Englishmen. They are our true hyphenates. They are the real traitors within our borders. They are the unloyal element that has introduced "corrupt distempers" into our national life.

For these American Tories there is only one adequate piece of advice: Let them get out! Let them enlist and take their places in the English trenches. Let them remember that the seas are open to them; Britannia rules the waves! Their hearts are in France and England; they are free to prove their sincerity by risking their lives there. We do not want them in America, fighting the war with their mouths, seeking to embroil the whole nation. I am aware that this advice cannot be followed by many of our most violent pro-Ally fanatics, because they are past military age. It is a remarkable fact that our bitterest defamers of Germany are old men. I shall not be invidious enough to mention names; but just recall to mind the leading American Tories! There is no more shameful spectacle in America than these malignant old men, waving their fists at the Kaiser, mouthing the garbage thrown to them from Fleet Street, hounding us on, shrilling for a sacrifice of American blood.

CONCLUSION.

Most thinking men and women agree that this is a time for America to keep her head and watch her step. Should the Teutonic armies continue their victories, and approach to a triumph, the efforts of hyphenated Anglo- and Franco-Americans to involve us will become more frantic. But that collective insanity we shall probably avoid, despite their fomentations. We shall do the world the negative service of standing aloof. But it seems doubtful that America will be able to accomplish anything positive for world peace, anything constructive for the future security of mankind.

And the reason?

Simply this: that bigotry cannot reform bigots; that prejudice and hatred and intolerance cannot heal a world gone mad with hatred and intolerance. America cannot effectively fight militarism so long as she thinks injustice to Germany. And let there be no mistake about that: American opinion is monstrously unjust. It is as unjust to Germany now as was British opinion to the North during our Civil War. America cannot suggest sensible remedies for war so long as she holds to the childish notion that the blood-guilt of this greatest of all wars is a personal guilt of the German military caste or of the German people.

Fundamentally, of course, none of the great governments at
war is blameless. We do not have here white angels fighting black
fiends, but human beings all smeared with the same scarlet. The
only question open to debate is, who is smeared the less? This ques-
tion finds its answer in the recent politics of Europe, the history,
say, of the ten years preceding the war. To me it seems that any
philosophical examination of this recent history gives Germany a
shade of advantage, a slightly superior claim on our moral sympathy,
both for the character of her aims, and her honesty in avowing them.

American comment on the war appears either to have over-
shot the mark, or undershot it. It has been either too naive or too
subtle. First of all, Americans made up their minds that Germany
commenced the war; that she was the "disturber of the world's
peace." It was a snap judgment, for it was based almost exclu-
sively upon the events of the twelve days of the crisis. The diplo-
matic documents of the European governments were said to embody
the "evidence in the case." Never was evidence flimsier. The dif-
ferent governments wrote, selected and printed what they wanted
the world to read. The dispatches are all scissors and paste, and
sometimes not even that, but plain fabrication, as in the instance
of the notorious No. 2 in the French Yellow Book. The worth-
lessness of such "evidence" for unbiased judgment is shown by the
fact that men come to exactly opposite conclusions in reading it.
Judgment depends not on what the dispatches say, but on which of
them one believes true, and which one rejects as false. From a
thorough perusal of the White, Yellow, Orange, Gray, Blue, Red
and Green Books, every person emerges with precisely that mental
color-blindness with which he started.

Americans condemned Germany at the beginning mainly from
newspaper accounts of the crisis. That snap judgment has never
been revised. The scholarly portion of American opinion has busied
itself chiefly in explaining what it assumed to be true. It has
started from the premise that the Teutons precipitated a world war,
and were bitten with militarism. So it has attempted to give reasons
for that militarism. It has sought to trace the influence of Nietzsche
and Treitschke on the Teutonic consciousness; it has attempted to
derive German psychology from Kant; it has made elaborate and
academic contrasts between the Latin and Teutonic civilizations,—
and so on through fine-spun dialectics. All of this discussion is but
window-dressing for a theory and a prejudice.

Some thoughtful Americans, who see the war as a logical result
of the silent, alert struggle in Europe between rival alliances for a
balance of power, covering many years, state a conclusion unfavor-
able to Germany in restrained language. They would agree with Prof. Ellery C. Stowell: "I do not wish to be understood as thinking that Germany really wished for war; but by her conduct she gave evidence that she intended to back up her ally to secure a diplomatic triumph and the subjugation of her neighbor, which would have greatly strengthened Teutonic influence in the Balkans. She risked the peace of Europe in a campaign after prestige." With such moderation it is hard to quarrel. But most pro-Ally Americans are not content to maintain that Germany was sixty percent wrong in the diplomacy directly preceding the war; they assert she was ninety-eight percent wrong, or one hundred percent wrong. According to these uncompromising partisans she plotted a war, conspired for it, deliberately provoked it.

To support the charge of conspiracy the pro-Ally fanatics surely cite the well-known facts. They undoubtedly point out that at the end of July, 1914, Germany had not recalled her reserves from any part of the world, that the Kaiser was yachting in the North Sea, that the harvests were not in, that the German fleet was scattered in small units on all the oceans. To demonstrate that the Entente Allies were innocently ignorant of the impending crash they probably call attention to the mobilization measures taken in Russia as early as June, to the timely review of the English fleet in the early summer, to the transportation of colonial troops to France several weeks before the ultimatums. They unquestionably go further. They show that England was unprepared for the conflict because she had been maintaining the two-power naval standard; France because she practised conscription and had recently passed the Three Year Law; Russia because the number of her armies and reserves was equal to those of Germany and Austria combined. Germany, they say, has been pursuing for a long time a selfish imperialistic policy; she has been seeking colonies and trying to guarantee markets for her export products. But the Allies on the other hand have pursued a relatively altruistic policy; they have stood for the status quo; they guard the rights of small nations. This disinterestedness of the Allies is demonstrated by their acquiring, previous to war, several times as much territory as Germany; by their treatment of Morocco, Finland and Persia; by their penetrations of Arabia and China. All of these arguments lead up to the conclusion that Germany is the one militaristic nation, and that her ambitions plunged a guileless world in strife. Exactly what we started out to prove!

But after all the warm partisan of the Allies does not reason about causes,—he feels. His emotions are dominant. Having deter-
mined that Germany is to blame for the war, he judges every subsequent issue unfairly. Atrocity tales from the Entente side stir his anger, whereas atrocity tales from the German side, even when better bolstered by proof, fail to move his imagination. He would demand that the United States protest the violation of Belgium's neutrality; but he would consider it silly to protest the violation of Greece's neutrality. It should be apparent to every thinking man that the Belgian affair must of necessity seem more reprehensible to the pro-Ally sympathizer than to the sympathizer with the Teutonic Powers. The latter cannot help but feel that Germany's extreme peril justified the passage of troops across neutral territory, and that Belgium, by her secret agreements with France and England, by her French sympathies, and by the fact and character of her resistance, constituted herself virtually one of the Allies. Whether this view is right or wrong, the fact remains that had the United States protested the invasion of Belgium she would not have been acting merely in the interests of international law; she would have been "sitting in judgment" on the war, she would have been taking sides. In any event it is not the business of the United States, where American rights are not invaded, to play the part of international Pharisee and send out protests every time any one does anything we deem "lawless" or "unrighteous." If we adopted that policy we should be shooting out protests every week. What tribunal appointed us the Judge of nations and their acts?

This is a time preeminently for charity, forbearance, friendliness to all. It is not a time for imputing bad motives, for recriminations. The war is the logical result of imperialism, of rival military alliances, of the doctrine of the balance of power. The dominant cliques of Europe thought a war inevitable. It has for decades been the business of these cliques to plot, not for war, not for peace, but for successful war. Possibly both sides thought the hour had struck in 1914, the Germans for strategic reasons, the Entente for political reasons. Unquestionably the statesmen of the Entente believed at the beginning they would soon crush Germany and Austria, that the 300,000,000 would soon overwhelm the 130,000,000. Their coalition once set in motion, they predicted a short victorious war. In this they simply misjudged, they underestimated Germany's strength and resources. I cannot believe there was much sinister calculation for the precise event on either side, except possibly by the autocracy and military caste of Russia. On the whole, Europe simply tumbled into war. The nations had erected rivalries and enmities which could not stand the strain of a real crisis.
If America wishes to accomplish aught for peace within the next year, the next decade or next quarter century, it must face the real situation. It must grapple, intellectually, with an evil system, with an international problem. Surely Europe is not training itself to solve the problem. So far as causes are concerned, this war was not a people's war. But to-day it has become precisely that. Hate has eaten into the vitals of every nation. To each people the wickedness of their foe seems the one great curse upon mankind. Blood-lust and revenge are reenforced by moral purposes. The spirit of the Inquisition is being revived. It hardly seemed possible; but one can see the re-creation of that hell of human motives in England and France—the idea of saving the soul by torturing the body,—of redeeming a nation by killing its citizens. Possibly Europe will recover from that insanity. Certainly America cannot help Europe by capitulating to the same madness. Only by the exercise of dispassionate judgment and an infinite compassion can we offer the world a new horizon and a hope.