The plan is an expensive one. Human beings, too, are sluggish, logged with social inertia. Intelligence, constantly administered and applied on the gigantic scale required by rational schemes of instruction for entire nations, seems humanly impossible. From sheer exhaustion, reason drops into routine: it is a biological law. The new methods, whatever their value, grow old, stiff, and rheumatic, even as our invaluable Kindergarten-system in some of its phases has now grown. And thus it seems that the öffentliche Verdummungsanstalten, or "institutions for the stupification of the public," as they have been classically termed, will always remain with us as a sort of divine necessity, and harmonising with the popular demand more than some enlightened educators seem to be aware of. It is in this mountainous mass of dough that the school of Prof. Dewey will be a leaven, and we hope in the interests of advancing civilisation, that the expectations entertained of it will be there or elsewhere fully realised.

T. J. McCormack.

NIRVANA.

From the German of E. Eckstein, by Hugo Andriessen.

This is the silent, slumbering lake,
The source of life and its treasures,
Of life with its tear-bedewed ache,
And its fleeting joys and pleasures.

All dream-born bliss and mundane pain
A phantom existence created,
Into nothingness return again
What from nothingness emanated.

The trembling, quivering rays of light
In icy embrace are lying;
The eternal gods sink into night,
The solar globes are dying.

All perish,—even this episode,—
Sere will be what now looks vernal:—
Through infinite space resounds the ode,
The Song of Death Eternal!

THE MAHÂYÂNA AND ITS FIRST EXPOUNDER ĀÇVAGHOSHA.

Buddhism is divided into two great churches—the Mahâyâna and the Hînayâna i. e., the large vehicle of salvation and the small vehicle. The Mahâyâna prevails over the entire North—Nepaul, Thibet, China, and Japan, and the Hînayâna is established in the South—Ceylon, Siam, and Burmah. Western scholars generally consider the Hînayâna as the original and pure Buddhism, and look upon the Mahâyâna as a later development in which Buddhism has been adulterated and is mixed with foreign elements. But this view cannot be upheld, and is naturally objected to by Buddhists themselves, especially those who belong to the Mahâyâna church.
While the name Mahâyâna, in contradistinction to Hinayâna, seems to have come into vogue at the time of Nâgârjuna and Aryadeva, it was used in quite a different sense before that time; and, besides, we have certain evidence that its principles date back to the days of Buddha. At the time of Ācâvaghoṣha and even long before him, this term was adopted by progressive Buddhists to designate the highest being or perfect knowledge, of which all sentient beings are uniformly possessed, and on which they can safely cross over the tempestuous ocean of birth and death.

Ācâvaghoṣha, the great Buddhist philosopher, lived presumably during the first part of the first century of the Christian era. Though coming several centuries after Buddha, he was the St. John and St. Paul of Buddhism, combined. He systematised Buddhist doctrines, and wrote not only a Buddhist gospel, the Buddhacarita, but also philosophical treatises, discourses, and hymns. Among them, one of paramount importance to the scholars of the Mahâyâna is The Awakening of Faith or the Mahâyâna-sutrâdhôpa-jastra.

This religio-philosophical treatise is in a word a condensation of the voluminous Sûtras that existed in Ācâvaghoṣha's time, such as the Vajracchedika, Sakâvatâ-ryâha, Crîmâlîha, Lankâvatâra, Saddharma-pundarîka, etc.; and almost all the Mahâyânic thoughts that developed later in their full significance are traceable in this writing of Ācâvaghoṣha. The latter, it is true, is a new departure, and betrays in some places the author's attempt to absorb and assimilate all the religio-philosophical doctrines then existing in the body of Buddhism; but it is after all a natural development from Buddha's conception of life and the world.

It is a great pity that we can now study this significant work only in its Chinese version, for its original Sanskrit has long been lost to the world. Samuel Beal, an authority on Chinese and Mahâyâna Buddhism, has endeavored in his Buddhism in China to give some account of Ācâvaghoṣha's doctrines, but he has erred in doing so, because of his insufficient acquaintance with his author's writings. Even Wassiljew, owing to his incomplete knowledge of Ācâvaghoṣha, has not escaped making blunders in his accounts of Mahâyânicism.

But fortunately we have now an English translation of this most important Mahâyâna book. The translator, T. Suzuki, a Buddhist from Japan, in performing his task, has carefully compared the two Chinese versions made in the sixth and the eighth centuries of the Christian era, and taken pains in every way to render the meaning of the original intelligible to the Western reader. An introduction on the life of Ācâvaghoṣha and his place in the history of thought, a glossary, and many explanatory notes have been added. The work is adorned with a frontispiece illustrating the philosophical conception of the Mahâyâna prevalent in Northern Asia,—the same illustration that accompanies this note. All in all, it is confidently expected that it will serve Buddhist scholars as a trustworthy guide through the labyrinthine maze of Mahâyânic speculative doctrines.

And now to a characterisation of the Mahâyâna doctrine in general. It must be borne in mind that the names Mahâyâna and Hinayâna were invented by supporters of the Mahâyâna, for the Buddhists of the Southern church never called their religion the Hinayâna, or small vehicle. Nor is the difference so rigorously marked as it seems to be, according to the usual Western representations of Bud-

dhism. The main difference is this: That the ascetic elements are more emphasised among Southern Buddhists than among Northern Buddhists. Northern Buddhism endeavors to actualise the ideal of a world-religion that will help not only single thinkers, but great masses. Buddhist missionaries always availed themselves of every opportunity to point out the way of salvation. Being very broad, they admitted mythological elements, and have to a great extent assimilated the religious views of the Thibetans, the Chinese, and the Japanese. By adapting their religion to the conditions of the various countries, they succeeded in spreading Buddhism all over Asia, and changed the wild hordes of Mongolian robbers into peace-abiding and charity-loving nations.

There existed in Buddha's day various tendencies among his followers; some were severe, some more liberal, while still others were inclined to mysticism, and cherished the hope of working miracles by faith or prayer and incantation or other religious means. Buddha's position, it appears, was that of a peace-maker. He taught his own doctrines without resorting to persecution or oppression. While he preached that a layman who had freed his heart from clinging could attain Nirvāṇa, he did not directly prevent the ascetic from self-mortification. He only interfered when they overstepped the limit and became inhumanly cruel to themselves. He expressly allowed his followers to accept garments and to dress themselves in yellow robes given to them by the wealthy members of the laity; but he allowed those who continued the old usage of clothing themselves in cast-off rags collected from refuse and cemeteries, to continue their habits according to the narrowness of their conceptions, until this narrowness had given way to broader views.

The same holds good of Buddhist ethics in general. Buddha himself ate meat, and did not forbid his followers from doing the same, pointing out that not what enters the mouth makes a man unclean, but what comes out of it,—words that strongly remind one of the parallel passage in the New Testament.

Centuries passed, and, as was natural, the narrow conception of Buddhism was deemed the more holy one among the masses of the people, and thus the monkish method of attaining salvation gained the ascendancy. Representatives of this conviction held their councils and proclaimed themselves the only true followers of Buddha. Documents of this kind induced European scholars actually to regard them as such, and to look upon representatives of the Mahāyāna as an aberration from the original teachings of Buddha. The Mahāyāna school, however, retaliated. They proclaimed their doctrines as the only true Buddhism, calling their church the Mahāyāna, or the large vehicle of salvation, and characterising their more ascetic brethren, who limited all their efforts to saving their own selves, as the Hinayāna, or the small vehicle of salvation. They enumerated seven great characteristics of the Mahāyāna, and insisted upon them as reasons why it was greater than the Hinayāna.¹

The central idea of the Mahāyāna philosophy is a belief in the Dharmakāya by which is meant that all the suchness in the world (bhūtatathatā), all that constitutes the determining factors in the chains of cause and effect (commonly called natural laws by Western scientists) form one great system which is the personality of the Tathāgata, that is, the prototype of Buddha. But, of course, we must bear in mind that in the body of these natural laws the spiritual and moral laws are not only included, but are even deemed to be its paramount and significant features; and they are not a dead letter, but a living and all-effective presence. Sometimes

¹Enumerated in the Yogacārabhūmi-Sāstra, Abhidharmasamgraha-Sāstra, and the Prakaraṇārayavacā-Sastra.
expressions are used to make us believe that this body of the good law is regarded as conscious, and it is called at the same time Samyaksambodhi, that is, the most perfect wisdom.

The material world, commonly regarded as the world of sin by adherents of the Hinayāna, is no longer rejected as bad in itself; it is bad only in so far as it does not yet bear the stamp of the Tathāgata’s wisdom.

A TYPICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MAHĀYĀNA FAITH.

There is a contrast between the particular and the universal; the particular is to be an exemplification of the universal, and if it is so, the former is as dignified as the latter. As soon as the particular attains to the universal and exemplifies the wisdom of universal law, it has attained to perfection, and a man of such disposition of heart is said to live in Nirvāṇa.
The philosophical conception of the Mahāyāna is illustrated in the accompanying picture which is found in Buddhist temples all over Northern Asia: We see Buddha enthroned as the Buddha of the good law; at his right side universality is enthroned on the lion, and is revered under the name Mañjuśrī; on the left side, particularity, called Samantabhadra, is seated on the elephant. The former represents wisdom and strength, the latter love and charity. Further down, we see two historical figures—the two chief disciples of the Tathāgata; Ānanda stands under Samantabhadra, or particularity, representing the loving-kindness of Buddhism, and Kācyapa, sometimes called Mahākācyapa, the formulator of doctrines and the intellectual leader among Buddha's disciples, stands under Mañjuśrī, or universality.

The illustration is typical, and an outline-drawing of this conception is also printed as the frontispiece to the great edition of the Mahāyāna text in Chinese, which enthusiastic Japanese believers in Buddhism undertook in 1881-1884. It was painted by Somé Yūki, a Japanese artist, who executed the picture according to the traditional style, after patterns which visitors to Buddhist temples may remember having frequently seen in Buddhist sanctuaries.

BOOK NOTICES.

Dr. Ferris Greenslet, Fellow in English in Columbia University, has recently published in attractive form a study of Joseph Glanvill, a prominent divine and publicist of the seventeenth century. Dr. Greenslet's book is the thesis which he presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Columbia University, and offers a readable, critical review of the development of English thought and letters in Glanvill's time. (New York : The Macmillan Co. 1900. Pages, xi, 235. Price, $1.50.)

The latest issue of the Citizen's Library of Economics, Politics, and Sociology, edited by Prof. Richard T. Ely, is a discussion of Economic Crises by Prof. Edward D. Jones, of the University of Wisconsin. Professor Jones's definition of a crisis is that of a disturbance of the equilibrium between demand and supply, and he believes that a helpful view of the causes of crises may be obtained by arranging them according as they arise from the side of demand and supply. He studies the effect which the increased use of capital has upon crises, the relation of legislation to crises, the effects of crises upon the wage system, the periodicity of crises, and the psychology of crises. (New York and London : The Macmillan Co. 1900. Pages, 251. Price, $1.25.)

Dr. John Bates Clark, Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University, is the author of a portly volume bearing the title The Distribution of Wealth, A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits, the purpose of which is to show that the "distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent creates." He claims to have discovered "a method by which the product of labor everywhere may be disentangled from the product of cooperating agents and separately identified." This is something for which both laborer and capitalist, each of whom deems himself unfairly rewarded