will thus eventually form a consecutive and comprehensive course of philosophical reading in the great original works of philosophy, which are far less bulky in size and more attractive as to matter than is generally supposed.

The present volume, which upon the whole is easy and entertaining reading, is an unannotated reprint, merely, of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, made from the posthumous edition of 1777, together with Hume’s charming autobiography and the eulogistic letter of Adam Smith, usually prefixed to the History of England, but deserving of wider circulation. These additions, with the portrait by Ramsay, which forms the frontispiece to the volume, render the picture of Hume’s life very complete. The volume has also an index.

With the great public, Hume’s fame has always rested upon his History of England,—a work now antiquated as history and remarkable only for the signal elegance and symmetry of its style. This once prevalent opinion, however, our age has reversed, and, as has been well remarked,¹ “Hume, the spiritual father of Kant, now takes precedence over Hume, the rival of Robertson and Gibbon.” It is precisely here, in fact, that Hume’s significance for the history of thought lies. With him modern philosophy entered upon its Kantian phase, became critical and positivistic, became a theory of knowledge. For the old “false and adulterate” metaphysics he sought to substitute a “true” metaphysics, based on the firm foundations of reason and experience. His scepticism—and of scepticism he has since been made the standard-bearer—was directed against the old ontology only, and not against science proper (inclusive of philosophy). “Had Hume been an absolute skeptic, he could never have produced an Immanuel Kant... The spirit of the theoretical philosophy of Hume and Kant, the fundamental conception of their investigations, and the goal at which they aim, are perfectly identical. Theirs is the critical spirit, and positive knowledge the goal at which they aim. To claim for Kant the sole honor of having founded criticism is an error which a closer study of British philosophy tends to refute.”²

Of Hume’s purely philosophical pieces the present book and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals are, in their precise, lucid, and engaging style, the most representative and the most elegant. The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals will be published in a succeeding number of the Religion of Science Library (having the portrait here reproduced for its frontispiece), and together these two pieces will afford an exact and comprehensive knowledge of Hume’s philosophy.


REINCARNATE.

From sky to sky a silent land,
   Through which an idle river flows,
Upon its banks, on either hand,
The purple iris blows.

The sunlight faints in languorous stream,
The sunlight fades in empty air—
A long, slant, timeless, yellow gleam,
    On all, and everywhere.

A long, slant, timeless, yellow ray,
    On which I look, in which I sow—
What seed, O Soul, that fills to-day
    With ghosts of Long Ago?

With ghosts of old Egyptian sand
    Where Nilus oozes home to sea,
With half-built pyramids, that stand
    And frown through time on me?

For was I slave, or was I king,
    I only, wondering, startled, know
(Let long, slant suns be quivering)
    Such lights were long ago,—

Were long ago, and crept and twined
    About my soul, and coiled and curled,
When in some dead Deed out of mind
    I won or lost a world.

L. C. Barnes.

BOOK REVIEWS.


The present booklet is the latest utterance of the editor of The Open Court upon the crucial problems evoked by the conflict of science with the conceptions of the traditional religions. His attitude is reconciliatory. While an energetic supporter of the monistic psychology, which has been termed by some of its advocates as a psychology without a soul, while thoroughly aware of the gravity of the charges that have been made against the old-fashioned dualistic conception of the soul as a metaphysical thing-in-itself, and conscious that modern science demands a thorough-going revision of our religious views, he still insists that the facts of man's soul-life remain the same as before, and that the new psychology is not a psychology without a soul, but a psychology with a new interpretation of the soul. He says: "The soul, it is true, can no longer be regarded as a mystical being, as an entity, or an essence,—a something in itself, possessed of certain qualities, and endowed with faculties: the soul is not that which feels and thinks and acts, but is the feeling itself, the thinking itself, and the acting itself; and the faculties, so called, are simply various categories under which the several sets of psychical functions may be subsumed. "There is as little need for the psychologist to assume a separate soul-being, performing the several soul-functions, as there is for the meteorologist to assume