The Military, Economy and the State: A New International System Analysis

Muhammed A. Asadi
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, masadi@siu.edu

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THE MILITARY, ECONOMY AND THE STATE: A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
ANALYSIS

by

MUHAMMED A. ASADI

B.S., Missouri State University, 1995
M.S., University of Toledo, 2001

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Doctorate of Philosophy in Sociology

Department of Sociology
in the Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
May 2012
DISSERTATION APPROVAL

THE MILITARY, ECONOMY AND THE STATE: A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS

By

MUHAMMED A. ASADI

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Sociology

Approved by:

Darren E. Sherkat, Chair

Jennifer Dunn

Rachel Whaley

Derek Martin

Jyotsna Kapur

Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
March 09, 2012
AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF


TITLE: THE MILITARY, ECONOMY AND THE STATE: A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS

MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Darren Sherkat

In this dissertation, I outline a theoretical justification for a new world systems analysis in order to understand economic development and underdevelopment, and stratification systems that emerge within nation states because of their global social location. I present my detailed case for amending Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis by empirically incorporating the interplay of the military, economy and state as opposed to his primarily economic division of labor that defines the core, periphery and semi periphery. I do this by uncovering the latent structure of militarization and its articulation within the world system controlling for state strength. I also outline the basic profile of my Militarized International System (MIS) model based on an extension of C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite (1956) thesis and empirically develop the model using a militarized division of labor. With data on 173 nation states, I validate my model through analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multivariate OLS regression. I also outline a theoretical articulation of class, race and gender stratification in the world system informed by the empirical findings. In the end, I make suggestions for “undoing” stratification to inform movements seeking social justice based upon the world-systemic nature of global stratification, where stratification in its articulation cannot be localized and therefore cannot be “fixed” locally within particular nation states.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the victims of global wars and militarization.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I want to thank my mother for her unwavering support and pride in my intellectual endeavors. My father and my elder brother (both of whom are not with us) deserve my gratitude for believing that I was capable of great things. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Dunn for her help and support throughout the program. For the theoretical portion of the dissertation and for the ideas that led to this dissertation in the first place, I would like to thank (the late) C. Wright Mills for his many writings and service to sociology. For the empirical portion of the dissertation, I would like to thank Dr. Darren Sherkat and Dr. Rachel Whaley, without whose input and direction on the statistical analysis, there would not be a dissertation. Dr. Elias Nigem deserves my gratitude for relentlessly encouraging me to pursue doctoral studies. Dr. Kristen Barber deserves my gratitude for her input on the presentation of the dissertation defense. Finally, I would like to thank all of my committee members and fellow colleagues for their encouragement and support.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

My purpose in this dissertation is to empirically incorporate the structure of global militarization, as an explanatory variable, for understanding economic development and underdevelopment in the world, including global systems of stratification and inequality. Given the historical precedence of militarization and its effects in terms of wars and the resulting alteration of state and economy, treating militarization as a mere consequence of a capitalist mode of production as Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis (Wallerstein 1974) does, or treating it as a relic of preindustrial societies (Spencer 1961 (1896)), leads to inadequate or historically misspecified models of development. It is my contention in this dissertation that the project of a sociological understanding of the international system, which is a methodological necessity given the structural focus of the field has not been realized thus far.

I am also proposing that in addition to the two main paradigms of development that hold hegemony in sociological literature, the functionalist, modernization perspective (Rostow 1966) and the Marxist, dependency perspective (Frank 1989 (1966); Wallerstein 1974), we need an alternative third perspective that incorporates, based on the sociological imagination (Mills 1959), the historical precedence of war and militarism in the formation of the modern nation state as well as the capitalist economy (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958) and also acknowledging that development and underdevelopment within a global social structure is pervaded by militarism and continuous (global) war, in which nation states are positioned based upon a militarized division of labor.
In his pioneering work, *The Power Elite* (1956), C. Wright Mills stated that the power elite involve an “uneasy coincidence of economic, military and political power” (Mills 1956:278). Mills looked at the elite not as individuals that conspire together based on personal interests, rather he saw the elite as occupying dominant positions among the dominant institutions (military economic and political) of a dominant country in the global system, leading to a uniformity of worldview and a “community of interests” (Mills 1956:253) that bind them together despite factions, “even across the boundaries of nations at war” (Mills 1956:283). These “community of interests,” proposed Mills, lead to decisions or indecisions that reproduce the U.S. social structure and have implications for other nation states within the international system as well (Mills 1956:286).

C. Wright Mills, before his death in 1962, was working on expanding this power elite explanation on an international level. In his 1959 book, *The Sociological Imagination* he stated:

> In our time problems of the Western societies are almost inevitably problems of the world. It is perhaps one defining character of our period that it is one in which for the first time the varieties of social worlds it contains are in serious, rapid and obvious interplay. (Mills 1959:150)

In his 1958 book, *The Causes of World War III*, Mills wrote:

> Imperialism by definition involves the interplay of economic, political and military institutions and men…The international system of the world today cannot be understood without understanding the changing forms of their interplay. (Mills 1958:67)

In this dissertation, I present a pathway for attempting a partial completion of Mills’ unfinished work and for that reason I propose to uncover the interplay between the state and the military within the capitalist economy of the international system. I plan to develop my proposed model of the international system as a revision of, if not a competing model to, Wallerstein’s World-Systems perspective. This is because a militarized global system, as I claim exists in the
world today, cannot be explained merely in terms of economistic reductionism that involves
division of (economic) labor and commodity trade and value chains (Brewer 2011) but needs
incorporation of, as Mills stated, “An interplay of economic, political and military institutions”
(Mills 1958:67). We must not overlook the fact that the workings of global institutions that
reproduce the international system include economic groupings like the World Trade
Organization and OECD, institutions of global finance like the IMF and World Bank, political
bodies like the UN as well as military alliances like NATO. It is only in their interplay,
dominated by the same commanding states, that we can uncover the structure of the international
system.

Sociological Justification for World-Systems Analysis

World-Systems Analysis suggests, and Wallerstein was certainly not a pioneer in
suggesting this, that in order to sociologically understand the “nature” of smaller units like nation
states that exist within a larger international system, we must understand the logic of the system
(Veblen 1997 (1923); Mills 1959; Cox 1964). Oliver Cox's, Capitalism as a System (1964)
details what Wallerstein would later define as his profile of the world system (1974). It is the
system that determines the internal characteristics of the entities that comprise it, which then
work based on its logic to reproduce the system in its region specific articulation of social
structures. Our unit of analysis therefore has to be the world system. The location of “public
issues” (Mills 1959:10) involving institutional contradictions which leads to systemic crises or
technological change which leads to systemic evolution (Lenski 1966; Luhmann 1997:144),
requires a wider sociological understanding of “global issues.” This being an application of what
C. Wright Mills described as the Sociological Imagination (Mills 1959:6), an intersection
between the micro level biographies of individuals (or nation states in the world system), historical context and societal structure. This dissertation is sociological in that it connects the “biographies” (histories) of various national states to the structure in which these biographies are enacted. Given the historical precedence of militarization and its effects in terms of wars and the resulting alteration of state and economy (Tilly 1985, 1990), the implied direction of determination is historically and logically in tune with my modeling in this dissertation.

**Incorporating Militarization within an Economic Division of Labor**

Since the dominant mode of accumulation in the world today involves global wars and militarization, the state gets structurally linked to economic globalization; the ongoing continuous wars that have been the distinguishing feature of an evolved capitalism post-World War II, represent a globalization of militarization which initiated the large scale economic globalization of the present. This new division of labor (Durkheim 1997 (1893)) cannot be simply defined in terms of industrial production and surplus extraction through commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1993) and trade relationships, rather, it has to be defined in military and political terms as well. These military ‘terms’ should include predominant military budgets of industrialized nations, enormous arms transfers to select regions of the world, the arms trade networks, the size and composition of standing armies as well as the diffusion of the militarized outlook among both civilian decision makers and civil society and the location of war based activity within characteristically distinct groups of nation states and the resulting emergence of new social and political formations. Militarization is a multi-dimensional concept which is broader than militarism. Whereas militarism refers to the status superiority in a society, of military “values, symbols and discourses” (Luckham 1994:24), militarization involves
structural articulation between the state, military and the economy, “dynamically linked both to
each other and widely to capital accumulation and projects for national and international
hegemony” (Luckham 1994:24).

From 1945 to 1975, there were around 119 wars fought, which involved 69 countries
(and the armed forces of 81) with the total cumulative duration of the wars being 350 years (Jolly
1978:13). Since 1984, half of all countries of the world experienced major armed conflict (that is
those involving a minimum of 500 dead). Besides actual conflict those countries that got out of
war in an increasing number in the 1990s, experienced “post war fragility, physical destruction
and environmental deterioration, social trauma, severely limited productive capacity and service
provision and general lack of trust, oversight and accountability” (Marshall and Cole 2009:5). As
long as we fail to incorporate the military and the role of force in world affairs, sociological
understanding of the (global) social structure will remain deficient (Janowitz 1975:91).

War making is not only related to the origin of states (Veblen 1997 (1923)), the
expansion of their civilian organization of extraction activities (Tilly 1985, 1990) and their
legitimacy when faced by external threats (Barkey and Parikh 1991:528), it led, in the case of
defeat to state transformation and/or revolution. Warfare, especially global wars led to the
political and economic origin (and transformation) of the international system of nation states
(Tilly 1990; Hooks and Mclauchlan 1992:757) and wars and standing armies led to the
emergence of the “welfare state” (Tilly 1990). Whereas most of the above describes the
experiences of the old “Western” states, the modern internationally sanctioned norm of non-
intervention, ensured that state form and territory of the new states was extrinsically
predetermined in the most part, as a result of which their extraction apparatus, related to war
making, as well as the task of homogenization of populations through citizenship remained comparatively underdeveloped.

Foreign dependency to finance state activities (as against local extraction) ensured state nurturing based on functions that were determined extraneously, giving these states ‘autonomy’ over their populations and society to a larger extent than was possible in the old states (Barkey and Parikh 1991:538), their elites therefore got linked externally through a colonially organized state apparatus, more so than internally (through a history of a state’s social formation). As a result there was little scope for “internal forging of mutual constraint between rulers and ruled” (Charles Tilly, quoted by Luckham 1994:14), this was supplemented by the lack of an “administrative apparatus” that arose in the old states as a response to the history of mass conscription for war and the resulting struggle by the state to contain the political ambitions of its coercive arm, the military (Kestenbaum 2009:240). This meant that all external shocks had greater internal effects on the new “developing” nations that were externally dependent and therefore internally weak, compared to the old. Fear of fiscal crisis, the ‘failed state’ phenomenon, that would occur in the absence of dependency on the foreign financier due to an underdeveloped extraction and administrative apparatus and a lack of a self sustaining economy, often led to revolutions or overthrow of governments (Campbell 1993), and therefore through experiential necessity, kept these states in destructive relationships with the dominant states (which represented the “infrastructural power” (Hooks and Mclauchlan 1992:759) of the old states on the new), and ensured periodic legitimacy crises and political turmoil within these new states.
This history of political instability in the new nations is empirically captured through instruments like the Political Instability Index\(^4\) that reveal a history of greater political instability in the new nations which translates into an institutionalization of the “weak state” phenomenon. Into such turmoil, the military often stepped in to restore order (Fidel 1975). Relying on explicit coercion more so than authority or manipulation, as is the case with the old states that have institutionalized a controlled form of class conflict through cooptation via a welfare state (Marcuse 1991), the military and paramilitary forces of these new states were more frequently, inwardly directed for the purpose of social control (Janowitz 1975; Horowitz 1975) as in many Latin American countries (Andreski 1968:211; Fidel 1975) and the Middle East (Brooks 1998). Such use of the military over politicized it, which was often supplemented by a hostile external ‘neighborhood’ that emerged as a legacy of colonization (as in the case of Pakistan-India or the states of the Middle East and Africa) and therefore provided the military with added authority in the internal as well as foreign affairs of the state. In the final analysis, politicization of the military blurred role distinctions between the civilian polity and military leadership and ensured that periods of turmoil within these nation states culminated in a military coup or a circumscribed “democracy” with the military calling the shots from behind the scenes through a coalition as in Guatemala and Turkey in the 1960s (Fidel 1975).

The Modern World System

Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis (1974, 2004) posits that since the 16th century\(^5\), with the rise of capitalism, the world market was dominated by a group of (few) core countries, those who colonized the world and now are the ones who control capital and material wealth in the world and whose production is capital intensive while the rest of the countries of the world
are peripheral, apart from a few (categorically residual) semi-peripheral countries (2004:93). The semi-peripheral countries, according to Wallerstein, attained this status mostly by invitation. Primary systemic logic of Wallerstein’s world system is based on the core-periphery dichotomy with the semi-periphery being a residual category even though intrinsic to the system and having special stabilization functions within it. The peripheral countries, where production is less capital intensive and relies on larger human labor input, were incorporated as part of the global economic system, which evolved to serve the core nations. As a result the periphery became dependent on the core for markets, provision of developmental resources and instruments of war. The peripheral countries are the primary theatres of war as well (Gillis 2009:2), this is empirically captured by the *Fragility Index and Matrix 2008* (Marshall and Cole 2009:25-30) that lists incidents of war experience (involving more than 500 deaths) by nation states within the past twenty years.

World-Systems analysts outline four trends that occur within the capitalist world system: mechanization, which is the capital intensive nature of production over time, commodification, that is the logic of commodity sale, extending to ever increasing areas of social life, proletarianization, the conversion of labor into wage based, non-coercive (manipulated but not forced) labor, and polarization, as the core and periphery become ever more unequal in access to global resources and life chances (Sanderson 2005). Within these processes, the role of militarization (not dependent on economic primacy) is explicitly ignored by Wallerstein even though it is recognized by world systems theorists that the hegemonic cycles within the capitalist world system end with a global war between the main contenders in the system (Chase-Dunn 1989:84). The role of military power in maintaining hegemony as well as equilibrating the disarticulated regions of the system is recognized by World-Systems theorists, but as co-primary
(together with the economy and the state) explanatory variable, military power is neither elaborated upon nor studied as causing a possible alteration in the dominant mode of production within an evolved capitalism, given the fact that historically speaking “war and preparation for war produced the major components of the European states” (Tilly 1990:28) and the post World War II economy emerged from and was conditioned by military priorities. It therefore becomes impossible to understand the organizational forms of nation states and their articulation within the global system relying on economic relationships alone, without reference to the military aspect of the political economy when the military and the state are treated as effects of an economic order and not co-determiners. For example, Jason Beckfield (2003) used membership data on intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) from 1960 to 2000 and concluded that “powerful states dominate IGO less now than they did in 1960 but…have grown more dominant in the INGO field” (p.401). This represents a privatized institutionalization of world-polity (political globalization) where inequalities of influence that favor the old (core) states mimic the inequality in economic relationships between core and periphery, represent a fusion of the economic with the political, giving the core structural advantage in directing “policy scripts and world culture” that affects “material and symbolic struggles among nation states” (p.404). The playing field is therefore not only economically rigged against the developing nations, it is politically rigged as well, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) state that global polity represents an expansion of class relations, “beyond labor processes to become institutionalized in state, colonial and interstate structures” (p.23).

Post-World War II, there was an increase in the emergence of newly formed independent states, controlled “more or less directly by military men” (Tilly 1990:216). In the decade of the 1960s, “27 coups and attempted coups took place in 9 Arab countries” (Brooks 1998). By the
1980s, nine out of ten African nation states had experienced “(military) coups, coup attempts or military plots” (Luckham 1994:26), with half of the governments on the continent being military in their origin. Civil-Military relations within the new nations have a predictable effect on the nation state’s “strategic assessment in their international disputes” (Brooks2008:54) and therefore directly influence economic and political outcomes of such interaction and need to be incorporated into the global division of labor proposed by Wallerstein. Talking about large structures and comparisons between them, Tilly (1984) suggested a dual division at the world systemic level: Networks of coercion clustering into states and networks of production clustering into regional modes of production (p.63). Apart from this coercion/production division, I am proposing a third division, that of militarized “system stabilization” as part of post-World War II systemic evolution of capitalism.

This third functional division gives the military an autonomous role, related as much to the production part of the equation, through the aerospace defense industries, technological research and innovation and the global arms trade, as to its coercion part in the form of the functional use of the military in “hot-spots” that are of significance to capitalist stabilization, as well as the symbolic maintenance of “posture” within an ongoing continuous global war⁸ that represents the globalization of militarization in the system as well as war related symbolism that binds populations to nation states. Systemic stabilization implies that crises in capitalism are averted through the conduct of war within the militarized states by the dominant nation states and through a globalized military Keynesianism where the higher economic growth of militarized countries stabilizes the system periodically. In other words, militarized interaction within a stabilization regime restores the levels of profit accumulation for a capitalist world system. Such stabilization, I argue, requires a “permanent defense network” of countries as a
counterpart to the permanent defense industry that defines the military industrial complex within the United States\textsuperscript{9}.

**A New International System Analysis**

In accommodating the military within World-Systems analysis, I am partially acting on Tilly’s recommendation for further research when he stated, “In general, the next round of work must examine…the interactions involved in war-making, taxation and the accumulation of capital…” (Tilly 1984:143)\textsuperscript{10}. Skocpol’s critique (1977) of Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis shortly after publication of his work, similarly suggested that Wallerstein ignored “politico-military interactions among emerging European states” (Skocpol 1977:1086). A change in the world polity that represents historically instituted structures beyond the economic, implies a transformation in the international system’s “logic and goals” (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000:26) and needs to be studied in its irreducible complexity beyond economic reductionism.

The main research problem for me in this dissertation therefore, is to determine the best way in which to empirically capture the interplay between the military, state and the economic spheres as it relates to the international system for the purpose of understanding economic development and underdevelopment in the world, including systems of stratification and inequality (as captured through life chance indicators) and to understand the incorporation of military Keynesianism as a stabilization engine of capitalism on a world systemic level. For that purpose, I am using as model\textsuperscript{11} the United States’ permanent war economy, the interplay of the political, military and economic institutions in what is popularly described as the *Military Industrial Complex*. The global methodology of accumulation/stabilization is a mirror image of the U.S. permanent war economy, which involves “fostering private investment growth together
with a continual preparation for war” (Spiegel 1940:718) for the purpose of “…a stable and planned flow of profit” (Mills 1958:191), so that the economy and the military become “structurally and deeply interrelated” (Mills 1956:215), and capitalist accumulation occurs always within a backdrop of a continuous global war. A militarized economic structure implies that the state has an enlarged and centralized role in the economy. Max Weber’s definition of the state as the only institution that monopolizes the legitimate use of force (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958) implies an intimate role of the military in state affairs. Uncovering the structure of militarization on a regional level and how it is articulated within national states that occupy specific positions within a militarized global division of labor, guides my choice of research methodology in this dissertation.

My methodology in formulating boundaries around different regions of the world based upon militarized stabilization of a global accumulation regime is guided by the sociological idea of “society” as an organizational unit of analysis. In tune with Charles Tilly’s assertion that without boundaries based on “different forms of actions that coincide, the idea of society as an autonomous, organized interdependent system loses its plausibility” (Tilly 1984:25), I am proposing three society-like divisions into regions (not necessarily geographically contiguous) that together constitute the structure of the militarized global capitalist system, where the internal logic of the region in question is determined through its role within the wider international system, which then determines the internal social structure and state form of the nation state in question. The international system is a “spatio-temporal whole, whose spatial scope is coextensive with a division of labor among its constituent parts…as long as the division of labor continually reproduces the ‘world’ as a social whole” (Arrighi 1997). To understand the ‘problem’ of militarization within a national state for example, we have to look at the role of
militarization within the global capitalist system (something Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis evidently ignores). Regarding gender based stratification and its link to militarization for example, nationalism based on “masculinized memory” (Enloe 1992:83) in military terms becomes not only the standard setter of citizenship but also a driver of gender based stratification within the wider society (McClintock 1993).

Similarly, the militarization of the global economic system has implications for not only how gender is articulated within various nation states that occupy different functional groupings within such a system, but also the organizational forms of those various nation states as well as the ‘logic’ of economic development within a military or a civilian arena. Without incorporating the military and the political in the formulation of theories of global development, mere economic explanations in terms of the production process, finance and trade, as world system theorists provide are inadequate. Regional functional differentiation based on groupings of nation states also serves the function of stabilizing the international capitalist system. This stabilization function in advanced capitalism often involves wars or threats of wars and has assumed together with surplus extraction, equal importance in the logic of the international system for its long term survival. For that purpose, I propose in this work, a division of the international system into: Command States (CS), Semi-Militarized States (SMS) and Militarized States (MS). From the militarized states arise some “rogue states” chosen by the command states for the purpose of war or war related activity that facilitates the larger global war of the period.

The Global Military-Economic Complex

What the main drift of the twentieth century has revealed is that the economy has become concentrated and incorporated in the great hierarchies, the military has become enlarged and decisive to the shape of the entire economic structure; and moreover the economic
and the military have become structurally and deeply interrelated, as the economy has become a seemingly permanent war economy... (C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, 1956:215)

As the continuous drift towards war becomes a ‘way of life’ within a societal structure, in that war becomes not an aberrant condition but a taken for granted reality, institutions that describe daily routines of existence are altered for its accommodation, inevitably resulting in a militarized culture overtime. If we carefully remove the multiple strata of cultural themes and moral justifications of a bygone era that surround present-day conduct of wars by the commanding states, we can uncover the root causes of wars in our time. These “roots” reveal a structure of permanent war based on which the economy and the state operate and through which the military has been incorporated into a global power structure, which has, in the final analysis, “terrible consequences for the underlying populations of the world” (Mills 1956:286) treating human life as incidental in the scheme of things (Horowitz 1963).

William Spiegel (1940) states that the economic aspect of a war based economy, or what Mills (1956) described as a “permanent war economy,” cannot be separated from the idea of total war. Total war involves not only the use of the military in the traditional sense, it involves what is described as “the economics of a military state” (Spiegel 1940:718), as well as a “nation at arms” (Janowitz 1975), in that the entire social structure is militarized and war is more or less continuous, with diplomacy a mere “prelude to war or an interlude between wars” (Mills 1956:209). No longer does war involve combatants only (Janowitz 1975; Lowry 1970:4-5; Hobsbawm 1996; Zinn 1990). The government is not only a regulator of economic life within a permanent war economy, it becomes one of the main customers of the corporations as well and subsidizes the production process (both directly and indirectly through research and development support). The ‘monopoly capital’ perspective on the functioning of the state, which hints at the
institutionalization of a permanent war economy (or the military/war dependency of the civilian economy) through government induced warfare spending, looks at the state’s function in managing the economic surplus through stimulating demand on behalf of the capitalists (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Boies 1994; Mills 1956)\textsuperscript{12}. This interplay of the political, military and economic institutions in the U.S. context is captured by what is popularly known as the \textit{Military Industrial Complex}.

Within this “complex,” the industrial sector comprises of the aerospace defense industry corporations that share a common interest (in the military) with the civilian monopoly sector transnational corporations. The former, if not part of the latter, (like General Electric and the Boeing corporations) are linked to the civilian monopoly sector through subcontractors (Kelley and Watkins 1995). The aerospace defense industry firms are interested in military contracts based on the military budget of the government that is the sole customer of their output (Melman 1974), the civilian monopoly sector is interested in the instrumental use of the military to get concessions and protection of their transnational facilities (Cypher 1984) as well as government research and development (R&D) support that usually filters through the aerospace defense industries, who are the primary beneficiaries of government subsidized research (Mills 1958:91; Markusen, Hall, Campbell and Dietrick 1991:248; Galbraith 1971; Lutz 2002\textsuperscript{13}). The legitimacy given to the governmental control of science (through warfare induced “necessity” of disproportionate funding) has technological consequences for the rest of society (McLauchlan and Hooks 1995).

Finance capital, the third sector of the industrial part of the Military Industrial Complex, benefits from government deficit spending for a large portion of its revenue\textsuperscript{14}. The financial
sector as well as the aerospace defense industries depend on foreign loans and sales of weapons respectively, much like the monopoly sector depends on relocation of facilities abroad\textsuperscript{15} and all three sectors are dependent on the government in areas of foreign policy and foreign relations. These three sectors share directors on their respective boards in the form of interlocking directorates leading to a fusion of interests (Mills 1956; Kerbo and Della Fave 1979). Many of the directors who serve on multiple boards of oligopolistic firms that help them circumvent antitrust laws to act as virtual monopolies have also served in the state and the military. Interlocking boards of directors and interchangeability of top positions forms the backbone of the structural connections that reveal “interplay” of the economic, military and political domains. This social complexity that results in a confluence of interests between the military, the state and the economy and the resulting ‘class consciousness’ and social cohesion among the power elite is something that economistic analysis alone cannot capture\textsuperscript{16}. The military has direct links with the aerospace defense industries through its retired generals working in top position in that industry\textsuperscript{17}, a type of organizationally veiled ‘conflict of interests’ regarding the military's public service and procurement for national defense that can be interpreted as a form of explicit corruption but is often not recognized as such\textsuperscript{18}. Finance Capital also promotes the relocation of monopoly sector multinationals abroad through IMF and World Bank structural adjustment loans (Chussodovsky 2003) which originate with them, to buffer the monopoly sector from the consequences of crowded out investment and high interest rates at home.

The civilian national security managers appointed by the President are usually representatives of the aerospace defense industries or the monopoly sector (Kerbo and Della Fave 1979: 7-10). They provide the network links between the military and the aerospace defense and monopoly sector industries and seek to maintain or enhance military budgets in
The Congress, relegated to the middle levels of power (according to Mills, 1956:255)\textsuperscript{19} is coaxed into budget/war approval by the executive who is influenced by his small cadre of appointees from the world of business and the military. The state manages surplus absorption through military Keynesianism represented by war related expenditure (Baran and Sweezy 1966), in order to manage “problems of the economic cycle” (Mills 1958:91), it subsidizes research and development and facilitates the relocation of multinationals of the monopoly sector abroad through its diplomacy and the functional use of the military, it also facilitates the workings of the IMF and World Bank as well as arrange weapons sales on behalf of the aerospace defense industries through military aid and otherwise.

![Diagram: The Military Industrial Complex](image_url)

**Figure 1.** Military Industrial Complex (Mills 1956, expanded)
Theories of the state that inform our understanding of the Military Industrial Complex can be broadly grouped into two major categories: Marxist models of the state and Non-Marxist models of the state. The Marxist models can be subdivided into Marxist instrumentalist (Domhoff 2005) and Marxist structuralist models (Poulantzas 2001, 2008; Boies 1994). The non-Marxist models are the state autonomy or state-centrist models, and they differ from the Marxist models in their treatment of the state’s role in the decision making process. Whereas the Marxist models are centered around economic causes of both state formation and functioning, even the Marxist structuralist models that attribute relative autonomy to the state as part of its function of “managing” the capitalist structure give causal primacy to the economy, the non-Marxist models look at the state as an autonomous unit having both separate interests to the capitalist class as well as the capacity and the ability to execute their fulfillment (Skocpol 1985).

In the non-Marxist models, the state as the wielder of the instruments of violence and extraction emerges as relatively autarkic, in that it is not affected in the most part by the wider society in its decision making process and does not serve the interest of any particular class as such. The state does however respond to external (international) competition both political and economic that affects its survivability. All decision making according to this model is incremental given the bureaucratic organizational form of the state that functions with uniformity, changes in which occur only during exceptional circumstances, which are extrinsic to the state and therefore not explained by these theories. Among the state-centrist views, Gregory Hooks (1991) is unique in that he not only incorporates but gives special treatment to the military in his explanation of the state’s decision making processes. Hooks states that due to war based
mobilization, the monopoly sector firms in the U.S., gained greater autonomy compared to the New Deal era as the government concentrated its activities on a permanent war economy, which became the “material foundation” of the post-war economic planning. In this institutional setup, post-World War II, according to Hooks (1991:19-21), the National Security State in the U.S. was built up using the bureaucratic machinery of the New Deal and decisions of economic, political and social significance are now centered in the Pentagon with its civilian national security managers. The state is dominant over the economy in Hooks’ rendition.

Among the Marxist perspectives on the state, the monopoly-capital explanation of the functioning of the state looks at the state’s function in managing economic surplus, stimulating demand through either welfare or warfare on behalf of the capitalists on whom it depends for extraction in the form of taxation and political capital (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Boies 1994). Part of this management of the unabsorbed surplus is through the use of the military budget for countercyclical (Keynesian) stabilization. Monopoly capitalists would argue that the state would increase military budgets during periods of economic stagnation (when surplus inventories build up due to lack of consumption, sales and profits shrink and unemployment rises) and would reduce them during periods of economic growth. According to the ‘monopoly-capital’ perspective, within advanced capitalism (or high capitalism), the monopoly sector, dominated by a few large corporations results in a form of structural power for capital, in that the state has to maintain the privileged status of the corporations for its own survival and for social reproduction. As a result special political and economic links develop between the monopoly sector and the state (Mills 1956; Boies 1994). The idea of a Military Industrial Complex represents an amalgamation of the monopoly capital and Marxist structuralist arguments, where the state is primordially linked to classes but assumes an autonomous existence of its own in helping to
reproduce a system, thereby maintaining its legitimacy and representing by proxy the capitalist class as a whole and not individual capitalists.

**The Military Industrial Complex and Economic Development**

Researchers differ as to the effects of a permanent war economy on overall economic development. Whereas Baran and Sweezy (1966) and Mills (1956) argue that a permanent war economy serves real accumulation functions for advanced (or high capitalism), Seymour Melman (1974; 1997) states that a permanent war economy operating through a state-capitalist Military Industrial Complex, what he describes as “Pentagon Capitalism” (Melman 2001:106), does not promote economic growth and general well-being of the industrial sector (Melman 1974; 1997). Melman argues that the permanent war economy has led to the depletion of the non-military industrial economic base of the United States (Melman 1974:25) with the military sector acting as “parasitic” in its relationship to the civilian economy (1974:63). This is indicated by U.S. production of civilian machinery and capital goods producing industries successively deteriorating to the point of total disappearance (2001:417), the non-competitiveness of U.S. civilian industry around the world and at home (1974:142), which in part has caused the flight of capital from the U.S. to overseas locations (1974:68) as well as the decline of the U.S. dollar through trade deficits (1974:151). Whereas military industries and their employees depend on the military economy, and it benefits them, they form a “minority of American society” (1974:280) and there is no economic necessity of having a permanent war economy in the system as a whole.

Melman however ignores the functional use of the military in the maintenance of U.S. economic advantage abroad (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Cypher 1984). Melman (unlike Mills
(1956)) also ignores the structural connections between the monopoly sector firms and the defense industries, not only do most of these “defense sector” industries operate also in the civilian monopoly sector (Boies 1994), they share interlocking directorates (Mills 1956:123; Domhoff 2005) with many of the monopoly sector firms, centered around the financial sector of the economy, the big banks (Kerbo and Della Fave 1979:11) that benefit from government subsidized research and development (Mills 1958; Galbraith 1971) as well as protection of their facilities abroad. Also, government deficit spending on the military generates interest revenue for the big financial firms, the same firms that finance the IMF and the World Bank and facilitate the workings of the multinational facilities of the monopoly sector in the US, through structural adjustment in countries that borrow from them (Chossudovsky 2003). It is for these reasons that many secretaries of defense with monopoly sector background and experience, appointed to the state, have pushed for the maintenance of high levels of military spending during their tenure at the Pentagon (Mills 1956). Primarily, Melman ignores the cultural consequences of a history of confluence of interest based interaction among the military, political and economic elite, post World War II, that resulted in a form of cultural solidarity between the power elite and also the fact that elite interests cannot be conflated with the interests of the people, even though the elite might attempt such manipulation for the purpose of legitimacy. This puts into question all arguments framed in terms of “national interest,” which get readily subordinated to elite interests, with both “interests” being qualitatively different to each other.

Wallace, Borch and Gauchat (2008) present a contemporary validation of Mills’ Power Elite explanation regarding the confluence of interests of the military, economy and the state and the use of military Keynesianism by the U.S. government for countercyclical stabilization during economic downturns. Using state-level data for 49 U.S. states, they report “strong evidence of
corporate influence on military spending levels” (p.238) and also that a greater presence of Fortune 500 firms (representing the monopoly sector) in a state had a positive effect on military spending. They also found that the strongest bivariate effect on defense spending was economic contraction, which “provides the clearest evidence that military spending is driven by a Keynesian dynamic” (p.238). Economic contraction was measured as a three year average, lagged one year so as to give time to the felt effects of economic contraction to materialize in the form of enhanced military spending. Contemporary evidence for the institutionalization of a war based economy is provided by Gauchat, Wallace, Borch and Lowe (2011) who examine the ‘defense-dependency hypothesis’ in 276 U.S. cities (the Metropolitan Statistical Areas). Since urban areas are the “engine of the U.S economy” (p.27), and “cities comprise of 83% of the U.S. population and 88% of national GDP” (p.27), defense dependency of U.S. cities, if established, would provide direct empirical evidence of the institutionalization of a “permanent war economy.” Using five measures of labor market outcomes, median household income, income inequality, poverty, unemployment and labor contingency for the 276 MSAs, they test the effects of both military procurement spending and military personnel spending on those outcomes, controlling for various demographic, human capital, industrialization and region related variables. Their results “strongly support the defense dependency hypothesis” (p.38) that is defense spending both on procurement and on personnel, “favorably affects,” net of other effects, all five of their dependent variables that are “mutually reinforcing” (p.38). The conclusion being that in the absence of such defense spending, urban areas would suffer economically, especially during economic recessions.

Szymanski (1973) tested Baran and Sweezy’s (1966) claim that the role of military spending is to prevent economic stagnation within a monopoly capitalist setup using a sample of
18 industrialized countries. Using military spending by the government as a percentage of GNP, he found that out of these industrialized countries the ones that have higher military expenditure have lower unemployment and that those countries had been growing at a rate 20% higher than those with the lower military expenditures. However, when the size of the economy is controlled for, economic growth reverses and leads to stagnation but unemployment reduction through military spending remains significant, and that dollar for dollar, military spending produces more jobs than non-military government spending (Szymanski 1973:10). Comparing the same relationships with non-military expenditure of the government, he finds that non-military expenditure, even controlling for size of the economy, leads to growth and reversal of stagnation.

Emile Benoit (1968), claimed that a significant portion of defense activity, “contributes to civilian economic objectives” (p.411) and therefore if defense programs that have a civilian spillover effect are cut, it would affect civilian investment much less than the total amount that is cut. Such military expenditures he claims have a low opportunity cost and therefore cannot be expected to raise standards of living simply though monetary diversion from the military to civilian use. Together with such direct contributions of military expenditure to civilian use in the form of infrastructure building and communication network development, Benoit notes that generally speaking, the military workforce in developing nations is superior to its civilian counterpart in terms of education and technical skills (p.416), resulting in a long term transfer of technical skills from the military to civilian industries, which would be lost were we to use the simple “guns versus butter” argument in their context, and that military expenditure attracts foreign aid, which would otherwise be lost as well. In another paper, Benoit (1961) claims that due to the greater propensity of the U.S. during peace times to cut the national debt by reducing defense expenditure, compared to others, there is a greater danger of national weakness given the
fact, according to him, that such reduction to stimulate economic growth, “may under all but exceptional inflationary circumstances prove largely self-frustrating” (p.457), and might even lead to a reduction in economic growth, given “certain structural characteristics of the way our savings are channeled into investment” (p.459).

In his pioneering study of defense expenditure and economic growth in 44 LDCs\textsuperscript{22}, Benoit (1978) disputed the general assumption by economists that defense expenditure would reduce investment and thereby slow economic growth. Whereas this plausible relationship between defense expenditure and investment held for the developed countries, Benoit presented evidence of strong and positive correlation ($r=0.55$) between defense expenditure and economic growth in the developing countries. This he claimed was not only significant but because of the strength of the relationship revealed a “direct interaction” (1978:275) between defense expenditure and economic growth. In order to check for spurious relationships based on correlation alone, he used OLS (Ordinary Least Squares)\textsuperscript{23} multiple regression controlling for foreign aid and the investment rate, which revealed a positive and significant contribution of defense spending to economic growth. He found that defense expenditure itself could not be explained through economic factors, economic growth and the GDP per capita were both unrelated to the defense burden as was the tax revenue. The reason why the LDCs had a big defense burden, he concluded was "the expectation of political and military leaders…to threaten or to engage in combat." These countries were areas where combat had occurred, or they were “on boundaries between rival power blocs” (p.275).

Benoit (1978) also thinks that the positive effects of the defense burden on economic growth can be due to the modernizing effect of the military, that challenges the unquestioned
acceptance of “local custom and tradition” (p.277), the pride of the military in “nation building,”
the increase in inflation due to the defense burden resulting in the utilization of “underutilized
resources which contributed to real growth” (p.278), or the psychological response of national
cooperation when living in a combat infested zone which has a high defense burden. In certain
countries in his sample, this positive relationship between defense burden and economic growth
did not hold and so Benoit ends with the disclaimer that “the true significance of military
stress...for economic growth remains as yet uncertain” (p.278).

Lisa Grobar and Richard Porter (1989) revisit Benoit’s assertion of a positive relationship
between defense burden and economic growth in LDCs. They conclude that recent evidence,
controlling for relevant factors (like foreign aid, per capita GDP and investment), does not
support Benoit’s positive correlations between military burden and economic growth and that
“overall military spending has a weak but adverse impact on economic growth in developing
countries” (p.318). Benoit’s results, according to Grobar and Porter are not robust since, “small
changes in the regression formulations dramatically change the estimates of the effect of military
spending” (p.331). The authors claim that some evidence does exist in the literature regarding
positive effects of military spending on economic growth, through “human capital formation and
 technological ‘spin-off’ effects” (p.343), but these are offset through the negative effects of such
expenditure on growth particularly through reduction of national savings and therefore capital
formation. Ignored by both Benoit and Grobar and Porter are the indirect long term detrimental
effects of high defense expenditure on economic growth through a reduction in government
expenditure on health care and education (Fontanel 1990:464).
Alex Mintz and Randolph Stevenson (1995) review the literature linking defense expenditure to economic growth (or stagnation) and state that findings go in both directions. Part of the ambiguity of the findings is because, according to them, “The lack of a strong theory to guide researchers has made the formulation of empirical models particularly difficult” (Mintz and Stevenson 1995:284). Whereas there is little debate regarding government spending stimulating economic growth (the so-called “Keynesian Revolution”), most models of economic growth do not separate between government and military spending, growth in government spending crowds out investment (1995:284), in part through increased deficit spending that raises interest rates making private finance of business more expensive as well as reducing the net amount left for private investment. Mintz and Stevenson find that the effect of non-military spending on economic growth is significant and positive (in 40% of the cases out of the 103 countries in their dataset), it is negative in only two cases (1995:295). The effect of military spending on economic growth is non-significant in 90% of the cases, while it is significant and positive in some cases particularly in the Middle East. In separate papers (Mintz 1989; Mintz and Huang 1990; Mintz and Hicks 1984), Mintz and his coauthors disaggregate military spending into 4 segments: personnel, procurement, operations and research and development (R&D) and conclude that only procurement expenditure results in a ‘guns versus butter’ relationship where increased procurement not only flows to the major oligopolistic corporations, it takes away from welfare spending like education (Mintz 1989:1291).

Gernot Kohler (1977) explains the failure of arms expenditure reduction and arms control based on the long term positive relationship between absolute military expenditure and GDP growth and suggests a possible causal relationship between the two based on a “social psychological push effect” (p.315), which he compares to Veblen’s ‘conspicuous consumption,’
differentiating it from the “action-reaction” model of arms control by generalizing it beyond competing nation states to a global arms regime, where each nation gets caught in a “circle of invidious comparison” (p.319). Looney and Mahay (1990) agree with Kohler’s general observation regarding absolute military outlays and economic growth, stating that despite variation in the share of GDP devoted to defense, in the long run, sustained economic growth is a necessary prerequisite to maintain a high defense burden, the direction of determination is however not investigated empirically. Kohler concludes that arms control is doomed to perpetual failure unless this ‘individuous comparison’ criteria are purposefully manipulated, despite the link of arms spending to economic growth much like addressing inflation concerns detached from its link to economic growth by policy makers. For this purpose, Kohler suggests that antimilitarist groups as well as state arms control bureaucracies that deal with diplomacy over arms control should work together and not at cross purposes. Pierre Deleu and Hakan Wiberg (1978), in critiquing Kohler agree with him that ‘invidious comparison’ much like the ‘action-reaction’ model might play a plausible role in military expenditure (even though Kohler failed to provide empirical evidence of his claims) but dispute his use of absolute (non-weighted) arms expenditure in the formation of his hypotheses as well as with the claim of generalizing comparison with some globally (un)defined ‘Jonses’ who become standards of emulation.

Chowdhury (1991) investigated the causal relationship between defense spending and economic growth in developing nations using Granger causality tests to “analyze the presence and direction of causality” (p.80), between the two variables. He intended to fill the gap in the literature where the theoretical possibility that economic growth might cause increased defense spending, rather than the converse, is not empirically investigated. He concluded that given differences in the sample period, type of government and socioeconomic structure, the
relationship between defense spending and economic growth varies from country to country and no generalizing conclusion can be made. He presents his findings as an explanation for the divergence in the conclusions of various authors who have investigated this relationship, where Benoit, Kennedy and Whynes find a positive relationship, Deger, Smith, Frederickson and Loony find a negative relationship and Biswas and Ram find no consistent relationship (Chowdhury 1991:81). In *Buying for Armageddon*, John Boies (1994) compares the influence of exogenous factors on state expenditure on the military as well as endogenous factors and their effect (1994:121), using OLS multivariate regression on data ranging from 1962 to 1986 (p.97). Boies tested both Marxist and State Centrist models through variables drawn from both models. Of the endogenous factors, only budgetary inertia (the effects of previous budgets on current budgets) was found to be significant in relation to state expenditure on the military (in that the previous year’s budget is an accurate predictor of subsequent year expenditure) and that also only in the procurement, operations and R&D areas of military expenditure (1994:121). Regarding the exogenous factors, Boies used the economic health of the monopoly sector, U.S. corporate interests abroad and defense contractor profits as variables. These relationships generally held as hypothesized, however, the relationship that produced the opposite result from that expected was defense contractor profits. Boies hypothesized that falling defense contractor profits would result in greater government spending on the military, the results showed the opposite to be true (1994:122). Boies states in his conclusion that his findings generally support the structural Marxists theories of the state but not the state centrist ones (Boies 1994:144).

Mintz and Stevenson (1995) state that for certain countries a positive and significant effect on economic growth was found related to defense spending. About these cases the authors write: “Indeed 7 of the 11 countries that have positive coefficients have experience significant
external security threats and have received massive military aid from the superpowers” (Mintz and Stevenson 1995:299). Whereas military based spending, especially procurement of weapons systems does not promote economic growth (spending on personnel might, see Mintz 1989), it is inversely related to the level of unemployment and thereby helps subsidize the periodic crises that affect the monopoly sector (Szymanski 1973). Government spending on the military might produce inflation and crowd out investment in the civilian sector (Mintz and Huang 1990) but the monopoly sector is buffered from such effects through deindustrialization and the relocation of production facilities abroad.

Shin (1990) hypothesized that greater strength of the military as an institution measured through a composite of the military participation ratio and expenditure, would lead the state “to play an effective role in the economic sphere” (p.228), resulting in rapid economic growth. In his study involving 74 countries, using OLS multiple regression, he found that this relationship did not hold in general but held for the group of rich LDCs. Ann Markusen (2004) found that aerospace defense industries in the developed/industrialized countries become dependent on foreign military sales, a mercantile cartel (p. 75) develops between the military industries of the developed nations and foreign (usually military) governments of the developing nations in the form of an “offsets regime,” in that arms sales are guaranteed if the sellers agree to buy components from the buyer and transfer technology and services. With ‘offsets’ based costs at around “7-10% of the value of the arms sales” (p.74), this allows the buyer to link their economic growth with military related procurement, merging their defense and economic development policies (p.83) in that the economic growth of the militarized developing country can be linked to arms sales and transfers from the developed countries, while allowing the seller to increase its sales at the same time. This leads to what Markusen (2004) describes as “bloated
world-wide military spending” (p.83). Together with the emphasis on the modernization of weapons systems related to the U.S. military buildup of the 1980s, military spending and sales is also related to regional economic changes in the U.S., the decline in traditional manufacturing industries, growth of the high tech sectors and a service-based economy with most new manufacturing jobs being located within heavy defense contract gaining states, while high technology industries that were “weakly defense linked” (O hUallachain 1987: 208, 222) also gained (suggesting a possible spillover effect), leading to defense dependency of the industrial sector.

**The Military and the State**

The state, which in Tilly's (1985) elaboration is in the business of “selling” protection through creation of threats (where none exist) and monopolizing the means of violence (to increase the “price” of protection by eliminating competitors), cannot be associated with any explicit form of “freedom and independence” since it exists through narrowing both. A narrowing of the meaning of both of these conditions (i.e. of freedom and independence) is made possible through externalization of the enemy and has led to the legitimacy and unquestioned ability of states to encroach upon individual lives (linking such restrictions to issues involving national security). Monopolization of geographic territory, as well as the “business” of violence keeps the states operating as profitable enterprises on behalf of the privileged, whose usurpation of resources is exonerated through such social formations as the state and its law-making and war-making. The formation of the state delegitimizes all conflict except the conflict that is brought to the state's arena, an arena occupied by organized crime bosses, if we were to take Tilly's argument literally. Therefore, as Tilly states (in tune with C. Wright Mills' conclusion in
1956 and Horowitz’s 1963 proclamation on the ‘normalization’ of war), "In these circumstances, war becomes the normal condition of the international system and a normal means of defending or enhancing a position within that system” (Tilly 1985:184).

Related to the state's primary racket of “selling protection” through “monopolizing the means of violence” and establishing legitimacy through externalizing the enemy, the exploitation of entire populations is made easier (through dealing on their behalf with various national states, to divide up territories and spoils, rather than individuals or groups by themselves). National states therefore become the predominant defining political entities in the capitalist world system and are given a “sovereign” status even though only the big crime syndicates (the so-called developed countries), if we were to use Tilly’s metaphor, enjoy any semblance of sovereign turf.

Taking the “society” out of interpretations of the state, as state autonomists like Theda Skocpol do (1985) in order to differentiate their views on the state from the Marxist (“relative” autonomy views), using a literal coercion based interpretation of state autonomy, in that the state reacts to external occurrences only after the fact, in tune with its special interests, renders their analysis non-sociological because the state is not historically situated within a societal structure. Whereas this might be the case with the new nations that adopted either the state apparatus designed by the colonial power for exploitation or implanted a European state form of the previous colonizer on a preexisting society, it certainly is not the case with Western European nations that have a history of state evolution (Tilly 1996). Citing extreme cases of top down revolution as in the case of Turkey’s Ataturk or Nasser’s Egypt, both of which had limited long term success in muting opposition or changing long term social structure (Fidel 1975; Brooks 1998), in order to prove state autonomy, as Skocpol does, ignores the fact that attempts at erasing
the history of societal organization is a much more difficult task than erasing the effects of public policy already enacted. Previously formed public policy according to Skocpol severely limits state autonomy through bureaucratic inertia but previously formed social organizational forms and cultures, in her view, apparently do not:

Such autonomous state contributions happen in specific policy areas at given historical moments\textsuperscript{25}, even if they are not generally discernable across all policy areas and even if they unintentionally help to create political forces that subsequently severely circumscribe further autonomous state action. (Skocpol 1985: 13)

Skocpol apparently does not, contrary to Tilly, look at the organizational evolution of the state. The new states that acquired military goods, expertise and organization form, extraneously (Tilly 1985:186; Lutz 2002), usually through the major powers whose clients they became, without internal struggles that subordinated the military and its interests to the civilian apparatus, as elaborated earlier developed a highly politicized military. This military-foreign alliance in these new nations converted the military into a superior, bureaucratically better developed organizational form amidst the underdeveloped civilian state organization (Horowitz 1975; Fidel 1975). The military could therefore easily bypass the civilian state in fulfilling its interests and ensuring its survival and growth. Militaries do not create surpluses for self-expansion, they rely for resources either on their state in the form of taxation or on a foreign entity in terms of military aid (Luckman 1978:44). This together with the external threats that existed in the ‘neighborhoods’ of these new nations made foreign alliance and dependency a matter of survival, and led to what Janowitz (1975) has defined as the “garrison state,” a state in which the military becomes dominant over civilian authorities, by fact or proxy.

The military outlook in such a relationship between the state and the military ensures that diplomacy will be sacrificed for militarized solutions involving force or the threat of force.
Given such a relationship, the tendency for the military to seize power in a military coup within these new nations becomes enormous (Tilly 1985:186). The interactional relationship within the world system that leads to a garrison-state organizational form for some nation states and not others and its implications for accumulation or stabilization within the system, linked to an arms trade regime (Markusen 2004) needs to be incorporated within World-Systems analysis based on militarization as a structural variable, controlling for state strength which can be measured through a state’s ability to extract taxes from the population.

According to Capmbell (1993) elites within the state respond to "geopolitical, economic or fiscal crisis" (1993:173) by altering tax policies. The way that tax policies will get altered depends, according to Campbell, on how various groups within society influence political elites. Different groups are proposed to have different “tax tolerance” (1993:173). The end governmental response based on group pressure depends on the accessibility of political elites as well as their “capacity to collect taxes” (1993:174). Political elites can also influence the mobilization of pressure groups, and the consequences of the taxation part of fiscal sociology (taxation policy by the government, its precursors and consequences) include, according to Campbell, rebellion when people cannot pay the taxes demanded, a pressure to legitimize taxes through undertaking programs that alleviate conditions that might, if left untreated cause rebellions. Fiscal crises of the state, its inability to collect taxation can foster revolution through state breakdown. Taxation as the “key to successful state building” (1993:174), is a necessity that historically arose in order to defeat foreign challengers to the state (through maintenance of large armies) or local competitors to state power (Tilly 1985), leading to the development of state bureaucracies of “extraction and monitoring” (Campbell 1993:177) as well as avenues for political participation and public goods delivery in order to give legitimacy to taxation policy. In
short, “the organizational strength of social classes, the institutional structure of the state and the system of political representation” (p.168), influences taxation, the level of which is an indicator of state strength (Robinson 1977).

Taxation is of central importance to understanding the state, taxation as a percentage of GDP, as an indicator of state strength measures the degree to which economic resources of the country are available for state use and must be understood in state failure (through fiscal crisis) as well as state building and bureaucratization. Taxation can also affect the “location of economic activity” (Campbell 1993:178) as well as the structure of economic organizations, the rise of large monopolistic firms is attributed to the U.S. government's tariff policies during the 19th century that “contributed to the decline of entrepreneurial firms and the rise of large, concentrated companies and economic sectors” (Campbell 1993:178). Taxation might also affect labor force participation as revealed by the negative income tax experiments of the 1970s, as well as philanthropy by the wealthy that seeks to counter the redistributive effects of taxation (tax write offs through formation of foundations and non-profit organizations and the like) and “contributes to the preservation of inequality” (1993:180). The emergence of the state as well as the long term role of the state as a preserver of the structural status quo cannot be understood without reference to fiscal sociology involving taxation policy of the state, how it emerges and its wider consequences within society and its mediating effects between the polity and society and between polity and the global system.

In order to sociologically understand the military coup phenomenon of nation states, we need to look at the “boundary relations between military, polity and society” and hegemonic (or class) crises that have “international as well as regional and national dimensions” (Luckham
Irving Louis Horowitz (1975) suggests that rather than looking at the internal military structure of military dominated nation-states we need to look at “the international complex of military systems and military networks” (p.302), in other words, economic and political linkages between nation states need to be supplemented with military linkages in dealing with, what Horowitz (based on Mills 1956, 1958) refers to as the “interpenetration of elites” (p.302). Operationalizing democracy as involving a multiparty system with control of government relegated to a civilian (and not military) bureaucracy, Horowitz tests the links between type of government and economic growth (using growth rates of total and per capita GNP) of developing nations, using data issued by the OECD (p.305). His findings reveal mixed results: for some countries that are single party, military ruled, GNP growth rates are high (his study measured growth over a near-decade from 1960-1968), while democratically set up countries (according to the above definition) have low GNP growth rates. In the “middle,” writes Horowitz, are a “clustering of 20 nations” that do not reveal any consistent relationship between type of government and economic growth (p.305), these are what Horowitz refers to as “politically experimental” nations (p.307). In many newly urbanizing economies, personal economic status is of greater importance than the structure of political leadership (Fidel 1975) and since the military in many cases brings stability in the economic arena, it is welcomed as ruler by the newly emerging middle classes in many of the new nations. Horowitz's conclusion is that political structure (with militarization explaining economic growth, and democratization, more often than not, linked to economic stagnation), “is a far more decisive factor in explaining the gross national product, than the economic character of production in any Third World system per se” (Horowitz 1975:308). Thus militarization more so than economic structure determines economic outcomes in developing nations.
Arms sales (most of which flow from the dominant industrialized countries and involve direct state mediation) equilibrate the balance of power between regional rivals and thereby encourage hostilities and war during non-conflictual periods (Sanjian 2003). On the other hand, “power transition” explanations (p.719) in which a widening gap during tranquil times maintains tranquility is also dependent on arms sales (or the lack thereof). Arms sales thus offer us a clue to the extraneous link of new state stability in the global arena, to wars and to continued underdevelopment of the state's internal legitimacy and extraction apparatus. In his analysis of arms transfers by the Soviet Union, the U.S. and ATP (all third parties), to India and Pakistan from 1950 to 1991, Sanjian finds that the U.S. and the ATP acted as “power balancers” (2003:725) thereby facilitating conflict between the parties, while the Soviet Union acted as a “power transitionist” helped cooperative relations by widening the gap between the two opponents in general. Militarization of the state, as a unique phenomenon by itself in developing nations’ biographies within the back drop of their normative preoccupation with economic development and military organizations that are more modern in their outlook compared to the entrenched social classes, is an important area of investigation that has thus far been neglected by most sociological analysis of development and underdevelopment.

The Military, Gender and Capitalism

The military creates a “common symbolic world” (Sasson-Levy 2002:367) that defines in ideology as well as in practice the “differences” between men and women. In other words the “biology is destiny” overgeneralization that suggests that women’s entire being should be defined in terms of their reproductive labor, finds its ideal-typical fulfillment within a military institution. My purpose in uncovering the relationship between the level of militarization and
gender is guided by the fact that gender as a stratification variable determines social position of groups of people within a society.

The military’s gendered structure is maintained and reproduced through the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), a militaristic version of reality that sees problems in terms of devaluing enemies (literally feminizing the enemy) and all solutions to problems in terms of aggressive combat, together with a belief in explicitly recognizable markers of hierarchy (as in the insignia stripes that define military rank) and total obedience of those considered inferior. Since women are disproportionately kept out of combat roles in the military, they are devalued through a gendered division of labor. The combat role, since it is materially constituted by men, has a cultural element of the hegemonic male in whose image women have to mold themselves in order to militarily prove themselves and to differentiate themselves from the “other,” that is the civilian female. Women in traditionally men’s roles (like infantry) in the military therefore distance themselves from other women in order to build status and affirm a positive identity (Sasson Levy 2002; Fanon 1963). This is a form of “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) in that such acts implicitly affirm inferiority of everything considered feminine within a society.

Nationalism based on “masculinized memory” (Enloe 1992) and the resulting definition of citizenship is historically (contextually) situated within the military (Tilly 1996) and drives gender based stratification within the wider society (McClintock 1993). Through incorporation of military men within the state, a warfare based state with a civilian façade is setup (Mills 1956), a state whose ruling elite are co-equally populated by “warlords.” In processes similar to how “affiliation” links colonized territories to imperial culture, displacing indigenous culture, to use Edward Said's conceptualization (Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 1999:26), nationalism framed in
masculine terms, sourced in the military as the hegemonic culture of a militarized political economy, reproduces through affiliation, a structure of gendered relationships within the wider society and the world given the dense networks of economic, political and military ties that exist at the world systemic level between the dominant nation states and their hegemony over the globalized mass culture. As a result of which we see similar policies on women serving in the military in geographically distant but structurally linked countries like the U.S., Australia, the UK, New Zealand, Canada, Germany and France in relation to discriminatory access given to women regarding the main combat function of the military, functions that disproportionately contribute to promotions and the officers’ staff. These militaries then become models of emulation for newly emerging military organizations in the developing world, often through direct training and structuration by the militaries of the dominant nation states.

Conscription of women in World War II in Germany, the US and the UK are illustrative examples of how gender is “done” in the military: Women were conscripted in Germany during World War II but their military jobs were labeled “civilian jobs,” in the U.S, American WASPs (Women’s Air force Service Pilots) were treated as civilians while in the UK conscripted women were explicitly classified as “non-combatant” even when they wore the uniform (Segal 1995:760). Similarly, women have been involved in combat and support operations in revolutionary wars due to labor needs during operations (needs during crisis times often trump strict gender divisions much like they did during WWII in the U.S.) in “Algeria, China, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Russia, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and the U.S. Revolutionary War” yet when the need was no longer there, gender divisions became dominant once again in the new roles that were allocated after these wars were over (Segal 1995:761), in that women were actively removed from military service.
Citizenship has historically been linked to the military and its combat role. In ancient Greece those that “made the city possible by taking arms on its behalf” (Kerber 1990:92) were model citizens. Since men monopolized combat roles, they became model citizens by default. As citizenship got monopolized by men because of their link with the combat functions of the military, women were systematically underrepresented in all facets of public life, just as they were underrepresented in the military in combat positions. The image of the citizen soldier, who is always a man, translates into other facets of public administration as well. Citizenship is structured in a hierarchical fashion based on sacrifice to the nation with sacrifice being measured in terms of actual combat roles that then get linked to men because they monopolize such roles in the military (Elshtain and Tobias 1990) and in capitalist societies to economic independence (Arnold 2004). This loss of citizenship by women in the modern nation-state has serious consequences for them since only citizens are given the status of full human being through an individuated identity; everyone else is judged more or less categorically. Through militarization, the system robs women of their human status within the political entity that defines the capitalist world system, the nation state, and therefore dehumanizes and objectifies them within the wider social and global structure (Arnold 2004). As Kestenbaum (2009) states, “…(mass) conscription had the effect of…hardening lines of gender differentiation and projecting those…directly into the apparatus of war making by identifying bearing arms for the state exclusively with those men who might be called on as citizens to fight” (p.248).

Women in the military are not considered ‘real’ women by their male counterparts who are fighting the war to defend ‘real’ women and children from the enemy. Facing this discrepancy in ascribed gender roles, women in the military are often ‘otherized’ as government supplied “whores and prostitutes” (Campbell 1990:115). Also preventing the full acceptance of
women within the military is their cultural image in the wider society as peacemakers. This image of women as ‘peacemaker’ is from the post-World War I era and reflects women’s purposeful exclusion from what was emerging as an independently powerful institution, the military, due to the centrality of warfare among the preoccupations of the state. As Joyce Berkman (1990) writes, there are two dominant images of women in history: that of a warrior and that of a mother (1990:143). The mother image was retained in relation to the modern nation state but the warrior image was dropped. Images of the woman warrior are found in almost all cultures as they are in early European history. The role of pseudo-warrior that women are forced to adopt in modern militaries, as in revolutionary wars based on labor needs, therefore predictably remains subservient to their mother role. Their pseudo-warrior role in crisis situations is seen as a “natural extension” of their role as mothers “protecting their children” (Segal 1995:761) and not as warriors performing an actual function in the military. Women are therefore “civilianized” even when they wear the uniform.

The dominant image of women within the wider culture that of peacemaker and mother directly relates to how the military “does” gender. In the justifications that are drawn up for war by the military is the rhetoric that war is needed in order to establish peace, in explicit Orwellian terms, “War is peace” (Orwell 1961:16). Peace is linked to defending women and children. Defending them cannot be accomplished effectively in terms of that logic if women were directly in the line of fire at the front lines. As a result those very few women who are given combat roles are either stigmatized as deviants or masculinized; they wear the uniform but “not as women” (Campbell 1990:107). The representation of female members of the military often as ‘daughters’ is a projection of the ideology of the family within which women are supposed to be located within gendered societies, these generalizations are applicable with a difference in degree only,
in Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), just as they in the U.S. and Western Europe (Segal 1995). Women’s symbolic inclusion within the military, even when they form 33 percent of the military’s ranks (as in the case of Israel) does little to undo gender (Sasson-Levy 2002). The fact that women in combat positions, where they have adopted the dominant image of the hegemonic male are content or “happy” does not mean that they are not oppressed (Chafetz 1984:7). Such contentment merely amounts to identity verification based on predetermined subordinated roles to which the individual has adapted and through which they now find meaning, a form of false consciousness that results in women looking down upon other women that don’t adopt a masculinized role and therefore an implicit acknowledgement of inferiority within the system.

Militarization is therefore a gendering process which works only when certain assumptions regarding masculinity and femininity are culturally dominant in the institution, which is then projected to the wider society because those images are required in order to perpetuate war (Enloe 1992:202). Recruits when they enter the military get indoctrinated into a militarized culture where military vocabulary is laden with denigration of feminine traits. Yet despite the association of women with images of peace, since their mobilization efforts are required during times of war; that is supporting war time rationing, price and wage controls and literally maintaining the peace in the civil arena, the military seeks their support, just as it seeks their enlistment when it faces labor shortages in crisis times. Most women in the U.S, as a result, support a strong military and their nation’s many wars, which leads to further entrenchment of gender based stratification and translates into violence against women as well. The economic basis of ideological hegemony, to use Gramsci’s conceptualization, is thereby linked though an alternative route to reproduction of gendered relationships within a militarized economic structure (Boothman 1995). As Joane Nagel suggested (2003:193), the massive Military Sexual
Complex proceeded concomitantly with the development of the massive Military Industrial Complex post WWII in the United States.

The evolutionary perspective of gender stratification suggests that, “The more often a society engages in warfare, the more likely is social control to be vested in politico-military elites that excludes women” (Huber 1999:71), also, in militaristic societies a “male culture of violence and coercive domination contrasts with female culture…” (Collins, Chafetz, Blumberg, Coltrane and Turner 1993:191). There is also a greater tendency for “sexual alliance politics” (Collins et al 1993:197) in militaristic societies, in that women become commodities that are exchanged to build alliances, which together with the capitalistic objectification of women, reproduces the use of women as commodities making them susceptible to even greater violence. Severe aggression against women, including rape, is significantly higher within the military compared to its prevalence within the civilian society, even controlling for crucial demographic variables (Heyman and Neidig 1999:242). The gender ‘factory’ so to speak within militarized capitalism and its link (through citizenship) to the state feeds directly from relationships that exist within the military and manifest themselves in terms of violence against women.

Militarization interacts with global capitalism in order to alter women’s relationship to the labor force and through that to the nation state. Ann Matear (1997) examined the relationship between the state, gender and the economy in Chile and states that the incorporation of gender into public policy by the Chilean state has benefited women employed in the export oriented agricultural sector of the economy. The provision of childcare by the state, freed women to enter the seasonal (summer) labor force. The entry of women into the export based agricultural labor force occurred in large part during military rule in Chile and led to the development of the
women’s movement. These changes, initially mediated through a militarized state, resulted in “shifting relationships between (global and local) capitalist (export based) and patriarchal structures” (p.97). The reason why the Chilean government supported childcare provision for women is not because it recognized a fundamental need based on gender equity, rather the service was provided to feed the profit interests of capitalists during a season where demand for labor outstripped supply and thus gender barriers broke down.

In a study of women working in the export sector, Stephanie Seguino (2000) hypothesizes that gender inequality would lead to export expansion since women who are paid unequal wages are segregated into low paying manufacturing jobs. Export expansion leads to technological change and eventually through such change to economic growth. In her basic regression model (2000:1219), she regressed GDP growth (dependent variable) on growth of capital stock and measure of skill levels of the labor force. Both of her independent variables were positive and significant. She then added various wage gap measures between men and women that measure gender based inequality and got positive and significant results. These findings supported her hypothesis of gender based inequality leading to economic growth through export enhancement. The shortcomings of her study, as the author herself acknowledges, are that "institutional differences within countries cannot be easily captured within this modeling framework" (Seguino 2000:1219).

Malhotra and Mather (1997) challenge the notion that education and employment, “empower” women in developing nations regardless of historical context and societal structure. Using survey, life history and focus group based data, they empirically examine the relationship between schooling, paid employment and the power of decision making at home. They conclude
that gender relationships are multidimensional within a family setting and that financial empowerment does not mean that inequality in dimensions “embedded within macro level societal institutions” will be affected since the “historical basis of family and gender relations is fundamental in shaping the nature of domestic power” (p.626). Education and employment rather than measure the empowerment of women, measure the level of capitalization of an economy and only in that specific context measure empowerment, generalizing which to all developing nations is erroneous.

**Militarization, Inequality and Basic Needs of the Population**

Using basic needs as the key dependent variable in their quantitative cross-national research, London and Williams (1998) state that meeting the “basic needs” of a population as a dimension of development is distinct from measures of income or inequality. In their research, they explore the relationship between “accumulation and legitimacy” in the provision of basic needs of a national state’s population, using dependency (measured through multinational corporate penetration), protest of local populations (measured through number of events of protest recorded from 1968-1975), and their interaction as predictors. They found “consistent negative relation between multi-national corporate penetration and basic needs provision” (p.761), net of other effects. Regarding protest their findings suggested, in tune with dependency and world systems theories, that it had a “modest positive effect on caloric intake and life expectancy (in the non-core or developing nations sample)” (p.765). Their conclusion, again based on the causation path way of World Systems Analysis, suggests that “international political-economic forces (i.e. corporate penetration), shape the sort of intra-national forces (i.e. protest)…” (p.768), which have consequences for national development.
The principal components of global inequality, even though distinct from basic needs provision, condition and shape it and include between-nation and within-nation inequality (Bergsen and Bata 2002; Firebaugh 2000; Schultz 1998). The major segment of global inequality is “between-nation” inequality which accounts for 70 to 90 percent of global inequality (Firebaugh 2000:323). Between-nation inequality represents a culmination of income divergence between (what became) the industrialized and the developing nations over the past two hundred years, over the major course of the industrial revolution. Firebaugh (2000) states, based on a sample of 120 countries, that between-nation inequality has now leveled off and the future trends of inequality will involve within-nation inequality. There are two divergent explanations of between-nation inequality, the convergence hypothesis which states that due to diminishing returns to capital and labor, the more a country industrializes the smaller its economic growth and therefore over time between-nation inequality diminishes, and the polarization hypothesis which states that industrialized countries enrich themselves “at the expense of the poor nations” (Firebaugh 2000:326). Polarization can be of two types; either based on economic polarization where there is a flow of wealth from the poor towards the rich nations or population based polarization where all growth is absorbed through the consumption of a growing population in countries with high fertility, leaving little for investment and capital development. Since population size matters in assessing world inequality, non weighted measures of between group inequality which take every nation to be similar in structure and effect will produce vastly different results from weighted studies that weigh inequality based on national population share to world population. Firebaugh (2000) and Schultz (1998) find that between-nation inequality (even though very high, 70 to 90 percent of global inequality) has now stabilized. Within nation inequality is still variable and will therefore form the major portion of changes in world
inequality in the future but since it is a mere 10 to 30 percent of global inequality, its effects on total inequality will be small. Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003, 2005) contend that despite convergence in industrialization between North and South, income divergence has persisted indicating a devaluation of industrialization as a pathway to development.

Bergson and Bata (2002), within the world systems paradigm, examine whether between-nation inequality is correlated with within-nation inequality. In other words, does the inequality in the world system translate into inequality among individuals within nation states? They examined a dataset of 72 nations, with between-nation inequality measured as an absolute gap between Core and non-Core nations GDP per capita (p.133), and found that when the global gap widens, the gap within countries (measured by the GINI coefficient) widened as well. They claim that this is plausible evidence of both types of inequality moving together. During the one year between 1965 and 1990 when the global gap narrowed, they found that within-nation inequality in non-core nations increased. They attribute this anomaly to “national cohesion,” which during worsening between-nation gaps prevents the within-nation gap from increasing disproportionately while when the global gap narrows, national differences are more pronounced. The implications of their research are that even if the global gap is reduced, without tackling the within country inequality, global inequality might not diminish, when the within group inequality might actually worsen. Similarly, Krueger and Perry (2005) find that income inequality might not lead to consumption inequality. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, they conclude that their conclusion is theoretically supported in household behavior where “idiosyncratic labor income risk” (p.186) that increases income inequality increases the value placed by households on the access to private credit (private lenders similarly adjust their behavior to make credit available) and informal insurance arrangements. They plot the consumer
credit to disposable income ratio data for the past 40 years together with the Gini income inequality coefficient for the U.S. and find a remarkable similarity between the two, where consumers made better use of and had greater access to credit when income inequality was high and they most needed it, diminishing the proportionality of consumption inequality to income inequality.

Nolan (1983) reassesses income inequality and economic growth based on world system position in order to address the concerns of critics (particularly Weede (1980), “specification of development” argument) of previous research who suggested that based on the Kuznet’s curve, controlling for development in a linear fashion is misspecification since development has a curvilinear relationship with inequality. Even after entering a polynomial ‘development’ control (development was measured as the log of per capita energy consumption), Nolan finds that country status (world system position) is a significant predictor of both income inequality and economic growth, enhancing the former (in the case of the periphery) and diminishing the latter. However, despite the classical claim by Kuznets (1955), there is inconclusive evidence of a polynomial relationship between income inequality and economic development in the literature (Rodreiguez-Pose and Tselios 2009:414).

In their “static and dynamic” panel analyses, Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios (2009) examine the effects of per capita income and education attainment (secondary and tertiary) on income inequality in the European Union region. They start with the assumption that because human capital is conditioned by education and allows for better participation in the “market,” enhancing basic-needs acquisition, it should be negatively associated with income inequality (Rodriguez-pose and Tselios 2009). Education might also affect income inequality through
wage-compression by increasing the supply and thus lowering the wage of high end workers and reducing the supply and enhancing the wages of low end workers. However, they find that relationship between human capital endowment (measured through educational attainment) and inequality, as well as between income per capita and inequality is positive, with secondary education attainment more strongly related to inequality than tertiary education and that there is “a positive and robust relationship between educational inequality and income inequality” (p.434). The authors also find that unemployment and specialization in finance capital are positively associated with inequality. Since high levels of military spending rely on extensive lines of credit and assume a well developed financial network, we can expect militarization, through the path of financial capital to be positively associated with inequality, but through the path of reducing unemployment through spending on personnel during mobilization, to be negatively associated with income inequality.

World-System theorists suggest that foreign direct investment by the Core countries in the Periphery is a form of dependency that stagnates their economic development in the long term (Chase-Dunn 1975; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) and worsens income inequality. This occurs because foreign multinationals get ‘sweet-heart’ deals in those countries in the form of tax breaks and land lease options, and often send back their surplus earnings to the Core and have weak linkages (both backward and forward) with their host country. Multinationals also deploy technology selectively for their market which is often non-indigenous, doing which, leads to non-transferable technological applications which supplement the stagnation or destruction of indigenous industry. Chase-Dunn (1975) states that even though investment and debt dependency has a negative impact on economic development and production in the agricultural sector, it enhances mining based extraction\textsuperscript{31} activity and worsens inequality in the dependent
nation state. Dependency enhances the income share of the top five percent but worsens it for the bottom three quintiles. This suggests that foreign capital penetration and loans link the peripheral elites to global capitalism and help suppress local “political and economic forces which attempt to mobilize balanced national development” (Chase-Dunn 1975:735). Dependency theorists therefore argue that foreign direct investment is detrimental to the economic health of the developing countries.

Empirical evidence on the effects of foreign capital penetration (PEN), that distinguishes between capital flows (short term change in capital stock) and the general accumulated foreign capital stock (long term), generally supports these findings to the extent that foreign direct investment is not as productive economically as domestic investment but they do not support the long term negativity of economic growth given foreign direct investment according to Firebaugh (1992:125), who claims that the effects of such investment are always positive, short term or long term. Firebaugh claims that what is presented as a ‘dependency effect’ by world system theorists is in actuality a ‘denominator effect’ (1992:118) in that capital stock is taken as the denominator in calculating penetration which necessarily leads to a negative effect, given the larger denominator. Using these numbers, claims Firebaugh, domestic investment would also lead to negative growth which is illogical based on economic theory.

World-System theorists counter this claim by stating that Firebaugh misinterprets a statistical interaction as a ‘denominator effect’ and that the negative effects of domestic investment as a function of greater foreign capital penetration (that Firebaugh uncovered) is already predicted by world system theorists since foreign capital penetration retards the productivity of domestic capital (Dixon and Boswell 1996). Alderson and Nielsen (1999) adjust
their estimates of foreign investment penetration taking note of Firebaugh’s (1992) critique and find that despite the positive but diminished effects of foreign investment on economic growth, “association between the Gini coefficient of income inequality and the stock of foreign investment…clearly suggests an important role of foreign capital penetration in the generation of inequality” (Alderson and Nielsen 1999:627), meaning the greater the foreign capital penetration in a country the greater the unequal distribution of income. Lee, Nielsen and Alderson (2007) find that government size (the size of the public sector), mediates the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on inequality. They conclude that at “low to intermediate” size of government (p.77), the effect of FDI on inequality is positive, but this reverses and becomes negative where the public sector is large. This means, according to them, that the role of the state in controlling the effects of economic globalization is crucial. Lee (2005) finds a “strong interaction between democracy and public sector development” (p.158), that explains within nation inequality, in that the expansion of the public sector in non-democratic (military) regimes leads to greater and not lesser distributional inequality.

By incorporating a new world system model with its regional articulation based on an economic accumulation track and a militarized stabilization track, as I propose, the varying flows and outcome effects of foreign direct investment on development in various regions within that system would be clearer than if we were to take all peripheral countries of the world as internally and systemically homogeneous. Taking note of the political (and military) use of investment funds, given the nation-states internal organizational form, and the complementary effect of militarization and foreign direct investment on worsening income inequality, we can get a clearer picture were we to adjust all economic models for militarization as a form of “internal control.” In fact Alderson and Nielsen (1999) suggest that future research “on the role of the world system
in internal inequality processes,” should develop models that take note of regional differences though better designed “sets of internal controls” (p.627).

Abell (1994) examined the relationship between military spending and income inequality in the U.S., using time-series analysis in the post Vietnam-War era. He posits that inequality might be enhanced by military spending because of pay differentials between the military and civilian labor forces, the greater exclusion of women and minorities by military contractors and the greater profitability of military contracts. Controlling for macroeconomic variables like taxation, economic growth and non-military expenditure by the government, he found a strong, robust, positive relationship between military expenditure and income inequality that is, net of other effects, military spending leads to rising income inequality.

Henderson (1998) examined the relationship between poverty and military spending and states that the relationship is “complicated through economic growth and unemployment” (p.503) (macroeconomic factors that are themselves influenced by military spending). He concludes that generally speaking, military spending during peace time results in higher poverty levels because the enhanced spending flows to procurement in the form of contracts, to research and development but not to personnel. When military spending is on personnel during mobilization for war, poverty is reduced (negative correlation). He recommends that if military budgets are reduced, the reductions should come from the non-personnel segments of the military budget or poverty will increase and if military budgets grow during peace time, the growth should be directed towards personnel and not procurement. Henderson’s study replicates Mintz’s (1989) finding regarding military procurement (and not personnel) that take government spending dollars away from education resulting in a “guns versus butter” relationship. This is
also confirmed by Gifford (2006) who examines the military expenditure and welfare relationship to test the “guns versus butter” explanation.

Conventional wisdom and economic theory hold that out of limited government spending, if more is spent on the military, less will be available to spend on welfare. This explanation however is historically challenged through the (historical) creation of welfare states through “war and mass national armies” (Gifford 2006:473). Gifford concludes that there need not be a generalized trade-off between guns and butter and that controlling for military spending (the military burden as against the size of the military), nations with larger armed forces spend smaller amounts on social welfare but those with conscription spend more on welfare. Similarly, Gifford states that welfare states cannot be measured through “regime types” (2006:502) that is a militarized autocratic state might spend more on welfare than a liberal democratic state, given its legitimacy crises.

The military conditions the “development and maintenance” (Gifford 2006:502) of a welfare state but it cannot be taken as a welfare state institution by itself since the “state’s pursuit of its military priorities also entails the mobilization of significant productive and labor resources (i.e. in competition with welfare) and is steeped in the discourses of civic virtue and social obligation” (p.501) as a latent function. Consistent with this ‘latent function’ of solidarity is the finding by Jencks (1985) that public opinion in the U.S. is highly positively correlated with military spending, however spikes in military spending can be noted in the period 1973 to 1980 when public opinion was uniform, which tells us that public opinion is “not the sole determinant of military spending” (p. 378) and that public opinion is only “partially endogenous, (and is) subject to manipulation by the President, the military, the arms manufacturers and many other
groups” (p.379). In regions that are conflict prone, with conflicts having their origin in the division methodology of the previous colonizers, arms sales to one rival might provoke a regional arms race, which even though enhancing security to some extent given the balance of power perspective during conflictual periods, has an “opportunity cost” of developmental alternatives foregone (Levine and Smith 1995:471), encouraging militarization of the political realm and through that a coercive control of the population (Fidel 1975) as development gets linked to militarization. We can therefore conclude, generally speaking, that militarization enhances inequalities in a society through several pathways, most of them linking back to the economics of war and militarization, the clearest manifestation of which is a garrison state.

**Militarization and Militarized States in the International System**

The military when it becomes part of the economic structure, as in a permanent war economy, implies that the state and the military both attain functional autonomy within a capitalist system. States are related to classes in the “last instance” (Poulantzas 2001) only in that the conflict involving classes leads to state formation as differentiation based on functional specialization for reproduction of a preexisting class structure. This functional specialization gives the state relative autonomy, which is an absolute necessity for any autopoietic or self-reproducing system (Luhmann 1997). Volunteeristic interpretations of the state as a conspiratorial agent on behalf of the bourgeoisie, related to capitalist accumulation and therefore to the circulation of capital and not to the relationships of production (Poulantzas 2001:50, 51), relationships that now firmly incorporate the military into the mode of production, are erroneous and simplistic from a sociological perspective and non-functional for the bourgeoisie itself, as
the state would lose legitimacy leading to restructuration and not reproduction of the capitalist order.

Within a society, the state, described by Weber as being the explicit (monopolistic) holder of legitimacy over the use of violence within a given territory (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958:83), and the final arbiter in settling grievances needs relative autonomy in its publicly visible function or it risks losing legitimacy and authority. Both state centrist theorists as well as Marxists can agree on the idea that the survivability of the state (based on its interests for the former or its ‘management’ of conflict on behalf of the bourgeoisie for the latter) is of prime importance to state managers and the capitalist system. Serving this interest of maintaining its authority for its own sake or for the sake of maintaining the mode of production, leads to the state’s visible face of relative autonomy that then has interactional consequences and shapes the behavior of those that fill various positions within the state. As the domain of the state enlarges and gets bureaucratized, these behaviors assume an existence all their own.

Capitalist accumulation without legitimation would be a short term affair, militarization as a technique of conflict management prolongs that accumulation period. The permanent threat that militarizes the international system also serves to entrench a lucrative arms trade for the defense industries, expenditure on military hardware predominates the budgets of many nation states that operate at various positions in the global system. In the modern capitalistic system’s power structure, the Command States and their network of institutions, the military, economic and political form a “central organ” whose function is to “coordinate and subordinate” (Durkheim 1997 (1893):165) various parts of the international system through their linkages with similar institutions worldwide. In such a system of organic solidarity, we can see the evolution of
the nation state itself as a contrived “division of labor” (the “organs” within a specialized system) having its origin in war that tries to speed up the process of incorporation and assimilation based on function. The military dominated economy serves real accumulation functions for the bourgeoisie besides the functional and symbolic use of the military and therefore needs to be investigated in greater depth than what is offered by Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis, which is the primary reason that necessitates a new international system analysis.

The organized military and war making is not only historically related to the origin of the national state and the concept of citizenship, it is the precursor to factory discipline and bureaucracy that made capitalism possible. It therefore becomes impossible to understand the structure of global capitalism without incorporating the role of militarization within this system (Janowitz 1975). However, sociologists as a group have, by and large, neglected the study of the military as a social institution, and militarization remains one of the most understudied areas in sociology and anthropology (Kentor and Kick 2008; Gusterson 2007). This neglect is also reflected in the near invisibility of issues related to "war, peace and the military" in introductory sociology textbooks prior to September 11, 2001 (Ender and Gibson 2002). My dissertation aims at closing a small portion of that large gap in sociological knowledge.

**Hypotheses**

I tested the following hypotheses in this dissertation:

**Chapter 3 (Additive Analysis)**

H.1 Militarization, net of other effects, will have a positive impact on economic growth.
H.2 Militarization, net of other effects, will have a positive impact on economic accumulation.

H.3 [Societies disadvantage women in direct proportion to their level of militarization within a capitalist world system]. The more militaristic a society, the lower the empowerment of women within that society.

H.4 Economic Development is dependent upon (the social construction of) race in the world system (which means that there is global apartheid).

H.5 Militarization is positively associated with income inequality within nation states, net of other effects.

H.6 Militarization is positively associated with basic needs provision (as measured through the UN (non-income) HDI) within nation states, net of other effects.

Chapter 4 (Regional Analysis)

H.1a: Militarized States will have lower gender empowerment on average compared to Semi-militarized states.

H.1b: Militarized States will have lower gender empowerment on average compared to command states.

H.2a: Militarized States will have higher Human Development on average compared to Semi-militarized states.

H.2b: Militarized States will have lower Human Development on average compared to command states.

H.3a: Militarized States will have a higher economic growth rate on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.3b: Militarized States will have a higher economic growth rate on average compared to command states.

H.4a: Militarized States will score higher on average on GDP per capita and the computed Economic factor compared to semi-militarized states.

H.4b: Militarized States will score lower on average on GDP per capita and the computed Economic factor compared to command states.

H.5a: Militarized States will have higher inequality on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.5b: Militarized States will have higher inequality on average compared to command states.

H.6a: Militarized States will have a greater proportion of non democratic regimes compared to semi-militarized states.
H.6b Militarized States will have a greater proportion of non democratic regimes compared to command states.

H.7a: Militarized States will be weaker states on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.7b: Militarized States will be weaker states on average compared to command states.

H.8a: Militarized States will have experienced more wars in the past 5 years and in the past 20 years compared to semi-militarized states.

H. 8b: Militarized States will have experienced more wars in the past 5 years and in the past 20 years compared to command states.

H.9a. Militarized States will have a higher arms import percent as proportion of tax revenue compared to semi-militarized states.

H.9b. Militarized States will have a higher arms import percent as proportion of tax revenue compared to the command states.

Some of these hypotheses were reworded and restated for the regional OLS multivariate regression in chapter 4.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

In Chapter 2, I describe the sample, dataset, concepts used and their relevance in the research together with their operationalization. I also describe the techniques of statistical analyses that I use in order to test hypotheses. In Chapter 3, I uncover the structure of global militarization and using the relevant control variables outlined in the empirical literature, I present my hypotheses and my detailed bivariate correlation and multivariate regression analysis with militarization as predictor of gender empowerment, economic growth, economic development, basic needs provision and income inequality. In Chapter 4, I use the operationalized structure of militarization detailed in Chapter 3 to regionally divide countries into militarized states, semi-militarized states and command states. Using this regional articulation based on militarization and its theoretical implications, I test various hypotheses.
based on the model on several outcomes using cross tabulation and analysis of variance (ANOVA) and then use multivariate regression techniques to isolate regional effects as predictors of gender empowerment, economic growth, basic needs provision and income inequality, while controlling for important variables outlined in the empirical literature. Chapter 5 is a summarizing conclusion and future directions chapter. Using the findings in chapters 3 and 4, the implications of the research are summarized regarding economic development and global stratification and its undoing, with suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2
DATA, METHODS AND ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I outline the sample, data description, data transformations, and my research methodology. I used existing data research for the purpose of my project. I started with a universe (population) comprising of 173 countries that are listed by the CIA World Factbook (2008) as having a non-zero military expenditure. Since the focus of my study was militarization, I wanted to concentrate on only those countries that have data on at least some of the indicators of militarization that I use for the purpose of the study. Based on these 173 nation states, I constructed a new dataset using various sources for the variables included in my various analyses (listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The data were input into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), which was also the computer software used for the various analyses that follow. Together those 173 nation states comprise over 99% of the world’s population (2010 estimate) and therefore generalizability should not be a problem.

Sample

The sample for my various statistical analyses in this dissertation ranged from a low of 91 countries (OLS regression, GEM on Militarized International System) to a high of 158 (various analyses). Given missing data for several of the independent and dependent variables (particularly the UN’s Gender Empowerment Measure, GEM), I lost several countries that did not have data based on a list wise (or case) deletion approach, which is essential for generalizable analyses but runs the risk of over representing those nation states that have well developed record keeping bureaucracies, which more often than not happen to be the more
capitalized countries of the world system. There is therefore this ‘elite bias’ in all such cross national studies. In comparison to other empirical studies of militarization, referred to in the previous chapter, my sample size (91-158) exceeds the sample size of most studies that I am aware of. Comparatively, the largest additive sample I came across in the literature comprised of 74 countries by Shin (1990) and 103 in the study by Mintz and Stevenson (1995). Even though information was collected at the level of the nation state (the unit of observation), the conclusions were drawn at the world systemic level as global society which has socio-structural effects that consequently determine the biographical experiences of the various nation states that occupy different position in that structure. The whole is greater than merely the sum of the parts in macro sociological analyses. This is similar to socio-structural analyses that take the individual as the unit of observation but society as the unit of analysis. My primary unit of analysis therefore was the world system.

**Variables**

The continuous variables used for the purpose of the study, together with data sources, sample size, means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values as well as the data year are listed in Table 2.1. This list is separated from the list of categorical variables used in the analyses (Table 2.2). Since some variables were used in certain analyses as dependent and in others as predictor or control variables, the lists do not divide the variables based upon that criterion (the explanation that follows clarifies the use of the various variables in specific analyses). Certain variables, because they were positively skewed were logged in order to fix the skew to fulfill the normal distribution assumption of the analyses. In order to ensure that the
variables were normally distributed, a Z-score of significance of skew was calculated for all variables using the following formula:

\[ Z = \text{Coefficient of Skew} / \text{Standard Error of Skew} \]

The following variables had a high Z score of significance of skew (>2.58), they were logged (using the natural log conversion of the variable) since they were positively skewed, in order to normalize the distribution: Arms imports as percentage of tax revenue (Z= 32.17), Inbound FDI flows (Z=28.455), GNI per capita (Z=13.49), Inbound FDI stock (Z=36.06), Military expenditure as percentage of GDP (Z=11.79), Military personnel per 100 population (Z=10.92), Military expenditure as percentage of tax revenue (Z=30.438), and Population (Z=41.01). The logged variables were checked again for skewness through a recalculation of the Z scores, skewness no longer seemed to be a problem.

Since my primary interest in this dissertation was an attempt at completing the work on the international system that C. Wright Mills proposed in his *The Sociological Imagination* (1959), which I claim is an improved revision of, and a competing model to Wallerstein’s World Systems Analysis (1974), currently the leading international system model within sociology, the primary task for me was to capture empirically the interplay between the military, state and the economic spheres as it relates to the international system for the purpose of understanding economic development and underdevelopment in the world, including systems of stratification and inequality. The predictor (independent) variables that I used in this dissertation as controls were economic and state related variables, while my main independent variable was militarization (in chapter 3) and the Militarized International System (MIS) as regional predictors (in chapter 4).
Conceptualization, Operationalization and Analyses

Economic Development

In order to separate the economic from the military, that is to control for the structure of economic accumulation around the globe, I constructed an economic scale using a principal component factor analysis that captured in its computation the latent structure of global economic accumulation/development. Development literature lists economic development based on measures related to GNI per capita (Chen 2005), or in some studies, related to consumption of kilowatt-hours of electricity (Chase-Dunn 1975). These measures on their own are imprecise in that they measure urbanization or industrialization more so than economic accumulation. Urbanization and industrialization are separate measures that on their own cannot be conflated with economic accumulation and development, much like basic needs provision and inequality cannot be conflated with development. All of these might be correlates of “economic development” but on their own they represent a misconceptualization of development. Development within an economic context signifies, within a capitalist world system, a development of the apparatus of accumulation on a global level.

Whereas dependency literature explains underdevelopment of the ‘South’ or the periphery or the “Third World,” based on trade, debt and investment dependency (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1975; Amin 1977; Frank 1989 (1966)), which are measured through export concentration, multinational penetration and external debt to GDP ratio respectively (London and Williams 1998; Bornschier and Chase Dunn 1985), I was interested not in economic dependency per se but in economic development as a control variable in various models that have militarization or the Militarized International System as main predictors and also in predicting
economic development/accumulation as a dependent variable given the nature of capitalism, based on the same primary predictors (militarization on a global scale or the Militarized International System as regional variables). Accumulation more so than dependency therefore defined the economic aspect of my study.

Accumulation is best captured through GNI per capita and foreign investment concentration indicated through inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) stock and flow. The UN describes GNI per capita as “Gross national income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year population.” The CIA Factbook defines inbound foreign direct investment stock as, “US dollar value of all investments in the home country made directly by residents - primarily companies - of other countries as of the end of the time period indicated,” and the World Bank defines inbound foreign direct investment flows as, “net inflows of investment (inflows minus outflows) to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.” For that purpose, I constructed an economic scale using a principal component factor analysis that captured in its computation the latent structure of global economic accumulation. The results suggested that three variables (see Table 3.02 and its detailed description in chapter 3), GNI per capita, inbound FDI stock and inbound FDI flows, could be grouped into one summary index of economic accumulation (N=143). The scale that measured the underlying concept of economic accumulation/development was internally validated in that it explained 82.75% of the variation in these economic variables among the nation states. Most of the accumulation/development, including a large GNI per capita, inbound
FDI stock and inbound FDI flows occur between the group of developed nations, or what are described as Command States in chapter 4.

**Economic Growth**

I conceptualized economic growth as a steady growth in the productive capacity of the economy and operationalized it as the average annual rate of growth in GDP from 2001-2010. The almost decade long annual rates of growth were averaged to give a more accurate account of a national states’ real economic growth per year, which often fluctuates on a short term basis unrelated to real economic activity, which was the reason for preferring the average annual growth rate of GDP from 2001-2010 instead of using a particular year’s growth rate alone. Each year’s growth rate in this measure is added and then the mean growth per year is calculated. Economic growth was used as a dependent variable in OLS multivariate regression with militarization as the primary predictor (chapter 3) and as a dependent variable with the MIS region variables as primary predictors (chapter 4). GDP growth percent was used as a control variable in the OLS model that predicted economic development, with militarization as primary predictor (chapter 3). Also dividing up the average GDP growth percent (average 2001-2010) scores of nation states in the world to above average (i.e. greater than a score of M= 4.03) and average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 4.03), I constructed a dichotomous GDP growth ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) GDP growth percent, this was used in a cross-tabulation analysis of GDP growth rank by MIS.
The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)\textsuperscript{37}, measures women’s agency in a particular country (index scores range from 0 to 1). Agency is conceptualized as political agency (operationalized as number of parliamentary seats held by women), employment (number of senior officers and management, professional and technical positions held by women) and earned income (in US $ PPP). Each of these three areas is converted into an “equally distributed equivalent percentage” and then nominally averaged without any further weighting. Some studies have also used the United Nations’ Gender related Development Index (GDI) as a measure of women’s empowerment. However the GDI is a GDP based ‘basic capabilities index’ that does not measure women’s comparative empowerment but rather favors the high GDP countries as more ‘gender developed’ (Schuler 2006: 162). Some high GDP countries that score high on the GDI (like Japan and France) score poorly on the GEM (Blackburn, Jarman and Brooks 2000:122). I therefore did not use the GDI in my analyses.

Pillarisetti and Mc Gillivray (1998) look at the UN Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and conclude that the measure is inadequate because it is not culturally sensitive as its empowerment aversion parameter is associated with 'historical and cultural factors' (1998:4) and its income component is included in unadjusted form with weights adjusted using active men and women in non-agricultural labor even though the non-agricultural part of employment in most developing countries is very small and therefore the GEM says "little about the power over resources" (1998:200). The GEM doesn't include women's right to vote as an empowerment measure. Also, by aggregating differences into one measure and ignoring variation within nations, the GEM has an “aggregation bias” (1998:200).
The dimensions used to construct the GEM are explicitly capitalistic where the old capitalist countries enjoy “economies of scale” based on those dimensions and therefore comparability with the more agricultural states is questionable leading to inaccurate or over inflated results of women’s empowerment in the “developed”38 countries (Schuler 2006). However, since no other cross-nationally comparative measures of gender empowerment of repute are available, I used the UN’s GEM scores as my operationalized measure of gender empowerment. GEM was also used because the three dimensions of empowerment listed by Kabeer (2005) are captured by it (agency (parliamentary representation), resources (economic representation) and achievement(earned income)), and since I used controls for the economic and state strength variables in my OLS models which would control for levels of capitalization and therefore take some defects out of what is essentially an elite biased estimate of women’s empowerment, per the UN’s own admission39, the results of my analysis should therefore be interpreted as relatively unbiased.

I used GEM in OLS multivariate regression as a continuous dependent variable, with militarization as primary predictor, controlling for demographic, economic and state variables (chapter 3). GEM was also used as a continuous dependent variable in OLS multivariate regression with the MIS region variables as main predictors, with demographic, economic and state variables as controls. Also, GEM was used as a continuous variable in ANOVA (analysis of variance) by MIS region. Dividing up the GEM scores of nation states in the world to above average scores (i.e. greater than a score of M=0.571) and average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 0.571), I constructed a dichotomous GEM ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) gender empowerment. This was used in cross-
tabulation analysis by MIS region to see how world system position in a militarized division of labor affects the membership in gender empowerment high-low categories (chapter 4).

**Basic Needs Provision**

Basic needs provision was conceptualized as access to basic necessities that are absolute requirements for sustainable existence. This was operationalized as the UN’s HDI or Human Development Index. The UN's HDI is a summary composite index that measures a country's level of basic needs provision indicated through: longevity (measures health provision), knowledge (measures education provision), and a decent standard of living (measured through GDP per capita). The non-income HDI removes this (last) income component, and for the purpose of my study it was of greater relevance compared to the income inclusive HDI, since high GDP per capita gives advantage to the developed nations regardless of inequality given the aggregated index and since I control for the economic factor which also has as component GNI per capita. Also, GDP per capita indicates "potential and not actual welfare" (London and Williams 1988:749), therefore using it as an indicator of actual needs provision would be erroneous. The other components of the HDI are relevant to my conceptualization of basic needs provision, longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth in the HDI and depends on health care provision; knowledge is measured as the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio, and depends on education provision.

The Human Development Index (HDI), reported in the Human Development Report of the United Nations, first appeared in 1990 in the first Human Development Report (HDR) published. The index can take a value between 0 and 1. Countries with an index score over 0.800 are considered part of the High “Human Development” group. Between 0.500 and 0.800,
countries are Medium "Human Development" and below 0.500 they are considered Low “Human Development.” Even though framed as a “development” index, giving preference and high scores to countries with a high GDP per capita, the index minus the income part measures basic needs provision more so than economic development. I used non-income HDI as a dependent variable, with militarization as its primary predictor in OLS multivariate regression (chapter 3) and as a dependent variable with the Militarized International System (MIS) variables as its regional predictors (chapter 4), controlling for demographic, economic and state variables as well as inequality. HDI was also used as a control variable in the OLS regression that has Gini as the dependent variable with militarization as its main predictor (chapter 3) and in an alternative model with the MIS region variables as Gini’s main predictors, controlling for economic, demographic, state variables and HDI. HDI was used as a continuous dependent variable in ANOVA (analysis of variance) by MIS region and was also converted into a categorical dichotomous ranking scale by dividing up the HDI scores of nation states in the world to high, above average (i.e. greater than a score of M=0.675) and low, average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 0.675). I constructed a dichotomous HDI ranking scale which was used in cross-tabulation analysis by MIS region (chapter 4) to see how a militarized division of labor that determines world systemic position affects basic needs provision ranking of nation states.

**Life-Chance Inequality**

Inequality was conceptualized as differences in life chance attainment and was operationalized as the Gini income inequality coefficient. This is because income within a capitalist world order offers access to the primary indicators of basic needs and life chances
including healthcare, education and through those to employment as well as family maintenance. The Gini measure of inequality was developed by Corado Gini in 1913 (Benson 1970) and is calculated using the Lorenz curve which depicts a relationship between percentage of aggregate benefits and the percentage of the population receiving those benefits. A Gini ratio varies from 0 to 1, with a ratio of 0 indicating every individual receiving the same benefits (perfect equality), while that of 1 indicates that that one person gets all the benefits (perfect inequality).

There are two measurement problems with Gini ratios as indicated by Benson (1970), the cell or stratified data bias and the aggregation bias. The number of strata or cells used in the composition of the Gini score affects its values, the larger the number of cells the larger the Gini coefficient and the larger the number of people per cell the more is variation in the scores making comparison a problem. Aggregation bias refers to the aggregation of individual Gini scores from smaller units of analysis like states within the U.S. to compute the Gini score of the larger entity like the U.S. which might not offer any useable information about particular inequality within the smaller units of analysis, and often greater inequality in the smaller unit might not aggregate into greater inequality in the larger unit (Benson 1970:446). Both of these measurement problems translate into relative lack of comparability between Gini scores cross nationally, when no specific equalizing weighting technique is used. However due to lack of better measure and previous use of this indicator of ‘within-nation’ inequality, I did not seek an alternative measure.

Inequality was used as a dependent variable with militarization as its primary predictor, controlling for economic, demographic and state variables as well as access to basic necessities. The Gini coefficient was also taken as a control/independent variable in the multivariate
regression analysis which has basic needs provision (HDI) as the dependent and militarization as the primary predictor, controlling for economic, demographic, state strength variables and the Gini income inequality coefficient. Also, dividing up the Gini scores of nation states in the world to above average (i.e. greater than a score of \( M=0.411 \)) and average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 0.411), I constructed a dichotomous Gini ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) inequality. This was used in cross-tabulation analysis by MIS region to see if world systemic position based on a militarized division of labor affects placement of nation states in high-low inequality rankings.

**Militarization**

In conceptualizing militarization, I used the description of militarization by Luckham (1994) and Lutz (2002). Luckham described militarization as a dynamic link between the military, economy and state that relates to “capital accumulation” and “national and international hegemony” (1994:24), while Lutz defined it as “the intensification of labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals” (p.724). Together with these two definitions, and the general definitional consensus among Spiegel (1940), Mills (1956) and Melman (1974) regarding “the economics of a military state” or a “permanent war economy,” which links the economy (high military expenditure as proportion of GDP), the state (high military expenditure as proportion of tax revenue) and society (high military participation ratio, i.e. military personnel per 1000 population, which I converted into a percentage for the purpose of this study), I developed a militarization scale using a principal component factor analysis that captured in its computation, the latent structure of global militarization. The results suggested that three variables (see Table
3.01 and its detailed description in chapter 3) could be grouped into one summary index of militarization (N=157). The militarization scale was internally validated in that it explained 70.81% of the variation in these militarization variables among the nation states. The variables used in constructing the militarization scale together, represent both the military burden of a nation state, represented by military expenditure (as a proportion of GDP and as a proportion of tax revenue) and the military participation ratio (military personnel per 1000 population that was converted into a percentage for the purpose of the analysis). Using the militarization scale and the status of countries as NATO or OECD founding members, secondary members or non-members, I constructed the Militarized International System (MIS) division of nation states into Command States (CS), Semi-Militarized States (SMS) and Militarized States (MS). The methodology of construction of this international system model based on a global division of labor and its empirical validation is discussed in detail in chapter 4.

Other Military Related Variables

The variable, military expenditure as a proportion of government expenditure, which also measures the military burden of a nation state was not used in the composition of the militarization scale since this measure was missing a comparatively larger number of cases compared to its substitutes, military expenditure as a proportion of GDP and military expenditure as a proportion of tax revenue. I only used this variable in my comparative analysis of extreme cases of militarization, comparing the top 5 militarized nation states in the NATO/OECD group with the bottom 5, and comparing the same for the non-NATO, non-OECD group.

Military dependency was conceptualized as foreign dependency on arms and finance of military related expenditures. I operationalized this concept through computing a variable that
combined foreign dependency and local extraction with relation to arms procurement, that variable was arms imports as a percentage of tax revenue. This variable was converted into a categorical dichotomous variable with a rank of high (above average) and low (average or below average) arms imports as percentage of tax revenue, and used in cross-tabulation (contingency table) analysis with MIS regional variables to find out what nation type in a global military division of labor is more likely to be militarily dependent upon the dominant (Core or Command) national states (chapter 4). The categorical variable that measures the incidence of major war in the past 5 years and major war in the past 20 years (data on these was obtained through the State Fragility Index, 2008) with major wars defined as those that involve greater than 500 casualties (Marshall and Cole 2009) was used in cross-tabulation analyses by MIS region to determine if world systemic position within a militarized global division of labor affected the location and incidence of war within nation states (chapter 4).

**State Strength**

In order to control for the state in assessing the impact of militarization on economic growth, economic development and stratification within nation states both in my additive models of global militarization (chapter 3) as well as the non-additive, regional model of MIS (chapter 4), I used the definition of the state made famous by Max Weber, which was elaborated upon by Charles Tilly (1985, 1990). The state, which in Tilly's (1985) elaboration is in the business of "selling" protection through creation of threats (where none exist) and thereby (in Weberian terms) monopolizing the means of violence (to increase the "price" of protection by eliminating competitors), is effective and legitimate if its extraction “racket” (Tilly 1985:171) is successful. This can be measured through tax revenue as a percent of GDP (which makes comparison
between states possible). The level of taxation is an indicator of state strength (Robinson 1977). I therefore used tax revenue as percentage of GDP as the operationalized indicator of state strength.

From the variable, tax revenue as percentage of GDP, I computed a total tax revenue figure using national GDP figures. This total tax revenue variable was then used in order to compute other listed variables that measure various concepts as a percentage of tax revenue. I also converted taxation as a percentage of GDP (mean=21.8, SD=12.1) into a dichotomous categorical variable of state strength (above the mean to represent a strong state and mean or below the mean to represent a weak state), based on a state’s extraction strength. This ranking variable was then used in cross-tabulation analysis by MIS region to determine if world systemic position based on a militarized division of labor determines state strength for groupings of nation states.

**Population**

To control for the effects of population, since demographic factors influence economic development and growth, gender empowerment as well as describe the racial construction of the (numerical) “majority” world, I controlled for a country’s population, which was normalized by taking the natural log of the absolute figures to fix positive skew in the data (as indicated above).

**Regime Type**

For the listed “regime type” categorical variable (Table 2.2), I used the listing of regime type by country provided by the State Fragility Index, 2008 (Marshall and Cole 2009). Of the listed four categories, instituted democracy, weak democracy, weak authoritarianism and strong
authoritarianism, I collapsed weak democracy and weak authoritarianism into my “experimental state” (Horowitz 1975) category, because they reflect a shifting constellation between the two extremes, the instituted democracy and instituted or strong authoritarianism. The three category regime-type variable was used in cross-tabulation analysis by MIS region to see if world systemic position within a militarized division of labor predisposed groups of nation states to certain regime types (chapter 4).

Summary of the Analyses

In chapter 3, I look at the global structure of militarization based upon the militarization scale as the main predictor of economic and stratification outcomes of nation states. I started with a detailed description of the construction of the militarization scale using principal component factor analysis and a detailed description of the construction of the economic development/accumulation factor which serves both as a control and as dependent variable in separate analyses. I then did a comparison of extreme cases, comparing the top 5 to the bottom 5 militarized countries based on scores on the militarization scale and gauged the percentage difference among the mean of the top 5 and the bottom 5, on military spending as a percentage of government spending, GEM scores, (non-income) HDI scores, GDP growth percent (average 2001-2010) and Gini scores. This gave me an indication of the direction of variation between the extreme cases. I did this comparison separately for NATO/OECD member countries and non-NATO, non-OECD member countries. After this, I looked at militarization and the economy, in terms of bivariate correlation analysis, to check for statistically significant relationship magnitude and direction among variables, and also did multivariate OLS regression analysis, to check for the specific weights of the relationship between militarization and economic outcomes,
taking economic growth and economic development as dependent variables in separate analyses, and using relevant controls.

In the OLS multivariate analyses, I checked for non-linear relationships, interaction effects, extreme outlier influence on regression results, multicollinearity (to check for high correlation between two or more predictors) and heteroskedasticity (using residual analyses and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) ‘goodness of fit’ test of the main models of each dependent variable to check for non-constant variation in the error terms). I then looked at militarization and global stratification and did bivariate correlation and multivariate OLS regression analysis using GEM, Gini and (non-income) HDI as dependent variables in separate analyses, with one analysis using Global Race as predictor of economic development with militarization as control. Similar to the economic analyses, I checked for non-linear relationships, interaction effects, extreme outlier influence, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity.

In chapter 4, using the militarization scale developed and discussed in chapter 3, I detail the construction of the Militarized International System (MIS) based on three categories of countries the define three regions that have distinct logic within the MIS based on levels of militarization. Those categories are Command States (CS), Semi-Militarized States (SMS) and Militarized States (MS). In order to validate my model of the international system, I did a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of militarization by MIS to check for statistically significant mean differences across the categories of the MIS on the militarization scale. In the ANOVA analyses in this dissertation, I also checked for homogeneity of variance across samples using the Levine test. In case the variances across samples were not homogeneous, I used the more robust Brown Forsythe test of median comparison (instead of the standard F-test), to validate
statistically significant mean differences across groups. Using Tukey's Post Hoc comparison test, Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant Difference), I also checked for homogeneity between pairs of groups in the regional divisions of the MIS.

Using the MIS categorization, I did cross-tabulation analysis of GEM rank by MIS, (non-income) HDI rank by MIS, GDP growth rank by MIS, Gini rank by MIS, Regime Type by MIS, State strength rank by MIS, War within the past 5 years by MIS, War within the past 20 years by MIS and Arms import rank by MIS. The cross-tabulation analyses were done in order to test various hypotheses using Chi-Square analysis of significance of relationship between variables and Cramer’s V analysis of strength of relationship between variables. The following analyses of variance were done in order to gauge mean differences among categories of the MIS: (Non-Income) HDI by MIS, GDP Growth by MIS, (Log of) GNI per capita by MIS, Economic Development/accumulation by MIS and Gini by MIS. In order to gauge the specific weights of regional division based on militarization and gender empowerment, economic growth, basic needs provision and income inequality, I did multivariate OLS regression analysis using the MIS regional dummy variables as primary predictors controlling for economic, demographic and state variables, first with the CS as excluded category and then with the MS as excluded category comparing it to the combined CS and SMS region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>VARIABLE SOURCE</th>
<th>DATA YEAR</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>MAX</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms Imports as % of tax revenue</td>
<td>SIPRI^49 and IMF (Computed)</td>
<td>2009-2010 Total</td>
<td>4.8129</td>
<td>15.546</td>
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<td>2009-2010 Total</td>
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<td>2.012</td>
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<td>CIA Factbook^52</td>
<td>2006 or nearest</td>
<td>2.215</td>
<td>1.879</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.40</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure as % of Tax Revenue</td>
<td>CIA Factbook and IMF^43, computed.</td>
<td>2009 or nearest</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>68.48</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>570</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure</td>
<td>World Bank^44</td>
<td>2006 or nearest</td>
<td>9.14</td>
<td>7.295</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>45.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log of MilGDP</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2006 or nearest</td>
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<td>.7767</td>
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<td>2.43</td>
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<td>Log of Milptax</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military population % total population</td>
<td>IISS^55 (Percentage computed)</td>
<td>2010 or nearest</td>
<td>4.173</td>
<td>3.942</td>
<td>.20</td>
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<td>.9226</td>
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<td>Militarization Factor</td>
<td>Factor Analysis</td>
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<td>World Bank^49</td>
<td>2001-2010 average</td>
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<td>Source</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>Median</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>World Population Data Sheet, PRB&lt;sup&gt;50&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>39.64</td>
<td>139.99</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>1338.1</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP)</td>
<td>IMF&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2009 or nearest</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Tax Revenue, Millions US $</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>See above</td>
<td>86.63</td>
<td>341.65</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3722.68</td>
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<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
<td>UN HDR&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.129</td>
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<td>UN HDR&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.180</td>
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<td>0.989</td>
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<td>Gini Income Inequality Coefficient</td>
<td>CIA Factbook</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.102</td>
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<td>Variable</td>
<td>Data Source</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Categories</td>
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<td>NATO membership</td>
<td>NATO website</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0=non-member 1=founding member 2=other member</td>
<td>0=145, 1=7 2=15, N=173</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD membership</td>
<td>OECD website</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0=non-member 1=founding member 2=other member</td>
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<td>War Within the past 5 years</td>
<td>State Fragility Index</td>
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<td>0= no warfare 1=warfare</td>
<td>0= 145,1=28 N=173</td>
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<td>War Within the past 20 years</td>
<td>State Fragility Index</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0= no warfare 1=warfare</td>
<td>0= 98, 1=75 N=173</td>
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<td>Regime type</td>
<td>State Fragility Index</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1=democratic 2=experimental 3=autocratic-dictatorial</td>
<td>1=92, 2=41, 3=23 N=156</td>
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<td>GEM ranking</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1= High (above average) Empowerment 2= Low Empowerment</td>
<td>1=53, 2=54 N=107</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth ranking</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1= High (above average) Growth 2=Low Growth</td>
<td>1=12, 2=91, 3=80 N=173</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-income HDI ranking</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1= High (above average) 2=Low</td>
<td>1=98, 2=63 N=161</td>
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<tr>
<td>GINI Rank</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1=High (above average) Income Inequality 2=Low Income Inequality</td>
<td>1=64, 2=80 N=144</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Strength Rank</td>
<td>Computed using Tax (% GDP)</td>
<td>2009 or nearest</td>
<td>1=Strong State (above average extraction) 2= weak state</td>
<td>1= 71, 2=95 N=166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms Import Rank</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>1= High Arms Imports (above average) 2= Low Arms Imports</td>
<td>1=62, 2=55 N=117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militarized International System (MIS)</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>1= Command States, 2=Semi-militarized States, 3=Militarized States</td>
<td>1= 20, 2=76, 3= 62 N=158</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Race</td>
<td>Computed</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1=White/European 2= Everyone else</td>
<td>1=36, 2=137 N=173</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER 3

GLOBAL MILITARIZATION AND ITS STRUCTURAL OUTCOMES

In her survey of the militarization process over the 20th century, Catherine Lutz argues that “the long process of militarization …has shaped almost every element of global social life” (Lutz 2002:724). Lutz defines militarization comprehensively as:

…the contradictory and tense social processes in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence…intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simultaneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force… (Lutz 2002:723)

Not only did militarization initiate the large scale economic globalization of the present, most nation states of the world emerged as a consequence of war or war related activity. The very idea of sovereign “nation state” and citizenship emerged out of war and the desires of the rulers to conscript the ruled for war (Tilly 1985, 1990). Military bureaucracies developed in Europe in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while civil administration involving tax collection did not bureaucratize until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this means that the military served as a model for the bureaucratization of the civilian state (Kiser and Baer 2005:241). Military discipline was the precursor to factory work, which is central to the capitalist mode of production (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958). The military was also a pioneer in fusing instrumental and non-instrumental motivation, doing so in a rational manner through the use of the drill, which precedes the “tribalism within modernity” (Hagedorn 2007:61), that defines post modernity, which is described by Marcuse (1991) as the hallmark achievement of functional rationality. Such fusion has, as part of the functioning of organic solidarity (Durkheim 1997
(1893)), introduced mechanical type bonding through massification (Mills 1951) and a national ethos, a form of civil religion (Bellah and Tipton 2006:228), that serves to legitimate citizenship and through that reifies the national state. This reified national state is often invoked by military rulers as they overthrow civilian regimes (Hutchful and Bathily 1998: xiii) around the world.

Instrumental motivations, where the individual person is being asked to sacrifice his or her life would neither be effective nor would they produce “heroic actions often found in battle” (Kiser and Baer 2005:236). This rational attempt at inculcating the irrational, by linking emotions to unrelated ends through use of the military drill that “created a lively spirit de corps among the poverty-stricken recruits and urban outcasts who came to constitute the rank and file of the European armies, so that other social ties faded to insignificance among them” (Kiser and Baer 2005:236), only later translated into the civilian arena producing what C. Wright Mills referred to as a mass society of “Cheerful Robots” (Mills 1959): people conditioned by a bureaucratized society, with its implicit rules of rewards and punishment, to control and monitor agent-actors resulting in self-adaptation and homogenization.

The military also served as a conduit for previously disenfranchised groups to enter the mainstream of society through conscription and citizenship. The process of “democratization” based on the manipulation of the mass of people for the purpose of wars by the elite, began first in the military and only later diffused to the civilian arena (Janowitz 1975:19). The military is the premier “otherizing” institution (the ideal-typical stratifier) without which neither racial nor gender based stratification can be fully understood, while at the same time it creates internal homogenization through controlling the life-experience of its members, thus becoming the precursor to the massification inherent in advanced capitalist societies. In the course of the past
25 years almost half of the countries of the world have experienced major wars (Marshall and Cole 2009:5), that have altered social structures, geographic territories and regional economies. Yet, militarization and war, as forms of social interaction, remain one of the most understudied areas in sociology and anthropology (Kentor and Kick 2008; Gusterson 2007).

My purpose in this chapter is to empirically incorporate the structure of global militarization, as explanatory variable for understanding economic development and underdevelopment in the world, including global systems of stratification and inequality. Given the historical precedence of militarization and its effects in terms of wars and the resulting alteration of state and economy, treating militarization as a mere consequence of a capitalist mode of production as Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis (Wallerstein 1974) does, borrowing from dependency theory’s “development of underdevelopment” (Frank 1989 (1966)), or treating it as a relic of preindustrial societies (Spencer 1961 (1896)), as an aberration in industrial social structures, as functionalists do, results in inadequate or historically misspecified models of development.

I am proposing that in addition to the two main paradigms of development that hold hegemony in sociological literature, the functionalist, modernization perspective (Rostow 1966) and the Marxist, dependency perspective (Frank 1989 (1966); Wallerstein 1974), we need an alternative third perspective that incorporates, based on the sociological imagination (Mills 1959), the historical precedence of war and militarism in the formation of the modern nation state as well as the capitalist economy and also one that situates development and underdevelopment within a global social structure that is pervaded by militarism and a continuous (global) war. I am also suggesting that in order to understand the “problem” of
underdevelopment and militarization within a national state, we have to look at the role of militarization within the global capitalist system. Dependency is not only economic (investment, trade and debt based), it can be political, military and cultural as well. Firebaugh and Beck (1994) emphasize the same point, "Although in principal, peripheral nations could depend on Core nations in a variety of ways- militarily, politically, culturally, - most research in sociology has focused on investment and trade" (p.632). It is my contention in this dissertation that the project of a sociological understanding of the international system, which is a methodological necessity given the structural focus of the field has not been realized thus far. Wallerstein (1974) and his group by canonizing Marx’s understanding of Victorian capitalism and generalizing it deterministically into the future, based on trade and manufacturing relationships alone, borrowing heavily from the ‘dependency’ school’s theories of development, merely present a partial globalized structural analysis, that is in fact an additive model of Marx’s analysis and therefore sacrifices for economistic generalizations, the global complexity that defines the present.

Practically ignored by Wallerstein (1974) and reified by the functionalists (Rostow 1966) are the cultural aspects of development in the world system. Structural reproduction of subordination, of what Wallerstein described as the periphery, ensures that even though developmentism remains the agenda of developing nations as cultural goal, ritualized attempts to attain it are always elusive and subject to repeated failure (Wallerstein 2004:55). We cannot therefore locate the world systemic source of such motivation to ‘keep on at it’ despite failure without incorporating global cultural elements into understanding this phenomenon. The idea of an objective (synthetically produced) global culture that overpowers the structural reality faced by diverse people living in historically diverse nation states needs to be incorporated into models
of development. We therefore need a model of the international system that can explain this
culture-structure mismatch and can link it to the globalization of culture that binds populations
uniformly to their national states, despite structural failure to attain, what are in fact non-
localized (exogenous) ‘dreams.’ Therefore, cultural components of comparison as system-
maintenance/reproduction mechanisms need to be incorporated within the traditional
development models, and these cultural components have involved a constant shift in definitions
of ‘development’ and duty as citizen for the purpose of manipulation and have involved the
glorification of the national state in explicitly military terms. Without incorporating these
cultural aspects of systemic reproduction, a culture that normalizes the military definition of
reality, what C. Wright Mills referred to as the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), the sociological
understanding of the operation of the world system remains grossly inadequate.

Capitalism’s ideological ‘Global Dream’ (of deregulation and privatization of public
enterprise) of top down development is offered to the majority world as fashion to emulate the
higher status industrially developed countries, while separating themselves from the more
“backward” ones (that might rely on socialism and state nationalization of industry). This
emulative “development,” like status-based consumption highlighted by Veblen, puts power on
“display” (Veblen 2008 (1899), p. 23) and has evolved due to the militarization pushed by the
developed countries, an active participation in their many global wars and a subordination of all
domestic agendas towards that end. The modernization explanation of development as the
official development ethos pushed on the “Third World” by international institutions is similar to
the projection of the ‘American Dream’ (and its associated middle class ethos) pushed on
African Americans in the U.S, which is totally detached from their structural economic reality
(of capital flight from the inner cities and skill mismatch, or the “janitorification” of the
workforce related to deindustrialization) faced by the ghetto poor. The ‘American Dream’ as part of the perpetual mythology of the individualized workman ethic for the purpose of motivation is pushed from on high to the U.S. working class promising them a lifestyle that most cannot attain because it is a moving target in the images that are presented. Its successful attainment always remains an elusive dream for the vast majority, otherwise the motivation to keep at ritualized wage-labor would diminish, which the capitalist system cannot tolerate for its successful perpetuation.

This also involves justifying through ‘achievement’ based explanations, for the sake of maintaining the status quo, the disparities people see in wealth, lifestyle and power among racial, gender, national and class groups. In other words, rather than provoke revolutions or anti-systemic social movements (contrary to Karl Polanyi’s or Gurr’s (1970) claim), relative deprivation is systematically generated by the elite in order to bind certain groups to their system while “otherizing” the relatively deprived, fracturing consciousness and enhancing the ability of the elite to counter pressures for social change. The system manages absolute deprivation but generates relative deprivation because it is functional in dividing the working class against itself. Political scientist, Clarence Stone (1993) calls this type of power to institutionalize a group’s advantages “ecological power,” a kind of power that mutes opposition by legitimizing inequality through ‘normalizing’ some groups and particular behaviors and devaluing, medicalizing or criminalizing all others. This in short represents the origin of the “rogue states” (defined militarily not economically) in the international system.

For the purpose of uncovering the global structure of militarization, using the world system as the unit of analysis, in that the world system is not merely a sum of the various
national states but is greater than and qualitatively different to the sum of its parts, a sui generis entity (Durkheim 1982 (1895)), I developed a militarization scale using a principal component factor analysis that captured in its computation the latent structure of global militarization. The results suggested that three variables (see Table 3.01) could be grouped into one summary index of militarization (N=157). These three measures of militarization were: the log of government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the log of government military expenditure as a percentage of total tax revenue and the log of military personnel as a percentage of total population. The first two measures (were both adjusted by taking their natural log because they were positively skewed) represent the military burden of a nation state while the third represents a log-adjusted military participation ratio expressed as a percentage. The Eigen value (2.12) was above the conventional threshold of 1.00. The factor loadings ranged from 0.726 for the log of military personnel as a percentage of total population to 0.915 for the log of government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Standardized Components</th>
<th>Militarization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Log of Government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP</td>
<td>0.915</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log of Military expenditure as a percentage of taxation revenue</td>
<td>0.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Military personnel as a percentage of total population</td>
<td>0.726</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eigen Value</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Variation Explained</td>
<td>70.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The variables combined to form this factor were in agreement with the definition of militarization in the literature, and the militarization scale was internally validated in that it explained 70.81% of the variation in these militarization variables among the nation states. In order to separate the economic from the military to control for the structure of economic accumulation around the globe, I constructed an economic scale using a principal component factor analysis that captured in its computation the latent structure of global economic accumulation. The results suggested that three variables (see Table 3.02) could be grouped into one summary index of economic accumulation (N=143).

Table 3.02 Principal Component Factor Analysis- Economic Factor (N=143)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardized Components</th>
<th>Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of GNI (ppp) per capita</td>
<td>0.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Inbound Foreign Direct Investment Stock</td>
<td>0.963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Inbound Foreign Direct Investment Flow</td>
<td>0.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigen Value</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Variation Explained</td>
<td>82.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three absolute measures of economic development/accumulation were: the log of GNI per capita, the log of inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock and the log of inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow. The Eigen value (2.48) was above the conventional threshold of 1.00. The factor loadings ranged from 0.832 for the log of GNI per capita to 0.963 for the log of inbound Foreign Direct Investment. The first variable (log of GNI per capita)
measures the size of the economy, the next two (log of inbound FDI stock and log of inbound FDI flow), foreign investment and accumulation activity in the economy. All of these measures were standardized by taking their Z-scores before factor analysis. The variables combined to form this factor were in agreement with the indicators of economic accumulation outlined in the development literature. The scale that measures the underlying concept of economic accumulation/development was internally validated in that it explained 82.75% of the variation in these economic variables among the nation states.

**Militarization: Descriptive Comparison of Extremes**

Table 3.03 lists the top five militarized countries as they compare with the bottom five militarized countries from among the NATO and OECD member countries (the “developed” countries), on military spending (as a percent of government spending), the GDP growth percent (an indicator of economic growth, measured as an average annual percent from 2001-2010), the Gini income inequality coefficient (an indicator of income/distributional inequality within a nation state), the UN’s (non-income) Human Development Index (an indicator of basic needs provision of a population) and the UN’s Gender Empowerment Measure (an indicator of women’s empowerment). Table 3.04 does the same for non-NATO and non-OECD members (the “developing” countries).

As Table 3.03 shows, for NATO and OECD member countries, the top five militarized nations have average government military expenditure that is 89.5% higher compared to the bottom five countries. The top five militarized countries were growing economically at a rate that is 3.2% higher compared to the bottom five, while at the same time they have 36.6% greater income/distributional inequality compared to the bottom five, their average HDI score is also
lower compared to the bottom five (by 6%, indicating lower human development/ basic needs provision) and they have a GEM score that is 22% lower compared to the bottom five (indicating lower gender empowerment).

Table 3.03 Comparison between top 5 and bottom 5 Militarized Nations that are NATO and OECD members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY NATO/OECD member countries</th>
<th>Militarization Index</th>
<th>Military Spending (% Govt. Spending)</th>
<th>GDP growth % (average, annual 2001-2010)</th>
<th>GINI Scores</th>
<th>HDI Scores</th>
<th>GEM Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 5 Militarized Nations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>0.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Top 5 Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.714</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.388</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.840</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.618</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bottom 5 Militarized Nations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-0.795</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>-0.603</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td>0.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-0.576</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.530</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>0.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.455</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>0.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Bottom 5 Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.592</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.14</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.87</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.284</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.893</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.793</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent difference and direction (Top 5 vs. Bottom 5)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.04 shows that for non-NATO and non-OECD member countries the top 5 militarized states have a government military expenditure that is 1016% higher compared to the bottom five militarized states. Also higher in magnitude compared to the NATO and OECD top five, is the GDP growth percent of the top five militarized states in the non-NATO, non-OECD
group. The top five in this group have a GDP growth rate that is 46% higher on average compared to their bottom five. Their higher inequality is lower in magnitude compared to the NATO and OECD top five (which had 36.6% higher inequality compared to their bottom five).

Table 3.04 Comparison between top 5 and bottom 5 Militarized Nations that are non-NATO and non-OECD members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY (Non-Nato, Non OECD)</th>
<th>Militarization Index</th>
<th>Military Spending (% Govt. Spending)</th>
<th>GDP growth % (average, annual 2001-2010)</th>
<th>GINI Scores</th>
<th>HDI Scores</th>
<th>GEM Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 5 Military Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3.105</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>2.975</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2.461</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1.965</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1.718</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Top 5 Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>+2.445</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.88</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.368</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.786</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.486</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bottom 5 Military Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>-2.933</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>-1.873</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>-1.856</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.712</td>
<td>0.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>-1.745</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>-1.363</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Bottom 5 Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.954</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.96</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.34</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.351</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.665</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.539</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% difference and direction (Top 5 vs. Bottom 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Top 5</th>
<th>Bottom 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militarization Index</td>
<td>1016% ↑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Spending (%) Govt. Spending</td>
<td>46.1% ↑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth % (average, annual 2001-2010)</td>
<td>4.84% ↑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI Scores</td>
<td>18.2% ↑</td>
<td>9.8% ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI Scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEM Scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top five militarized states (non-NATO, non-OECD) have GEM scores that are almost 10% lower compared to the bottom five (indicating lesser gender empowerment), while contrary to the NATO and OECD nations’ top five militarized states, the top five militarized states in this category (non-NATO, non-OECD) have HDI scores that are 18% higher compared to their bottom 5 (indicating higher human development/basic needs provision). Given extremes
in militarization, in such comparisons, we can analytically suggest that for NATO and OECD member countries, higher military expenditure translates into much lower gender empowerment, lower basic needs provision, slightly higher GDP growth and much higher inequality. For the non-NATO and non-OECD member countries, higher military expenditure translates into lower gender empowerment; higher basic needs provision (contrary to the NATO/OECD group), much higher GDP growth and slightly higher inequality. However, in order to uncover the global structural effects of militarization on economic growth, economic development, gender empowerment, basic needs provision and inequality, that are generalizable, we need bivariate and OLS multivariate regression analysis using global data and not only comparisons between extremes, which is what the next section is about.

**Militarization, Economic Development and Inequality**

**Economic Growth and Economic Development**

What William Spiegel (1940) defined as the “economics of a military state” (p.718) or what Mills (1958) defined as a “permanent war economy” (p.67), or what Melman (1970) later defined as “Pentagon capitalism,” implies that the state, economy and the military get intertwined in the production and consumption process. This means that the state and the military become not only regulators and customers of the major corporations, customers that have near monopsony power, they guide and subsidize the civilian production process as well through power of legislation, control of funds and science, in order to avert crises and manage “problems of the economic cycle” (Mills 1958:91) in terms that are acceptable to an elite who are themselves interchangeable between the military, economy and the state (Mills 1956). Spending on the military, particularly on procurement is a “politically acceptable and direct and efficient
way to pump money in the pockets of capital” (Boies 1994:86) rather than indirectly through welfare which is dependent on people’s consumption expenditure, spending dependent on the goods market and cost minimization, over which the government has comparatively lesser control compared to the cost-plus formulation that defines Pentagon capitalism (Melman 1974) and leads to “dead-weight” gain for the corporations. Over time such a confluence of interests leads to economic dependency on military procurement and spending (Gauchat, Wallace, Burch and Lowe 2011), and profitable relocation abroad (Cypher 1984) which feeds militarization both at home in the U.S. (Markusen 2004) and around the world and therefore serves to naturalize a permanent war economy and normalize war as a system generality (Mills 1956; Tilly 1990).

With the media bringing war into the living rooms of hundreds of millions across the nation and the globe, the psychic adaptation of living in a “rough neighborhood,” which is a necessary consequence of skewed media coverage of global events (Gusterson 2007:164) facilitates the reproduction of the politico-economic-military setup, with its structure of stratification, that describes a global permanent war economy, binding and subordinating people to their national states (Horowitz 1964). Such ‘binding’ is the political aspect of averting crises, which complements the economic aspect of crisis aversion, military Keynesianism, and its logic of war based and war related spending. The excess capacity (Baran and Sweezy 1966) that periodically affects the capitalist economy and precipitates a recession that without intervention can lead to a depression, is often presented as a natural calamity to the public by their political leaders, as if it has nothing to do with a political economy where mass accumulation by the few is of greater concern in organizing social activity than the unemployment of the many. The reasoning behind excess capacity, what Veblen described as “industry sabotage” by business (Veblen 1997 (1923)), with profit calculations sabotaging both industry and technological
capacity by restricting production to keep prices high (Samuels 1994) represents a consequence of surplus extraction by the bourgeoisie through not only present but also future consumption by the workers made possible through debt, facilitating credit to cash strapped families, at exorbitant rates of interest.

Krueger and Perry (2005) find that income inequality might not lead to consumption inequality because private lenders adjust their behavior to make credit available during economic downturns. This supplements capitalism’s ongoing transfer of wealth from the people towards the ultra rich, the poor get poorer and the rich richer with eventual recessions where the bourgeoisie sabotage industry because previous levels of accumulation cannot be maintained. Managing accumulation (and not job creation) is the primary concern of the captains of industry and therefore all human activity, within a bourgeoisie society, is geared towards that end (Veblen 1997 (1923)). The relationship between finance capital, future consumption and recessions is the structural clue to the confluence of interest between finance capital and monopoly capital just like deficit spending by the government, links finance capital to the profit concerns of the aerospace defense industries and the warfare state. This also provides a structural clue to the incidental status of the worker (expendable in wars and recessions) within a warfare based capitalist mode of production. Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios (2009) find that specialization in finance in a political economy contributes to higher inequality, in their study of the EU region.

For militarized spending to be able to avert economic crises, it should be able to restore previous levels of accumulation in order to encourage the capitalists to invest in future job growth to enhance accumulation. It is here that the functional utility of military Keynesianism as a policy tool of the state comes to the fore as the stabilization engine of a crisis prone economic
Szymanski (1973) tested the claim of the link between economic growth and military spending for industrialized countries and found that the countries that had greater military expenditure were growing at a rate 20% higher than those with lower military expenditure and they also had lower unemployment. Given the initial large aggregate GDP of the developed countries, even a small percentage increase in GDP amounts to a large aggregate number. When Szymanski controlled for the size of the economy, the higher growth rate vanished but the lower unemployment in the industrialized high military spending countries remained intact.

For developing countries Benoit (1968, 1978) in his seminal work on the relationship between military spending and economic growth, found a strong positive correlation between the two, which remained significant even in a multivariate regression model controlling for investment and foreign aid. Benoit came to the conclusion that “a significant portion of defense activity contributes to civilian economic objectives” (1968:411). Mintz and Stevenson (1995) in their review of the empirical literature in this area found that the relationship between military spending and economic growth goes in both directions (in various studies), but confirm that spending on personnel might cause economic growth but not spending on procurement (Mintz 1989). Military spending was found to enhance inequality (Horowitz 1975) taking money away from education and health (Henderson 1998; Fontanel 1990), which leads to the conclusion that if enhanced military spending occurs during peace time where most of the increase in spending goes to procurement, it would lead to greater poverty and inequality, while if the spending goes to personnel, during mobilization for war, it might have the opposite effect. In their study involving 49 U.S. states Wallace, Borch and Gauchat (2008) found that the strongest bivariate effect on defense spending was economic contraction, which provides evidence of a military
Keynesian dynamic in place in the U.S. Complementing this claim is the study by Gauchat, Wallace, Borch and Lowe (2011) which found defense dependency in the 276 U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), where military spending positively enhanced economic indicators.

For military Keynesianism to be a viable stabilization engine for capitalism, we should find that militarization is positively associated with economic growth and also positively associated with economic accumulation and development (this would reveal a ‘structural pathway’ that encourages militarization and military dependency in the world system). Based on these assumptions, I tested two hypotheses that would provide evidence for a military Keynesian dynamic in place in the global system. My hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1: Militarization, net of other effects, will have a positive impact on economic growth.
Hypothesis 2: Militarization, net of other effects, will have a positive impact on economic accumulation.

Table 3.05 presents the bivariate zero-order correlations between economic growth and various predictors in the model. Bivariate correlations reveal that militarization is positively associated with GDP growth ($r=0.231$, $p<0.001$) as expected. In fact militarization has the strongest positive (bivariate) relationship with economic growth in the model. The economic factor (that measures economic development/accumulation) was negatively associated with economic growth ($r= -0.193$, $p<0.05$) which is also in tune with expectations since a higher level of economic accumulation, as in advanced economies signifies diminishing returns to capital investment (Firebaugh 2000). The demographic variable representing population (log of population) had a positive relationship with economic growth ($r= 0.213$, $p<0.01$). This is in tune with expectations since a growing population requires extra resources for its sustenance which, primarily through consumption drives economic growth (Sweezy 1940), and overtime such
consumption gets institutionalized at higher levels of economic activity, representing greater economic development.

Table 3.05 Bivariate Correlation (GDP Growth %, Average Annual 2001-2010) N=141

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP Growth</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population (1)</td>
<td>0.213**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor (2)</td>
<td>-0.193*</td>
<td>0.297***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP) (3)</td>
<td>-0.493***</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>0.470***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (4)</td>
<td>0.231**</td>
<td>0.162**</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>-0.209**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization Squared (5)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.141*</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.327***</td>
<td>0.416***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor Squared (6)</td>
<td>-0.310***</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.245**</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

However, an alternative view suggests that a rapidly growing population can have a negative impact on economic growth by worsening the quality of human capital and worsening the age-dependency ratio (Petrakos, Arvanitidis and Pavleas 2007). We need to make a distinction here between economic growth and economic development. Economic growth does not necessarily translate into economic development in the absence of productive investment, rather it merely
increases inequality and accelerates capital drain (Chase-Dunn 1975; Lee 2005). The state variable, tax revenue as percentage of GDP, was negatively associated with economic growth as expected. A higher extraction rate diminishes investment and consumption and thereby inhibits economic growth. Lee and Gordon (2004) find, using cross-country data from 1970-1997 that high corporate tax rate diminishes economic growth through reduced investment, since more people opt for entrepreneurship when corporate taxes are low (p.1027).

The economic factor was significantly positively associated with the log of population, as discussed above, a higher population over time might translate into higher level, instituted, economic activity. Militarization was significantly positively associated with log of population as well ($r= 0.162$, $p<0.01$), in tune with my expectations because a larger population might mean the need for a larger military in developing nations that is inwardly directed (Janowitz 1975; Horowitz 1975), for the purpose of control, which will increase the militarization scale due to the military participation ratio component of the factor. The relationship of militarization to economic growth was strong and positive, as hypothesized. However, bivariate relationships are no guarantee of magnitude, direction or significance of multivariate relationships, therefore I used multivariate regression analysis to isolate the effects of militarization on economic growth net of other effects, and tested for non-linear relationships as well as interactions between militarization and the various controls outlined in the model predicting economic growth.

Table 3.06 presents the multivariate regression results. Model 1 regresses GDP growth percent (annual average 2001-2010) on demographic and economic variables. Model 2 adds the state variable (tax revenue as percent of GDP) to the demographic and economic variables. Model 3 adds militarization to the economic, demographic and state variables. Model 4 adds
militarization squared and economic factor squared to check for nonlinear polynomial relationships and Model 5 adds interaction terms of militarization with the economic, demographic and state variables to check for confluence of effects. Outlier influence analysis revealed that Bahrain was an extreme, influential case and was removed from the analysis. Collinearity did not seem to be a problem (VIF <2.5) in the models.

Table 3.06 Ordinary Least Squares Regression of GDP Growth on Militarization (N=141)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>0.441** (0.124)</td>
<td>0.240* (0.120)</td>
<td>0.229 (0.120)</td>
<td>0.216 (0.125)</td>
<td>0.215 (0.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td>-0.693*** (0.206)</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.224)</td>
<td>-0.127 (0.226)</td>
<td>-0.139 (0.231)</td>
<td>-0.135 (0.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP)</td>
<td>-0.094*** (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.087*** (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.084*** (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.084*** (0.021)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.327 (0.205)</td>
<td>0.510* (0.211)</td>
<td>0.530* (0.226)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.362* (0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.485** (0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.035 (0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(centered) X Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072 (0.249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic factor X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003 (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax(% GDP, centered)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003 (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.965*** (0.361)</td>
<td>5.519*** (0.587)</td>
<td>5.379*** (0.590)</td>
<td>6.148*** (0.703)</td>
<td>4.760*** (0.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 Standard Errors in Parenthesis

As Table 3.06 shows 28 % of the variation in GDP growth percent was explained by model 3 that adds the militarization predictor to the model, which was a 16.2 percent explanatory improvement over Model 1, which had the economic and demographic predictors only.
However, militarization seems to have a curvilinear and not a linear relationship with economic growth because it is statistically non-significant as a linear predictor by itself (b=0.327, p=0.113), even though the direction is revealing and as expected. When the quadratic term was added to the model (in Model 4), the model significantly improves from explaining 28% of the variation in economic growth to explaining 36% of the variation, the quadratic term (a= -0.362, p<0.05) was significant. This means that militarization (Minimum= -2.399, Maximum=3.105) has a curvilinear relationship with economic growth, and since the quadratic term is negative, the curve is concave, its curvature is downwards. At 0.704 on the militarization scale (-b/2a= -0.510/2X -0.362= 0.704), the curve reaches its highest point, with economic growth increasing with a per unit increase in militarization, net of other effects and then levels off. Any increase in militarization beyond 1.408 leads to a recessionary trend, net of other effects. Increase in militarization, net of other effects, does not enhance economic growth for the two top militarization quintiles, while it does so for the bottom three, based on the curvilinear relationship between militarization and economic growth (Figure 3.1).

Model 4 also shows that the economic factor (representing economic development, minimum= -2.764, maximum=2.261) has a quadratic relationship with economic growth, both linear and quadratic terms are negative which means the curve once again is concave, and the curve is at its maximum at (-b/2a=0.139/-0.97) -0.143 on the economic factor. Economic development past -0.143 on the economic scale results in a reduction of economic growth, net of other effects (Figure 3.2). Increase in economic development, net of other effects, enhances economic growth only for the bottom two quintiles of the economic (development) scale, while for the top three quintiles, any increase in economic development, net of other effects, decreases economic growth.
The other predictor besides militarization and the economic factor that was statistically significant in predicting economic growth was the state variable (tax revenue as percent of GDP). As expected, for every one unit increase in tax revenue (percent of GDP), economic growth decreases by 0.084 units (b= -0.084, p<0.001), net of other effects. This was theoretically predicted because increase in corporate taxation makes investment unattractive and thereby diminishes economic growth. Model 5 revealed no significant interactions between militarization and the other predictors in the model. I can therefore confirm my hypothesis 1, with some reservations, based on the curvilinear nature of the relationship. The key to making militarization a stabilization engine seems to be at lower levels of militarization (bottom three quintiles of the militarization scale), beyond a certain level militarization results in economic contraction but the economic growth based ‘addiction’ at lower levels implies that countries keep on militarizing regardless of the fact that at higher levels of militarization there is little economic growth as a consequence of incremental increases in militarization, given a militarized culture evolving in the process.

In order to test my hypothesis 2 listed above, which stated that net of other effects militarization will have a positive impact on economic development, I used OLS multivariate regression (Table 3.08), after examining the bivariate zero order correlations (Table 3.07) between the economic factor and its several predictors including my proposed predictor, militarization.
Figure 3.1 Curvilinear Relationship: Economic Growth and Militarization

Figure 3.2 Curvilinear Relationship: Economic Growth and Economic Development

Figure 3.3 Curvilinear Relationship: Economic Development and Militarization
Table 3.07 presents the bivariate zero-order correlations between economic development as measured through the economic factor (see Table 3.02) and various predictors in the model including militarization (see Table 3.03). Bivariate correlations reveal that militarization even though revealing a positive direction of association is not significantly related to economic development. The economic factor was negatively associated with economic growth (-0.193, p<0.05) which is in tune with expectations since a higher level of economic accumulation, as in advanced economies, signifies diminishing returns to capital invested (Firebaugh 2000) as previously stated.

The demographic variable representing population (log of population) had a positive relationship with economic development (0.297, p<0.01). This is in tune with expectations since a growing population requires extra resources for its sustenance which overtime are instituted into an economic system resulting in economic development. However, the alternative view suggests that a rapidly growing population can have a negative impact on economic development by worsening the age-dependency ratio (Petrakos, Arvanitidis and Pavleas 2007) and consumption based economic growth which crowds out investment. The state variable, tax revenue collected as percentage of GDP was positively associated with economic development as expected. Economies that are developed usually have a better infrastructure of taxation monitoring and collection, which is indicative of a strong state and a higher “capacity to collect taxes” (Campbell 1993:174).
Since developed economies have lower economic growth rates due to diminishing returns on capital investment, a consequence of industrial maturity (Firebaugh 2000), and lower growth rates are also indicative of higher tax rates (Lee and Gordon 2004), we can speculate that higher tax revenue collected would be positively associated with economic development indicating capitalist state maturity, this as I will later demonstrate, is also related to inequality and basic needs provision as well (as high capitalism’s conflict management techniques).

Table 3.07 Bivariate Correlation (Economic Development) N=141

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Factor</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population (1)</td>
<td>0.297***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP) (2)</td>
<td>0.470***</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth % (3)</td>
<td>-0.193*</td>
<td>0.213*</td>
<td>0.493***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (4)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.162*</td>
<td>-0.209**</td>
<td>0.231**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization Squared (5)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.141*</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.416***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Bivariate relationships are no guarantee of magnitude, direction or significance of multivariate relationships, therefore I used multivariate regression analysis to isolate the effects of militarization on economic development net of other effects and tested for non-linear relationships as well as interactions between militarization and the various controls outlined in the model in predicting economic development. The results are presented in Table 3.08.

As Table 3.08 shows 36% of the variation in economic development was explained by model 3 that adds the militarization predictor to the model, which was a 2% percent explanatory improvement over model 1 (which had the demographic, state strength (tax revenue as percent of GDP) and economic growth predictors only). Militarization had a positive enhancing effect
(b=0.171, p<0.05) on economic development/accumulation as measured by the economic factor, net of other effects. Every one unit increase in militarization produces a 0.171 unit increase in economic development, net of other effects, i.e. controlling for demographic, state strength and economic growth. Tax (as percent of GDP), which measures state (extraction) strength also had a positive enhancing effect per unit increase in tax revenue (percent GDP) on economic development/accumulation (b=0.044, p<0.001), net of other effects. For every unit increase in tax revenue (as percent of GDP), i.e. for a unit increase in state strength/legitimacy, economic development (capitalist accumulation) goes up by 0.044 units net of other effects. Contrary to claims of international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, economic growth does not have a significant (linear) relationship with economic development, net of other effects. The quadratic relationship between economic growth and economic development (not reported in the table) was also found to be statistically insignificant. This means that enhanced economic growth of nation states, net of other effects, does not translate into within-nation economic development, possibly due to offsetting capital exit from those nation states, which reduces their potential investment gains of economic growth to zero. The capitalist promotion of enhancing economic development in the developing nations through neo-liberal reform (or militarization) led economic growth is not supported by the data.

These results are in tune with Marxist models of the state that give the state a function of managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie as in Marxist instrumentalist models (Domhoff 2005) or in Marxist structuralist models, where a strong autonomous state enhances and manages the capitalist structure (Poulantzas 2001, 2008; Boies 1994). The log of population measuring population size also had a positive enhancing effect on economic development, net of other
effects \( (b=0.245, p<0.001) \), a one unit increase in the log of population enhances economic development/accumulation by 0.245 units, net of other effects.

Militarization has a curvilinear relationship with economic development (in Model 3) where the quadratic slope is positive (which means that the curve is convex) and the model with the quadratic function explains 40.2% of the variation in economic development, which is an improvement of almost 4% over the linear model. The curvilinear relationship reveals that an increase in militarization, net of other effects, results in a greater than linear effect in enhancing economic development at higher levels of militarization. The quadratic slope which enhances the linear addition to economic development based on militarization increase, reaches its minimum point at \((-\frac{b}{2a}= -0.033/0.354)\) -0.093 on the militarization scale, where it levels off, thereafter economic development increases with a per unit increase in militarization, net of other effects. At low levels of militarization, economic development decreases and at high levels it increases, per the curvilinear relationship (Figure 3.3).

Increases in militarization, net of other effects reduces economic development for the bottom two quintiles on the militarization scale, while at higher levels of militarization (the top three quintiles), any increase in militarization, net of other effects has a positive effect on economic development. I can therefore (strongly) confirm my hypothesis 2 which suggested a positive effect of militarization on economic development/capitalist accumulation net of other effects, with accelerated development beyond low levels of militarization. Not only is militarization a strong linear predictor of economic development, it also has an enhancing curvilinear effect on economic development, per unit increase in militarization, at higher levels, net of other effects. This means that a (military) Keynesian dynamic is in place around the world
linking militarization increase with enhanced economic development. This link between economic development and militarization was captured by Benoit (1968) as noted earlier, military expenditure directly contributes to civilian use in the form of infrastructure building and communication network development.

Benoit noted that generally speaking, the military workforce in developing nations is superior to its civilian counterpart in terms of education and technical skills (p.416), resulting in a long term transfer of skills from the military to civilian industries, which would be lost were we to use the simple “guns versus butter” argument in that context, and that military expenditure, in the developing world attracts foreign aid and development investment, which would otherwise be lost as well, this is captured by the inbound FDI flows that are part of my measure of economic development/ accumulation (Table 3.02).

**Militarization and Global Stratification**

The military is the premier “otherizing” institution in its modus operandi. Without otherizing “the enemy” it cannot function, that is, it otherizes for the purpose of eliminating the enemy with ease and in order to retain its distinction as a non-civilian institution. Militarization of civil society has grave consequences for racial and gender based stratification. This ‘otherization’ function of the military is often coupled with violence and the control of the means of violence, which when it diffuses through a militarized culture, the military metaphysic (Mills 1956) as in the U.S., leads to coercive, violence based control of the “other,” witnessed both in global wars and the (brutal) police control of the black ghetto (Hamilton and Carmichael 1992), violence against women and a culture of rape (Herman 1984).

**Gender Stratification**
Militarization interacts with global capitalism to alter women’s relationship to the labor force and through that the nation state, where a hierarchy of citizenship exists in direct proportion to economic independence (Arnold 2004), independence that is disproportionately denied to women and minorities. The “common symbolic world” (Sasson-Levy 2003:367) that the military creates, as a total institution, in order to facilitate its effectiveness in the deadly use of force for the fulfillment of politico-economic motives, has grave implications for the articulation of class, race and gender within militarized societies (Kestenbaum 2009). Not only is military vocabulary loaded with denigration of feminine traits, since women are disproportionately kept out of combat roles in the military, they are devalued through a gendered division of labor. Similar devaluation of women occurs in the civilian labor market where women are disproportionately designated into roles that are considered “natural extensions” of housework (Cohen 2004), generally considered to be lower status in capitalist economies.

I seek to answer the following question in this section regarding militarization and global gender based stratification: Is the level of gender based stratification in a society (reflected by the level of empowerment of women vis-à-vis men) explained by the level of militarization of that society? I therefore hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3: [Societies disadvantage women in direct proportion to their level of militarization within a capitalist world system]. The more militaristic a society, the lower the empowerment of women within that society.

In other words my hypothesis states that militarization reduces women’s empowerment. Naila Kabeer (2005) defines empowerment as the “ability to make choices” (2005:13) in order to cause change. In her rendition, empowerment has three closely related dimensions those of agency (entailing choice), resources (facilitating choice) and achievement (the end result of
empowered choice). When we talk of choice however, it entails not only the choice between given official alternatives (Mills 1959) but rather the imagination to invent alternatives based on ideals of social justice that might or might not be predefined within a social structure. Empowerment of women therefore in the ideal sense would entail the level to which women as informed members of the public can cause structural change in order to fix public issues related to gender based inequalities and other issues in their society, inequalities that are structurally perpetuated (Risman 2004; Matear 2007). However this broad, idealized definition of empowerment as conceptualized cannot be operationalized realistically because of the types of social structures that exist, working within which we need to measure the level of comparative empowerment of women. I will therefore restrict myself to Kabeer’s definition and measure women’s ability to make decisions that affect outcomes of importance in relation to themselves and to their families.

The three dimensions of empowerment listed by Kabeer (2005) are captured by the United Nations’ Gender Empowerment Measure. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), measures women’s agency in a particular country (index scores range from 0 to 1). Agency is conceptualized as political agency (operationalized as number of parliamentary seats held by women), employment (number of senior officers and management, professional and technical positions held by women) and earned income (in US $ PPP). Each of these three areas is converted into an “equally distributed equivalent percentage” and then nominally averaged without any further weighting.

In order to test my hypothesis, I used OLS multivariate regression (Table 3.10), after examining the bivariate zero-order correlations (Table 3.09) between the UN GEM measure and
its several predictors including my proposed predictor, militarization. Table 3.09 presents the bivariate zero-order correlation results: Bivariate correlations reveal that militarization is strongly negatively associated with gender empowerment ($r= -0.383$, $p<0.001$) in tune with expectations. The economic factor which measures economic development/accumulation was strongly positively associated with women’s empowerment ($r=0.571$, $p<0.001$). This is also in tune with expectations. The dimensions of the GEM measure gender empowerment within the context of a capitalized society, where “economies of scale” as a degree of capitalization give women proportionately greater access to education and the labor market and through that route to political representation. Tax revenue (percent of GDP), the state variable, was also strongly positively associated with gender empowerment ($r=0.660$, $p<0.001$). A stronger state means a well developed capitalist economy, where conflict is brought under institutional control through the workings of the state (Poulantzas 2001). Greater political representation by women in a strong state also produces gains in empowerment.

Even though completely in tune with expectations, bivariate relationships are no guarantee of magnitude, direction or significance of multivariate relationships, therefore I used multivariate regression analysis to isolate the effects of militarization on gender empowerment, net of other effects, and tested for non-linear relationships as well as interactions between militarization and the various controls outlined in the model in predicting economic development.

Table 3.10 presents the multivariate regression results. Model 1 regresses GEM on demographic and economic variables. Model 2 adds the state variable (Tax revenue percent of GDP) to the demographic and economic variables. Model 3 adds militarization to the economic,
demographic and state variables. Model 4 adds militarization squared and economic factor squared to model 3 to check for nonlinear relationships. Model 5 adds interaction terms of militarization with the economic, demographic and state variables to model 4. Bahrain as an extreme influential case was removed. Collinearity did not seem to be a problem (VIF <2.5) in the model.

Table 3.09 Bivariate Correlation (GEM) N=91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GEM</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEM</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population (1)</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor (2)</td>
<td>0.571***</td>
<td>0.330**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP) (3)</td>
<td>0.660***</td>
<td>-0.179*</td>
<td>0.505***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (4)</td>
<td>-0.383***</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>-0.279**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization Squared (5)</td>
<td>-0.266**</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.322***</td>
<td>0.501***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor Squared (6)</td>
<td>0.454***</td>
<td>0.298**</td>
<td>0.567*</td>
<td>0.419***</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

As Table 3.10 shows 63.9 % of the variation in GEM was explained by model 3 that adds the militarization predictor to the model, which was a 17.4 percent explanatory improvement
over Model 1, which had the economic and demographic predictors only. Militarization had a diminishing effect on gender empowerment, per unit increase in militarization, net of other effects ($b=-0.060, p<0.001$). For every unit increase in militarization, net of other effects, GEM scores go down by 0.060 units. The standardized coefficient of militarization in the model shows that militarization has the strongest diminishing effect on GEM, per standard deviation increase in militarization ($\beta=-0.311$), net of other effects. The next closest diminishing effect on gender empowerment, per standard deviation increase in model 3 is the demographic variable, log of population ($\beta=-0.243$), net of other effects. The log of the population unstandardized coefficient, which represents the log-adjusted (to fix positive skew) population of a nation state as stated above also had a negative impact on gender empowerment. Every one unit increase in the log of the population diminishes gender empowerment by 0.024 units, net of other effects ($b=-0.024, p<0.01$). This is in tune expectations, the larger the population of a country the lower the score of women’s empowerment because of a relative scarcity of resources available to women in all societies compared to men, given gender discrimination, other things being equal.

The economic factor had a positive impact on gender empowerment, a one unit increase in economic development/accumulation results in a 0.105 unit increase in gender empowerment, net of other effects ($b=0.015, p<0.001$). Standardized slopes reveal that the economic factor has the strongest positive effect, per standard deviation increase in the variable in model 3 ($\beta=0.546$), net of other effects. The second strongest positive effect, per standard deviation increase in the variable, is that of the state variable, tax revenue as a percent of GDP ($\beta=0.385$). The unstandardized slope of this variable reveals (in model 3) that every unit increase in tax revenue as percentage of GDP, empowerment of women goes up by 0.004 units,
net of other effects ($b=0.004$, $p<0.01$). Both of these results, regarding the economic factor and the state variable were in tune with my expectations as discussed above.

Table 3.10 Ordinary Least Squares Regression of GEM on Militarization (N=91)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>-0.039*** (.008)</td>
<td>-0.024*** (.008)</td>
<td>-0.024** (.007)</td>
<td>-0.032*** (.008)</td>
<td>-0.034*** (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td>0.135*** (.016)</td>
<td>0.088*** (.018)</td>
<td>0.105***(.017)</td>
<td>0.101*** (.018)</td>
<td>0.104***(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP)</td>
<td>0.005*** (.001)</td>
<td>0.004** (.001)</td>
<td>0.002* (.001)</td>
<td>0.002 (.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.060***(.013)</td>
<td>-0.049** (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.050** (0.016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.015** (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.022* (0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.026 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(centered) X Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.024 (0.020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax(% GDP, centered) X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.619***(.025)</td>
<td>0.464***(.043)</td>
<td>0.503*** (0.040)</td>
<td>0.547*** (0.048)</td>
<td>0.538***(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard Errors in Parenthesis.

When the quadratic term was added to the model (in Model 4), the model significantly improved from explaining 64% of the variation in GEM to explaining 66% of the variation. The quadratic term ($a=-0.015$, $p<0.01$) reveals a curvilinear relationship of militarization with GEM, and since the quadratic term is negative, the curve is concave, its curvature is downwards. The curve reaches its maximum point at (-b/2a= 1.63) 1.63 on the militarization scale. Beyond this any increase in militarization diminishes GEM scores. At low levels of militarization, per the curvilinear relationship GEM scores increase until 1.63 on the militarization scale and thereafter
they decrease. I can therefore confirm my hypothesis 3. Militarization, net of other effects, has a significant diminishing effect on women’s empowerment, which accelerates compared to a simple negative linear effect (expanding the diminution in GEM) especially at higher levels (highest quintile) of militarization (Figure 3.2). Model 5 revealed one significant interaction of militarization and the (centered) log of population. For every one unit increase in the log of population (which measures an increase in population), the negative effect of militarization on GEM is enhanced by 0.022 units (b=-0.022, p<0.01), net of other effects. Countries that are militarized and have a large population would therefore have lower gender empowerment, compared to countries with equal levels of militarization but a smaller population.

Figure 3.4 Curvilinear Relationship GEM and Militarization

In an international system where continuous wars have become a normal part of people’s ‘taken for granted’ world (Berger and Luckman 1967) post World War II, militarization and military men have ascended to positions of prominence within the global structure (Mills 1956). Militarization due to the nature of the institution involved is a gendered undertaking which works
only when certain assumptions of masculinity and femininity become culturally dominant within societal structures. These cultural images of men and women are required in order to perpetuate ‘wars without end’ (Enloe 1992) and to reproduce a militarized social structure post formation. As I demonstrated in this segment, the more militaristic a society the less empowered its women in terms of choices they can make through political and economic participation, even controlling for economic, demographic and state strength factors. My research demonstrated that militarization has a significant and highly diminishing effect on women’s empowerment that is curvilinear and therefore expands the diminishing effects of gender empowerment at higher levels of militarization. The negative effect of militarization on gender empowerment is further enhanced through the interaction between militarization and population. In high population countries, the negative effect of militarization on GEM is larger than in militarized countries with lower population, net of other effects, per unit increase in militarization.

Racial Stratification

The use of (racial/ethnic) categories for implementing Civil Rights legislation has the effect of granting minority status, within the United States, to immigrant workers where "minority" is grounded at the level of the world system. Such definitions depict in clear terms the division of the world between two classes of people: the white 'majority' and the rest, who have both a world systemic level minority status as inhabitants of the periphery (even though they are a numerical majority), and a latent minority status (due to such categorization) from the standpoint of the core states, thus becoming minorities de facto when they enter a core state. Essentially this entails a racialization and ethnicization of nationality and reflects the hegemony of the core over the periphery. (Gimenez 1988:42)

The power elite sponsored U.S. racial ‘project’ post World War II required that all whites within the U.S. be collected within a single white category to be institutionally separated from blacks (without the explicit overt racism of the past). Whites were de-cultured and de-ethnicized, through structural assimilation through programs like the GI Bill, from which blacks were excluded in the most part, whites only affirmative action (Katznelson 2006). Together with white
upward mobility post World War II, and the creation of a new (white) middle class (Mills 1951), segregation was implicitly enforced through ‘redlining’ of Black neighborhoods which made loans for home repair and buying impossible, supplemented by practices of the Federal Housing Administration. Destruction of ethnic European neighborhoods, whose residents were allowed a one way move to the suburbs (Jones 2003), a move denied in total to blacks, further strengthened racial boundaries (Massey and Denton 1996). A very close international parallel was the development of war-devastated European nations through Marshall Aid (the international extension of this racial ‘project’) and favorable trade terms by the U.S, from which the non-white nations of the world were largely excluded, thereby leading to their purposeful underdevelopment (Alam 2000).

The transfer of economic misery abroad in the form of wars to feed a permanent war economy, as the previous segment demonstrated has grave consequences for people living in the majority world, people who are increasingly defined in the international system based on race. The U.S. and its European allies are not only buffered from the effects of war, in large part, due to geographic separation, their (dominated) war based international system is through war related spending relatively quickly (in the short term) taken out of a recession (as was witnessed post 9/11), with military spending (as against welfare) described by Baran and Sweezy (1966) as the most (politically) acceptable form of Keynesian spending in advanced capitalism which directly siphons money from the people to the corporations, unlike the indirect route taken by welfare spending. This occurs at the expense of hundreds of thousands of non-white lives, the war dead (and a few thousand white lives, the disparity in the number of war-dead being another form of “white privilege”), not to mention the hundreds of billions of dollars of the U.S. public’s money, both living and those not yet born (due to loans being taken out in their name, i.e. public debt),
that are recycled to the military industries and financial institutions as “debt service” interest payments.

The internally colonized as members of the “underclass,” within developed nations represent a classification that shares its epistemology with the classification of various countries as “Third World” (Hadjor 1995:129). The language of these ghetto “outsiders” is considered as foreign and exotic as other “Third World” languages. It is seen by the mainstream as a section of society where chronic poverty, homelessness, crime, drugs, and disease have reached epidemic proportions, similar to and sometimes worse than the “Third World,” due primarily (as racialized arguments go) to the personal shortcomings inherent in the nature or culture of the ghetto inhabitants themselves (Blau 1999), the “culture of poverty” argument detached from its structural roots (Parker and Kleiner 1970), which is extended internationally while dealing with enemies that are caricatured as uncivilized. The empirical magnitude of global apartheid is revealed by the fact that 16% of the world’s population (European/European settler states: countries in North America, Oceania and Europe) command 59.4% of global GDP, leaving less than 41% for 84% of the world’s population.57

In order to uncover the racialized structure of global development and underdevelopment and to gauge the effects of militarization interacting with race in determining economic outcomes, I constructed a dichotomous (dummy) categorical (cross-national) global race variable, with a score of 1 for European/white and a score of 0 for all others, and used it as predictor of economic development in an OLS multivariate regression model. Since my analysis was world systemic, I looked at the premier intergovernmental economic and military institutions, NATO and OECD to uncover the global construction of race, race being a global
structural variable. Out of the 28 NATO member countries (NATO being the premier intergovernmental military organization), all 28 are European or European settler states. Of the 34 members of the OECD (OECD being the premier intergovernmental economic organization), 30 are European/European settler or numerically white majority states. The remaining 4, Israel, Mexico, Japan and South Korea are not numerical ‘white majority’ states, but are given ‘honorary’ white (Osada 2002) status by these organizations. I therefore incorporated all members of NATO and OECD into the score of 1 (European/white) given the racial structure of both organizations and the rest of the world into 0 representing “everyone else.” Using this variable as predictor of economic development, I tested the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Economic Development is dependent upon (the social construction of) race in the world system (which means that there is global apartheid).

Model 1 regresses economic development (the economic factor made up of the principal standardized components, log of GNI per capita, log of inbound FDI stock, log of inbound FDI flows) on the demographic (log of population), state strength (Tax as percent of GDP), economic growth and militarization variables. Model 2 adds the global race variable (global race=1, European/white). Model 3 adds the interaction term (interaction between militarization and global race) to model 2. As Table 3.11 shows, model 2 that adds the global race variable to model 1, explains 51.8% of the variation in economic development. This is an improvement of 14.4% over model 1 that did not have the global race variable. Being European/white nation states in the world has an enhancing effect on economic development (b=1.136, p<0.001), net of other effects, compared to the “everyone else” race category of nation states. In fact the standardized increase in economic development based on European/white region was the strongest positive effect on economic development in the model (Beta=0.501), net of other
effects. The next strongest positive effect on economic development, per standard deviation increase in the independent variable was that of the log of population (Beta= 0.267), net of other effects. These results clearly reveal that the social construction of race, which is a fiction, biologically speaking (Gould 1996), is socially naturalized through the pathway of economic (development) outcomes, rigged to benefit some and exclude others.

The other significant predictors of economic development in model 2 were: the log of population, a one unit increase in the log of population, net of other effects, increases economic development by 0.158 units (b=0.158, p<0.001). This result was expected based on the discussion above on population growth and the institutionalization of enhanced consumption within an economy. Tax revenue (percent GDP), the state strength variable, also had a positive enhancing effect on economic development as expected and discussed in the previous segment. A one unit increase in Tax revenue (percent GDP) increases economic development by 0.020 units, net of other effects. Militarization, as expected (and discussed above) had a positive enhancing effect on economic development (b=0.149, p<0.05). For every one unit increase in militarization, net of other effects, economic development goes up by 0.149 units.

Model 3 added the interaction term (militarization times global race=1) to model 2, doing so improved the explanatory power of the model (compared to model 2) by 1.5%. The interaction was significant and diminishing (b=-0.387, p<0.05), net of other effects. For every one unit increase in militarization in European/white nations, the positive enhancing effect of a per unit increase in militarization on economic development, reverses and becomes negative (b=0.206-0.387= -0.181), i.e. it reduces economic development by 0.181 units, net of other effects, compared to the “everyone else” race category of nation states. This finding helps us explain the fact that militarization and its link to economic development in the developing
countries is strengthened through its positive results but not so for the white/European developed nation states. Most of the material militarization of developing countries is made possible by the developed nation states, but produces negative effects in terms of wars that kill and destroy millions, since these wars occur mostly in the “everyone else” racial category of nation states in the global system, these wars can be defined as ‘racial wars.’ The benefit of such warfare accrues to the European/white states that have an absolute advantage over the “everyone else” nation states category in economic development as the regression results revealed. Economic development in the international system, by and large, is a ‘whites only’ club, revealing to us the structure of global apartheid. I can confirm my hypothesis 4 based on the above findings. Understanding the linkages between militarization that facilitates ‘otherization’ through an economic pathway in the global system, where economically less developed translates into “inferior” and imputes a subordinate identity, makes these findings pioneering in uncovering the ‘racialized’ global power structure and the destruction that the developed countries periodically impose on the developing world.

The major portion of global income inequality is between-nation inequality, which accounts for 70 to 90 percent of the total (Firebaugh 2000:323). In order to measure between-nation or between region inequality, the general methodology is to gauge differences between GNI per capita figures between the high income and low income countries/regions. Sudhir and Segal (2008) define between-nation inequality as, “inequality among individuals in the world with each individual assigned the average per capita income of his or her country of residence” (p.59). Taking the above classification of race as regional division, we can calculate the magnitude of between region inequality based upon differences in GNI per capita between the 1) white/European (N=36) and 2) everyone else (N=137) group. The T-Test of mean comparison
revealed ($t (171)=13.38, p<0.001) that the mean difference between the “European/white” group (M=$30211, SD=14449) and the “everyone else” group (M=$9352, SD=14380) was statistically significant.

Table 3.11 Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Economic Development on Global Race (N=141)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>0.210*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.158*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.161 (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (%GDP)</td>
<td>0.044*** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.020** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.020** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.032)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td>0.171* (0.077)</td>
<td>0.149* (0.068)</td>
<td>0.206** (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Race=1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.136*** (0.179)</td>
<td>1.080*** (0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.387* (0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Race=1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.389*** (0.257)</td>
<td>-1.161*** (0.229)</td>
<td>-1.179*** (0.227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard Errors in Parenthesis

Within nation inequality unlike its between-nation counterpart is measured through the Gini income inequality coefficient and forms a comparatively smaller part of overall global inequality. Does between-nation inequality at the world systemic level translate into within nation inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, based on the structure of global militarization? This is the question I seek to answer in the next section.

*Militarization and Income Inequality*

Militarization is linked to inequality through several pathways discussed in the literature. However greater inequality does not always translate into the recognition of inequality, in other words, subjectively felt relative inequality might be psychologically diminished within a militarized society. The military as the ideal typical stratifier, in its organization makes explicit
the unquestioned display of rank-status (Janowitz 1975), questioning which makes one subject to court martial. Whereas militarization enhances inequalities (Horowitz 1975; Lee 2005; Markusen 2004), it also binds populations to the national state in the military’s “band of brothers” fashion making inequality “natural” and tolerable.

The path that leads from militarization to inequality starts with foreign dependency and the resulting foreign direct investment that flows to militarizing countries as a condition of military sales (Benoit 1978). Foreign direct investment by the core in the periphery (to use Wallerstein’s division) stagnates economic development in the long run and through that path worsens inequality (Chase Dunn 1975). By linking militarization with industrial economic development, through “offsets” thereby bloating foreign military sales (Markusen 2004), ensures that not only will industrialization not be indigenously determined, initial attempts at industrialization will displace the agricultural workforce and result in enhanced inequality based on the Kuznet’s curve (1955) phenomenon. Militarization is positively linked to poverty (Henderson 1998) and income inequality (Abell 1994) and the link of government military spending to finance capital (or foreign capital) whose development in an economy is positively associated with inequality (Rodriguez-Pose and Teslios 2009), all point to possible pathways to enhanced income inequality through militarization.

Military rulers that are preponderant in militarized societies (Tilly 1990) are undemocratic and therefore represent foreign and local power interests more so than “the people.” This results in the benefits of economic development and economic growth often going to the top quintile which increases inequality (Lee 2005) as well. Bergson and Bata (2002) find that between-nation and within-nation inequality are positively correlated except during the one year between 1965 to 1990 when the global gap narrowed, within country inequality went up.
Since militarization results in economic growth particularly among developing nations, which means that the global gap (measured through average regional GNI per capita difference) narrows for them, not just as an exception but as a rule of militarization, it implies based on the Bergson and Bata thesis that (Gini based) within country inequality should go up.

In order to test the effects of global militarization on within nation inequality measured through the Gini income inequality coefficient, I used bivariate zero-order correlation and OLS multivariate regression analysis to test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Militarization is positively associated with income inequality within nation states, net of other effects.

The results are presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. Table 3.12 presents the bivariate zero-order correlations between Gini and various predictors in the model. Bivariate correlations reveal that militarization is not related to Gini, even though the direction is revealing and as expected, the association is not statistically significant (p=0.360). Militarization does seem to be positively associated with the log of the population, since the militarization variable includes the military participation ratio, this relationship is expected, as previously discussed. The economic factor was negatively associated with Gini (r=-0.413, p<0.001) which is in tune with expectations (Kuznets 1955) where a higher level of economic development, past the initial industrialization, results in lower income inequality.

Tax (as percent of GDP) was also negatively associated with Gini (r=-0.430, p<0.001). This is also in line with expectations. A stronger state represents an institutionalization of conflict to manage legitimacy of the system through welfare (Marx 1850; Poulantzas 2001) which involves a redistributive function of taxation (Campbell 1993). It is therefore expected that the greater the ability of the state to extract taxes, where the state is considered legitimate as in
democratically setup political systems, the lesser the inequality. HDI was also negatively
associated with Gini (r=-0.459, p<0.001). This is also in tune with expectations, the provision of
basic goods including education ensures that relative inequality will be challenged more so than
in a militarized, mechanically bound ((Durkheim 1997 (1893)), dictatorial society, resulting in its
diminution. However, bivariate relationships are no guarantee of magnitude, direction or
significance of multivariate relationships, therefore I used multivariate regression analysis to
isolate the effects of the various predictors of income inequality.

Table 3.13 presents the OLS multivariate regression results. Model 1 regresses Gini on
demographic (log of population), economic (economic factor), state (tax as percent of GDP), and
basic needs provision (HDI) variables. Model 2 adds the militarization variable to model 1.
Model 3 adds militarization squared and the economic factor squared to model 3 and model 4
adds interaction terms of militarization with the demographic, economic and state variables to
check for confluence of effects. The interaction between militarization and HDI was producing
an unusually large VIF (31) and was therefore removed from the analysis. Outlier influence
analysis revealed that the United States and Brazil were extreme influential cases and were
removed from the analysis. Collinearity, besides the excluded interaction, did not seem to be a
problem (VIF <2.5) in the model.

As Table 3.13 shows 26 % of the variation in Gini was explained by model 2 that adds
the militarization predictor to the model, which did not signify an explanatory improvement over
model 1. Militarization as predictor of inequality was also not statistically significant, even
though the direction of association was revealing and as expected (b=0.006 p=0.576). HDI (non-
income) which measures basic needs provision in life expectancy (health) and education, net of
other effects had a diminishing effect on inequality ($b=-0.166$, $p<0.05$). For every one unit increase in basic needs provision, inequality goes down by 0.166 units, net of other effects. In fact HDI had the strongest inequality reducing effect in the model based upon its standardized slope ($\beta=-0.310$), net of other effects, per standard deviation increase in HDI.

Table 3.12 Bivariate Correlation (GINI) N=124

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GINI</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GINI</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population (1)</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor (2)</td>
<td>-0.413***</td>
<td>0.291**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP) (3)</td>
<td>-0.430***</td>
<td>-0.188*</td>
<td>0.577***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI (4)</td>
<td>-0.459***</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.783***</td>
<td>0.657***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (5)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.162*</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization Squared (6)</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>-0.172*</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.146*</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor Squared (7)</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.188*</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
The second largest effect in the model that reduces inequality was that of the state variable (Tax as percent of GDP), it had a standardized slope (beta) value of -0.255, which signifies that for every one standard deviation increase in tax revenue (percent GDP), income inequality measured through the Gini coefficient goes down by 0.255 standard deviation (units), net of other effects. The state variable based on its unstandardized slope (Tax as percent of GDP), per unit increase, net of other effects, had a diminishing effect on Gini (b=-0.002, p<0.05). This means that for every one unit increase in tax revenue (as percent of GDP), inequality goes down by 0.002 units net of other effects. The quadratic terms were non-significant in model 3 as were the interactions between militarization and the other predictors of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td>0.002 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP)</td>
<td>-0.002* (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002* (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>-0.165* (0.080)</td>
<td>-0.166* (0.080)</td>
<td>-0.184* (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td>0.006 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (Squared)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor (Squared)</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population (centered) X Militarization</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic factor X Militarization</td>
<td>0.000 (0.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax(% GDP, centered) X Militarization</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.594*** (0.064)</td>
<td>0.594*** (0.064)</td>
<td>0.600*** (0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Gini in model 4. We can logically specify these significant results (even though militarization is non-significant by itself, net of other effects) with reference to militarization and its link to these other variables. Based on the above results however, I cannot confirm my hypothesis 5.

In the long run, military rulers lose legitimacy and therefore as a tactic of enhancing their rule they manipulate basic goods provision while maintaining the structure of inequality similar to the multinational “accumulation-legitimation” cycle (London and Williams 1998). Based on these complications and the non-comparability of the Gini across societal structures that might have the same Gini score but gross differences in wealth, we cannot interpret these results as being totally conclusive. The militarization scale has as a component, the military participation ratio (expressed as a percentage that was then logged to remove the positive skew in the data) and we know that military spending on personnel which can be through increasing the size of the military does not enhance inequalities, whereas spending on procurement does (Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios 2009; Gifford 2006), which leads us to the following specification: It might be that both the inequality enhancing and diminishing segments of the militarization scale cancel each other out or that the effects materialize over a longer term that is not captured through cross sectional analysis. Through the pathway of economic growth, basic needs provision and spending on personnel coupled with an enhanced desire for legitimacy through manipulation, militarized societies might have an ambiguous relationship with income inequality. Similarly, in cross sectional analysis as this one, we see that findings in the empirical literature go in both directions regarding growth or diminution of global inequality, a possible pathway of testing this would be to disaggregate the militarization factor and regress Gini on the disaggregated components, which is not the purpose of this analysis that seeks to uncover the structure of
militarization as comprehensively as possible in the global system. I therefore agree with Sudhir and Segal (2008), when they conclude:

Given these uncertainties, and the range of estimates for the direction and magnitude of change in global inequality, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no change in global interpersonal inequality over 1970-2000. (Sudhir and Segal 2008:91)

Based on the above discussion in the section that compared NATO/OECD top five militarized countries with the bottom five and did the same with the non-NATO/non-OECD group, we saw (Table 3.03 and Table 3.04) that the magnitude of income inequality was greater for the top five militarized NATO/OECD countries (compared to their bottom five) versus the inequality between the non-NATO/non-OECD countries (their top five militarized countries compared to the bottom five). This tells us that there might be a plausible link between world system position and its interaction with militarization in order to determine income inequality. Since the OLS model presented above took the world as a whole, it did not distinguish between countries that might occupy different regions within a militarized division of labor. The next chapter will look at those relationships.

**Basic Needs Provision**

Welfare states had their origin in “war and mass national armies” (Gifford 2006:473). The massive bureaucracy that the welfare state necessitates for the distribution of basic necessities also had its historical origin in military bureaucracies (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958). A contemporary example of this is the emergency response of the new nations whenever they face natural disasters. In order to manage the provision of basic goods and services, the military, as a superior bureaucratic organization, is indispensable to such “welfare” activity.
In the advanced capitalist nations, in an apparent detachment from the history of welfare through warfare, welfare and warfare now compete with each other for governmental resources (Fontanel 1990), and it often seems on the surface that the liberal welfare state is diametrically opposed to the warfare state. This however is not the case, not only are welfare and warfare historically intertwined, the warfare priorities of the state led to the manipulations that defined both citizenship and through that the provision of welfare. The emergence of mass standing armies, to whom the benefits of citizenship were first extended (Tilly 1996), before they accrued to the rest of society, had their origin in the desires of the rulers to conscript the ruled for war and to monopolize coercive force and sell protection (Tilly 1985). Welfare was necessary in order to justify extraction (taxation) from civil society, even as it laid the foundations of a warfare (based) state.

In the U.S. post World War II, the welfare bureaucracy that centralized the state and enormously expanded the powers of the executive (in the New Deal) was transformed into a permanent war establishment, here again welfare and warfare, even though framed as competitors complemented each other (Mills 1956; Hooks 1991). The military however, cannot be taken as a welfare institution, even though it conditions “the development and maintenance” of a welfare state (Gifford 2006:502). This conditioning occurs through the necessity of requiring the mobilization and extraction (taxation) efforts of the masses and the resulting cultural framing of warfare discourse in terms of “civic virtue and social obligation” (Gifford 2006:501), which also requires the institutionalization of limited welfare activity for the purpose of legitimacy (structural verification) just as it does the institutionalization of war. Consistent with this ‘latent function’ of solidarity in this warfare-welfare manipulation is the finding by Jencks (1985) that public opinion in the U.S. is highly positively correlated with military spending.
The manipulation that defines the (modern) welfare state, which serves to strengthen state apparatus to manage class conflict through the extension and over development of the coercive arm of the nation state, the military, can never alter the status-reality of the proletariat within a capitalist mode of production. Within such manipulation, conflict discourse internally becomes a discourse about limited redistribution and welfare (the political default of labor unions in capitalist nations, which have been instituted in the system as part of conflict management through their granting of legitimacy to the capitalist class structure, owner-worker dichotomy) and externally, a discourse about war and enemies. Welfare that makes the condition of the proletariat temporarily tolerable is itself a zero sum game within a bourgeoisie dominated society, where the prime purpose is to maintain or enhance the level of capital accumulation. Welfare for some, within such a setup, always means warfare for others.

Henderson (1998) found that the overall relationship between military spending and poverty is positive except during mobilization, because most of the spending increase during mobilization goes to personnel and so basic goods provision might actually improve. Short term economic growth, which as we found was a factor of militarization (Benoit 1978), enhances consumption based development in militarized states and might also lead to enhanced basic goods provision concomitant with rising inequality (Abell 1994), much like the concomitant increase in aggregate demand and inflation. Military rulers are modernizers (Fidel 1975; Horowitz 1975; Benoit 1968) and their short term industrialization results in rising inequality but an overall increase in the provision of basic needs. Therefore, in tune with the historical link between warfare and welfare and the link between economic growth, military rulers and industrialization, and economic development, I expect militarization to be positively associated with basic needs provision (as measured through the UN (non-income) Human Development
Index). In order to test the effects of global militarization on basic needs provision measured through the UN Human Development Index (HDI), I used bivariate zero-order correlation and OLS multivariate regression analysis to test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: Militarization is positively associated with basic needs provision (as measured through the UN (non-income) HDI) within nation states, net of other effects.

The results are presented in Tables 3.14 and 3.15. Table 3.14 presents the bivariate zero-order correlations between HDI and various predictors in the model. Bivariate correlations reveal that militarization is not related to HDI, even though the (positive) direction is revealing and as expected, the association is not statistically significant (p=0.297).

HDI (non-income) was positively associated with economic development (r=0.784, p<0.001). This is in tune with expectations, economic development implies an institutionalization of consumption at higher levels (which is not the same as economic growth), which ensures for successful reproduction, the greater provision of basic needs compared to lesser economic development controlling for Gini. As expected Gini was negatively related to HDI (r=−0.443, p<0.001). The greater the inequality in a society, the greater the implied non provision of basic needs and tolerance of the authorities for such non provision. The institutionalization of a welfare state that establishes legitimacy of taxation based upon provision of basic needs ensures that there will be a positive relationship between basic needs provision and tax revenue (as percent of GDP). Bivariate correlation between HDI and tax revenue (as percent of GDP) reveals the same in tune with expectations (r=0.655, p<0.001).
Table 3.14 Bivariate Correlation (non-income HDI) N=126

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population (1)</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor (2)</td>
<td>0.784***</td>
<td>0.328**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP) (3)</td>
<td>0.655***</td>
<td>-0.153*</td>
<td>0.580***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI (4)</td>
<td>-0.443***</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.376***</td>
<td>-0.402***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (5)</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.168*</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization Squared (6)</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.172*</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.150*</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor Squared (7)</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.195*</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Since bivariate relationships (even when significant) are no guarantee of magnitude, direction or significance of multivariate relationships, I used multivariate regression analysis to isolate the effects of militarization on (non-income) HDI, net of other effects and tested for non-linear relationships as well as interactions between militarization and the various controls outlined in the model in predicting basic needs provision. Table 3.15 presents the OLS multivariate regression results. Model 1 regresses the UN’s non-income HDI on demographic, economic state and inequality variables. Model 2 adds the militarization variable to model 1. Model 3 add militarization squared and economic factor squared to check for nonlinear relationships to model
2 and model 4 adds interaction terms of militarization with the economic, demographic and state variables to check for confluence of effects to model 3. Outlier influence analysis revealed that Bahrain was an extreme influential case and was removed from the analysis. Collinearity did not seem to be a problem (VIF <2.5) in the model except when the interaction between militarization and Gini (VIF 82) was added to the model, this interaction was therefore removed from the analysis.

As Table 3.15 shows 73 % of the variation in HDI was explained by model 1 that has the demographic, economic, state and inequality variables. Adding the militarization predictor in model 2 did not improve the model’s explanatory power. Militarization was insignificant as a predictor of HDI, even though the positive direction (b=0.005, p=0.667) was revealing and as hypothesized. Non-significance means that the null hypothesis of a zero slope coefficient cannot be rejected. Hence we have to conclude that controlling for demographic, economic, state and inequality, militarization has no effect on basic goods provision. Population (model 1) was negatively associated, net of other effects, with basic goods provision per unit increase in log of population, as expected. A larger population has greater needs compared to a smaller population in absolute terms and therefore given limited resources, a larger proportion of people might go without basic needs. For every one unit increase in the log of population, basic needs provision as measured through the UN’s (non-income) HDI goes down by 0.030 units (b=-0.030, p<0.001), net of other effects.
The economic factor signifying economic development/accumulation had a positive relationship with HDI (model 1), net of other effects, per unit increase in economic development as expected. Economic development implies an institutionalization of economic activity at higher levels and therefore any increase in such institutionalization means that the basic needs provision capacity of the economy increases, net of other effects. For every one unit increase in the economic factor, net of other effects, basic needs provision as measured through HDI goes up by 0.133 units (b=0.133, p<0.001). Standardized coefficient of the economic factor (beta=0.741) revealed that the largest positive impact on basic needs provision was that of economic development.
development, net of other effects, per standard deviation increase in economic development. The state variable (Tax revenue as percent of GDP) was also positively related to HDI, net of other effects. For every one unit increase in tax revenue (as percent of GDP), HDI goes up by 0.002 units ($b=0.002, p<0.05$) net of other effects. This is in tune with expectations, since a greater extraction ability of the state, indicated by an increase in tax revenue implies not only a greater capacity of the state to meet the basic needs of its population but also a greater legitimacy in that it has been successful in its extraction efforts and such legitimacy necessitates greater basic needs provision for its maintenance, as discussed earlier. Model 3 revealed no quadratic/curvilinear relationships between militarization and HDI and none between the economic factor and HDI. The quadratic relationship between the economic factor squared and HDI was barely insignificant ($p=0.07$). If significant, it would indicate a concave curvilinear relationship between economic development and HDI where higher levels of economic development diminish HDI, net of other effects.

The largest (standardized) negative effect on basic needs provision was that of log of population ($\beta=-0.252$), per standard deviation increase in the log of population, net of other effects. The second largest negative effect, per standard deviation increase, was that of income inequality as measured through the Gini coefficient ($\beta=-0.116$), net of other effects. The unstandardized coefficient for Gini revealed that for every one unit increase in Gini, net of other effects, HDI goes down by 0.215 units ($b=-0.215, p<0.05$). This is in tune with the expectations of greater tolerance of deprivation in high-inequality societies. I cannot confirm my hypothesis 6 directly based on these results, since militarization as a predictor of HDI is insignificant, however as theorized, militarization works through the economic and state pathways over time to enhance basic needs provision and is also linked to greater inequality, which is negatively
associated with HDI. Militarization requires access to taxation (or foreign aid) and increase in taxation results leads to enhanced basic goods provision. The relationship between taxation and basic goods provision was confirmed in model 1. Economic development, also positively related to HDI, is itself dependent upon militarization as the multivariate results in Table 3.08 revealed. Therefore, even though directly not supported, hypothesis 6 can be specified through the relationship of militarization as predictor of economic development and through that of basic goods provision. A longitudinal analysis might make these relationships clearer.

**Conclusion**

I had proposed in this chapter that in addition to the two main paradigms of development that hold hegemony in sociological literature, the functionalist, modernization perspective and the Marxist, dependency perspective, we need a third perspective that situates world development and underdevelopment and stratification based upon global militarization. Since militarization on an international level determined (historically) both economic and political outcomes in societies that as a consequence of it attained their characteristics as “nation states” (Veblen 1997 (1923); Tilly 1990), ignoring it can lead to misspecified models. We are now in a position, after the foregoing analysis, to confirm the necessity of such a perspective.

Militarization has a positive effect on economic growth until intermediate levels of militarization, even after controlling for economic development, population and state (extraction) strength variables, the curve that represents that relationship increases till 0.704 on the militarization scale (minimum=−2.399, maximum=3.105) and thereafter levels off and beyond 1.408 on the militarization scale, any increase in militarization diminishes economic growth to levels below the intercept value of economic growth. Militarization was also positively related to
economic development and accumulation with a (positive) curvilinear relationship that enhances (the positive linear effects of militarization on) economic development, controlling for economic growth, population and state (extraction) strength variables, beyond -0.093 on the militarization scale, which represents low levels of militarization. This tells us that militarization led economic growth provides for stabilization of a crisis prone capitalist world system, while militarization led economic development proves that there is a (military) Keynesian dynamic in place on a global level, intimately linking militarization with economic outcomes.

The effects of enhanced militarization within nation states as a consequence of a permanent war economy that economically benefits all things military, means that the ‘otherization’ nature of the military institution, where a separation is culturally constructed and structurally implemented to facilitate destruction of “the enemy” in war, diffuses within civilian society. My research demonstrated that militarization had a significant and highly diminishing effect on women’s empowerment, the relationship was also curvilinear, with the curve enhancing the negative linear effect in an amplifying manner beyond 1.63 on the militarization scale. This amplified diminution of women’s empowerment in highly militarized societies is enhanced based on the size of their population, countries with larger populations that were militarized were worse on gender empowerment scores compared to militarized countries with smaller populations. Militarization interacts with race (European/White compared to all others) by ensuring that the economic benefits of militarization accrue to only the developing nations, net of other effects, ensuring that they militarize, due to structural (development) necessity and face the consequences of military dictatorship and destruction through wars that benefit the developed countries. The global system “chooses” those socially defined as non-white to be the mass casualties of war.
Income inequality and basic needs provision, even though conditioned by militarization through economic growth and development and state (weakness or strength) pathways did not seem to be directly affected by it, net of other effects. This might represent a weakness of cross-sectional analysis that cannot capture effects over time, where in the longer term, military rulers that lose legitimacy enhance basic goods provision to their populations, or the fact that events like warfare alter the vertical stratification structure of a society (Andreski 1968). Future research should look deeper into these relationships.

Since the OLS models presented in this chapter took the world as a whole, they did not distinguish between countries that might occupy different regions within a militarized division of labor, the fact that many of the relationships were curvilinear also tells us that position in the international system can have an enhancing or diminishing effect compared to linear relationship alone. The next chapter will look at those relationships on a regional level based upon levels of militarization, which should provide a clearer picture of the true relationship between global militarization and economic and stratification outcomes experienced by nation states, based upon their structural position within a Militarized International System (MIS).
CHAPTER 4

MILITARIZED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The habits of command and obedience generated by the needs of war tend to persist in times of peace. And naturally, if the wars are frequent and the peace is rare, even peace-time political (and economic) organization will resemble that necessary for waging war… (Andreski 1968:93)

Regional Division of Labor beyond Economic Reductionism

The ongoing continuous war in the international system that has become the distinguishing feature of an evolved capitalism post-World War II, represents a globalization of militarization. However, this “globalization” much like its economic counterpart does not articulate uniformly within different national states. It is therefore necessary to incorporate “internal controls” (Alderson and Nielsen 1999:627) that help us understand the regional clustering of states based upon functional specialization within the international system. World Systems theorists proclaim a dual politico-economic division of the world that primarily involves a (territorialized) economic division of labor between national states (Wallerstein 1974, Chase-Dunn 1989). The war-based origin of national states (Tilly 1990) is downplayed by World System theorists who proclaim a social formation of the national state as a political consequence of a globalized capitalism and its need for legitimating accumulation based upon competitive nationalism (Chase-Dunn 1989). Even though World Systems theorists recognize the necessity of political clustering in the world system, as against a solitary global polity (the world empire), in the final analysis, such clustering is reduced to economic determinism, with the global polity defined as “an extension of class relations” (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000:23). However, a major defect in locating class relations within a global economic division of labor is that it
conflates class with trade relationships (Koo 1984). Class relations cannot be understood on a global level without incorporating both intra-national and international articulation of such relations based on varying modes of production within an capitalist dominated but not essentially a fully capitalist international system. The system does however depend, for its reproduction, on the political and military hegemony of the advanced capitalist states. These relationships, especially the articulation of class, intra-nationally are mediated through the state that extracts resources from society (or in the case of neo-colonial dependency, from the colonial power on behalf of whom the economy is managed, leading to a weak national state) in order to control conflict through both coercive and administrative forms of organization (Skocpol 1979). Control is supplemented through the cultural formation of a national ethos for the purpose of binding diverse populations (often through warfare based definition of self and “other”). Global military posturing through offense based organizations (that were formed as “defense pacts” like NATO) by the capitalist nations that do business “under one flag or another” (Veblen 1997 (1923)), and dominate both the global production and consumption circuits is intrinsic to the accumulation logic of the world system and cannot simply be taken as an aberration linked to specific economic interests. This makes the state institution not only a facilitator of trade relationships, but gives it an important role in reproducing or the “doing” of class on an international level through managing internal class conflicts to facilitate external accumulation. The state is therefore of contextual importance in articulation of global class relationships.

Understanding class relations and their intersection within a global system requires the incorporation of internal differences as process levers, differences based upon historically formed societal structures and their functional articulation within a global system that without the mediation of politics and warfare would be non functional. The “necessity of the economic
situation” (Cox 1964:177) of artificially created political entities, the new national states, as well as the external military threat that was a consequence of their haphazard creation (Robbins 2010), and the internal conflicts of historically pitting ethnicities against each other during colonization, facilitates the integration of (non-capitalist) new nations in destructive long term relationships with the major capitalist powers that dominate the world system. These relationships, much like a structure of social stratification, reproduce the unfavorable conditions of the new nations within a global stratifications regime, that post World War II was reorganized based on the assumptions of an ongoing global war and therefore economically benefitted, in its functioning, all things military. Not only is war making integrated with socio-economic development and positively affects it (Andreski 1968; Markusen 2004; Benoit 1989; Boies 1994), with certain exceptions (Grobar and Porter 1989) and clarifications (Mintz and Randolph 1995; Szymanski 1973) among both developing and developed nations (Benoit 1978; Wallace, Borch and Gauchat 2008), it leads through an emulation based social-psychological “push effect” (Kohler 1977) to attempts to ultra militarize, to outdo each other in defense spending. In the case of the new nations, the military becomes the harbinger of modernization (Horowitz 1975) which partially explains the dominance of the military in politics in these emerging nations (Tilly 1990) and its link to economic growth.

The social construction of “enemies” (in the image of Hitler) and the implied necessity of war against an unreasonable foe and for the “liberation” of the enemy's population and its projected “positive” consequences (German “democracy” and Japanese “development”) are often presented as justifications for war by the power elite based on a caricatured image of World War II. This allows us to historically situate the permanent war economy’s defining event and to socially situate the motives of an elite that sought and achieved hegemony over its capitalist
rivals in World War II and thereafter through global militarization was successful in “saving capitalism from itself.” The purpose of such socially situated rhetoric (Mills 1940) is to stress continuity and stability and “an essential component of sameness” (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:73) in a societal structure.

During acute crises in global capitalism, peaceful competition is replaced by global wars that “provide a new framework” for continual capitalist accumulation (Amin 1977). The difference now, compared to World War II mobilization, is that the process of structural reproduction of the permanent war economy does not require the reorganization of workplace, class, gender and race that these elite were forced to undertake through necessity during “the good war” (that killed 70 million, over 60% of whom were civilians) in mobilizing the masses for their cause. Soon after their cause was achieved however, they abandoned this social reorganization by removing women from the workplace and denying blacks a path to their subsidized middle class. What they didn't abandon was the permanent war economy and the consequences of war based mobilization and production. In other words the “new framework” that Amin (1977) talks about reproduces itself as a framework of perpetual war. This served not only to justify a military definition of reality, or what C. Wright Mills (1956) referred to as the military metaphysic, it ensured an unquestioned subordination of the individual to the state in the name of “national security,” as it reinforced class, race and gender based divisions.

Based on a military division of labor, internal divisions are routinely glossed over “in the name of the nation” while confronting a foreign foe and attitudes between veterans and non veterans regarding trust in government and international affairs increasingly converge (Segal and Segal 1983:210). This means that a synthetic cultural homogenization is attempted by the elite
through use of the cultural apparatus (the mass media and formal education) even though the stratification structure remains intact (the cultural notion of “The American Dream” or modernization in the global arena). Alienation is the end result of such a culture-structure mismatch that itself has become a systemic generality due to the hegemony of ideas and ideals (to use Gramsci’s terminology) having nothing to do with the reality of people’s existence within a permanent war economy (Boothman 1995). This means that peace in the shadow of a war based system is always uneasy, both internally and externally.

The rhetoric of human rights and freedoms, democracy versus fascism, the positive-self and negative-other presentations (van Dijk 1993) that “justify” the entry of the major capitalist nations into limited wars that are enacted within a backdrop of a continuous global war (as in the current war on terrorism), reveals to us the complex interactions involved between state, military and the economy that lead back to the global restructuring that took place during and after World War II, with intergovernmental organizations like the UN (1945), NATO (1949), and OECD (with roots in the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 1947), all dominated by the major capitalist powers, emerging. We cannot therefore sociologically reduce this complexity to trade and manufacturing chains but need to incorporate both internal state apparatuses as well as militarization of countries that serve as theatres of wars together with an economic accumulation regime in which control of the means of production is made possible through war and militarization of the production process itself (Spiegel 1940; Mills 1956; Melman 1974). In Marxian terms, we are looking at a qualitatively new mode of global production which results in altered relationships of production over time. Using the Victorian capitalism formulation with its “labor metaphysic,” that is the foundation of Wallerstein’s World Systems Analysis, leads to erroneous results.
I propose in this chapter, apart from Tilly’s coercion/production division (that seeks to incorporate autonomy for the state within the world system), a third division that of militarized “system stabilization” as part of post-World War II systemic evolution of capitalism (Mills 1956). When military power and its related industries dominate the corporate sector and foster national economic dependency (Gauchat, Wallace, Burch and Lowe 2011), and growth (Benoit 1978), when war becomes an easy escape from responsibility for the ruling elite and a major stimulus for an economy (Mills 1958; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Benoit 1978; Szymanski 1973) and when military spending predominates the national budgets of nation states, and militaries and arms trade regimes become the only route to industrialization (Markusen 2004) and the only way to establish coercive hegemony in the world system’s stratification scheme, which grants absolute advantage to the capitalist nations, then the foundation is set for militarization to become institutionalized in the global system, both as the feeder of the status quo, which makes war or war related activity an automatic default position in times of crisis and a system generality (in Durkheim’s 1997 (1893) terms), peace in these circumstances is not only dealt a mortal blow, it signifies in its presence a social revolt, a form of social change that interferes with elite interests and is therefore coercively confronted by the managers of the status quo.

In the militarized capitalistic system’s power structure, the command states and their network of intergovernmental institutions, the military (NATO), economic (OECD), political (UN), cultural (the new media) and intra-governmental institutions (the foundations, non-profits and think tanks (Beckfield 2003; Domhoff 2005)) form a “central organ” whose function is to “coordinate and subordinate” (Durkheim 1997 (1893):165) various parts of the international system through their linkages with similar institutions worldwide and part of this coordination involves the perpetuation of war as a cooling mechanism for global capitalism during times of
crises. The command states possess what Hooks and Mclauchlan (1992) define as “infrastructural power” (p.759). The exercise of power can manifest itself either directly through coercion or indirectly through manipulation (Mills 1956; Janowitz 1975) depending on the capacity of elites to “arrange the conditions under which people interact” (Abrahamson 2005:28). The militarized reorganization of the world, post World War II, translated into ecological power (Stone 1986) possessed by those nation states that I term the command states.

Warfare serves a dual function within a system of institutionalized warfare: control and stimulus. Control is necessary to ensure the global stratification hierarchy within which and because of which capitalist accumulation takes place and stimulus is necessary in a crisis prone system in order to (as FDR put it), “save capitalism from itself,” and it occurs in terms of warfare, war related expenditure and the fostering of a militarized division of labor within the global political economy. This third functional division involving militarization gives the military an autonomous role, related as much to the production part of the equation, through the aerospace defense industries, technological research and innovation and the global arms trade (Galbraith 1971; Markusen, Hall, Campbell and Dietrick 1991) as to its coercion part in the form of the functional use of the military in “hot-spots” that are of significance to capitalist stabilization, accumulation, as well as the symbolic maintenance of “posture” within an ongoing continuous war that represents the globalization of militarization in the system as war related symbolism binds populations to their various nation states (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Gifford 2006).

Systemic stabilization within a crisis prone system implies that when capitalism faces systemic crises, the conduct of war within the militarized states by the dominant nation states,
via military Keynesianism, stabilizes the system. In other words, when the accumulation track that defines economic interaction within a capitalist world system is threatened by disruption due to crises, militarized interaction within a stabilization regime restores the levels of profit accumulation through subsidizing the accumulation track and latently, culturally shocking the global population through disaster and war. Such stabilization, I argue, requires a “permanent defense network” of countries as a counterpart to the permanent defense industry that defines the military industrial complex within the United States. This “permanent defense network” of countries serves as a lucrative arms market for the command states, channeling a good part of the economic growth of the militarized states towards them and thereby feeding the defense dependency of their urban areas (Gauchat, Wallace, Borch and Lowe 2011).

The militarized countries, through war related activity and “reconstruction” post destruction by the command states, mitigate the economic growth crises in those states. This occurs through reversal of the diminishing returns to capital investment encountered by the advanced capitalist economies (Firebaugh 2000), through such reconstruction and the “importation” of the economic growth of entire groupings of countries by them, countries that they purposefully destroy in the long run. There is a symbiotic relationship between the buyers and sellers of arms in the form of “offsets” (Markusen 2004) that links industrial development and technological transfer to these militarized countries with arms sales, granting them both higher economic growth and political legitimacy, which is supported either explicitly or implicitly by the command states. These relationships are summarized in my model of the Militarized International System (MIS) in Figure 4.1.

Typology: Command States (CS), Semi-Militarized States (SMS) and Militarized states (SMS)
My methodology in formulating boundaries around different regions of the world according to the classification scheme I describe below is guided by the macro sociological idea of “society” as an organizational unit of analysis (Tilly 1984). I am proposing three society-like divisions into regions (not necessarily geographically contiguous) that together constitute the structure of the global capitalist system, where the internal logic of the region in question is determined through its role within a militarized division of labor, which then influences the internal social structure and state form of the nation state in question, constrained only through historical complexity, i.e. the biographical history of a nation state. In Durkheim's terms, the extrinsic coercion of the global system as “global (social) facts” that exist sui generis affect each individual nation state based on its positional peculiarity within the system. The uniform translation of these “facts” is complicated only through historical experiential variation of the different national states and therefore conditions their development, while being conditioned by it (Marx 1875). The control of history making by the command states through an increasingly bureaucratized and rationally objectified system means that convergence of experience will produce homogeneity in developmental outcomes for even those national states that were historically diverse to start with.

The command states (CS), I propose, include the industrialized nations of the world given the history of the intersection of economic, political and military domination that crystallized in the formation of intergovernmental organizations like NATO and the OECD and elite dominated intra-governmental organizations like non-profits and think tanks (Beckfield 2003). The internal economic structure of the CS is constituted by a monopoly capitalist sector and a state subsidized military/welfare sector. This is projected globally in the form of (1) economic globalization that represents links between the CS and the rest of the world and (2) militarized globalization that
represents warfare based interaction between the CS and the Militarized States (MS), as well as the network of CS military bases and military alliances globe over. The CS have a dual sector economy, the ideal typical representation of which is the United States, given its initial hegemonic position in the world system post World War II (Wallerstein 1974; Hooks 1991), with an over-developed state subsidized military sector and arms industry and a globalized (multinational) monopoly sector that seeks production facilities and markets abroad in addition to the home market.

Figure 4.1 Dual Sector Militarized International System (MIS)

The CS capitalists are the major beneficiaries of the global arms trade and the global accumulation track, not only do they control commodity markets, they are the major arms
peddlers around the world. The functions of CS militaries have for the most part been reduced to what Janowitz described as a “Constabulary Force” (Janowitz 1964:18). Restitution of ‘rogue nations’ (that emerge from the MS) though military intervention (as in the case of Iraq or Libya) is their main military function together with facilitating political, military and economic integration into the system through a destabilization regime, where economic sanctions serve to weaken an already weak state within the militarized national states. This occurs in the backdrop of a continuous global war that is generally ‘cold’ except for certain ‘hot spots’ (of limited warfare) that are located within the MS.

The ‘hegemonic power’ among the CS is the one with the military edge, given which accumulation shares of the various states within the CS can be regulated and peacefully enforced in non-crisis times. The major-power war (as in World War I and World War II) is a result of hegemonic decline in relative military (and economic) strength so that capitalist competitors that maintain an uneasy peace within the CS feel that they are in a position to militarily challenge the proportional distribution of capitalist accumulation that was previously decided upon (Moul 2003)\textsuperscript{61}. I therefore expect the hegemon among the states in the CS to be the most militarily developed on all indicators of militarization as well as one most active in limited war theatres and one that possesses a strong state that maintains a high level of legitimacy as measured through its ability to extract resources from the population. Among NATO and OECD founding members, the U.S has the highest military expenditure as percentage of GDP (4.06\%, 2009 estimate), the highest military expenditure as a percentage of tax revenue (14.4\%, 2009 estimate), the highest military expenditure as percentage of government expenditure (19.5 \%, 2006 estimate), the highest aggregate GDP ($13.2 trillion, 2009 estimate), the highest inbound Foreign Direct Investment Stock ($3.121 trillion, 2009 estimate) and the highest aggregate tax
revenue collected ($3.723 trillion, 2009 estimate). In most of these cases, the U.S. exceeds the second highest contender by 300% on average. Hegemony cannot be described in economic terms alone.

The Militarized States (MS) have a military dominated state and economy in that the military is the most powerful institution in these nation states, either visibly in the form of a military government or behind the scenes military domination through a co-opted political setup. Their state has problems of legitimacy (Harries-Jenkins and Van Doorn 1976; Brooks 1998, Fidel 1975). Economic growth in these countries is linked to militarization and war related activity (Mintz and Huang 1990; Markusen 2004) where military rulers outdo the civilians in economic development and growth (Horowitz 1975). These nations help stabilize the periodic (self-induced) crises in the capitalist system, being an engine for war and war related spending and reconstruction based (military) Keynesianism of the CS. Having a militarized societal structure and the resulting emergence of a militarized culture that legitimizes it within the MS means that these nations will score poorly on measures of gender empowerment and will be, as a society, the worst oppressors of women and minorities. At the same time, given their high economic growth rate due to militarized spending, these states will score higher compared to the SMS on measures of human development (linked to the economy), which is a necessary strategy adopted by garrison states based upon their enhanced need for legitimacy (London and Williams 1998), compared to more representative state types. Higher economic growth rates also signify, in the absence of productive local investment and mass political representation (no democracy) that the benefits of such ‘growth’ commonly go to the top income bracket, increasing inequality (Chase-Dunn 1975; Horowitz 1975; Lee 2005) and the disruption and neglect of the traditional economy by a modernizing military, which not only alienates but also relatively deprives the
mass of the population, while promoting a minuscule middle class based on an import fed consumer culture.

In the command states, legitimacy through manipulation of the population (through the exploitation of the surplus of the developing nations) is given high priority (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985). This binds the local populations of the command states to an exploitive system and results in the formation of an identity of superiority, a national consciousness that not only denigrates other nationalities but sees global inequalities as “normal,” and based on personal achievement alone. Such social engineering that facilitates capitalist accumulation is given priority because if the command states fail, the entire system’s status quo is threatened.

The Semi-Militarized States (SMS), as a residual category, have no intrinsically specific qualities of their own; they contain a mixture of CS processes and MS processes. It is in the interaction between the CS nations intra-regionally and between the CS nations and the SMS (and MS to a lesser extent) inter-regionally that capitalist accumulation takes place, involving competition among monopoly capitalists of the various CS states (Veblen 1997 (1923)), facilitated by international financial institutions that open up the markets and economies of the SMS through neoliberal structural “reforms” (Chussodovsky 2003). Part of this dual role is the buildup of militaries of certain nations that then become the major purchasers of CS weapons systems, and form a conduit for supplying arms to the other developing nations (Straubhaar 1986). Socialism within the system is coercively discouraged not because it might benefit any particular nation state or prevent access of the command states to its material resources but because through a ‘domino effect’ socialism might discourage the operation of the militarized region and its link to economic growth.
Hypotheses

From the above profile and the link between militarization and various outcomes in the literature, my concern with regional state forms is for the purpose of predicting several outcomes regarding gender empowerment, human development, economic growth and inequality, using regional divisions based on militarization. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H.1a: Militarized states will have lower gender empowerment on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.1b. Militarized states will have lower gender empowerment on average compared to command states.

H.2a: Militarized states will have higher Human Development on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.2b: Militarized states will have lower Human Development on average compared to command states.

H.3a: Militarized states will have a higher economic growth rate on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.3b: Militarized states will have a higher economic growth rate on average compared to command states.

Since militarization requires access to funds, and the resulting higher economic growth that is characteristic of militarized spending, as well as foreign (command state) aid that is tied to militarization (Benoit 1968), military and security related aid (in what the U.S. gives) forms the bulk of it (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004), I hypothesize:

H.4a: Militarized states will score higher on average on GDP per capita and the computed Economic factor compared to semi-militarized states.

H.4b: Militarized states will score lower on average on GDP per capita and the computed Economic factor compared to command states.

Since higher growth rates also signify, in the absence of productive local investment that the benefits go to the top income bracket, increasing inequality (Chase-Dunn 1975) and that
militarized states because of their national security persona often represent international interests (Cypher 1984; Fidel 1975), higher growth rates and economic development does not necessarily translate into equity especially in the absence of job growth and a non-democratic regime type (Lee 2005). The military as a “modernizing agent” (Benoit 1978) in developing nations can lead to greater inequality through neglect of traditional economic areas involving agriculture in tune with the observation by Kuznets that inequality increases during initial phases of industrialization (Kuznets 1955). Therefore, I hypothesize:

H.5a: Militarized states will have higher inequality on average compared to semi-militarized states.

H.5b. Militarized states will have higher inequality on average compared to command states.

Militarization of a national state implies that the military becomes prominent in state affairs, it is politicized to a greater extent through a national security ethos that subordinates the will of the people to national interests defined in military terms (Mills 1956; Andreski 1968; Janowitz 1975), I therefore also expect militarized states to have a military dominated as against a democratically set up regime type:

H.6a Militarized states will have a greater proportion of non democratic regimes compared to semi-militarized states.

H.6b Militarized states will have a greater proportion of non democratic regimes compared to command states.

Since militarized states have legitimacy problems due to the garrison state form’s non representative structure and the resulting long term alienation of the public, I also hypothesize that:

H.7a: Militarized states will be weaker states on average compared to semi-militarized states.
H.7b: Militarized states will be weaker states on average compared to command states. Militarization is related to war based activity, which not only feeds it but legitimizes its mode of operation to the wider society (Mills 1956; Horowitz 1963; Tilly 1985). I therefore hypothesize that:

H.8a: Militarized states will have experienced more wars in the past 5 years and in the past 20 years compared to Semi-militarized states.

H.8b: Militarized states will have experienced more wars in the past 5 years and in the past 20 years compared to command states.

Being part of the militarized ‘stabilization track’ as I propose in my model, militarized states will use greater economic resources for the purchase of weapons systems from abroad and will receive a greater incentive to do so through military aid and weapons sales from command states in particular. I therefore hypothesize that:

H.9a. Militarized states will have a higher arms import percent as proportion of tax revenue compared to Semi-militarized states.

H.9b. Militarized states will have a higher arms import percent as proportion of tax revenue compared to the command states.

Data, Methods and Analysis

The following analysis used cross national data on 173 nation states (which for the purpose of various analyses ranged from a sample size of 91 to 158, given missing or unavailable data). For the purpose of dividing up countries into one or another type: Militarized, Semi-militarized or Command, I used the militarization scale that was developed using a principal component factor analysis that captured in its computation the latent structure of global militarization. The results suggested that three variables (see Table 4.01) could be grouped into one summary index of militarization (N=157). The three absolute measures of militarization were: the log of government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the log of government
military expenditure as a percentage of total tax revenue and the log of military personnel as a percentage of total population. The first two measures, both adjusted via taking their natural log to fix positive skew, represent the military burden of a nation state, while the third represents an adjusted military participation ratio, expressed as a percentage.

The Eigen value (2.12) was above the conventional threshold of 1.00. The factor loadings ranged from 0.726 for the log of military personnel as a percentage of total population to 0.915 for the log of government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The variables combined to form this factor were in agreement with the definition of militarization in the literature.

Table 4.01  Principal Component Factor Analysis (N=157) Militarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardized Components</th>
<th>Militarization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of Government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.</td>
<td>0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Military expenditure as a percentage of taxation revenue.</td>
<td>0.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Military personnel as a percentage of total population</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigen Value</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Variation Explained</td>
<td>70.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constructing and Validating the Militarized International System (MIS)

The militarization structure variable (mean=0, SD=1) had a maximum militarization value of 3.105 and a minimum of -2.399. Countries that were founding members of NATO and OECD (see Table 4.02) were automatically classified as command states (CS). Those that were
non-founding members of NATO and non-founding members of OECD, if they were above the mean on the militarization factor (militarization factor value greater than 0), were classified as Militarized States (MS). Those countries that were non-founding members of NATO and equal to or below the mean on the militarization factor (militarization factor value less than or equal to 0), were classified as semi-militarized states (SMS). Non members of NATO and OECD were included in the classification of militarized and semi-militarized states based on their scores on the militarization scale (above average, MS or average and below average, SMS).

Table 4.02 NATO and OECD: Country by Membership Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FOUNDING MEMBERS</th>
<th>SECONDARY MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECD</strong></td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA.</td>
<td>Australia, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34 members, 20 Founding, 14 Secondary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
<td>Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, UK, USA.</td>
<td>Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28 members, 12 Founding, 16 Secondary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The computation of the Militarized International System (MIS) gave me 20 CS, 76 SMS and 62 MS (countries listed in Table 4.03). Iceland didn’t have a militarization factor score (because it was missing the military participation ratio figures) but since it was a founding member of both NATO and OECD, I included it in the list of command states. In order to validate this militarization based division of nation states, I used one-way analysis of variance.
(ANOVA) to see whether average differences between groups (CS, MS and SMS) on the militarization factor, are greater than average differences within groups, in effect testing the null hypothesis: Ho: Mean CS (militarization) = Mean MS (militarization) = Mean SMS (militarization)= Mean (Grand). Using Tukey's Post Hoc comparison test, Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant Difference), I also checked for homogeneity between pairs of groups to specifically gauge whether the MS differed from both the CS as well as the SMS on militarization, and the direction of the difference, in order to be sure that country classification did not give ambiguous results of differences in militarization. The results are presented in Table 4.04.

### Table 4.03 Militarized International System (MIS). Country by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>N=20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTROIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semi-Militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>N=76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBANIA, ARGENTINA, BAHAMAS, BANGLADESH, BARBADOS, BELIZE, BENIN, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, BURKINA FASO, CAMEROON, Cape Verde, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CONGO, REPUBLIC, COSTA RICA, COTE d'IVOIRE, CZECH REPUBLIC, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ETHIOPIA, FINLAND, GABON, GAMBIA, GHANA, GUATEMALA, GUINEA, GUYANA, HONDURAS, HUNGARY, INDIA, JAMAICA, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KENYA, KYRGYZSTAN, LAOS, LATVIA, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, LITHUANIA, MADAGASCAR, MALAWI, MALI, MALTA, MAURITIUS, MEXICO, MOLDOVA, MONGOLIA, MOZAMBIQUE, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NIGER, NIGERIA, PANAMA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PARAGUAY, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, ROMANIA, SENEGAL, SEYCHELLES, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SURINAME, TAJIKISTAN, TANZANIA, TOGO, TRINIDAD &amp; TOBAGO, TUNISIA, UKRAINE, UZBEKISTAN, VENEZUELA, ZAMBIA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>N=62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN, ALGERIA, ANGOLA, ARMENIA, AUSTRALIA, AZERBAIJAN, BAHRAIN, BELARUS, BOSNIA, BOTSWANA, BULGARIA, BURUNDI, CAMBODIA, CHAD, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, CONGO, DEM. REPUBLIC, CROATIA, CUBA, CYPRUS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, ESTONIA, FIJI, GEORGIA, GUINEA-BISSAU, INDONESIA, IRAN, ISRAEL, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MACEDONIA, MALAYSIA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, MYANMAR, NAMIBIA, NEPAL, OMAN, PAKISTAN, PERU, QATAR, RUSSIA, RWANDA, SAUDI ARABIA, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SOUTH KOREA, SRI LANKA, SUDAN, SYRIA, THAILAND, TURKMENISTAN, UGANDA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, URUGUAY, VIETNAM, YEMEN, ZIMBABWE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The one-way ANOVA of militarization by the MIS revealed, regarding militarization scores (Table 4.04) that mean scores differed significantly across the three categories (CS, SMS and MS, N=157). The Levine test of homogeneity of variance across samples revealed that variances of the samples were not homogeneous (Levine (2,154) = 3.595, p<0.05) and therefore the Brown Forsythe test of median comparison was used, which revealed significant difference between the three categories of the MIS (BF F (2, 66.894) =108.581, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc comparison of the three categories indicates that the MS scored much higher on militarization on average (Mean=0.943 (SD=0.735), 95% CI [0.756, 1.130]), compared to the SMS (Mean=−0.716 (SD=.511), 95% CI [-0.833, -0.60]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). The MS scored higher on militarization compared to the CS (Mean=−0.211 (SD=0.685), 95% CI [-0.541, 0.119], the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). Tukey's HSD, using the harmonic mean sample size, places all three country types, MS, SMS and CS into mutually

Table 4.04 One Way Analysis of Variance, Militarization by MIS N=157

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militarization Factor</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Brown-Forsythe (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>94.920</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47.470</td>
<td>119.724</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.595</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>108.581</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>61.060</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>156.000</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Type</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command States</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
<td>0.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-militarized States</td>
<td>-0.716</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
exclusive subsets (p<0.05) on militarization. This analysis of variance established the empirical (criterion) validity of my division based on levels of militarization. I therefore proceeded with hypothesis testing.

**Analysis: Cross tabulation and ANOVA**

**Gender Empowerment**

Table 4.05 Cross Tabulation GEM Rank by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militarized International System (MIS)</th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-Above Empowerment</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low- Average or Below Average-</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=105)=19.151 ***
Cramer's V =0.427***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

I hypothesized (1a and 1b) that militarized states would score lower on the measures of gender empowerment compared to both semi-militarized and command states. A cross tabulation of the United Nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM, M= 0.571, SD= 0.161) by the categories of the Militarized International System (MIS), provides initial support for my hypothesis 1a and 1b (Table 4.05). Dividing up the GEM scores of nation states in the world to
above average (i.e. greater than a score of 0.571) and average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 0.571) we can construct a dichotomous GEM ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) empowerment. As table 4.5 shows, 94.7% of the Command states fall into the high (above average) GEM rank while only 35% of the militarized states do so, a difference of almost 60%. Compared to the semi-militarized states, the militarized states are fewer as a percent in the high GEM rank (35% versus 45.7%, a difference of 10.7%). On the flip side, 65% of the militarized states fall in the low (average or below average) GEM ranking, while only 5% of the command states do, a difference of 55%, while compared to the semi-militarized states, the militarized states are proportionally greater in the low GEM ranking (65% versus 54.3%, an excess of 10.7%). Chi-square analysis reveals that these differences are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=105) =19.151, p<0.001), and that the relationship is very strong between the two variables (Cramers V= 0.427, p<0.001).

The one-way ANOVA of the UN Gender Empowerment Measure by the MIS revealed, regarding gender empowerment scores (Table 4.06) that mean scores differed significantly across the three categories (CS, SMS and MS, N=105). The Levine test of homogeneity of variance across samples revealed that variances of the samples were homogeneous (Levine (2,102) = 3.625, p=0.077) and therefore the F-test of mean comparison was used, which revealed significant difference between the three categories of the MIS (F(2, 102)=26.387, p<0.001). The Tukey post-hoc comparison of the three categories indicates that the MS scored much lower on GEM on average (Mean=0.494 (SD=0.149), 95% CI [0.446, 0.542]), compared to the SMS (Mean= 0.564 (SD=.109), 95% CI [0.532, 0.597]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.05). The MS scored even lower compared to the CS (Mean=0.759 (SD=0.140), 95% CI [0.692, 0.827], the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001).
Table 4.06 One-way Analysis of Variance, GEM by MIS (N=105)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN GEM</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.455</td>
<td>26.387</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.625</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>1.759</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.669</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above findings I can confirm my hypotheses 1a and 1b, that the Militarized states score lower on gender empowerment compared to the semi-militarized and the militarized states, and that if a state is militarized, there are greater odds of it being in the low gender empowerment category (based on the cross tabulation above) compared to both the command states and the semi-militarized states. In tune with the theoretical elaboration, we can conclude that militarization of states is a gendering process which works only when certain assumptions regarding masculinity and femininity are culturally dominant in the institution, which are then projected to the wider society because those images are required in order to perpetuate war and legitimate a war based society (Enloe 1992:202). This inevitably involves a proportionately greater exclusion of women from socio-economic and political arenas defined in military terms and geared towards war.
Basic Needs Provision and Human Development

I hypothesized above (2a and 2b) that militarized states would score higher on the measures of human development (basic needs provision) compared to semi-militarized states but would score lower compared to command states. A cross tabulation of the United Nation’s Non-Income Human Development Index (HDI, M= 0.675, SD= 0.180) converted into a rank of below average and above average by the categories of the Militarized International System (MIS), provides initial support for my hypothesis 2a and 2b. Dividing up the HDI scores of nation states in the world to above average (i.e. greater than a score of 0.675) and below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 0.675), I constructed a dichotomous HDI ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) human development.

As table 4.07 shows, 100% of the command states fall into the high (above average) HDI rank while only 60.7% of the militarized states do so, a difference of almost 40%. Compared to the semi-militarized states, the militarized states are higher as a percent in the high HDI rank (60.7% versus 55.4%, a difference of 5.3%). On the flip side, 39% of the militarized states fall in the low (average or below average) HDI ranking, while none of the command states do so. Compared to the semi-militarized states, the militarized states are proportionally lesser in the low HDI ranking (39% versus 45%). Chi-square analysis reveals that these differences are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=155) =13.752, p<0.001), and that the relationship is strong between the two variables (Cramers V= 0.298, p<0.01).

The one-way ANOVA of the UN non-Income Human Development Index by the MIS revealed, regarding human development/basic needs provision scores (Table 4.08) that mean scores differed significantly across the three categories (CS, SMS and MS, N=155). The Levine
test of homogeneity of variance across samples revealed that variances of the samples were not homogeneous (Levine (2,152) = 14.663, p<0.001) and therefore the more robust Brown-Forsythe test of median comparison was used, which revealed statistically significant difference between the three categories of the MIS (BF F (2, 92.8)=26.114, p<0.001). The Tukey post-hoc comparison of the three categories indicates that the MS scored higher on the HDI on average (Mean=0.667 (SD=0.172), 95% CI [0.623, 0.711]), compared to the SMS (Mean= 0.641 (SD=.172), 95% CI [0.600, 0.680]), the difference was not statistically significant (p=0.616). The MS scored lower compared to the CS (Mean=0.883 (SD=0.058), 95% CI [0.856, 0.910]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). Based on the above findings I cannot confirm my hypotheses 2a but can confirm hypothesis 2b: the Militarized states score higher on human development/basic needs provision compared to the semi-militarized states but the results are not statistically significant and therefore the null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be rejected. The militarized states score lower compared to command states as was expected; the results in that case are statistically significant.

Cross tabulation revealed that if a state is militarized, there are greater odds of it being in the higher category compared to the lower category of human development/basic needs provision. These findings support my theoretical claim that militarized states due to higher growth rates and economic development compared to other developing nations, will show enhanced human development concomitant with greater inequality, also the enhanced need for the militarized government to maintain legitimacy leads to greater basic needs provision among the population (London and Williams 1998; Harries-Jenkins and Van Doorn 1976).
Table 4.07 Cross Tabulation HDI Rank by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Income HDI ranking</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within MIS</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within MIS</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within MIS</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within MIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (above average) human development</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (average or below average) human development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=155)=13.752 ***  
Cramer's V =0.298**  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 4.08 One-way Analysis of Variance, HDI by MIS (N=155)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN HDI</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Brown-Forsythe (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.474</td>
<td>16.681</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>14.663</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>26.114</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>3.993</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2, 92.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.941</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean  SD  
Command States | 0.883 | 0.058  
Semi-militarized States | 0.641 | 0.172  
Militarized States | 0.667 | 0.172  
Economic Growth and Economic Development

I hypothesized above (3a and 3b) that militarized states would score higher on the measures of economic growth, given the multiplier effect of militarized spending and superior access to foreign aid that such spending entails (Benoit 1978; Melman 2001; Markusen 2004) compared to semi-militarized states and are also not affected by the diminishing returns to investment like the advanced capitalist command states. A cross tabulation of the average GDP growth rate (gdpgrow01, mean=4.03, SD= 2.49) transformed into a dichotomous variable based on above or below average GDP growth by the categories of the Militarized International System (MIS), provides initial support for my hypothesis 3a and 3b. Dividing up the average GDP growth percent (average 2001-2010) scores of nation states in the world to above average (i.e. greater than a score of 4.03) and average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 4.03), I constructed a dichotomous GDP growth ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) GDP growth percent.

As table 4.09 shows, 100% of the command states fall into the low GDP growth rank while only 34.5% of the militarized states do so, a difference of almost 65%. Compared to the semi-militarized states, the militarized states are higher as a percent in the high GDP growth rank (66% versus 60%, a difference of 6%), while being lower as a percent in the low GDP growth rank (35% versus 40%). Chi-square analysis reveals that these differences are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=151)=27.76, p<0.001), and that the relationship is very strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.429, p<0.001).
The one-way ANOVA of the GDP growth rate percent by the MIS revealed, regarding GDP growth (Table 4.10) that mean scores differed significantly across the three categories (CS, SMS and MS, N=156). The Levine test of homogeneity of variance across samples revealed that variances of the samples were not homogeneous (Levine (2,153) = 4.592, p=0.012) and therefore the more robust Brown-Forsythe test of median comparison was used, which revealed statistically significant difference between the three categories of the MIS (BF F (2,114.88)=23.728, p<0.001). The Tukey post-hoc comparison of the three categories indicates that the MS scored higher on the GDP growth percent on average (Mean=4.96 (SD=2.80), 95% CI [4.24, 5.67]), compared to the SMS (Mean= 3.95 (SD=1.82), 95% CI [3.53, 4.37]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.05). The MS scored higher on GDP growth percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP Growth Rank</th>
<th>High-above average growth</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low- Average or below average growth</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=156)=27.755 ***
Cramer's V =0.429***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 4.09 Cross Tabulation GDP growth percent Rank by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=156</th>
<th>Militarized International System (MIS)</th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-above average growth</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low- Average or below average growth</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
compared to the CS also (Mean=1.62 (SD=0.83), 95% CI [1.23, 2.01]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001).

Table 4.10 One-way Analysis of Variance, GDP growth percent by MIS  (N=156)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP growth (Mean % 2001-2010)</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>168.889</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84.45</td>
<td>17.679</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.592</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>730.812</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>899.701</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command States</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Militarized States</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I can therefore confirm my hypotheses 4a and 4b, the militarized states have higher GDP growth rates compared to both the semi-militarized and command states and the mean difference between the growth rates of the CS, SMS and MS are statistically significant. A higher growth rate, among the developing nations, means that militarized states will display comparatively higher levels of economic development as measured through the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and the factor that measures the structure of economic development (a composite measure I constructed made up of the log of GDP per capita, the log of inbound foreign direct investment flows and the log of inbound foreign direct investment stock using principal component factor analysis (Eigen Value= 2.48, percent variation explained= 82.75). However developing economies, despite their faster growth rate, diverge and do not converge with the
level of economic development attained by the command states, and therefore both the MS and the SMS should be lower on economic development indicators (Bergsen and Bata 2000; Firebaugh 2000, Arrighi, Silver and Brewer 2003, 2005), because regardless of economic growth, militarization does not produce long term economic development.

One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) of log of GNI per capita by the MIS (Table 4.11) and of the Economic Factor by the MIS (Table 4.12) confirm my hypotheses 4a and 4b. The one-way ANOVA of log of GNI per capita by the MIS reveal, regarding log of GNI per capita that mean scores differed significantly across the three categories (CS, SMS and MS, N=158). The Levine test of homogeneity of variance across samples revealed that variances of the samples were not homogeneous (Levine (2,155) = 13.632, p<0.001) and therefore the more robust Brown-Forsythe test of median comparison was used, which revealed statistically significant difference between the three categories of the MIS (BF F (2,136.992)=33.516, p<0.001). The Tukey post-hoc comparison of the three categories indicates that the MS scored higher on the log of GNI per capita on average (Mean=8.72 (SD=1.34), 95% CI [8.37, 9.06]), compared to the SMS (Mean= 8.49 (SD=1.18), 95% CI [8.22, 8.76]), the difference was not statistically significant (p=0.483). The MS scored lower on the log of GNI per capita compared to the CS (Mean=10.49 (SD=0.37), 95% CI [10.32, 10.67]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). On the economic factor, similar results were obtained (see Table 4.12 and 4.15) regarding the Levine, Brown Forsythe and Tukey’s post hoc tests, with the higher mean score of the MS not being statistically significant compared to the SMS, while being significantly lower compared to the CS.
I can therefore confirm my hypothesis 4b but cannot confirm 4a and its prediction that the militarized states will reveal higher levels of economic development compared to the semi-militarized states. This is understandable, because not only does military spending not represent productive investment, which leads to economic development, the semi-militarized states, on the accumulation track of the international system have a group of “accumulation states,” the counter part of the militarized states having “rogue states”, and the accumulation and market development in those states (akin to Wallerstein’s semi periphery) means that the average score of the SMS even though lower than the MS is statistically non distinguishable, in cross-sectional analysis (longitudinal analysis might reveal significant differences) but is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Table 4.11 One-way Analysis of Variance, Log of GNI per capita MIS (N=158)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log of GNI per capita</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Brown-Forsythe (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>64.972</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34.486</td>
<td>23.237</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>13.632</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>33.516</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>216.696</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1.398</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>281.668</td>
<td>1.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>281.668</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>1.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>1.344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I hypothesized above (5a and 5b) that militarized states would score higher on the measures of inequality (as measured through the GINI income inequality coefficient) compared to both semi-militarized states and command states since higher economic growth for militarized states, as was empirically demonstrated above, also signifies, in the absence of productive local investment, and representative government (Lee 2005) that benefits go to the top income bracket, increasing inequality (Chase-Dunn 1975). This is supplemented by the finding that militarization is positively linked to poverty (Henderson 1998) and income inequality (Abell 1994) and the link of government military spending to finance capital (or foreign capital) whose development in an

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Factor</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>49.146</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.573</td>
<td>37.050</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.864</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>92.854</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142.000</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command States</td>
<td>1.47114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Militarized States</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States</td>
<td>0.33418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.12 One-way Analysis of Variance, Economic Factor by MIS (N=143)**

**Inequality and Income Distribution**

I hypothesized above (5a and 5b) that militarized states would score higher on the measures of inequality (as measured through the GINI income inequality coefficient) compared to both semi-militarized states and command states since higher economic growth for militarized states, as was empirically demonstrated above, also signifies, in the absence of productive local investment, and representative government (Lee 2005) that benefits go to the top income bracket, increasing inequality (Chase-Dunn 1975). This is supplemented by the finding that militarization is positively linked to poverty (Henderson 1998) and income inequality (Abell 1994) and the link of government military spending to finance capital (or foreign capital) whose development in an
economy is positively associated with inequality (Rodriguez-Pose and Teslios 2009; Chase-Dunn 1975) also points to a possible pathway of militarization enhancing inequality. A cross tabulation of the Gini scores (Gini, mean=0.411, SD= 0.102) transformed into a dichotomous variable based on above or below average scores by the categories of the Militarized International System (MIS), provides initial support for my hypothesis 5a and 5b. Dividing up the Gini scores of nation states in the world to above average (i.e. greater than a score of 0.411) and average or below average (i.e. less than or equal to a score of 0.411), I constructed a dichotomous Gini ranking scale of high (above average) and low (average or below average) inequality.

As table 4.13 shows, 90% of the command states fall into the low inequality rank while only 51% of the militarized states do so, a difference of 39%. Compared to the semi-militarized states, the militarized states are higher as a percent in the high inequality rank (49% versus 47.8%), while being lower as a percent in the low inequality rank (51% versus 52.2%). Chi-square analysis reveals that these differences are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=138) =10.268, p<0.001), and that the relationship is strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.273, p<0.001). Based on the cross tabulation, I can confirm my hypothesis 5a and 5b, that militarized states have higher income inequality compared to both the semi-militarized states and the command states. However, in order to decipher if dichotomous group differences are statistically significant, we have to do an analysis of variance and post-hoc tests.
Table 4.13 Cross Tabulation GINI Rank by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gini ranking</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within MIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High- above average income inequality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States (MS)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low- Average or below average income inequality</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States (MS)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square (2, N=138)=10.268 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Cramer’s V =0.273***
| *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 4.14 lists the results of the one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) of GINI by the MIS. The one-way ANOVA of GINI by the MIS reveals, regarding the GINI coefficient that mean scores differed significantly across the three categories (CS, SMS and MS, N=138). The Levine test of homogeneity of variance across samples revealed that variances of the samples were not homogeneous (Levine (2,135) = 3.751, p=0.026) and therefore the more robust Brown-Forsythe test of median comparison was used, which revealed statistically significant differences between the three categories of the MIS (BF F (2,121.389) =15.472, p<0.001). The Tukey post-hoc comparison of the three categories indicates that the MS scored higher on income inequality scores on average (Mean=0.428 (SD=0.093), 95% CI [0.400, 0.455]), compared to the SMS (Mean= 0.420 (SD=0.099), 95% CI [0.396, 0.443]), the difference was not statistically significant (p=0.884). The MS scored higher on income inequality compared to the CS
(Mean=0.312 (SD=0.061), 95% CI [0.283, 0.341]), the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). Even though the MS scored higher on income inequality on average as hypothesized, the non-significance of the results mean that I cannot confirm my hypothesis 5a. However 5b which stated that the MS would score higher on income inequality compared to the CS was confirmed. Since both the MS and the SMS by and large fall in the developing and not fully industrialized country categories, the higher income inequality they reveal compared to the CS is understandable (Firebaugh 2000), also the interrelationship between “within and between” nation inequality means that as GDP per capita diverges between the developed and developing countries, within country inequality increases as well (Bergsen and Bata 2002). The inequality generated through capital penetration in the accumulation track that describes the semi-militarized states (Chase-Dunn 1975) is matched by the inequality generated through militarized spending in the stabilization track (Horowitz 1975), as a result of which the difference in inequality between the militarized and semi-militarized states is not significant, but significantly greater compared to the command states.

Table 4.15 summarizes the mean comparisons between CS, SMS and MS based on Tukey’s HSD regarding gender empowerment (UN GEM), economic growth (GDP growth percent), basic needs provision (UN non-income HDI), inequality (Gini coefficient) and economic development (composite of log of GNI per capita, log of inbound FDI stock and log of inbound FDI flows). Militarized states differ significantly (negatively) from both CS and SMS on gender empowerment. They differ significantly (positively) compared to both CS and SMS on economic growth. No other difference between the MS and SMS is significant even though the direction indicated by the data is in tune with my hypotheses. The MS and the CS differ significantly on basic needs provision, inequality and economic development, as expected.
Table 4.14 One-way Analysis of Variance, GINI by MIS (N=138)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Levine (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Brown-Forsythe (df 1,2)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>12.401</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.751</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>15.472</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>1.157</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.370</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIS</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command States</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Militarized States</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.15 Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(I): Militarized States</th>
<th>(J): Command States</th>
<th>GEM</th>
<th>GDP GROWTH %</th>
<th>NON-INCOME HDI</th>
<th>GINI</th>
<th>Log of GNI per capita</th>
<th>Economic Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militarized states</td>
<td>-0.265*** (0.037)</td>
<td>3.336*** (0.563)</td>
<td>-0.216*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.1158*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-1.772*** (0.304)</td>
<td>-1.569*** (0.216)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-militarized States</td>
<td>-0.070* (0.028)</td>
<td>1.002* (0.377)</td>
<td>0.0264 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.017)</td>
<td>0.2332 (0.202)</td>
<td>0.2366 (0.147)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Military Dominance and the State

In order to empirically test the component of my model (Figure 4.1) that hypothesizes the emergence of a garrison state (Janowitz 1975) in military dominated political economies and an experimental state (Horowitz 1975) in the semi-militarized states (my hypotheses 6a and 6b), I used the listing of regime type by country in the State Fragility Index, 2008 (Marshall and Cole 2009). Of the listed four categories, instituted democracy, weak democracy and weak authoritarianism and strong authoritarianism, I collapsed weak democracy and weak authoritarianism into my “experimental state” category, because they reflect a shifting constellation between the two extremes instituted democracy and instituted or strong authoritarianism. Table 4.16 presents the results of the cross tabulation of regime type by MIS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental (Weak Democratic or Weak Autocratic)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic/Dictatorial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=148)=29.699***
Cramer’s V =0.317***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
As table 4.16 shows, 100% of the command states fall into the “Democratic” category, which in the militarized capitalism of the command states implies a confluence of interests between the military, polity and economy (Mills 1956), while only 39.3% of the militarized states do so (and 69.1% of the SMS). On the flip side, 26.2% of the militarized states are autocratic/dictatorial compared to 6% of the SMS and 0% of the CS. That a very small proportion of the SMS fall into the autocratic/dictatorial segment compared to the MS, while a very large proportion of them (69.1) fall into the democratic camp, with 25% in the experimental state type, even though the MS have a proportionately greater representation in the experimental state type compared to the SMS, I can conclude that their “experiment” is not as much towards the democratic side as the SMS. Chi-square analysis reveals that these differences are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=148) =29.70, p<0.001), and that the relationship is very strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.317, p<0.001). I can therefore confirm my hypotheses 6a and 6b which stated the claim that the MS will have a greater proportion of non-democratic regime types compared to both the CS and the SMS.

In order to test my hypotheses 7a and 7b, I took the extraction ability of a government, indicated by tax revenue collected as a percentage of GDP, to be an indicator of state strength (Robinson 1977; Tilly 1985; Campbell 1993). I converted taxation as a percentage of GDP (mean=21.8 SD=12.1) into a dichotomous categorical variable of state strength (above the mean to represent a strong state and mean or below the mean to represent a weak state). The results are presented in Table 4.17: 100% of the command states fall into the “Strong State” category, while only 29% of the militarized states do so (and 40% of the SMS). On the flip side, 71% of the militarized states are “Weak States” compared to 61% of the SMS and 0% of the CS. Chi-square analysis reveals that these differences are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=158) =31.83,
p<0.001), and that the relationship is exceptionally strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.449, p<0.001). I can therefore confirm my hypotheses 7a and 7b which stated the claim that the MS will have a greater proportion of weak states compared to both the CS and the SMS. The weakness of the MS is due to legitimacy problems and the dependence on foreign military aid, it is also a result of the state’s autonomy from the mass of its population that is alienated due to top down modernization attempts by military leaders (Harries-Jenkins and Van Doorn 1976, Brooks 1998, Fidel 1975). As a result, even though the middle classes that are “born” in these attempts find military rule palatable due to its stabilization potential and the support of their style of life, the larger destabilization of the countryside by such “development” and the resulting fallout is often ignored by military leaders.

Table 4.17 Cross Tabulation State Strength by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=158</th>
<th>Militarized International System (MIS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command States (CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Strength Rank (based on above or below average Tax % GDP)</td>
<td>Strong State (above average tax extraction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak State (average or below average tax extraction)</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=158)=31.825 ***
Cramer's V =0.449***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Militarization of a societal structure implies that wars and war related activity become the normal mode of interaction (Mills 1956; Horowitz 1963; Tilly 1985). As Benoit (1978) in his seminal study on militarization and economic growth observed, among the LDCs that had a big defense burden, most of them were in geographic areas where combat had occurred (p.275). I therefore predicted (hypotheses 8a and 8b) that militarized states will have proportionately greater war based activity, as measured through the incidence of major war in the past 5 years and major war in the past 20 years (data on these were obtained through the State Fragility Index, 2008, with major wars defined as those that involve greater than 500 casualties (Marshall and Cole 2009), compared to both command and semi-militarized states. The cross tabulated results of major wars within the past 5 years and within the past 20 years by MIS are presented in Table 4.18 and 4.19 respectively.

Among the militarized states, 27.4% had experienced war within the past 5 years compared to 9.2% of the semi-militarized states and 10% of the command states (which amounts to almost three times the frequency of incidence of war within the militarized states compared to the other states). These results are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=158) =8.93, p<0.05), and the relationship is strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.238, p<0.05). Table 4.19 (war within the past 20 years) reveals much the same as Table 4.18, except that the difference is more pronounced and the relationship much stronger. Sixty three percent of the militarized states experienced war within the past 20 years compared to 38 percent of the semi-militarized states and 10% of the command states. These results are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=158) =19.393, p<0.001), and the relationship is very strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.350, p<0.001).
The fact that the frequency of war within the past 5 years or 20 years remained constant for the command states while it increased dramatically for the semi-militarized states, hints at the

Table 4.18 Cross Tabulation War Within the Past 5 years by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War within the past 5 years, NO</td>
<td>Count 18</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS 90.0%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War within the past 5 years, YES</td>
<td>Count 2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS 10.0%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count 20</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS 100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=158)=8.929*  
Cramer’s V =0.238*  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 4.19 Cross Tabulation War Within the Past 20 years by MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War within the past 20 years, NO</td>
<td>Count 18</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS 90.0%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War within the past 20 years, YES</td>
<td>Count 2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS 10.0%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count 20</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within MIS 100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=158)=19.393***  
Cramer’s V =0.350***  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
plausible possibility that in the longer term militarized states are either fighting among themselves (62.9 % vs. 27.4%) or with the semi-militarized states (38.2% vs. 9.2%), with contribution from the command states that provide most of the hardware for war. This provision of war material takes me to the next set of hypotheses (9a and 9b). Militarized states as the stabilization engine of the militarized capitalist system are the major purchasers of weapon systems sold by the command states. This is one way in which the surplus generated from enhanced economic growth in the militarized sector of the international system flows to the command states. Such flows ensure that the network of military industries in the command states get contracts and the urban areas dependent on them get stabilized during times of crises through job creation and its multiplier effects (Gauchat, Wallace, Borch and Lowe 2011; Markusen, Hall, Campbell and Dietrick 1991). The second method of stabilization is the entire country level reconstruction of invaded and war destroyed countries by the command states, which in effect amounts to an ‘importation’ of economic growth by the command states to counter the diminishing returns to investment faced by the ‘advanced’ economies.

Using arms imports as a percentage of tax revenue (mean=4.8129 SD=15.546), I converted this continuous variable into a dichotomous categorical variable with categories representing high arms imports (above the mean), and low arms imports (mean or below the mean). A cross tabulation of arms import rank by MIS reveals (Table 4.20) that 82.4% of the militarized states fall into the high arms import rank compared to 35% of the SMS and only 16% of the CS. The militarized states are therefore 2.4 times more likely, compared to the semi-militarized states; to be in the high arms import category, while 3.7 times less likely to be present in the low arms import category compared to the semi-militarized states. These results are statistically significant (Chi Square (2, N=116) =34.290, p<0.001), and the relationship is
extremely strong between these two variables (Cramers V= 0.544, p<0.001). The results reveal that the militarized states region has greater military dependency compared to the semi militarized states region.

**Table 4.20 Cross Tabulation Arms Import Rank by MIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms Import Rank (Above or Below Average)</th>
<th>Militarized International System (MIS)</th>
<th>Command States (CS)</th>
<th>Semi-militarized States (SMS)</th>
<th>Militarized States (MS)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High, above average arms imports Count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low, average or below average arms imports Count</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within MIS</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square (2, N=116)=34.290***
Cramer's V =0.544***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

The foregoing empirical comparison between the MS and SMS based on the above reveals that implicitly controlling for basic needs provision, income inequality and economic development (since these are statistically identical between the two groups, Table 4.15), the MS are, as a consequence of their high militarization, significantly lower in gender empowerment, significantly higher in economic growth, significantly higher in military dictatorships, significantly weaker in terms of states and significantly more likely to have experienced major wars in their region, compared to the SMS.
Multiple Regression Models and the Militarized States

The confirmation of most of my hypotheses through cross tabulation and analysis of variance provides initial evidence for the plausibility of various segments of my model of the international system (Figure 4.1) and also implies a need to amend economist models of global development and stratification like Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis. In order to move beyond mere plausibility and to uncover the specific effects of this regional division, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression method to determine the specific regional weights assigned to various outcomes regarding gender empowerment, economic growth, basic needs provision and inequality. The results are presented below.

Militarized States and Gender Empowerment

The military’s gendered structure is reproduced in a militarized society through the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), a militaristic version of reality that sees problems in terms of devaluing enemies (literally feminizing the enemy), denigrating feminine traits and framing all solutions in terms of aggressive combat. Since women are kept out of combat roles, they are devalued through a gendered division of labor (Enloe 1992). Militarization interacts with global capitalism in order to alter women’s relationship to the labor force and through that, the nation state. I therefore proposed (hypotheses 1a and 1b) that militarized states would be least empowering to women among all other types of nation states with ‘type’ defining region. Regarding the expected direction of these relationships, I expected that the higher the level of economic development, as indicated by the economic factor variable, the more absolute resources available to women, which would enhance the achievement dimension of gender empowerment as measured through the United Nations’ GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure).
Regarding population size, I expected that the larger the population of a country, the lower the GEM score, because of relative scarcity of resources, available to women, given a large population where men have resource priority. Regarding the state variable (tax as a percentage of GDP), I expected a positive relationship between it and GEM since a larger public sector reduces inequalities as part of conflict management and the benefit of that also accrues to women in terms of enhanced spending on education, literacy and job growth and therefore broadens the 'choice' dimension of women's empowerment.

Multivariate regression results are presented in Table 4.21 Using the region as predictor and economic, demographic and state variables as controls, I regressed GEM on MIS using the command states as excluded category. Model 1 regresses GEM on demographic, economic and state variables, Model 2 adds Militarized International System (MIS) regional variables, with CS as excluded category. Model 3 combines the CS and SMS as one region to compare to the MS (excluded category). Model 4, 5 and 6 add the interaction terms: economic factor and the region CS+SMS, log of population (centered) and the region CS+SMS, tax as percent of GDP (centered) and the region CS+SMS respectively to Model 3. As stated above, I seek to answer the following primary question using multivariate regression analysis: Is the level of empowerment of women within a nation state explained by its regional categorization based on the Militarized International System (MIS)? My primary hypothesis therefore is:

For militarized states (independent variable), women’s empowerment (dependent variable) is less than command states and the combined region of semi-militarized and command states, controlling for economic, demographic and state factors.
As Table 4.21 shows, 60% of the variation in women’s empowerment was explained by model 2, which contains demographic, economic, state and MIS regional variables. For militarized states, net of other effects, GEM scores are lower by 0.101 units (b=-0.101) compared to command states, the results are statistically significant (p<0.01). The standardized coefficient reveals that the negative regional effect of being a militarized states on GEM is the largest negative effect in the equation (Beta= -.297), net of other effects, which exceeds the negative effect of one standard deviation increase in log of population (Beta=-0.256) net of other effects, which was the second largest reducer of GEM in the model. As expected, economic development as indicated by the economic factor variable has a statistically significant positive effect, per unit
increase in economic development, on GEM (b=0.088, p<0.001), net of other effects.

Demographic effects, as measured through the log of population, have a statistically significant negative effect, per unit increase in log of population on GEM, net of other effects (b=-0.025, p<0.01), and state strength, measured through tax revenue (as percent of GDP), has a statistically significant positive or enhancing effect on women’s empowerment as theorized, per unit increase in tax revenue (% GDP), net of other effects (b=0.004, p<0.01).

Combining both command states and semi-militarized states, in order to compare regional effects of these states, with the militarized states as excluded category, reveals (in model 3) that the combined CS+ SMS region, net of other effects (i.e. controlling for economic, demographic and state variables), is 0.076 (b=+0.076) units higher in GEM scores compared to the militarized states. The results are statistically significant (p<0.01). These results confirm my hypothesis that net of other effects, militarized states adversely affect women’s empowerment compared to other state types. Interaction analysis between the combined CS+SMS region and the economic, demographic and state variables (Models 4, 5 and 6) did not reveal significant results. Collinearity did not seem to be a problem in the model, given its absence based on tolerance and variance proportions methods and only conservative detection through VIF (>2.5 but < 4.0).

**Militarized States and Economic Growth**

Economic growth in militarized states is linked to militarization and war related activity (Mintz and Huang 1990; Markusen 2004; Horowitz 1975, Benoit 1978). The enhanced economic growth due to militarization might come through military initiated modernization and military burden based inflation led utilization of underutilized resources together with a psychological
response of national cooperation and solidarity (Benoit 1978) and through technological spin-offs (Grobar and Porter 1989) and military spending linked “offsets” (Markusen 2004).

Through such enhanced economic growth, these nations help stabilize the periodic (self-induced) crises in the capitalist system through being an engine for war and war related spending and reconstruction based (military) Keynesianism of the CS, as they feed the economic dependency of the command states’ civilian economy on military industries in what is popularly termed the military industrial complex (Gauchat, et al 2011; Markusen et al 1991). My primary hypothesis therefore is:

For militarized states (independent variable), economic growth (GDP growth percent-dependent variable) is greater than command states and greater than the combined region of command states and semi-militarized states, controlling for economic, demographic and state variables.

The OLS multivariate regression results are presented in Table 4.22. Model 1 regresses GDP growth percent on demographic, economic and state variables, Model 2 adds Militarized International System (MIS) regional variables, with CS as excluded category. Model 3 combines the CS and SMS as one region to compare to the MS (excluded category). Model 4, 5 and 6 add the interaction terms: economic factor and the region CS+SMS, log of population (centered) and the region CS+SMS, tax as percent of GDP (centered) and the region CS+SMS, respectively to Model 3.

Table 4.22 shows, 32% of the variation in economic growth rates was explained by model 2, which contains demographic, economic, state and MIS regional variables. For militarized states, controlling for economic, state and demographic factors, GDP growth rates are higher (b=2.123) by 2.12% compared to command states, the results are statistically significant (p<0.01). The
standardized coefficients reveal that the positive economic growth effect of militarized states is the largest positive effect in the model (Beta= +0.422), net of other effects, which exceeds the positive demographic effects of a one standard deviation increase in the log of population, net of other effects (Beta= +0.162), the second largest positive effect in the model.

### Table 4.22 Ordinary Least Squares Regression of GDP Growth Rate on MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (N=141)</th>
<th>Model 2 (N=141)</th>
<th>Model 3 (N=141)</th>
<th>Model 4 (N=141)</th>
<th>Model 5 (N=141)</th>
<th>Model 6 (N=141)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.224)</td>
<td>0.099 (0.237)</td>
<td>-0.078 (0.219)</td>
<td>0.371 (0.307)</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.221)</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>0.240* (0.120)</td>
<td>0.240* (0.117)</td>
<td>0.226 (0.118)</td>
<td>0.253 (0.117)</td>
<td>0.252 (0.197)</td>
<td>0.226 (0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (% GDP)</td>
<td>-0.094*** (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.070*** (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.083*** (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.072*** (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.082*** (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.081** (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2.123</strong> (0.718)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.326 (0.710)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS+SMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.978* (0.377)</td>
<td>-1.065** (0.375)</td>
<td>-0.967* (0.386)</td>
<td>-0.982* (0.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS+SMS (X) Economic Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-0.795</strong> (0.385)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS+SMS (X) Log of Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.037 (0.230)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS+SMS (X) Tax % GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-0.002</strong> (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.519*** (0.587)</td>
<td>3.522*** (0.963)</td>
<td>5.881*** (0.592)</td>
<td>6.210*** (0.454)</td>
<td>6.349*** (0.469)</td>
<td>4.087*** (0.424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.266 <strong>0.318</strong></td>
<td>0.301 0.301</td>
<td>0.301 0.301</td>
<td>0.301 0.301</td>
<td>0.301 0.301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard Errors in Parenthesis.

Economic development as indicated by the economic factor variable had a non-significant (positive) effect, per unit increase in economic development, on GDP growth, net of other effects. Demographic effects, as measured through the log of population, had a statistically significant positive effect, per unit increase in log of population on GDP growth, net of other effects (b=+0.240, p<0.05), and state strength, measured through tax revenue (as percent of
GDP), signifying the state’s extraction ability, had a statistically significant negative or diminishing effect on GDP growth, per unit increase in tax revenue (% GDP), net of other effects (b=-0.070, p<0.001).

Combining both command states and semi-militarized states, in order to compare regional effects of these states, with the militarized states as excluded category, reveals (in model 3) that the combined CS+ SMS region, net of other effects (i.e. controlling for economic, demographic and state variables), is 1.065 % (b=-1.065) lower in GDP growth compared to the militarized states. The results are statistically significant (p<0.01). These results confirm my hypothesis that net of other effects, militarized states have higher economic growth rates compared to other state types, which makes them the ideal stabilization engines in a crisis prone capitalist world system.

Interactional analysis between the combined CS+SMS region and the economic, demographic and state variables (Models 4,5 and 6) revealed one significant interaction, between the economic factor and the combined CS+SMS region (b=-0.795, p<0.05). For the CS+SMS region (compared to the MS), a one unit increase in the Economic Factor reduces average GDP growth by (-0.795 +0.371= -0.424) 0.424%, net of other effects.

**Militarized States and Human Development/Basic Needs Provision**

The “basic” needs of a population as a dimension of development are distinct from measures of income or inequality (London and Williams 1998). In order for a state to remain viable it must maintain legitimacy for the purpose of extraction (and/or domination of a societal structure) (Tilly 1990). Military governments have an acute problem of legitimacy (Janowitz 1975, Brooks
1998, Harries-Jenkins and Van Doorn 1976), which they counter in the short term through enhanced economic growth, a limited redistribution and modernization which is a direct consequence of militarization and foreign aid (Benoit 1978). Foreign aid by the command states is often conditionally based on militarization of a nation state, and is a pathway through which the command states militarize groups of nations for the stability of the global economy.

As a result, a middle class initially emerges or grows in numbers in these states and this class sees military rulers as promoters of stability (Fidel 1975) because they ensure a smooth flow of goods and services that are otherwise disrupted during political turmoil of weak civilian regimes, which are quite common in developing nations (Marshall and Cole 2009). This is the scenario in the short term. In the longer term, the need for legitimacy forces military rulers to adopt a civilian facade and incorporate civilian political representatives as partners in their rule (Brooks 2008). This leads to enhanced class conflict, and in the presence of a weak state, also a characteristic trait of militarized states (as was empirically demonstrated in Table 4.17), disruption, turmoil and enhanced inequality. I therefore expect militarized states, in cross-sectional analyses; to have a better record on basic needs provision, as measured through the UN's Human Development Index, net of other effects. In other words, based upon the enhanced need for legitimacy in the short term, controlling for economic, demographic, state strength and income inequality (as measured through the GINI coefficient), I expect (primary hypothesis) that:

Militarized states, net of other effects, have a positive impact on basic needs provision compared to both command states (since the economy is being controlled for) and the combined region of command states and semi-militarized states.
The OLS multivariate regression results are presented in Table 4.23. Model 1 regresses non-income Human Development Index (HDI) on demographic, economic state and income inequality measures, Model 2 adds Militarized International System (MIS) regional variables, with CS as excluded category. Model 3 combines the CS and SMS as one region to compare to the MS (excluded category). Model 4, 5 and 6 add the interaction terms: economic factor and the region CS+SMS, log of population (centered) and the region CS+SMS, tax as percent of GDP (centered) and the region CS+SMS respectively to Model 3.

Table 4.23 shows that 74.5% of the variation in non-income HDI scores was explained by model 2, which contains demographic, economic, state, income inequality and MIS regional variables. For militarized states, controlling for economic, state, demographic and inequality measures, non-income HDI scores are higher (b=0.087) by 0.087 units compared to command states, the results are statistically significant (p<0.05). The standardized coefficients reveal that the positive effect of militarized states on non-income HDI in the model (Beta=+0.225) is second only to the HDI enhancing effect of the economic factor (Beta=+0.791) and exceeds the positive effects of tax extraction (% GDP) by the state on HDI (Beta=+0.201). Economic development as indicated by the economic factor variable had a significant positive effect, per unit increase in economic development (b=0.142, p<0.001) on non-income HDI scores, net of other effects. Demographic effects, as measured through the log of population, had a statistically significant negative effect, per unit increase in log of population on non-income HDI scores, net of other effects (b=−0.030, p<0.001), and state strength, measured through tax revenue collected (as percent of GDP), signifying the state’s strength, had a statistically significant positive or enhancing effect on non-income HDI scores, per unit increase in tax revenue (percent of GDP),
net of other effects (b=0.003, p<0.01), i.e. for every unit increase in tax revenue collected (as percent of GDP), non-income HDI scores go up by 0.03 units, net of other effects.

Combining both command states and semi-militarized states, in order to compare regional effects of these states, with the militarized states as excluded category, reveals (in model 3) that the combined CS+ SMS region, net of other effects (i.e. controlling for economic, demographic, state, and income inequality variables), is not statistically significant but is directionally revealing (b=-0.017, p=0.367). These results confirm my hypothesis that net of other effects,
militarized states have higher non-income HDI scores (that measures basic needs provision) compared to command states. The comparison between the combined command and semi-militarized states with the militarized states, even though revealing the correct direction, was not statistically significant and therefore could not be established. Interaction analysis between the combined CS+SMS region and the economic, demographic and state variables (Models 4, 5 and 6) did not reveal any significant interaction. Collinearity was a problem in model 6 with one of the interaction terms having a variance inflation factor (VIF) of 4.2. However no unusual effects of it were noted on the other variables.

**Militarized States and Inequality**

As stated in the previous segment, militarized states due to their higher economic growth (which is a factor of militarization) and low legitimacy, nurture the formation of a middle class. However due to this economic growth going to the command states as a consequence of militarization through an arms trade regime and to only a small segment of the population due to non representation (Lee 2005), and in the absence of productive local investment due to the “crowding out” effect (Mintz and Stevenson 1995), and non-representation which results in the disruption and neglect of the traditional economy by a modernizing military, the mass of the population gets relatively deprived during the initial stages of industrialization (Kuznets 1955). Military regimes can never move beyond the initial stages of industrialization due to the obvious lack of investment and capital formation that is a consequence of militarized economics, together with a dependency on command states that demolish or stunts the growth of the client state’s local bourgeoisie. This military dynamic not only alienates but relatively deprives the mass of
the population while promoting a minuscule middle class that becomes its flag carrier and supporter. My primary hypothesis therefore is:

Militarized states, net of other effects, have a positive impact on income inequality (i.e. they enhance inequality) compared to command states and the combined region of command states and semi-militarized states.

The OLS multivariate regression results are presented in Table 4.24. Model 1 regresses the GINI income inequality coefficient on demographic, economic, state and non-income HDI (basic needs provision) variables, model 2 adds Militarized International System (MIS) regional variables, with CS as excluded category. Model 3 combines the CS and SMS as one region to compare to the MS (excluded category). Model 4, 5 and 6 add the interaction terms: economic factor and the region CS+SMS, log of population (centered) and the region CS+SMS, tax as percent of GDP (centered) and the region CS+SMS respectively to Model 3. Interaction between the region (CS+SMS) and HDI resulted in extreme collinearity (VIF 22) and was therefore excluded from the analysis.

Table 4.24 shows that 28.5% of the variation in GINI income inequality coefficient was explained by model 2, which contains demographic, economic, state, and non-income HDI and MIS regional variables. For militarized states, controlling for economic, state, demographic and basic need (non-income HDI) measures, GINI scores are higher (b=0.071) by 0.071 units compared to command states, the results are statistically significant (p<0.05). The standardized coefficients reveal that the positive effect of militarized states on income inequality in the model (Beta= +0.349) is the largest GINI enhancing effect in the equation. Besides the regional variables, the only other statistically significant effect on GINI was non-income HDI. A one unit
increase in the non-income HDI reduces income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient by 0.195 units (b=−0.195, p<0.01), net of other effects.

Combining both command states and semi-militarized states, in order to compare regional effects of these states, with the militarized states as excluded category, reveals (in model 3) that the combined CS+ SMS region, net of other effects (i.e. controlling for economic, demographic, state, and basic need (non-income HDI) variables), is not statistically significant but is directionally revealing (b=−0.019, p=0.223) in its effects on income inequality. These results confirm my hypothesis that net of other effects, militarized states have higher income inequality scores compared to command states. The comparison between the combined
command and semi-militarized states with the militarized states, even though revealing the correct direction was not statistically significant and therefore could not be established. Interactional analysis between the combined CS+SMS region and the economic, demographic and state variables (Models 4, 5 and 6) revealed one statistically significant interaction (Model 6, Table 4.24), which was between the region (CS+SMS) and the state variable (tax revenue as percent of GDP). For the (CS+SMS) region, compared to the MS region, every one unit increase in tax revenue as % GDP reduces income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient by (-0.004 +0.001) 0.003 units, net of other effects. Collinearity did not seem to be a problem in the model, given its absence based on tolerance and variance proportions methods and only conservative detection through VIF (>2.5 but < 4.0) for some variables.

**Conclusion**

…The key to understanding capitalism as a historical social system is in accounting for its repeated reconstitution under new social, political, economic and ecological arrangements in successive cycles of world scale accumulation. (Brewer 2011:324)

Rapid social change within advanced capitalism, which occurs for the purpose of maintenance of the accumulation status quo (indicated through technological and status obsolescence, modes of production and styles of life), together with an “end of history” in that value ambivalence and identity transience become a perpetual condition of existence, because of a lack of history of uniform interaction, are the distinguishing (signature) features of a capitalist social system. When some sociologists account for such rapid social change, that is made possible through the control of the productive and cultural apparatus by the very few (elite) that dominate the production and consumption circuits of accumulation, it is often interpreted as “conspiracy theory.” Given the fact that “repeated reconstitution” (Arrighi 1997; Brewer 2011)
that is structural and cultural engineering, which is the hallmark characteristic of the capitalist social system, involves "conspiracy," i.e. coordinated social interventions that seek structural adjustment, “adjustments that have not yet been institutionalized and made automatic, and which involve a coordinated intervention for structure maintenance” (Asadi 2010:74), is in fact no "conspiracy theory" since it is structurally ingrained as adjustment mechanism. Generalizing from social systems of the past, that described pre-modernity, in trying to understand the social system of capitalism, in the post-modern era not only leads to erroneous results, it produces sociological works that get outdated upon production (including works based on classical Marxism, like World-Systems Analysis). In other words, such work becomes part of the cultural obfuscation of the present that describes the selective dipping into the past by cultural technicians to legitimize and prolong the current status quo.

Wallerstein uses, what C. Wright Mills (1969) described as the ‘labor metaphysic’ of classical Marxism, where class struggles make the Core (or bourgeoisie) hegemony a temporary phenomenon. This has not borne out in empirical reality, neither on the nation-state level nor on the level of the world system. Core/Command State hegemony in the world system appears to be a continuous and ever concentrating phenomenon. Similarly, the declining proportion of the labor force represented by labor unions and their ‘distributional metaphysic,’ where the worker/owner dichotomy is not challenged rather a redistributive formula is pursued as a form of an institutionally sanitized “conflict,” in the backdrop of an enhanced, war based, nationalism, makes the classical Marxist labor explanation unrealistic in today’s world. The evolved nature of capitalism altered from the Victorian (lassiez faire) type towards a bureaucratized/advanced militarized form that we see in the dominant states today, called for new analysis, which I undertook in this chapter. In our current-day international system, the Command states manage
class struggles and business cycles, provoke revolutions or elicit them, manufacture consent through the media and further, political and military institutions become autonomous partners with the economic in co-determining affairs of consequence, as (formal) rationality and social linkages between institutional elites makes for an ever ready and ever changing reconstitution formula for the preservation of the accumulation status quo.

In this chapter, empirical evidence was presented for a militarized model of the international system, in which a regional militarized division of labor determines economic, political, life-chance and war based outcomes. As a counterpart to the permanent war economy that has been a distinguishing feature of a reconstituted and evolved capitalism post World War II, a regional militarized globalization in this system has involved a “permanent defense network” of nation states, which function, even when at war with the command states, on their behalf. Their enhanced economic growth and the resulting economic development has made these countries economically stronger as a group compared to other “developing nations.” Militarization has modernized these nations more so than their semi-militarized counterparts in general despite their autocratic/dictatorial regimes, but at the same time has produced greater inequalities including gender based oppression within them on a regional level. The cost of the incremental benefit that a militarized global system provides to militarized states is felt in the disproportionate location of warfare in their region. Warfare that serves to subsidize a crisis prone capitalism through bloated arms sales, reconstruction and controlled industrialization that enhances rather than diminishes, between-nation and within-nation inequalities.

Through militarization, the middle class expands in developing nations, because of a limited consumption-based redistribution of their superior economic growth, which gives these
militarized nations enhanced ability at basic needs provision, net of other factors, even compared to the command states. However in the longer term, the lack of legitimacy and enhanced inequalities that are also a characteristic trait of their militarized structure, as well as war based destruction of what are termed “rogue states,” that are chosen by the command states from among these same militarized states, makes their probability of total destruction much higher compared to other state types. This means that not only is industrialization a temporary phenomenon in such states, their superior provision of basic goods and necessities to their populations, and through that social stability, is also transitory. As a counterpart to the rogue states, are the ‘accumulation states’ that emerge out of semi-militarized states. The exploitation potential of the SMS state region for the purpose of capitalist extraction, means that the semi-militarized states score lower on average, on economic development outcomes compared to militarized states, even though these differences in cross-sectional analysis are non-significant.

Table 4.25 Aggregate Regional Economic Variation in the MIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP Total (US $, Billions)</th>
<th>Inbound FDI Stock (US $, Billions)</th>
<th>Inbound FDI Flows (US $, Billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command States</td>
<td>28848</td>
<td>10847.8</td>
<td>797.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized States</td>
<td>8617</td>
<td>2894.7</td>
<td>275.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi- Militarized States</td>
<td>9976</td>
<td>2672.6</td>
<td>175.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Difference MS vs. SMS</td>
<td>13.62%</td>
<td>8.31%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The major part of these differences are based on inbound FDI flows as the command states maintain their stabilization track based on militarized states through short term economic growth through FDI injections (Chase-Dunn 1975). Table 4.25 documents these regional
disparities in aggregate economic outcomes. Whereas the semi-militarized states have a regional GDP aggregate that is greater than that of the militarized states, inbound FDI flows to the MS region are 57% higher compared to those to the SMS region.

I have demonstrated in this chapter the functional utility to the capitalist system of having a group of militarized states, and that this utility is linked to global war, and a globalization of militarization that has been a constant feature in the system post-World War II. This global war necessitates a warfare based division of labor, which serves to stabilize a crisis prone capitalism, which occurs through human and infrastructure destruction on a very large scale. The consequence of having militarized states in the system has life and death outcomes for individuals and nation states within the global system, conditioning the life-chances of billions around the globe. In the next chapter, I look at the workings of this new international social system and outline research avenues for the future.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

However power works—through raw force, prestige, authority or the reproduction of class inequalities—it works to structure the social worlds in which people live. Some do well and some are fortunate; others don't or aren't. But the fortunes we have, or lack, are never entirely ours to keep, or regret. These organizing, enduring, invisible but salient, social structures are necessary to hold social worlds together, but they can be deadly and sometimes are. (Lemert 2012:141)

The maintenance of large defense burdens and large militaries by the developing nations has biographical consequences for their populations within a scheme of ‘social history’ that defines the modern nation state’s life-cycle. It is in the articulation of these diverse effects, economic, political and military that the stabilization of the capitalist status quo is achieved on a world systemic level in a system that is highly militarized and extremely deadly for the vast majority of humankind. The components of the global ‘military industrial complex,’ like its U.S. counterpart are tri-sectoral. A division of labor exists based on militarization as organizing principle that links the command states to the operation of militarized states in the international system and involves an institutionalization of war and carnage on a massive scale. Within such an environment, national consciousness and a militarized identity emerge among groups of nation states and their populations, consciousness in which the world is witnessed as a massive war theatre, involving a continuous battle between good and evil, with good uniformly defined in terms congruent with the interests of the capitalist nations. As a result, self-worth attainment for nations and their populations is framed in terms of emulating capitalist economies, non military goals are feminized and their proponents socially emasculated.

This translates into a denigration of femininity, the institutionalization of sexism on a world systemic level, and economics and politics defined by the prioritizing logic of national
security. At the same time such ‘logic’ ensures that devoid of historical context all efforts at emulation of the developed nations that now maintain a monopoly on economic, political and military power will result in an absolute disadvantage for the developing nations in terms of “catching up.” Military dependency of the developing world on the developed nations, who are the major arms peddlers around the world, ensures economic and political dependency, making the opportunity cost of such dependency choices extremely low, because the alternative means total and complete destruction through imperial wars. Most nations in the global arena therefore fall into a “development trap” that within a militarized international system means living and dying “by the sword” based on terms structured by the command states.

In the race towards economic development and modernization, state and nation building through bureaucratization, national security becomes the cultural preoccupation of the new (developing) nations, in part due to a long history of confluence of interests between the previous colonizers and the local elite that managed these dependencies on their behalf and inherited the same organizational structure of administration post ‘independence,’ as well as the warfare based environment in which the new nations were born. Militarization directed both internally and externally, therefore attains functional priority, leading to a politicization of the military and its incorporation within the feudal economy of the developing nations (Zewde 1998), which is strengthened as a result, subordinating the local bourgeoisie to both the feudal elite and command state capital. My point in this dissertation, after uncovering the link between militarization, economic development, economic growth and the resulting stratification outcomes (regarding race, gender and inequality) was that this cultural priority based on national security is structurally encouraged based upon the logic of the world system, a system authored by the command states. Not only do the command states set the structural agenda, they also offer
instrumental support of militarization through military aid (Benoit 1978) that predominates their aid provision and industrialization based “offsets” (Markusen 2004) together with the provision of the instruments of war (and training) through massive arms trade economies, and they also manipulate arms supply to facilitate wars (Sanijan 2003). This means that the resulting life-chance and stratification outcomes of groups of people (the vast majority) trapped within such a politico-military-economic setup that is increasingly bureaucratically structured for the purpose of control, is actively maintained and encouraged by the dominant nation states that benefit from the global status quo.

Bureaucratization, as the hallmark feature of modernity, its “organizational embodiment” (Kiser and Baer 205:225), is deeply ingrained in the workings of the international system, and is historically rooted in the needs of states for the maintenance of large military organizations. The oligarchic control of the professional military translated into the social formations of the civil state, which was made in its image resulting in public affairs being managed by “a minority of influential persons to which management, willingly or unwillingly, the majority defer” (Mosca 1961 (1939):192). The Weberian idea of self-submission of civil society through bureaucratization is a translation of the Marxist notion of ideology, the ruling ideas (Marx 1875), related to the structural logic of the ruling class which reproduces bourgeoisie advantage. Marx’s concept of ideology was refined by Antonio Gramsci through the concept of hegemony. The bourgeoisie’s economic system for its survival needs the raising of “…the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling class” (Gramsci 1971:366). Thus cultural ‘logics’ specific to class formations are diffused throughout society leading to the emergence of (class specific) common sense that reproduces the class
structure while at the same time preventing consciousness of the bigger socio-economic structure. Once these conditions are achieved, the ruling class enjoys cultural hegemony.

On the level of the nation state, the regional division of labor based on militarization ensures that the ‘logics’ specific to nation formation are diffused leading to the emergence of a militarized metaphysic that prevents nations from seeing the ‘development trap’ into which they are forced through structural and cultural precedent. The ideology (or cultural) apparatus plays a distinctive role given the globalization of communication, dominated by the developed nation states and their media technology. The results of such militarization within the logic that defines the Militarized International System has deadly consequences for militarized states that attain the “rogue nation” category and serve as locations of wars or war based activity in the system. The ascension of military warlords to positions of power, which results in the successive degradation of all civilian institutions within such countries, means that not only would benefits of economic development go to the powerful few, enhancing inequality in the longer term, but also that when legitimacy crises occur as they do in garrison states, any provision of basic necessities to counter such problems will be a temporary affair and will enhance relative deprivation while not improving the absolute deprivation faced by the populations of the LDCs in question. The human dimension of total wars that decimate these nation states, means that not only their attempts at economic development but also national defense (the two primary reasons for militarization within the global system) are futile.

The ‘military metaphysic’ (Mills 1956) of the command states that emerges as a consequence of a militarized capitalism, through a structure of global militarization attains cultural hegemony in the world system. Further, such a militarized culture is given verification-
authenticity through limited material incorporation without altering the basic relationships of capitalist production. The need for verification of the ideational content through actual social existence is the foundation of Marxist sociology: “It is not the consciousness of men (women) that determines their existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (Marx 1859). The bureaucratization of the global structure introduces complexity into this structure-consciousness equation, given the fact of structural power held by the dominant nation states. The concept of the cultural apparatus (Mills 1959), instruments of objective culture production like the mass media and formalized education, and their ability to circumvent the facts of people’s daily existence by creating ‘dreams’ has enhanced the ability of the elite to muddy people’s consciousness on a global level. Those that control the means of life and violence possess social/global power, which ensures that they control the production of ideas and can structurally incorporate synthetic ‘dreams’ within a limited segment of the population for motivational salience. Such limited incorporation explains the cultural ascendancy of the middle class within the developed and developing nations, much like it explains the “model minority myth” and the rise of the “Asian Tigers” group of nation states.

The fact that these “exceptions” describe a non-generalizable, minuscule proportion of the global population is often downplayed by these cultural “scientists” that operate within intra-governmental think tanks within the developed nation states and have enormous influence in setting local and international political agendas. Circumstantial exceptions, with circumstances chosen by the command states, are presented routinely (in publications and policy statements) by these cultural technicians as paragons of “individual responsibility,” as countries that “play by the rules” and hence attain “civilization,” civilization being a Eurocentric code word indicating racial superiority (van Dijk 1993). The fact that the combined GDP of the command states that
form less than 13% of the nation states (and 12% of global population) is 61% of global GDP (and the structural advantage such wealth offers their accumulation endeavors) is conveniently overlooked in such cultural formulations.

Due to the increased ability of the elite in advanced capitalism to dominate structure by organizing opportunity (or smashing it) and dominating culture by controlling the cultural apparatus, the mass media and formal education, they can easily manage ‘facilitating’ culture (Mills 1956), producing what Marx understood as ‘false consciousness.’ In Habermas’ (1987) terminology, system integration overpowers all alternatives and forces the individual to conform by colonizing their life-world and thereby determining their identity, which for its verification needs structural authentication, and so actively reproduces inequality through such verification, this being the actual process behind ‘doing’ and constituting institutions (Stryker and Burke 2000; Stets and Cast 2007). The nation state stratification structure in the international system is a closed system, where the circulation of nation states is possible only horizontally between militarized and semi-militarized states, with a few well advertised exceptions that are statistically quite insignificant in terms of either global population or global GDP in defining the general trend. The overall similarity of economic structure between the two state types, the militarized and semi-militarized, as this cross-sectional study unveiled is testament to the fact that even though militarization leads to incremental benefits for the militarizing developing nation states, the substantive benefits of militarization of those states flows to the command states, leaving them at the same economic level, in general, as semi-militarized states, and also that the militarization of the SMS much like the MS leads to economic growth and not to any substantive longer term economic development except at very high levels of militarization, levels at which
economic growth diminishes, as a result of which these states lose their utility as stabilization engines and enter the spiral of destruction through war.

This system of circulation of states within a cycle of ‘militarization-destruction-militarization,’ within a scheme where the command states direct “policy scripts and world culture” that affects “material and symbolic struggles among nation states” (Beckfield 2003:404), is the ongoing tragedy in the majority world where developing nations face one lost decade after another, indicated by the huge global gap that defines between-nation inequality in the global system. As we study the world situation involving the “active retardation” (Skocpol ed. 1984:293) of the economic periphery by the core in order to maintain its hegemony over global accumulation, we are reminded of Malcolm X’s narration regarding two types of slaves, during the (chattel) slavery era in America: the house slaves and the field slaves (Haley and Malcolm X 1987). Looking at the situation of the current day virtual enslavement of the world by the command states, given disparities in life chance attainment, we can interpret militarized states, that are given greater access to the economic “pie,” as house slaves that not only keep the field slaves in line but are directly vested in the Militarized International System and its perpetuation. This incremental “privilege” however does not grant them any real status difference compared to other developing nation states since movement within this stratification structure is horizontal, and at the same time ensures their greater potential for destruction through wars. In this final chapter, I summarize the findings of the previous two chapters regarding the global structure of militarization in the world system and the intrinsic outcomes experienced by militarized states and outline pathways for future research.
The Stabilization “Engine” at Work

For military Keynesianism to be a viable stabilization engine for global capitalism, it needs to be linked to economic growth and for it to sustainable as a viable system in the long term, linked also to economic development/accumulation concerns of the dominant (command) states. The link of militarization to economic growth in the system implies that within a culture of developmentalism, militarization will be an attractive option among the choices available to nation states. There is therefore this structural ‘encouragement’ of militarization in the world system, ‘normalized’ through a military definition of reality and material incorporation of ‘wars without end.’

As stated in chapter 3, there is a concave curvilinear relationship between economic growth and militarization, net of other effects. Militarization as a predictor of economic growth, significantly improved the explanatory power of the model that predicts economic growth (by 24%). The findings revealed that increase in militarization did not enhance economic growth for the top two militarization quintiles, but did so for the bottom three, net of other effects. That economic growth is linked to enhanced militarization within the bottom three quintiles (that is till the middle quintile) of the militarization scale implies a structural, economic incentive to militarize further at those levels (Figure 3.1). Reading this together with the concave curvilinear relationship between economic development and economic growth (Figure 3.2), reveals that the greatest increase in economic growth occurs in the bottom two quintiles of the economic development/accumulation scale, net of other effects. The countries that together act as the stabilization engine of the global economy are the ones that are themselves operating at the bottom two quintiles of the economic accumulation scale, which combined with militarization
led growth, net of other effects, including economic led growth, gives these nation states enormous economic growth potential and hence their status as economic growth engines of the world.

The bottom three quintiles of the militarization scale comprise of 120 out of the 157 nation states in the sample, while the bottom two quintiles of the economic development/accumulation scale comprise of 66 of the 143 nation states that have economic development data. In the ‘natural history’ of the nation state, within a Militarized International System, which begins with wars and ends with them, a selection advantage of militarization is offered to the developing nation states, with the alternative choice having a much higher opportunity cost (of foregone militarization) compared to the militarization choice. As a result, countries start their cycle of militarization led economic growth, that in the lower two quintiles of the economic development scale (that comprises of a majority of the developing nations, not including the developed nations), leads to enhanced economic growth, net of other effects in that militarization led economic growth, enhances economic (investment) led growth.

Past the lower two quintiles of the economic development/accumulation scale, further ‘development’ does not lead to economic growth, but militarization net of other effects does so, which means that militarization acts as a counterbalance to the stagnation faced by most developing nation states. Past the lower three quintiles of the militarization scale, further militarization results in reversal of the gains in economic growth (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.1). We can speculate that when this incentive to militarize is instituted in a political economy past the mean of militarization and exemplifies itself in the form of a garrison state, such addiction to militarization, even though not bearing ‘fruit’ anymore in terms of enhanced economic growth is
still pursued in a ritualized fashion by a militarized political economy, but now lacks utility for the command states.

Militarization is positively associated with economic development, net of other effects, as is state strength. Militarization has a curvilinear enhancing effect on economic development at higher levels of militarization. For the bottom two quintiles on the militarization scale, increase in levels of militarization does not enhance economic development, which only increases past the second lowest quintile on the militarization scale. This means that countries that begin their journey towards militarization, getting transformed into militarized states past mean levels of militarization initially face diminishing economic development until they reach past the second lowest quintile on the militarization scale. This means that the enhanced economic growth is not productively invested into the economy but is siphoned off in terms of arms procurement and training to the command states that provide most of the material means of warfare to the developing nations (Figure 3.3). The enhanced economic growth as a consequence of militarization however continues slightly past the third quintile of the militarization scale, net of other effects, when countries are fully militarized, after which point economic growth diminishes while development/accumulation is enhanced through further militarization. The combined CS+SMS region, net of other effects (i.e. controlling for economic, demographic and state variables), is 1.065 % (b=−1.065) lower in GDP growth compared to the militarized states.
Figure 5.1 Structural “Encouragement” of Militarization in the International System

*Multivariate Regression results regarding (non-income) HDI and GINI were non-significant in the additive models.
This “development trap” that entices nation states to keep militarizing beyond any benefits in terms of enhanced economic growth (the militarized states in the international system with mean militarization of 0.9427 are operating at this level, at higher economic growth compared to other states but an economic growth rate that is diminishing per unit increase in militarization, net of other effects) leads to a trajectory that progresses through military dictatorships for this region (4.3 times more likely compared to semi-militarized states, Table 4.16), a delegitimized weak state with political turmoil in this region (10.5% more likely compared to semi-militarized states, Table 4.17), and wars and total destruction of involved nation states in this region (3 times more like within 5 years compared to semi-militarized states and twice as likely in twenty years compared to semi-militarized states, Table 4.18 and Table 4.19). The material incorporation of wars within the Militarized International System ensures that within the past 20 years, out of 158 nation states in the sample, 71 were involved in major wars (defined as those that involve greater than 500 casualties (Marshall and Cole 2009)). At higher levels of militarization when countries start experiencing diminishing economic growth but enhanced economic development, they no longer remain of use to the global capitalist system as “growth engine” and because they are trying to break out of the global stratification hierarchy (enhanced economic development) they face a greater probability of total destruction through wars.

**Militarization, Gender and Race**

The confluence of militarization, modernization, racism and misogyny is rooted in a war based global (social) structure. It is a consequence of such a militarized structure that the highest level of impersonality (Simmel’s blasé attitude (1903) as psychic adaptation) takes root, an impersonality which dehumanizes designated ‘enemies’ and considers their total destruction
morally inconsequential. In its instituted form, such impersonality represents global racism that facilitates the “doing” of the war machine and the tolerance of mass deaths of people considered different and inferior.

The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison by U.S. soldiers was a physical portrayal of the same impersonality, which true to the military spirit represented an attempted denigration in terms of the feminine (military vocabulary is laden with denigration of feminine traits). If we replaced the photographs of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib with those of female models routinely depicted by the U.S. advertising industry, we see a similar portrayal of people, and also notice a discursive similarity in the rationalizations for such actions. Much like the atrocities against the Iraqis were justified as “Iraqi liberation,” those against women by the advertising industry are often packaged as “women’s liberation” (Kilbourne 1999).

The fact that this impersonality is structural and not “isolated incidents” as the media often portrays them to be, is proven not only in the conduct of U.S. wars abroad, as in the killing of civilians through remote, drone based warfare or the destruction of the life lines of entire populations through “shock and awe” campaigns, but also in the violence that disproportionately affects women and minorities within the United States. Global sexism and racism are projections of the sexism and racism that originates with and is actively maintained by the dominant nation states and the war based system that they structured post-World War II, contextualized (historically) in the explicitly race based structuring of the colonial world.

**Racial Wars in the Militarized International System**
Global segregation, much like residential segregation defined in racial terms ensures that boundaries get defined and thickened together with socio-structural exclusion from the world outside through strict immigration controls, it also ensures that poverty gets concentrated (Massey and Fischer 1998) giving structural reinforcement to an oppositional culture that arises as a response (Anderson 1999). The process that defines the lead up to command state (imperialist) wars goes through just such an exclusionary pathway (currently being set in place for designated “rogue states” like Iran and Pakistan). It also involves militarization of the ghetto where most of the casualties of violence due to such militarization are racial minorities themselves, much like most of the casualties of war are in the “Third World” nation states that form the vast majority of active theaters of war (Table 4.18 and Table 4.19).

Such reinforcement of exclusion that successively amplifies itself, supplemented through stereotypical coverage by the mainstream corporate media leads to intensification of definition by those that have power of ascription and adoption by those towards whom these definitions are directed. They become self-fulfilling prophecies of initially caricatured behavior that defines the “other” (Becker 1966) and determine, in the case of the international system, based upon nation state position, the adoption of a global hierarchy of national identities in which the racially exclusive (whites-only) command states occupy the top tier and set the emulation agenda for the rest of the world, while their demonized enemies become paragons of evil and disgust, which results in their further isolation and separation (Goffman 1963).
Synthetic ‘structural’ retardation of minorities and underdeveloped nation states, through poverty and violence is an actively maintained process within advanced capitalism and leads back to a militarized otherization that defines global racism and enhances the accumulation of the racially exclusive command states. Not only is economic development/accumulation defined in racial terms in the Militarized International System, in that being in the European/white group of nation states had an enhancing effect on economic development (b=1.136, p<0.001), net of
other effects, compared to the “everyone else” race category of nation states, the standardized increase of economic development based on European/white was also the strongest positive effect on economic development in the model (Beta=0.501), net of other effects (Table 3.11), the link between militarization and global race is exactly as theorized above regarding racial wars. For every one unit increase in militarization in European/white states, the positive enhancing effect of a per unit increase in militarization on economic development, reverses and becomes negative (b=0.206-0.387= -0.181), that is, it reduces economic development by 0.181 units, net of other effects (Table 3.11), compared to the “everyone else” race category. This finding helps us explain the fact that militarization and its link to economic development in the developing countries is strengthened through its positive results (as elaborated above) while being qualitatively different to its outcome for the European/white states based on the social construction of race, which means not only that militarization is ‘encouraged’ only in racially defined developing nation states through its structural link to economic growth and development, its effects in terms of wars will disproportionately affect those described as racially inferior in the scheme of things, which is prima facie evidence for racial wars in the global system in addition to the fact that most casualties of war are in nation states that fall in the non-European (“everyone else”) category.

**Gender and Militarization**

Patriarchy and racism are part of the cultural lag of pre-industrial, feudal relationships that are managed by the elite through changing definitions of ‘womanhood’ and ‘race’ and ensure stabilization of the periodic crises in the capitalist political economy through management of relative deprivation. This stabilization is achieved through internally dividing the working
class and through a manipulative use of women’s labor, with their cyclical inclusion and exclusion from the labor force and controlling them through a militarized definition of reality that materially incorporates male domination within a social structure through role restriction, in effect ingraining patriarchy in “world processes, empire building, globalization (and) modernization” (Enloe 2004, p. 6). The restructuring of the U.S. post World War II, mirrors the restructuring of the international system, in other words policies enacted by the U.S. elite in the post-war era, in congruence with its relatively subordinated European allies (since the U.S emerged as the only post-war hegemonic power), had grave consequences for the underlying populations of the United States and the world. The pattern of inequality that emerged in the U.S. through state sponsored restructuring post World War II, while not similar in magnitude was similar in form to the global pattern of inequality in the post-war world restructured by the same forces (Asadi 2011).

The United Nations (UN) Security Council constituted after World War II ensured through privileging the Allied victors of the war (with the United States at their helm) that no collective action would be possible against their personal interests through their veto authority. Subsequently, veto power was used by permanent members to protect their allies (Israel in the case of the U.S. on numerous occasions) from any UN enforcement measures, rendering the UN quite ineffective as an equalizing agent, while using it as a legitimating tool for validating the bourgeoisie liberal world order, global militarization and for punishing non-integrating ‘rogue states’ (Frederking 2007:30). A long run trend in substitution of female for male labor (after the deindustrialization of the U.S. in the 1970s) is witnessed where the feminization of the labor force results in overall lower average wages for both men and women. The preponderance of temporary and ‘part time’ work as female labor is incorporated as a cost saving
arrangement into formerly male segments of the labor market and does not grant any substantive comparative benefit to women (Seguino 2000). Similarly, Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003, 2005) contend that despite convergence in industrialization between North and South, income divergence has persisted, which implies in similar fashion to the above that when industrialization became ‘peripherialized’ after the deindustrialization of the 1970s in the U.S., it was qualitatively devalued, much like feminized labor in the world system, and no longer defined a pathway to economic development or status equality.

My research demonstrated that the structure of global militarization has a significant and highly diminishing effect on women’s empowerment that operates in a curvilinear manner to enhance militarization’s negative linear effects at higher levels of militarization. At low levels of militarization, the negative linear effects of militarization are countered by the enhancing curvilinear effects possibly because of economic growth and the modernization ethos of new military rulers that translates into greater economic opportunity for all in the short term. In high population states, gender empowerment diminishes with greater magnitude, per unit increase in militarization, net of other effects compared to low population countries (at mean levels of militarization), as the interaction between militarization and population reveals, in the multivariate model that predicts gender empowerment (Table 3.10) A clustering of nation states based on a militarized division of labor ensures that women’s empowerment in those nation states (the region) will be lower than in all others on the regional level (Table 4.21).

Militarization has a negative linear relationship with gender empowerment, net of other effects. For every unit increase in militarization, net of other effects, GEM scores go down by 0.060 units. The standardized coefficient of militarization in the model (Table 3.10) shows that
militarization has the strongest diminishing effect on GEM, per standard deviation increase in militarization (beta=-0.311), controlling for economic, demographic and state factors. For the highest quintile on the militarization scale, the negative linear effect is further enhanced by a curvilinear quadratic effect (Figure 3.4), net of other effects.

The highest quintile of militarization is the region on the militarization scale, where militarized states exist, where further militarization per unit does not enhance economic growth, and this is the same region where the loss of gender empowerment, per unit increase in militarization is the greatest, net of other effects. At the same stage of militarization, economic development is increasing (Figure 3.3) but this does not translate into higher empowerment for women because of the negative effects of militarization, which produce the worst outcomes for militarized states (the region) compared to all other state types (Table 4.21) in terms of gender empowerment. The United States has a militarization score of 0.834, which borders the highest quintile of militarization, here the negative linear effect of a per unit increase in militarization is only slightly countered by a rising curve that is fast approaching its highest position to begin a linear enhancing descent.

For militarization to be challenged and the military’s hegemony over the global structure undone, ‘undoing gender’ (Deutsch 2007) is of paramount importance. Militarization, as a gendering process, cannot survive without typifying ideal ‘manhood’ and denigrating femininity. Such images are needed in order to perpetuate war and legitimate a war based society (Enloe 1992:202). This inevitably involves a proportionately greater exclusion of women from socio-economic and political arenas defined in military terms and geared towards war, much like women are proportionately excluded from combat roles in the military. Undoing gender would
undo militarization and the war based system, much like undoing racism would undo the ability of the command states to embark on imperial wars.

The solitary logic of the capitalists, of accumulation for the sake of accumulation cannot be maintained without a complete disregard for human life, in effect treating human life as incidental in the scheme of things, which their many wars clearly reveal. It is not merely a disregard but an active contempt for humanity other than their class that describes the mentality of the power elite. However if their nationalism and racism structure collapses, will they then be able to sustain and conduct wars as effectively and as destructively as they have in the past? Destruction at “home” by the elite that commandeer the global system, is always less sustainable compared to their destruction abroad because ‘otherization’ is difficult to maintain in the absence of separation, geographic or otherwise. Without ‘otherization’ wars are unsustainable, since it is relatively more difficult to generate public consent (Reiter and Stam 2002). Even though wars are racially enacted, the population of the command states does not benefit from such war making and accumulation. Net of other effects (i.e. controlling for economic, demographic, state strength and inequality), the militarized states and the semi-militarized states both score higher on (non-income) HDI, which measures basic needs provision, compared to the command states (Table 4.23).

What Is To Be Done?

“In a world of widely communicated nonsense, any statement of fact is of political and moral significance...In such a world as ours, to practice social science is, first of all, to practice the politics of truth.” (Mills 1959:178)

In the foregoing chapters, we have analyzed the world situation and studied the problems associated with militarization, which have relatively easy structural solutions if attempted by
those with structural power in the global system, the command states. Why those solutions are not tried is because of power and wealth at the command of vested interests that benefit immensely from the status quo. The world might represent a broken system for the vast majority of humanity but it works very well for the elite that commandeer it. This means that all alternative ideas regarding global restructuring are choked to death before implementation, because the few that dominate the current system have too much to lose, even as the very existence of humanity is at stake, and periodically threatened through total wars and nuclear weapons, weapons whose use is made more likely given the military metaphysic.

Arguments that seek to excuse social issues as mere “human shortcomings” assume as a premise that what is happening in the various countries of the world is happening in vacuum-like conditions, where all nations are separate and compete fairly based upon merit and goodwill. They also assume that history is being made in the U.S. and other command states by the “will of the people.” Both these assumptions are incorrect: in a capitalist society, where wealth, power and administrative control of the major institutions of society becomes enlarged and concentrated, the decisions (that have enormous consequences) are made by a minority that controls the wealth and dominates the machinery of the various institutions (Mills 1956). Further, the decisions of these power elite have global ‘life and death’ consequences for hundreds of millions; the effects of such decisions are not limited by geographic boundaries of countries but are structured to reproduce the Militarized International System. For example, distributional deprivation caused by the flow of enormous wealth from the poor countries towards the rich industrialized countries, in the form of massive military contracts together with debt dependency (and structural adjustments by the money lending institutions like the IMF and
World Bank), results in over 40,000 preventable deaths every single day, according to UN statistics, these 40,000 daily deaths are casualties of war in addition to actual war related deaths.

How do we reclaim our freedom in the face of these overwhelming social forces of control and domination generated by the elite? The first act of emancipation from this condition is to recognize it for what it is, total enslavement. It is an act of understanding the fact that the vast majority of humankind in the world today have no say or control over major decisions, economic, political or military, they are mere spectators. They are acted upon but cannot act, or when they do act, their actions have no structural consequences for their societies or the world.

At any point when we recognize the true nature of our oppression and develop “human consciousness” (not merely class consciousness), we are forced to come to terms with the fact that as individuals we cannot change the social structures that exist in our societies and the world system. However, we can surely learn how these structures function and consciously reject them. In this act of rejection is the first step towards eventual global change and emancipation.

The nation-state system is merely a bureaucratized version of the age-old colonial practice of “divide and rule.” Its formalized control mechanisms work only to keep developing countries and their populations apart, and in wasteful competition and conflict over what amounts to be mere “crumbs from the master’s table.” Where it concerns the multinationals or the ‘power elite’, the bureaucracy of the nation-state system ceases to exist; they neither respect national boundaries nor national sovereignty. The whole world is their playing field, or more aptly put, their killing field, as people of Bhopal, India experienced firsthand in 1984, and the people of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya more recently.
As capitalism's system of tyranny collapses around the world, its defense mechanisms, its instituted means of crisis aversion come to the fore with greater frequency. Post World War II, the reconstituted warfare based capitalism reveals its crisis moments primarily through warfare but also through previously instituted means of crisis aversion that manifest themselves with greater frequency, in the form of manipulation of welfare and redistributive movements. Eventually when those previous means of slow return to the status quo do not work, in that people's consciousness is loosened, capitalism quickly reconstitutes itself under new arrangements, prior to the emergence of full blown class consciousness, leading to “confusion” in emerging identities and the reestablishment of another uneasy status quo.

Social movement formation represents consciousness beyond the individual level and involves recognition of personal troubles as public issues (Mills 1959). A prerequisite for any social movement's formation is the common recognition by large groups of people that what they value is threatened and that it is worth their while to do something to change the status quo and have their grievances addressed, and the belief that their involvement will make a difference, the political efficacy of participation (Sherkat and Blocker 1994). However, the “threat” (or grievance) and the resulting motivation are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the formation of social movements, which also require resources, material and organizational, in order to attain a viable structure of opposition (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Those who want to maintain the status quo have at least four options to challenge oppositional movements once they evolve and they deploy all of those to various degrees, given the specific characteristics of the movement they seek to challenge:
1) Their superior ability to mobilize resources to form pseudo social movements to counter oppositional movements.

2) Their domination of the (objective) culture production apparatus, the mass media and formalized education, which gives them an effective monopoly over the mainstream images of "reality," which they use in order to counter the threat oppositional movement members present. At times the grievance of the opposition is symbolically incorporated in official discourse, resulting in the co-optation of social movements, and a fracturing of the oppositional consciousness, as in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.

3) Culturally deriding the values of the opposition as “uncivilized” or “extremist” or “criminal” (McPhail 1989) and thereby shocking the mass society, again through the cultural apparatus that they dominate and using explicit force in order to decimate the now weakened social movement.

4) Promoting value neutrality as “scientific,” through the formalized educational apparatus that they dominate, knowing that value neutrality in actuality signifies promoting the status quo (Mills 1959), which espouses definite values in opposition to the values espoused by the social movements they seek to counter.

Given the structural (resource based) and cultural (trend setting) advantage of the elite, the best oppositional social movements can achieve in the short term are incremental benefits due to such cooptation. However every time a social movement is co-opted, its initial formation proves to be costly to the status quo in that the powers that be make an effort in terms of expense and symbolism to counter it, raising the bar for the next similar cycle of movements, since the
political structures that gave rise to them are “sustained in the schematic orientation of former
(movement) participants” (Sherkat and Blocker 1997:1063) and, every successive movement
alters the “political opportunity structure” (Buechler 1993:226), raising the demand for social
change incrementally.

In effect, the entire middle class is a consequence of such alteration of the political
opportunity structure and raising of demands, the middle class in its current form is a pseudo
social movement organized and funded by the bourgeoisie to counter the worker's social
movement and we know that funding such a movement has not been cheap for them, but we also
know that the raising of such a class within the capitalist order has effectively neutralized both
through the objective production of “values” as well as organization, the socialist revolution, at
least in the short term. Such was the logic behind the welfare state with the “liberals” acting as
vanguards of the capitalist order and the “conservatives” ensuring that the costs of cooptation are
kept at the minimum required level. Social movement formation on a global level is our last best
hope to undo the militarization that is undoing us all.

Between structural coercion and individual social action is the process that defines
identity formation and (the resulting quality of) consciousness. As a precursor to all social action,
consciousness ensures whether inequality will be “done” (reconstituted) or undone. The making
of arguments through the cultural apparatus is the pathway through which the elite's ideology of
perpetuating inequality attains hegemony and translates into the tyranny that defines the current
status quo. The role of the intellectual within such a scheme, particularly the sociologist, is
critical to both causing social change or through official default, facilitating the status quo. The
official default of the establishment intellectual, feigned through a value indifference (presented
as “objectivity” that in reality helps reproduce the status quo, behind which are specific values) amounts to a crime against humanity given the war based system's continuous carnage on a global level. On the other hand ‘resource’ support by the intellectual of truth (demystifying actual structural reality), what C. Wright Mills referred to as the “politics of truth” (1959:178), amounts to consciousness ‘capital’ which can help the oppressed challenge and overcome their oppressor's worldview, this is the first step towards eventual social change.

**Future Directions**

Future research should look at tracing the stabilization pathway of war based activity in the international system. Research using longitudinal data on the Militarized International System (MIS) can reveal whether the systemic logic of a war based system has altered in any significant manner in the decades post World War II. Periodizing such alteration in terms of the economic crisis that defined the deindustrialization of the 1970s in the dominant states and the current “great recession,” would be expedient in order to see if the structure of militarized capitalism is changing or diminishing in its utility for system stabilization over time. Further development of the MIS model so that its power of predictability can be successfully applied in predicting location of wars, and/or the selection of rogue nations for warfare based activity by the command states could also be an interesting potential advancement in the field. The link between militarization and population growth, through a psychological effect of higher perceived mortality, should also be investigated. As far as micro level analysis is concerned, the effects of a militarized culture on national identity formation and its link to a hegemonic culture that globalizes apartheid in the relationships between national states needs to be empirically investigated in greater detail. Overall, there is a genuine dearth of sociological research on the
military and how as an institution it interacts with other institutions of consequence in producing societal and global, life and death outcomes. This dissertation besides an attempt at completing the unfinished work of C. Wright Mills on the international system, attempted at countering this neglect, at least incrementally.
END NOTES

1 According to Brewer (2011), “the global commodity/value chain perspective might now be considered the leading paradigmatic frames for defining and analyzing the causes and consequences of the global division of labor.” (p.308)

2 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

3 It is erroneous to generalize about globalization as the weakening of the nation state. The capitalist state does not weaken with economic globalization; the states that do weaken as a result are the ones that describe the new nations that increasingly lose their ability to affect economic outcomes in their economies. Multinational capital relies on a strong home capitalist state and its functional use of the military besides its pump priming function (as in military Keynesianism) to facilitate the accumulation process.


5 Giovanni Arrighi (1997) has amended this in line with Braudel’s assertion that capitalism began in the 13th century Italian city states. Oliver Cox (1964) stated the same independently, however it attained a global outlook much later.

6 “...Conflicts in the post Cold-War period have been fought in low income countries by small, poorly trained armies” (Gillis 2009:2).

7 Also known as objectification, and is the master trend within capitalist societies that Weber chose to describe as bureaucratization.

8 As the ‘Cold War’ of the U.S. with the Soviet Union and the U.S. led global ‘War on Terrorism’.


10 Also, “It is hard to imagine the construction of any valid analysis of long-term structural change that does not connect particular alterations, directly or indirectly, to the two interdependent master processes of the era: the creation of a system of national states and the formation of a worldwide capitalist system” (Tilly 1984: 147).

11 “The countervailing powers (of advanced industrial capitalism) do not include those that counter the whole. They tend to make the whole immune against negation from within as well as from without; the foreign policy of containment appears as an extension of the domestic policy of containment.” (Marcuse 1991:51)

12 As Mills (1958:91) put it, “war also enables men to solve the problems of the economic cycle without resort to political policies that are distasteful to many politicians...The terms of their long term solutions, under conditions of peace, are hard for the capitalist elite to face…”

13 “Military R&D (in the U.S.) accounts for more financial and intellectual resources than are devoted to health, food production, energy and environment combined.” (Lutz 2002:141)

14 Total interest per year on U.S. National Debt is expected to be $414 billion for fiscal year 2010 (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/ir/ir_expense.htm, retrieved 12/16/10) with deficit financing, interest payment on national debt, being the fourth largest discretionary spending category of the government after Defense, Social Security and Medicare.
15 “U.S. multinationals accounted for 23 percent of U.S. private sector GDP (or value added) in 2007. However, they contributed 31 percent of the growth in real GDP and 41 percent of U.S. gains in labor productivity since 1990” (McKinsey Institute, Growth and Competitiveness of the United States, http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/role_of_us_multinational_companies/pdfs/MGI_US_MNCs_Exec_Sum.pdf, retrieved 12/16/’10). In 2004, intra-firm trade made up about a third of all U.S. exports and a little more than a third of U.S. imports (Dunning and Lundan 2008:486)

16 Empirical work on uncovering interlocking boards of directors and interchangeability is surveyed by Kerbo and Della Fave (1979) with the conclusion that, “In our view, the patterns of interlocks and overrepresentation that appear repeatedly in the studies reviewed here are sufficient to cast serious doubt upon the pluralist view of power in America.” (Kerbo and Della Fave 1979:18)

17 “Of the 158 retired generals and admirals identified (by the Pentagon) as mentors (hired by them), 80% had financial ties to defense contractors, including 29 who were full-time executives of defense industry companies” (USA Today, 8/13/2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-08-13-mentors13_ST_N.htm, retrieved 12/16/’10)

18 The (widely advertised) corruption of public officials in "Third World" nations pales in comparison to such corruption given the amounts involved and the resulting wars that kill hundreds of thousands if not millions per episode.

19 “Indeed many believe that congressional abdication and obstruction, not presidential usurpation, has been the main cause of the shift of power to the Executive.” (Mills 1956:255)

20 U.S. trade deficits are fictitious in the most part since a large part of the trade deficit of the U.S. is made up of its multinationals sending completed goods back to the U.S., which counts as “imports” in the balance of trade calculations. As reported by International Labor Organization (ILO), http://actrav.italic.org/actrav-english/telelearn/global/ilo/multinat/multinat.htm, retrieved April 28, 2010.


22 Less Developed Countries.

23 A statistical technique that uses sample data to estimate the true population relationship between two variables by minimizing the sum of the squared residuals from the estimated line to the observed data points.

24 Other than their ‘bureaucratic inertia’ explanation.

25 No explanation is given by Skocpol on why these “historical moments” occur.


27 Some examples include the female militia during the French Revolution, Joan of Arc and the participation of women in urban riots.

28 Such conflation of women and children leads to infantizing women and over-sexualizing children, linguistically reflected in the interchangeable use of the word “baby.”

On average, 23.2 per 1000 spouses of military personnel experienced a violent victimization. -FY90-96, (Spouse & Child Maltreatment, Department of Defense, reported by the Miles Foundation), also “30 percent of female veterans reported rape or attempted rape during active duty, 37 percent of women who reported a rape or attempted rape had been raped more than once; 14 percent of the victims reported having been gang raped.”, also, “Rates of marital aggression are considerably higher than civilian rates, double, three to five times. -The War At Home, 60 Minutes, January 17, 1999. http://www.refusingtokill.net/rape/domesticviolencein%20themilitary.htm retrieved 2/21/’10).

The link between economic dependency and deforestation is examined by Shandra (2007) with the conclusion that dependency increases deforestation and that there is a negative relationship between GDP per capita and deforestation which implies that “richer nations are able to externalize their environmental costs onto poorer nations (2007:543).”

Weber defines the nation as a “community of sentiments” that inevitably gives rise to a state. He also stated that if no institution existed that knew the use of violence the state would disappear and anarchy would prevail (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958:78)


SPSS, Version 18


“Developed” and “underdeveloped” have subjective value connotations linked to global power. When I refer to developed in this dissertation it is merely for the purpose of categorical classification. I totally reject that value laden baggage that comes with such categorization.

They state, “…nearly all of the GEM indicators reflect a strong elite bias making the measure more relevant for developed countries and urban elites in developing countries .”


Henceforth, when I refer to HDI in this dissertation, I am referring to non-income HDI, unless otherwise specified.


http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1_00.html, retrieved 1/11/2011.


Japan and South Korea have U.S. troops stationed on their soil and Israel is ‘ruled’ by white settlers (Levy 1997).

The “everyone else” category does contain a few white majority states like Russia, Argentina and Ukraine, however I left those in the “0” category based on the social construction of race in order to be consistent much like the Irish, Jews and Southern Europeans in the U.S. were not initially considered “white” (Tehrani 2000). However, even with their exclusion from the "0" list, since their economic development scores are very high (mean of 0.82104), compared to the group of "everyone else" (mean =0.32729) category in which they are located, it would further enhance and not diminish my “global apartheid” conclusion. The mean difference of economic development between the two groups (White/European, mean 1.09091 and ‘everyone else’ -0.32729) is so large that shifting or moving a few countries does nothing to alter the fact that there is global apartheid, even though as constructed the measure might be construed as slightly ‘untidy’.
Described by Clearance Stone as “a capacity to reshape the context—that is, the social ecology—within which one operates” and “to enlist government in restructuring the terms under which social interaction occurs” (Stone 1986:84).

“…the very strong evidence is that approximate parity in power capabilities encouraged war between great power disputants between 1816 and 1989” (Moul 2003:468).

Different thinkers have used various terms to describe how those in authority present their interests to people in representations (or master symbols according the Mills and Gerth (1964)) that ensure that those interests appear to people as if they were actually people's interests or desires. Mosca described this as the "political formula," Weber as "legitimations" and Durkheim as "collective representations" (Mills and Gerth 1964:277).

Marx’s Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, March 1850 talks about such limited incorporation through state subsidization of capitalist production to ease the miserable condition of the proletariat to prevent revolutionary consciousness. Lenski (1966:181) states “Since no ideology can long survive if there is no substance to back up its claims, a ruler must make some delivery on the promises inherent in it.”

A comparison of historical mean GDP growth rates between militarized states (MS) and the semi-militarized states (SMS) reveals that per decade, after the 1980s, the mean GDP growth rates for both the MS and SMS have increased (3.4 to 4.9 percent and 2.3 to 3.9 percent respectively), with the MS exceeding the SMS growth rates by one percent in general. Given that global GDP has increased, this increased growth rate translates into much high aggregate increases in GDP. However, the MS and SMS division I used is based on 2010 (or nearest) militarization data, while previous decades might not have had the same militarized and semi-militarized states which makes this comparison inconsequential. There is therefore a need for future research that involves longitudinal bivariate and multivariate analyses of these relationships.
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VITA
Graduate School
Southern Illinois University

Muhammed A. Asadi
muhammedasadi@gmail.com

Missouri State University
Bachelor of Science in Economics, August 1995

University of Toledo
Master of Arts in Sociology, December 2001

Special Honors and Awards:

2011  Mikhail Bakunin Award for contribution to the understanding of the state institution from Sociologists without Borders.

Dissertation Title:
The Military, Economy and the State: A New International System Analysis.

Major Professor:  Darren E. Sherkat

Publications:


