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Revolutionary Identities and Competing Legitimacies: Why Pariah States Export Violence

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Revolutionary Identities and Competing Legitimacies: Why Pariah States Export Violence

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Abstract

Amid the burgeoning literature on international norms, the study of states that violate them, so called pariahs, remains sparse (Shannon 2000). Although recent studies of pariah states have identified numerous ways in which they break international norms, we do not know why they pursue one action over another (E.g Geldenhuys 2004, Nincic 2005). This paper examines the pariah state phenomenon within the context of norms and deviance, providing unified criteria to define it, in addition to attempting the first exhaustive list of pariah states from the Treaty of Westphalia to present. It then looks at one pariah behavior, the export of violence, evaluating all existing theories, in addition to providing my own, where the export of violence is caused by the state's "revolutionary identity" which leads to the adoption of competing and incompatible norms. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) I test this against the other alternate and prevailing hypotheses, demonstrating that a combination of sovereignty, existential threat, and either irredentism or a revolutionary identity is necessary to cause the export of violence. As an additional analysis, I examine this under the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, achieving similar results.

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I. Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has experienced an unprecedented convergence of international norms. Increasingly, states' individual interpretations of what constitutes proper international conduct has homogenized, leading to the emergence of what some have termed an "international norms regime" (Donnelly 2007, 79). As many scholars argue, as liberal democracy gains consensus as the best way for a state to conduct its affairs, ideological fault lines have appeared to fade away as states join into a single global community, with a single vision of how all actors should present themselves.¹

Amid this emerging normative consensus, there are few fates worse for states than to be condemned to the status of a pariah, or a state that deviates from commonly accepted norms. Accused of transgressions ranging from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to support for terrorism to systematic violations of human rights, pariah states stand outside the international order, challenging the values that the rest of the world holds dear. These "rogues" (Litwak 2000) "outcasts" (George 1993) or "renegades" (Nincic 2005) do not simply break the occasional norms that most states, including many of its most prominent members, are often wont to do (Shannon 2000). Rather, they represent a full rejection of the international order, deviating not out of self-interest, but out of a loathing of the entire system (Geldenhuis 2000).

Why states choose to engage in pariah activity is unclear. Indeed, the costs of deviance can be, and, more often than not, are, severe. At best, the state risks international condemnation as a pariah; at worst, it may trigger an armed invasion by status-quo powers interested in protecting the norms these states challenge by punishing their deviance (Herrmann and Shannon

¹ An example of this is liberalism's oft cited "Democratic Peace Theory" in which democracies are more likely to see one another as legitimate and therefore be less likely to go to war. In an extreme case, Fukuyama (1992) argues that the world is moving towards a system of universally liberal, democratic states.

2001). Ignorance of such rebuke is unlikely. If the historical record is any indication, few pariahs escape some form of sanction or punishment for their crimes (Nincic 2005).²

Even less clear is why break some norms but not others. While different deviant behaviors that pariah states engage in may elicit a common response from the international community, it is unknown why states violate certain norms over others. This may be due to an overwhelming focus among scholars on why states deviate, rather than why they engage in a particular act.³ Despite there being many different types of deviant acts that a pariah state may engage in, most of the current scholarship implies that states engage in all forms of deviance for similar reasons (Beit-Hallahmi 1988, Geldenhuys 2000, Nincic 2005). This seems unlikely, given that logically a state would not violate human rights for the same reasons that it would support transnational terrorist groups.

This paper will attempt to shed light on this gap, focusing on one of the more grievous offenses, the export of violence, in which a state either invades or destabilizes another state's government. Exporting violence is among the most serious norm transgressions that a pariah state can commit, violating state sovereignty, the mutual respect of which is imperative for the international system to function (Morgan 2006). Although not all deviant states try to export violence, most do, and insufficient research exists to suggest why this is the case.⁴

Attempting an answer to this puzzle, I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an experimental research technique developed by Ragin (1987) that compares cases in order to isolate causal variables combinations, to compare a set of 78 pariah states across a 60 year period

² Geldenhuys's (2004) extensive study of international reactions toward pariah states demonstrates that the mere act of labeling a pariah is nearly always accompanied with some form of tangible punishment.

³ As will be shown, most pariah state literature (Harkavy 1981; Beit-Hallahmi 1989; Litwak 2000; Geldenhuys 2000; 2004; Nincic 2005) focuses on the cause of deviance, instead of why a state commits particular acts, such as nuclear proliferation or systematic human rights abuses.

⁴ While the paper takes a decidedly constructivist stance, this does not mean that realism or liberalism cannot provide answers to the phenomenon of why pariah states export violence. However, the author does believe that constructionism offers the best explanation.

between 1945 and 2005.⁵ In addition, I also separately examine the structural break during and after the Cold War (1945-89) to see if there is a variance in the causes of deviance between the structures of different international systems.⁶

Aside from evaluating existing hypotheses of deviance, I also introduce one of my own devising, inspired by literature from the English school on revolutionary states.⁷ My theory argues for the existence of a “revolutionary identity,” in which the state exports violence due to a radically different and incomparable constitutive notion of what a state is, thereby creating a competing value system that challenges the prevailing international order, inducing states to conflict (Bisley 2004). This conflict occurs at two levels of analysis: the interstate level, due to a need by the state for like-minded allies, and the system level, where the state must legitimate its adopted values by undermining the prevailing norms of the international system.

By evaluating mine and other hypotheses, I aim to demonstrate that the presence of state sovereignty, threat, and either a revolutionary identity or irredentism (the claim to another state's territory) by a pariah state will increase the likelihood that it will export violence. To determine the validity of these hypotheses, my paper unfolds as follows. First, I define norms and deviance, paying close attention to how both relate to the structure of the international system, and then offer a two-step conditional model to objectively identify pariah states. Next, I present three conventional hypotheses, as well the three from outside the literature with an emphasis on how revolutionary identities lead to the export of violence by pariah states. Next, I explain the QCA process that I use in relation to my model, as well as describe my methods for data collection. I

⁵ QCA is most useful when evaluating multiple causation or the possibility that more than one independent variable is necessary to affect the dependent variable (Rihoux and de Meur 2009). The different possible causes for the export of violence will be elaborated upon later in the paper.

⁶ Many authors suggest that, as the international structure changes, the nature of deviance changes as well (Huntington 1993). It is entirely possible that a change in the international order (such as what occurred at the end of the Cold War) could change the rationale behind why states export violence.

⁷ Primary English school theorists consulted are Bull (1977), Armstrong (1993), Halliday (1999), and Bisley (2004), who represent some of the most prominent paradigm voices.

follow this with an analysis of my data, demonstrating how the presence of threat, sovereignty, and either irredentism or a revolutionary identity are likely to cause a pariah state to export violence. I conclude with a summary of my findings in addition to the possible implications and limitations of my research.

II. Concepts of Norms and Deviance

Despite their international prominence in both media and contemporary foreign policy debates, pariah states remain a poorly studied phenomenon, evinced by the inability of scholars to even agree on a single term – aside from pariahs (E.g. Betts 1977; Harkavy 1981; Beit-Hallahmi 1989), such states have alternately been referred to as deviants (Geldenhuis 2004), outcasts (Inbar 1985), outlaws (George 1993), rogues (Klare 1995; Litwak 2000), and renegades (Nincic 2005) without much distinction.⁸ (The pejorative nature of these terms has also led many scholars to reject the idea that pariah states are objectively definable, and are simply a label to castigate states that others dislike.⁹) Most scholars, however, see pariah states as a real and definable phenomenon, though they disagree on a definition. The fractured state of knowledge therefore requires us to establish our own definition of pariah states.

I define a deviant state as a state which has been accused of violating the key norms of its greater community, and has thereby been labeled as a deviant. Norms are defined as, “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996, 5). “Key norms” are those which are widely held, and require special justification in order for other countries to accept their violation (Geldenhuis 2004, 20). Norms can be constitutive, which construct the identity’s actors, interests, or possible forms of action of an identity, or regulative,

⁸ For an evolution of both the term “pariah state” and their place in the international system, see Henriksen 2001.

⁹ Klare (2004) argues that the pariah states lack any objective definition, and are actually a plot by the United States security apparatus to justify high military budgets through the perpetuation of an expensive but outmoded “containment doctrine” (Klare 1994, Chapter 1).

which constrain the behavior of actors to certain forms of acceptable conduct within an identity (Jepperson et al. 1995, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). All norms have both prescriptions and parameters, which describe both what the actor should do, as well as the context in which the norm applies (Shannon 2000, 295). It is this obligative nature of norms, or, as Florini states, their sense of “oughtness,” that sets them apart from other unifying international agreements (1996, 364).

It is to this understanding of norms that we add deviance, or the, “violation of existing codes of conduct accepted by a particular group or community” (Geldenhuis 2000). The violation is any action that “excites some anger, disapproval, or indignation” which results in the condemnation or punishment of the offender (Thio 1998, 4). Applied to international relations, reactions may range from public condemnation, expulsion or suspension from prominent intergovernmental organization, sanctions, or even armed intervention (Geldenhuis 2004, 40-1).

The severity of the reaction to a deviant act is influenced by the strength of the norm (Geldenhuis 2000). Most pariah states cases involve breaking “high consensus” norms, often set by powerful or hegemonic actors, which are widely held and agreed by most other states to be “settled.” A settled norm is typically backed up by some form of international legislation that clearly defines the legal prescriptions and parameters for the state regarding that violation. Examples include the Universal declaration of Human rights (UDHR) or one of history’s many Non-Proliferation Treaties (Geldenhuis 2004). Such norms are usually addressed by international treaties or conventions, such as the non-proliferation treaty regarding the prohibition of acquiring nuclear arms (Geldenhuis 2004, 18-9). Low-consensus norms are not as widely held, but can still result in deviance is enough pressure is exerted by the international community.

Norms are not immutable, unchanging structures, and are often contested by competing, incompatible norms, where only one norm may dominate at a given time (Florini 1996, 637).

The same applies for deviance as well, as the first states to adopt new norms, in addition to those who fail to conform, may risk the pariah label.¹⁰ Accepted standards of behaviors within a community change and evolve over time, with new norms overtaking older ones as they gain or lose legitimacy.¹¹ Norms can emerge at different speeds, often quite rapidly, as in the case of decolonization after World War II, leaving the few states which did not conform, including Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, as pariahs (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Norm strength can also vary over time as well, such as with the norm of self-determination.¹² This does not mean that other, competing norms will not be held, only that they may be held by a minority of pariah states which refuse to accept the new international order as legitimate (Geldenhuis 2004, 19).

Norms and deviance also vary by region. While most scholarship on norms tends to focus on their international application (Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Florini 1996; Wendt 1992; 1995) different norms can exist simultaneously at the regional level as well (Barnett 1996/7, 600). As states within a common region often share closer historical and cultural similarities, these norms can often be far more specific and involve cultural norms that are not shared by the greater international community (Huntington 1993). These different regional and international norm regimes can exist simultaneously, and in many cases conflict.

¹⁰ For an example of deviance as a norm pioneer, see the case of Revolutionary France (Bukovansky 1999). For an example of a state left behind by changing norms, see Apartheid South Africa (Klotz 1995).

¹¹ Finnemore and Sikkink describe this as a three stage “life cycle.” In the first stage, emergence, a number of actors (who may be individuals, groups, or states) acting as “norm entrepreneurs” introduce and attempt to persuade others of new normative principles. The second stage, norm cascade, occurs after the number of actors adopting the new norm reaches a ‘tipping point’ and the pressure to adopt the new norm accelerates. In the third stage, internalization, the norm becomes so widely accepted that following the norm becomes second nature. In the third stage, internalization, the norm becomes so widely accepted that following the norm becomes second nature (1998, 903-5).

¹² Ethnic self-determination became a strong norm following the aftermath of World War I. However, in response to many of the problems it contributed to in aiding Nazi expansion and WWII, it was largely ignored for decolonization. New African states were granted their independence along colonial boundaries, rather than ethnic ones (Taras, Ray, and Ganguly 2010).

For example, the Cold War featured two competing normative regimes, one defined by individual values, market economies, and democracy, and another that championed socialism, the proletariat, and collectivist values. Each bloc had its own sets of norms which governed acceptable behaviors within and between states (Hobsbawm 1994; Westad 2005).¹³

While norms may emerge and spread from any part of a society, they most often originate from the society's most influential, powerful actors.¹⁴ This hierarchical nature of norms means the norms that emerge are more likely to help support the status quo, or a group of actors who seek to maintain the existing order, and whose responsibility it is to ensure that others do not challenge it (Halliday 1999, Bisley 2004). The most powerful states in the international system, therefore, have the most influence in determining which norms emerge or gain acceptance, as well as taking the lead in punishing pariahs that do not conform (Nincic 2005, 22; George 1993, 49). It also means that the most powerful states are unlikely to be labeled as pariahs, given that they, "make the rules." This gives such states the status as "norm-setters," who both make and enforce the norms of the international system (Herrmann and Shannon 2001).

Hierarchy also means that deviance poses a direct threat to the status quo, challenging not just the authority of preponderant powers, but the legitimacy they derive from the norms that support their position. Deviance may be an intentional attempt to undermine the existing international order and replace it with one more equitable for those states which are unsatisfied with their inferior position (Geldenhuis 2004, 22-3). Many scholars borrow from the English

¹³ While norm violation by states often leads to them being labeled as deviants, if a state can become sufficiently powerful enough, its deviance may be overlooked by a grudging deference. The prime example of this phenomenon is the Soviet Union, which remained a pariah from its revolutionary founding in 1917 until contingencies that made its cooperation with the West necessary to defeat Germany led to its rehabilitation in 1941. The USSR exited the war with superpowers status, making it too powerful, influential, and important in the world system to be treated as a pariah. Many of the great powers today experience a similar situation.

¹⁴ Goertz and Diehl (1992, 640-1) describe three different types of norms and their origins: Cooperative norms, which arise from the basic self-interest of all actors involved, hegemonic norms, which originate from a societies most powerful and centralized actors, and decentralized norms, which like cooperative norms, are held and enforced by all members of society, but may conflict with each actors self-interest.

school, viewing the international system as a “society of states” which functions through mutual agreement over several fundamental, structural norms (Bull 1977; Armstrong 1993).¹⁵ In effect, norm-setters can therefore be seen as defending the international system against deviance, acting not out of individual agency, but also as a systemic response to uphold the norms that support their preponderance.¹⁶

As a result, a state’s propensity for being labeled as a pariah is highly dependent on that state’s standing within the international system, making norm-setters unlikely to ever be labeled for transgressing (Geldenhuis 2004, 21). Even when states do face condemnation, as the United States did after mining Nicaraguan harbors, they are unlikely to face more than a “slap on the wrist” (Donnelly 2007, 155-8).¹⁷

Being a member of the status quo is not the only way that a norm-violating state may avoid being labeled as a pariah. Many norm violators are able to escape the ‘pariah’ label through contingencies, or, “other circumstances affecting the labeling process of [pariahs], despite having no connection to its objective features” (Nincic 2005, 23). Contingencies often revolve around the state’s relationship with the status quo. States with strong strategic or historical ties with status quo powers will be much less likely to be labeled as deviant, while those with poor relations are far more likely. For instance, while repression by Sudan in its Darfur region has been labeled by many Western governments as genocide, similar actions by

¹⁵ Hedley Bull categorizes these norms as the balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war, and the preponderance of great powers. For a greater discussion on these norms, see (Bull 1977; Armstrong 1993).

¹⁶ For a more detailed explanation as the punishment of deviance as a systemic force, see Bisley 2004. Describing the phenomenon of counterrevolution, Bisley describes it as a multilayered phenomenon, where states both react to revolution not only for their own interests, but also to maintain the existing international order, from which they benefit. In this way, revolution is not just the individual act of state, but also a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the international order. This is described later in this paper.

¹⁷ While the US foreign policy making apparatus was punished “internally” by the US congress, which cut off the Reagan administration’s funding of the Contras, this does not constitute international pariahdom, as the US’s status vis-a-vis other countries was not affected by Congress’s sanction (Blum 2003). However, this does not constitute international deviance. For a state to be considered a pariah, it must be labeled by other states in the international community, rather than another internal body criticizing the executive.

neighboring Ethiopia in its Gambella and Ogaden regions remains largely ignored (Jalata and Schaffer 2010, 178) Sudan's contingencies likely include its opposition to Western policies or previous support for terrorism and revolution, while a contingency for Ethiopia might be its strategic importance and close alliances with Western powers. Because of these contingencies, states are only considered as pariahs if their actions are labeled as such by status quo powers (Nincic 2005, 22).

II. Defining the "Pariah State"

Given what we know of norms and deviance, I argue that a pariah state fulfills two criteria: First, the state has violated a norm held by its greater regional or international community. Second, the state has experienced a formal rebuke (whether through condemnation, censure, sanctions, etc.) from the same community that labels the state for its transgression. When these two criteria are met, the state may be considered a pariah. These categories are elaborated on below.

The first stage of deviance is norm violation, in which the state violates a high-consensus norm held by a significant part of the international system. While scholars disagree on what norms are considered to be widely held, they generally include the following¹⁸: 1) Acquisition of excessive or illegal arms, 2) state sponsorship of terrorism, 3) human rights violations, 4) posing a threat to status-quo interests, 5) lacking formal recognition as a state, and 6) the export of violence. A violation of any of these norms may result in branding the state as a pariah:

2.1 Acquisition of Excessive or Illegal arms

Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD) include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The acquisition of these the allows a state to rapidly change the balance of power within its own region, potentially making itself a regional hegemon, and possibly challenge the

¹⁸ For an exhaustive list of pariah behaviors, see Litwak 2000, 47; Geldenhuys 2004, Chapter 2; Nincic 2005, 48-53.

Great powers directly (Geldenhuis 2004, 24-5). In addition, the destruction wrought by these weapons is considered to be beyond the pale of human decency, creating a stigma that makes their acquisition and usage unethical (Nincic 2005, 56). This norm is codified in numerous multilateral agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological Weapons Convention (UNODA 2012).

While they lack the stigma of weapons of mass destruction, excessive arms can upset the balance of power in a region in a similar way, and possibly precipitate other deviant acts. Though not codified in any formal documents, there has been a longstanding informal rule that all states' armaments should be in proportion to their needs (Geldenhuis 2004, 30).

2.2 *State Sponsorship of Terrorism*

Terrorism, or, “intentional violent acts carried out by non-state actors against non-combatants with the purpose of effecting a political response” (Young and Findley 2007, 4) is widely agreed to be unacceptable by the international community, not just for the fear and insecurity it sows, but also for targeting civilians (Nincic 2005, 50-1). State support of terrorism is therefore equally unacceptable. While some authors (Donnelly 2007) argue that this is a fairly recent norm, it has consistently elicited negative reactions from offending state's greater community, even in “ethically-flexible” periods such as the Cold War (Litwak 2000, 75-6). Since 1970s numerous international treaties and UN security resolutions have been signed that codify support for terrorism as a deviant act (Geldenhuis 2004, 27-8).

2.3 *Human Rights Violations*

The deviance of systematic human rights violations has oscillated over time. While the international human rights regime did not take shape until after World War II, many acts of deviance, including the Armenian genocide, the Congo Free State disaster, and the Italian

invasion of Ethiopia were still condemned for their brutality, if not as consistently (Donnelly 2007, 4). Although the Cold War put some human rights concerns on hold, many states were still condemned for their behavior (Beit-Hallahmi 1987, Maechling 1981). Human rights violations can occur either through the repression of a state's own population, or through war crimes committed on another's during conflict (Geldenhuis 2004, 31-6). The offenses that constitute deviance from this norm are spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which nearly all states are signatories (UDHR 1948).

2.4 *Threatening Status-Quo Interests*

As many critics of the US's "Rogue State" policy¹⁹ note, the primary violations that pariah states are guilty of is posing a threat to the interests of the status quo. In the Western-dominated post-cold war world, this is often referred to as "anti-westernism" or "assertiveness" (Klare 1995, Litwak 2000, Geldenhuis 2004, Nincic 2005). A better way to describe this phenomenon is, "posing a threat to the status quo," since it accounts for deviance within the Communist world as well.

Threatening status quo interests is pariah because it challenges the established balance of power. States that violate this norm have made some economic, ideological, or security decision that threatens the geopolitical position of the status quo powers, either by directly challenging them or by shifting the balance of power from one pole to another (Armstrong 1993, 280). This endangers the status quo power's geopolitical position, threatening the structure of international society.

¹⁹ The US's Rogue State policy was a policy developed in the early 1990s to designate those states which, in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, continued to defy the emerging international normative consensus. For a greater discussion, see Klare 1994; Litwak 2000.

2.5 *Non-recognition as a State*

An often overlooked criterion for deviance is a state's defiant existence in the face of international non-recognition. States are social constructions, and exist only because others choose to believe they do. This is reinforced by the coercive use of force by institutions (Waltz 1979). For a state to exist, it must have sovereignty, which must be exerted by the state, and, at the same time, respected by others (through the norm of non-interference) (Morgan 2006). When a state exercises its sovereignty without reciprocal recognition from other states, the state violates the shared agreement between states of what a state is. The states that violate this norm are often small, and their existence is only officially acknowledged by a select few states, which are often charged with their defense (Caspersen & Stansfield 2011). Examples include the former Soviet "Republics" of Abkhazia and Transnistria, which, at the time of this writing, have existed for nearly two decades, and are only recognized by Russia, which provided for their defense in wars in 1992, and 1993 and 2008 respectively (King 2001).

2.6 *Export of Violence*

The final form of deviance, and the subject of this paper, is the export of violence. This is defined as the use of force by one state to weaken or overthrow the regime of another, through either direct military intervention or destabilization via the support of proxy actors with arms, logistics, or training (Bisley 2004, 52-3). The export of violence violates the norm of sovereignty that underpins the entire state-based international system by guaranteeing that no state has a right to violate another's authority within its borders. It should be clarified that, in the pariah context, the export of violence is not simply the use of force against another country, but what is seen as an unreasonable use of force, either because of the excessive use of force or its unjustifiable nature (Geldenhuis 2004). Despite the strong taboo against intervention, the majority of cases in

Table 1 (~60%) have attempted to overthrow another regime. States that export violence are among the most serious norm violators, as their deviance puts the integrity of other states at risk.

2.7 *Labeling the Pariah*

After a state has broken a norm, it must face some sort of rebuke from its greater community that labels it as a pariah (Becker 1963, 9). The burden of this duty usually falls on the community's norm-setters, who pressure the offending state in order to (ideally) "resocialize" the it back into the accepted norms of the community (Herrmann and Shannon 2001).²⁰ While norm-setters may be important intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations or shared as a collective responsibility by a group of states, the responsibility of defending norms challenged by pariahs most often falls the one or more of the great powers of the international system (George 1993, 49). Many great powers in fact view it as their duty to defend the status quo against such offenders (Lake 1994, 46).

The state must therefore not be a member of the status quo, nor have any contingencies that might influence norm-setters to refrain from labeling the state as a pariah. Once these measures are both met, the state will be labeled with some level of severity (Nincic 2005, 23).

Applying these criteria to all states from the beginning of the international system, we are able to identify any state, from the beginning of the Westphalian system to today, which qualifies as pariah. The results of this analysis, forming the first attempt at an exhaustive list of pariah states from the Treaty of Westphalia to present, are displayed in Table 1 below.

²⁰ For non-recognized states, resocialization typically implies their absorption into whatever state they are recognized by the majority of the International Community as belong to. For example, Somaliland might shake it pariah status by yielding to the authority of Somalia's internationally recognized government in Mogadishu.

Table 1: Pariah States in the International System: 1948-2012

Country ^a	Start Date ^b	End Date ^c	Export of Violence ^d	Violation ^e	Country ^a	Start Date ^b	End Date ^c	Export of Violence ^d	Violation ^e
Ottoman Empire	1648	1856	Yes	4,5	Argentina	1976	1983	Yes	2,3
Kingdom of the French	1789	1792	Yes	1,4	Ethiopia	1977	1991	Yes	3
French First Republic	1792	1804	Yes	1,4	Guatemala	1979	1996	No	3
French Napoleonic Empire	1804	1815	Yes	1,4	Syria	1979	Ongoing	Yes	2,3
United States Confederacy	1861	1865	Yes	3,4,5	Iran	1979	Ongoing	Yes	1,2,3,4
Ottoman Empire (2)	1914	1923	Yes	3,4	Nicaragua	1979	1990	Yes	1,4
Soviet Union	1917	1941	Yes	2,4	Bolivia	1980	1981	No	3
Weimar Republic	1918	1933	No	4	Cambodia	1981	1993	Yes	5
Italy	1935	1936	Yes	3	Northern Cyprus	1983	Ongoing	No	5
Czechoslovakia	1938	1938	No	5	Burma	1988	Ongoing	No	5
Spain	1945	1955	No	3	China	1989	1994	No	3
South Africa	1946	1994	Yes	1,2,3	Sudan	1989	Ongoing	Yes	2,3,4
Israel	1948	Ongoing	Yes	1,2,3,5	Pakistan (2)	1990	2001	Yes	1,2
North Korea	1948	Ongoing	Yes	1,2,3,4	Zaire	1991	1997	Yes	3
South Korea	1948	1987	No	1,3	Iraq	1991	2003	No	1,3,4
Yugoslavia	1948	1955	Yes	4	Haiti (2)	1991	1994	No	3
East Germany	1949	1972	No	5	Somaliland	1991	Ongoing	No	5
China	1949	1970	Yes	1,2,3,4	Serbia and Montenegro	1992	2000	Yes	3,4
Egypt	1952	1973	Yes	2,4	Transnistria	1992	Ongoing	No	5
North Vietnam	1956	1975	Yes	2,4,5	Equatorial Guinea	1993	Ongoing	No	3
South Vietnam	1956	1975	No	3,5	Turkmenistan	1993	2007	No	3
Guinea	1958	1978	Yes	3,4	Nigeria	1993	1999	No	3
Portugal	1960	1974	Yes	3	Afghanistan	1996	2001	Yes	2,3,4,5
Cuba	1960	1992	Yes	3,4	Belarus	1997	Ongoing	No	3
Katanga	1960	1963	No	5	Indonesia (2)	1998	2001	No	3
Albania	1961	1978	No	4	Liberia	1999	2003	Yes	2,3
Indonesia	1961	1965	Yes	4	Venezuela	2000	Ongoing	Yes	2,4
Haiti	1962	1986	No	3	Zimbabwe	2000	Ongoing	No	3
Pakistan	1965	1980	Yes	1,4	Eritrea	2001	Ongoing	Yes	2,3,4
Rhodesia	1965	1980	Yes	2,3,5	Haiti	2001	2004	No	4
Romania	1968	1989	No	4	Uzbekistan	2005	Ongoing	No	3
Czechoslovakia	1968	1968	No	4	Somalia (ICU)	2006	2006	No	2,3,4
South Yemen	1969	1990	Yes	2,4	Abkhazia	2008	Ongoing	No	5
Taiwan	1971	Ongoing	No	1,5	Anjouan	2008	2008	No	5
Uganda	1972	1979	Yes	3	Kosovo	2008	Ongoing	No	5
Chile	1973	1990	No	2,3	South Ossetia	2008	Ongoing	No	5
Libya	1973	2003	Yes	1,2,3,4	Bahrain	2011	Ongoing	No	3
Paraguay	1974	1989	No	3	Pakistan (3)	2011	Ongoing	Yes	1,2
Democratic Kampuchea	1975	1979	Yes	3	Egypt (2)	2011	Ongoing	Yes	3
Vietnam	1975	1980	Yes	4	Libya (2)	2011	2011	No	3

^aFor space reasons, official country names are used only for historical clarification. Additional numbers represent the same country hold pariah status over multiple time periods.
^bDenotes the year the state was "labeled" as a pariah.
^cDenotes the year of the state's formal "resocialization" with the international community. "Ongoing" signifies that the state is still a pariah.
^dE, Because the Export of Violence is the focus of this paper, it has been given a separate column in the table.
^eEach number represents the following violations: 1) Acquisition of Excessive or Illegal Arms, 2) Support for Terrorism, 3) Human Rights Abuses, 4) Threatening Status-Quo Interests, and 5) Non-recognition as a State.

IV. Pariah States and the Export of Violence

A central question behind much of the literature on pariah states is why, given the costs of norm-breaking, states continue to engage in deviant behavior following their ostracism (Beit-Hallahmi 1988; Tanter 1998; Shannon 2000; Geldenhuys 2004; Nincic 2005). Pariah status imposes high costs, and it is unclear why states engage in it when the international reaction is likely to be so severe. The remainder of this paper examines one such form of deviance, the

export of violence, in order to determine why pariah states might be willing to risk the ire of the international community.

A number of theories exist in the literature to explain why states break norms or engage in deviant behavior. Unfortunately, while most pariah state scholarship is careful to describe the different actions a state may make to be labeled as an outcast, there is very little to suggest why states select one strategy over another.²¹ As previously noted, most works implicitly assume that all forms of deviance are the result of the same causes. I present these theories below, assuming, as their authors do, that they explain why states export violence.

Some recent scholarship argues that the export of violence is due to an externalization of domestic politics, where the state is compelled to export violence in order to placate a citizenry that may question the state's legitimacy (Nincic 2005, 26-7). By externalizing domestic politics, elites can induce a "rally around the flag" effect, gaining support from the population in addition to marginalizing more moderate factions of the government that may pose a challenge (Snyder 1999, 270). Idi Amin's invasion of his neighbors is often considered to be the direct result of this (Ullman 1978).

The literature also notes that in order for externalization to be successful, the state must believe itself capable of weathering the negative international reaction that it is likely to face (Tanter 1998, 33-8; Nincic 2005, 98). Because of the popularity of sanctions in dealing with pariah states, this is often measured by how vulnerable or "open" it is to foreign trade (Geldenhuis 1990, 20; Nincic 2005, 99). Essentially, the domestic benefits of deviance must outweigh the economic costs imposed by the country's pariah status. Thus,

²¹ While Litwak (2000), Geldenhuis (2004), and Nincic (2005) all list different deviant behaviors, they do not suggest why a state may choose to violate one behavior over another. All tend to emphasize the uniqueness of each state's case, citing individual reasons for each country's choice in deviant action, rather than a comprehensive theory for a particular strategy.

***H₁**: A pariah state will be likely to export violence when its domestic legitimacy is widely questioned and its government believes that it is capable of weathering economic sanctions.*

In addition, some scholars of this theory also divide pariah's deviant actions into two levels of primary and secondary deviance (Lemert 1951). Primary and secondary deviances are concepts created by sociologist Edward Lemert (1951). According to the theory, a primary deviant act is an act committed in order to secure the regime's power over its population. These are either ideationally or economically motivated, and can involve repressive measures like human rights abuses, or acts designed to garner prestige, like the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Nincic 2005, 34-8). After being labeled as a deviant for the primary act, all other acts are secondary, in that they are done to ensure the regime's security vis-à-vis other states (38-9). This is essentially the traditional defensive-realist position, that states attack others when they feel insecure (Waltz 1979). Therefore,

***H₂**: A pariah state is more likely to export violence when it is threatened by other states.*

Other scholars argue the export of violence to be the direct consequence of forced, extreme isolation combined with the presence of an existential threat to the state's security. This is based on the observation that pariah status is often followed by diplomatic isolation from the international community (Geldenhuis 1990). Status quo powers most often punish pariahs through sanctions designed to weaken the regime and coerce it to change its behavior (Lake 1994, 46; Litwak 2000:103; Tanter 1998, 30-3). At the same time, the state's deviant status makes it a liability for other states, who may incur high economic or security commitments to supply or defend the deviant and reputational costs by being associated with a deviant (Fazal 2004, 341). As the case of Israel demonstrates, the United States' alliance has cost billions of

dollars in aid, in addition to a wounded reputation among Arab countries as a “supporter of the illegal Zionist entity” (Walt and Mearsheimer 2006, 30-4).

This has a devastating effect on the pariah state’s security, because, in the realist paradigm, all states are concerned about their security, and those which cannot guarantee their own survival must do so through alliances with others (Rothstein 1968; Harkavy 1981, 138). The allies that the pariah state has consider it to be a liability and are not considered reliable enough by the deviant state to remain allied indefinitely (Inbar 1985, 16-7). The only allies that the state can usually find are those who are also similarly isolated, creating its own “Pariah International” (Harkavy 1981, 155; Beit-Hallahmi 1989, 211).

This theory also assumes a state to be experiencing an active threat aimed at supplanting the government and is viewed by the government as dangerous to its survival (Inbar 1985, 11-2). The threat can take many forms, ranging from wide-spread insurgency to hostile neighbors to open war with other states (Beit-Hallahmi 1989). This combination of isolation and threat leads to siege mentality in which the regime feels that it must do whatever it takes to survive, and is much more likely to use force to accomplish this goal. When denied the allies it needs to ensure its security, deviant states are then faced with an extreme security dilemma that leads them to policies of desperation, in which the state exports violence with the goal of either weakening their or their allies enemies, or literally creating new allies via the overthrow of hostile governments (Beit-Hallahmi 1989, 208, Calvert 1996, 162).²² From this, we can hypothesize,

H₃: A deviant state is likely to export violence when it experiences severe diplomatic isolation in addition to an existential military threat.

Although not an explicitly "pariah state" theory, a fourth theory that may explain the unacceptable use of force against other states may be irredentism, or one state’s claims to the

²² Yehezkel Dror (1971) first warned of “crazy states,” which would engage in seemingly incomprehensible, highly deviant behavior in order to ensure their own survival when the costs of acting appropriately become too high to ensure its security.

territory of another for historic, ethnic, or religious reasons (Laitin 2007, 3). The emotional sentiments that irredentism evokes makes it a powerful tool with which elites may manipulate to elicit popular support from their citizenry (Carmet & James 1995, 90). This is particularly true in times of crisis or low political legitimacy where elites can create a “rally around the flag” effect that boosts popular support by instigating a culturally-based war (Nincic 2005, 28).

Irredentist claims may also be irritated by dissatisfaction with the international order. Geldenhuys notes that not all international orders are neutral in their consequences, and that some states inevitably benefit at the expense of others (2004, 22). While many may not desire the remedy of “extreme revisionism” that those with revolutionary identities desire, they still may attempt what he terms “orthodox revisionism,” or the restoration of previously held power within an existing international order (23). The desire for restored power can easily manifest itself in irredentist claims that the state “deserves.” Applying this to our theory, an irredentist state is likely to export violence if it has either legitimacy problems or an existential threat. Therefore,

***H₄:** A deviant state is likely to export violence to increase domestic legitimacy by acting upon irredentist sentiments that may increase the regime’s domestic support. And,*

***H₅:** A deviant state will export violence by using irredentist sentiments as a reason to attack enemies to increase its own security when it faces an existential threat.*

Many scholars, however, argue from the English school paradigm, emphasizing that a violation of widely-held norms challenges the prevailing social order by disregarding the normative principals upon which it is founded (George 1993; Litwak 2000; Geldenhuys 2004; Ben-Yehuda 1990, 47). Deviance stems from the state’s dissatisfaction with its place in the international order, which it sees and unfair and harmful to its interests. In this perspective, deviant states export violence in order to change the prevailing geopolitical order, either through obtaining a greater share of power within the existing world structure, a revolutionary overthrow

of the system to create a more equitable distribution of power, or somewhere in between (Geldenhuis 2004, 23).²³

This hypothesis is difficult to model, as it is hard to know what the motivation is behind a state's desire to challenge the prevailing social order. However, by introducing English school theories on revolutionary states developed by authors like Armstrong, Halliday, and Bisley, we can construct a testable, positivist hypothesis that demonstrates the theory. This "new" paradigm asserts the export of violence is prompted by the deviant state's adoption of what I term a, "revolutionary identity." This is a "construction of nationhood or statehood" that varies radically from that of the state's greater community (Katzenstein 1996, 5). It does not refer directly to a revolutionary state, (although revolutionary states feature prominently, but not exclusively, among those with revolutionary identities) instead describing a state who's conception of the international structure and the legitimacy of acceptable state behavior is incompatible with prevailing norms (Halliday 1999, 21).

Identities are made up of constitutive norms, which determine what identities are acceptable for a state to adopt in a given community (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 891, Barnett 1996/7, 598-606). Identities constitute the state's sense of self, as well as its conception of others, thus determines how a state interacts with others, which in turn affects what sort of norms it subscribes to, and what behaviors it believes to be acceptable (Wendt 1999, 227-9).²⁴ For states to function as a cohesive, international community, they must share the same basic identity regarding certain core norms of the international system.

²³ Non-revolutionary identity examples include Fascist Germany and Japan, who both sought to restore their prestige after humiliations by the status quo. Revolutionary examples include states like Libya or Iran. Radical revisionism is best shown by many poor states' advocacy of a new international economic order (Geldenhuis 2004, 23).

²⁴ For a full discussion on the role of identities in international relations, see Wendt 1999, 224-45.

These “core” norms are structural norms, which help determine how the international system is organized (Bull 1977; Armstrong 1993). A state with a radically different, and therefore “revolutionary” identity, has a different conception of what a state is and how it should interact with others, thereby holding a completely different conception of “oughtness” vis-à-vis the international community (Armstrong 1993, 213).²⁵

Revolutionary identities may be thought of as a form of deviance, in that they violate widely held norms of state conduct. However, they are distinct because they are constitutive, rather than regulative norms, which determine what identities are acceptable for a state to adopt in a given community (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 891; Barnett 1996/7, 598-606). A revolutionary identity is not a form of state behavior, and therefore does not require the state to violate any particular standard of conduct in order to be declared deviant (Bisley 2004, 64). Rather, the state’s pariah status is derived from its rejection of its greater community’s conception of how states should be constructed, thereby threatening the integrity of all other states’ identities by offering a competing vision of what a state is (Halliday 1999, 152-3). As Kissinger describes it, “it is not the adjustments of differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system itself (Kissinger 1957, 2). The state is not dissatisfied with its place in the international order, but instead has taken issue with the order’s very construction.

Historical examples of pariah states with revolutionary identities abound. Revolutionary France was forced to fight the whole of monarchical Europe for the right to exist as the world's first nationalist state. Over a century later, the Soviet Union rejected the nation-state concept, seeing the world’s proletariat as a single identity to be united in a global struggle against the bourgeoisie. Today the Islamist states of Iran and Sudan fuse religion and law, challenging the

²⁵ It is entirely possible that pariah states export violence because they dislike their position in the global pecking order, or because it is within their interests to do so. However, this section aims only to present this theory within the context of the existing literature. A full analysis of all possible explanations is beyond the scope of this paper.

widely accepted notion of the modern, growth focused secular state. Other states, like Argentina and Pakistan, have periodically seen themselves as deserving of the same power and standing as the world's great powers (Maechling 1981; Nincic 2005). The confrontations that developed between these states and the international system were often the direct result of the challenge posed to the existing system by the pariah state's revolutionary identity.²⁶

When a state adopts a radically different set of norms, it creates a heterogeneous international system or a system in which countries are constituted on different processes of legitimacy, thereby creating different and conflicting aims and goals for states, which can lead to conflict (Bisley 2004, 62). These different processes include differing organizational types, legitimate principles of political action, and values that are appealed to justify or determine state behavior (Bisley 2004, 62; Aron 1973, 91). The opposite of heterogeneity, homogeneity, is a system of states which, while possibly differing in their political or social structures, accept common definitions of these processes that allow them to agree on a legitimate form of conduct. They are able to create stability in the international system through "functionally similar units kept in check by the balance of power" (Bisley 2004, 66).

The issue of legitimacy is critical. Because the state is constructed on a radically different set of principals, the state's conception of what sort of behavioral norms are legitimate may be incompatible with those of its neighbors (Kissinger 1957, 1).²⁷ Legitimacy is based in the shared beliefs of actors in a given society, who must agree on a particular conception of what is considered acceptable (Clark 2003, 80). Applying this to our understanding of norms, legitimacy

²⁶ There are no exhaustive works on states with revolutionary identities or their resulting effects. However, Goldstone (1991), Armstrong (1993), and Halliday (1999) offer an extensive number of case-studies whose sheer volume adequately exemplifies the phenomenon.

²⁷ Kissinger explains legitimacy as, "an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy" (Kissinger 1957, 1). This essentially states that legitimacy is a shared set of norms between states, which is how I use it in this paper.

refers, “not to some abstract conception of right, but to the norms of a specific cultural system at a given time” (Bukovansky 1999, 24). Legitimacy is central when dealing with norms and deviance, as a norm must have a shared sense of legitimacy in order for it to become the shared behavioral expectation we defined it as (Katzenstein 1996, 5)

A shared sense of legitimacy allows for stability in the international system, as it allows for nations to work out their differences through diplomacy, or the, “adjustment of differences through negotiation” (Kissinger 1957, 1). As nations share the same basic sense of how the international system is constructed and what a state may or may not due to pursue its interests within it, they can usually work out their differences peacefully (Bisley 2004, 62). While this does not necessarily prevent war, it ensures that war will be fought in the name of preserving the existing order (Kissinger 1957, 2). In the anarchic structure of the modern system, this is dependent upon an agreement over both a balance of power and moral consensus (Bisley 2004, 61). The internal acceptance of these basic principals is instrumental for international order to exist.

Within a heterogeneous system, this shared sense of legitimacy breaks down (Aron 1973, 90; Kissinger 1957, 2). A state with a revolutionary identity subscribes to its own constructed norms, and therefore will likely see all other states as lacking in legitimacy. As all other states fail to conform to the pariah’s identity, it sees the rest of the international system as deviant and therefore undeserving of the same rights that the state allows itself (Armstrong 1993, 213). Diplomacy in such an environment becomes useless, since states that cannot agree on a single principal of legitimacy cannot relate to one another and therefore, “cease to speak the same language” (Kissinger 1957, 2). The international system, for its part, will likely regard the state as illegitimate in turn, confirming Richard Pipes famous commentary of the Soviet Union,

which, “by challenging the legitimacy of all foreign governments...invited all foreign governments to challenge theirs” (Pipes 1990, 669).

Under heterogeneity, deviant states are compelled to export violence in order to strengthen their own norms by getting other states to accept them (Calvert 1996, 136). Because normative regimes are created by a shared consensus of what is normative by all states within a community, by exporting violence, the deviant state can create other states that share its conception of legitimacy, thereby strengthening its own normative regime (Halliday 1999,227). This conflict is best seen not only as a competition between states, but between systems, where the greatest consensus on a norm will lead to greater legitimacy (Katz 1997, 1; Bisley 2004, 59). As the deviant state does not see the rest of the international community as being legitimate, it will have little compunction in attacking that that it views to be illegitimate states (Armstrong 1993, 213).

Like the other hypotheses presented, however, simply possessing a revolutionary identity is not enough. The presence of an existential threat must also be present. The combination of threat to the regime and the heterogeneity that comes from an inability of the state to agree on international legitimacy and communicate with other states leads to a heightened sense of mistrust, creating a spiral of misperceptions that leads to conflict (Walt 1996).²⁸ Taken together,

H₆: A deviant state is more likely to export violence when it possesses a revolutionary identity and perceives an existential threat, thus giving it a moral imperative to spread its ideology.

V. QCA Methodology

Because each hypothesis involves a variety of simultaneous conditions, I use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to simplify and determine which combinations of conditions are necessary to induce deviant states to export violence. Developed by Charles Ragin (1987; 2000),

²⁸ For a more elaborate description of the “spiral model” see Walt 1996, Chapter 2.

QCA uses Boolean algebra to compare across cases to determine what conditions are essential for producing certain outcomes. QCA has many similarities to quantitative methods, in that it uses a formalized process and clear identification of both independent and dependent variables for which rigorous measures are constructed. Aside from these similarities, however, the approach is decidedly qualitative. Unlike quantitative methods like linear regression that disaggregate cases into a collection of disparate variables and their respective co-variations to the dependent variable, QCA takes a holistic approach, examining each case's cluster of variables as an individual observation. This allows the observer to see how independent variables relate to one another, in addition to the dependent variable.

QCA's process of minimization uses logic similar to experimental research design by systematically eliminating superfluous variables that are not shared between cases of the same positive outcome. This systematic process is repeated across all cases, eventually identifying the combination of causal conditions necessary to produce a positive result. For a one-step example, if we just look at Afghanistan and Liberia, we can see that both export violence, and both share almost the same combination of independent variable conditions. The only difference between them is the presence of revolutionary identity, which Afghanistan possesses but Liberia does not. We could therefore eliminate revolutionary identity as a causal condition. QCA continues this process across all of the cases in the truth table until only the prime implicants (causal conditions) remain.

QCA's advantage lies in its ability to formalize qualitative insights so they can be used to study a wider range of cases (Krook 2010, 890). By comparing across cases, QCA can reduce the clusters of variables to their necessary components. In this way, QCA can reveal multiple paths to the same outcomes that less rigorous qualitative techniques are unable to do. While it remains

the brainchild of Ragin (1987; 2000) the approach has become more complicated over the years, as crisp set (binary) QCA has given way to “fuzzy-set” (interval) coding and other complicated modifications. Due to a lack of rigorous, quantitative data for the variables, I use Ragin’s basic, crisp-set QCA for my analysis.

For my analysis, I use the truth table algorithm (TTA), which includes a number of advantages over other QCA approaches.²⁹ All QCA solutions produce a complex and parsimonious solution. The complex solution uses only those empirical cases which appear in the partial truth table. Because it does not fully reduce all of the cases, complex solutions have a tendency to create multiple overlapping solutions that fail to completely isolate the prime implicants (Rihoux 2004). Parsimonious solutions, on the other hand, use counterfactuals, or theoretically possible combinations which are not supported by empirical evidence (Ragin and Sonett 2008, 8). While this allows the cases to be reduced to their most basic elements, it also has the potential to eliminate some implicants which may play a role in some solutions but not others. A third, intermediate solution, strikes a balance between the two by using counterfactual analysis to only eliminate those variables that are redundant and easily eliminated (10). Unlike most other QCA software, TTA produces not only the complex and parsimonious scores, but intermediate solutions as well. Due to both physical space and Ragin and other scholars’ arguments that intermediate solutions provide the most accurate combination of necessary conditions, I examine only the intermediate scores in this section.

In an additional contrast to other QCA methods, TTA also includes measures for consistency and coverage for each combination, as well as those for the entire model. Consistency is an analogue for R^2 in statistical regression models, measuring how well each of

²⁹ The Truth Table Algorithm is included alongside the traditional Quine QCA algorithm as a part of fsQCA 2.0. For replicative purposes, this software can be obtained at <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/>.

the causal combinations and the model fit the data. Coverage is divided into two measures: Raw coverage measures how many cases the combination explains, while unique coverage refers to how many cases are explained only by the variable combination (Ragin 2005, 87).

Crisp set QCA (QCA using dichotomous variables) requires a number of steps. First, I identify my independent and dependent variables, and reduce each to a dichotomous variable, using rigorous criteria to determine if the variable has a sufficient level or is present (1) or has an insufficient level or is absent (0). Second, I select my cases from the population of deviant states, constructing a truth table of all cases, including counterfactuals not present in the existing data. Finally, I use Boolean algebra to reduce all of the cases into the causal combination. The final results will then be discussed in detail.

VI. Variable Selection and Binary Coding

To select my variables for my QCA analysis, I examined all four of my hypotheses, and identified all of the conditional variables implied by each. I then devised a rigorous measure for each variable with which I examined my cases. In total, I was able to disaggregate six different variables in total, whose concepts and measures are briefly explained below: 1) Export of violence 2) Diplomatic isolation, 3) Revolutionary identity, 4) Protected economy, 5) Existential threat, and 6) Sovereignty over foreign policy and military.

5.1 Export of Violence (Dependent Variable)

The dependent variable for my analysis is export of violence. As previously elucidated, the export of violence refers to one of the following: 1) The use of military force to invade another country with the goal of either acquiring territory or overthrowing the government, or 2) Destabilizing another country by supporting rebel groups inside of it. Coding for the dependent variable was straight-forward: If the deviant state attempted to invade another

country, it was coded as positive. Additionally, if evidence could be found that the government had lent support (either through military, logistical, or political training and aid) to anti-government groups³⁰ in other countries, it was coded as positive. A lack of either of these conditions was coded as negative.

5.2 *Diplomatic Isolation*

Diplomatic isolation is the main causal condition in H₃. This condition has been studied extensively by deviant state scholars, and remains the dominant theory for explaining deviant behavior (Geldenhuis 1990; 2004). Unlike other measures in this study, I use a quantitative measure, dividing the number of states that the deviant has diplomatic relations with by the total number of states in the international system.³¹ I obtained my data from the correlates of war (COW) database, which gives dyadic bilateral diplomatic relations for states in regular intervals (for the 20th century, intervals are in years of 5). A review of the states widely recognized as isolated revealed that all had bilateral relations with fewer than 40% of the states in the international system, so this served as a baseline for determining whether the remaining deviant states were isolated (Harkavy 1981; Beit-Hallahmi 1989; Geldenhuis 1990). For states that remained deviant over long periods of time, I ignored any scores that “crossed the line” unless it showed a consistent change in at least more than one year. For instance, if a hypothetical state’s relations were 35% in 1970, 43% in 1975, and 32% in 1980, all three years were coded as “isolated.”

³⁰ Anti-government groups refer to groups outside of normal political processes only. These included armed insurgencies and terrorist organizations. Technical support to legal opposition parties was not included.

³¹ Other authors who have used COW to measure isolation, such as Jo and Gartzke (2007, 174), modified the measurement, only considering relations of states within 350 miles and the great powers. Because of the international character of norm violation, I am inclined to think this is better.

5.3 *Protected Economy*

In addition to a lack of internal legitimacy, H_1 also implies the necessity that the state's economy be able resist any economic sanctions that may be imposed by norm-setters to coerce it to cease exporting violence (Nincic 2005, 98). A closed economy would therefore be much better equipped to withstand the torrent of sanctions that might be expected to follow the violations of another country's sovereignty. I measure this with the traditional measure of economic openness adding the country's net imports and exports and dividing them by its GDP [(imports + exports) / GDP]. After consulting the literature, I determined that a sufficiently closed economy needed to have less than 25% economic openness in order to be considered protected (Birdsall & Hamoudi 2002, 13). Like isolation, if an observation "crossed the line" in one year but did not remain, I ignored it as an anomaly.

5.4 *Lack of Internal Legitimacy*

Regime legitimacy is important for both H_1 and H_{4a} , and refers to a state's government being seen by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power (Gilley 2006, 500). Citizens who view their government as legitimate are more likely to defer to its laws and participate in its institutions (Levi et al. 2009, 355). Without political legitimacy, citizens will often attempt to circumvent government institutions, and corruption will flourish. To ensure people follow its laws, the regime must coerce its citizens into acquiescence, often through the use or threat of violence.³² Simply put, legitimacy is a citizen's willingness to obey a regime (356). Legitimacy is difficult to measure. Scholars typically formulate a list of indicators, usually including voter turnout, the use of secret police or the military to maintain domestic order, or institutional corruption, considering the regime to be illegitimate when the indicator is prominent enough. Recent efforts by Bruce Gilley (2006) to quantify legitimacy have led to the creation of

³² For a more detailed discussion of legitimacy, see Gilley 2006 and Levi et al. 2009.

numerical values for legitimacy. While this measure is preferable, I lacked access to the data necessary to create my own table of “pariah legitimacy” and therefore measured it using a conventional, indicator-based way.

The indicators I elected were: 1) the presence of a secret police to keep order, 2) widespread, protracted labor strikes, and 3) the presence of an armed insurgency with popular support whose aims involve the overthrow of the government.

5.5 *Revolutionary Identity*

A state with a revolutionary identity is constructed on radically different constitutive norms, causing it to have a heterogeneous, incompatible conception of the key underlying norms of the international system. By “key, underlying norms, I borrow from Armstrong (1993) and Panah (2002) who together identify four different agreed upon norms that make the relationship between state homogeneous: 1) International law, 2) Diplomacy, 3) The balance of power, and 4) Market structure. Because revolutionary identities are an unfamiliar concept to international relations scholarship, empirical cases are added to better illustrate the operationalized variable.

The first indicator, international law, refers to the sharing of compatible internal constitutions by states (Bisley 2004, 62). This ensures that all states hold the same basic values in regard to what the state is and how it relates to its citizenry (Armstrong 1993, 204). While homogenous states may not share the same laws, they will speak the same legal language, utilize the same reasoning, and operate under the same basic legal principles (104). A violator will use an alien reasoning, and view the world from a radically different perspective (206). An extreme illustration of this is the case of the French Revolution, where, prior to 1789, sovereignty was understood by the international (European) system to mean that a state was the legal property of a select nobility, and everything that fell within its sovereign borders the property of that same

nobility (Bukovansky 1999, 199). Revolutionary France introduced nationalism, the idea that a nation belonged to its entire people equally (200-2). The clash of values created a natural conflict between France and the prevailing monarchic system. More recent examples include Rhodesia and South Africa's rejection of egalitarian law, and Iran's Islamic constitution, which lead to the Ayatollah Khomeini's declaration that, "Islam has no borders" (Halliday 1999, 125).

Diplomacy is the second pillar, denoting an agreed upon method by which states communicate (Armstrong 1993, 245). In a homogenous system, all states share processes and organs through which states communicate with one another, and have an agreed upon conception of what certain actions and statements symbolize (248). A citizen of America cannot speak for their country – only specific representatives of the US government, including ambassadors, the secretary of state, and the president and vice president may do so. They are considered representatives of the US government, and all states are in agreement that their words and the states beliefs are the same (270). Adolf Joffe, the Soviet Union's first Ambassador to Germany, provides an archetype example of "revolutionary diplomacy." Joffe refused to present his credentials to the German Kaiser, and instead addressed the German people directly, both in words and the distribution of arms to revolutionaries (Halliday 1999, 95).

The final pillar, the balance of power, identifies a common agreement between states over the hierarchy of the International system. Unlike other institutions designed to regulate state behavior, the balance of power also ensures state sovereignty while at the same time maintaining order (281). States in homogenous systems share agreement over the distribution of power in the system, and while they may not like it, acknowledge it as a stabilizing force that preserves order and discourages conflict (Armstrong 1993, 273-4). States can reject the balance of power in two ways, either by upsetting the balance by shifting power from one faction to another, or by

directly challenging the entire system by asserting itself as a new pole of power and influence. An example of the former is Cuba's abrupt switch of alignment from West to East following its revolution in 1959. The latter is represented by Iran's desire to be recognized as a regional power, in addition to breaking Israeli hegemony in the Middle East.

Panah (2002) also argues for the inclusion of economic systems as well. Market structure influence the way people interact economically with one another and the same can be said for nations (282). States which do not share the same basic market structures often find it difficult to interact and trade with one another (279). Because of this, the status quo typically promotes a dominant market structure which all states must internalize in order for them to all exist in a homogenous trading environment (291). A state with a different market structure rejects this, and the heterogeneity that results is likely cause tension between the state and the status quo (290). To exemplify this, during the cold war, the western world adopted a market capitalist system, while the Eastern bloc had a centrally planned economy. Because of their radically different market structures, trade was incredibly difficult, and states within each block that rejected their respective systems were dealt with harshly.

I code revolutionary identity as positive if any one of the following conditions is met: For international law, the state, by law, denies rights afforded by the rest of the international community to a significant part of its population or bases its laws on principals that are foreign to western constitutions, such as Islamic law. It can also involve political systems in regions that do not tolerate them, like democracy within Communist Eastern Europe, or dictatorships in modern Europe. For diplomacy, the state refuses to use the accepted diplomatic channels of other states, and either denies the legitimacy of foreign diplomats, or uses organs other than their executive foreign ministry, or embassies to communicate with other states. Balance of power is coded as

positive if the state either abruptly switches its alignment from one pole to another (exclusively for cold war cases) or the government makes public statements that it deserves a higher position in the global pecking order. Market structure is coded positive if the state has a different market structure than the status quo power, which manifests as either a socialist system within a capitalist community or, in case of the cold war, a capitalist system within a socialist bloc.

5.6 *Irredentism*

One state's claims to the territory of another for historic, ethnic, or religious reasons – irredentism – are another cause that is likely to lead to conflict. The emotional sentiments that irredentism evokes makes it a powerful tool with which elites may manipulate to elicit popular support from their citizenry (Carnet and James 1995, 90) This is particularly true in times of crisis or low political legitimacy where elites can create a “rally around the flag” effect that boosts popular support for the regime by instigating war (Nincic 2005, 28).

Irredentist claims may also be irritated by dissatisfaction with the international order. Geldenhuys notes that not all international orders are neutral in their consequences, and that some states inevitably benefit at the expense of others (2004, 22). By nature, deviant states are dissatisfied with the international order, which they see as unjust. While many may not desire the extreme revisionism of those with revolutionary identities, they still may desire what he calls “orthodox revisionism,” or restoration of previously held power (23). The desire for restored power can easily manifest itself in irredentist claims that the state “deserves.” I code irredentism as positive if the state's government has made any public claims to territory that is internationally recognized to belong to another state.

5.7 *Existential Threat*

Another condition that must be accounted for is the presence of an existential threat to the deviant state's government. Existential threat is the sole condition for H₂ (Nincic 2005, 38), and all of the other hypotheses imply its presence (Beit-Hallahmi 1989, 208; Halliday 1999, 152; Carment and James 1995, 89). The presence of a threat to the state's survival gives it an imperative to take extreme action in order to survive, and the governments it target may be complicit in attempt to destabilize or invade the deviant, adding moral justification for retribution (Bisley 2004). I code the presence of an existential threat as positive if the state was either bordered by hostile neighbors, was threatened with invasion or destabilization by a great power, had a popular insurgency inside the country whose goals include regime change, or were at war with a neighboring country. The state was coded (1) in the presence of any of these indicators.

5.8 *Sovereign Control of Foreign Policy and Military Resources*

A final condition that must be present in order for a state to export violence is that the state must have control over its foreign policy and military resources. Without the ability to devise its own foreign policy and use force independently, a state will lack the ability to export violence, even if its government desires it. "Sovereign control" is therefore a qualifier, absolutely necessary for the export of violence, but not sufficient.

"Sovereign control" is a broad term, and a lack of it can be demonstrated in many ways. The state's institutions may have failed, and therefore can neither craft foreign policy nor give orders to the military or other government organizations that will be followed, as seen in many African states (Herbst 1996/7). The state's sovereignty may also be outright denied by the international community, as in the case of Iraq in the 1990s, where international sanctions and

no-fly zones prevented Iraq from using any military force outside its borders. Finally, international pressures can constrain a state's options, dissuading any use of force (For example, South Korea's long-standing claim to North Korean territory) With this in mind, sovereignty is coded as positive if the state had no serious constraints on its ability to craft its own foreign policy or utilize its military in any way it saw fit. States were coded a negative if they were occupied by foreign governments or had a large (10,000+) foreign troop presence on their soil, or if they under constant military pressure from foreign forces that prevent the military from mobilizing.

5.9 *Data Collection and Case Study Selection*

I selected my cases for QCA analysis from the list of all pariah states compiled in Table 1. I aimed to select as many cases as possible, although availability of data (specifically for the "protected economy" and "isolation" variables) limited my sample size. The dependent variable was coded by consulting the relevant literature on each state, establishing whether they met my established criteria for the export of violence. Most of the literature on pariah states, including Harkavy (1981); Beit-Hallahmi (1989), Geldenhuys (1990; 2004), Tanter (1998), Litwak (2000), and Nincic (2005) contained anthology sections which detailed the actions of a wide variety of deviant states, allowing me to easily research most of cases out of a few books. Individual sources were consulted for the remaining cases. Table 2 lists all of the sources consulted for each case. The qualitative independent variables (lack of legitimacy, revolutionary ideology, threat, and sovereignty) were obtained from many of the same sources with the same methodology. These were qualitative or historical books that were not necessarily about the state's pariah status, but contained information on its international relations from which I could draw data for the QCA analysis.

Table 2: Qualitative Data Sources for Pariah States: 1945-2005

Country ^a	Era	Source	Country ^a	Era	Source
Spain	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990, 2004	Argentina	Cold War	Maechling 1981
South Africa	Both	Polakow-Suransky 2010, Geldenhuys 1990	Ethiopia	Cold War	De Waal 1991
Israel	Both	Barnett 1996/7, Beit-Hallahmi 1988	Guatemala	Both	Koonings & Kruijt 1999
North Korea	Both	Geldenhuys 2004	Syria	Both	Litwak 2000, Geldenhuys 2004
South Korea	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990, Harkavy 1981	Iran	Both	Halliday 1999, Panah 2002
Yugoslavia	Cold War	Banac 1988, Nachmani 1990	Nicaragua	Cold-War	LeoGrande 1986, Blum 2003
East Germany	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990, 2004	Bolivia	Cold-War	Morales 1992
China (1)	Cold War	Van Ness 1970	Cambodia	Cold-War	Gottesman 2003
Egypt	Cold War	Heikal 1978	Northern Cyprus	Cold-War	Kaliber 2005
North Vietnam	Cold War	Westad 2005, Vital 1971	Burma	Post-Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004
South Vietnam	Cold War	Blum 2003	Sudan	Post-Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004, Peterson 2000
Guinea	Cold War	Azarya and Chazan 1987, Glejeses 1997	China (2)	Post-Cold War	Donnelly 2007
Portugal	Cold War	Meredith 2005	Pakistan (2)	Post-Cold War	Nincic 2005
Cuba	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990, 2004, Beit-Hallahmi 1988	Zaire	Post-Cold War	Prunier 2009
Katanga	Cold War	Domingues 1989, Geldenhuys 2004	Iraq	Post-Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004
Albania	Cold War	Westad 2005	Haiti (2)	Post-Cold War	Girard 2004
Indonesia	Cold War	Bunnell 1966	Somaliland	Post-Cold War	Lewis 2008
Haiti (1)	Cold War	Loescher & Scanlan 1984	Serbia and Montenegro	Post-Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004
Pakistan	Cold War	Harkavy 1981, McMahon 1994	Transnistria	Post-Cold War	Popescu 2006
Rhodesia	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990, Horne 2001	Equatorial Guinea	Post-Cold War	Roberts 2007
Romania	Cold War	Braun 1978, Deletant 1995	Turkmenistan	Post-Cold War	ICG 2003, Olcott 2006
Czechoslovakia	Cold War	Williams 1997	Nigeria	Post-Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004
South Yemen	Cold War	Halliday 1990	Afghanistan	Post-Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004
Taiwan	Both	Vale 1997, Payne & Veney 2001	Belarus	Post-Cold War	Korosteleva et al. 2003
Uganda	Cold War	Litwak 2000, Ullman 1978	Indonesia (2)	Post-Cold War	Nincic 2005
Chile	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990, 2004	Liberia	Post-Cold War	Hoffman 2004
Libya	Cold War	Geldenhuys 2004, Blum 2003	Zimbabwe	Post-Cold War	Godwin 2007
Paraguay	Cold War	Geldenhuys 1990	Eritrea	Post-Cold War	Wrong 2005
Democratic Kampuche	Cold War	Kiernan & Chwioroth 1996	Haiti (3)	Post-Cold War	Blum 2003
Vietnam	Cold War	Morris 1999	Uzbekistan	Post-Cold War	Lopes 2011

^aVenezuela was not included in the initial analysis and was added as a pariah state after the data had already been analyzed. However, its qualitative indicators are consistent with the result of the analysis, so I do not have reason to believe that its inclusion would alter the results.

Quantitative data was somewhat more difficult to obtain. For the isolation variable, I secured all of my data from COW's Diplomatic Exchange Database, which contains a dyadic list of diplomatic exchanges between countries between 1870 and 2005 (Bayer 2006). Economic data was obtained from two sources: Bilateral trade data was obtained from COW's Bilateral Trade database, which contains adjusted bilateral trade data on both dyadic and aggregate forms for all countries between 1860 and 2009 (Barbieri and Keshk 2009). Adjusted gross domestic product per year is obtained separately from the Penn World Table Index, which contains, among other indicators, total adjusted GDP per year for 189 countries between 1950 and 2009 (Heston et al. 2011).

The lack of quantitative data for cases before World War II and after 2009 meant that I had to limit my analysis to pariah states after WWII but before 2005. This removes not only the “classic” deviants like Revolutionary France and the Soviet Union, but also the current states involved in the “Arab Spring.” Despite these limitations, I selected as many cases as availability data permitted. States whose conditions changed over time or had multiple periods of deviance were given an additional case for each period under their respective set of conditions. Using this methodology, my total number of cases is 78, very high for a QCA analysis. Unlike many larger-n QCA analyses, I choose not to remove less-repeated combinations for the sake of simplicity, and compute all possible cases. For transparency, Table 3 shows the partial truth table constricted with TOSMANA software displaying all of my final coding decisions for all cases.³³

A close examination of Table 2 highlights an interesting aspect of pariah state scholarship. There is a noticeable “generation gap” between the literatures, with most of the early, isolation-based theory written during the 1980s, followed by a second wave, adopting sociological theories of deviance, in the early 2000s. Dividing the dataset into cold war and post-Cold War subsets may provide support for H₃’s isolation and threat explanation during the cold war. In addition, both H₁ (which argues that a lack of legitimacy and economic insularity) and H₄ (lack of legitimacy and irredentism) may hold true for post-Cold War era, where many states engaging in deviance were either new or had unpopular, “ancien” regimes which might benefit from domestic support through the export of violence. To do this, I divided the cases up based on their respective time periods (1945-1989 for the Cold War, AND 1989-2005 For the Post-Cold War era), allocating overlapping cases to both subsets, and ran two separate analyses.³⁴ Each

³³ Only actual existing cases are displayed in a partial truth table. A full QCA analysis includes all logically possible combinations of variables. These “counterfactual” cases do not exist outside of the QCA analysis, but is necessary to increase Boolean Algebra’s validity in the face of limited empirical data (Ragin 1987).

³⁴ The partial truth table for these two data sets can be seen in the Appendix.

subset's sample size was logically smaller, with the Cold War dataset numbering some 59 cases, and the post-Cold War set having only 30 cases. The results are discussed alongside those of Table 3 in the next section.

VII. QCA Analysis of Results

Table 3: Partial Truth Table of Pariah States: 1945-2005

Isolation	Threat	Revolutionary Identity	Insulated Economy	Sovereignty	Irredentism	Legitimacy Problems	Export of Violence (DV)	Country ^a
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Argentina, Ethiopia
1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	Chile, Guatemala, Haiti (1991-4)
1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	Paraguay, Zimbabwe, Turkmenistan
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	Bolivia, Indonesia (1998-2001), Nigeria
		1	0	1	0	0	1	Nicaragua, Israel (1973-95), Sudan
1	1							(2001-5), Cuba
		1	1	1	0	0	1	Israel (1948-55), Vietnam, Sudan (1989-2000), Guinea (1958-72)
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	Israel (1955-61), Iran (1985-1988)
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	Israel (1961-1973), Israel (1995 - 2005),
								Portugal, Iran, Egypt, Yugoslavia
0	1							Rhodesia, South Africa
1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	Spain
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	
		1	1	1	1	0	1	Democratic Kampuchea, North Korea,
1	1							North Vietnam, China (1949-71)
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	Cambodia, East Germany (1949-53)
1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	Burma
		0	0	1	1	1	1	Uganda (1972-4), Uganda (1978-9),
1	1							Zaire Liberia
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Uganda (1975-7)
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	Katanga
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Northern Cyprus, Transnistria
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	Syria (1979-85), Serbia
1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	Syria (1986-2005), Eritrea
1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	Iraq
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Afghanistan
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	Libya
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Belarus, Guinea (1973-4)
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	Pakistan (1965-72)
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Pakistan (1973-80)
1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Uzbekistan, Albania
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Czechoslovakia
		1	1	1	0	0	0	Romania (1968-1973), Romania (1984-7)
0	0							Romania (1974-83), Romania (1988-9),
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Guinea (1975-8)
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	Haiti (1962-74)
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Haiti (1975-86)
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Haiti (2001-4)
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	Indonesia (1959-66)
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Equatorial Guinea
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Somaliiland
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	South Yemen
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	South Korea (1948-66)
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	South Korea (1967-87)
1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	South Vietnam
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	China (1989-94)
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	East Germany (1954-72)

^aVenezuela was not included in the initial analysis and was included as a pariah state after the data had already been analyzed. However, its qualitative indicators are consistent with the result of the analysis, so I do not have reason to believe that its inclusion would alter the results.

Table 4 provides the final intermediate minimization results of the QCA analysis. Using the TTA, my 78 cases were reduced to two distinct combinations of variables:

Table 4: Full Pariah State Analysis: 1945-2005

Variable Combination	Raw coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
IRRIDENTISM*SOVEREIGNTY*THREAT	0.5	0.225	1.0
SOVEREIGNTY*REVOLUTIONARY IDENTITY*THREAT	0.775	0.5	1.0
Solution Coverage	1.0		
Solution Consistency	1.0		

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the data. First, a state must have a significant degree of autonomy. As all five hypotheses implied, a state's sovereign control over its foreign policy and military apparatus is imperative for a state to export violence. This is reflected by Table 3, where, regardless of any other underlying factors, all states that experienced any exogenous forces preventing them from exercising an independent foreign policy did not export violence. This finding is also consistent with realist international relations theory, in which states require a degree of sovereign control in order to constitute themselves as actors (Morgan 2006).

A second necessary condition is the presence of an existential threat, implied by all hypotheses except H₁. This is hardly surprising, however, as it is fully supported by the realist argument that states export violence when their security is threatened (Waltz 1979). However, while the presence of threat is necessary, it is not sufficient, and requires other conditions in order to induce a state to action, somewhat diminishing realist claims.

In addition to threat and sovereignty, the analysis also necessitates the presence of a revolutionary identity or irredentism for a state to export violence, lending strong support for hypotheses H₅ and H₆. An interesting aspect of the findings is how the export of violence is due almost entirely to state's external relations. While revolutionary identities are internally

constructed, their disruptive nature is an external issue (Bisley 2004). The lack of domestic irritants, like economic openness or a lack of internal legitimacy further supports the hypothesis showing that it is the state's incompatible relationship with others that drives its errant behavior (Halliday 1999). According to the raw coverage, the presence (or absence) of a revolutionary identity, threat, and sovereignty explains nearly 80% of all cases where a state did or didn't export violence. Unique coverage shows that revolutionary identity is the only plausible explanation for half of all cases.

The remaining incidences of state export of violence were caused by the presence of irredentism, threat and sovereignty. This is interesting, as it shows irredentism to only have an effect when the pariah state faces a tangible threat in the form of armed groups or states. A lack of legitimacy, long considered a reason for states to exploit irredentist sentiments and thereby instigate war, is not present. This idiosyncrasy suggests that the export of violence, at least by pariah states, has very little to do with the state's domestic regime situation. A more likely explanation is that the regime's sense of threat enhances its dissatisfaction with the global hierarchy, increasing its insecurity, and persuading it to use force to strengthen its international position through the acquisition of more territory or by destroying or weakening those state it sees a threat to its survival (Geldenhuis 2004, 22-3).

The entire model shows a perfect fit with the dataset, demonstrating that when both combinations of conditions are taken together, they explain all cases in the dataset, making sovereignty, threat, and either revolutionary identity or irredentism sufficient to make a deviant state likely to export violence. In Boolean notation:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Export of Violence} \\ = \textit{SOVEREIGNTY} * \textit{THREAT} * (\textit{IRREDENTISM} \\ + \textit{REVOLUTIONARY IDENTITY}) \end{aligned}$$

The overlap in the raw coverages is likely due to some cases (such as Argentina, North Korea, and Iraq) that share both irredentism and revolutionary identities, and it is unclear which is motivating them. The QCA analysis supports this, as the unique coverage of each explanation is equal to everything not covered by the other explanation's raw coverage.

However, as noted previously, generational differences in the literature suggest that there may be causes that are being hidden by including all cases in the same analysis. To remedy this, I divided the two datasets into the "Cold War" and "Post-Cold War," for which the TTA produced the following results:

Table 5.1 Cold War Pariah State Analysis 1945-2005

Variable Combination	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage
IRRIDENTISM*SOVEREIGNTY*THREAT	0.46875	0.1875
SOVEREIGNTY*THREAT*REVOLUTIONARY IDENTITY	0.8125	0.53125
Solution Coverage	1.0	
Solution Consistency	1.0	

Table 5.2 Post-Cold War Pariah State Analysis 1989-2005

Variable Combination	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
IRRIDENTISM*SOVEREIGNTY*THREAT	0.75	0.4167	1.0
SOVEREIGNTY*REVOLUTIONARY IDENTITY*THREAT	0.5833	0.25	1.0
Solution Coverage	1.0		
Solution Consistency	1.0		

Unfortunately, neither the cold war nor post-cold war datasets reveal any new causal combinations. The same factors that explain the entire dataset explain the two data subsets. Despite having the same causes, the coverage percentages for each subset vary. The Cold War dataset shows roughly the same results as the entire sample, except the raw coverage of

revolutionary identity is roughly four percent more prevalent, while irredentism is four percent less so. Unique coverage shows the slightly lower changes in the same directions.

In the Post-Cold War dataset, on the other hand, Irredentism is far more common. Some three quarters of all cases are explained by irredentism, while revolutionary identity raw coverage has fallen almost 20%. Unique overages have almost flipped, with Irredentism the sole explanatory combination for over 41% of all cases, while revolutionary identities explain only 25%.

The change in coverage for each cause is largely consistent with conflict literature regarding the cold war and post-cold war eras. During the Cold War, the ideological conflict between the west and communism meant that the pole of power that a country aligned with could easily upset the balance of power, leading to deviance and war (Hobsbawm 1994). Cuba, Nicaragua, Yugoslavia, And Argentina are but a small sample of the many countries whose export of violence was directly related to the global ideological divide (Westad 2005).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the creation of numerous new countries caused by its and Yugoslavia's fracturing, as well as the end of communism as a viable ideology, lead to the rise of ethnicity as a cause for conflict as ethnic groups squabbled over the pieces of the states that once belonged to the second world. As many scholars of ethnic conflict argue, irredentist feeling became inflamed, leading to an increase in conflict (Laitin 2007). These findings lend significant support to the existing conflict theory.

VIII. Conclusions

Overall, the results suggest that the export of violence requires a combination of sovereign control of foreign policy and military forces by the state, a perceived existential threat from inside or outside the country that directly threatens the state's regime, and either an

irredentist impulse by the same leadership, or, more commonly, the possession of a revolutionary identity by the state, which causes the it to develop an incompatible and competing sense of what norms are legitimate, which it then feels compelled to spread in order to legitimate its own deviant conception of acceptable international conduct. Domestic factors like the legitimacy of the regime and vulnerability of the state's economy to sanctions have little effect on a state's decision to export violence. Isolation, long believed to be the prime implicant in the export violence by deviant states, has some applicability during Cold war during which it was theorized, but not outside of it. A final effect of the global shift in the international structure has been a small decline in the number of states with revolutionary ideologies and a rise in those espousing irredentism.

Applied more generally to the norms and deviance as a whole, there are a number of larger implications that may be drawn from the data. First, international ostracism and sanctions, the traditional strategies used by the status quo in dealing with deviant states, are unlikely to have much effect on their behavior (Nincic 2005). On the contrary, as the analysis showed, the results of the analysis determined that export of violence by deviant states is entirely the result of exogenous state relations. No endogenous factors, including regime legitimacy or an insulated economy have much of an influence on a deviant state's decision to export violence. Rather, the result is entirely related to how the state interacts with the rest of the international system (Litwak 2000). This should provide somehow for those policy makers who believe that the United States can affect the errant behavior of many deviant states, including the current tensions with Iran or recently renewed talks with North Korea.

The data also suggests that status quo powers should take a closer note of revolutionary identities. The status quo has tended to take a hard-line on deviance, often without trying to

understand why the states act the way they do (Armstrong 1993; Halliday 1999; Panah 2002; Bisley 2004). This is more likely to inflame tensions and increase misunderstandings between the state and the system, preventing any sort of conciliatory actions by either side (Walt 1996). By approaching a pariah state with the understanding that it is operating under a different set of norms, rather than simply breaking them, more headway can perhaps be made in reintegrating the state into the fold (Wendt 1999).

The high accuracy of the indicators should not be taken to imply that the models have no flaws, however. The model is far from perfect, and a number of improvements could be made that might contribute to its robustness. Among existing measures, a more quantitative for legitimacy similar to Gilley's analysis (2006) may reveal a more accurate and rigorous method to account for regime legitimacy, and possibly pave the way for a fuzzy set analysis. A similar graduated measure could also be done for sovereignty and threat as well, breaking the degree of each variable into increments. This may change their preponderance among the data.

The analysis may also be lacking important variables that may modify the data substantially. The analysis is largely a hypothesis test, where I have tested the variables implied by existing theories as well as those of my own. Literature on pariah states is comparatively sparse, and there may be other, important factors that have not been examined that may shed a greater insight on a state's decision to export violence.

Additionally, the analysis could have done with the inclusion of non-deviant states as well. This can both reduce accusation of "selecting on the dependent variable" (King, Koehane, and Verba 1994). In addition, it can also determine if the theory is applicable to all states as a whole, rather than just pariahs. If, as this author believes, that these causal combination have a greater applicability, it could yield some very interesting advances in conflict literature.

Despite these limitations, however, this study represents an important contribution to the thus-far thin amount of literature on pariah state behavior. In addition to applying a rigorous, empirically supported method to what was previously a largely theoretical field, I have demonstrated the importance of revolutionary identities in producing tensions between countries, as well as establishing through rigorous methodology the combination of factors that lead deviant states to export violence. In addition, this paper represents the first attempt at an exhaustive list of pariah states. While far more research is necessary in order to fully evaluate both pariah state behavior and the effects of revolutionary identities, this work represents an important first step.

As international norms continue to emerge and change and the expectations of behavior for states in the international system continue to fluctuate, our conceptions of deviance will continue to change and evolve as well. It is important to remember that while states with revolutionary identities may view the world from a radically different and incompatible perspective, that does not mean that they are necessarily wrong, or that the identities and behaviors they embody will not come to dominate in the future. As Fred Halliday explains with some trepidation in the concluding portion of, "Revolution and World Politics," while revolutionary have always failed in the quest to bring about the complete change of the world order that they desire, they nearly always experience some minor success by exposing a flaw or iniquity in prevailing global norms, forcing the international system to eventually change and develop in order to resolve them (Halliday 1999, 330). While an identity may be revolutionary today, someday it may be considered the global norm.

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