the summer of 1916 he proclaimed the independence of Arabia from Turkey. Troops attempted to put down the revolt, but were unsuccessful. In September the Emir of Nejd proclaimed his adherence to the newly revolted state and Medina followed the others. In the winter of 1916-17, the kingdom of Hedjaz was organized, the Red Sea littoral was captured and the King of the Hedjaz announced his intent to reorganize Arabia as a modern industrial state. Of the great peninsula of Arabia there remains only El Hasa to the Turks.

In these war times all is fluctuating and uncertain; what Turkey may lose further and what she may regain by the war are on the lap of the gods.

If the Allies win the war Turkey will probably be partitioned, Syria going to France; Mesopotamia to England; Armenia and Constantinople to Russia; Arabia will remain independent; Palestine may become Zionist, and what is left of Turkey will work out its political salvation in Asia Minor.

If the Teutons win the war, Turkey will still lose Arabia and Egypt, but will remain nominally independent, but under German military and economic control—a hollow independence.

Should the war end in a stalemate, Turkey might preserve the status quo ante bellum.

ENGLISH DIPLOMACY.

BY THE EDITOR.

BRITISH diplomacy has lately assumed a new aspect, especially with regard to Turkey, and it has introduced changes whose wisdom may appear in the distant future though at present their advisability seems to be doubtful, and so we will point them out without either recommending or condemning them. We will only say that with the formation of the Entente a spirit seems to have possessed British diplomacy the result of which will be shown in the end of the present war.

England has always exercised a kind of patronage over Turkey. When "the sick man of Europe" was a moribund power England stood up for it, while Greece and afterward the Christian nations on the banks of the Danube and south of it were fighting for their independence. It was England who insisted on the necessity of keeping Constantinople in the hands of the Moslem and on Turkey's privilege of closing the Dardanelles against the Russians.
And there was a good reason for this policy. In India the followers of Mohammed not only form great masses of the population, but they are also the most active and energetic of its people. The Sultan of Turkey, however, has been and is still the recognized head of all Islam, and so it was essential for England to be friendly with the sultan. When the Turkish navy was destroyed in the battle of Navarın (October 20, 1827,) by the English, French and Russian navies, the news was by no means welcome to the diplomats of England. On the contrary it was openly called "an untoward event," because it was incidentally a help for Russia and a serious setback to Turkish power and prestige.

Russia has always been deemed the main enemy of England, and the English poet gave warning of the bear that walks like a man.

All this has been changed since England prepared for war by forming an alliance against Germany known as the "Entente." Russia has been favored as the better ally for England, and Turkey has thereby been forced into an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The main purpose of England's recent policy was to get rid of Germany as a most dangerous rival in industry and commerce, but for this purpose Russia seemed to be a more desirable ally than Turkey. Turkey could be regained afterwards, but Russia formerly feared by England as her rival in Asia, would serve her best in a struggle against Germany; and after Germany had been humiliated, England could grant Germany again an opportunity of fighting for England against Russia for which Germany would be grateful.

England had much more generous plans for Germany's good than is generally known. Several years ago when traveling in England, I read in an English paper, that England considered Germany's need of colonies and decided to give her some in South America. That was against the Monroe Doctrine and would involve Germany at least in strained relations with the United States, but that was exactly what England desired—to make a rapprochement between these two powers impossible. England knows what she is doing and her diplomacy has always been the same. England has a high contempt for America and American efficiency. She ranges our military power (as the London Nation has it) as about equal to that of Bulgaria. But her main point even now is not so much to gain the United States as an ally for herself as to alienate the United States and Germany, not only for the present but for all time to come. That is the English plan, and England is apparently succeeding.
Turkey has been driven over into the camp of the Central Powers, although the old condition of needing to keep the head of the Islam world friendly to England remains, but England is cunning enough to think of a substitute and make up for a deficiency in the array of her game. The result is that England wishes to curry favor with some one who could supplant the Islamic court of the sultan. Such a person indeed exists. He is the shereef of Mecca. The shereef of Mecca is a direct descendant of Mohammed and there has always been a kind of rivalry between him and the acknowledged head of the Moslem world in Constantinople. The Turkish sultan is recognized as the protector of Islam, but the shereef of Mecca being the head of the holy land of Islam has always been jealous of the sultan's authority and the relations between the two rulers have always been openly or secretly strained.

The common courtesies officially exchanged on definite occasions have never been sincere, and it was not difficult for English agents to stir the concealed distrust between the two into active hostility. To accomplish this was the easier since Constantinople has been affected by European culture more than the isolated Arabian land of Mecca and Medina. The Arabians in Mecca are simple folk who are more conservative than the Turks of Constantinople with their superficial touch of European culture. In Constantinople a new party has arisen. It is a modernization of Islam, and its members call themselves "Young Turks." They introduced reforms which are by no means welcome to the adherents of the prophet in Arabia and the result is that the shereef of Mecca has actually protested against the Sultan's policy by proclaiming a revolution. The situation has been carefully prepared by England and has been called a "master stroke" of English diplomacy.

A little book has been written by a well-known Dutch scholar, Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje of Leyden, in the interest of England. He views with favor the recent events in Mecca and looks upon the holy war of Islam proclaimed in Constantinople as "made in Germany." Recently the same author has written another book entitled The Revolt in Arabia in which he says near the end (page 39 to 40):

"For the moment, a revolt in West Arabia against Turkey, under the lead of the Great Shereef and aided by England, can cause serious trouble to the Turkish government, and all the more because it is at Mecca, familiar to and cherished by the entire Mohammedan world. Such a campaign, well prepared and ably

\[1\] C. S. Hurgronje, The Holy War Made in Germany.
conducted, would be a master-stroke in opposition to the attempt made by Young Turkey under German protection to excite the medieval fanaticism of Islam against other religious sects and to use it as an incentive to strife. However that may be, those who abominate playing with the fire of religious hate, a measure to which the Young Turks, in the main non-religious, have allowed themselves to be persuaded, have no reason to regret the Arabian uprising. All that can tend toward making an end of the unworthy noisy talk of 'caliphate' and 'holy war' may be regarded as commanding respect."

The book contains in the appendix (pages 43-50) an English translation of the proclamation of the shereef of Mecca in defense of his revolt.

Take off your hat to the diplomacy of England! It has one advantage, that it is, and so far has always been, successful. Three centuries ago it beat Spain, then Holland, then Denmark, and in the middle of the nineteenth century waged the Crimean war, then the Opium war, the Boer war—none of them honorable, but all profitable. This present war belongs to the same class, and no less an author than G. Bernard Shaw in criticizing with humorous sarcasm Mr. Cecil Chesterton's *Perils of Peace*, ridicules the latter for representing Britain, the innocent lamb, as attacked by the wolf Germany and blames him for unmanly and unworthy squealing. Mr. Shaw describes British diplomacy as successful nor does he see any reason for Mr. Chesterton to be ashamed of it.

I repeat: Take off your hat to English diplomacy. England plays a leading part in the world out of all proportion to her size or other accomplishments, and this is due solely to her diplomacy. The powers on the continent of Europe have always been divided, and between the two antagonistic groups she has always kept the decision in her own hands. The first mistake England made was in allowing her American colonies to withdraw from her empire, and she made a second one when she failed to have the United States divided into two confederacies, the North and the South. A third blunder, so it seems, may have been for England to allow the foundation of the German Empire. The question at present is whether an attempt to undo her third blunder was wise, and the future will show whether it would not have been preferable to have attacked the United States or Russia before wrestling with Germany. England had hoped for a speedier decision, and it is sure that she made some serious miscalculations in underrating Germany, and this one blunder may cause all her schemes to miscarry. According
to a careful German estimate Germany would not be able to carry on an "industrial war" or a blockade such as England has hurled upon her. Herr E. Possehl proved it in a speech made before the war on May 11, 1912, and according to all rules Germany ought to have been thrown to her knees long before this. This has not yet come to pass but may still happen. The German government has taken precautions against it which have been successful beyond all expectation.

On the other hand events have happened which lay beyond human calculation. The revolution in Russia is by no means a welcome incident for the English cause, although England has cleverly given a kick of contempt to the fallen Czar and at once sided with the rising republican powers that have taken charge of the affairs of the tottering government. It might have been nobler to help their ally in the critical moment, but it was more diplomatic to blame him for all mishaps and denounce him as pro-German, and England is not yet at her wits' end. She started the war by establishing the Entente and led one power after another into the fray—Italy and Rumania, but she held her greatest trump and played it last—the United States.

England's main purpose in drawing the United States into the present war lies in the distant future, and it is not difficult to point it out even now. Supposing that the part to be played by the United States against Germany will fail on the battlefield the ulterior purpose of British diplomacy may yet be attained. It is this: Germany and the United States are the main commercial rivals of England: they both must be overcome if England is to dominate the world commercially as well as politically, and the main thing to be avoided is the possibility that both should come to an understanding in resisting English supremacy. Germany and the United States have never before been at war and there was a positive danger that friendly relations between them could be built up. This could not be prevented more surely than by a war, and for this reason nothing would be more welcome to England. Wars spread the seeds of hate and such a hate is needed to prevent any friendship from developing by common interests. Nothing would be more dangerous to Great Britain and her world dominion than a German-American friendship and this is effectually undermined by a war.

England does not expect effectual assistance from the United States, but the ulterior purpose of the English diplomats in inducing the United States to enter the war is to drive a wedge between Germany and the United States, before the leading diplomats of both
should become conscious of their common interests so naturally obvious in face of the threatening British world dominion. Our contemporary American diplomats are too pro-British to see any danger that threatens from Great Britain and so we have become victims of a far-sighted English diplomacy.

English diplomats are narrow and sometimes make mistakes. They suffer for their blunders which endanger their plans in a frightful way, but their traditions are well preserved and they keep in mind their final goal, which is the building up of the British Empire and the destruction of rivals before they can become dangerous. The present war aims at nothing but the destruction of Germany before she can have a chance to build a navy strong enough to stand up against the British navy, and the war between the United States and Germany has a more ulterior purpose than American help for England in this great world war.

It is not likely that America will be of great assistance in the French trenches, although of course American troops will be used to their fullest extent in the fighting lines. The English claim that they have still five million soldiers of their own ready to go to the front, but they keep them at home and let others take the precedence in the honor of gaining laurels on the battlefield. No doubt the Americans will acquit themselves of the task as gloriously as did the French, the Australians and the Canadians, perhaps with greater readiness, some of them being convinced of the honor which they are thus allowed to gain.

History repeats itself, and it is peculiar that similar conditions involving a conflict to the end between the greatest power on land and the greatest maritime power within a certain sphere of interest has taken place before—first in Greek antiquity between Sparta and Athens and later in Roman antiquity between Rome and Carthage. We will not say that the end of these wars is always the same, but we will point out that there are many coincidences which show that under similar conditions people believe in a similar way and within certain limits the outcome too is the same. We have seen states like Athens in Greece and Carthage in northern Africa built up upon the basis of commercial conditions. The citizens grew wealthy and had the idea of unlimited dominion over the seas commanding access to other countries and colonies for themselves. When the Romans opposed Carthage's power, a Carthaginian leader is reported to have said, "What do you want to do with Carthage? You can't even wash your hands in the Mediterranean without our permission;" and it is true that Rome had to fight hard before
Scipio, sitting upon the ruins of the destroyed center of Semitic civilization, repeated the famous quotation from Homer in gloomy foreboding for his own city. "Εσοκται ὅμαρ ὅταν ποτ' ἀλώλη Ἰλιος ἡφι. "There will be a day when sacred Ilium shall be no more."

The advantages of war were at first on the side of the sea powers—of Athens and of Carthage—and after the first triumphant stroke the Athenians erected a small temple to the goddess of victory, calling her Νική ἀπερεός, the wingless victory, because henceforth she was to make her permanent abode in Athens, and they placed the little fane at the entrance of the Parthenon. We reproduce as our frontispiece the famous relief representing the goddess putting on her sandals.

Analogy is a dangerous basis for prophecy—even historical analogies which after all are the soundest. In one respect, however, the facts of Greek history teach a lesson that is applicable to-day. The two great Greek powers ruined each other and left to rising Rome the opportunity of becoming the leader of mankind. Two Germanic nations are now facing each other in a foolish spirit of hatred and rivalry, and if the Saxons and Teutons continue the war to the same bitter end they will leave the task of world-leadership to a third power. This would inevitably have been the United States if she had not taken part. On the other hand Russia may recover from her present derangement and the Slav may yet become the heir of the future.

If the war should finally end in favor of England it will not be due to the English armies or the prowess of their allies but first of all to the superiority of English diplomacy. If, however, England fails in her main purpose of crushing Germany, the conduct of this war though led in detail by clever diplomats would end in the first notable failure of English diplomacy, and it seems to me that the first result would be the foundation of a Centralia, a close coalition of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. It may be possible that England will succeed in isolating this new empire and take the rest of the world for herself. But in this case it would be an essential point in our American policy not to be included in the British Empire, but to remain independent. Had we kept out of the war, not only our independence but even our financial, commercial and political predominance would have been assured. Now our fate has become very doubtful, but let us hope that our traditional American policy as guided by Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and Hamilton will come to the front again and lead us to the place that heaven seems to have reserved for our country.