MISCELLANEOUS.

"LA GUERRE QUI VIENT."

BY A. KAMPMEIER.

In 1911 a pamphlet was given out by the publishers of the Guerre Sociale in Paris under the title La guerre qui vient, by Francis Delaisie. It is interesting to see how some things of which the author wrote five years ago happened literally when the war broke out. An English translation has been published side by side with the French by Small, Maynard and Co., and the essentials of the document are summed up as follows in the Kölnische Volkszeitung:

When Delaisie wrote in the midst of peace in May, 1911, to speak of a possible or probable war seemed folly at first sight. The world has long been lulled into pacific dreams! And yet he said that even then a terrible war between England and Germany was being prepared.

England had a double plan. (1.) To encircle Germany by a system of alliances which will leave her isolated in Europe without military and financial aid in her hour of danger. Thus we saw Edward VII making advances to France in 1903 and negotiating with her men of finance upon whom he bestowed Morocco (which, by the way, did not belong to him). Soon afterwards he became reconciled to the Czar by making some concessions in Persia and the Balkans. He attempted to get Italy out of the Triple Alliance by offering her Albania. He stirred up anew the old dislike of the Hungarians for the Germans. With money and advice he helped the Young Turks to overthrow Abdul Hamid who had become too closely allied with William II. Soon Germany was entirely surrounded by hostile powers and obliged to face her enemies alone. (2) At the same time England began great preparations for war. English engineers built the first dreadnoughts. Then all the larger armored cruisers, till then stationed in all the seas to protect the empire in which "the sun does not set," were called back and concentrated in the ports of the mother country.

The war will be a commercial war. For this reason there will be a return to the old procedure of privateering and continental blockade. It would be to England's advantage to stop the German imports and exports and thus to cripple German industries. For this reason Hamburg and Bremen must be blockaded. The London government further will make use of its prestige by concluding customs treaties with different countries; it will take for itself all orders for rails for railroad construction, and everywhere possible create preserves for itself as in the case of Morocco and Egypt.

Even according to the view of the English admiralty the purpose of the future war is to shut up the German ports, to capture the German merchant navy, to cut off the supply of the German factories and prevent the export
of German wares. It is a kind of continental blockade which will be a repetition of that in the time of Napoleon I.

So far we have spoken as if the workshops on the Rhine, in Saxony and Silesia could only be supplied by way of Bremen and Hamburg. This is not exact. There are two ports which play an almost equally important role in German industrial life. These are Rotterdam and, more important, Antwerp.

Rotterdam, not far from the mouth of the Rhine, is sought by thousands of ships which run up the river and bring to the iron works and spinning-mills of Westphalia their necessary raw material, iron ores, cotton and wool. Likewise Antwerp on the broad Schelde is much nearer than Bremen to Essen. Rhenish industries get very much of their raw material via Antwerp and the Belgian railways, and they export the largest part of their products by the same route. Antwerp and Rotterdam have become two great intermediate storing places for German industries. Speaking economically they are two German cities though politically they are foreign to Germany, Rotterdam being in Holland and Antwerp in Belgium. This is a fact of greatest importance. Therefore the government of George V must try with all its might to close both ports.

Belgium is, as we know, a neutral country. The neighboring states have bound themselves by treaty to respect its territory in case of war. This is a great difficulty for England, for it is indispensable to England to close the harbor of Antwerp, and she cannot enter Antwerp without violating the treaty. For England to triumph over Germany Antwerp must be closed; for Germany to withstand England Antwerp must remain open. For both nations it is a vital question.

Therefore the fate of both empires will be decided in the neighborhood of Antwerp. In the Belgian plains will be fought the battle between the two great industrial nations for the economic dominion over the Old World. As has been said, England, in order to starve out German industries, must unconditionally blockade Antwerp. If Germany gets ahead Antwerp must be taken by land. But in this case the modus operandi changes; war on land takes the place of a blockade by sea.

England must land troops in Belgium to bar the way of the Prussian army and throw it back on the Rhine and the Meuse. That is why Lord Kitchener, the great English general, spoke the famous words: "The borders of the British Empire in Europe are not the Straits of Dover, but the line of the Meuse,"—a peculiar statement showing how Belgian neutrality is regarded.

But with what troops will England occupy these borders? About this the London cabinet is perplexed. It is well known that England has no compulsory military service. England alone in Europe has avoided laying upon its subjects the heavy burden of a "national army." But in spite of this the English must have troops to occupy Belgium and to throw back the Prussians upon the line of the Meuse. Since they had no troops in their country they thought of France. They said to themselves: "We have no soldiers but France has them. There across the channel is a fine, large, well-trained and well-supplied army sufficient to withstand the Germans. The French people are brave, they are warlike; they love war and know how to wage it. If only the great words 'national honor,' 'the higher interests of the fatherland' and 'civilization' are suggested to them they will go to war. Let us try to win the French army. This will not be difficult. French democracy is only an orna-
ment. In fact that nation is governed by only a small number of men of finance and large industries, who control both press and politicians. Let us bargain with these men. Let us promise them some important war loans by which their banks will receive good commissions; let us bind ourselves that they shall receive concessions for railways in Turkey and some important enterprises in Syria, Ethiopia and Morocco. And for a few millions they will sell us the French army."

England is not given to illusions regarding French military ability; very probably she suspects that we shall be beaten in the Belgian plains and perhaps find a second Waterloo. But (argues the French author) we shall have forced Germany to bear the expense of a double war upon sea and land and at the same time to pay out many millions for her land army, instead of using those millions to repair or replace her battleships. We thus will have contributed to empty her treasury and the Emperor with his funds exhausted will be forced to capitulate. That will be a triumph for George V. Very probably France will be partly occupied, robbed, and be burdened for a whole generation with an enormous war indemnity, but England will have overcome her rival. After Germany is beaten and France weakened she will once more have regained and fortified her unconditional superiority over the world.

At the present time there are negotiations going on with England regarding a military convention. In case of a conflict with Germany the British fleet would protect our channel coast and our troops would march upon Antwerp. But if it pleases the Foreign Office in London to begin the fight their diplomats will know how to arrange matters in such a way that they will put the responsibility upon the opponent, and we shall be obliged to go to war to help King George V in compliance with a "defensive" agreement.

If only the thought of a "German danger" has first found sufficient root in France, then some fine night the English battleships will sail under full steam to Flushing. At the same hour, or almost at the same time, the Prussian regiments will start on fast trains from Aix-la-Chapelle to Antwerp. Immediately the French government will stop, as usual, all dispatches, all letters, that might give notice of the movements of the troops. Then an official notice will be given to the press. The next day in all papers the words will appear in type as high as one's hand: "The neutrality of Belgium is violated! The Prussian army is marching upon Lille!"

At this terrible news, repeated through the million voices of the press, the peasant, the small patriotic citizen, the poorly informed laborer, will place himself at the disposal of the army. Without time for reflection they will be carried in stock cars to the Belgian plains. The German army, thus hindered in its march toward Antwerp, will fall upon them.

And thus, through the cunning of a small group of financiers and diplomats, a great people will be involved in a war it did not want.

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The book is remarkable for the deep insight which the author displays in the character of English diplomacy. He knew in 1911 that the war would come and he stated the reason, pointing out that England would not tolerate Germany's industrial and commercial rivalry: And the purpose of the book was to prevent his country from becoming ensnared in the meshes of English

1 Italics are the translator's.
intrigues. He advised France to remain neutral. He said if England and Germany have to enter into a fratricidal war let them fight it out alone. Both want an alliance with France; England wants the assistance of her army, Germany needs her gold. Germany has not capital enough to wage a protracted war against wealthy Albion. Let France refuse her army to England and her money to Germany; the wisest policy will be for her to remain neutral. Delaisie's advice was not followed by the French government and France accepted the tempting inducements of England's proposals. The time may come when the French people will regret that France did not listen to the warning voice of the prophet who understood the signs of the times better than her politicians and other influential men who led the country on the wrong path to a terrible national disaster implied in this dreadful war waged only in the interest of Great Britain.

VENICE AND THE DARDANELLES.

In the seventeenth century Venice represented the maritime power of the Mediterranean. She was the England of that age and commanded a navy which in size was out of all proportion to the city on the lagoons of the Northern Adriatic. Venice possessed many islands so fortunately situated that her rich patricians were in virtual command of the sea. But by the time the Turks invaded Europe Venice had lost her traditional vigor; the leaders had grown too rich to still be animated by the spirit of conquest, and Venice lost one possession after another. The battle at Lepanto gave the island of Cyprus to the Turks. Then Venice ventured once more to try to overcome the new power which began to be a serious menace to Europe, and she sent a powerful fleet to the Dardanelles in order to break through the straits and attack the new Turkish capital at Constantinople. But it was the last great effort of the famous old city. All her attacks were repelled with heavy loss, and here her power was fatally broken so that she never recovered her former glory. Soon afterward Jussef Pasha landed on the island of Crete and took one city after another without meeting serious resistance on the part of the Venetians, and after him the grand vizier Mohammed Kopril, an Albanian by descent, completed the subjugation of this important island. In 1657, when the Venetians once more renewed the attack on the Dardanelles this latter chief succeeded in annihilating their fleet, and the disaster put an end to Venetian maritime power in the eastern Mediterranean. Our frontispiece represents the Venetian attack in 1646.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.


This latest addition to the list of books dealing with the modern drama in its international aspect has great merits. It is an essay in interpretation of the modern drama, or rather of the naturalistic drama, which in the opinion of the author (and the writer of this review) is the only broad and vital drama. In his short preface the author states that his aim is to give an account of the modern drama with historical orderliness and intellectual