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Secessionist Movements: An Analytical Framework

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From Katanga to Quebec to the Jura of Switzerland to Armenia, new secessionist movements rise to the surface while others rejuvenate after a certain period of hibernation. Secessionist movements have become a menace to the international political order by creating anarchy and conflict. They are fueled by a basic human aspiration for self-determination. As a phenomenon, secession has been around for centuries. However, the post World War Two and post Cold War eras provided fertile ground for their growth, as the colonial powers arbitrarily carved out non-assimilated people and formed artificial sovereign states.

Several political analysts have been using the terms secession and separatism interchangeably. At this point it would be wise to differentiate between several political phenomena, which all swamp the pure issue of secession. Secession is demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status (Beran 1984, Heraclides 1992 and Wood 1981). The aim is to redraw the boundaries instead of moving out of the control of the host state. Separatism is merely demand for formal autonomy (Heraclides 1992). Irredentism refers to formal withdrawal from one state in order to join another. Buchanan (1991b, 10) wants to eliminate this distinction between secession and its special exception, irredentism. However, this distinction is essential as the state that wants to accept the minority in question adds complexity to the whole dispute. War may be the only solution
as the receiving state may be looking at economic or military
gains, such as oil fields or mountains suitable for natural
defense against the host state (Buchanan 1991b).

To this date there have been sporadic attempts to categorize
and analyze past and present secessionist movements in order
to predict future attempts. This study attempts to formulate
a concise theory on the justifiable reasons for secession, then
presents several secessionist movements through a historical
perspective and finally attempts to critique and categorize
them according to various degrees of legitimacy of secession.

A theory of secession should contain several elements.
It should include the preconditions of secession, the rise of
secessionist movements and the effectiveness of their actions,
the response of central governments, confrontational developments
between the secessionist unit and the host state and finally,
resolution of secessionist crises based on certain normative
rules (Wood 1981). This essay deals in part with the resolution
of the secessionist crises and in particular with their
legitimacy in the international arena. The theory will attempt
to answer an old but fundamental question. How do we as members
of the international community respond to such claims? When
is a secessionist movement legitimate? The purpose is ultimately
comparative. This framework will give us guidance.

Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) have used their
power and influence in the past to support certain secessionist
movements, while crushing others. Therefore, political
scientists need to start using the same standards to all future
secessionist movements. However, providing a list of reasons for moral legitimacy of secession will not suffice. A scale has to be established. The more conditions a secessionist movement satisfies, the more sound the legitimacy for secession will be. However, every secession case needs to be checked individually. Secession has a moral character and it always has a right and a wrong.

It is interesting to note that none of the great philosophers of history such as Marx, Mill, Locke, Rousseau, Plato, Hobbes or Hegel have given much thought to the idea of secession (Buchanan 1991b and 1992), while the notion of self-determination has been traced to Aristotle (Kampelman 1993). During the 16th and 17th century Althusius claimed secession was possible in order to avoid tyranny and Pufendorf advocated that the ruler had absolute sovereignty and therefore, groups could not secede (Beran 1984). A convenient explanation may be that they may have never had to face a secession case. A great deal of state disputes were resolved by the military.

It was not until the American Civil War that political philosophers came to realize a relatively new phenomenon (Buchanan 1992). After all, political divorce from a state was unheard of. Nevertheless, a complete and systematic political analysis on secession was still in its infancy.

A theory on the legitimacy of secessionist movements is desperately needed within the international political arena. The media bombards people every day with news of new and resurging secessionist movements. The 90s has experienced a
rash of uncontrolled nationalism, which may have disastrous effect on the international political order (Buchanan 1991b, 2).

This theory has to be practical first and normative second. It will defuse and possibly solve problems of indefinite divisibility of minority populations. As long as there are major differences between populations, the potential for the development of secession remains viable. The international community will be able to help stranded or trapped minorities that have become weak politically or militarily. A practical theory on the legitimacy of secession may put an end to the fear of indefinite divisibility of states (Heraclides 1992) and to the creation of inviable political and economic entities (only due to absence of free trade) and thus may prevent the addition of stress to the already strained economic arena. It may prevent any damage to the will of the majority or the minority by not allowing anyone of the parties to blackmail the other. Finally, it may end inappropriate action taken by IGOs and streamline their efforts (Heraclides 1992).

Self-determination, diversity and the pursuit of liberty place highly on the agenda of liberalism (Buchanan 1991b, 4). However, liberalism does not recognize group rights as it relates to secession (Buchanan 1991b, 7), which is inconsistent with the notion of accepting freedom as the ultimate political value (Beran 1988). Birch (1984) claims that individuals have the right of voice in a democratic state which falls in line with self-determination. Nevertheless, secession is attempted by
cultural groups when their host state does not include them in the decision-making process, as will be shown in the case studies later on. Beran (1988) points out that if individuals have the right of voice, then according to liberalism, they should automatically have the right to exit.

A report by an International Commission of Jurists published in 1972 went so far as to suggest that the right of secession can only be exercised once (Kampelman 1993). Birch (1984) also claims that once individuals are committed to a state, that they should have substantial grievances in order to justify their exit. Political association is not unalterable and is created to satisfy the needs of the people that live within it (Buchanan 1991a). The exceptions include the inviability of the new state (only due to absence of free trade), exploitation of sub-groups within it, and inability to recognize other potential secessionist movements in the future (Beran 1988). However, Beran (1988) does not permit the secession of an area which is culturally, militarily and economically essential to the host state and contains a high share of the economic resources. Beran (1984) writes that Dahl and Tufte have shown that there is no relationship between the viability of the state and its size, because no one state depends exclusively on a single resource. Therefore, it should not be a point of interest whether a secessionist movement wants to abstract a high share of resources or value from the host state, as the latter will still survive through trade.

In the early 1900s, the League of Nations endorsed minority
group rights in general, short of secession. Even Woodrow Wilson did not endorse secession, except in the case of colonialism (Kampelman 1993). Roosevelt advocated that self-determination did not imply fragmentation of a nation (Kampelman 1993).

A change occurred during the interwar period as Hitler abused his notion of minority rights. He justified his conquests of Checkoslovakia and Poland by invoking the rights of German minorities. Therefore, after 1945 the international community treated minorities as merely cultural groups without any political clout. The United Nations supported national self-determination on the one hand, but refused to support any secessionist movements in the developed world. Its aim was to end colonialism in the Third World peacefully, mostly because the states that emerged from the era of colonialism were arbitrarily carved without any considerations for the ethnic groups involved (Buchanan 1991b, 20 and 1992). The U.N. Anti-Colonial Declaration of 1960 disapproved of any attempt to fragment the national unity of a state (Heraclides 1992). Nevertheless, it has recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in spite of its earlier claim. Since the advent of the Jewish holocaust, the U.N. has pushed aside its dogma on minority rights and has pushed human rights instead (Buchanan 1992). International law recognizes only sovereign states and their individuals. It would be violating the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign country, thus causing international anarchy (Buchanan 1992).

Self-determination refers only to the right of a majority
within a political unit to the exercise of power. Any association between the right of self-determination and the right of secession by the U.N. would have brought international anarchy to the Cold War era, as the US would support one side and the Soviet Union the other (Buchanan 1992). States and other IGOs have the capacity to act indirectly as intermediaries, as in the case of the Tutu and Houtsi in Rwanda. They can act as providers of humanitarian aid, as in the city of Sarajievo Bosnia. Lastly, they can take the side of the majority or the seceding minority group.

In a democratic framework an individual has the right to choose his own government. Beran (1988) points out that liberty is a fundamental political value and that the willingness of its citizens should be the only concern to the international community. However, practically this world can only support the growth of a finite number of viable sovereign states. What criteria should the international community use in order to accommodate the minority group? This theory on the legitimacy of secessionist movements does not prevent any cultural group from attempting to secede, but serves to guide the United Nations and other IGOs into supporting cultural groups that have a high level of legitimacy. Buchanan states (1991b, 21 and 1992) that illegitimate minority groups may potentially seek out milder alternatives to secession first, such as limited autonomy, federalism, confederalism. Secession is legitimate only under certain circumstances that will be discussed in the theory below.
The Theory

First, the legitimacy of a secessionist movement depends upon the presence of a defined territory. Buchanan (1992) states that a contiguous majority within the previously defined territory and the application of the Harm Principle, which does not allow interference with a group of individuals so long as their decisions do not harm others, are desirable elements that increase the legitimacy of the seceding group. Furthermore, the seceding group may accommodate the minority within that territory, by buying their property and protecting their interests and rights of expression, religion, association, due process and participation in political processes in case they decide to remain as citizens of the seceding nations (Buchanan 1991b, 29-30). Therefore, the existence of a seceding majority within a defined territory increases the legitimacy of that group.

Second, Buchanan (1991b, 32) says that John Stuart Mill has argued that diversity makes a contribution toward social utility (Buchanan 1991b, 32). However, the result of the increased level of diversity that the new state brings will be realized only through the permeability of its external barriers. Foreign trade, intercultural associations and membership in international organizations are some factors that bring about a change in permeability, thus increasing global diversity. The argument for increased diversity becomes stronger when the seceding cultural group has no political representation in the host country. Therefore, the increased diversity that
the seceding group brings to the world increases its legitimacy.

Third, the original states that formed the union in America had set some goals. During the Civil War some of the states saw fit to secede from the union because it did not measure up to their expectations. The exit of a seceding group from a state may be possible when the state is no longer able to satisfy the original goals and expectations upon which the state was formed. Buchanan (1991b) states that the seceding group may be allowed to immigrate or secede with their land especially if the seceding group was a sovereign state at the time of entry. Therefore, the seceding group gains legitimacy when their goals and expectations have changed over time.

Fourth, Buchanan states that certain states systematically draw resources from one group and deposit them with another on purpose (Buchanan 1991b, 40). This unequal treatment creates a net flow not only of money but of manpower as well from one region of the country to another. In contrast with Buchanan's (1992) suggestion that a transfer from the rich citizens to the poor citizens is not an injustice, many other means exist by which a government can increase the standard of living of poor areas without transferring resources from the rich to the poor. For example the government can transfer technology for new industrial complexes and thus create new jobs in the poor areas. It can educate individuals and return them to their homeland to prosper. However, discrimination on the part of the government, or even lack of respect, might accelerate the process of secession. Change occurs when something does not
function right. The power exercised by the government ends where the unjust exploitation of a certain number of its citizens begins (Buchanan 1991b). Therefore, the seceding group gains legitimacy in cases of discriminatory redistribution.

Examples of discriminatory redistribution include the Basque region in Spain which has been paying three times the percentage of state expenditures. The Biafra region in Nigeria contained 22% of the population, contributed 38% of the revenues while it received only 14% of the state expenditures. Furthermore, the Katanga region in Congo contributed 50% of the revenues while it received only 20% back. Discriminatory redistribution occurs on an environmental basis as well as economic. There have been numerous reports from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which cite high birth defect rates as a result of the concentration of Soviet heavy industry (Buchanan 1991b, 1991a and 1992).

Fifth, history provides evidence of overextended political units swelling to empires. As the empire grows larger it becomes unable to cope with the increasing number of problems from the countryside. Therefore, the empire's administrators focus their resources and time on the problems of their major cities. Therefore, the efficiency of the public administration infrastructure declines. Renaissance cities such as Florence and Venice were incorporated into greater nation-states because they were too small to protect their trade routes (Buchanan 1991b, 45-46). Today, small and weak states rely on international bodies for their protection (Buchanan 1992).
One of the subordinate reasons the Soviet Union broke up was due to decreased efficiency within the seceding states. Mass quantities of grain and other products spoiled in their storage bins because they could not reach the big cities in time due to transportation deficiencies and inefficient administration. Therefore, the anticipation of increased efficiency of public administration by the seceding group increases its legitimacy.

Sixth, the United Nations Charter (Article 1 and 55), the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaim a right for self-determination for all people. The key word is people. It refers to groups of individuals that have a common culture, religion, shared traditions, language, ethics, customs and above all history. The people form the basis for a nation. These factors differentiate the term nation from the political boundaries of a country. Unfortunately, there are very few places in the world that are homogeneous. Often, a mixture of nations occupy a common area of land. Unlike a sovereign state, the boundaries of a nation are quite fuzzy. With the advent of the information superhighway the boundaries become even fuzzier, as cultural elements from one nation enter another. For example, are German-Americans living in the US members of the German nation? What about the individuals that satisfy some but certainly not all of the features that constitute a nation?

Ethnic identities can be object of political manipulation
(Wood 1981). In F.Y.R.O.M. (Macedonia), for example, the Yugoslav leader Tito forged a nation called Macedonia to serve his political ambitions of keeping Macedonia as a state within the Yugoslav federation. Several groups consisting of Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians had developed irredentist views after the second World War aspiring to join their respective nations. Therefore, the existence of features of primordial nationalism within a seceding group increases their legitimacy.

Seventh, a cultural group may vie for secession if they feel that their culture is truly threatened from extinction. A culture's value is determined by its contribution to the lives of the people who live by it and by the people who indirectly come into contact with it (Buchanan 1991b, 52). However, a culture may only be saved when the individuals within that culture want it saved and when it is beyond their capacity to act. Examples include, the Armenians of Turkey which have been systematically slaughtered and the French-speaking citizens of Quebec which are assimilated by the English-speaking Canadians (Buchanan 1991b, 55). Once secession is successful the new constitution can warrant a right of exit in the future for various ethnic groups living within it by providing difficult but surmountable barriers (Buchanan 1992). The region can be allowed to secede only if the vast majority decides that it is wise to do so (Birch 1984). An important factor in the decision is the presence of a distinctive economic interest (Hechter 1992). An exception to the rule would be cultures that are so violent and anti-human that should not warrant
preservation, such as the Nazis (Buchanan 1991b). Therefore, the preservation of a distinct culture by a seceding group, when other alternatives to secession are not available, increases its legitimacy.

Eight, many times the majority within the host state or a second sovereign state act aggressively toward the minority group and threaten to exterminate it. The host state may not be willing to apply any defensive measures in order to stop the aggression. Therefore, the minority group wants to secede in order to prepare its own defense against the aggressor by strengthening its economic and military status, by asking for aid from other states and IGOs (Buchanan 1991b, 65). An excellent example is the case of the people of Armenia that inhabit parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria. Two weeks ago the Turkish army invaded the northern province of Iraq in order to exterminate certain leaders of the Armenian Liberation Army. Iraq does not think highly of the Armenian people and does not want to oppose the Turkish invasion. Therefore, the Armenians want to secede from all three states and form their own sovereign state. Therefore, the anticipation of threat from an external to the seceding group source increases the legitimacy of that group to secede in order to defend itself from the aggression.

Nine, the minority group may have been a sovereign state until the time it was unjustly annexed by another state. Buchanan (1991b) points out that the secession is simply the reappropriation of stolen property by the rightful owner. This statement begs the question of who is the rightful owner. The
Soviet Union annexed the three Baltic Republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania during World War two. In 1991 the three republics declared their claim to secession by arguing that the territory was unjustly taken by the Soviets. However, how old does the claim to ownership have to be in order to be valid? The claim of the Baltic Soviet Republic was valid for two reasons. First they were annexed as a result of a unilateral declaration of war and second they existed as sovereign states before the annexation trying to do everything in their power to avoid the conflict. Therefore, the legitimacy of the seceding group increases when it claims to reappropriate stolen property or territory.

Finally, the theory of liberalism proclaims that each people has the right of self-determination. The number of nations occupying this Earth is large. Practically, the number of potential nations far exceeds the number of viable states, even though there is no direct relationship between the viability of a state and its size. The wealthy states that are small in size became wealthy before they were reduced in size. the opposite may not be true. The United Nations is flooded with applications for financial aid to Third World countries. U.N. resources have been stretched to the limit after the humanitarian aid missions to Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Therefore, the international community has to look into the survivability of these aspiring and emerging secessionist movements. Nationalism is on the rise as new cultural groups learn from the mistakes of the old ones. The ease of success of secessionist movements
in the former Soviet Union has provided the spark for the emergence of new groups. Issues that were previously not discussed within the framework of the seceding group now receive the center of attention. Some may want to refer to Monaco or Cyprus which have a population of less than a million. Nevertheless, these countries had a strong and relatively homogeneous society as well as a powerful economy. Therefore, the legitimacy of the seceding group increases when it is wealthy and/or favors free trade.

Before examining the legitimacy of claims to secessionist self-determination, I must examine some basic facts with respect to the history and development of the different secessionist movements worldwide. After each case study, the secessionist movement rated according to the aforementioned theory. However, there are two traps with such an approach. First, most political scientists advocate secession only under certain conditions mentioned in their theories. Secession is not a privilege but a right (McGee 1992). When a group has the right to secede, the theory provides a measure of the level of legitimacy present in that society. Second, when a group satisfies only a fraction of the criteria its legitimacy to secede is lessened? Many people die on the altar of secession trying to exercise their right. A lot of money are spent to advance a secessionist cause. These are some of the reasons why I say that this theory determines the legitimacy of secessionist movements.

The case studies examined are the Katanga secession of Congo, the Naga secession of India, the Kurd secession of Iraq,
Syria, Turkey and U.S.S.R., the Bangladesh secession of Pakistan, the Biafra secession of Nigeria, the Eritrea secession of Ethiopia, the Equatorian secession of South Sudan and the Quebec secession of Canada.
CASE STUDIES

The Katanga Secession of Congo

Congo was the second-largest country in Africa on June 30, 1960, at the time of its independence. Katanga, its southeastern province, declared its independence on July 11. Out of all the African states that gained their independence Congo was the least prepared state. It was a meltingpot of about 150 ethnic groups that spoke forty languages. The three largest ethnic groups were the Baluba, the Lunda and the Bayeke. Since Katanga was the richest province of Congo, it was swamped with immigrants from the neighboring province of Kasai (Heraclides, 1991).

The secessionist party called Conakat formed in 1958 as a reaction to the influx of poor immigrants, who amounted to 38% of the population. The recruitment of the immigrants by the mining companies, falling copper prices and the increasing political activity of the immigrants all resulted in the formation of Conakat. Its purpose was the establishment of a sovereign state that would be governed only by the Katangese. However, the viability of Congo lay in the copper minefields of Katanga. The public sentiment favored full secession while some of its leaders favored separatism. The secessionist movement died out in 1963 after the deterioration of relations between the Katangese leaders and Belgium. Furthermore, the U.N.-US diplomatic offensive isolated the province economically and politically, which led to the downfall of the Katanga regime. Kennedy's administration advocated that Congo would not be viable
without the province of Katanga and would thus fall in the hands of the Communists (Heraclides, 1991).

The Katangese legitimized their secession with arguments of violent atrocities by the host government, of legitimate authority to rule their own homeland (based on election results), of refusals by the host government to compromise and of the economic benefits to the rest of the states of Central Africa (Heraclides, 1991).

The Biafra Secession of Nigeria

Nigeria became independent in October 1960. Seven years later and after two coup attempts the Eastern region of Nigeria seceded calling itself the Republic of Biafra. Nigeria, like Congo, was highly heterogeneous and consisted of more than 400 ethnic groups. The Ibo group comprised about 64% of the Eastern region and were educated, economically affluent and held many government positions. The Northern region remained the most dominant group until 1966, when a military group belonging to the Ibo group organized a coup. The Ibo of the Eastern region remained in power for a year, until the Northern region organized their own coup and regained control. That coup lay the foundation for the ensuing secessionist movement in the Eastern region known as Biafra. Massacres and atrocities ensued for two years (until 1968), which brought about a million refugees to the Eastern region. The rest of Nigeria wanted a tight federation, but the Easterners desired to achieve sovereignty. Neither side was capable militarily of action. Therefore, each side attempted to penetrate the international system but with
limited success. Biafra fought well on the battlefield as well as the diplomatic table, with help from the Nixon administration and French arms (Heraclides 1991).

The arguments for the legitimacy of secession on the side of Biafra were the pre-war massacres, the reluctance of the Nigerian state to accept any other compromise except surrender, the use of a land and marine blockade to starve the population, the bombing of civilians and the cultural threat from the rest of Nigeria (Heraclides 1991).

The Southern Sudan Secession

Sudan became independent on January 1, 1956. 40% of the population was Arab even though they were concentrated in the north. From 1930 on, the southern province of Equatoria was treated separately from the northern by the English, so that the Africans would not be subject to Arab culturalism and could therefore develop a line of their own. Southern Sudan became a distinct entity both in their minds as well as in the minds of foreigners as a result of British policy. The Southerners were African, black, underdeveloped, poor, rural and Christian, while the Northerners were white, Arab, rich and Muslims. The infrastructure of the government lay mostly in the hands of the Sudanese Arabs. From 1947 until a few months prior to Sudan's independence the Sudanese Africans pressed for a federation or autonomy in order to rid themselves of the second-class citizenship. The Southerners tried to remedy the situation by democratic means and were very close to obtaining their goals by 1958. However, a military coup by the North
vanished any hopes that the South might have of gaining some political clout. By 1960 the Southerners resorted to an armed struggle. Nevertheless, the Southerners could not mount the same kind of international activity as the Biafrans or the Katangans, as the oil reserves were not discovered until 1979. By 1968 they wanted full sovereignty. Soviet and radical Arab involvement in the crisis was increasing. The CIA and Israel became involved in the mid-sixties but the war and the secessionist movement ended in 1972 as it was forgotten in the West. Finally, no IGOs were directly involved in the conflict (Heraclides 1991).

The arguments for the legitimacy of the South Sudanese secessionist movement were mainly black nationalism, self-determination, extreme inequality (politically and economically), threat of assimilation by the Arabs, reluctance on the part of the Arabs to even consider the Southern Sudanese's claims to autonomy or federalism and violent atrocities. However, there was still some concern over the viability of the aspiring state and inter-ethnic conflicts.

The Kurdistan Secession

Kurdistan is a nation divided between Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Soviet Union and Turkey, as a result of the arbitrary carving of states from the former Ottoman Empire after World War two. The Kurdish have lived in the same vicinity since the Persian Empire two thousand years ago. However, it has assimilated itself into a nation only from the turn of the century, even though it was internationally recognized as a minority group
before the formation of Iraq. The treaty of Sevres in 1922, which provided autonomy to the Kurds, was replaced by the new treaty of Lausanne in 1923. On January 22 1946 the Kurds of Iran declared their independence, which lasted for a year until it was crushed by the Shah of Iran. During the 60s and the 70s the Kurds held fundraisers for promotional purposes in Lausanne, but could not sustain international interest. However, their goal was vague. Some of the leaders wanted autonomy, others tight or loose federation and others wanted a confederation.

The Bangladesh Secession of Pakistan

Pakistan became independent in 1947 when it was part of India. This action separated the Muslims from the Hindus. It is difficult to carry out an analysis on this conflict based on religion. It is also necessary to carry out an analysis of the social and cultural factors imposed by the British rule (Heraclides 1991 and Kumar 1990).

There were two wings in Pakistan at the time of its formation. They split in 1971 because the West Pakistanis and the Eastern Pakistanis had linguistic (very few East Pakistanis could speak Urdu, the official language of Pakistan), cultural and social differences. Communication and transportation problems ensued as soon as Pakistan was formed due to the great distance that spans between them. East and West Pakistan were never one nation, as they had no common history, no common consciousness or ethnicity (Heraclides 1991). In fact, the first signs of nationalism were present in the 1830s (Soumitra
1992). The Pakistani leaders wanted to forge a nation (Heraclides 1991). East Pakistan was relatively homogeneous, while West Pakistan was trying to unify its four ethnic groups (Burcheit 1978). Economic conditions for the East Pakistanis went from bad to worse, as a result of extreme corruption (Heraclides 1991 and Burcheit 1978). In 1966 the East Pakistanis proposed a system of loose federation. The election system changed to one-man one-vote in 1970, which gave an overwhelming majority to East Pakistan in the legislature. The East Pakistanis started to strengthen their military. In 1971 they wanted nothing short of complete independence. The West Pakistani Army occupied Bangladesh (East Bengal before 1946) during that year. The Pakistani Air Force attacked India's airfields and started a war on December 4 1971, which ended with Bangladesh's independence days later (Heraclides 1991).

Bangladesh's main arguments for legitimacy of their secessionist movement was self-determination, atrocities during the late 60s, linguistic, cultural differences, discriminatory redistribution (as evident from the per capita income difference between West and East Pakistan), absence of any historical or ethnic ties (Heraclides 1991). The main motive for secession in East Pakistan has been associated with socio-economic factors such as the contradictions between big traders and the poor. These factors were largely ignored by India and the rest of the world (Kumar 1990). Therefore, the majority of states in the U.N. voted against the secession (Heraclides 1991).

The Eritrean Secession of Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the only African country that has not been
colonized by the West. The Italians tried to colonize the region
in the late 30s, but were beaten in the battle of Adowa. The
government remained autocratic until 1974 when the king Selassie
was deposed. Eritrea was a region on the northeast boundaries
of Ethiopia effectively blocking Ethiopia's access to the Red
Sea. At the time of annexation the population of Eritrea
numbered four million, which was about 10% of the total Ethiopian
population with the land percentage being about the same. The
population living in Eritrea was fairly homogeneous comprised
of an equal number of Muslims and Tigrinyans (Heraclides 1991).
The Soviet Union advocated self-determination in the form of
full sovereignty, while the US favored the king's position of
a loose federation. Therefore, the U.N. established a federation
with Ethiopia and Eritrea as its two federated states in 1950.
However, there were sporadic arguments for secession from the
late 40s. Their targets for political support included
neighboring African states such as Egypt, Libya, Somalia, as
well as the US and Israel. However, in 1976 the Eritreans
switched to the Soviet camp and received support only from
conservative African states. During the 60s Ethiopia succeeded
in annexing the Eritrean region and reducing its Assembly to
a powerless entity. The armed struggle of the Eritreans started
in 1961 as a result of the annexation and continues currently
(Heraclides 1991).

The Eritrean arguments for the legitimacy of their
secessionist movement include self-determination, atrocities
from the king, oppression, black colonialism, the abolishment of the freedom to assemble, to free speech, free elections to the point of suspension of the Eritrean constitution (Heraclides 1991).

The Naga Secession of India

The Naga are situated in the northeast region of India. They reside in a highly heterogeneous part of India. The Naga are Mongolian in origin and retain a distinct cultural background. They are divided into 14 tribes with some linguistic differences. From the time of the British occupation on through the Indian independence they were treated differently and isolated, effectively becoming second-class citizens. In 1947 the Naga opted for autonomy with an option to secede in ten years. Therefore, in 1956 they requested full independence but were denied by the Indian government. Many riots ensued (Bucheit 1978).

However, the political situation changed in 1962 when the Indian government changed its stance and its constitution in order to calm down the riots. In 1963 India declared that the Nagaland was given the full rights of statehood within India. The Naga were not satisfied and again declared full independence. They explained that their territory was never conquered by the Indian Army, but was forced into a union with India by the British. They subsequently turned down a plea of autonomy from India, but accepted a cease-fire which lasted from 1964 to 1972. However, by 1967 they were receiving support from Pakistan and China. The successful secession of Bangladesh diverted troops
to Nagaland and the Naga themselves could not use Bangladesh as their guerrilla battlefield. Therefore, from 1971 on their military power was minimized and subsequently put down in 1975. The secessionist leaders were given amnesty. The result was that Nagaland remained a state within India. Many Naga saw this as a favorable turnout of the conflict, as they gained their cultural autonomy. Secession may not have been a perfect idea anymore, since Nagaland would not have survived politically and economically (Bucheit 1978).

The arguments for the legitimacy of the Nagaland secessionist movement were self-determination, atrocities by undisciplined Indian troops. Nevertheless, their population was not homogeneous and the Naga leaders could not prove that their cause was supported by a majority of the population (Bucheit 1978).

The Quebec Secession of Canada

Canada is a heterogeneous confederate country with a population of about 23 million, two-thirds of which speak English. The rest speak French and reside within the boundaries of Quebec, comprising about 80% of the state's population. Their economy and culture is largely dominated by the Anglo-Canadians. Therefore, most Franco-Canadians were dissatisfied with the present situation. Since the 50s Franco-Canadians's numbers and income seem to declining, while the unemployment rate has risen (Flowers 1984).

Bilingualism started in 1867 when the French were defeated by the British and resulted in a federated country. From then
on Canada accepted this dispersed nationalism and slowly began to change from an agrarian society to a structure of urban and industrial megalopolis. By 1960 the Francophones started to implement a plan to raise their income and status. During the 60s and early 70s a blossom of new secessionist parties and terrorist organizations promoted an independent Quebec. The general population, however, was not too keen on independence. Its major ally has been France. Presidents De Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing overtly gave support for a free Quebec, while reaping personal benefits from their speeches in upcoming elections. In 1980 there was a referendum posed by Parti Quebecois, the ruling party since 1976, which opted for sovereignty of Quebec. However, most of the French population said no to independence. From then on Quebec tried to muster internal support for its cause instead of seeking international recognition. Nationalism was difficult to exploit, non-radical and non-violent. The case of Quebec has shown that even though international organizations fail to recognize secessionist movements as wholes they may recognize ethnic groups seeking only autonomy.

**SUMMARY**

Examining the case studies I sought to find out how they fit the theory on the legitimacy of secession. First, the secessionist movements of Katanga, Sudan, Bangladesh and Eritrea had a defined territorial base. They defined their territory through the use of the host state's external borders and
administrative internal subdivisions. The remaining four had a territory defined culturally. The defined territory enveloped members of the ethnic group arbitrarily, transgressing borders of sovereign states.

Second, the secessionist movements of Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh and Eritrea brought about an increase in global diversity. They were unique culturally and historically. The remaining movements had citizens in neighboring countries which did not want to become part of the secession. The Katangese ethnic groups could be found in the rest of Congo, while there was a small amount of white colonialists. The Ibo citizens of Biafra could be found in the rest of Nigeria, while the Naga were basically Indians that evolved to adapt to the Himalayas. The Franco-phones of Quebec are nothing more than Canadians speaking French. A similar culture can be found in the rest of Canada and France.

Third, the secessionist movements in Biafra, Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland observed changes in their original goals and aspirations of the host state after its formation. Most of the aforementioned ethnic groups were forced to join the arbitrarily carved post-colonial states. The Katangese secession could not have been due to these changes as independence was sought days after the independence of Congo. The secession of Quebec also could not be attributed to these changes, as it has its own legislature and enjoys partial autonomy in a federal system.

Fourth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra,
Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh and Eritrea were victims of discriminatory redistribution. Resources were systematically drawn out of these regions and invested in the rest of the host state. The Naga were nomads and could not be assessed any taxes. Furthermore, resources were scarce in the Himalayas. In the case of Quebec the majority of the taxes stayed within the state of Quebec, while the other regions of Quebec enjoyed the same standard of living.

Fifth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland sought an increase in the efficiency of their public administration infrastructure. In most cases the host states were either too large to assume the basic responsibilities of a state efficiently or too underdeveloped to support the seceding region. In the extreme case of Bangladesh, the host country Pakistan was thousands of miles away. Biafra's and Quebec's administrative structures were at the same level of development as in the rest of Nigeria and Canada respectively.

Sixth, the secessionist movements in Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Quebec were fueled by primordial nationalism. They were homogenous and compact. The Katangese secession was supported by 150 different ethnic groups, while the Biafran by more than 400 and the Naga by about 14.

Seventh, the secessionist movements in Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Quebec aimed at the preservation of a distinct culture. Some features that can be attributed to a distinct culture include common language, tradition, history
and religion. Again, the movements in Katanga, Biafra and Nagaland were too heterogeneous to constitute a distinct culture.

Eighth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra, Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland anticipated external threat either from the host state or from a third state. Most of the movements were characterized by numerous deaths of supporters. The only movement that has not anticipated any form of physical threat is the one in Quebec.

Ninth, the secessionist movements in Sudan and Kurdistan were victims of rectificatory injustice. Sudan was taken by the Arabs and slowly assimilated, while Kurdistan was dismembered by Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The rest of the movements had cultural control over their land but not political.

Finally, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra, Sudan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, and Quebec are considered to be viable in case secession is successful. The subjective decision is based on their overall economic situation, the presence of natural resources and their prospects for free trade.
Figure 1 summarizes the results.

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<td>8. Anticip. of threat</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>9. Rectif. injustice</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>4/10</td>
<td>9/10</td>
<td>7/10</td>
<td>9/10</td>
<td>9/10</td>
<td>3/10</td>
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Summing up the results from the examination of case studies, I observe that the theory holds true. There are four nations that have scored high, meaning they have a high degree of legitimacy with their people and may still be holding strong. First, there is one nation that has already seceded, Bangladesh, which places highly on the legitimacy scale with a relative score of 9/10. Other nations that are very likely to secede are the Sudanese-Africans (9/10), the Kurds (7/10) and the Eritreans (9/10). Second, there have been four nations that have either compromised with their host state or died out due to low support. They are the Katangese (5/10), the Biafrans (4/10), the Naga (3/10) and the Quebecois (3/10). It is interesting to note that the last two nations are the ones that
have either compromised to autonomy or federal status and have scored the lowest of them all. Therefore, it is my opinion that this theory fits the framework of international secessionist movements and should be used to measure their legitimacy or degree of solidarity. In a normative and liberal framework every secessionist movement succeeds. However, this theory is more practical than normative.

The secessionist movements with high levels of legitimacy (more than 5/10) are more likely to be supported by the United Nations and the IGOs and thus succeed, whereas the ones with low levels of legitimacy (less than 5/10) are more likely to compromise. Buchanan (1991b) points out that the right to self-determination is vague and does not necessarily mean sovereignty. Low legitimacy secessionist movements may be encouraged to try other forms of self-determination, such as autonomy, federalism, confederalism. In a democratic state political power is divided evenly among the members of the state. Other possible solutions for low legitimacy secessionist movements include the acceptance of special rights within the host state accorded only to members of the seceding group, such as a guaranteed number of seats in the legislature irrespective of their population percentage. The host state may implement longer residency requirements so as not to change the population demographics within the seceding region. It can accordspecial group property rights to members of the seceding group to discourage non-members from acquiring land within the seceding region. All these measures can be implemented instead of
secession, which can satisfy the requirements of both the host state and the seceding group.
REFERENCES


