THE POPE AND HIS CRITICS.

BY J. MATTEN.

"...Le pape Benedictus ayant maudit l'Antéchrist, il sera proclamé que ceux qui le combattent se trouvent en état de grâce et, s'ils meurent, vont au ciel tout droit, comme les martyrs... On reconnaîtra l'Antéchrist à plusieurs traits... il aura un aigle dans ses armes et il y en a un aussi dans celles de son acolyte, l'autre mauvais monarque. Mais celui-là est chrétien, et il mourra de la malédiction du pape Benedictus, qui sera élu au début du règne de l'Antéchrist...."—Prophétie du frère Johannès, XVIIe siècle, from Les Prédictions sur la fin de l'Allemagne réunies et commentées par R. d'Arman.

ROBERT DELL in "The Vatican and the War"¹ admits that when the news of Cardinal Giacomo della Chiesa's election to the office of St. Peter reached France "the French press congratulated itself on his alleged Francophile tendencies, and some of the more adventurous papers formed more or less fantastic anticipations of his possible action." "A few days later," so Dell continues, "the absurd report was circulated that the new pope was about to issue an encyclical on the war, in which he would declare that the responsibility for it rested on Germany," and "other reports equally baseless followed."

The unbiased observer will find in these admissions the psychological basis for the genuine disappointment caused in France and England by the attitude of a pope who was expected to be Francophile, but who was found to be wanting in such a qualification; by the silence of a pope who, as the prophet had been made to forecast, would hurl his anathema in the face of William II, the Antichrist, his ally, the other "bad monarch," and their hordes of barbarians.

¹ Fortnightly Review, Feb., 1915.
Years ago Dr. Della Chiesa had attracted the late Cardinal Rampolla's attention, and when the latter was appointed apostolic nuncio to the court of Spain he invited his protégé to accompany him as his secretary. Their relations at Madrid and later on in Rome are described in an article by Dr. E. J. Dillon, "The Pope and the Belligerents."² "In this capacity," so we read, "the young priest had an opportunity, which he utilized to the full, of familiarizing himself with the modes of thought, the tactics, and the methods of his eminent chief, whose trusted confidant he soon became. Promoted in 1887 to the post of secretary of state, Cardinal Rampolla took Monsignore della Chiesa for his private secretary, and later on Leo XIII testified his appreciation of his services by appointing him adjoint state secretary."

It is this patronage bestowed on Giacomo della Chiesa by Cardinal Rampolla and the undisguised recognition of Chiesa's attachment and services to his chief that had given rise to the illusion that he must, as a matter of course, have adopted his protector's strong and well-known favoritism for France.

However the illusion has been short-lived. The French and English verdict is that Benedict XV is not only not strong enough in his Francophile leanings, but that he has no such leanings at all. Indignation and anger at the realization of such an apparently very distressing truth have prompted Dr. Dillon, that knight of the poisoned pen, to accuse Cardinal della Chiesa of having simulated in the conclave the Francophile tendencies accredited to him, in order to win the French and Belgian cardinals' votes, while the German and Austrian prelates had been won by secretly apprising them of his real attitude toward France.³ Dillon's only attempt to prove this contemptible calumny is the glib assertion that "almost immediately after his accession to the Fisherman's chair he appointed the worldly Austrian churchman to the post of participante and the office of intimate counsellor to himself." This "worldly" Austrian churchman is Monsignor Gerlach, according to Dillon "one of the most compromising associates and dangerous mentors that any sovereign ever admitted to his privacy." Dillon is very careful to state that Monsignor Gerlach is "described"..."as a man...of German Christianity, who when in Vienna consorted with ecclesiastics of the type depicted by Poggio and incarnated by French abbés of the free and easy days of the Regency, when many an

ecclesiastic practised the rule of the monks of the Screw, of which
the first ran:

“My children, be chaste—till you’re tempted;
    When sober, be wise and discreet;
    And humble your bodies with fasting
    Whenever you’ve nothing to eat.”

“Years ago,” so Dillon continues his denunciation of Gerlach—and
by innuendo of the pope—“the story runs [again he is careful
—he lets the “story run”], Gerlach made the acquaintance of a
worldly-minded papal nuntius in the fashionable salons of gay
Vienna, and, being of similar tastes and proclivities, the two
enjoyed life together, eking out the wherewithal for their costly
amusements in speculations on the exchange.... Some years ago
Gerlach’s name emerged above the surface of private life in Rome
in connection with what the French term un drame passionel, which
led to violent scenes in public and to a number of duels later on.”
With a brazenness usually found only where conscientiousness has
ceded to be a virtue Dillon ventures to assert that the only quali-
fications of Monsignor Gerlach for the position to which the pope
has appointed him were the “Pan-Germanism of the favorite and
his intimate knowledge of the accommodements qu’il y a avec le
ciel.”

Quite a different view on the subject of papal appointments
is expressed in the following passage from Current Opinion, Oct.,
1914: “Observers of the situation at the Vatican insist that the
appointments of Benedict XV, few as they have been, indicate a
complete departure from the [alleged pro-German] policy of the
last pontificate.” The policy of the last pontificate was that of Pius
X, and especially that of his secretary of state, Mery del Val. Of
Mery del Val’s administration one Giovanni Pioli says that it was
“unscrupulous, cynically dishonest,” a “forge of Macchiavellism,”
that it was “conducted by all available means—from corruption by
money in order to induce delation of friends, and misuse of con-
fession in order to discover modernists, to the systematic disfigure-
ment of truth, the habitual belying of public utterances and private
engagements, the misrepresentation of the intentions even of such
respectable bodies as that of the ‘Assembly of the French Bishops’
and the question of the ‘Cultuelles’”—and in addition to all this it
was, as Dell informs us, “pro-German.”

Commenting on Cardinal Della Chiesa’s election to the chair
of St. Peter, Current Opinion, Oct., 1914, finds that with the ap-

pointment of Cardinal Domenico Ferrata (the intimate friend of Cardinal Mercier, the present prelate of Belgium), as Benedict's secretary of state, all this was changed, for "the significance of the conspicuous position assumed by Cardinal Ferrata in the new pontificate is due to his championship of the French republic always and everywhere." And while Dillon in ill-disguised wrath designates as the "pope's mentor and guide through the labyrinth of intellectual politics" the "worldly Austrian churchman" Gerlach, "this man of violent Pan-German sentiments," Current Opinion considers Ferrata, the champion of "the French republic always and everywhere," as "the adviser of the new pope in all that relates to international affairs." Of the "Austrian churchman" Gerlach and his past and present activities we know, aside from Dillon's gossip, next to nothing; of Ferrata we do know that his secretaryship lasted about one month, for he died on October 10, 1914.

The encyclical, so eagerly awaited by the French and English, appeared. It was however no thundering bull excommunicating old Emperor Francis Joseph, nor did it absolve the German Catholics from their oath of allegiance to William II, the heretic, the Antichrist, or as Dillon so lovingly calls him, Attila's admirer and imitator. Nay! In it his Holiness did not even consent to do the Allies that small favor of declaring "that the responsibility for it [the war] rested on Germany." One can hardly appreciate the extent and bitterness of the Allies', and especially France's, disappointment at the pope's obstreperousness, unless one takes into consideration the amazing yet undeniable fact that the French, high and low, seem to have actually relied on the new pope to act in accordance with what the prophets of the past and near past were supposed or said to have predicted he would do to the "Antichrist" with the "eagle in his arms" and to his "acolyte, the other bad monarch." Among the scores of French books on "the war of to-morrow," issued during the last twenty years by French civilians and high officers of the army, there are not a few in which the optimistic view of a French victory over Germany is based on prophecy. One of the most illuminating creations of this character is a brochure published about three years ago, entitled La fin de l'empire d'Allemagne. La bataille du Champ des Bouleaux, by Commandant de Civrieux, with a preface by Commandant Driant, Deputy of Nancy. On its cover this charming booklet bears the reproduction of a "memorial tablet"
showing, below a conspicuous cross, the following tell-tale inscription:

“Ainsi
En l’an 191...
Selon les prédictions de la
Célèbre Prophétie de Strasbourg
Au Champ des Bouleaux
En Westphalie
Une génération et demie après sa fondation
Périt
Avec le troisième et dernier Kaiser
L’empire allemand des Hohenzollern.”

The same pamphlet announces the issue of another of these silent but striking proofs of French mental aberration.

Les prédictions sur la fin de l’Allemagne, réunies et commentées par R. D’Arman is the title of a collection of all that could be distorted into a prediction of Germany’s downfall and the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty as Germany’s reigning house, covering the ground from Civrieux’s aforementioned prophecy of Herman of Strasburg of the thirteenth century down to Admiral Nogi’s utterance of Port Arthur fame and Madame de Thèbes’s annual almanac contributions. The bottomless depth of naiveté, a naiveté found among other nations only in their kindergartens and among the senile and insane, is revealed in the preface which in all earnestness admits that “William II and his people have known better than anybody the predictions made concerning the present war and concerning the end of their empire....and that even this knowledge has not hindered the Kaiser and the crown prince from forcing us to enter the present conflict!” How deep-rooted French reliance and belief in these prophecies is can be judged from another gem found in the same preface. Here it is: “Considered in their totality the predictions which we cite in this work suggest a remark still more elevating and encouraging for France: So many prophecies from sources so varied, so old, as if they were the consequence of an identical tendency, and as if, in this case, they demonstrated that there existed in the world throughout the course of centuries a universal, immutable opinion essentially favorable to France against her enemies. This is indeed une force immense.”

6 “Thus, according to the predictions of the famous prophet of Strasburg, perished on the Birchfield in Westphalia the German empire of the Hohenzollern with its third and last Kaiser in the year 191..., a generation and a half after its foundation.”
One of the prophecies found in D'Arman's "work," that by "Frère Johannès" (1600), contains this passage: "One will no more see priests and monks hold confessions and absolve the combattants; first, because for the first time priests and monks will fight with the other citizens, and then because the pope Benedictus, having cursed the Antichrist, will proclaim that those who combat him [the Antichrist] will be in a state of grace and, if killed, will go right to heaven like the martyrs.

"The Bull [the expected and disappointing encyclical] that will proclaim these things will reverberate far and wide; it will revive courage and it will cause the death of the ally of the Antichrist.

"One will know the Antichrist by various signs.... He will bear in his arms an eagle, and an eagle will be found in those of his acolyte, the other bad monarch.

"The latter, however, is a Christian [a Catholic] and he will die in consequence of the malediction of Pope Benedictus who will be elected at the close of the reign of the Antichrist."

As the world is aware, the present pope, Benedict XV, has failed to act true to "prophecy." Hence the maddening effect upon the disappointed Allies caused by the encyclical which did not contain a malediction for nor an incrimination of the Central Powers. In fact, most of the critics of the encyclical, on the Allies' side, see in it an unveiled accusation that France and her allies are responsible for the war. It is however hard to see how anything but a guilty conscience could justify such an interpretation. The encyclical Ad Beatissimi enumerates as the causes of the war: Lack of mutual and sincere love among men; contempt of authority; injustice on the part of one class of people toward another; and the consideration of material welfare as the sole object of human activity. Commenting on these causes of the war as designated by the pope a more or less impartial American critic, the Brooklyn Eagle, observes: "The pope knows of course that it is obedience to temporal authority that makes men fight. By 'contempt of authority' he means the denial of a divine standard of morals and conduct. That the lack of love and social injustice exist and have their effect on the minds of all men cannot be denied. But the fourth cause stated, in a sense, includes all others." The Brooklyn Eagle, as is apparent, does not construe the causes given in the encyclical as a plain or veiled accusation of the Allies, in fact it unmistakably shows that it considers the pope's statements as an impartial arraignment of all that is and all that are subject to criticism. "If material

7 Literary Digest, Dec. 5, 1914.
welfare were the sole object of human activity,” so the Eagle continues, “then Germany might well think, as she does, that her vast army should be used at the psychological moment to make safe her trade predominance, and England might well think that she should seize the psychological moment to crush the trade of Germany. The pope is right. Our ideals are defective. And from defective ideals all evils spring.”

Robert Dell, in the article quoted above, takes a different view, a view characteristic of the criticism voiced in the countries forming the new “Holy Alliance.” “Catholic writers,” so he opines, “have said as little about it [the encyclical] as they could help, and they seem to be generally agreed that it had better be consigned to oblivion as soon as possible. From their point of view they are right enough, for the encyclical makes it obvious on which side are the pope’s sympathies during the present war. As M. Julien de Narfon remarked in the Figaro, it is a little strange that the pope should attribute the war to a lack of respect for authority, seeing that in Germany respect for authority is, if anything, exaggerated. It would be more than a little strange if the pope were not on the side of Germany and Austria, as he obviously is. The encyclical is a scarcely veiled attack on France and, in a lesser degree, on England and Belgium. The whole burden is that the crimes of democracy are the ‘root cause’ of the war; the democratic countries engaged in the war are France, England and Belgium. That France is particularly aimed at is patent. Which of the belligerent nations has separated itself from ‘the Holy Religion of Jesus Christ,’ that is, from the Roman church? France. In which, more than any other, have men proclaimed (in papal language) ‘that striving after brotherhood is one of the greatest gifts of modern civilization, ignoring the teaching of the gospel, and setting aside the work of Christ and his church’? In France. In which has socialism taken the strongest hold and class antagonism been keenest? In France. In which have ‘the plastic minds of children been moulded in godless schools’? In France. In which have Catholic bishops consistently denounced the ‘bad press’? In France.” These views of what France is or is not do not however agree with the picture Dr. Dillon places before us. “Welcoming the accession of a friend and disciple of Rampolla’s,” so Dillon writes, “they imagined he would at once change the orientation of the Vatican policy toward France and the Triple Entente. In France the outbreak and progress of the war coincided with a general revival of religion among the

people, which was fomented by the patriotic demeanor of the bishops and the clergy. Some of the most brilliant French generals were known to be devout Catholics. Many of the most daring soldiers were French priests. Cardinal Amette, the archbishop of Paris, proved one of the truest exponents of the patriotism that thrilled all French hearts. In a word, the ground was cleared as it had not been for half a century, and all that was needed was an enterprising pope to have it cultivated. But Benedict XV acted on the maxim that the weal of the whole church which unites all belligerent catholics in its fold must be preferred to the well-being of a part. Sympathy he feels for each and all, but he cannot allow the working of either sympathy or indignation visibly to influence his relations with the peoples who are its objects. He is their spiritual chief, not their political leader!” Dillon here states unmistakably that the pope considers himself to be and has acted as the spiritual chief of all the nations at war and not as their political leader. Dillon therefore must and does produce reasons other than political for the pope’s alleged leanings toward the Central Powers. So he reminds his readers of the fact that at the outbreak of the war the “Allied Powers were practically unrepresented at the Vatican... The Teutons, on the contrary, were in force.” Hence he thinks that “most of the information respecting the diplomatic negotiations which preceded the rupture and setting forth the position and aims of Germany and her ally, reached the organs of the Vatican after having been filtered and colored by these interested agents,” and that “there was no corrective available.” “If,” so he continues, “we add to this decisive fact the circumstance that the story thus told was also the narrative which was calculated to meet the wishes of those who heard it, we cannot affect surprise at the strong Germanophile leanings which are still noticeable at the Vatican.” However Dr. Dillon realizes and admits that naturally the pope’s interest should lie with the Catholic Hapsburg monarchy rather than with schismatic England and Russia, that the latter especially was viewed with disfavor on account of its undeniable hatred for Catholicism and particularly because its representative at the Vatican could hardly find an excuse for Russia’s untimely “work of conversion” in the newly conquered province of Galicia. It is true that “at the eleventh hour the British government bestirred itself and sent Sir Henry Howard as minister and plenipotentiary extraordinary to represent British interests at the Vatican... but his task was rendered extremely difficult long before it was set him.” Dr. Dillon considers “this mission” as “opportune” and states that “the work it has ac-
complished has been rapid and useful.” But on this point the Allies’ sages are again at odds. Dell is of the opinion that the Vatican, in order to stand in well with the Allies in the improbable event of their victory, “has made desperate efforts to enter into diplomatic relations with England and France in order, when the time comes, to put forward its claims,” and that “the English government, with the extraordinary simplicity that English governments invariably show in dealing with the Vatican, has allowed itself to be duped.” He believes that “if Sir Henry Howard has really gone to Rome merely to lay the case for the Allies before the pope, his mission will be as useless as it is undignified.” The same critic disagrees most fundamentally with Dillon on the reasons for the pope’s alleged pro-German leanings. He suggests that the pope’s personal views in the matter have no bearings on his or rather the Vatican’s public stand. To him the pope is and must be first of all a politician who places the Vatican’s interest and welfare above all, even above his conscience. That is at least what I read out of the following:

“Whatever the personal sympathies of Cardinal della Chiesa may have been—and there is no particular reason to believe that they were especially Francophile—Benedict XV is bound to consider the interests of the papacy. The policy of the Vatican will only be understood when it is realized that the papacy is bound by its principles to put self-preservation and the maintenance of its domination before everything else. . . . But this is the logical consequence of the whole theory of the papacy, which identifies religion with itself, so that its own interests become the highest interests in religion. If it were true that the guardianship of divine revelation had been committed to the pope and that its existence in the world depended on the existence of the papacy, it would follow that the papacy must consider first its own preservation, even if it involved losing a whole nation to the church or drenching the world in blood. No disaster could be so great as the disappearance of the papacy. This is the key to the policy of the Vatican.” While so far Dell differs from Dillon, the two agree on the reasons why the Vatican, whatever its principles and inner motives may be, must in the present war find the “interests of the papacy” in a “victory for Germany and Austria.” “There is,” so Dell admits, “not a single Catholic country among the Allies, for, although Belgium has a Catholic government at present, half the Belgian people are freethinkers. England is heretical. Russia, Serbia and Montenegro are schismatic; Japan is pagan, and France is freethinking. Austria, on the other hand, is the only great Catholic power left in the world, and her downfall would be a disastrous
blow to the papacy. Should the Austrian empire break up, Spain would be the only Catholic state left. It is impossible that the papacy should contemplate such a possibility without dismay." But there is another valiant pro-Allies critic who on this point most decidedly contradicts both Dillon and Dell; it is Stephen Graham, the champion of "Holy" Russia. In his recent marvelous book, *Russia and the World*, page 194, he pronounces, with an air that permits of no questioning, "the fact" that "Rome stands to gain far more from the success of the Allies than from German domination." "German success," so he asserts, "means a stronger Protestant influence in the world generally—it means certainly a stronger influence in Austria; even the unification of the German and Austrian empires is possible. On the other hand the success of Russia means, or ought to mean, I presume, the establishment of the Poles as a nation once more, though under the protection of the Czar." Graham pretends to believe, and asks the world to do the same, that "what Rome has lost in France she can make up in autonomous Poland (and autonomous Ireland) when once the war has ended in the dispersal of the German dream of empire." For "Poland, if restored, would be a great Roman Catholic country" and "of that there can be no doubt."

An American Catholic priest, requested by the *Outlook* to give his views on the election of Benedict XV, sums up the situation as follows: "If Germany should win and enslave Europe, he [the pope] will have to contend with the same arrogant spirit that created the Falk laws and the *Kulturkampf*. Should the Allies prove victorious, Rome will be most intimately brought in contact with the overwhelming power of the Greek Orthodox church, its most deadly enemy. The triumph of Russia will sound the death knell of Roman Catholicism in Europe...." (*The Outlook*, Sept. 9, 1914). The American reverend's fear that a victorious Germany might enslave the world could easily be banished by a little study of Germany's policy and aspirations from sources other than the London-New York press and disconnected and falsified citations from Treitschke, Nietzsche and Bernhardi. The assumption that the history of the Falk laws and the *Kulturkampf* could repeat itself to-day is an error explicable and excusable only by the reverend's apparent lack of appreciation of the strength of the German Catholic population and the force of its representation in the Reichstag. That Russia's triumph would "sound the death-knell of Roman Catholicism in Europe" has been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt by the

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religious persecutions practised during her short occupancy of a section of ancient Poland, and it is this ill-treatment of Catholic Galicia that refutes Graham's utterly insincere claim that the Catholicism of Poland would be respected by a victorious Russia. Interesting and instructive in this connection is a pamphlet issued in London four months before the outbreak of the war (re-issued in this country in 1915 with additional evidence) by Vladimir Stepankovsky, a Ukranian from Russia. Stepankovsky reveals in detail the astounding fact that Russia, for years before the war, has been carrying on in Austrian territory a well-developed secret political and religious campaign aimed at the seizure of Galicia by a coup d'état. Valentin Gorlof in his Origines et bases de l'alliance Franco-Russe (Paris, 1913), attempts to belittle Russia's treasonable activity in another man's land, Galicia. He attempts to turn the tables, charging that "Austria, through her persecution of the Orthodox, and seeing everywhere Russian intrigues," has succeeded in making out of Galicia a "Russian Alsace-Lorraine." Gorlof's flippant reference to Galicia as a Russian Alsace-Lorraine and his assertion, unsupported by anything like proof, that Austria had persecuted the Orthodox in Galicia or in the Bukowina have been effectively answered by the findings of the various Ruthenian treason trials of 1913 and 1914, and by Stepankovsky's revelations. To speak of the Ruthenians of Galicia as Orthodox is nothing short of a misrepresentation. According to Stepankovsky "nine-tenths of the Ruthenians in Austria-Hungary belong to the Greek Catholic or Uniate church. The Ruthenian Greek Catholic church, although it employs, in common with the Orthodox, the Eastern Rite, in dogma is at one with the church of Rome....it preserves the marriage of the clergy, yet is subject to the pope." It was among these Greek Catholic Ruthenians, subject to the pope, that Count Bobrinsky and his associates carried on their proselyting and "con- trived to effect some conversions among the illiterate peasants of the remote, mountainous regions." Finally Antonius of the Russian province Volhynia proclaimed himself the Orthodox bishop of Galicia. It was of such conditions and of the widespread political Pan-Slav propaganda that the Austrian government through the Ruthenian treason trials attempted to make an end when the war broke out and when Galicia for a time came under the actual rule of the Czar. Count Bobrinsky, the former agitator, was made governor general of the conquered province. In his "inaugural

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address" he informed the mayor of Lemberg of the "leading principles of my policy." Lemberg and eastern Galicia he considered as the "real origin of Great Russia." Hence: "the reorganization will be based on Russian ideals." Hence: "we will immediately introduce the Russian language and Russian customs." Hence: Archbishop Sheptitsky, Catholic primate of Lemberg, was arrested and deported, and the Russian Orthodox bishop Euloge occupied Sheptitsky's seat. Even Dr. Dillon ("The Pope and the Belligerents") admits that "history is there to attest Russia's uniform hatred of Catholicism," that "the chronicle of daily life in the newly conquered province of Galicia contains abundant evidence that the spirit of aggressive proselytism is still rampant," and that "the present governor of Galicia is a Russian whose name has a sinister sound in Catholic ears." Church dignitaries in Rome, so Dillon states, have asked this ominous question: "Was it necessary ....that he should depose a Ruthenian bishop and send him into exile? Even as a matter of policy was it not incumbent on him to defer the 'work of conversion' until military occupation had passed into annexation and avoid giving Russia's enemies a lethal weapon against her?...But if at the present unseasonable moment the authorities of Czardom indulge in religious prosecution at such loss of prestige to themselves, what may we not expect when it can be organized without any risk or fear of effectual protest?"...A Catholic Poland, if a united Poland should ever be placed under Russian suzerainty? No, Mr. Graham's assurances to that effect will hardly be taken seriously among his own following. "Russia," to quote Dillon, "therefore finds little favor at the Vatican."

Further cause for the most violent criticism is found in the passage of the encyclical in which the pontiff joins "to the desire of a speedy peace among nations....also the desire for the cessation of the abnormal conditions in which the head of the church is placed and which is in many respects very harmful to the tranquility of the people themselves," or still another passage in which, as Dell is pleased to express it, the pope "raises once more the old parrot-cry that the papacy is not free," when Benedict complains that "for a long time past the church has not enjoyed that full freedom which it needs—never since the sovereign pontiff, its head, was deprived of that protection which by divine Providence had in the course of ages been set up to defend that freedom..." The phrase of the "prisoner in the Vatican" is too well known, and so is the fact that the pope is virtually a prisoner too well established to permit of a denial. Still Dell claims that "the effrontery of asking the world to believe
that the papacy is not free at a moment when a conclave has just been held at Rome in the middle of a European war, free for the first time for centuries from any outside interference, takes one’s breath away.” Be it remembered that the conclave was held when Italy was still at peace and that when Italy entered the war the Teutonic representatives left the Vatican, taking up residence in Switzerland. Italian statesmen of late have asserted that this step was due to the pope’s decision and not to a demand or pressure from the Italian government. While it must be admitted that so far the Italian government’s attitude toward the Vatican has been tolerant it is equally true that Article 11 of the Italian guarantee law merely affords protection for the diplomatic intercourse of the Vatican with foreign powers for the time when Italy is at peace, and that in time of war Italy may by legislative act revoke that guarantee. In fact during the parliamentary debate on the guarantee law Deputy Corte in an amendment expressly demanded the abolition of all diplomatic privileges of the pope in time of war. However the chamber declared the question to be superfluous. Hence the pope’s decision has proved to be wise. To this we must all the more readily agree when we read the savage criticism of the pope’s attitude by Dillon.11 “When”—so Dillon thunders—“[in addition to the representatives of Prussia, Bavaria and Austria] harmless foreigners like the learned head of the Benedictines and the pious priest Ledochowski [general of the Jesuits]—both men who eschew politics—were admonished to quit the kingdom of Italy as subjects of a belligerent enemy, the pope covered the Austrian plot-weaver [the same Gerlach whom Dillon considers the pope’s all-powerful adviser] with his protecting wing, shares with him the exterritoriality of the Vatican, allows him to communicate in cipher with the band of Austrians and Germans who are watching and praying in Swiss Lugano, and is content to survey international politics through the distorting medium of his Pan-Germanism.”

The remarks of a London daily, made prior to the death of the late pope,12 will suffice to silence Dell’s and Dillon’s criticism. This is what the London paper had to say on the subject: “The presence of pope and king side by side in Rome would probably be more embarrassing to both parties were the pontiff to issue forth from the Vatican than is the existing arrangement where there is no conflict of jurisdiction or influence. But we have seen from the late illness of Pius X that the ‘incarceration’ of a man of active

habits in a not overhealthy palace year in and year out is detrimental, 

nay more, may be fatal, to the unhappy victim. Many a medieval 
pope died of the wintry cold of the Lateran: modern pontiffs, unless 
they have the frame of a Leo XIII, may succumb to the summer 
heat of the Vatican, with their eyes longingly fixed on that cool 
and breezy papal villa in the Alban Hills, which is "so near and 
yet so far." Nor is this "imprisonment" in the Vatican detrimental 
to health alone; it has exercised an adverse effect upon the policy, 
and especially the foreign policy, of the Holy See. A pope who 
cannot travel, who cannot have free intercourse outside with all 
sorts and conditions of men, is naturally cut off from valuable 
means of information and becomes inevitably inclined to take the 
views of his environment. Under existing conditions the head of 
a universal church has all the disadvantages of a sovereign who 
cannot, like Harun-al-Raschid, go about and hear, alike for reasons 
of health and for reasons of statesmanship; but tradition dies hard 
there, and sufficient time has not yet elapsed for a new pope to 
arise who knew not the days of the temporal power." That the 
pope's reference to the church's "abnormal position" need not be 
interpreted as a demand for the reestablishment of temporal power 
is seen from the views expressed in the New York Nation of Jan. 
7, 1915. "The language," so the passage reads, "is guarded and 
moderate, and....it contains nothing that need be interpreted as 
anti-Italian or temporalistic. The statement that the Holy See is 
now in an equivocal and abnormal position, against which Catholics 
the world over have not ceased to protest, and that its liberties 
have been (somewhat) compromised and its freedom of action 
(somewhat) curtailed, is only the plain truth. If a claim of the 
temporal power be involved, it is only by induction and inter-
pretation."

Furthermore the Catholic church's views regarding the reestab-
lishment of the Holy See's temporal power are not the same as they 
were a generation ago. There can be no doubt that the Catholic 
world would view the re-erectio of the papal states in their old ex-
tent as an anomaly, even a papal Rome cannot be considered as in 
the scope of possibility or even desirability. There must be and 
there will be an amelioration of the intolerable position of the 
Holy See, but what that amelioration is to be is a question too large 
to be discussed in this connection. Dell is of the opinion that 
"there is....good reason to believe that Germany and Austria have 
pledged themselves, if not to restore the Temporal Power, at least 
to give some satisfaction to the papacy" and that "they would not
be sorry to humiliate Italy.”

There is indeed good reason to believe that Germany and Austria will see to it that “some satisfaction” be given to the pope when peace terms are settled, but it will not be in the desire and spirit of “humiliating” Italy.

Last, but not least, must be considered the criticism leveled at his Holiness because he “remained silent” while all the rest of the world grew hysterical about the stories of “alleged German atrocities,” the victims being, as the pope’s critics have it, “mostly Roman Catholic men and women.” Francis Tyrell has outdone all in his brochure, The Pope and the Great War. The Silence of Benedict XV. Can It Be Defended? His “pamphlet for thinking people of all denominations,” as he calls it, contains twenty-two pages of the most scathing arraignment of the pope, and nine pages of “extracts from the official records” of alleged “German atrocities in France and Belgium,” each extract being followed by Tyrell’s indictment of Benedict XV in the form of the refrain: “And the pope is silent.” Tyrell tries for effect by contrasting the dignity of the office and the failings of its present incumbent. Such extolling of the Holy See by a non-Catholic Englishman would appear to those who know English church history as almost comical were it not for the fact that the subject matter is too serious to permit one to hold Mr. Tyrell up to sheer ridicule. Thus I shall confine myself to a mere reductio ad absurdum.

What nation has ever vilified and besmirched “popery” as England has done? However it is not “popery” of which Tyrell speaks—it suits his purpose to use the more dignified terms “pope-dom,” “papacy,” “vicarage of Christ,” “ambassadorship of God.” It is the individual who occupies the exalted office whom he flays. The same “inmates of nunneries” who for centuries have been called names too vile to repeat, now, for the sake of argument, become “nuns” and “holy women.” The same “tools of popery” of the past are now spoken of as “priests” and “venerable cardinals.” The same “popery” which in times gone by has been accused of having sent out its robed servants to murder, by the administration of the poisoned eucharist or by other means equally foul and effective, disobedient kings, queens and suspected dignitaries of the church, the same “popery” now, when it is needed to serve the former accuser, is appealed to as the “supreme arbiter of truth and morals,” as the

13 According to an Associated Press despatch of Jan., 1914, the Corriere d’Italia, a Catholic organ, has in what is considered as an “inspired” article disclaimed any intention on the part of the pope to “count upon the European conflict for the solution of the Roman question, which, as Cardinal Gaspari said, will not be solved by force of arms.”
"power...that...expresses the rule of Christ upon the earth," whose duties are recognized to be none less than to "act and conform to and do all things on earth as the representative of, and in the spirit of...[its] Master were He in the flesh again." The same "popery" whose bulls used to elicit nothing but mockery and curse are now eagerly awaited and demanded in order to "make the lords of war tremble with fear and impotence."

Tyrell in scorn and wrath proclaims "the cold and frightful fact....that the pope—the greatest personage in the world—has not had the courage to raise his voice against the greatest wrong that has ever been perpetrated by one nation upon another—the violation and the ruin of Belgium"; that "the pope through motives of fear or policy has failed to condemn a monstrous international crime, and he has kept a sphinxlike peace while solemn neutrality treaties and Hague conventions were being reduced to worthless and discarded papers"; that "in the Belgian atrocities the pope has had all the material for such a protest [the expected encyclical] and condemnation"; that "if the spiritual driving force of the Catholic church is to be throttled by the worldly diplomacy of nuncios and the careful consideration of the 'war chances' of the respective belligerents, then the spiritual potency of the Catholic church is in a bad way"; that "the rationalists and the hostile critics of religion will put the whole Christian system on its trial"; that "they will single out the Roman church and its attitude throughout the war as a striking example of how far the Christians of this century have strayed from the path of Christ"; that "they will assert with damning conviction that at a time of the greatest crisis the world has ever known, at a time when every voice and every influence for the cause of civilization and humanity was of immeasurable value, the 'sitter in St. Peter's chair' remained dumb and made no protest to the world against the armored German giant when he trampled a little nation in the dust and violated all the sacred obligations which alone preserve the civilized peoples of the world from dissolving into anarchy and barbarism."

This line of argument and this kind of abuse seem to be the favorites of most of the pope's critics. One R. B. C. Sheridan, in an article, "The Vatican and the War," Part II,14 comes dangerously close to disputing Tyrell's place as the chief warrior against the pope. Both however, and in fact all of their lesser fellow warriors, are admonished by none less than the Right Reverend Monsignor

14 The Nineteenth Century and After, Oct., 1915.
Canon Moyes, D.D.,\textsuperscript{15} who maintains that “a papal condemnation shall be founded in the security of truth and justice,” that “it must be based upon facts that are judicially verified,” and that “it cannot rest upon mere press presentment of evidence, or upon common rumor or report, or upon depositions of \textit{ex parte} witnesses, however respectable, or upon any process which would neglect \textit{audi alteram partem}, or would include the yea of the complainants while excluding the nay of the accused.” Although Monsignor Moyes has an altogether unjustified belief in the convincing evidence of the Bryce report, he admits that “however much the pope may be personally convinced, if he is to act officially and judicially it is plain that he cannot base an accusation upon what is, despite its excellence, an \textit{ex parte} statement, emanating from one side only of the belligerent parties”; in fact Monsignor Moyes goes so far as to concede that “if the case were reversed, and if—\textit{per impossibile}—our [the English] troops had been accused of similar excesses, the Catholics of the British empire would have felt it keenly—more keenly than one could easily put into words!—if the Holy See had proceeded to launch a public denunciation against the honor of our army solely on the strength of a report drawn up by our adversaries.”

These reasons suggested by the Rev. J. Moyes are indeed the same that his Holiness through his secretary of state and in person has advanced. Under the heading, “Is England Trying to Force the Pope’s Hand?” the \textit{Literary Digest} for July 31, 1915, reports that “by recent newspaper dispatches it appears that Great Britain and Belgium are in the mood to force an issue with the Vatican. Sir Henry Howard, the British envoy.... has proffered a demand that the pope condemn the sinking of the Lusitania and Germany’s submarine warfare against merchant ships in general, also that he condemn the use of asphyxiating gases and the bombardment of unfortified coast towns.... The Belgian envoy, it is said, represents to Cardinal Gaspari, the papal secretary of state, that now is the opportune time for the pontiff’s voice to be heard, and Belgium demands of the pope that he condemn Germany’s violation of her neutrality.... ‘deploring the German atrocities and characterizing them as unjustified’”.... To this Cardinal Gaspary replied as quoted: “The Holy See, which is unable to make inquiry, finds itself unable to decide. In the present case however the German chancellor recognizes that it was a violation of international law, although declaring that it was legitimatized by military necessity.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, Part I.
Hence the invasion of Belgium was included in the consistorial allocution of January 22 reproving every injustice." Anent this reference to the mentioning of the invasion of Belgian territory in the allocution of January, 1915, Monsignor Moyes admits that "if this be so, it would follow that the pope has not only gone far but, if anything, even farther than he was bound to go, in condensation of the violated neutrality," and he adds that "the Belgian minister himself, Baron Von Heuvel, recognized that the pope 'could go no further.'" Still, R. B. C. Sheridan announces that "the papal theory has been tried by a supreme test and has been found wanting." He is of the opinion that "the Roman church in France and Belgium will never completely recover from the blow caused by the revelation that the See of Peter had, at the crucial moment, no publishable opinions upon the martyrdom of Belgium," and he even advises Belgium and France to punish the pope "by taking the necessary steps to emancipate themselves from his tutelage" and by "a shrewd guess" he sees a close union of the Anglican and Gallic churches with that of Russia. "The Russian religion"—so he proclaims—"is available as a model for the restoration of autonomous French and Belgian national churches, which, freed from papal obstruction, could apply themselves to the task of reconsidering the dogmatic accretions which would still hereafter separate the Western church from the Orthodox East." Mgr. Moyes, as has been seen, recognizes the justness of Cardinal Gaspari's reply when he grants that "it is upon....qualifying facts that the morality of the atrocity facts depends." that "many of them by their very nature are of a class that cannot be arrived at without investigation and, in some cases, investigation of a kind which exceeds the reach or even the competency of a papal tribunal." Mgr. Moyes here especially refers to Germany's plea that her violation of Belgian neutrality was forced upon her by military necessity. It is patent that a condemnation of Germany's act by the pope would have to rest on the denial of the "necessity." However such a decision could be reached only with the knowledge of the "whole diplomatic history not only during the crisis in 1914 but during the last fifteen years which led up to it—a dossier of which much is necessarily not known to the general public." It is indeed encouraging to see a man of Mgr. Moyes's affiliations\(^\text{16}\) state that "it is hardly to be wondered at that Benedict XV, or any pope in his

place, should decline to commit himself to such a blundering excursion into the region of political judgments," and that "what is to be wondered at—and it is the paradox of the present position—is that the pope should be invited to make this particular escapade by critics who are usually the first to resent above all things the intervention of the spiritual power in politics." Monsignor Moyes has thus answered the question better than many wish it to be answered.—*Sapienti sat!*

Even the pope's efforts in behalf of peace have been made the object of reproach and attack. Thus R. B. C. Sheridan speaks of the pope's "prayer for peace and other unfriendly signs." The pope is reported to have approached President Wilson on the possibility of taking steps toward the restoration of peace,—an incident which Dillon

an exchange of ideas, both direct and indirect, accompanied by a voluntary spirit and serene consciousness, setting forth with completeness and clearness the full extent of the aspirations of each, eliminating those which are unjust and impossible.

"It is absolutely necessary, as in all human controversies where the contending parties seek a settlement, that each group of belligerents should cede on some points and renounce some of the advantages hoped for, and that each should make these concessions with good grace, even if it costs some sacrifice, in order not to assume before God and man the enormous responsibility of the terrible slaughter which is without previous example in history and which, if continued, may prove to be the beginning of a decline from that degree of prosperous civilization to which Christianity has lifted the world."

Who, be he the pope's friend or foe, will deny the justness and soundness of the principles of the peace advocated and prayed for by his Holiness? Who, be he in sympathy with the Allies or the Central Powers, will refuse to admit that this is the kind of peace that the world needs and wants, the only kind that would not be an "armed truce"?

Verily, these "expert" opinions of more or less partial critics make interesting reading, especially when, as the evidence tends to show, these critics are in agreement only in their one desire of striking hard at the object of their lordly displeasure."