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PERSIAN PLAN OF THE MOSQUE AT MECCA.
From a Persian manuscript of 990 A. H. (1583 A. D.)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.
"JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME."

BY WALTER WOODBURN HYDE.

The prediction so confidently made at the beginning of the world war that American sympathies would be pro-German within four months proved a wild one. The idea that the independent and fair-minded Americans would in a short time come to gauge properly the events which led up to the declarations of war and understand the position of Germany, was rudely shattered. Now, nearly two years after the war began, the sentiment of the United States, owing in part to successive inoculations of anti-Germanism caused by such untoward events as the "Lusitania" disaster, is pro-Ally to a degree which along the eastern sea-coast amounts almost to hysteria. Under the influence of an excited press Americans feel themselves permitted to indulge in the most unrestricted abuse of Germany and everything German. Even our intellectuals—philosophers, historians, scientists, professors—in fact all who are supposed to labor for truth without passion or prejudice, and to take a pride in rational thinking, are openly and shamelessly consecrating their energies and abilities to the fostering of hatred and bitterness.

Perhaps of all these the worst offenders have been our university professors, a class of men devoted to the liberty of thought and completely untrammeled by political entanglements. Yet in their private and public utterances many of them have shown the most pronounced anti-German sentiments, though they may have studied in Germany and have received German degrees. They are certainly losing an opportunity of performing a service to their fellow men in these days of need, for which their training should have fitted them; but they have done little toward softening the growing bitterness and bringing about a better understanding. It
is sadly disappointing to find that the greatest issues of our times cannot be discussed even in academic circles without passion and that education and learning do not give an objective and unbiased view of things and are not safeguards against the prevailing hysteria.

In the eyes of all the conflict has come to be just what it is to the untutored mob—a gigantic struggle in which the elements of civilization are arrayed against those of savagery, a struggle between autocracy and democracy, the pride and flower of our culture. That such a sentiment could not possibly find a responsive chord in Petrograd or Calcutta seems to have occurred to no one. The process of moral whitewashing in the case of Russia has passed all bounds; the knout, the Cossack and Siberia are all forgotten, and she stands forth as white and unsullied as any of her allies. Neutrality is nothing but a name shorn of all meaning. It is used now only in a collective sense in reference to the government when we wish to defend some act like the export of munitions. To the individual it means nothing, and even to the government itself its meaning is tenuous.

Such an organization as the American Rights’ Society, whose avowed purpose is to bring the country into the conflict on the side of the Allies, is allowed to press its propaganda with unblushing publicity. A petition signed by hundreds of prominent men including numbers of university teachers, giving moral support to the Allies by openly wishing them success in their righteous struggle, meets scarcely a word of protest, though such an act could easily be construed as a breach of the country’s neutrality. A just note of complaint against England’s interference with our commerce and mails on the high seas was held back avowedly in order not to let it appear to have been in anywise influenced by representations contained in the German answer to our submarine demands.

The word “hyphenates,” a term of stinging reproach in a free country, is hurled against some of our best citizens, designating not only German-Americans and Irish-Americans, but loosely any one and every one who does not chime in with the majority. It is totally forgotten that this term is equally applicable to those who take the side of the Allies, in fact to anybody and everybody who puts the interests of either set of belligerents above those of his own country. We have become conscious of Russian police methods in New York, by which private telephone wires of suspicious pro-Germans have been tapped. Some months ago an employee of the Library of Congress, who had been in public service for forty years, was dismissed from office, because he was alleged to have made remarks...
disrespectful to the President's submarine policy! If the war continues we shall inaugurate regular sentences for the crime of *lèse-majesté*.

All attempts to analyze the conditions preceding and surrounding the conflict are thrown to the winds. People with little training in history, political science or psychology, and almost completely ignorant of the recent diplomatic history of Europe, feel free to sit in judgment. On the assumption that the Germans began the war and have conducted it like savages, the prevailing view of hostility toward them is defended. But few people any longer have the slightest interest in the rights of the case. They know that a great war is being waged, they long since have made their decision as to who are the culprits, and they are impatient that the supposed aggressors have not yet been properly punished. They are ready to believe the most incredible tales of atrocities and ferocity on one side on evidence which would be ruled out of any criminal court, and are fain to see no holes in the armor of the other.

The Kaiser has been denounced as the "central enemy of mankind," the "arch-fiend of humanity," the man who brought all this suffering into being by his lordly and irresponsible will. The fact that millions of Germans give this exalted position to Sir Edward Grey, whom they look upon as a scoffing, crafty, sardonic Mephistopheles, whose main object in life is to strangle and asphyxiate Germany, does not show them the fallacy of such a characterization, nor the fact that exactly similar notions of public men have been held in all previous wars. Yet it is known that the private life of the one is marred only by a fondness for hunting and travel, that of the other by the fact that he is an ardent devotee of fishing and a tamer of birds and squirrels! This denunciation of the Kaiser has finally, to be sure, under the pressure of later developments in the submarine controversy, undergone a violent modification and must be applied now to the whole German people, for it is readily seen that not even he nor his advisers can always shape the will of their down-trodden serfs.

The most astounding views, bringing into court the whole past of Germany, which never before had been questioned, are heard. It is forgotten that the Germans have anything to do with the shaping of our modern civilization. Their whole idea of *Kultur*, though rarely understood, is nevertheless denounced. Much is made of the fact that they look upon their civilization as superior to any other, but nothing is made of the claim of the Allies that they are waging a war against barbarism. We still talk loudly of the "rights
of humanity” in our public speeches and documents. But our concept of humanity is merely coincident with legality; if we but keep within the bounds of international law, we are humane. We seem oblivious to the fact that there is a higher law—the law of morality. No lofty idea since the French Revolution has been so debased as this of humanity. It is strange that more anti-Germans are not tired of such hollow talk. It is strange that we all cannot see that a nation which is concerned with the shipment of death-dealing materials on such a gigantic scale to whichever side, should not prate of humanity. If we do we must not be offended if we are ridiculed even by the Allies themselves.

The prevailing attitude of mind is manifestly unsound and wrong. Let it be granted that never before in the world’s history has there been such a tremendous stirring of men’s inmost feelings; nor since the downfall of the empire of Rome has so large a proportion of the earth’s denizens been so profoundly interested. It could not have been expected that in such a universal struggle Americans also should not have had their sympathies aroused to the depths. But however bitter and acrimonious the struggle has become, there is absolutely no excuse for our losing our heads and becoming as mad as the belligerents are. It is not our war; we did not begin it, nor were we even remotely concerned in bringing about the international situation which made it inevitable. Our interest, however great we think it, cannot possibly compare with that of the nations actually involved. There is no excuse for us so ardently to share the views of one side as to be saved from actual participation almost by a miracle. It would seem that under the law of nations we were at present doing enough in helping that side—albeit through accident as we have all along maintained—to the extent of being responsible for the death of multitudes of men on the other, to satisfy even the most bellicose without having to go further. Even as a matter of expediency it should occur to those who are eager to have us involved, that it is almost certain that the temporary stopping of the export of arms would mean the crushing of France before we would be ready to intervene.

If our sympathies are the result of intolerable wrongs, we must reflect that such wrongs are inevitable in a war of this magnitude, and that we have suffered from both sides. If we call the Germans Huns because of their crimes on the sea and in the air, we must reflect that their provocation has been great. They have all along maintained that such acts were in reprisal. We Americans know that such an excuse is not valid, and that much of the submarine and
Zeppelin policy of Germany has been inhuman and wrong—for two wrongs cannot make a right. We must not forget, however, that the lex talionis is still potent in our own national counsels; nor that recently our President himself, without consulting Congress, sent a force of men into a neighboring state to punish a bandit who had murdered our citizens. Such an act of reprisal as that for the massacre at Columbus is merely the latest example of the oldest and deepest rooted in human nature of all laws.

Let us at least try in a measure to understand the German view-point. We know that the English blockade, her policy of encirclement, even though it has failed to reduce Germany to famine, has been the cause of untold suffering and hardships and even loss of life. No American with any idea of fairness can fail to see that such a blockade, including non-contraband as well as contraband, and sadly interfering with the commerce of neutrals, has overstepped the tenets of international law. The grim ferocity and lack of quarter with which this terrible war has come to be waged is evidenced by the fact that England finally refused to let the United States ship Red Cross supplies for wounded German soldiers. So if there has been brutality on one side, there certainly has been on the other. And there is a fine subtlety in the English method of trying to starve millions of a civil population—for their lack of success in no wise absolves them from moral guilt—that we close our eyes to when we see the open butchery of non-combatants on the high seas.

Few people appear to realize that a nation cannot long let its acts fall short of its words. It would be but a righteous Nemesis for us who have vilified Germany with such unbridled license to be obliged finally to back up our sentiments with the sword. But before it is too late can we not take a larger view of the conflict and see that we shall be of far greater value to the world by remaining neutral than by entering a war which seems now so far spent? It cannot continue forever and negotiations must end it; the great work of reconstruction can be immeasurably furthered by us.

Let our better natures reassert themselves and let our resentment not develop into a Hymn of Hate, but be tempered by pity. Let us remember that in this unequal contest which the Germans are waging with half the world for ideals dear to them, that they also have made appalling sacrifices and have willingly shed their best blood. Let us remember that the death of a son or brother, of a husband or father, is quite as terrible a misfortune to one of our German sisters as to one of France or England. Let us try to
imbibe a little of the spirit of that noble Frenchman, Romain Rolland, who, in his chapter entitled *Inter Arma Caritas,*¹ has, almost alone of his countrymen and in the face of being called a traitor just because he has not filled the measure of hate against the enemies of France, steadfastly refused to be swept off his feet by popular passion. He has been able to see above the clash of arms the sublime truth that the tragedy of this war is not only that of his beloved France, but that it is the tragedy of humanity, "that each of the nations is being menaced in its dearest possessions—in its honor, its independence, its life." He realizes that the soldiers of each are equally fighting for what they hold precious, and he has nothing but sympathy and pity for them all. And like a seer he has been vouchsafed the power to see far ahead, that the greatest task of the future, long after the din and smoke of battle is past, will be that of replacing the outworn creed of individualism and nationalism with something vastly higher—internationalism.

This is a task which seems chimerical now in these days of bitterness and gall, but one which is fated to be the goal toward which mankind will strive. Following the immortal dictum of his compatriot Jaurès that "the need of unity is the profoundest and noblest of the human mind," he has raised his voice for the great truth that "cooperation, not war, is the right duty of nations and that all that is valuable in each people may be maintained in and by intercourse with others." It is this spirit of charity in war that we Americans should try to instil into our hearts; for we ought to be fitting ourselves to help in the great work of reconstruction which is to follow, and not, by our utterances and acts, put ourselves outside the sympathy of one side in the struggle.

In the plethora of war literature it is encouraging now and again to find a book which has been written by a man who can still lift himself above the conflict and survey it with sanity and fairness from a broader and higher level. Especially gratifying is it to find such a book written by a citizen of one of the warring nations, since the comments and conclusions of such a one are sure to command American attention.

Such a book is *Justice in War-Time*² by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, the chief of the English pacifists. It is undoubtedly one of

¹ In his volume *Au-dessus de la mêlée,* translated under the title *Above the Battle* by C. K. Ogden and published by The Open Court Publishing Company of Chicago.

² Published by the Open Court Publishing Company.
the best contributions to the subject of the war that has yet appeared, and so, with the hope that its circle of readers may be increased, I wish to give some account of its contents. It may be said in advance that whoever is interested in reading war news only to feed his prejudices, and whoever does not wish to modify hastily made opinions as to the causes of the conflict, will get little comfort from reading this book. For it is written with a fullness of knowledge, a grasp of ideas and a frankness and clarity of judgment that are almost unique. It is a book which can have only a beneficial effect on the crisis through which America is now passing.

Its author is connected by birth with one of the great houses of England and is known throughout the English-speaking world for his contributions to mathematics, philosophy and social science. He is a lecturer and sometime fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and is the son of the late Viscount Amberley, and grandson of Lord John Russell, the famous prime minister of England, whose name was prominent in the last century among the champions of civil and religious liberty. He is heir to the present Earl Russell, whose independence of spirit is shown by his self-styled title of "agnostic." He is well known in American scientific circles, especially by his philosophical lectures here. Thus his last scientific work, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, embodies the Lowell Lectures for 1914. His intimate knowledge of Germany is evidenced by the title of his first book, German Social Democracy, which appeared in 1896.

The present book consists of a series of twelve essays, all of which, with the exception of the last two, had already appeared in various magazines. As they were written over a period of a year and a half, they show certain repetitions and also inconsistencies, as his first impressions have necessarily become modified by the development of events. Several of them discuss pacifism in its broader aspects and start from the thesis that most people are pacific by nature and are incited to war only by politicians and journalists. He is not so extreme as pacifists of the Tolstoy type, but admits that some wars, even though evil, are justified, the only question being whether their results outweigh their evil. He states his belief that the present war is merely one of prestige, with no great principle involved, and so unjustified. He is certain that it is not being fought in defense of democracy, and that even if the Allies should win, democracy could not be stuffed down the throats of the Germans who "have the form of government which they desire" (p. 33).
When Germans maintain that England has a brutal national egotism and that they are fighting for civilization against an envious world, and when the English retaliate by averring that Germany is a country of ruthless militarism and that they are upholding treaties and the rights of small nations, Mr. Russell finds such language melodramatic to a sober mind and concludes that every nation is egotistic; that each, in pursuing its own interests, may spread civilization and uphold treaties, but that no nation does it at the sacrifice of "a million men and a thousand million pounds"; that when such sacrifices are made, it is always for selfish purposes (p. 3). Though each side in the present war claims it is fighting in self-defense and so blames the other, each is fighting really because it wished to, and is now angry and determined to be victorious (p. 14); inasmuch as neither side has so far won decisively, the fury of the combatants grows and will grow the longer the war endures. So he finds the German statement that the war will be decided finally by nervous endurance not impossible (p. 16). Such a hatred has been aroused among the Allies by German successes that this alone is the greatest danger to civilization (p. 112). His main purpose in writing, however, is to find out the truth about the causes which led up to the war; for he asserts that the truth will not adapt itself to national needs, since "it is in its essence neutral" (p. 2).

The best part of the book, therefore, is contained in the last five essays on the history of the Entente policy during the incumbency of the Foreign Office by Sir Edward Grey. It is in essence a reply to Sir Gilbert Murray's elaborate defense of Grey. It is avowedly a criticism, not of the personality of the secretary, but of the maxims which he inherited. His conclusion in brief is, that though Germany was more to blame than England for the outbreak of the war, if England's policy in recent years had been conducted differently "there is a likelihood that the present European war would never have occurred" (p. 123). His contention is that England must not remain "wrapped in self-righteousness, impervious to facts which are not wholly creditable to us." He does not believe that a criticism of the past of the Foreign Office can do anything but good, especially since both England and Germany, in presenting their case to America, went too far in claiming a "complete sinlessness not given to mortals."

Such a frank and outspoken criticism of his country in the course of a great war could easily be looked upon as unpatriotic. It is not strange, therefore, that its author should be called a "pro-

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German” by Professor Murray, who says that he and Mr. Brailsford “are not at present in a state of mind which enables them to see or even to seek the truth.” That this is unfounded, and that at heart Mr. Russell has English prejudices, can be made out from many passages in the book. Thus (on page 125) he says that so long as he has known Germany he has abominated the Kaiser and looked upon him as “one of the sources of evil in the world.” But in denouncing him he does not go to the extreme to which Professor Murray has gone, who seems to regard William as the “central enemy of the human race.” Nor in any part of the book does he make invidious comparisons between Germany and her enemies. However, in a more recent article, he delivers himself of the opinion that Germany is a less civilized country than either France or England. Here he strikes a far lower note, but one that has been struck often enough since the war began. Perhaps nothing more futile has been done than making such comparisons between the civilizations of the countries concerned. If ever it were profitable or fitting to do this, surely it is not the time during the course of a great war. Every educated man knows that the world would be seriously impaired by the injury of any of its three great civilizations—whether Anglo-Saxon, Gallic or Teutonic.

In discussing the causes of the war he first brings up the question of Belgium. He shows that the belief held by most English Liberals at the beginning, that the English participated in the war because of Germany’s violation of the treaty of 1839 by invading Belgium, is not true. Perhaps nothing has set the American people against the Germans more than this act; and probably no deeper rooted belief has been held by our people than that England and France joined in the war because of it. Mr. Russell made it clear that not all Englishmen believed this, even though Professor Murray says it was “one of the obvious and important events leading up to the war.” Thus the London Times combated the notion repeatedly, nor was it at first held in France, Russia or even Germany. Mr. Russell says (p. 127) that he does not believe there “can now be two opinions as to the part played by Belgium in our participation; if the Germans had not attacked Belgium...the government would have found it impossible to stand aside while France was being crushed. France, not Belgium, was for us the decisive factor.” He mentions the well-known evidence that the German ambassador Lichnowsky asked Grey if he could promise neutrality if not only the integrity and independence of France, but also the

neutrality of Belgium, were respected; to which Grey answered he could not.\textsuperscript{5} This happened on August 1, three days before England declared war. Sir Gilbert Murray's comment on this incident is therefore quite incorrect: "We could not tell Germany how much we would take to stand aside while France was crushed. We could not arrange with Germany for a limited crushing of France... all such bargaining was both dishonorable and illusory and dangerous." But France was included in the arrangement, and probably it was nothing but fear that the Germans intended crushing France, despite their promise and despite the fact, which any candid observer must grant, that Germany did not want an enemy on her back in the west while engaged with the Russians in the east—that brought both France and England into what otherwise might have remained a war localized in eastern Europe.

On August 2, England promised France she would intervene if Germany should attack her northern and western coasts, though Germany had already promised she would not. Even in his speech of August 3 Grey said little of Belgium, and throughout his consequent speeches he spoke chiefly of France, and made it clear England would help France. The best that can be said for England is that Belgium gave the Foreign Office "an occasion for hypocrisy" (p. 129), while at the same time it gave to Germany "an occasion for brutal violence." Mr. Russell goes further and maintains that not only would England have participated if Belgium had not been involved, but, if her interests had been on the side of Germany, she would not have taken part even if Germany had invaded Belgium. He is unsparing in his arraignment of England's professions. He cites the case of 1877 when there was tension between Germany and France almost sufficient to bring about war. Then the possibility that Germany would march through Belgium was admitted, and the newspapers\textsuperscript{6} of England discussed her obligation if such an event took place and concluded that England

\textsuperscript{5} See British White Paper, No. 123; telegram of Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador to Germany. It runs in part thus: "Sir:—I told the German Ambassador to-day... He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied:... our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. I am, etc., E. Grey."

\textsuperscript{6} He cites the Standard of Feb. 4, 1887; the Pall Mall Gazette of Feb. 4 and 5; the Spectator of Feb. 5—giving the purport of their conclusions in Appendix A.
need not keep her obligation to Belgium to the extent of going to war. Yet this obligation was the same then as in 1914, as it likewise rested on the old treaty of 1839. But the British view of her interests had changed in the interim; in 1887 she had trouble with France and Russia and not with Germany; if war had come then her interests would have been for a German victory. In 1914 she had trouble with Germany, and so stood for Belgium, and it was the intention of her Foreign Office to help France in any war between France and Germany (p. 131).

Leaving out of account, therefore, the invasion of Belgium in explaining the war in the west, he goes deeper and finds that the war there, like the one in the east, was simply the result of the rivalry of states (p. 83). For, like all candid writers, he leaves the diplomacy of the last fortnight altogether out of account. To appreciate, then, the real causes of the struggle, he reviews England's relation to the Entente, for he maintains that ever since the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement in 1904 the war had been on the point of breaking out, and he admits that in 1911 "our readiness to provoke a European war was greater than that of Germany" (142).

As so little is known by most Americans about these relations, perhaps it will not be amiss to give a brief résumé of Mr. Russell's account of the events of the last few years before the explosion of 1914. During the Boer war England found she was faced with the unanimous hostility of Europe and that there was fear lest France, Germany and Russia might form a coalition against her, a fear partly averted by the deep estrangement between France and Germany since the latter had taken Alsace-Lorraine years before, and also partly because the combined navies of the three nations could not match the British. However, the German navy laws of 1898 and 1900 had even before made it clear to England that she could not long hope to equal these navies and so, when she found it to her interest to have friends, she was drawn into an alliance with Russia and France. He frankly confesses it was neither "love of French liberalism nor even of Russian police methods" which produced the Entente—but only fear of Germany, and that, whether or not this fear was reasonable, the measures which England took were dictated rather by panic than wisdom, and brought the danger nearer by increasing the warlike feeling of both France and Germany. England's long standing difficulties with France and Russia were amicably arranged. By 1904 an Anglo-French agreement was concluded by which England agreed to support the claims of France
in Morocco in return for France's recognition of England's claims in Egypt. In 1907 an arrangement was made with Russia by which the latter got peacefully in Persia what she had long wanted.

Mr. Russell looks upon the Morocco incident, to which he devotes thirty-two pages, as the most important chapter in the history of the Entente. M. Delcassé, then minister of foreign affairs in France, since preparing the 1904 agreement with Lord Landsdowne, became strongly anti-German and the old revanche—the fundamental desire of French nationalistic feeling—took on a new lease of life just when there were signs of its waning. To show his indifference to German public opinion, when he knew that England would support France, Delcassé even failed to notify Germany officially of the Morocco agreement. In 1905, William, to match this discourtesy, went to Tangier and announced that Morocco was independent and in need of reforms and that in the interests of Germany these must be safeguarded. Later he demanded an international conference on the status of the country, which had been decided long since by the Madrid Convention of 1880. At the resulting conference of Algeciras Germany submitted to the acquisition of certain rights there by France and Spain, at a time when, owing to Russia's Manchurian campaign, a preponderance of military power was on her side. Again in 1911, owing to a supposed danger to Europeans in Fez, France sent a relief expedition which occupied the capital and then, because of pressure from the colonial party, refused to withdraw. Germany made no objection to the sending of the expedition, but demanded that since the agreement of Algeciras was thus modified, compensation must be given her in return for parting with all her rights in Morocco. France refused and England stood by her; Germany dispatched the "Panther" to the harbor of Agadir; England, through the "Mansion House Speech" of Lloyd George, virtually threatened Germany that she was ready to go to war for her Moroccan interests. Finally, when relations between England and Germany were almost at the breaking point, an agreement was effected through the effort of the Kaiser and the peace party in Germany, by which France was to have a protectorate over Morocco, and Germany was inadequately compensated with lands in the French Congo. This affair of 1911 made "the revanche begin to seem a possibility; men who had been pacifists became jingoes, the three years' service law was introduced, and the whole tone of French politics was changed" (p. 169). The French Yellow Book (ch. I, No. 5) relates with great frankness the effect on Germany, which felt the agreement was humiliating.
and decided it could not again submit to such threats. In this connection Mr. Russell quotes the editor of the Italian periodical *Scientia* (June-July, 1915, pp. 44, 45) to this effect: "This exclusion was perhaps an error for the cause of European peace, because of the great disappointment and the lively irritation which the incident left throughout Germany." Mr. Russell concludes that Germany's unyielding front in 1914 was largely due to the humiliation in having yielded to England's threats at the time of the Agadir crisis; similarly the uncompromising stiffness of Russia was due in large part to her humiliation in 1908, when Austria-Hungary took Bosnia and Herzegovina. He says each "had suffered one humiliation, and each felt that another would ruin its prestige" (p. 170). If Germany egged on Austria, England certainly did France (p. 150).

To get into relation with Russia was not an easy thing for England. For in 1902, because of her Asiatic interests, England had allied herself with Japan, and Japan had whipped Russia in 1904-5, and thus there was tension between England and Russia. Her first task, therefore, was to help reconcile Russia and her ally, and then, by means of a huge loan made conjointly with France to Russia, and by the partition of Persia, win the friendship of the Slavs. By 1907 all outstanding differences had been settled (pp. 171f): In Tibet neither Russia nor England was to seek an advantage: in Afghanistan British suzerainty was to be recognized; in Persia, though its "integrity" and "independence" were to be observed, Russia was to have a sphere of influence in the north, including the capital, Britain in the south. He devotes seventy-two pages to the partition of Persia. What he thinks of it is seen in his summing up of its history since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement as "one long record of perfidy, cruelty and greed" (p. 180). It is good that at last an Englishman has had the courage to tell the truth about Persia! By the Anglo-French loan of 1906 Russia was enabled to suppress her revolution, her Duma and the constitution that had been wrung from her ruler, reorganize her army, reconquer Poland, deprive Finland of the liberties which the Czar had promised to defend—in a word rehabilitate the old autocracy (p. 177). In lending this aid England was "not only committing a crime against Russia, a crime against liberty, and a crime against humanity, but we were preventing the removal of the chief argument by which the military party have appealed to the ordinary citizen in Germany"—for that appeal was based on fear of her powerful neighbor. If Russian autocracy had not been rehabilitated,
a liberal movement would have had a chance, and this would have taken place if the loan had been postponed only a few months. Furthermore this command of capital undoubtedly inclined Russia to a friendship away from Germany—favored by the party of Witte—and inclined her toward France and England, a potent factor in later leading up to the world war.

Mr. Russell sums up by saying (pp. 203f) that England on various occasions since 1904 pursued a policy "of needless hostility" to Germany and acted in a way to increase the hold of militarism and aggression on Germany. He concludes that England, though "of the lightest shade of gray," had her part in bringing on the war; "We and they [the Germans] have been immoral in aim and brutal in method, each in the exact degree which was thought to be to the national advantage. If either they or we had had loftier aims or less brutal methods, the war might have been avoided" (p. 137). He has no illusions about the aims of the great powers; the basic fact in the European situation is that all of them "have the same objects: territory, trade and prestige" (p. 136). In the pursuit of such purposes none of them "shrinks from wanton aggression, war and chicanery." England, because of her geographical situation, can achieve her aims by petty wars outside Europe, while Germany can achieve hers only by a big war in Europe. The rights of small nations—of which we Americans hear so much, though little is said of Greece—have never been considered by England in furthering her aims. Thus he adduces the case of Morocco, which appealed to Germany for protection against French aggression, but neither France nor England was for that reason put in the wrong! Persia "the intellectual aristocracy of the Moslems"—had finally freed itself from the corrupt rule of the Shah and was becoming liberalized, but this did not stop the Cossacks nor the British from overrunning her. Under such circumstances he says there can be nothing said against Germany protecting the Turks: for years England, for her own interests, kept the Sick Man of Europe alive by money and war; it is now only a change of doctors. In short all considerations of humanity and liberty have been subordinated to the "great game" of the Entente.

Apart from his analysis of the causes of the war, perhaps the most important contribution of the book is the author's clarity of vision in seeing that it is now time that the fearful struggle should stop. Many people in the allied countries and most people in the United States have had the idea that it would be only a question of time before Germany would be worn down by attrition and that
the war would be ended by an excess of population on the side of her enemies. Mr. Russell shows, what ought to have been clear to every one from the first, that even if England and Germany should continue to fight for five centuries, as England and France once did, they would both continue to exist (p. 95). This fact is slowly being realized after months of fighting, and so the sooner a way is found by which each side can endure the existence of the other the better. The deadlock on both fronts makes a "purely strategical decision almost impossible" (p. 108). "It is fairly clear now that neither side can hope for the absolute and crushing victory which both expected at the outset, except at a cost which cannot be seriously contemplated" (p. 121); "Most military authorities are agreed that it is impossible to crush Germany" (p. 121). We know that, despite her bad crops of last summer, Germany has been able to hold out against the ever-tightening blockade of England and can continue to do so; and the Allies know that to shake off the German grip on their soils would cost them monstrously. Thus it is clear that negotiations must end the war and they should not be delayed.

Mr. Russell gives us a gruesome picture of the crime of fighting further (pp. 109f): if the war does not soon end, all the young men between the ages of 18 and 45 in all the fighting nations will be killed or maimed; the moral level of all Europe will be lowered by familiarity with horror; the mental efficiency of the continent will be diminished by the deterioration in education and by the death or nervous weakening of the best minds; and the subsequent struggle for existence will be terrible. In other words he fears that an almost mortal wound may be dealt to civilization: "If the war does not come to an end soon it is to be feared that we are at the end of a great epoch, and that the future of Europe will not be on a level with its past."

Every one feels the almost irreconcilable differences between Germany and England. Where Germany feels a sort of contemptuous liking for France and a tempered ill-feeling toward Russia, she feels her differences with England can only be removed by the destruction of her power. In "The Future of Anglo-German Rivalry" (pp. 67f), Mr. Russell quotes the dire prophecy of Eduard Meyer, the greatest living historian, who holds the chair of Mommsen at the University of Berlin. In an article in Scientia7 he regards Germany as the analogue of Rome, Britain of Carthage. Scarcely

hoping for a decision in this war, he looks forward to a long series of struggles like the Punic wars, and says the "characteristic of the next century will be unconquerable opposition and embittered hate between England and Germany." Mr. Russell says the same idea is held by many English professors, except that their military hopes are not so modest, for they expect an overwhelming defeat of Germany now.

Mr. Russell has some good ideas about how the dispute may be settled after the war (pp. 96-100). An international Council should be formed; it should be composed only of diplomats, since they will continue to represent national prestige; their deliberations and treaties should not be secret; military intervention should in cases of need be used to enforce its awards. Thus, like Ex-President Taft, Mr. Russell believes that moral force is still insufficient to enforce what is right. He thinks that all humane people in Europe want America to have a share in the peace negotiations, and proposes that such a congress might take place in the "neutral atmosphere of Washington" with Mr. Wilson as its leader. Doubtless such an arrangement would be agreeable to most of the Allies; but I fear that the Central Powers have not such a complete faith in the neutrality of Mr. Wilson. Perhaps it would be better for the Roman pontiff or the King of Spain to head such a congress—men who have not had to pass sleepless nights in trying to keep the goodwill of a people which has suffered by our "legal" attitude.

In these latter days we are hearing rumors of peace and many good people are fain to believe that there are now lights in the skies which are not the red lights of Mars, and that the black night which settled over Europe with such swiftness two years ago is about to lift. But no one can prophesy as to when or how the great conflict will end; and if we examine these rumors we must sadly admit that they are very tenuous as yet. Most of them come from Germany, and for the very good reason that the Teutons are the only ones who, by successes so far, are in a position to talk peace. That they are tired of the war and the suffering entailed by England's blockade, is certain. The German people, through their able note to us—which the New York Times characterized as "irritating but acceptable"—have very recently officially reiterated their desire for peace. And that a change of heart has already taken place in Germany is also shown by the fact that recently Maximilian Harden has been allowed to say that "the sword having failed to achieve what was promised us, the time is ripe for the brain to
assert itself in directing German affairs.” That many thoughtful Germans are trying to overcome their feelings of hatred is shown by the beautiful words written long ago by Prof. Rudolf Eucken of Jena in his “German Thoughts and Wishes for the New Year, 1915,” in which he expresses the hope that the mighty spiritual movement which the war has called forth might continue to influence German life afterward, and gives a sacred warning against racial pride and narrow nationalism, and an exhortation to preserve comity with all nations; “As Germans, we must consider our attitude toward the world of as much influence as our attitude toward ourselves. We must not allow ourselves to indulge in a narrow national life. We must not and shall not have a false racial pride. On the contrary, we must ceaselessly broaden our lives, steadily preserving our interrelations with all mankind. Our great nation cannot attain its proper level without keeping the whole of humanity in mind.” Thoughts looking to peace have also recently been expressed by the German chancellor, whose speeches have been models of self-restraint. Let us for a moment see if any such sentiments can be marshalled from the official pronouncements of the chiefs of the Allies’ ranks, to meet the longing for peace which is manifesting itself throughout Germany.

President Poincaré, in his Nancy speech (May 14), in response to Germany’s tentative declaration regarding peace in her reply to our note, has this to say: “France does not want Germany to tender peace but wants her to ask for peace.” In explaining the only kind of peace which France could accept, he says: “The Central Empires, haunted by remorse for having brought on the war, and terrified by the indignation and hatred they have stirred up in mankind, are trying to-day to make the world believe that the Entente Allies are responsible for the prolongation of hostilities—a dull irony which will deceive no one.” He does not want a peace which would leave Germany with the power to recommence the war and keep France eternally menaced, and so long as the Germans will not recognize themselves as vanquished, France will not cease to fight. In other words the bloody conflict must go on. It is a strange message from the chief of a country which has lost so many men that it will not publish the number, and from the country which had the promise of not being attacked if she remained neutral. But Frenchmen never can believe Germans, even when they come bearing gifts. On May 22, in an address of welcome to the visiting officials and members of the Duma, Premier Briand said the only peace which the Allies would demand would be one free of intrigue and that it
would come only after a decisive victory, which would ensure the world against a similar catastrophe in the future.

Let us see if the outlook for an early peace is more hopeful across the Channel. On May 13 Sir Edward Grey, departing from his usual custom of silence, gave out his first interview to the press. I quote in part from the Philadelphia Bulletin (May 13): "Prussian tyranny over Western Europe, including these islands, our people will not stand. The pledges given by Mr. Asquith as regards the restoration of Belgium and Servia shall be kept.... What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war; free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard and from the perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords." "In fact we feel that we are fighting for equal rights, for law, justice and peace, and for civilization throughout the world against brute force, which knows no restraint or mercy." "The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed." In other words the war must go on; there is no crack in the Allies' armor; the status quo must be kept up; England and not Germany must be in the ascendant in the counsels of western Europe, and England's fleet must at any time be able to blockade and dominate Germans. When after two years of such bitter strife, England's chief can express himself in this unrestrained manner, it seems a tragic misfortune that her destiny can be left in such hands in her hour of need.

But we must remember that this is not the view-point of all Englishmen. We have seen that it is not the view-point of the author of the book which we have been discussing. We know that the hardest thing in our mental life is to get the point of view of one from whom we differ. Whether we agree with it or not, we must remember that in this struggle there is another point of view. According to English official figures given out in London on May 10, the total casualties suffered by the Germans since the war began were 2,822,079, and probably these figures are right. They mean one thing, that there is another point of view, hard though it be for France or England to see it. They mean that the Germans, if an angel of the Lord could strike the golden scales, also have an ideal and are willing to suffer colossal losses for it.

Mr. Bernard Shaw, who throughout the war has been fearless
in his utterances, has told his countrymen some homely truths. He asks: "When did we first begin to believe in the French army after its stampede from Namur to the gates of Paris? It was when, in the middle of our absurd explanations that the retreat was a successful combination of profound strategy with undying heroism. Joffre electrified us by bluntly saying that the French had disgraced themselves and should not have been beaten at all, and that there was no excuse either for the men or the generals, many of whom he promptly sacked. . . . Since then he has been the only general in the field in whom there is any large and generous faith." He goes on to say that "the distinguishing feature of the campaign is the grim devotion of the officers and men who have gone into the trenches without a ray of illusion as to the moral merits of this monstrous collapse of European civilization. They have given their lives not in the least because they believe that they are fighting the good fight for the clap-traps of our press and platform, or because they think that a German is so much worse than an Englishman that the Englishman is entitled to extirpate him as vermin, but solely because when they and their allies are violently attacked, they must either be slaughtered like sheep or stand up and fight until the attack is beaten off." He adds: "There are plenty of men in the British trenches. . . . who admire the Prussian system. They have no patience with British muddle, British slummock, British lazy hatred of order and intellect and learning. Their one hope of any good coming out of the war for their countrymen is that it will knock the nonsense out of them and compel them to organize in the German fashion henceforth. . . . There are men. . . . who are acutely and constantly aware that every German killed is a loss to England and every Englishman killed a loss to Germany. There are men who. . . . are convinced that. . . . Jean Bloc was right when he said that modern war between fully armed powers of the first magnitude can pile up corpses, but cannot achieve decisions." I have quoted these words at length because of the belief that if war is ever to stop on this earth it will not be for the lack of fodder to nourish the passions which cause it, but because it is a futile thing, owing to the fact that modern invention in carrying it out makes a decision impossible. In other words war, like everything else, is sure some day to create its own Frankenstein.

In any case it is folly for England with her past record at the Dardanelles, Loos, Mesopotamia, Saloniki and elsewhere, to con-

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9 In an article in the Philadelphia North American of May 7, 1916, entitled "Too Much Bluff in the British War Policy:"
continue her unyielding spirit. It is excusable in Russia, which has saved the day for the west on so many occasions; or in France, which has borne the brunt of the struggle in the west with such fortitude and heroism. But it seems unreasonable for England which spiritually until recently has never been sufficiently in the war to determine its course except as she has kept the seas, to take the leading role in saying how long the war shall last or what shall be the conditions of peace. And yet it is possible that apart from all calculations of exhaustion, apart from the signs of peace discernible in Germany and her changed attitude toward neutrals, apart from England's domestic worries, and in spite of the avowed determination of all the Allies to continue the struggle, there may develop such a rivalry between Russia and Britain in the near East as will demand peace merely to check the ambitions of the former. Thus the war, brought on with no higher motive than the rivalry of states, may, after all this superhuman sacrifice, be fated to be brought to an end by nothing higher than the same rivalry of states.

Philadelphia, June 1, 1916.

Postscript: Since writing the above, events of momentous importance have taken place in the war situation: the Russian drive under Brusiloff, the great offensive of France and England on the Somme and the Ancre, the entrance of Rumania into the war and her subsequent collapse at the hands of Teuton and Bulgar armies, the recovery of ground lost to the Austrians by Italy and to the Germans by France at Verdun, the overthrow of the ministries in the chief capitals of the Allies,—and lastly the German peace proposals of December 12 and the more recent appeal of President Wilson to all the belligerent and neutral nations alike to declare, as a preliminary step toward peace, their views as to the terms on which the war might be concluded. Just now every one's attention is on the outcome of the German peace overture. Almost immediately an answer of refusal was indicated by Russia and France, and all eyes were turned with intense interest on the new British Premier, as he is universally looked upon as bearing the grave responsibility of further protracting the struggle or bringing it to an end. On December 18 Mr. Lloyd George spoke at length in the House of Commons on the war situation and England's attitude; his speech was full of "reparation" and "guarantees," Germany's "outrage on civilization" and "atrocities on land and sea," and how she had "plunged Europe into this vortex of blood," and that for the Allies to enter into a conference without knowing Germany's terms was "putting
our heads into a noose, with the rope in the hands of the Germans.” His concluding sentence once again summed up the British feeling toward the Central Powers, a model of concentrated hatred and fear: “The triumph of Prussia . . . would leave mankind to struggle, helpless, in the morass of horror. That is why, since this war began, I have known but one political aim . . . That was to rescue mankind from the most overwhelming catastrophe that has ever yet menaced its well being.” However, many American papers have pointed out that the speech really contained less of rancor than might have been expected; that it contained nothing like the former hymn of hate, the menace of retaliation on the German people, of England’s intention of obliterating their nationality and civic future. On the contrary, it gave a distinct denial of any purpose of crushing Germany and a clear definition of the general enemy as Prussian militarism, whose ambitions, if uncurbed, might know no limits. Such a note, it is felt—despite its surface hostility—ought to help on the way to peace, even if fighting shall be resumed for a time with redoubled fury. The situation for the moment, then, waits on the answer of Germany and the good sense of those responsible for England’s welfare.

That the English people want peace as well as the German is not doubted, nor the belief that it is folly to continue the struggle. If in five months, with a drive of unparalleled concentration on a front of only forty-four miles on the Somme, the British can report losses aggregating almost a half million men and an advance nowhere of over six miles, while the Germans at the same time were protecting 1700 miles of front; and if the combined armies of the Russians and the Entente at Saloniki could not save Rumania from her fate, it would seem to a candid observer that the continuation of the war would be futile. If, however, the war is to go on, we must anticipate with Mr. Lowes Dickinson “a war of years; a war getting more and more destructive and more and more ruthless, a war in which the last remnants of law and of humanity may disappear; a war in which we may see the wiping out of whole cities by bombs and the wholesale murder of prisoners; a war which, by the time it ceases from sheer lack of power to prosecute it, may have destroyed irretrievably the bare possibility of all common life between the nations.”