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There Would Have Been No War

If the French government had said to the English
You shall not have our army
the French government had said to the Germans
You shall not have our money

Read these definitions taken at random from

THE INEVITABLE WAR
(La Guerre qui Vient)

By FRANCIS DELAISI

Ambassadors: "Ambassadors in gold braid are today no more and no less than the agents of the banks and the great corporations."

Democracy: "A blind used to cover up the intrigues of the financial oligarchy which is in reality in control of the government and the people.

Diplomats: "The tools of the financial and industrial oligarchy who work to obtain for them foreign loans or foreign purchases for their goods."

Finance's Strongest Ally: "Popular ignorance."

Foreign Policy: "(Something) beyond the control of both public opinion and parliament; it is even beyond the control of government. In our mistrustful democracy it rests with a single man and a small coterie of financiers and men of affairs at will to unchain a war and embark this country upon a series of the most perilous adventures."

Moving Forces of Wars: "Orders, concessions, loans."

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counted as coming from enemy sources. I have been keenly in sympathy with the great English Liberals in their struggle against modern imperialism in England, and Leonard Courtney, Gilbert Chesterton, Bernard Shaw, Philip Snowden, Frank Harris, Francis Neilson, and a host of others who have stood against the imperial policies of their country are my heroes, along with the great English Liberals of the past age, Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Morris, Hunt, Keats, Shelley, Byron, and Browning, whose patriotism led them to tell their country her sins in the hope to save her from wrong-doing. This seems to me true patriotism and the correct interpretation of "my country wrong or right." The thing which would cheer on our country when she is wrong is unworthy of the name of patriotism and will lead her to destruction, so my prayer is and will continue to be, God speed the right and chastise us into the path of right-doing.

When I say that the facts of this war seem to me to incriminate England, it is not because I have a German bias. I have not had access to the German side of the story, except recently in pamphlets and periodicals, which I try to read with discrimination, keeping in mind the principle that bias and deliberate attempts at deception in enemy literature are pitfalls that must be avoided. Of course I have admired greatly the literature, science, public economy, and general administration, in which Germany has led the world.

As I have said, my information is almost all from English and American sources. If I know more of Rhodes and his policies than others do who have read much since the war began, it must be credited to the vivid interest that I brought to the reading of the Contemporary Review and the Fortnightly Review in the nineties, and to the accretions that followed, largely at the time of the Boer War and after the Boer War, when we, who were ardent sympathizers with the republics against the British Empire, entertained some of the most notable men who came to this country, men who knew the South African situation at first hand.

* * *

"Alliance, if you please, understanding between gentlemen."

Cecil Rhodes in 1895 made his first attempt to annex the South African republics to the British empire, and this was a prelude to uniting Africa later from the Cape to Cairo by annexing the German colonies through which his railroad was planned to pass. It was at this time that, "thinking in continents," he formulated his world-policy to "paint the map of the world a British red." After the annexation of the African republics, the next great step in the process was to be a division of the world before 1920 between the Russians and the united Anglo-Saxon peoples, and the means that were to be employed were alliances of Great Britain with Russia and with the United States. The proposition was stated boldly and fully, and in such a manner as to make the inference perfectly clear that before 1920 Germany must be removed from the map, her fragments appropriated by the Allies. As this policy was presented in the article "1920," published in the Contemporary
OUR SECRET ALLIANCE.

Review (London, December, 1894) no pretext was made that Germany was threatening the world and no chivalrous or holy motives were assigned for forming this concerted action against her. The "changed purposes of Pan-Germanism," and "protection of little nations," and "war against militarism," and "war against war" were all advanced later in the procedure—was not the purpose to appeal to the public and confuse the issue, to win our American diplomats and our American people as well as the people of allied Europe? Mr. Rhodes himself never professed fear of Germany and thought that the British navy would be sufficient, if increased according to his recommendation, to capture the new German navy whenever it chose.

Those who try to understand this world war of Rhodes's making and our part in it can do so only if they look to the motives assigned long before the fray was begun, and before our diplomats were captured. Therefore I propose to direct attention back to the beginnings when motives of imperial methods were not masked, and to the men who first worked for an American alliance. My discussion will be limited mostly to events on this side of the Atlantic to show the extent to which the project of an alliance with "America" has succeeded. Most of the evidence will be unearthed by future historians who can gain access to facts now hidden, and a great deal will never be brought to light, for the agreements have been secret, "understandings between gentlemen," as Mr. Chamberlain stated in his announcement to the House of Commons in the course of the Boer War. An investigation of the expenditure of Cecil Rhodes's millions, bequeathed to be administered secretly with the purpose of bringing "America" into alliance with Great Britain would bring to light much that is hidden, but will hardly be permitted by the empire that after the Jameson Raid failed to investigate Rhodes's piracy in its behalf. On this side of the Atlantic, however, the course of events is sufficient to prove that a secret alliance was made—the proof was practically sufficient before Mr. Chamberlain made his announcement. Perhaps no treaty entered upon as our constitution provides, by and with the consent of the Senate, has ever been so important in its influence upon our national ideals and welfare as this secret one has been, so it behooves us before the next step is taken to understand as completely as possible what has happened, what is involved, and what is likely to follow.

It might seem that it would be impossible to win the United States to the Rhodes policy of annexing the republics and painting
the map of the world red, including our own territory. Washington had warned us in solemn accents not to entangle ourselves in foreign politics, and had promised us the greatest material prosperity if we would treat all nations justly and as friends,—"I conjure you to believe me, my Fellow countrymen." Webster had urged us merely to live up to our republican principles as a means of influencing the world to a more fortunate future in which the nations would improve their conditions by adopting our most successful institutions; and our country has been so marvelously successful that it has more than realized the hopes that the fathers cherished. Washington and Webster might well have been astounded to see the United States of 1895, its population, its power, its wealth, its expansion, and the influence that its ideals had exerted upon the world as manifested in legislation and in revolutions in other states, with the aim to secure such liberties and independence as had benefitted us.

How many changes in British colonial government might be credited to American success? How much had our influence to do with the formation of the republics in Central and South America, and with successful and unsuccessful revolutions in Europe, Africa and Asia in the course of the last century? "Where the bayonet is at their throats, men pray for it," said Webster, and this is still proved true in the revolution attempted in South Africa in 1915 and in the Irish revolution of this current year. Our "Glorious Fourth," Independence Day, had taken rank with Christmas in the hearts of our people, and it had been our unvarying practice for over one hundred years to extend our sympathy to people in any part of the earth engaged in a struggle for liberty. With such traditions would it not seem impossible to win our American people to imperialism as a home policy and support of Rhodes imperialism as a foreign policy? It has proved impossible to win the nation at large and in the open, but easy to get an effective secret alliance. Why? It is time that we should consider this, for the danger is within our gates.

The first incident in which an American of great influence allied himself to help carry out the Rhodes policy was the Jameson Raid (Dec. 27, 1895—Jan. 1, 1896), intended to result in annexing the South African republics to the British empire. In the courts of Pretoria and in the trial of Dr. Jameson before the parliamentary committee in London, it was proved that John Hays Hammond, along with other "reformers" had been guilty of intent to bring on war by gross misrepresentation of facts. The conspirators at-
tempted to make their raid seem chivalrous, even holy, by a tele-
gram appealing for assistance in behalf of women and children
who had really never been in danger—a telegram concocted two
months before it was sent out, to be despatched guilefully at the
psychological moment. Not only the "reformers" and Jameson
and Rhodes were guilty of this conspiracy, but also the highest
British officials, including Joseph Chamberlain, secretary for the
colonies; Lord Salisbury, prime minister; and the Prince of Wales,
later King Edward VII, for these stood by Mr. Rhodes throughout
the trial and continued to give him their support afterwards. The
parliamentary committee that conducted the trial shielded the main
plotters and entered into the plot, for they refrained from asking
the questions that would have shown the guilt of the imperial offi-
cials; Parliament also became implicated by accepting the report of
this committee without further question. If I remember correctly,
only two members of the committee dissented and only a few editors
took exception. From that day the policy of the British government
has never varied from the policy that Rhodes outlined—alliances
have been made as he advised, and more than he advised, and the
navy has been increased as he suggested. If the present war ends
as he planned, Germany will have been eliminated before 1920 as
a world power. The pleas of righteous and chivalrous purpose
made by the imperial officials of to-day must be discounted in his-
tory as heavily as those of the chartered company whose offenses
the empire condoned and sheltered—for, as pointed out by a few
English Liberals even to-day, the acts have been paralleled with the
sending of the Johannesburg telegram, only more wily and success-
ful—see the succession of documents and speeches in How Diplo-
mats Make War, by Neilson, member of Parliament throughout
the five crucial years, 1910-1915. Of course that is not the subject
of this paper but another story.

The Boer War and the alliance of England, Russia and Amer-
ica against Germany were planned by Rhodes, as I have said, before
the Jameson Raid, in 1895. If President Cleveland was approached
with a suggestion to form such an alliance he did not respond, for
in accordance with American traditions he expressed the symp-
athy of our government to the Transvaal after the Jameson Raid,
he upheld the Monroe Doctrine against the encroachments of Eng-
land in Venezuela, and he requested the recall of a British diplomat
who was using his influence in favor of certain candidates in an
American election. Entering upon their duties the year following
the Jameson Raid, President McKinley and John Hay made the
secret alliance, adopting an imperialist national policy and the secret Rhodes imperialist world-policy. These have since been maintained by our succeeding presidents but have never been openly approved by the nation, for every administration still sees an attempt to fix the date for the independence of the Philippines, and every effort to enter into open alliance with England and come to her open assistance in war has been thus far frustrated.

As a tooth of a mastodon shows an anatomist what the rest of its skeleton and its life habits must have been, so a very few facts will be sufficient to show what manner of men Hay and McKinley were: both had marked traits.

Hay characterized McKinley as a man who wore a mask and had the face of a "fifteenth-century ecclesiastic," a description that could hardly be bettered. All the world knows what that type connoted—wile and guile; and these traits are amply illustrated in admiring remarks that Hay adds on the way McKinley could talk even to an office-seeker so as to let the man go away satisfied, supposing that he had received a pledge, only to discover his mistake later: "Six different senators might in turn press the claims of their protégés, and Mr. McKinley without duplicity would send each senator away believing that his own would be appointed; and all the while the President had settled on another candidate." This speaks volumes for McKinley's "diplomacy"; and what definition could Mr. Hay have constructed for "duplicity" that he did not include this under it? What will he not do by omission and commission, and still hold himself guiltless? With such an estimate of McKinley and such an idea of duplicity, Hay worked for McKinley's election, thereby again giving his own exact measure in public morality. Thayer says of McKinley's methods: "He had the art of throwing a moral gloss over policies which were dubious, if not actually immoral," and instances the extermination of certain tribes of Filipinos, which extermination McKinley termed "benevolent assimilation" to make it look well to the public. This is the Rhodes method to perfection, and provides a formula that will give the correct interpretation to many events: "throwing a moral gloss over policies which were dubious if not actually immoral"!

Men of "big business," like Hanna and Carnegie, were McKinley's friends and supporters, and it is quite possible that Carnegie's support in the election was secured by a pledge to work for a British-American union as well as to maintain the high tariff on steel rails, for as early as 1893 Carnegie had written in the North American Review, "Let men say what they will, I say that as surely
as that the sun in the heavens once shone upon Britain and America united, so surely is it one morning to rise, shine upon, and greet again the reunited state—the British-American union.” It is to be noted here that Carnegie was distinctly of those who did not put “America first”—what abuse would not our Anglophiles have uttered if some German-born American had written with like enthusiasm proposing even alliance with Germany!

Of Hay we are told in Roosevelt’s Autobiography that since the days when he served as secretary to our great radical, Abraham Lincoln, he had grown more and more conservative, and that he considered Roosevelt too liberal, but that he and Roosevelt were in complete accord on foreign policies. Thayer says that Hay came to resent the interference of senators while he was conducting the state department and would greatly have preferred to carry on his work without explaining foreign affairs to them and winning their support. “Trust the President,” a slogan he might have made to fit his own case, has become in this war the slogan of the men who have been initiated into secret imperial diplomacy, who do not refrain from questioning him on foreign understandings because they know that he is going to be unduly friendly with England and distinctly hostile to Germany. If he should be unduly friendly with Germany and distinctly hostile to England they would not trust him or ask the nation to do so.

By a man’s chosen friends one knows him, and Hay’s friends were not of democratic type. One of the letters he wrote while in England mentions with admiration a very rich senator, his friend, who had been entertaining him at an English country seat where he was spending the summer, and calls him “the finest type of Tory baronet you ever saw”—a truly American spirit would have had at least a grain of regret at the sight. Hay developed a frigid manner and was difficult of approach, even forbidding to the public, and his most intimate friend, Henry Adams, the historian, had like serious limitations. Thayer describes Adams as a man who had lost his faiths and enthusiasms, who had withdrawn from the world as a solitary and now admitted only the select to his presence, and who saw life as a jest and nothing more. The friends were evidently sophisticated in the full derivative sense of the word, men who professed wisdom, but who had lost the true wisdom of life. Adams had adopted a habitual tone of sardonic irony, and Hay, to judge from his letters reported by Thayer, was given to perpetual banter, sarcasm, and jesting, a style quite the opposite of sincere and noble, and all the more to his discredit because in his impressionable youth
he had lived in the daily presence of so great, sincere, simple, and kindly a man as Abraham Lincoln. That noble presence and Hay's contact with the pioneers of the West in his early youth should have taught him the relative values of diamonds-in-the-rough and sparkling paste, but he did not learn the lesson. He became exclusive, and the basis of his exclusion was not sincerity and nobility. He seems not to have been sensitive on these points, as is seen in his relation to McKinley and his evident pleasure in the company of insincere politicians whom he fell in with in London and to whom he lent his support.

If Mr. Hay had found a statesman of the type of Gladstone at the head of the Liberal party when he visited London in 1896, he might have been elevated to higher ideals, he certainly would not have been tempted as he now was by Chamberlain and other men of the Rhodes school. It is startling to see how like McKinley, Hay, and Adams in guile, insincerity, and lack of faith, were the English Liberal statesmen at the head of their party in 1897, as described in two keenly analytical articles in the *Contemporary Review* (London) of that year, signed "A New Liberal," and entitled "Wanted, a Policy" and "Wanted, a Leader." In the hierarchy the Tory leaders, Chamberlain and Rhodes, outranked these as masters of masters. In those articles are set forth the "helplessness and headlessness" of the Liberal party of 1897. Many reforms awaited a champion, but no champion presented himself to lead the Liberals to victory in their behalf. Of the Liberals on the Front Bench:

1. Lord Roseberry has proved a disappointment. "When a man fails like that he does not return";

2. Harcourt cannot get a following. "It is painfully clear that public opinion credits him with no belief and less enthusiasm...he fails to impress people with his sincerity...People don't believe in him, or they don't trust him either...That sounds brutal, but there it is, and there is no use in keeping up the farce of pretending not to see it";

3. John Morley is a most estimable man, but he incurs the suspicion of being an impractical doctrinaire—"a man of scrupulous ratiocination, and fastidious words, rather than a man of action. Of his kind he is admirable, but an impossible leader";

4. Asquith is not promising, though even in his college days he was picked out as Mr. Gladstone's successor and noted by Mr. Gladstone himself. "He failed to develop the right qualities...Possibly the strong wine of social success changed him... The party
get no help from him and certainly no sort of inspiration. Probably the reason is that he has none to give. For his fatal fault, if I understand him, is that he believes in nothing;"

5. Campbell-Bannerman also is not promising. "I have given him up. He is too rich and too lazy, and his only ambition seems to have been the hope of the speakership and a peerage."

The "New Liberal" of 1897 wrote with the eye of a seer, and his judgment has been justified in every case by events. In 1916 the world knows the sequel:

1. Lord Roseberry never returned;
2. Mr. Harcourt never got a following;
3. Henry Campbell Bannerman realized his ambition of the speakership and a peerage. He was the leader of the Liberal opposition during the Boer War, perhaps persona grata to the government because when the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII) shook hands with Rhodes in the face of the Jameson investigating committee, Campbell-Bannerman, then a member of that committee, refrained from asking for the telegrams that would have shown the imperial officials in collusion with Rhodes. His pro-Boer questions annoyed Mr. Chamberlain in the course of the Boer War, but did not change the outcome one iota. Perhaps they helped Campbell-Bannerman to realize his peerage, for when Sir Edward Grey was asked to undertake the foreign office he refused to consider the invitation unless Campbell-Bannerman should be "banished to the House of Lords," where questions, if asked, would not annoy him and would certainly be innocuous.

4. Mr. Asquith has been the premier that, along with Sir Edward Grey, led affairs to Armageddon. "The strong wine of social success" may have led him farther and farther from the straight way, for he married the woman of high social standing who was widely celebrated a few years ago by William Watson's poem, "The Woman with a Serpent's Tongue":

"Who slights the worthiest in the land,
Sneers at the just, contemns the brave,
And blackens goodness in its grave....

To think that such as she can mar
Names that among the noblest are;
That hands like hers can touch the strings
That move who knows what men and things?"

Had Watson a premonition of this war when he wrote that last verse? During this war Mrs. Asquith's influence has been felt to
be so malign that the newspapers of the empire have been appealed to, to keep silent on the subject.

3. Finally, the prophet was right on Mr. Morley, for he left the cabinet in 1914 when this war began, because he would not be held responsible for the future, having been deceived by Sir Edward Grey though a minister of the Crown, on the most important facts preceding the declaration of war. He has been the man of probity and honor, but not a strong leader.

Hay visited London in 1896, a few months after Jameson's Raid and at about the time when Mark Twain was visiting the scene of the raid in South Africa; and he returned to London as our ambassador in 1897, immediately after McKinley's inauguration, at about the time that Mark Twain was writing his marvelously lucid and penetrating chapters on Rhodes and the raid in Following the Equator. Because my well-restrained statements concerning Rhodes might see exaggerated and because sound conclusions could hardly be stated more picturesquely or with greater force, I shall quote his words to show the respect that was paid to Rhodes and his policies in the nineties:

"In the opinion of many people Cecil Rhodes is South Africa; others think he is only a large part of it. . . . He is the only colonial in the British dominions whose . . . speeches, unclipped, are cabled to the ends of the earth, and he is the only unroyal outsider whose arrival in London can compete for attention with an eclipse. . . . The whole South African world seems to stand in shuddering awe of him, friend and enemy alike. It was as if he was deputy-God on the one side and deputy-Satan on the other. . . . blasphemed by none among the judicious, and even by the indiscreet in guarded whispers only."

This is how Rhodes's influence was estimated by an unbiased American observer, perhaps the keenest mind among us at that period. It would hardly be possible to overestimate the influence of Rhodes upon the policy of his country. He was no poor scholar with a limited influence upon scholars, like Treitschke, no remote philosopher influencing a still smaller circle of philosophers, like Nietzsche, but himself the Superman, nourished on the doctrine of the survival of the fittest formulated a generation earlier by his own countryman, and interpreting that doctrine in the light of his conviction that He and His are the fittest. A good imperialist appreciation of Rhodes is the article by H. Cust, M. P., in the North American Review, July, 1902. This member of Parliament expresses no horror of Rhodes though his schemes imply the wars to
follow, a conspiracy to be carried out later by political corruption, and consummate hypocrisy to cover up the tracks. Cust is one of that Parliament, doubtless, that rewarded Alfred Austin with the Laureateship hot-cakes after his writing his poem in praise of Jameson’s chivalrous (!) raid, and he and his like have led their nation into holy horror of Germany because, they charge, she intended to enter on a career of conquest and annexation—the very policy they admired in Rhodes! Can they produce documents to prove their charge stronger than those that convict Rhodes? Rhodes saw the annexation of the republics before he died, and he lies buried in a spot that he himself selected on the top of a high African mountain overlooking the scene of his triumph. When the people of the conquered republics lift up their eyes to that tomb they quote the appropriate text that the devil took him up into an exceeding high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the earth and the glory thereof, and said unto him, “All these things will I give unto thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me”—but Rhodes, being an imperial Englishman, did not say, “Get thee behind me, Satan.” Our friends in South Africa tell a good story that illustrates the feeling concerning his plans to annex the world—that while Mr. Rhodes was a guest at their home they were out on the porch one night when the talk turned to the stars and whether they are inhabited. Mr. Rhodes was the person who hoped they were not, and the rest judged that that was because the stars were beyond his reach: he could not hope to annex them to the British empire. Mark Twain sums up Rhodes’s schemes to annex everything beneath the stars, in chapters that should be read by every American and made our text-book to ensure our understanding the policy and the methods that took Hay and his successors in. What could be more illuminating testimony than this:

“What is the secret of his formidable supremacy? One says it is his prodigious wealth—a wealth whose drippings in salaries and other ways makes men his interested and loyal vassals; another says it is his personal magnetism and his persuasive tongue, and that these hypnotize and make happy slaves of all that drift within the circle of his influence; another says it is his majestic ideas, his vast schemes for the territorial aggrandizement of England; and another says that he wants the earth and wants it for his own, and the belief that he will get it and let his friends on the ground floor is the secret. . . . He deceived the Duke of Fife—it is the Duke’s own word—but that does not destroy the Duke’s loyalty to him. He tricks the reformers into immense trouble with his raid, but most
of them believe he meant well. He weeps over the harshly taxed Johannesburgers and makes them his friends: at the same time he taxes his charter-settlers fifty percent.... He raids and robs and slays and enslaves the Matabele, and gets worlds of Charter Christian applause for it. He has beguiled England into buying Charter waste paper for Bank of England notes, ton for ton, and the ravished still burn incense to him as the Eventual God of Plenty.... An archangel with wings to one-half of the world, Satan with a tail to the other half. I admire him, I frankly confess it, and when his time comes I shall buy a piece of the rope for a keepsake."

What insight into the weaknesses and wrongs of the modern world! Oh, that Mark Twain had been our ambassador to London instead of Hay! He would have understood the methods by which the imperial officials that supported Rhodes were working, and would have seen through the toils that were weaving to ensnare our republic. Perhaps Hay saw more than he commented on, knew more than he told, and made terms with it as he had with McKinley's indirection.

Two incidents revealed in his letters seem to show that Hay was simply flattered and dazzled and did not know that he was taken in. The first was that in which he met both Mr. Chamberlain and Harcourt at a dinner in London, in 1896, and had some talk with them, feeling like the maiden in highly distinguished company: "It was a chance that a girl of her age rarely gets to see the greatest politicians of the time in their hours of ease"; second was that of a day or two later, when Balfour and Harcourt invited him to talk over Cleveland's Venezuelan message and the prospect of McKinley's election. He was then struck by the fact that nearly every word he had said to Balfour had been repeated to Harcourt and that Harcourt had remembered it all: "These English public men have wonderful memories," he muses. He was then asked to talk with Mr. Chamberlain and Curzon, also. The conversations are said to have been long, and probably touched on other subjects besides those for which he was invited, for Thayer tells that when Hay was in London in 1896 "he got wind of the changed purposes of German imperialism... In brief, his experiences in London revealed to him the aims of Pan-Germanism."

In the opinion of Dr. Usher, Pan-Germanism was merely an expression of the national consciousness and an effort at self-preservation paralleled in other nations: "If Germany is wrong, others too have been wrong; indeed, if her conduct is unjustifiable, no country in the world can establish its moral and ethical right
to existence." Certainly as compared with England Germany had been slow in setting out to annex colonies, and she is hardly to be blamed for looking toward the Philippines and tracts in China and Africa if England is approved for annexing Egypt and millions of fertile miles in other regions. The questions for historians to settle are, whether in 1896 Germany had changed her legitimate purposes so as to threaten the civilized world or any particular nation in it, and exactly what the "changed purposes" were, as presented then to Mr. Hay in London by British government officials. I have seen no proof that she had changed her purposes, but, as I have shown, on the contrary, that Mr. Rhodes had schemed before 1877 to paint nearly all of the available earth red, and, backed by the imperial officials, had outlined a scheme in 1895 for dividing the world between the Russian and Anglo-Saxon peoples allied—which could only be done by breaking Germany. From 1895, if not earlier, Germany must prepare for "the Day," and her preparations to defend herself must give an opportunity to her foes who had made the conspiracy against her to ascribe her efforts to overwhelming ambition, and in general to misinterpret her every act of prudence to the world. It should be the first doctrine of history that assertion from an enemy source does not constitute proof, but it seems not to have occurred to Hay or to Thayer that mere statement from London was not enough to prove felonious intent on the part of Germany and that the informers were not above suspicion of both national interest and duplicity, Chamberlain having just been implicated with Rhodes in Jameson's piratical raid in South Africa (as all the world believed the more because the investigating committee had not fully investigated) and Harcourt being considered insincere by even his own party, as "A New Liberal" testified.

Hay seems to have felt something of this, as his choice of the word "politician" shows. Did he know that Rhodes and his followers were themselves "thinking in continents" since 1877, with the purpose of "painting the map of the world red," and that the first step in the process after the unification of Africa was to be a division of the world (especially Germany) between the allies (Russia and the United Anglo-Saxon peoples)? He may have known all of this, and thought it no worse than McKinley's duplicity, which he counts not against him, for these are the ways of the world that is after all very merry, and very bright with tinsel! As for Republic vs. Empire, that meant little to him—possibly he had come to like the ways of empire best. He may therefore have seen deeply into the Rhodes policies and have wished to bring the changes that they
implied—in short, he may have simply judged their evil as good in promise and to be winked at. He certainly showed penetration sometimes, for of the French-Russian alliance, which had just been announced in London in 1896, he remarked that France had sold herself like a prostitute and would not even receive a high price, a judgment that is being justified in this war, where poor France has lost far more than she can hope to gain, but Russia and England may hope to win, as Rhodes computed.

It is not to our purpose to go deeply into the motives that led McKinley and Hay and their circle to desire an alliance with England, secret if it must be, open if possible. Perhaps the “big business” of such men as Carnegie and Lodge predisposed them toward an imperialism of the type that supported Rhodes rather than toward a republicanism that hampered “big business” by anti-trust legislation. Not only Carnegie in 1893, but Sir George Grey in the same year, and Rhodes in 1895 had written articles expressing themselves for the incorporation of the United States in the British empire—Rhodes had held these ideas much earlier. Is it possible that Hay did not know this? As soon as he, then our ambassador to England, brought the question of alliance up in 1898, consulting influential friends by letter, Senator Lodge approved it heartily, perhaps then as now interested personally as well as in behalf of his state in the “big business” of making munitions. Alliance, of course, means wars to follow.

Hay to Lodge: “Your letter gave me the most gratifying account of feeling among the leading men of America that I have had from any source. It is a moment of immense importance, not only for the present but for all the future.” “The leading men of America” who had expressed approval doubtless included Roosevelt and others of the Harvard group.

Was the motive of these men standing for alliance high and idealistic, defensible and appealing? If it had been they would have worked openly, not in secret. (1) Was it warmth of feeling for the mother country? Possibly it was to some extent, as in Carnegie’s case, but then it is the hyphenated Americanism that men of this group have been rightly quick and loud in condemning. It now appears that this class of English-Americans have been our only alarming “hyphenates” for the past twenty years, and it is consistent with the Rhodes methods that they, who are themselves pro-English and working for an English alliance, have cast reproach on our German-Americans for warm regards to the sufferings of their mother-country, though not one of our German-Americans
has proposed to form a German-American alliance, or to involve the United States in war for Germany's sake. To continue the question of motive: (2) Was it because England had given to America the most precious of her national institutions? That question is open to debate, and other nations would have much to say. If one is to look to sources, the Dutch might maintain that little Holland gave what is best in her own institutions to England, as well as that she gave the most precious gifts to the United States, not only to New York, but even to New England— even to Harvard. (3) Was it because the men of "big business" in the two nations acting together could put money in their pockets? There is good evidence that it was. What ignoble and mercenary motives must our American poet, William Vaughn Moody, have been hearing when he stood on Boston Common beside the Shaw Memorial and, facing the monuments of a past of splendid ideals, was moved to write in his "Ode in Time of Hesitation,"

"When we turn and question in suspense  
If these things be indeed after these ways,  
And what things are to follow after these,  
Our fluent men of place and consequence  
Fumble and fill their mouths with hollow phrase,  
Or for the end-all of deep argument  
Intone their dull commercial liturgies—  
I dare not yet believe! My ears are shut!  
I will not hear their thin satiric praise...  
We shall discern the right  
And do it tardily—O ye who lead,  
Take heed!  
Blindness we may forgive, but baseness we will smite."

Men of Massachusetts, and Boston, and Harvard have been foremost in defending and assisting the British Rhodes-imperialists in this war, and in assigning low motives to those who stand against them. Let them reexamine the evidence and see if they be not themselves again on the wrong side. In England the most open minds are realizing, even to-day, the wiles of their secret foreign office and admitting its methods of bringing on this war. It is well that we should not forget that the same interested classes in Massachusetts once found good arguments for slavery and the slave trade, and that a generation ago their "gentlemen mobs" stoned Whittier and tried to hang Garrison to a lamp-post. Let them examine the life of Rhodes and the imperial "gang" who captured our diplomats twenty years ago by inventing "Pan-Germanism" just at the

2 Neilson, How Diplomats Make War.
time when they themselves had determined to paint the map of the world British red by this attack of allies upon Germany, let them examine the means by which our information during this war, and before it, has been diverted and perverted to further the purposes of the empire; let them try to investigate the use that has been made of Rhodes’s millions, bequeathed to be expended by a secret committee, to win America to an alliance with England. Does not all this secrecy prove that this cause cannot stand the light?

“Massachusetts, God forgive her,
She’s a-kneelin’ with the rest.”

Most of our people to-day, and also a great body of English people, are not to be blamed for not understanding the situation in Europe and our relation to it, for they have been deliberately misled by masters of guile, as the following incidents will show. Some of our leaders have been fully aware of the ignoble and un-American policies that are being secretly carried out and they should be held to account. One likes to think that even those who yielded to the lower motives had been appealed to also by higher sentiments and traditions. Let them defend themselves,

“Blindness we may forgive, but baseness we will smite.”

I believe that the great body of our English-American people in New England, as throughout the country, is truly American at heart, as is proved by the fact that the race-sympathy of our English-Americans was strongly against Rhodes and his imperialism and with the radical English party, the pro-Boers, in the Boer War. By selection and descent they are of the very best that England has produced, and superior to the larger number of the English to-day in England, being the idealistic, radical element that England cast out as effectually as France cast out her Huguenots, and as the most independent element has been cast out from Ireland—all to our good fortune. It is only our imperialists of “big business” and “frenzied finance,” in sympathy with the English Tory element, that are trying now to carry out the Rhodes war-program, though professing to be innocent of intent, chivalrous to small nations, even holy because fighting for humanity—and against war! A “moral gloss” indeed; as strong as the Johannesburg fake-telegram that pleaded in the names of the women and children!

In reading Hay’s life one sometimes wonders whether stupidity or consummate deceit is the solution of the problems. In a letter
to Senator Lodge in 1898 he tells how he persuaded Mr. Chamberlain to give warm words of support to the project of an alliance between England and America, and how warmly Chamberlain gave them. Mr. Chamberlain must have been a good actor if he kept his face straight when he heard it, for he had been scheming for some time past how to get America to enter into an alliance, against her ideals, traditions and interests. With Rhodes, Chamberlain doubtless held the opinion that unless Great Britain could make the American alliance and the Russian alliance, and carry out her policies against Germany before 1920, she would sink to a third-rate power, while the United States would take first rank. They might well have thought that it would be difficult to persuade the United States to abet, and to follow! The following is the quotation from Hay's letter to Lodge just referred to:

"Among the political leaders on both sides I find not only sympathy, but a somewhat eager desire that the other fellow shall not be the more friendly. Chamberlain's startling speech was due partly to a conversation I had with him in which I hoped that he would not let the Opposition have a monopoly of goodwill to America. He is greatly pleased at the reception his speech met with on our side, and says that he 'don't care a hang what they say about it on the continent.'" Of course, "the continent" is Germany, always the "enemy" in mind in the nineties. Chamberlain's "startling speech," after warm references to "kinsmen across the Atlantic" (he chose to forget how many of the people in the United States are not from England and "kinsmen") contained these words: "I can go so far as to say, that terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together in an Anglo-Saxon alliance." There is no suggestion on either side that loss to the United States may be involved. Oh, that Mark Twain had been our ambassador in London! John Hay is distinctly of that half of the world that would look up to Rhodes as "an archangel with wings"—Mark Twain belongs to the other. Is it conceivable that if he had been our ambassador in London Mark Twain would have been persuading Chamberlain and Rhodes to take him into the lair of the Lion, and be warm about it? not knowing that they were scheming how to persuade him to enter? And Hay is thought to be a statesman! And he proceeds to violate his country's republican ideals, to tie it up in expense and danger in the Philippines, to lend its aid to the British to crush the South African republics, thereby giving Republican government a great setback in the history of the
world and strengthening empire, and to work in alliance with England for the destruction of Germany! Let future historians decide whether he was a trustful incompetent biassed by cater-cousinship, merely taking fair words at their face value and knowing nothing of further imperial purposes, or whether he was a profound schemer who knew the real motives and further policies but chose not to admit the real situation, while he pledged his support to an alliance meaning wars and the absorption of our republic in an empire. In the following years, while the splendid English Liberals (called in derision pro-Boers, although they were only pro-justice, and in the best sense pro-British) tried with all their might to keep Mr. Chamberlain from the war that the Rhodes policy ran in Africa, Hay and McKinley abetted the imperialists to the best of their ability. Hay sometimes had a sense that he had fallen from the old high ideals—witness his letter to John Bigelow, our veteran diplomatist, who had written him in the traditional American spirit concerning the Philippines:

Hay to John Bigelow, London, Sept. 5, 1898: “I fear that you are right about the Philippines, and I hope that the Lord will be good to us poor devils who have to take care of them. I marvel at your suggesting that we pay for them. I should have expected no less of your probity, but how many except those educated by you in the school of morals and diplomacy would agree with you? Where did I pass you on the road of life? You used to be my senior; now you are ages younger than I am.... and yet I am going to be Secretary of State for a little while!”

After such clear admission of an understanding of what he had become, the things that Hay did as Secretary of State in the Boer War seem not less than the conscious sin against the Holy Ghost, the unpardonable. Thayer says: “John Hay was among the few who understood the significance of the change from the very first moment, and he accepted it without looking back, or, so far as appears, without regrets.... He shaped all his work as Secretary of State with reference to it. To place this country as speedily as possible in such relations with the rest of the world as became its character, was henceforth his controlling purpose.” This last statement means that he made his arrangements with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury to help in crushing the Boer republics, and even in devising measures to be used against Germany in the war that they, with Rhodes, projected before 1920. Proof of this and of his active hostility to Germany will be quoted in incidents presently.

President McKinley and Hay intended to propose an alliance
with England to Congress, but the mere mention of this purpose called forth such a storm of remonstrance from the country that they gave it up. In a few days hundreds of thousands of names were sent in through Irish-American societies, a convincing demonstration. The many public meetings held throughout this nation to pass resolutions, collect money for the Boer republics, and send supplies for the Boer prisoners of war in the Bermudas spoke the same strong sentiment. In Chicago an ambulance corps was fitted out; in Denver and Boston the city councils adopted resolutions of sympathy; public meetings were held in every part of the nation for protest; Edward Everett Hale led in relief work; but for the first time in its history the national government refrained from passing resolutions of sympathy because the president, who strongly dominated his party, opposed it. In every way he showed his willingness to let the republics go down, so reversing the policy of President Grant toward them when the British attacked them at Amajuba, and of President Cleveland when Dr. Jameson made his raid. He even permitted unusual violations of American rights, the most notable of which were rifling of mails under our flag in Africa, and treating foodstuffs as contraband of war. This argues that McKinley and Hay had discussed with officials in London even the policy they would follow in the projected European war to occur before 1920, the war against Germany, and is significant especially in connection with articles in the English press of the nineties on cutting off food supplies in case of war with Germany. An American ship filled with grain and billed for Africa was captured while crossing the Atlantic by a boat of the British navy. Some editorials made comments at the time that this was probably not a bona fide transaction, for the republics would hardly buy grain in the United States, but that it was perhaps intended as a precedent, to be quoted when food supplies were seized in the next war. The incident is worthy of the "Rhodes gang," and of wily and guileful fifteenth-century diplomacy on this side.

A short time before the South African war broke out President McKinley called Hay home from London and appointed him Secretary of State. At the close of the Boer war I happened to hear of the extreme dissatisfaction among the friends of John Sherman at McKinley's policy. Sherman had been Secretary of State during the time when Hay had been ambassador in London, but had not been consulted on all of these matters of the Spanish and African wars and would not have consented to the new policy, which was agreed on secretly while he was officially at the head of the depart-
ment. Hay and Chamberlain doubtless made their alliance or came to their "understanding" before the Spanish war, which McKinley professed to be trying to keep out of, and which he need not have fought, for there was no proof that the "Maine" was blown up by Spaniards, and Spain had just offered to come to an agreement on points under dispute.

Certain editorials written before the Spanish war in some of the "inspired" papers pointed out that the war, if it came, and especially the Philippines, if they were taken, would draw us out into world politics, and this has always seemed to me the probable reason why we went to war and acquired the islands. Spain had been impoverished by them, their people were Asiatic and not likely to become able to manage themselves as a republic even after our efforts to teach them, and strategically they are hard to defend. A genius at strategy, Napoleon, practically gave us Louisiana because it would be hard to defend, and Russia gave us Alaska for the same good reason, but McKinley and Hay possibly wanted to take the Philippines because when the day of our trial comes they wanted us to be so endangered that England could seem to deserve our gratitude by offering us assistance—and so the alliance would be made. This happened in a small way when Dewey entered Manila. The incident of the German admiral at the battle of Manila, of which so much has been made, illustrates imperialist efforts to make the most of trouble between the United States and Germany.

It was not very long since England had taken Egypt, and only a short time since she had tried to take the Boer republics—why should Germany, also wishing colonies, not have been thinking of capturing the Philippines? Our president helped to thwart her by actually taking them and then made them the occasion of our building a great navy, to save England and France the necessity of maintaining a fleet in the Far East. We became, in fact, the offensive arm of the British in the Far East, and pulled the chestnuts out of the fire. The only people among us who can gain by our holding the islands are the munitions makers and a few bankers who will exploit mines and franchises; the nation must pay. While Spain is recovering from her possessions, having lost them, we who have acquired them shall continue to be weakened by holding them, in money, men and ideals, of which the greatest is our confused and violated ideals.

Sherman was anti-imperialist and "pro-Boer," and he and his friends fought the McKinley policies at the time of the Boer war,

3 Usher, Pan-Germanism, chapter on "Position of the United States."
but were unable to change them. They were the more embittered because Sherman had been forced out of his seat in the Senate to give it to Mark Hanna as a reward for election services in McKinley's campaign, and because now he had been not only disregarded, but forced out of his position in the Department of State. Even Thayer, Hay's apologist, thinks that Sherman had been badly used—another instance of fifteenth-century guile, added to ingratitude.

My informant in this matter of anti-imperialist feeling was the Hon. F. W. Reitz, a man whose testimony on the South African situation should be taken into account by any who write history. Mr. Reitz, if any person, knew the whole story. Born in Africa, he was connected by birth and marriage with the foremost families of South Africa. His sister was the wife of Premier Schreiner of Cape Colony, who was the brother of Olive Schreiner the author. He had completed his education in a European university, and had distinguished himself in law before he entered public life. Preceding President Stein, Mr. Reitz had been at the head of the two republics in their most critical days. He was the president of the Orange Free State who made the treaty of alliance with the Transvaal, by which the two nations joined their forces if either should be attacked. After his removal to the Transvaal he was appointed judge of the Supreme Court, and later Secretary of State, which position he filled throughout the war, taking charge of the affairs of the nation after President Krüger removed to Europe. He is a man of insight and conviction, of calm and kindly nature, serious, but also gifted with a sense of humor, which, like Philip Freneau in our Revolutionary war and James Russell Lowell in the Mexican war, he used to keep up the spirits of his countrymen by a series of war poems in dialect. Mr. Reitz was an "Irreconcilable" and had been forbidden by Mr. Chamberlain to return to Pretoria, being made an exception to the Proclamation of Amnesty.

While considering what he and his family would do next Mr. Reitz came to this country, and while he was lecturing in Michigan and Iowa on the Boer war he and his wife were our guests for three or four weeks just after they had been in Philadelphia and Washington among our anti-imperialists. At this period, if ever, he would have given way to bitterness and shown poor judgment, but throughout this trying time he remained perfectly just, and deliberately as well as constitutionally moderate in statement. His disabilities have since been removed and he is now a member of the senate in the South African parliament. The following incident, of which the last part was told me by Mr. and Mrs. Reitz, illus-
trates the length to which McKinley and Hay were willing to go in their partisanship for England at the time of the Boer war.

Soon after the South African war began our consul in Pretoria notified the State Department that the British were interfering with our mails and opening state documents under our flag on trains in Africa, but nothing was done about it by our president and Mr. Hay, outside of attempting to discredit the report. When the consul started for America to lay his evidence before those interested, he and his report were held up to ridicule before he arrived and he was at once superseded by Adalbert Hay, the son of our Secretary of State.

Adalbert Hay was very young and had had no previous experience in foreign affairs; his father was known to be hostile to the cause of the republics to which he was now accredited—in fact was understood to have bargained them away by secret diplomacy—but these were evidently not sufficient reasons against his selection for the post at this time. When young Mr. Hay started to fill his post as consul at Pretoria, his father sent him by way of London, where he visited en route Lord Salisbury, the very man who was conducting the war by which the republics he was accredited to were being done to death! Has fifteenth-century politics anything to exceed this in ingenious and studied insult?—an affront given weak friends suffering defeat, to flatter and reassure a powerful friend hostile to them, and this affront given by the very person that bargained them away and betrayed them? There is something barbaric about it—it belongs earlier than the fifteenth century, to the period of Regan and Oswald!

The sequel is brighter and more creditable to human nature. When Mr. Adalbert Hay reached Pretoria he was received in a friendly spirit by President Krüger and Mr. Reitz, the Secretary of State. He was entertained at the home of Mr. Reitz, and proved himself then and always kindly and straightforward. When the Boer government at Pretoria was broken up, he returned to America a true friend to many of the Boers whom he met in Africa, and leaving many friends behind. In Washington, after he returned, he was frank in correcting misunderstandings about the Boers and began collecting money for Boer relief, which led to a difference between him and his father; but after his death (he fell from a window in an upper story of his club, where he was sitting to take the air one very warm night) his father contributed money in his memory for the relief of the destitute in South Africa. That was
after the war was over, when the republics had been annexed to the empire.

Another incident that shows the feeling of President McKinley to the British and the Boers is the following; which also, I think, has never appeared in print. It was told us by Mr. Wolmarans, one of the committee of three sent over by the republics to lay their cause before our president. When the hour appointed for the interview came the envoys were attended by a number of people, including their secretary and Mr. Montague White, the former representative of the Transvaal in London. President McKinley listened to their address, then took up a typewritten document which had been prepared before they entered, and read it as his answer. We are told by Benjamin Franklin that the American Indians had a custom of making no reply to a delegation from another tribe until at least a day had elapsed, so that the other tribe might know that its communication had been duly considered. This was held to be a point of dignity and good manners, but such dignity and good manners were not observed at the White House that day. When his "reply" was finished the President asked the delegates whether they had noticed the beautiful view from the window of the room in which they were standing, and led them to see it, and while they were looking at the view that he pointed out, he left the room. No time was given them for discussion.

One might think that this would cap the climax of the incident, but not so. In the course of the interview the secretary happened to stray about the room, and at the open door which led into the next room found Lord Pauncefote, the British ambassador, sitting within earshot of the proceedings. It is to be hoped that American diplomacy never reached a lower ebb.

After President McKinley's death, we who had felt the error of those days had hopes that President Roosevelt would be the strong man who would set things right. At once imperialist editorials began chorusing the praises of our Secretary of State and hoping fervidly that he would be retained, and very soon an announcement followed that President Roosevelt had invited Hay to retain his position and would carry out the McKinley policies. He seems to have carried them out, always and consistently. It is far from me to wish to detract from the good things that President Roosevelt did. He proved himself a strong and able man in some things, but he failed to take the greatest opportunity that Fate gave into his hands, of being just and friendly to all foreign nations. In his autobiography his ideal for his foreign policy is high and thor-
oughly American in character, but he did not reverse the policy toward the South African republics, with whom we had had special treaties signed by President Grant; he refused to read or even receive the written statement sent him by Korea, when Japan was annexing that little country, with whom we also had a treaty; he himself, with Secretary Hay, violated the little republic of Colombia, breaking the treaty we had with her and not even compensating her generously, and yet he has been violent in reproaching the United States for not going armed to the aid of Belgium, assigning the reason that she is a "little nation" that had a treaty with us—although she had given various evidences that she intended to fight on the side of France, and although Germany had proposed to England to pledge herself not to invade Belgium if England would do the same, and had offered Belgium to do her no injury if she would merely permit transit—far less than the Allies have since exacted from Greece. It seems that Roosevelt's sympathy is as 1:3 at the most, and that in the fourth case it is a Rhodes-imperial pretext. He cast in his lot with the "Rhodes gang," and when he became a candidate for the presidency one of the candidates for the vice-presidency on his ticket was John Hays Hammond, the mining engineer who had worked with Jameson and Rhodes in Johannesburg, who was one of the "reformers" that devised the fake telegram. Roosevelt is discredited in that he would have accepted Hammond as his running mate, to manage by his Rhodes tricks the making of our treaties, and in case of our president's death to become our president, in charge of foreign affairs.

When Mr. Reitz was in the United States he was told by a person in contact with President Roosevelt that the President would be pleased to talk the African situation over with him, but he did not act on the suggestion, for there was nothing to be said except in reproach, and that would not be worth while.

One letter in Thayer's Life of John Hay is evidence that Hay and Roosevelt were not in a frame of mind friendly to Germany and anxious to make the most of incidents that betokened friendliness on the part of officials representing Germany. By Thayer this incident is quoted only as evidence of Hay's humor and playfulness. But it is also evidence that he played a dangerous game and maliciously fomented ill-feeling against Germany, and that President Roosevelt was far from blameless. The incident reported is this: the Emperor of Germany had sent President Roosevelt a medal such as he had presented to the German soldiers who fought against the Boxer rebels in China, intending it as a delicate recog-
nition of our soldier-president, and certain that his gift would not be open to criticism on the ground of its intrinsic value, for our Constitution forbids our presidents to receive such gifts. The gift was not acknowledged speedily and cordially, and an attaché placed himself in the path of the Secretary of State as a reminder of his monarch's interest:

Letter of John Hay to President Roosevelt: "State Department, Nov. 12, 1901. Count Quadt has been hovering around the State Department for three days in ever narrowing circles and at last swooped upon me this afternoon, saying that the Foreign Office and even the Palace Unter den Linden was in a state of intense anxiety to know how you received His Majesty's Chinese medal, conferred only on the greatest sovereigns. As I had not been authorized by you to express your emotions I had to sail by dead reckoning, and considering the vast intrinsic value of the souvenir—I should say at least thirty-five cents—and its wonderful artistic merit, representing the German eagle eviscerating the Black Dragon, and its historical accuracy, which gives the world to understand that Germany is IT, and the rest of the world nowhere, I took the responsibility of saying to Count Quadt that the President could not have received the medal with anything but emotions of pleasure commensurate with the high appreciation he entertain for the Emperor's Majesty—and that a formal acknowledgment would be made in due course. He asked me if he was at liberty to say anything like this to his government, and I said he was at liberty to say anything whatever the spirit would move him to utter. I give thanks to whatever powers there be that I was able to allow him to leave the room without quoting Quantula sapientia."

Mr. Hay must have been an excellent dissembler if the German diplomat did not see the tongue in the cheek. Again this is Oswald diplomacy; and the man who writes such a letter is piling up the fuel to start the fire of war. This letter implies perfect agreement on the part of President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State.

I do not remember that President Roosevelt made an effort to secure an alliance with England in his administration, but this was done by his successor, President Taft, who was named as candidate by the Republican convention because Roosevelt gave him the strongest of support, using the argument that Taft was thoroughly acquainted with the situation and would carry on the "policies" of the Administration. This he proceeded to do, and in March, 1911, proposed to make a treaty with England providing for un-
limited arbitration for all time. This, of course was greeted by a chorus of approval by English speakers and editors.

Strangely enough, Sir Edward Grey's peace speech was delivered while he was supporting estimates for greater naval expenditures, consistently with Rhodes's advice. That year England, Russia and France spent £24,241,226 against Austria and Germany's £11,710,859; by 1914 the Entente were spending £43,547,555 against the Triple Allies' £17,605,204, this last including Italy's expenditure; and long before 1911 the Entente had secret agreements as to mobilizing and plans of campaign, that only the small inner circle knew, not including other members of the Cabinet, unless Mr. Asquith. In the summer of 1911 the Moroccan incident all but precipitated war. On the authority of William T. Stead we know that the British envoys went to the conference instructed to bring on war, and Lord Roberts in a signed article tells that then the British navy was assembled and ready for action. But that time Russia did not mobilize and so Germany would not declare war, though she had been deliberately affronted. When President Taft proposed unlimited arbitration for all time with England did he know that this danger of European war was to be created in 1911 by England? And why did he not try to bind us to Germany by a like treaty at the same time? Also why did he send a squadron of our navy to visit the nations now Allies, but not to visit Germany? Immediately upon his proposing unlimited arbitration with England for all time, Sir Edward Grey's speech took it that "this would probably lead to their following with an agreement to join each other in any case when one of them had a quarrel with a third nation that had refused to arbitrate."

And this phrasing, "a third nation that had refused to arbitrate," throws light upon (1) the next attempt to bind the nations by arbitration treaties, and (2) the proposal made by Sir Edward Grey just before the war in 1914 that Germany subject her cause to arbitration, even while Russia was mobilizing, when every day lost would place Germany at the mercy of her foes and result in their fighting the war on her territory when they were fully ready—another instance that shows how carefully imperial methods are thought out. Did President Taft know that these arbitration treaties that he proposed could be "worked" in this way to enable the Allies to get the best of Germany?

When President Taft and Sir Edward Grey were first proposing unlimited arbitration, the British editors were mightily pleased, but American editors were not. The Washington Post ex-
pressed the national feeling when it said, "'Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,' is part of the unwritten constitution of the United States." Soon it became clear, as in McKinley's administration, that an open alliance would not be acceptable to this nation. Congress was strongly against it, as well as the press, but no sooner had Congress adjourned than President Taft again advanced the project, and again had to drop it. The Chicago Inter Ocean called it "bubble-blowing—a splendid jug-handled arrangement for us to be obliged to quarrel with every European nation for England's sake! For that is what it would come to." Finally President Taft, convinced that unlimited arbitration was impracticable, began holding unofficial conversations with M. Jusserand, the ambassador from France, with the result that he finally arranged arbitration treaties with England and France, but not with Germany, who perhaps saw her danger. If Germany also had signed she would have been obliged either to break her treaty of arbitration while Russia was mobilizing, or to suffer the consequences—invasion when Russia and the other Allies were fully ready to attack her, when no chance was left her to push the war to their territory.

When one sees these methods, that Rhodes would surely have applauded, one must question whether there is a chance that the holy names of "peace" and "arbitration" have not been used among us these last few years to cloak the policy of war that was proposed against Germany before 1920. More than a suspicion has grown upon me, knowing the Rhodes policies and imperial methods, that our arbitration treaties and peace societies have been designed by the imperialists as another effort to "throw a moral gloss over policies dubious if not actually immoral," claiming "benevolence" while ruthlessly working for "extermination." Our small "ring" working for alliance and peace meant to join the British in this Rhodes war against Germany. Failing to bind Germany by the second type of arbitration treaties, Sir Edward Grey nevertheless proposed to her in 1914, while Russia was mobilizing, to submit her cause to arbitration, so placing her under a moral cloud before the public even if he could not bind her as he had wished.

Another evidence of laying plans far ahead to crush Germany by the arbitration treaties is shown in the following quotation from Figaro, 1911, published in Paris at the time of Taft's proposal for arbitration treaties: "If other nations do not join the movement, those who have pledged for arbitration should adopt the principle of boycotting by inserting a clause in agreements that they should
suspend all relations of commerce, transportation and postal service with any country warring upon the signers."

This is not only against Germany, but also against us and all other neutral nations. Will our imperialists and anglophiles acquiesce, though they are so determined to maintain our rights to sail on enemy ships that they would plunge us into war with Germany for it, while at the same time they have not maintained rights in Mexico, but recall us from the danger zone there where many Americans have been killed just because they were Americans?

And after all of this, what must be thought of the latest of peace societies that aims to secure peace by preparing us for war and binding us by treaty to fight the nation that refuses to arbitrate? President Taft is its president—he who tried to bind us to England, but not to Germany, by a treaty of unlimited arbitration for all time, just before Sir Edward Grey tried to precipitate war in 1911 by insulting Germany, and who made arbitration treaties that could be "worked" against Germany while her allied enemies were arming. John Hays Hammond is its vice-president—he who wrote the fake-telegram, appealing for assistance for women and children who were not in danger, two months before it was guilefully sent out by Rhodes. This spring, when that "Society to Ensure Peace by Preparing for War" was forming, a member of the British Parliament lecturing in this country told us that an attempt will be made in our Congress to frame new arbitration treaties containing this clause. Is it likely that such treaties would be used to do justice to all nations, or that John Hays Hammond and the other tricksters who planned the arbitration schemes against Germany in the past would manage by a fake-telegram or other equally unscrupulous and more clever means to "throw a moral gloss" over their unholy policies and make it seem that we ought to go to war as they desire?

We shall not need to devote space to the other acts of President Taft nor to those of President Wilson, which are still fresh in our aching memories. John Brisbane Walker in his Cooper Union Speech has summed up the case well in his eight charges that President Wilson has not been for America first, but for England. President Wilson, like President Roosevelt, is doubtless prejudiced because he has read much English history from English sources. He has been fighting for Duessa, the Empire and "big business," while our true Una is abandoned and strays without her natural protector. May he see the wiles of the enchantress, and come back to defend our ideal.
And what of our prospects if Mr. Hughes should be our next president? It is clear that Roosevelt wanted to be president himself to carry out his plans, but both he and Taft have expressed themselves as perfectly satisfied, since the long conference that they held with the new candidate—the conference of Roosevelt and Hughes was reported in the papers to have been three hours long, and to have been held so secretly that even the waiters were not in the room except when specially summoned. Why such secrecy? It is in accord with too much secrecy that has gone before.

And why all of this preparedness? There is no person in this country who would not want a preparedness for defense, and an efficiency equal to German efficiency in that truly holy cause. Is one not justified in hazarding a conjecture that we are preparing to enter this war on the first likely pretext, and to be ready to take part at the next turn of the Rhodes diplomatic screw, when Russia will be the victim, along with Japan, who has risen into power since 1895 and is now allied with Russia for protection of the East? When I say that that will be the next Rhodes war if all goes according to schedule, I find that even people who have an unusual knowledge of history do not know what I mean, for our busy lives are too full of local affairs to permit most of us to wander so far afield as Africa in our reading. But a few months ago I talked with a man who understood perfectly, an English gentleman who had been in Oxford when Rhodes was there and knew him personally. This gentleman not only understood what the Rhodes wars are, but proved his mastery of the Rhodes policies by saying, "The next European war will be against Russia, and Germany will fight as an ally of England," meaning the broken Germany that he expects to come out of this war. Japan may well be more afraid of us than we are of her if our Rhodes imperialists get their way. To-day Russia and Japan are England’s allies, but "perfidious Albion" cannot be counted on to-morrow. When the last of the independent nations have been broken, the map can be painted red—if the people of the United States will consent.

If Great Britain is successful in this war, the fruits that she garners will be exactly what Rhodes planned before 1895—Germany’s African colonies lying on the route from the Cape to Cairo, and the breaking up of Germany as a world power, carrying with it the destruction of her commerce abroad. Incidentally "to the good" will be also the relative weakening of all other strong European nations and a prolongation of their weakness through the long period to come when they will be repaying the money they have
borrowed from her, and the interest on it. The only other nation that can gain much for the present is Russia, and her prospects for the future are not good. Japan offers a new and different problem, which this paper cannot attempt to discuss—but observers must realize that the United States is expected to fight her soon. The usual means by which England reduces the power of strong rivals proportionally to her own is to incite them to fight each other without herself striking a blow—and let it not be forgotten that we also are her great rival, the greatest if we accept the judgment of Napoleon when he signed the deed giving us Louisiana and of Rhodes when "1920" was written. Our true eastern policy should be an honest friendliness with China and Japan. Japan would willingly grant, as China has done, such restrictions of immigration as would safeguard our country, and would offer such privileges of investment as China would gratefully give us since we returned the surplus indemnity money. That act of common honesty has been called exceedingly shrewd diplomacy on our part by the nations that kept their surplus indemnity money—and so it doubtless is, for it still holds true that honesty is the best policy. How much has not England paid in money, men, and honor for her Rhodes, whom she shielded when he stooped to dishonor for her gain? and how much will she not pay for him in years to come? and what will be our penalty for McKinley and John Hay? May it not be a war with Japan! She doubtless fears us because she has seen us from the days of the Spanish war living by a secret alliance with England, conquering Asiatic islands, helping to conquer African republics, policing the waters of the Pacific so that England may use her fleet elsewhere, and adding boats upon boats to our navy, possibly to use them against her and China. Shall we profit if we help to annex China and Japan to the British empire? After we helped Great Britain to annex the South African republics, she repaid us by cleverly inserting a clause into her law regarding the importation of machinery, that effectually excluded American industrial machines from Africa.

The hope of our poor world at this crisis seems to me to be in the United States, and to lie in justice and friendliness to all nations, and in making a notable success of the Republic. Since I have understood the Rhodes policies and methods of the empire in South Africa I have never been able to hear with patience the frequently made assertions that a republic is the most corrupt form of government and that an English king has less power than an American president. The truth seems to be that in our republic
our political "rings" can be broken and that we have held more investigations and arrived at more disagreeable truths than the empires have. Could Canada conduct an investigation of the matters of which I have spoken, though she pour out her blood and treasure for the imperial cause? Who ever heard of any muck-raking in the Russian empire? But it is the first principle of public health that muck must not only be raked, but cleaned out. In the British empire it is clear that matters are hushed up and that the highest officials, including the king, constitute a "ring" that cannot be investigated. Even the farce of Jameson's trial would not have occurred if that genius at world-politics, President Krüger, had not "waited for the turtle to show its head" before he struck at it, and then sent Dr. Jameson to London for trial. Our political "rings" are not hard to reach, and we can investigate if our people demand it. Also, we have no official who "can do no wrong," or who, having done wrong, is beyond impeachment and its penalty.

The greatest question before the American people just now is this of alliances and foreign wars, and it is essential that all parties should announce their platform of principles and purposes. Every time that our presidents have moved toward open alliance with England this nation has shown its disapproval so strongly that the matter has been dropped, as I have shown. The astonishing votes for Ford at the primaries this year spoke the same national feeling—no foreign alliance, no war. In Ohio and Pennsylvania the vote showed Roosevelt so far behind Ford that he could not hope to carry an election; the people have spoken against him as they spoke against Taft, and many good judges on public matters believe that he will never again emerge to win an election. That vote is an argument that no man can carry an election here if it is understood that he purposes foreign alliance and war. If President Wilson has a chance of re-election it is because he has not yet committed us to war, much as he has done that is unjust and dangerous. Many people still believe that he does not want war, as he says that he does not. If Mr. Hughes purposes war, he has a chance of election only because he has not announced himself. If these two candidates purpose alliance or war after the nation has shown such evidences that it does not want either alliance or war, they are playing a game of bunco on our people in not announcing their stand.

And among our people a profound distrust is rising. Only to-day it was pointed out to me that German-Americans have not been put on committees for the coming republican campaign, and
the bitter forecast was made that this probably meant Hughes for President, Roosevelt for Secretary of State, and both for war. I am not German myself, I have not known many Germans; but our German-Americans seem to me to have been excellent citizens and to have shown themselves wonderfully patient and devoted under the bad treatment they and their mother country have been receiving. All attempts to prove them implicated in violence and treason have proved fruitless—and only a few German citizens have done far less than might have been reasonably expected in the way of violence. Then why discriminate against our German-Americans, if the Republican party means justice to German-Americans here and to Germany abroad in case of Hughes's election?

The two policies from which we must choose—let us be clear on this matter—are Rhodes imperialism and America finally again subordinate to England in a map painted British red, or the United States still the Great Republic and leading the world by her example to a friendliness that enriches all by commerce instead of hate that impoverishes all, even the one who wins, by war. Rhodes and his imperialists realized that if his policies were not successful before 1920, including the alliance with the United States, the United States would become before 1920 the leading power of the world—as it has done. In this century just past, most strongly in the five years just past—when China, Portugal, South Africa, and Ireland have tried to become republics—this world tendency toward American ideals is proved. We may still conquer the world in peace by our idealism, even England. Shall we disappoint the hopes of those who struggle, by ourselves giving up what has been our most precious acquisition and their star of hope? And is this change to be brought about by the secret machinations of a small group of our own interested officials against the will of the people? In the century that is past the British empire has waged almost perpetual wars for conquest and power, with the result that her people are the most poverty-stricken in western Europe, and according to her own statistics have degenerated greatly physically. Our splendid Canadian of Toronto, Mr. McDonald, tells as a peace argument how the men of his clan in Scotland have dwindled in size as a result of the wars of the empire—if we send out our young men into imperial wars we shall likewise attain riches for a few munitions makers and bankers now, but poverty and degeneration for the nation at large, and final extinction as a republic for all.

Will our presidential candidates make clear their position on foreign alliance and war? One profoundly wise suggestion on
what we should have instead of war was reported in the New York Times last spring, in an interview with Henry Ford, which was that we should spend one-fourth as much money as a war would cost us in trying to find out who gets up and disseminates this agitation for war. If either President Wilson or Mr. Hughes will announce a policy of friendship with all nations and entangling alliances with none and will pledge himself to such an investigation as Ford suggested, the votes cast for Ford in the primaries assure him an overwhelming majority. A Ford policy of peace and investigation, or a secret and Rhodes imperial policy of wars—which shall it be?

God give us wisdom, and preserve our republic to be a friend and guide to the nations. God speed the right!