policy of Austria and her attempts in the direction of social reformation. The colonial policy of Austria is her Balkan policy; other colonies are not even dreamed of in Austria. It is merely an economic colonization, since the Balkan states are the natural market for Austrian productions. Austria is unconscious of any desire of political expansion. It is this Balkan policy which has produced the antagonism of Russia; for its most vital demand is the deliverance of the Balkans from Russian imperialism. As regards the problems of social reform, Austria like the rest of Europe owes an enormous debt of gratitude to Germany. Austria was the first European nation which in 1887 followed the epoch-making example of Germany by introducing governmental labor insurance. The nationalization of railroads, the taking over by municipalities of electric car lines, the telephone, gas and electricity, stock-yards, of the importation of meat etc., are some of the items of that German and Austrian political socialism, which, as already said, has been called monarchical socialism by American admirers.

If finally I am to sum up the fundamental components of Austrian policy, this may best be done by repeating the three main items of the inner political, the foreign and the socialistic program: national autonomy, a Balkan policy on an economic basis, and a well-tempered state socialism.

UNITED STATES: CRUSADER.

BY ROLAND HUGINS.

"Let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and objects are."
—President Wilson, April 3, 1917.

AMERICA strikes. For three perturbed years she has stood outside Armageddon, watching, irresolute. Now she swings her vast resources of men and materials into action. She smashes a blow at Germany, the foe of democracy, of law, of small nations. She makes battle for the rights of humanity.

America is fighting without passion, without hatred. She fights to build the future, not to avenge the past. For herself she demands no indemnities, no territories, no compensation. Her hands are clean. She gives herself freely. She has nothing at stake but honor, nothing to gain but the peace of the world.

At the beginning a number of radical pacifists called this a
"Wall Street war." They mistook the mood of the country,—and of Wall Street. The financiers will keep their trade in munitions, but they are certain to lose more in taxes than they can recoup. This is a war of sentiment. Nearly all of the recognized leaders of American thought endorsed this war before it was declared: Root, Roosevelt, Choate, Taft, Hughes, Eliot, and scores of others. These men are not moved by the hope of speculative profits.

Since the start of the war in Europe American opinion has run hostile to Germany. Our newspapers, the professors in our universities, our business men and our statesmen, have been vehement in their denunciation of the Central Powers. President Wilson followed the sentiment of these people, he did not lead it. There was no hypocrisy, as our German friends charge, in the President's war message to Congress of April 3. Every word welled from a deep conviction. "We fight," he said, "without rancor and without selfish objects." We fight "for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”

II.

This war, as most of us recognize, is a break with our political past, but not a break with our moral past. The United States has fought five or six wars before; and with the exception of one, the Mexican War, these have always been crusades against wrong-doing. The Revolution threw off the tyranny of George the Third. The War of 1812 defended the rights of neutrals at sea. The Civil War crushed slavery. The war with Spain freed Cuba from the grasp of Weyler and his like. This great republic has struck, now and again, a swift, clean blow for justice: clearing out the Barbary pirates, throwing open the prison of Vera Cruz. And once more the republic takes the sword in the same heroic spirit it fought its wars of old.

On its political side, however, this war is the greatest innovation made in American polity since the foundation. Heretofore we have scrupulously refused to participate in European quarrels. Our policy was laid down, with clarity and precision, by President Washington in his Farewell Address. He declared:

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her poli-
tics, or the ordinary combinations or collisions of her friendships, or enmities... Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?”

The “set of primary interests” to which Washington referred is the struggle for power. European nations, he said in effect, are ambitious rivals. They compete with one another for territory, for colonies, for prestige. They are a vast network of hereditary loyalties and enmities. Their rivalship involves them in frequent wars. They fight for each other or against each other, they combine and recombine, as interest, temper or caprice dictate, so that the bitterest foe of yesterday becomes the dearest ally of to-day. European interests have to us at most a very remote relation; the causes of these frequent controversies are essentially foreign to our concerns; we would do wisely not to entangle our peace and prosperity in their toils.

Such was Washington’s judgment and advice, given at the time of the French Revolution, and directly concurred in, as we know, by Hamilton and Madison. For a century and a quarter this elder wisdom has guided American relations with Europe. But now, after two or three years of deliberation, we have repudiated this policy of isolation. We have not gone so far, as yet, as to make a permanent alliance with any part of Europe. None the less we are, for the first time in our history, playing an important and probably decisive role in European affairs.

We have reversed our policy, and the effects will be momentous for us; but our action is not, on that score alone, to be condemned by any one. John Stuart Mill remarked: “A great statesman is he who knows when to depart from traditions, as well as when to adhere to them.” We have departed from our traditions, for reasons that we believe to be both adequate and unselfish: We have refused to believe that the present Titanic struggle is all of a piece with Europe’s former wars. We do not think this a conflict between greedy rivals, equally unscrupulous and mutually responsible. We think that Germany and her accomplices are chiefly, if not wholly, to blame. We believe three things: that Germany was the brutal aggressor in this war; that she waged the war with a calculated and inhuman frightfulness; and that her victory would be a positive disaster for civilization and for the democracies of the world. For these beliefs we risk our wealth and our lives. We pledge ourselves to stop and bring to terms a government that has run amuck.
Not even our enemies should be allowed to believe us mean-spirited and guileful. We may, conceivably, be mistaken. We may have miscalculated. We may have profoundly misread European politics. Of our good sense, only the future can judge. On April 26, 1917, President Wilson wrote to Arthur Brisbane: "In these trying times, one can feel certain only of his motives, which he must try to purge of selfishness of every kind, and await with patience for the judgment of a calmer day to vindicate the wisdom of the course he has tried conscientiously to follow."

III.

The purpose of a war is not achieved by starting it. In a long war the objects with which we begin may not be the objects with which we finish. We began the Spanish-American war to free Cuba, but we ended with the Philippines and an Asiatic problem on our hands. We have, now, no quarrel with the German people as distinct from the German government. But after we have spilled a flood of our blood, it may be, in order to help kill hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of the German people, we may feel less kindly toward them.

We must make clear to all the world, said our President, what our motives and objects are. Yes, to all the world. And it strikes me that there are people right here in America, and many people in England, France, Russia and Italy, who will need to be told, again and again, the objects for which these United States fight. The Germans will find out what we are saying to them. Our ships and guns will make it very clear to them. "Hindenburg," remarked Lloyd George, "does not know America." Is Mr. Lloyd George sure that he himself, and Milner and Curzon and Balfour and Carson, know America?

The specific mistake that Englishmen and Frenchmen will be prone to, is this: that they will mistake the extreme pro-ally partisans in America for representatives of the whole of America. They will not realize that we have two hyphenate bodies in America, the German-Americans and the Anglo-Americans. Neither faction represents the bulk and heart of the American people. The pro-Germans are those whose sympathies in the war lie rather with Germany and Austria than with their opponents. The Anglo-Americans are those who love England, or France, as though it were their native land, and whose loyalty to America is really conditioned on American aid to the Entente.

The pro-Germans are not a source of danger at present. In
any event they have no choice but to acquiesce in the measures taken by the American government. They are, of necessity, suffering acute spiritual distress; many of them are torn by conflicting emotions. But whatever their feeling may be, they are powerless, and they know it too well to cause a disturbance. Our Anglo-Americans are, on the other hand, a real source of danger, because they actively misrepresent American ideals. They are not, at heart, Americans, with a faith in America's nobility and destiny; they are at heart Colonials. Civilization for them does not center in Washington and New York and Boston. It centers in Europe,—somewhere along a line drawn between Paris and London.

These Colonials cursed America when it seemed to be hampering the Entente, and blessed it when it helped the Entente. They have shot poisonous gas on President Wilson one month, and a stream of rosewater the next. They have for two years sought to involve America in the war, and now they are happy and triumphant. But their work is not finished. They will not rest until they have done their utmost to bring about a permanent alliance or "understanding" with Great Britain and her allies. They want America to help the Entente to the fullest measure possible, but of course they would consider it impertinent for America to attempt to dictate any of the policies of the Entente. They are rapturously enthusiastic over the war.

As I say, the English and the French will do well not to identify these Colonials with America. The vast bulk of Americans are not enthusiastic over the war. They go into it reluctantly, grimly, with heavy hearts, impelled only by a sense of duty. The extreme slackness of recruiting since the declaration shows that no war fever is raging. Had the question of war or peace been submitted to popular vote, we have no notion what the decision would have been; for the idea of a referendum was anathema to those who wanted the war most. Americans, the bulk of them, are "pro-ally" in one sense only. We believe the Allies to be fighting for principles that we, too, hold sacred. But we are distinctly not interested in advancing the imperial ambitions of any one, either ourselves or our friends. We fight for the right, as we see the right.

IV.

And so America speaks a new language in international affairs, and she has something pertinent to say to her friends as well as to her foes. If America should address herself, for example, to
Great Britain, who is our nearest of kin and who should understand us best, she would express herself as follows:

"For the first time in our history our relations have become really cordial and affectionate. We now, as a people, see the vast store of human worth and character in England; and we can admire and love her despite her faults. And we know that this is the only true and sensible way for us to regard England; for any nation can love any other nation, and any can hate any other, as history has proved scores of times, and is proving again to-day.

"We know you will return our love, but we also know that we are purchasing your love with a price, and a costly price. We pay for it with our own spilt blood. We pay for it too, with the hate and rankling sense of injustice aroused against us in millions of German hearts.

"Europe, we are not unaware, has always looked on us with contempt. We have been called shopkeepers, dollar chasers, materialists. We have been thought to be a vast uniform pool of middle-class commonplaceness. You, Englishmen, have been ready enough to subscribe to this aspersion, that we are Philistines. We do not again want to hear this slander. On purely idealistic grounds we are helping you to win your greatest war. We are fighting the first purely doctrinaire war in history. We are a novel force in affairs: a nationalized sentimentality. And we shall be for a long time a dangerous sentimentality: rich, ingenious,—and armed.

"We are fighting Germany because we believe her to be an anachronism: and we do not think anachronisms of that kind should be tolerated in this modern world. We do not think the twentieth century is the time for national piracy, or for thirteenth century methods of warfare. We have refused to excuse German brutalities on the ground of necessity. We have not allowed her to do, in her desperation, what other nations would be tempted to do in desperation, because we regard her as a nation whose spear knows no brother, fitter for Roman times than ours.

"There is one compliment you must not pay to us: do not imagine we are pursuing any deep or subtle policy. Do not imagine we are better versed in Realpolitik than we appear to be. This war was not forced in America in order to secure an adequate preparedness, nor to forestall a possible aggression from Japan. We did not even go to war to protect our ships and our commerce. We know perfectly well that our controversy with Germany over submarines hinged upon our refusal to enforce international law
against your food blockade of Germany. In us there is no wil
or guile. May we say that we expect to find none in you? We
have taken your professions that you are fighting for righteous-
ess and peace at face value, without any discount. May we say that we
expect those professions to be lived up to?

"And may we add further, that we realize that words are
slippery things, and may mean different things on different sides
of the Atlantic? We do not want to destroy the future to avenge the
past. A peace without victory may no longer be possible, but we
shall certainly want to see a peace without punishment. We want
to teach Germany a lesson, we do not want to reduce her to impo-
tence. A minimum of common sense would tell us that a despoiled
and ravaged Germany would simply make Central Europe the breed-
ing ground for new wars. We see no more reason to give free play
to French hate than to any other variety of it. Hate cannot insure
peace; only magnanimity can. We can shoot guns, big and little,
but we do not expect to find any blood on the nails of our soldiers'
boots.

"In that way and for these purposes, our English friends,
America makes war. And for these purposes she will make her
future wars."

SYMPATHY FOR POLAND IN GERMAN POETRY.
BY MAXIMILIAN J. RUDWIN.

SUFFERING Poland has never failed to arouse the sympathy
of the poets of Germany. The critical events in the history of
this martyr of Europe have always been accompanied by expres-
sions of deep compassion on the part of the literary men in Ger-
many.\(^1\) The first partition of Poland touched the heart-strings of
the Swabian bard Christian Daniel Schubart (1739-1791), and this
unfortunate poet, who afterward became the innocent victim of the
tyannical duke of Württemberg,\(^1\) has the credit of having written
the first German poem which gives expression to the grief of Poland.\(^2\)

\(^1\) On the life and imprisonment of Schubart see the article in the London
journal Leisure Hour, 1854, III, 667f., and 685f.

\(^2\) Vide Robert Franz Arnold, Geschichte der deutschen Polenliteratur,
Vol. 1: Von den Anfängen bis 1800. Halle, 1900. The appearance of the
second volume, which is to bring the subject down to date, has been unduly
delayed. Professor Arnold has shown in the first volume such an intimate
acquaintance with the subject that the continuation of his scholarly work is
being eagerly expected even on this side of the Atlantic.