy which habitually was friendly to France, as the party of the stadtholder depended on English favor.

The first few years after the war of the Spanish Succession found the Dutch republic in a deplorable condition. The alliance with England, endangered by the death of Queen Anne, was confirmed at the accession of George I, the Elector of Hanover. France under its regent was bent on securing Dutch friendship, so that affairs with these two powers were quite satisfactory. Elsewhere, however, the republic suffered loss of prestige by not protecting its commerce in the Baltic and the Mediterranean seas, particularly by submitting supinely to the depredations of the pirates of Algiers and Tunis. At home, there was an attempt to reform the government of the union, but although nearly a year was spent in discussion, nothing really came from it. The second great assembly to save the state failed, as did the first in 1651, and left its future again to depend on "a wonderful work of divine providence," as the council of state declared.

Under these conditions the foreign policy of the republic rapidly deteriorated. Self-interest alone determined its action. Thus when Austria permitted the organization of the Ostend Company
in 1722 the Dutch and English governments protested vehemently, the Dutch denying the freedom of the seas, one of the principles laid down a century before by Hugo de Groot in his great book on the laws of nations. The economic prosperity or prostration of the Austrian Netherlands was nothing to the Dutch, who no longer had a complete trade monopoly, being forced to share their former commerce with many other rivals, among whom were Denmark, Hamburg and Bremen, to say nothing of England and France, their chief competitors. Austria, desirous of conciliating the maritime powers, suspended the Flemish rival and placed Belgium again under the economic yoke of the Dutch provinces. This concession did not, however, avail to extend the aid of Holland to Austria in the Polish succession dispute, nor in the Austrian succession war till it was nearly too late, and then only in a half-hearted manner.

The great war of the Pragmatic Sanction, in which Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa were the heroic figures, proved the rise of Prussia, the disintegration of the Hapsburg empire, and the fatal disinclination of the Dutch republic to observe faithfully its treaties and obligations. The republic, several times assisted by Austria in its own dire perils, sought to compromise with honor when the empire was in danger, and endeavored to remain neutral in spite of its treaty requirements. When aid was finally rendered in 1743, it was done grudgingly and against the will of the regents. The Dutch name of military and naval glory suffered grievously in this war, for the help given was insignificant, and the manner of its handling egregiously ignominious. The navy was small and poorly equipped, fighting no important battle, and the army, whose special task it was to defend the southern Netherlands, was beaten back in disgrace, so that Belgium fell into French hands, the barrier forts proving no obstacle to the victorious legions of France. If proof had been needed that the ring of barrier fortresses was not invincible, the Dutch received it in 1743 and 1744, and they received still further confirmation of their vulnerability in 1747, when the French, in order to hasten peace, invaded Zeeland and Brabant, and laid siege to Maastricht. So desperate had the condition of the Dutch republic become that it was compelled to petition England, its other ally, to conclude peace, declaring that "since its existence it had never been more exposed to being invaded or overwhelmed." England was bitterly disappointed by this "shameful document," but could not carry on the war singlehanded, so that peace negotiations were soon under way. The representatives of the states naturally received but scant consideration from England
and France, and were forced to accept whatever terms these two powers agreed upon, an equal footing being from now on out of the question. In short, the republic was, as Blok says, "a miserable spectacle to its friends, an object of ridicule to its foes."

Thus the fatal internal weakness of the Dutch republic had brought about the shameful peace of 1748, which concluded the war of the Austrian Succession and revealed to friends and foes its true and nearly hopeless condition. One remedy remained as of old, the restoration of the prince of Orange to the headship of the state, but even this panacea, when applied in 1747 and 1748, had lost much of its old-time efficacy. Since 1702, when William III died, there had been a "stadtholderless interregnum," and now, when the republic had gone from bad to worse, there was a loud demand from the common people, who had always believed in Orange, to have the young prince William IV elevated to his ancestors' former position. This was indeed done, but more essential changes were not made. More authority was concentrated in the prince, but otherwise the old aristocratic system, limiting government to a number of ruling families, survived in a slightly modified form, denying to the people a truly representative system such as alone might have withstood the violence as well as the doctrines of the French Revolution.

For the moment, however, there was great relief and rejoicing, especially when an heir was born to the prince, thus providing for the continuity of the rule of Orange. The new stadtholder was more powerful than any of his predecessors, and his supreme authority was recognized. "From him were now expected a better general guidance, a greater development of the state's resources, reform of army and navy, revival of the former prosperity, a regeneration of the entire nation—a hard task for the prince placed at the head of a republic. Supported as he was by the citizens, it lay in his hand to improve the machine of state by augmenting the influence of the citizens upon the government, as the great prince, William I, had indicated, but he did not desire this. He wished to maintain the old 'aristocratical' form of government, redressing the most crying abuses, removing the most hated regents and replacing them, and balancing the still threatening oligarchy by increasing the powers of the 'eminent head' of the republic. This balance the prince could alone secure by a pernicious system of secret correspondence with the foremost regents, by intrigues and favors that raised the lowest passions to means of government. The republic could not be permanently preserved in this way."
The final fall of the republic was accordingly only a matter of fate and time. England's friendship and Prussia's aid might indeed delay the crisis, but could not avert it, as subsequent events were to prove. Nevertheless, the elevation of William IV brought a betterment in the general condition of the country. Trade and commerce revived, finance was made sound and prosperous, and a general prosperity followed which rivaled that of former days, notwithstanding the fact that the colonies had decreased, the trade of the great East India Company being especially in a state of decay. A period of thirty years of unbroken peace followed, somewhat similar to the period in American history after the Civil War. In both periods there was a general prosperity, much national disintegration of life, manners and thought, an incurable optimism based on shallow philosophies, a decline of religion and dogma, a refusal to learn from history, and a pacific tendency which reduced the military and naval efficiency of the nation. Besides the greater concentration of authority in the prince's hands, the removal of some regents, there was an improvement in internal finances by the abolition of the system of farming, which had led to such grave abuses and scandals. The postal system was also improved, but beyond this the reforms made did not alter the constitution of the state so much as its personnel. The prince himself was an amiable, weak man, not capable of reforming a state in which privilege and aristocratic pretension were so strongly intrenched as in the so-called United Netherlands, united in name only. His early death in 1751 left the country in charge of his wife, the Governess Anne, an English princess who found the task also greatly exceeding her natural capacity. Part of her labors were taken over by the Duke of Brunswick, a German general in the employ of the States General. Thus two foreigners were placed at the head of the Dutch republic at the most critical period of its history, naturally exciting patriotic opposition and personal antipathies on the part of many Dutchmen.

A reduction was made in the appropriations by reducing the size of the army which had played such an inglorious part in the late war; the state of the navy may be guessed from the fact that peace with the pirate states of Morocco and Algiers was bought, not compelled, while diplomacy fared no better in securing a new commercial treaty from France, nor in fruitless negotiations with Austria regarding the disposition to be made of the southern Netherlands. Austria, in fact, was not enamored of its possessions, nor of restoring the barrier fortresses to protect Holland from France, especially not when in 1756 a Franco-Austrian alliance was made, which
totally changed the status of the Austrian Netherlands, changing them from a buffer state into a French outpost. The former alliance of Austria with the naval powers of the North Sea naturally was immediately broken, but instead of uniting the Dutch republic more closely with Great Britain, this made the aristocracy all the more determined to be on good footing with France, long the common enemy of England and the house of Orange.

The republic soon found itself in a difficult position. England and France were again at war, this time for the supremacy of the seas and colonial expansion. In America France's colonies and military ambitions lay directly athwart the path of English colonial domination, while in India too the French were continually in conflict with English commerce and power. England could not tolerate a chain of French forts from Canada to the mouth of the Mississippi, blocking further expansion of its own colonies on the Atlantic seaboard, nor could it view with equanimity the growing naval strength of France, heretofore surpassed only by its own mighty sea power. The Netherlands, now that Austria was no longer an ally of them and England, had everything to fear from such a war. By treaty the Dutch were bound to assist the English, yet their own powerlessness and precarious position made them wish to retain French friendship also. Hence they endeavored to maintain a complete neutrality, a position then as now impossible to hold. An English demand that the treaty be complied with was refused at the behest of France, this naturally causing British pride to be offended. While France showered favors on the faithless Dutch, England showed its resentment by capturing Dutch merchant ships. Violent disputes arose in the republic about the necessity of providing convoy to the threatened commerce, but the decrepit state of the navy and the bankrupt condition of the admiralty prevented adequate protection from being furnished. Moreover the regent Anne, being an English princess, would not hear of an increase in the navy without the army being likewise increased, but this idea, while essentially correct, was violently opposed by the mercantile cities and the partisans of the French. At the Hague, it was said, there were many English or French partisans, but "no Hollanders." The princess and her party were blamed for their English sympathies, and the party of the "States" for its French partisanship.

Meanwhile Dutch trade was seriously hampered by the war. France was furnished with war supplies, but it could not in return insure the safety of Dutch shipping. All efforts to increase the navy were met by the insistent demand of the land provinces that
the land forces be increased too, so that a general deadlock followed after most vehement discussions. The navy counted in 1757 less than thirty ships, and the army had dropped to thirty-three thousand men—a sad commentary on the fall from the glory of other days when the Dutch republic had hundreds of battleships and fully half a million of men under arms. Finally after much wrangling some additional ships were built and they performed noteworthy services but could not avail to restore the old prestige or revive the former prosperity of trade. When the war between France and England came to an end in 1763, the Dutch republic had no part whatever in the peace conferences, and found itself ignored by its powerful ally, which from now on had not only the undisputed dominion of the seas, but was also in possession of French Canada, the Mississippi Valley, the Antilles and French Hindustan, being now by all odds the greatest naval and colonial power in the world.

It would seem, therefore, that Holland, conscious of English superiority, could not afford to affront the old rival, but would assiduously cultivate British friendship, especially now that France had been decisively humbled. Such, indeed, was the policy of the duke of Brunswick and the council pensionary Steyn, who after the death of Princess Anne in 1759 had become entrusted with foreign affairs, as well as with the guardianship of the young prince William V. The duke acquired a vast power in the republic, his opponents being gradually removed from influence and Orange partisans put in their place. By a judicious diplomacy the duke even received the good-will of the "States" party, so that at the assumption of government by the prince of Orange in 1766 there were many testimonials of gratitude from the States General and the Provincial Estates for his fatherly care of the country and the prince. The prince married a Prussian princess, a woman with much more determination and courage than he was to show in the last and most critical days of the old Dutch republic.

The period now ensuing was indeed a turbulent one, not only in the Netherlands, but also in foreign countries. It was the time of the first partition of Poland, of plans to exchange the ownership of Belgium, of the American revolution, and last but not least, of the political and social philosophy of the French revolution, with its tremendous and dramatic effects. That the Dutch republic should have survived the gathering storm was extremely unlikely, nor in fact desirable. Its anachronistic constitution and internal condition were such that they deserved no better fate than that which overtook them—a warning to other countries and
times. England too was ruled by a small aristocracy, but English traditions of liberty and flexibility safely weathered the storm of the great revolution, while the Dutch republic was moribund and inert and collapsed when the visible signs of government were removed. The growth of democratic ideas in America and France found a ready response in the Netherlands, but the history and organization of the republic were not favorable to a liberal reconstruction of its form under the new conditions.

During the administration of William V the old antipathy against England was revived in an intensified form. The revolt of the American colonies against British rule found strong sympathy in Holland, partly on account of democratic tendencies, and partly because of commercial reasons, which were very potent, since the colonies depended during the war on their West-Indian smuggling trade, carried on largely in Dutch bottoms. Hence the willingness of Dutch merchants and especially of the city of Amsterdam to make loans to the struggling colonies, and the readiness to aid America at the expense and to the detriment of England. That country, already at war with France and the American colonies, naturally desired to retain the friendship of the Dutch. As before in the Seven Years' War, however, the influence of France was strong enough in the republic to cause English displeasure, and finally a break in the old relations, resulting in the fourth English war. A request for the return of the Scottish brigade, which had been stationed in the Netherlands since the days of William of Orange, was refused by the States General on the grounds that the brigade was needed in their own defense. Another English grievance was the contraband trade of the Dutch, especially the furnishing of war supplies to France, principally by Haarlem and Amsterdam. While England maintained a conciliatory attitude, France was bound to force the hands of the Dutch, threatening to injure Dutch commerce unless a naval convoy was granted to the illicit trade forbidden by the English. Thus matters stood

with France cajoling this way and England insisting upon that way, till finally proud Albion, although beset by foreign enemies and harassed by domestic revolutions, abrogated the ancient treaties in 1780, following this the next year—after the republic had entered the armed neutrality league and through its chief city, Amsterdam, made an understanding with the American colonies—by a declaration of war upon its old rival and ally.

The Dutch on their side entered the war with incredible optimism and a fatal lack of preparedness. The proud language of
the French partisans, which swore vengeance upon perfidious Albion for having dared to hold up Dutch commerce, was in sharp contrast to the defenseless situation of the country and its colonies. The coasts were nearly bare to an English invasion, and the minor colonies fell into the enemy's hands almost without a struggle. Dutch commerce was driven off the seas, the French giving no aid to their new ally; a meeting between an English squadron and a Dutch fleet at Doggersbank proving nothing except that Dutch courage was still in spite of British sneers a fine quality of the navy. Luckily for the decrepit republic, England was busily employed elsewhere and had no heart in this war, so that peace offers were constantly made and as constantly refused by the French party, which still hoped to humiliate England with French help. While France was thus encouraging Holland to persist in a foolish war, she herself secretly concluded preliminaries of peace with Great Britain, thus isolating the republic. This was the reward which a fateful friendship for France received, but it did not deter the French party, now called the patriot party, from preventing a renewal of the old alliance with Great Britain. The stadtholder, helpless as he was, received most of the blame for the disastrous war and inglorious peace, while the "patriots" now openly demanded a reconstruction of the state after French political ideas and American example. As Blok says in his history: "No treaty of peace was more humiliating than that of Paris, none showed the republic in a more disordered condition—a mockery of a state, hopelessly divided in itself, without influence abroad, without power on land and sea, without future, living alone in the remembrance of its great past and in the prosperity left by that past."

The war over, internal strife became fiercer than ever. The old-time prosperity had been largely destroyed by the war: trade and commerce had gone to England and neutrals, industry was disorganized, and the colonies were in decay. The cause of all the woes of the republic was loudly proclaimed to be the antiquated form of government, as shown in the aristocratic rule of the regents and of the stadtholder. Opposition gradually centered against the latter and his removal was demanded, while the state itself was to be remodeled upon democratic principles. Some of the regents themselves were imbued with these principles, and they consequently became the leaders of the new movement which found most of its supporters among the intellectuals of the cities. The people at large still clung to the memories of Orange, but as they were dissociated from the government their wishes were not consulted. By various
means and measures the power of the prince was much curtailed, at first to the delight of the aristocrats who meant to gather up the authority lost by the head of state but who soon found out that the forces now at work and which were to sweep them away also were already beyond their control.

A period of confusion and revolutionary movements followed the war, and French ideas and leadership became the guiding factors while English influence and Prussian interest were strong counterforces. The republic, in 1785 committed to a French alliance, thus became not only the victim of its own contending factions but also the subject of foreign power and interference. There were at first three parties in the state: the patriot, the regent and the Orange or stadtholder party. The rapid growth of the patriot party soon forced a coalition between the two latter parties, who sought to check the rising discontent and the introduction of a more popular government. Holland and Utrecht led the way in an organized resistance to the old system of government, followed closely by Gelderland, where the Van de Capellens, known for their American sympathies, held sway. The prince and his advisers at first weakly gave way, and this made the revolutionaries, counting on aid from France, bolder than ever. The army and navy were still in favor of Orange, but the prince hesitated to use them against the patriots, although the English ambassador openly advocated a counter-revolution in favor of the stadtholder party. While matters thus went from bad to worse, an incident occurred which brought about the intervention of Prussia and the restoration of the old order.

It so happened that the princess, who was a sister of the king of Prussia, was stopped and delayed on a trip to the Hague by some over-zealous citizen guards and was furious at the treatment thus received. A repARATION was demanded of the Provincial Estates and as promptly refused. England and Prussia threatened, but with no result. As Holland would not punish the guards, on the grounds that no insult had been intended, the king of Prussia sent an army which soon overcame the small Dutch citizen army. The regular army, be it remembered, was still pro-Orange, and opposed to the patriotic innovations. Amsterdam alone held out for a while, but as French help did not arrive finally submitted in despair. The revolution, such as it was, had failed, and the prince was "restored" to his offices and full dignity, while the patriots were punished with removal from office, imprisonment and exile. Many went into voluntary exile, mainly to France, which welcomed the
patriots of 1787 with open arms, the "first fruits" and the promise of its own revolution.

The restoration of the archaic system in the United Netherlands naturally broke the back of the French alliance, and allied the Dutch republic once more with England and also with Prussia. A state so constituted could not forever delay its fall, nor could foreign aid prevent the final catastrophe. The last period, from 1787 to 1795, was a time pregnant with mighty events and portentous warnings. The French revolution of 1789 was casting its shadow before, encouraging the Dutch patriots and causing gloomy forebodings among the regents and all adherents of the old system. Every province was divided against itself, and only the danger of Holland's supremacy kept the rest of the provinces in common accord at all. There was no feeling of a national and indivisible unity which made them forget their separate existences; this feeling was to be instilled through many bitter years of French oppression. The army was without leaders and discipline, the navy had practically ceased to exist. Foreign commerce was declining, while colonial trade was at its lowest level. Thanks to the treaties with Prussia and England, however, the foreign position of the republic was somewhat improved, as these two powers virtually became its protectors. The last days of its existence were further brightened by the fact that in Van de Spiegel, the state pensionary, it possessed a man of uncommon intelligence, great moderation, fine patriotism and spotless integrity. The stadholder, too, more conscious of his responsibility, applied himself with great diligence to affairs of state, while the new appointees in the government were all firm adherents of the house of Orange and of the traditional scheme of government. If the republic could be saved, then its present condition was hopeful and not beyond promise of recovery.

Foreign complications soon presented great difficulties for the republic. In Belgium the liberal-mindedness of Emperor Joseph II had caused strange results. The attempt of the emperor to change the antiquated institutions and laws for a modern representative government met fanatical opposition on the part of the people, especially from clergy, nobility and local bodies, such as gilds and cities, proud of their ancient freedom and suspicious of any attempts to coordinate their charters and organizations into a more centralized and organic whole. The opposition to the reforms became soon dangerous to the authority of the emperor and threatened to establish a new state in Europe, or merge Belgium with France. Fortunately for the Austrian government Louis XVI still ruled in
France, so that help from that quarter could not be extended to the Belgian revolutionaries. As the emperor persisted in his desire to introduce the new system of government, he abrogated the ancient bill of rights called the JoyeuseEntrée, and dissolved the recalcitrant councils and provincial estates, thus adding to the general confusion. Many people went into exile, among them the former leader of the opposition, Van der Noot, who went about from court to court soliciting aid to make Belgium independent. A close union with the Dutch republic was suggested also, showing the great interest the northern Netherlands had in the state of affairs in the south.

Meanwhile the French Revolution took place. A month after the fall of the Bastile, a revolution occurred in Liège, which was quelled by Prussian troops but against Austria. From Liège the insurrection spread to other parts of the country, the weak authority of the Austrian government being soon overthrown. The Provincial Estates met at Brussels in 1790 and established as States General the “United States of Belgium,” maintaining the old laws and constitutions of the country. This reactionary spirit was unsatisfactory to the liberal element, now made bold by the progress of events in France and desirous of following the path of the great revolution. The three allied powers of Prussia, England and the Dutch republic resolved not to interfere in Belgian affairs, unless the emperor should request their help. Prussia now came to an agreement with Austria regarding the restoration of order in Belgium, and the short-lived Belgian republic expired without a blow. Thus another state was regulated into its former condition by the concert of Europe.

Affairs in France now required the attention of the great powers. Louis XVI, alarmed for his safety and desiring to get back his autocratic power, secretly besought Austria and Prussia to make war on the Assembly, hoping thereby to regain his former authority. War accordingly was declared, but the expected restoration did not follow. The Prussian invasion of France was stopped at Valmy, the Convention declaring the republic on the same day in 1792. All France arose as one man to repel the invaders and to bring the blessings of liberty, fraternity and equality to other oppressed peoples. The defeat of the Austrians at Jemappes put Belgium into French hands, to the great delight of the Belgian patriots but to the deep anxiety of the Dutch republic, scarcely recovered from its own uprising. Belgium was annexed to France in order to enjoy the benefits of the revolution, and Holland might expect the
same fate, once the hungry French patriots extended their zeal to free more peoples from the yokes of their governments. In this the French were urged on by the Dutch exiles, many of whom formed a foreign legion in the army of the French republic. Diplomatic relations between the two republics had already been broken off in August 1792, when on February 1, 1793, the Convention declared war on “the king of England” and the “stadtholder of the Dutch republic.” England, of course, was the chief enemy, but the Dutch republic, being an ally of England, naturally must be attacked also. After some initial successes, the French were thrown back, and the Dutch republic saved once more. Dumouriez, the French general, was disowned by the Convention, but as he had monarchical leanings he evacuated Belgium, thus exposing France to the victorious armies of the allies. Great plans were now made by the coalition against France but were dashed to the ground by the unexpected resistance of the French army, now greatly enlarged under Carnot. The campaign went badly for the allies, the Netherlands again being menaced by the French, who were meanwhile still in communication with the Dutch patriots.

The following year, 1794, went disastrously for the allies and the Dutch. Deprived of Prussian aid the republic fought a losing campaign against the French, while the Austrians and the English were as decisively defeated. Belgium was lost the second time, and Dutch Brabant and Flanders occupied by the French. Only a nominal resistance would meet their armies on the march to Amsterdam and Utrecht, once the Meuse had been crossed. Maastricht and Nimègueen fell, as did Bois-le-Duc, placing the country at the enemy’s mercy. With the small English army remaining inactive, and the Dutch army retiring from the frontier forts, after offering valiant resistance, the patriots were busy with their appeals to the French to come and end the hated Orange government. They wanted French aid, not a conquest, in order to found a new state based on the ideas of the great revolution. But the mass of the people, still loyal to the house of Orange, and horrified at the excesses of the revolution, did not want a change in the government, at least not in this way. The French, on their part, were not eager for a new Dutch republic, so that hope revived of concluding an honorable peace. It was not till a delegation from the Dutch patriots persuaded the National Convention at Paris that imperative action was necessary that the command was given to invade Holland itself. Once given, there was little or no opposition. Small wonder, for the Dutch troops numbered only four thousand men, while the
English and Hanoverians counted but eleven thousand. The province of Utrecht surrendered. Holland felt in like mood, for the defenses had been given up one by one. The prince's government had apparently abdicated.

Worst of all, the prince of Orange did really abdicate. Without adequate internal support, deserted by the allies of the republic, the prince stadtholder found himself a "man without a country." The French refused to treat with the republic so long as he was at the head of it, and the patriots desired him gone, while the common people were powerless to help him—reasons enough why he contemplated flight to England. At a gloomy session of the Estates of Holland he admitted that the province could not be defended any longer. On the same day he with his family embarked at Scheveningen for England—an exile from the country which his forefathers had redeemed from Spanish oppression and saved repeatedly from French domination or conquest. The long-threatened French supremacy over Dutch affairs was now an accomplished fact, to be followed during the reign of Napoleon by a complete annexation. On the same fateful day that the prince of Orange left Holland the famous old Dutch republic ceased to exist, the government almost automatically suspending its functions. Its place was taken by the so-called Batavian republic, organized upon French revolutionary principles by the committees of patriots in the various provinces. Thus perished a state which once proudly acclaimed itself as the "Commonwealth of the United Netherlands," which during a short history of two hundred years rivaled, if not eclipsed, the glory that was Greece, which transferred definitely the seat of empire to northwestern Europe, and opened the way out of ecclesiastical bondage and political tyranny to civil liberty and religious freedom, two indispensable attributes of civilization.

MORE'S UTOPIA.

BY C. H. WILLIAMS.

In the September Open Court we touched upon the influences at work to make More interested in the topics discussed in his Utopia and which helped to stimulate that interest when it had been aroused. It is our task now to examine the material More had in his possession to assist him in the development of the plan which matured about 1516 into the book Utopia.

It was not the practice of sixteenth-century authors to attach