Italy would help her if they could. The only help—ye heavens!—could come from the "historic allies" of England whom she now is trying to starve and crush. Will they return good for evil? Will they not on the contrary feel tempted to make the Russo-Japanese alliance still more overwhelming, in the hope of sharing in the spoils? A Russian garrison will soon make its appearance at Jerusalem, ready to march on the Suez canal. Half of Persia will be taken at once, and the other half will be left in nominal British control, which will cease at the first hint from Petrograd. India may for some time continue nominally a British possession: in reality it will be part of the Russian empire as soon as Germany, hitherto its rampart of protection, has been broken down.

And to bring this ruin on herself, Britain is striving tooth and nail!

AN AMERICAN JUDGMENT OF GERMANY'S CAUSE.¹

A LETTER TO MY FRIEND IN KHAKI.

BY JOSEPH W. PENNYPACKER.

YOUR interesting narrative of life among the cacti I can answer only by giving you some reflections made as I look out upon the pageant from my watch-tower. You are for Germany. You may not know it, or possibly you are not aware of the reasons why. Here are some of them.

Texas contains 265,780 square miles, Germany 208,830. Contrast her size with that of the three great powers that have acquired extensive colonies, England, Russia, France,—and then smile at the mistranslation which our ignorant or malicious press has given to the song-title "Deutschland über Alles." Yet upon that small territory exist 70,000,000 people, whose total share in the world-commerce before the war was $5,000,000,000 a year. The great British empire had $7,250,000,000 a year, and the United States stood third with $4,250,000,000 a year. To this second place commercially Germany had climbed in fifty years. What does that mean? It means that by a spiritual process the German people had cultivated intensively, efficiently, frugally, the home products and industries of their

¹ With one or two omissions of personality, this is a bonafide letter written from back home to one of "the boys" on the Mexican border in August, 1916.
208,830 square miles and that they were economically justified in desiring to expand.

This question of national expansion is interesting. The moral basis for it, if any, is the right of the more civilized nations to carry their culture down among the more elemental peoples along the equator and bring back in exchange their native wealth. In 1904 England and France secretly agreed to recognize mutual "spheres of influence" in Egypt and Morocco—that is, to take those places. In 1907 England and Russia agreed as to the spoliation of Persia and chased out Mr. Shuster. It is only fifteen years since England took the Transvaal and Orange Free State by warring on their women, and now that she has got the single German colony in Africa she intends to hold contiguous territory from Egypt to Good Hope. Yet not England, France, nor Russia is cultivated at home so intensively as Germany. The latter, although she had commercial interests in Morocco, recognized the French protectorate and waived her rights by the treaty of Algeciras. That kept the peace in Europe; but it was unfair to Germany.

For Germany was needing to expand. Where did she go? Did she seize her neighbors? No! She acquired by purchase and treaty a right of way through the Balkans and Bulgaria, and set about building the Berlin-Bagdad railway intending to develop Mesopotamia to the top of the Persian Gulf. This was a good plan for civilization. Germany was going southeast. She was going among the Turks. She was developing a fertile country. As an American I heartily approve the plan. She had more right there than had England in Egypt, France in Morocco, or Russia in Persia. But when she got as far as Koweit, biff! she found herself blocked again by a treaty which the local sheik had made with England. Mind you, England was not trying to develop the country herself, but only to keep the German railway off the Persian Gulf. And why? Because if the line went through, England's India trade through Suez would be opened to competition. That also would be a good thing for us and for civilization. No single nation rightly monopolizes the world trade routes. But England looks upon the India trade as hers exclusively. And therefore Koweit is the key to a true understanding of the causes of this war. In a sense Germany is commercially the aggressor, but she has demanded no more than her right, an equal chance with other powers. England, unwilling and perhaps unable to compete commercially, is the military aggressor. When the history of this century is written, England will be found the real criminal now, just as she always has been in
the past. It is only the truth that she has conspired with France and Russia to shut Germany in on all sides; and now that Germany is driven to strike, they mean to crush her if they can. The recently announced plan of the Allies for a trade-boycott after the war tells the same story. That can only cause further trouble. To gain her selfish aims England has gone to all lengths. She is the ally of Russia and of Japan, and traitor to her own race and to western civilization. And in spite of all, she is failing. I, for one, hope to see her pay a very heavy penalty; for there will never be an enlightened peace founded on justice until this historic, deceitful, narrow British diplomacy, which sets other powers against each other and gobbles small nations, has been taught such a severe lesson as it can never forget.

Belgium! I confess the invasion of that unfortunate land does not seem to me, when my mind looks upon it from all sides, nearly so wicked a deed as the Anglomaniacs have shouted it into our ears. In the first place it was an act of war, not a cause of war. It was a military act after war had been declared. The British assertion, of which so much capital has been made in the United States, that England entered the war to protect Belgium is mere sham. England has never stood protector of small nations,—consider Ireland, the Transvaal, Greece. And in proof positive that Belgium was but a pretext and not England’s casus belli we have the secret treaty which Edward Grey in 1906 made with France, whereby England pledged her aid to France in the event of a war in Europe. In a deliberate policy aimed at Germany England supported France, regardless of the merits of her causes, in 1904, in 1906, in 1911, and finally in 1914. Have you ever asked yourself how it happened that France got into the quarrel between Servia-Russia and Austria-Germany? Would Germany prefer to fight Russia alone, or Russia and France together? France was bound ally of Russia by her own desire and treaty! For a correct understanding of Belgium’s case it is necessary to consider her geography. She lies opposite the English coast and between Germany and France, both of which countries were exposed to attack through her territory. But notice that an attack through Belgium into France would reach no vital spot and be, therefore, only a blow in the face; whereas an attack through Belgium into Germany would reach the Rhine provinces and be, therefore, a blow at the very heart of her munition and manufacturing center.

To fair reasoning it is clear that the invasion of Belgium was a defensive measure. The German ambassador had asked Grey
point blank whether England would remain neutral if Germany kept out of Belgium, and Grey had refused to promise. He was tied to France. The Germans captured in Brussels, and published, documents proving beyond a doubt that Belgium had not been honorably neutral. Those documents, the written minutes of a series of verbal conversations between high Belgian military officials and an English military attaché as far back as 1906, contain a plan for the landing of an English army upon Belgian territory. I assert that as Belgium's neutrality had been guaranteed by the powers, she could not honorably enter into secret negotiations of a military nature with one of them. She was not really neutral and the Germans knew it; yet they offered, you recall, to pay an indemnity and go through harmlessly. To be sure, Belgium was justified in refusing and resisting, but she made herself the pawn in England's game. In this whole matter of Belgium there has come only one open and honest word from any statesman in Europe. The words of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag deserve to go down in history. He said:

"Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already set foot upon Belgian territory. It is against the law of nations. The French government has, it is true, declared at Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as the enemy respected it. We knew, however, that France was ready for the aggressive. France could wait; we, no. A French attack upon our flank in the lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. So we have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded protests of Luxemburg and Belgium. We shall recompense them for the wrong we have done them as soon as our military end is attained. When one is threatened as we are, and fights for that which is most sacred, one can think of only one thing,—to attain the end, cost what it may. I repeat the words of the Emperor. 'It is with a pure conscience that Germany goes to war.'"

Here is no subterfuge. Nor were the fears of the Chancellor groundless. I have read the diplomatic correspondence of the Belgian ministers of foreign affairs with his three chargés d'affaires at London, Berlin, Paris,—letters covering the politics of Europe from 1905 to 1914. These four Belgians, looking forward, dreading for their country the deluge that finally came in 1914, substantially agree that during those years Germany was very patient under insult in an effort to keep the peace, while England was pulling the wires and making her secret treaties with France, Russia, and Japan.
Belgium! We all feel sorry for her plight; we all feel admiration for her heroic stand; but some of us are convinced that intrigue on one side was provocation for assault on the other. If England really desired to save her, she had the opportunity by guaranteeing her own neutrality. There is no proof to the present day that Germany intends to hold her permanently, or do more than insure her own safety.

Freedom of the seas! Since the time of Grotius a great ideal! The hope that the ocean outside the three-mile limit may become a public road upon all parts of which the commerce of every nation shall go with equal and entire safety. This when the world is at peace. And in time of war only two limitations of the ideal, (1) the belligerent's right of visit and search for contraband, (2) the belligerent's right to blockade the enemy. In spite of our very silly and partisan press, all who know history and have the capacity to think see clearly that upon the seas at least this fight of Germany's is our fight and the fight of all neutral nations.

When the war broke out, our duty as the leading neutral was plainly to have asserted our full rights with equal vigor against both parties. We haven't done it. What those rights were was a question of international law and practice. And in judging the policies of England and Germany in this matter we must take a big, broad view and let the details go. The record from the beginning of the sea-warfare and all the diplomatic exchanges relative thereto show the main facts to be as follows:

In 1909 the rules of sea-warfare, with definition of contraband, of legal blockade, and of neutral rights, were assembled in writing in the Declaration of London signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Spain, Holland, Italy, the United States. It is true that that Declaration was not ratified, the House of Lords refusing on the ground that it limited England's sea-power; nevertheless, though not technically law, it represented the consensus of civilized opinion on right practices at sea. On August 6, 1914, we asked both England and Germany whether they would conduct the war by the Declaration of London. Germany answered "Yes." England answered "Yes.—with numerous modifications essential to our success." We thereupon notified Germany that the Declaration of London was abrogated and that we would stand upon the rules of commonly recognized international law. Almost at once the early British Orders-in-Council, without declaring a legal blockade of German ports, did declare nearly every sort of product,—foodstuffs, etc.—contraband, and British cruisers took up
their station off New York and began to seize American cargoes. On November 2, 1914, England declared the North Sea a war-area, under pretext of mine-danger but really to cut off our commerce with Scandinavia. At the end of December we sent to England our first protest on seizure of our commerce, and were told that it was necessary; we said nothing about the "war-area." After waiting three months Germany, on February 4, 1915, declared a submarine war-zone around England. She admitted it was illegal, but justified it as retaliation for the starvation "blockade" which was, indeed, equally illegal. The illegality of the British "blockade" is a technical matter set forth in many notes of protest which England has answered only by pleas of "necessity" and might. Technically the "blockade" is illegal because it is not "effective," is not "impartial to all neutrals," is not "limited to enemy ports," fails to distinguish between contraband and bona fide neutral goods, and for other reasons. As a matter of fact it is easy to see that England has deliberately cut off our trade with the Scandinavian countries while her own exports to them have been increasing. The American note of October 21, 1915, shows that between March 11 and June 17 of that year 273 vessels carrying American cargoes were haled into Kirkwall by the British. It is equally easy to see that the true reason England does not draw a legal cordon of warships around German ports is because she fears submarines. American passengers would be no protection to a British war-ship, even in the view of this Administration.

From the beginning Germany has been ready to abandon her submarine war on commerce if England would make her "blockade" legal. Even without this concession she has met our demands half way by practically abandoning it; whereas our appeals to England have met with no response. Our position in this triangular controversy has been monstrously unjust. The illegal "blockade" started first. The illegal U-boat warfare on merchantmen was an effective reply. Our rights under law were both to ship munitions to the Allies and to ship non-contraband goods to the Scandinavian countries or to Germany herself. But in an unneutral spirit we have done the former without doing the latter; and accomplishing nothing against the "blockade" ourselves, we have compelled Germany to abandon her own effective weapon. What do you suppose a German thinks of Mr. Wilson's "sacred humanity" when he knows his brothers are shot daily by American shells sold for money? It is idle to suppose the lives lost on the Lusitania were one bit more
precious in the eyes of Deity than are those lives which would have been sacrificed if her cargo of bullets had reached England.

Because the submarine is a new weapon not yet established in sea-law, Germany's position has been difficult and not strictly legal; but it has, I assert, been always more liberal and more in accord with common sense than has England's. Take the case of the "armed merchantman." In the days when any war-ship was comparatively so heavy as to be safe from merchant guns, the rule requiring a warning before capture or destruction of armed enemy commerce was all right; but to-day when the war-ship is a frail submarine sinkable by a single shot, she cannot reasonably be compelled to face hostile guns merely to warn. The old days of pirates are gone. In the modern world the "armed merchantman" is an anomaly, and in reason every armed ship is a war-ship. It is illegal for a civilian to carry concealed weapons,—the same should be true of a civilian ship. And recognition of such a rule would do away with the present difficulties of practice, enabling a submarine to warn with safety and then compelling her to do so. This solution of the problem the United States actually proposed to all belligerents on January 23, 1916. Germany accepted. England declined! Sweden recognized it when she warned her citizens not to travel on armed belligerent ships. Such sanity is not law to-day because England insists upon the peaceable "armed merchantman" (I wonder why?): but the Germans are entirely right in their contention that such ought to be the law. It may be noted in passing that under the old rule, upheld by England, the Germans were legally justified (the wisdom of it is another matter) in executing Captain Fryatt. For his "armed merchantman" was not a war-ship, yet he attacked a submarine. If his "armed merchantman" had been a recognized war-ship, he would have been treated, if captured, as an honorable prisoner of war.

But all these technicalities do not conceal the main issue of world import: England claims to rule the sea. In 1861-65 while we were busy, she destroyed our merchant marine. In 1914 when we proposed to buy the interned German merchant fleet, she protested; and we yielded, though we had a perfect right to make the deal. And what of Panama! Both the Clayton-Bulwer and the Hay-Pauncefote treaties were ratified on the basis that the proposed canal across the Isthmus was to go through territory of a third nation, owned neither by England nor by us. When we subsequently bought the canal-zone and built and paid for the Canal alone, the basis on which these treaties rested was ended, and the treaties fell. Yet
when we came to establish rates, England stepped in with a protest; which Mr. Wilson and Mr. Elihu Root allowed, thus practically taking the Canal back under the old conditions. It was an absurd act, for it gives England a lien for future diplomatic meddling, though she has geographically no more right there than if the Canal went from Philadelphia to San Francisco. And the Panama Canal was the only waterway in the world free from English domination!

England has gone too far. This war shows her up. Her blacklists, her trade-boycott, her stealing of our mails, her seizure of our ships,—are hurting her cause. There is a change of sentiment since the beginning. For as the real issue beneath the surface becomes more apparent, people begin to see that Germany's cause is ours. The true significance of the Deutschland's trip was to point, as no mere words could ever do, the common cause of Germany and this country against English abuse of sea-power.

In conclusion a few deeper and more positive words. What I have said hitherto is the negative side of the argument. The real reason I am for Germany in this struggle is because I think the Germans, a great people, have a message for us that is spiritual. They have begun their growth at home; but they show a deep, true culture of moral earnestness, capacity for enlightenment, and fearless searching for truth, such as will take the world onward. In this war the Germans are the only people who have been permitted to read the adverse reports of foreign newspapers as well as their own. Look at their universities and their sustained and arduous scholarship. The British empire is founded on wealth exploited from other peoples: the German culture is founded on ideals. What English scholar to-day is attracting the attention accorded to Rudolph Eucken? We may scoff at the claim which Germans make seriously of being the most advanced people vitally, but let us consider their remarkable social progress and their great leadership of thought, and not smile too lightly. By English lies, sold unfortunately to the American press, the German people have been slandered and vilified; but the most striking spiritual fact of the war has been the courageous unity of will in the German people behind their ring of defenses. They are contending against enormous odds,—which we, to our shame, have helped to heap up,—but they cannot be broken.

During our Civil War, while English privateers were wrecking our commerce and English statesmen were hoping to see this nation permanently split, 50,000 Germans were fighting to a man on the side of freedom. Of what use a national history if we forget in our
FROM ZAMBOANGA TO SINGAPORE.

BY A. M. REESE.

WHEN the Norddeutscher Lloyd steamer "Sandakan" left the dock at Zamboanga she had in the first cabin only three passengers, a Russian of uncertain occupation, a young lieutenant of the Philippine constabulary, and myself. We had, therefore, the

THE WATER FRONT AT SANDAKAN.

pick of the deck staterooms, which is worth while when traveling within ten degrees of the equator in mid-summer.

Zamboanga is the chief city of the island of Mindanao and is