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Democratic Repression of Non-Violent Activist Groups and the Likelihood of Political Violence

Peter Vining

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Introduction

Scholars of comparative politics and international relations rely heavily on regime typologies during research. Despite recent arguments that question their versatility and comparability (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010), scales such as Polity or Freedom House are usefully leveraged to test arguments about behaviors associated with different types of regimes. Other scholars rely on qualitative and more nuanced taxonomies of regimes, such as those proposed by Geddes (2003), Bratton & Van de Walle (1994) or Gandhi & Przeworski (2007). From these typologies, prevailing theories of state behavior have developed that frequently characterize regimes in terms of democratic or autocratic. Democracies, for example, are expected to facilitate cooperative social norms (Putnam, 1993), allocate resources through stable electoral and party institutions (Iverson & Soskice, 2007; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Carey & Shugart, 1995), and accommodate political dissent by subjecting those institutions to popular participation and competition (Huntington, 1991). Autocracies, in contrast, are expected to monopolize resource allocations for an exclusive ruling subset (Ross, 2001; Olson, 1993) and repress or encapsulate potential political opposition (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Carey, 2006; Gurr, 1970).

Focusing in particular on the democratic regularity of tolerance for political dissent, scholars have suggested that the free expression and participation of dissenters within a democratic electoral system decreases the likelihood of those dissenters resorting to violent rebellion in order to resolve their grievances Gurr (1970). In his analysis of civil conflict, Gurr argues that democratic institutions offer mechanisms through which dissent can be channeled peacefully within a democratic regime. More recent findings do suggest that established democracies are relatively less-afflicted by violent civil conflict and civil war than non-
democracies (Lacina, 2006; Hegre, 2002). In contrast to democracies, Gurr (1970) argues that autocracies use repression in order to prevent and mitigate civil conflict in all of its forms; when able to, they construct internal monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are designed to silence and/or eliminate dissenters before they can foment rebellion. Consistent with this logic, Hegre’s (2002) study also found that established autocracies were indeed less likely to experience civil war than non-autocracies.

While these characterizations of regime behaviors towards political dissent have led scholars to expect state behaviors that often prove empirically typical, it is well-known that democratic states do not always behave “democratically,” and that autocratic states do not always behave “autocratically” as might be expected. When focusing on the expectation of democratic tolerance for non-violent political dissent, examples abound to demonstrate that democracies, at times, can and do use tools of repression in order to silence or even eliminate non-violent dissenters. Historical examples include early democratic Europe’s repression of colonial subjects in Africa (Mamdani, 2001), South African repression of Black Nationalist groups prior to the end of apartheid, and American repression of identified leftist subversives during the 1950s, as well as civil rights activists during the 1960s. More recently, some democracies have repressed the activities of nonviolent Islamist groups to varying extents. Laws passed in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, United States and elsewhere have restricted and/or banned the activities of specific non-violent Islamist groups for varying reasons, most of which relate to security issues and the global “War on Terror.” Additional laws have passed in democratic countries that restrict the practicing of cultural customs often associated with Islam; France’s banning of wearing hijabs in public is a prime example.
This paper does not examine the normative ramifications of “democratic repression,” but rather investigates what security implications such behavior might have for the states exhibiting it. Specifically: how might a democracy’s use of repression against non-violent political dissenters affect the likelihood of subsequent political violence? Can democracies silence dissenters as effectively as Gurr (1970) argues that established autocracies are able to? How do repressed activists groups respond in a democratic environment? In this paper, I use dynamic network analysis in order to investigate how democratic repression of non-violent activist groups may be associated with the likelihood of political violence. Drawing on social movement theory, I argue that when forced to resort to informal channels for reorganization in democracies, repressed activists are more likely to radicalize and thus support or potentially commit acts of political violence. Repressed activists are more likely to radicalize because the informal networks that they resort to overlap with those already being used by other repressed activist groups, including those that use political violence. As a result, repressed activists establish social connections with other repressed activists, including those who advocate for or use political violence. I argue that this phenomenon occurs both domestically and internationally, because the fluidity of informal networks used by repressed activists transcends borders. As a result, democratic repression may also lead to an unintended consequence of radicalized activist proliferation abroad. Finally, I argue that this phenomenon poses a unique problem to democracies, because they lack sufficient internal monitoring and costly punishment mechanisms necessary to dismantle informal networks vis-à-vis authoritarian states. Drawing on evidence gathered from the non-violent Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, I use a comparative case study approach to analyze the extent of activist repression in four democratic states. I then use dynamic network analysis in order to study changes in the organizational affiliations of Hizb-ut
Tahrir members over time. I use this method in order to infer radicalization, and thus likelihood of political violence.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss repression in a democratic context and why I expect it to facilitate activist radicalization. In particular, I draw on social movement theory, organization theory and findings in political psychology in order to propose network-level mechanisms through which this process can occur. Second, I measure democratic repression using a comparative case study approach by taking advantage of a natural experiment with respect to the non-violent Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBT). By comparing HBT across four different democracies that have repressed it to varying extents, I am able to gauge how variation in repression is likely associated with the subsequent behavior of the activist group membership. Third, I propose a micro-comparative research design that makes use of automated techniques and dynamic network analysis in order to investigate the effects of democratic repression at network level. Finally, I conclude with a summary of findings and implications for future research, as well as public policy towards peaceful activists.

Section 1: Networks, Organizations, and Adaptive Responses to State Repression

Scholars have often approached the study of civil conflict (both peaceful and violent) from perspectives that aggregate and emphasize the beliefs of political actors at an organizational level, arguing that actors make rational choices based on these beliefs. Most studies of civil war, for example, tend to assume that the motivations of rebel groups are given; greed-based models conceptualize political actors as profit-maximizers (Collier & Hoefler, 2008; 2004), whereas grievance models consider the political and economic inequities of political actors as having explanatory power for their decisions to bear the costs of conflict (Walter, 2004; Kalyvas, 20060; Gurr, 2000). Comparativists studying non-violent forms of civil conflict often use similar
approaches. Cohen’s (1994) study of the breakdown of democracy, for example, conceptualizes political actors at the party level in terms of their.

While these studies of dissident organizations provide important insights into the emergent behavior of aggregated political actors, scholars of political psychology and terrorism have focused increasingly on how such aggregated political actors form, in terms of individual choices to participate. Specifically, these scholars seek to address the apparent puzzle of why individuals would agree to bear the costs and risks associated with joining a dissident group when the likelihood of group-level success in accomplishing stated goals is usually very low. Most rational choice approaches would suggest that it would be against the individual’s interests to do so; rather than personally bearing the costs of participating in civil conflict (whether peaceful or violent), it would be in an individual’s best interests to free-ride by allowing others to bear these costs and still reap any rewards of success.

The costs and risks associated with joining dissident groups, even in democracies, are high. The Islamist group Al Muhajiroun, for example, demanded significantly more time of its members, in addition to financial support, than other UK-based Islamist group; moreover, members of the group faced social stigma and the disownment of friends and relatives due to its radical views and support for violence (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Yet when it legally operated in the UK, Al Muhajiroun never suffered shortages of manpower. In fact, Al Muhajiroun leader Omar Bakri Mohammed boasted that, at times, he was forced to turn away interested individuals. Some psychologists approach the process of joining radical activist groups at an individual level. Horgan (2008), for example, argues that individuals can be profiled in terms of various stages of radicalization which are evidenced by roles that entail varying levels of involvement. At the core of any dissident group often lie the most ideologically and materially committed members,
whereas the bulk of the group’s support comes from a less-committed but sympathetic periphery. Both Horgan and Wiktorowicz & Kaltenthaler (2006) argue that integral to the process of radicalization are elites who build dissident groups for rational and purposive ends. These authors argue that political elites can alter the incentive structures of individuals through a combination of ideological indoctrination and, more subtly, the building of personal relationships with fellow group members. Thus the apparently puzzling behavior of individuals bearing the costly (and potentially deadly) burden of joining a radical activist group might be explained in terms of manipulated social incentives such as family, friendship, group affirmation and feelings of community. Elite manipulation of social incentives is also typical of religious cults, subcultures and other groups that are relatively socially isolated. Recent work by Abrahms (2008; 2006) draws on this argument to explain individual incentives within terrorist organizations; Abrahms argues that the individual social benefits of participation in a terrorist group better-explain otherwise puzzling group-level behaviors (such as never-ending terrorism and anonymous attacks, for example) than do explanations that are rooted in an assumption that the group always behaves in ways that are consistent with its stated strategic goals.

The aforementioned studies of radicalization and roles of elites in the radicalization of individuals complement broader studies of the strategic behavior of political actors. Political elites, according to Wiktorowicz & Kaltenthaler (2006), alter individual incentive structures through radicalization in order to build their organizational capacity. The group itself may then pursue more purposive strategic goals, such as control of wealth, political power or the reconciliation of grievances. But what are the specific mechanisms through which political elites reach out to individuals? What makes some individuals more susceptible to radicalization than others? Scholars of social movement theory suggest that social networks are the mechanisms
through which political elites and the ideological core of a social movement reach out to potential new members for recruitment (Tarrow, 1998). It is through social networks that political dissidents organize and recruit. When studying Al Muhajiroun, for example, Wiktorowicz (2004) notes that established group members often drew on established friendship, family and student networks in order to recruit new members. Social networks can be distinguished between formal networks, such as the hierarchal and associational ties between co-workers created through institutions and associations (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Varshney, 2002), and informal networks, such as friend and kinship ties and. Increasingly, informal networks emerge from ties established among individuals via internet venues such social networking websites, web forums, anonymous chat rooms and massively multiplayer online role playing games (MMORPGs) ¹ (Collins, 2007; 2006, Clark, 2004).

Scholars studying dissident political groups (both peaceful and violent) agree that informal networks are particularly important for recruiting and building organizational capacity (Collins, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2004). Anecdotally, many of the most ideologically extreme political and religious groups are comprised largely of immediate and extended family members and friends. Again, Wiktorowicz (2004) establishes the importance of informal networks to the Islamist group Al Muhajiroun for identifying and recruiting members in the democratic United Kingdom. Collins (2007) found similar reliance on kinship ties by the

¹ Web-based networks themselves can be distinguished between those that are formal and those that are informal. It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that all social connections formed through internet venues are informal. Websites such as Linkedin.com and Facebook.com, for example, can be used both as a component of a formal institution (such as a component to an organization’s official website), or informally to communicate with friends, relatives and other social contacts. For my purposes, I generally consider internet-based networks to be informal if they are not associated with an established formal network, and especially if participation in the web-based venue is anonymous. Anonymous forums and chat rooms, for example, undoubtedly fall within the category of “informal networks” because they facilitate social networking among individuals without associating them with institutions or organizations. Formal web-based networks, in contrast, generally are those that have physical manifestations. If an organization’s official website includes contact information and an office location, for example, it would certainly be considered a component of a formal network.
more moderate Islamist groups Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic Renaissance Party in the Central Asian Republics, as well as the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan. From his experiences in Afghanistan, David Kilcullen (2009) noted that marriage was frequently used by members of the Taliban in order to build ties with local villages and thus secure loyalty and support.

While political dissidents often use their informal networks for recruitment and political organization, they also make use of formal networks when operating in permissive environments (Collins, 2007). For example, scholars studying the group Al Muhajiroun note that the democratic environment of the United Kingdom permitted the group to establish an official headquarters and offer formal educational and religious services to the general public; using these formal channels of outreach facilitated the group’s attempts to reach broader audiences among the UK Muslim community and build organizational capacity (Pantucci, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Indeed, in permissive contexts such as those of liberal democracies, formal networks arising from established institutions with routines are extremely important both for growth and maintenance (Greif, 1994). Political scientists posit that formal organizations, such as political parties, professional associations and unions, are primary power-brokers in democracies and also constitute the fabric of civil society (Cusack, Iverson & Soskice, 2007; Iverson & Soskice, 2006; Varshney, 2002). Indeed, most would agree that formal organizational structures (such as a core leadership and headquarters) are prerequisite for organizations that wish to pursue political goals in democratic contexts. Furthermore, the cultural importance of formal networks in democratic contexts (as argued by Greif, 1994) actually results in the elevation and separation of one’s formal networks from one’s informal networks during the operations of political organizations. It is a cultural norm in Western democracies, for example, to frown upon the excessive integration of one’s formal and informal ties; practices such as
nepotism, “office dating,” and official solicitation of business or politics in family and friendship settings are frequently viewed as social faux-pas at best and corruption at worst.

As a result of these norms, political dissidents that operate in democratic contexts seek to establish organizations that facilitate the growth and outreach of their formal networks. “Professionalism” is key to the organization’s appeal in these contexts; despite potentially fiery rhetoric and extremist views, dissident organizations in democracies still seek to establish headquarters with offices, official websites that are professionally designed, organizational routines, hierarchies and otherwise emulate the organizational behavior of other, more conventional establishments such as political parties and unions (Horgan et. al, 2010; Horgan, Kenney and Vining, 2010). However, in contexts where they are unable to establish organizations that facilitate the development of their formal networks, political dissidents must rely exclusively on informal routes to recruit and organize. In her study of Islamist groups in the authoritarian environments of Central Asia, Collins (2007) found that Islamist organizations which utilized inclusive informal networks in particular (defined as those that do not inherently limit their scope to exclusive identities, such as ethnicity) were generally the most successful at recruiting new members and organizing.

Political dissidents prefer to organize formally when they are able to and that when they are unable to (due to a repressive legal environment, for example), they choose to organize via informal routes. Scholars have also argued that political dissidents adapt their organizational tactics in response to their legal environments; this process can occur via proactive decision-making by the group, or organically through selection. Work by Kenney (2010; 2009; 2007), for example, demonstrates the rapid adaptive behavior exhibited by militant networks that use terrorism in direct response to changes in the intensity of repressive actions taken by
governments that fight them. Following this vein of logic, it is reasonable to assume that when political dissident groups experience repression levied against their established formal networks, they will seek to preserve their network ties by reorganizing over informal venues. This argument is consistent with the empirical findings of scholars studying peaceful and violent Islamist groups (Collins, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2004). Moreover, this assertion is strengthened by findings in political psychology that conceptualize political dissidents as social solidarity-seekers; Max Abrahms (2008), for example, suggests that individuals join militant groups that use terrorism in order to establish and maintain ties with other like-minded individuals, who often feel otherwise alienated within their broader societies.

If political dissidents are also social-solidarity seekers, it would be expected that changes in repression of those dissidents would not likely affect their social ties to one another, or their interests in establishing those social ties with others similar to them. Thus the disbanding of an official organization would not necessarily imply disbandment of the network, but would simply force a change in its venue of manifestation. A recent discussion by Perliger & Pedahzur (2011:46) of network analysis applied in study of terrorism notes that networks are indeed distinct from the organizations they often manifest in; they note, for example, findings suggesting that networks of violent religious groups in the West form long before both their cause for organization, as well as their actual use of violence (Hoffman, 1999; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Stern, 2004). Such networks almost certainly endure following an organizations disbandment.

The preceding discussion of networks, organizations and responses to repression of political dissident groups suggests several important notions that I integrate into my argument. First, while political dissidents use both formal and informal networks to organize and recruit,
they prefer to focus primarily on formal networks in permissive environments, such as those of liberal democracies. Second, as social solidarity-seekers, political dissidents seek to establish and maintain social ties with other political dissidents. Third, as adaptive entities, political dissidents are expected to maintain their network ties and build new ones through informal networks when their formal network structures are repressed and thus untenable. Finally, from my earlier discussion of regime behaviors, it appears that while democracies are generally more tolerant of political dissident groups than autocracies, democracies can change their “tolerance threshold” in response to changing perceptions of security and risk. As a result, democracies sometimes repress political dissidents that they previously tolerated, and vice versa. As I will later discuss in the specific case of Hizb ut-Tahrir, this was exactly what happened to many non-violent Islamist groups during the post-9/11 era. I now turn briefly to how these prior findings relate to my argument about the effect of democratic repression on the likelihood of political violence.

Because democracies tend to tolerate more extreme ideologies held by political dissenters than do autocracies, the universe of political dissenters that have established formal organizations and use formal networks is broader in democracies than in autocracies. In both democratic and autocratic contexts however, those political dissenters that advocate and/or practice varying forms of political violence are almost uniformly repressed. Few regimes tolerate groups that not only oppose the status quo, but also use violent methods to bring about change. As a result of this regularity, most overtly violent politically dissenting organizations have relied heavily on informal networks and methods in order to organize and recruit. Exceptions to this claim would include organizations which grow strong enough to conquer territory, and thus establish their own formal organizations outside the de facto jurisdiction of other states; examples include the FARC in Columbia and Tamil Tigers before their defeat in 2009. Other
exceptions would include organizations that find tolerance and/or support within states other than the state in which they seek to bring about political change; Hezbollah in Lebanon is a pertinent example.

Because existing violent activist groups have adapted to the use of informal networks in order to organize, recruit and pursue their political goals, I argue that non-violent activists whose formal network structures are dismantled will be more likely to experience radicalization and thus support or commit acts of political violence. I expect to observe this outcome because when non-violent activists are repressed, they also reorganize by resorting to the same informal networks (and particularly internet-based venues) that violent activists are already using for the same purpose. Thus in attempting to achieve the benefits of social solidarity with other political dissenters and reorganize, previously non-violent dissenters are more likely to become affiliated with, radicalized, and/or recruited by violent elites and their organizations through informal channels than if they had been permitted to continue organizing themselves formally. I formulate this expectation as the following falsifiable hypothesis:

**H1: Repression of peaceful Islamist groups in democracies increases the likelihood of group members’ association with violent Islamist groups and their membership.**

In addition to arguing that democratic repression of non-violent political dissenters is likely to facilitate their radicalization via provoking association with violent groups over informal channels, I also propose that the repression of non-violent political dissenters will likely facilitate their migration internationally. This argument is based on the logic that informal network venues (especially those that are internet-based) are less bound by borders than are their formal counterparts. Thus dissident activists who are repressed within one state are expected to
intermingle with likeminded individuals and groups abroad in order to pursue the benefits of social solidarity. Therefore, I also propose that:

**H2: Repression of peaceful Islamist groups in democracies increases the likelihood of group members’ migrating internationally**

The consequences of democratic repression of non-violent political dissenter is an important, policy-relevant topic, especially in the post-9/11 era. Evidence supporting my hypotheses would suggest, among other things, that in order to reduce the likelihood of extremists using political violence, democratic governments should be careful and err on the side of tolerance when deciding a “threshold of extremism” that they are willing to tolerate, lest they inadvertently facilitate the recruitment of violent groups. Evidence supporting my first hypothesis would suggest a causal mechanism through which a democratic country’s repression of a non-violent dissident group would likely result in the subsequent radicalization and possible participation in violence among the groups membership. Furthermore, evidence supporting my second hypothesis would suggest that domestic repression of political non-violent dissidents has international consequences; they are likely to migrate abroad. The subsequent sections of this paper discuss the two-part qualitative/quantitative research design that I employ to test these hypotheses. The research design first uses a comparative case study approach in order to construct my independent variable, which is “level of repression” of non-violent Islamist groups in a democratic context. I then discuss the construction of my dependent variable using semi-automated data collection methods and dynamic network analysis. The resulting research is a semi-quantitative comparative case study that investigates how the associations of Islamist group members change as a function of repression in a democratic context.
Section 2: Comparing Cases of Democratic Repression in Democracies: Hizb ut-Tahrir from 2002-2009

To investigate how democratic repression of nonviolent activist groups is associated with the subsequent likelihood of political violence, I examine democratic repression of Islamist groups during the post-9/11 era. Government scrutiny of Islamist groups in democratic countries increased after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Rubin (2010) defines Islamism as “a revolutionary political ideology, parallel to such systematic programs as communism, fascism, liberal democracy and nationalism.” Islamist groups, according to Rubin, advocate for the establishment of Islam-based systems of governance and thus tend to reject the legitimacy all other forms of government. Moreover, these groups also advocate for the unification of the umma (Muslim community) within a single pan-Islamic Caliphate. As a result of holding these ideological beliefs within the modern system of states, Islamist groups are inherently anti-systemic, regardless of their location; even Iran, which has enshrined Islam into its constitution, has not escaped the criticism of some Islamist movements that believe it to be too liberal (Samii, 2010).

Whereas Islamist ideology consistently rejects the modern notion of the nation-state, Islamist groups vary in approach and tactics. Some Islamist groups have openly embraced armed struggle and are directly responsible for carrying out violent attacks, often in the form of terrorism (Al Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah being prominent examples). Other Islamist groups mix fiery rhetoric with provisions of indirect support for other Islamist groups that use armed tactics, thus falling into a nebulous category of organizations that facilitate and sometimes support the use of armed methods, despite not using violence themselves. The UK-based group Al Muhajiroun is an example of one such group; Pantucci (2010: 226) has described Al
Muhajiroun as a “connective thread through most Islamist terrorist plots that have emanated from the United Kingdom,” while conceding that no Al Muhajiroun members have actually committed acts of violence in the name of, or as present members of the organization. Violent Islamist organizations and their supporters have posed a security challenge to modern states, thus resulting in their widespread repression. Most recent acts of democratic repression against Islamist groups have targeted those groups identified as being responsible for directly carrying out or providing material support for acts of political violence. Police actions against the well-known violent Islamist group Al Qaeda, for example, have occurred in Germany, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Al Muhajiroun was banned from the United Kingdom in August 2005, following charges of inciting racial hatred (a crime in the UK) and alleged connections to the July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London.

While some Islamist groups are engaged in violent conflict with the states that they seek to overthrow, many other Islamist organizations eschew violence and use exclusively non-violent methods to pursue their political goals. Perhaps the most prominent example of these groups is the worldwide Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation, or Party of Islamic Liberation). Like other Islamist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBT) advocates for the establishment of a pan-Islamic Caliphate and thus rejects the regimes of states in which it operates, whether they are democratic or autocratic in nature. While HBT advocates for the overthrow of modern states, it has pledged (and appears to follow) an exclusively non-violent strategy in pursuing this goal. While some governments have questioned the truth of this claim and allege that HBT provides support for violent Islamist groups, the clear consensus is that despite its fiery rhetoric, the group eschews violence for both tactical and ideological reasons. From a tactical point of view, because the group operates in over 40 countries worldwide, a shift towards violent methods in one
country will likely precipitate sustained repression of HBT’s activities globally (Collins, 2009; Whine, 2006). Ideologically, the group’s UK-based leader and official website both quote Koranic scripture in order to argue that the political activism of the Prophet Mohammed himself was limited to building a political base of support and then seeking Nusrah (assistance and material support) from those in power, rather than directly engaging in acts of violence (Whine, 2006; Mayer, 2004).

Despite its commitment to non-violent approaches to pursuing its political goals, HBT has experienced varying levels of repression and constraints on its activities in the countries it operates. HBT has experienced nearly uniform outlawing in both authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries, though a few exceptions exist. Most predominantly-Muslim countries have banned the organization; however, it operates freely in both Indonesia and Malaysia (Baran, 2004). HBT members are especially repressed in the semi-authoritarian Central Asian republics, where the group is extremely popular and thus perceived as a legitimate threat to secular regimes. Recent fieldwork on the group by Collins (2007) has found that HBT has experienced violent repression in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; association with the group carries minimum prison sentences of at least three years in all three countries, and many members have alleged torture. Interestingly, Collins has found that HBT in Central Asia maintains its non-violent approach to activism despite these challenges and, for the most part, condemns the overtly violent Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Though as I will later discuss as relevant to my arguments, Collins notes that factions of HBT in Central Asia may be moving in a direction towards condoning violent methods in order to “evolve in response to its political circumstances” (p. 83).
HBT has posed an interesting conundrum for the many liberal democracies in which it operates. On the one hand, the group’s anti-systemic rhetoric and popular perceptions of the group as being linked to Al Qaeda have led democratic governments to often investigate and, at times, dismantle the organization and while prosecuting its members. However, most liberal democracies also recognize that as a non-violent activist group, HBT is exercising free speech and thus expressing its political dissent in a manner that is typically tolerated. As a result of this conundrum, democratic countries have leveraged varying amounts of repression against the group. Some democracies, such as Turkey, have outright banned the group and have for many years. Other democracies, such as Australia and United States, are far more tolerant of HBT’s activism. Still other democracies, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have changed their policies regarding the group over the years.

HBT’s apparent variation in experience within democratic countries is an interesting quasi-experiment that permits a comparative approach to studying my broader research questions regarding how a democracies use of repressive measures against political dissenters is associated with the likelihood of political violence. I have chosen five democracies that have repressed (or not repressed) HBT to varying extents: the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Germany and Turkey. I’ve chosen to examine the behavior of these states with respect to HBT for the years 2002-2010. I have chosen these five cases and time period for several important methodological reasons:

First, four of the five cases that I have chosen are clear liberal democracies during the time period I examine. From 2002-2009, The United Kingdom, United States, Germany and Australia were all consistently classified as “free” countries by Freedom House (2010) and assigned scores of 10 by the Polity IV Project (Marshall & Jaggers, 2010), which is the most
democratic score possible. Furthermore, each of these countries exhibits an established respect for freedom of organization, expression and protest (though some relevant exceptions exist with respect to Germany). My fifth case, Turkey, is more accurately described as a semi-democracy; Turkey has established democratic institutions and party politics, but has more restrictions on freedoms of organization and expression than my other three cases. Turkey was consistently classified as “partly free” by Freedom House and scored a 7 on the Polity IV scale, indicating a country that might best be described as “mostly democratic,” but not as democratic as the other three cases I analyze.

Turkey was included in the analysis because it exhibits persistently high repression of HBT in a mostly-democratic context, and also because studying Turkey permits nesting of my analysis of democratic repression of activist groups within the broader study of state repression of activist groups. In particular, examining semi-democratic repression in conjunction will full-democracies allows me to build on recent findings by Collins (2007) with respect to the group’s activities in semi-authoritarian and fully-authoritarian contexts. While Collins’ study focused mainly on differences in the level of success among Islamist groups in repressive environments, she implicitly discusses the effects of authoritarian repression on Islamist group behavior.

Second, in addition to being comparable in terms of their regime types, these four countries span the possible range of my independent variable, which is democratic repression. Scholars have pointed out that studying variation on an independent variable of interest is as important as studying variation on the dependent variable when using qualitative approaches to establish causal relationships (George & Bennett, 2005). As I have already discussed, Turkey exhibited high levels of repression, whereas Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States exhibited decreasing levels of repression (in that order).
Third, apparent within-case variation in the use of repression over time in three of my four cases enhances my plausible establishment of causation with respect to my dependent variable, which is group membership’s likelihood of political violence. As a result, I am able to use qualitative methods in order to build a small-N dataset which, while insufficient for using many large-N quantitative techniques, permits me to use basic statistical techniques in order to measure change over time. The resulting analysis that I present is thus a hybrid quantitative-qualitative approach.

Fourth, the analysis of a single activist group across five countries permits me to control for important factors such as variation in group ideology and (to some extent) tactics. As I have already discussed, HBT is a worldwide Islamist movement whose country-specific branches subscribe to the same ideology and use similar, non-violent approaches. Furthermore, it can be established that HBT is actively functioning and seeks to build its organizational capacity in all four of my cases. Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting this assertion is the fact that the official HBT website is offered in only seven languages, which include English, Turkish and German (in addition to Arabic, Russian, Danish and Urdu) (Baran, 2004). While the movement has experienced varying levels of success and popularity in each of my cases, I don’t expect differences in group size to affect how democratic governments have treated them within my cases; far more important for the democratic context is whether the group can be directly or indirectly linked to the use of political violence. For example, despite only having relatively few members, the violent activities of the Red Army Brigades (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group) in Germany resulted in intense and sustained German efforts to eradicate the group and arrest its members (Aust, 1998). Because HBT in the countries that I study have not been directly linked to acts of political violence, I believe that differences in group size will not have the same
importance as they might in a non-democratic context; non-democratic regimes are more likely to fear being forcefully overthrown by a disenfranchised population which a larger dissident group could potentially mobilize, in addition to suffering the costs of violent civil conflict.

Fifth and finally, I chose to study HBT in these four countries during the years 2002-2010 because they fall within the post-9/11 era. I chose this range of dates from both a theoretical and pragmatic standpoint. Theoretically, the relationship between democratic governments and Islamist groups is expected to be different during the pre-9/11 era than during the post-9/11 era. Namely, I would expect to observe little variation in the level of repression of these groups prior to 2002 because Islamist groups had little salience in domestic political discourses of liberal democracies. Thus I would expect to observe few (if any) actual instances of repressive activities, which I argue are necessary to drive the theoretical relationships that I have discussed. In addition to this theoretical expectation, I also argue that examining years prior to 2002 presents a methodological problem with respect to data collection. Specifically, while HBT has certainly operated in the states I examine prior to 2002, little information exists about group membership, activities and other data that would allow me to analyze how group members respond to changes in the level of repression they experienced. This lack of data is the result of relatively little media coverage that the group received prior to 2002, as well as availability of fewer digitally archived source materials. A brief search for materials published in 2000 using the same search terms that I use for 2002, for example, yielded less than 100 results. This is insufficient for the construction of my dependent variable (membership likelihood of violence), as few (if any) membership links could be established.

To summarize, I am studying how repressive measured used by democracies are associated with the likelihood of political violence in five states with respect to the Islamist
group HBT from 2002-2010. These cases were selected for purposes of comparability and context, variation in the independent variable, control of variation in other relevant variables and for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons with respect to the date range. Drawing on available research on these five, I construct my independent variable (democratic repression of the group) as a 1-4 scale variable which I assign to each case-year (as follows) and present the findings in table 1 and figure 1 (below). Measurement criteria, coding decisions and sources, in addition to case study overviews of HBT’s experience in these states appear in Appendix A.

Table 1.1: Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir across Four Democracies from 2002-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HBT Australia</th>
<th>HBT UK</th>
<th>HBT Germany</th>
<th>HBT Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Variation in Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Four Democracies from 2002-2009
Section 3: Using Network Analysis to Study Change in Activist Organizational Affiliations

A persistent problem facing many researchers who study civil conflict is a lack of available data about dissident groups themselves. This problem is especially pertinent to researchers who study violent civil conflict and civil war; accurate information about secretive rebel groups tends to be very limited (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). While data availability is less of a problem when studying non-violent political dissident groups, their relatively small size coupled with little previous documentation them makes studying them difficult without fieldwork. This issue arose while attempting to study HBT; thus far, only a few researchers have conducted fieldwork on the group. These include Collins (2007) research on HBT in Central Asia, Wiktorowicz (2004) examination of HBT in the context of its offshoot organization, Al Muhajiroun, and brief policy analyses based on fieldwork by Whine (2006). Other studies of the group are limited to broader, state-centered analyses that examine the group’s relationship with other groups and state apparatus. I have collected and leveraged this available information to the fullest extent possible for the construction of the independent variable. Measuring changes in the organizational affiliations of individual group members is more difficult. However, digital materials do exist on the group’s activities in the liberal democracies I study and thus offer potential source material for studying HBT at an individual level of analysis. These materials include news reports, web forum posts and information published by the group itself. This section discusses the approach I take in order to leverage existing text-based sources to collect and aggregate data about the group’s membership, as well as how the organizational affiliations of the group’s membership change over time. I draw on these materials to construct my dependent variable, which is strength of member affiliations with violent Islamist groups.
Section 3.1 Using Dynamic Network Analysis to Study Group Affiliations of Individuals

Collins (2009) study of HBT in Central Asia concludes that group members leverage their informal networks in order to organize and recruit. She draws on qualitative interview and focus-group data that she collected in Central Asian countries in order to support her arguments. Networks (and social networks in particular) use graph theory in order to represent relationships between nodes. Nodes may be specified to represent people, organizations, places or things. Relationships between those nodes (called links) can be conceptualized thematically and in terms of strength. A social network, for example, portrays who interacts with whom. A dynamic network, by definition, is a network that is changing; dynamic network analysis is the study of changing networks (often over time). Furthermore, a meta-network is a network of networks; studying, for example, how changes in a social network affect a financial network, would involve meta-network analysis (definitions derived from Scott, 2000). The networks I map for this study is are meta-network comprising individuals, organizations and locations.

While simple network analyses have been carried out by researchers in a variety of fields for several decades, the ability to study complex and dynamic networks has only recently been made computationally feasible (Carley et. al, 2010). Advances in computing power, storage and bandwidth in the past decade have permitted social scientists to harvest and analyze large quantities of social data from open source materials; moreover, the development of automated software and processing techniques have greatly assisted social scientists in the completion of once arduous collection and coding tasks (Schrodt & Gerner, 2010). This paper leverages these technologies in order to analyze mass quantities of open-source text materials for the purpose of measuring HBT group membership affiliations over time. While the focus of the study is substantive in nature, I am also implicitly investigating the extent to which such open-source
materials and automated analytical techniques can assist social scientists in reaching conclusions about political phenomena.

In order to measure changes in group member affiliations over time, I employ dynamic network analysis software created and shared by Carnegie Mellon’s Center for the Computational Analysis and Social Organizational Systems (CASOS), based at Carnegie Mellon University. In particular, I leverage the programs Automap (Carley et. al, 2010a) and Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) (Carley et. al, 2010b). In brief, Automap is a software tool that assists users in extracting and pre-processing large quantities of text from source materials (such as digitalized newspaper articles) for the purpose of preparing it for network analysis. Automap offers several particularly useful functions including a “named entity extractor” which assists in identifying the names of individuals, organizations and locations, and a “web-scraper” program that can mass-archive webpages and save them as text documents. Automap also can be used to detect links between nodes using a process called “windowing,” which generates links between entities in a pre-constructed thesauri based on proximity in text. Organizational Risk Analyzer is a package of software tools that allow the user to construct, visualize and analyze networks and meta-networks over time. I will describe in subsequent steps how I have made use of these tools for my research purposes, but first discuss the source materials I have collected for the analysis.

Section 3.2 Collection of Source Materials for Hizb ut-Tahrir

Among the great advantages offered by automated data collection is the ability to process massive quantities of raw source materials in the form of text and glean relevant information for analysis. The data that I am interested in are social affiliation data, and the affiliations of individuals with organizations specifically. I use these metrics to construct my dependent
variable (discussed further in section 3.3). In order to collect these data, I leverage a wide variety and depth of source materials published between the years 2002-2010. I chose these dates both for the theoretical purpose that state relationships with Islamist groups became more politically salient following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, and for methodological purposes of data availability. With respect to the construction of my dependent variable (membership likelihood of participation and/or support of political violence), source materials from which to draw on are sparse prior to 2002. For example, a brief search for articles about the group published in English news sources that are made available by Lexis-Nexis for all years prior to September 11, 2001 yielded only fewer than 300 articles. In contrast, well over 17,000 articles were published about the group from 2002-2010.

I leveraged article databases made available by Lexis-Nexis and Factiva in order to archive approximately 18,400 newspaper articles which contain “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” “Islamic Party of Liberation” (which is HBT’s English name) and other transliterations (ie “Hizb at-Tahrir,” for example) in their text. I searched both English and foreign-language news sources; because I am looking specifically for the proper names of group members, organizations and locations, this process does not require fluency in multiple languages in order to reasonably carry out. Of the 18,400 articles I archived, roughly 7,600 were English articles obtained from Lexis-Nexis news sources, 2,000 were non-English articles obtained from Lexis-Nexis news sources, and 8,800 were both English and non-English articles (combined) obtained from Factiva news sources. Furthermore, articles collected for my baseline network year (2002) were roughly 1,100. Interestingly, published articles that mention HBT peaked during 2005; this was to be expected because members of the group were investigated (though exonerated) for connections to the

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2 The exception includes the names of locations, such as countries; foreign-language variants of locations were used when constructing location thesauri.
2005 London Bombings. Variation in media coverage of the group due to these circumstances will likely compel me to address possible bias in coverage due to the number of articles published that discuss the group during a given year, in addition to likely period effects stemming from the 2005 London Bus bombings. Table 2 (following) depicts summaries of the news articles that I was able to archive.

Table 2: Articles Collected Using HBT-Associated Search Terms, 2002-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lexis English</th>
<th>Lexis Foreign</th>
<th>Factiva all*</th>
<th>Year Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>~1099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>~1476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>~2113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>2750</td>
<td>~5117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>~2682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>~2348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>~1827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>~1789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~18451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Rounded to the nearest 50

In addition to the newspaper articles that I have archived, I have also converted all of the case study references that I used to construct my independent variable into text format and have included them in the analysis. Several of the published articles include quotes by HBT members, for example, and one even includes a small list of member names and roles. All of this information was useful for the techniques I then used in order to detect and extract network data. Next, I made use of Automap’s webscraping tool in order to mass-archive webpages and publically available forum posts on the Hizb ut-Tahir international and country-specific websites (ie the official Hizb-ut Tahrir Australia). This effort led to the collection of about 11,000 webpage saved as text files with varying amounts of content. Finally, I was also granted access to the Dark Web Forum project, which is an effort to mass-archive web forum posts on “jihadi”
websites; these posts contain user pseudonyms as well as names of some group members. After examining forums in English I deemed that approximately 93 were HBT relevant, in that the group was mentioned or referenced by users posting within that conversation thread. These materials were extracted and saved as text documents.

Section 3.3 Extraction of Named Entities

After sorting my source materials by year published, I used two tools embedded in the Automap software package in order to extract proper nouns and thus named individuals who are possibly members of HBT during for all years. The first of these tools, called a Named Entity Extractor, is a simple program that evaluates text and searches for three types of patterns: strings of characters that begin with capitalized letters, series of strings of characters that begin with capitalized letters, and series of strings that begin with capitalized letters, but that are broken by one non-capitalized word. The third component of this search is useful for finding proper nouns of organizations such as “International Society of Political Psychology,” for example. Character string series that are identified as possible candidates are extracted into a spreadsheet, which lists each unique set of character strings by its frequency. The result is a spreadsheet filled with the likely names of persons, places and organizations and how frequently those concepts appeared in the text. This list was about 10,000 concepts long, and contained many false positives (such as the first words of sentences).

In addition to the named entity extractor, I also generated a complete bigrams list for the text. A bigram is a consecutive set of two character strings in text. The sentence “See spot run.,” for example, contains the bigrams “See_spot” and “spot_run.” The N-gram generator program creates a list of unique bigrams for the entire quantity of text provided, sorted by frequency of appearance. This feature is enormously useful for identifying regularly-appearing names of
individuals. If John Smith was an important figure in the HBT-relevant source materials, for example, the John_Smith bigram would be expected to appear frequently. Unfortunately, the bigram list generated for the 1,100 articles published in 2002 was well over 100,000 entries long. I was able to truncate this list substantially by ignoring all bigrams whose frequency of appearance was less than two (n ~ 40,000).

After combining the named entity and bigram lists that I used generated, a brief Perl program to further truncate my list of candidate named entities by only retaining bigrams of string of characters that are capitalized at their beginning (“John_Smith” would be retained, for example, while “This_is,” and “not_relevant” would be discarded). The finalized spreadsheet of bigrams and named entity candidates was roughly 5,000 entries long; this was an entirely manageable list of likely candidates for a single researcher to analyze. Moreover, I have confidence that, assuming that all human beings have at least two capitalized components to their names, I only missed those individuals who were mentioned only a single time throughout the large quantity of articles and text documents that I examined. From this list of roughly 5,000 concepts, I extracted 1229 apparently unique individuals.³

Section 3.4 Using Agent Thesauri to Clean and Pre-process Text

Following the extraction of named entities via use of bigram and named entity recognition software, several steps had to be taken in order to “clean” and preprocess the raw text material in preparation for network analysis. First, it was necessary to account for variation in how the roughly 1229 individual’s discovered appear in the source materials. Newspaper articles, for example, tend to refer to individuals in three ways: by their full names, by their surnames only, and by their surnames with titles (ie Mr./Ms./Dr./etc). Because surnames are a

³ Some mistakes and/or failures to attribute two spellings, pseudonyms, etc of the same individual are likely inevitable, despite subsequent edits to the list.
common element to all of these ways in which individuals tend to be discussed in news, included used for surnames that were shared by more than one individual (John_Smith and Jane_Smith, for example, would be left with their full names intact rather than being erroneously aggregated into a single “Smith”). Taking these steps helped ensure that the number of links between individuals and their associated organizations and locations would be most accurately detected.

In addition to preprocessing the names list, variations in the naming of other key entities had to be accounted for by aggregating them into a single, common concept. Carley et al. (2010a) refer to this process as building a generalization thesaurus; generalization thesauri are necessary due to the fact that newspapers use different spellings and/or acronyms for the names of some organizations and locations. Also, spelling errors occasionally occur in digitalized newspaper data. Furthermore, because I leveraged news from non-English sources, variations in language had to be taken into account (primarily for location entities). Thesauri were built using variations in title, spelling and language for six primary entities of interest: Hizb ut-Tahrir, Turkey, Germany, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. Automap uses thesauri during text preprocessing in order to detect variations in spellings/phasings and replace them with a single, uniform concept. Example entries appear in table 3 (below):

Table 2: Sample Thesaurus for Turkey and Hizb ut-Tahrir Aliases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>alias</th>
<th>common concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkei</td>
<td>turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-ut- Tharir</td>
<td>hizb_ut_tahrir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-ut-Tahir</td>
<td>hizb_ut_tahrir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The example thesaurus entries above would result in the transformation of all occurrences of the character strings “Türk,” “Turkei,” and “Turkey” into the single string “turkey”
throughout the entire series of text. The full generalization thesaurus used for this project (including names) was about 3100 entries, which included named individuals, case study locations and the primary organization of interest (HBT). Text was preprocessed using the generalization thesaurus, in addition to several other helpful thesauri made publically available to correct common spelling errors of country names and “clean” the data by removing certain symbols, extra spaces between words, and extra breaks between paragraphs.

Section 3.5: Using a Meta-Network to Associate Individuals with Country Branches of HBT

Following the preprocessing of the data, a second thesaurus was built in order to construct the HBT “meta-network” as it appears during the baseline year of 2002. This task involved the simple designation of generalized entities as either “agents,” “locations,” or “organizations.” Automap and ORA were designed to construct meta-networks consisting of many other kinds of networks, such as “resource” and “knowledge” networks (Carley et al., 2010a); for the purposes of this research, only agents, locations and organizations are necessary. A simple example of the meta-network thesaurus is provided in table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Concept</th>
<th>Meta Concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>john_smith</td>
<td>agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turkey</td>
<td>location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hizb_ut_tahrir</td>
<td>organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the meta-concept thesaurus, Automap is used to evaluate the entire span of text provided to it for the occurrence of pre-processed concept strings and properly associate them with a meta-concept. The program creates “windows” of text in order to establish links between these concepts (Carley et al., 2010a). A window size is specified by the researcher, which is usually a unit of text (such as number of words, number of sentences, or paragraphs). Two
concepts that appear within a specified window size are assigned a link. Affiliation between these concepts is assumed to be stronger and more reliable as the number of links between them increase. Thus two individual names, or an individual name and organization name that frequently appear within a window size can reasonably be assumed to have some affiliation.

For a brief example of this process, consider the three entities “hizb_ut_tahrir,” “united_kingdom” and “abdul_wahid.” Using a window size of 5 sentences (meaning that links are created if concepts appear within five sentences of one another), 12 links were found between “abdul_wahid” and “united_kingdom” and 6 links were found between “abdul_wahid” and “hizb_ut_tahrir” during 2002 alone. Thus it would be reasonable to surmise that the individual Abdul Wahid has some associations with both the United Kingdom and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Indeed, Dr. Abdul Wahid is a prominent HBTUK member who later became chairman of the HBTUK executive committee. For demonstrative purposes: using a window size of five sentences, a rough approximation of the international HBT network from 2002 sources appears in image 1 (following). This network includes links between HBT and individuals, links between HBT and countries, links between HBT, countries and individuals, and links among individuals who are linked to HBT (second degree of separation). Image 2 (following) displays approximated individuals with at least five links to both the United Kingdom and Hizb ut-Tahrir; thus approximating the United Kingdom’s Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBTUK) network. Indeed, independent verification confirms that several of these individuals are indeed members of HBTUK. This process was used in order to approximate each country-specific HBT network for the span of years 2002-2010. The networks of individuals generated through this process form my unit of analysis, which I refer to as “group membership.” I construct group membership by aggregating
the individuals identified in each country branch of HBT, using the same generalization thesaurus techniques in section 3.4.

Image 1: Approximated 2002 Hizb ut-Tahrir International Network

Image 2: Approximated Membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s United Kingdom Branch (HBT network on left, UK network on right, HBTUK membership in middle)
Section 3.6: Extracting, Aggregating and Classifying Islamist Organizations

After using automated methods to approximate the HBT organizational network, I then measured HBT membership affiliations with Islamist organizations over time. This step involved independent research to compile a list of known domestic and international Islamist organizations. In order to construct this list, I relied heavily on Rubin’s (2010) Guide to Islamist Movements, supplementing with additional materials that I used to carry out my case studies. From these materials, I constructed a list of 260 known Islamist organizations. The full list of these organizations and how they were coded appears in Appendix B. Each of these groups was briefly studied in order to determine whether they use or have used violence in pursuing their goals. Islamist organizations were then classified on an ordinal variable from 1 to 3 that describes their use and/or support for violence, as follows:

1: Islamist groups are coded as 1 during a given year if evidence found suggested that the organization actively eschewed the use of violence (rhetorically, materially, and in practice). 148 of the 260 Islamist organizations were determined to fit these criteria.

2: Islamist groups are coded as a 2 if evidence found suggested that the organization embraced and/or supported the use of violence rhetorically and/or materially, but that the organization itself was not responsible for directly carrying out acts of political violence. 27 of the 260 Islamist organizations were determined to fit these criteria.

3: Islamist groups are coded as a 3 during a given year if evidence was found suggesting that the organization embraced and/or supported the use of violence rhetorically, materially, and that the organization itself was responsible for carrying out acts of political violence. 85 of the 260 Islamist organizations were determined to fit these criteria.

Following the classification of Islamist groups according to these criteria, variations of the group’s names were then populated within a generalization thesaurus, while the groups themselves were aggregated according to their coding criteria using the same methods specified
in section 3.4. Table 5 (below) provides a brief example of this process, which was carried out for all years (2002-2009).

Table 5: Example of Aggregation/Classification of Islamist Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>alias</th>
<th>common concept</th>
<th>Level of Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Muhajiroun</td>
<td>al_muhajiroun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Saviour Sect</td>
<td>al_muhajiroun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb ut-Tahrir</td>
<td>hizb_ut_tahrir</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb at-Tahrir</td>
<td>hizb_ut_tahrir</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>al_qaeda</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaida</td>
<td>al_qaeda</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Gorus</td>
<td>milli_gorus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Goros</td>
<td>milli_gorus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 3.7: Expanding the Article Database to Include Islamist Organizations beyond HBT

The next step in constructing the dependent variable was to archive additional source materials using the available list of Islamist groups as search terms. This step facilitates the tracking of HBT member’s organizational associations without biasing the available dataset with only HBT-relevant sources. While collecting a decade of source materials for 260 Islamist groups might appear to be seemingly an onerous task, archiving so many articles using available technologies is now well-within the abilities of a single researcher. Current research at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism, for example, is making use of over 200,000 articles archived for the Irish Republican Army (Horgan, Kenney & Vining, 2010) over a four decade period. Thus the final dataset from which HBT membership affiliations will be studied over time will likely consist of tens of thousands of articles, providing a broad database from which to establish links.
Section 3.8: Using Dynamic Network Analysis to Track HBT Member Affiliations Over Time

The final step in construction of the dependent variable is in establishing HBT member affiliations with Islamist organizations in 2002 using dynamic network analysis, and tracking how these affiliations change over time. This step requires a combination of three constructs:

1) The aggregated 2002 HBT country-specific membership list
2) The aggregated and classified Islamist organizations list
3) The Islamist organizations article database for 2002-2010

Using these materials, ORA is then used in order to calculate links between the aggregated HBT membership for each country, and each aggregation of classified Islamist groups. The resulting data generated are as follows for each country-year:

1) Number of links between cases of HBT membership and non-violent Islamist organizations
2) Number of links between cases of HBT membership and semi-violent Islamist organizations
3) Number of links between cases of HBT membership and violent Islamist organizations

These metrics are calculated for the case-specific HBT membership networks for each year, 2002-2010. The operationalized metric used from these data are *proportions of total organizational links* in order to account for differences in total links established for a given year. The calculation of these metrics will provide aggregated indications of how membership organizational affiliations change over time with respect to constructed categories of Islamist groups; thus substantive conclusions can be reached about how the group membership’s affiliation with different types of Islamist groups is associated with varying levels of repression. If the proportion of country-membership’s total links with violent Islamist groups is found to increase over two years, for example, it would be considered potential evidence that the
membership’s likelihood of violence has increased. At time of writing, the final and concluding sections of this paper discuss challenges to carrying out these remaining steps, addresses shortcomings of the research and briefly discusses implications should evidence be found in favor of my hypotheses.

**Section 4: Challenges, Next Steps and Implications of the Research**

*Section 4.1: Challenges*

Computational challenges associated with carrying out dynamic network analyses on text sources that sum to well over 1 billion characters are to be addressed by making use of available high-performance computing resources. In this section, I wish to focus on discussing important methodological challenges that should be addressed in subsequent refinements of the research design. I have highlighted the most important ones as follows.

First, assuming that proximity in text constitutes true “links” between entities (be they people, places or organizations) is tenuous. While the pilot analyses I’ve carried out indeed indicate that links between entities often do capture true relationships, false positives inevitably occur. I have attempted to mitigate this problem to some extent by removing individuals, for example, who should obviously not be classified as part of the HBT membership variable. “Tony Blair,” for example, was frequently found to be “affiliated” with HBT despite clearly not being a member of the organization. The more comprehensive solution to this problem, however, is the independent verification of membership lists by finding evidence suggesting that the individual is indeed a member of the group. Thus a first and simple (though time consuming) refinement of this research design is independent verification of the HBT membership thesaurus. This would involve searching the available source database for the names specified in the thesaurus and rightly classifying those who are HBT members, while removing the others.
A second major challenge to this research that is related to accuracy of specifying the HBT membership network involves availability of articles covering HBT during the span of years. While 1,100 articles for 2002 is seemingly a broad database to draw from, I was only able to establish links equal to or greater than five for about 20 individuals. Among the solutions to this problem will likely be drawing on an expanded article database (including all Islamist organizations) in order to attempt to expand the verified HBT membership list. In many ways, this approach is similar that of snowball sampling in field research. In addition, the inclusion of web-scraped pages and forum posts mitigates this problem to some extent as well.

Section 4.2: Next Steps

At time of writing, the independent variable (democratic repression) has been measured via case studies for each of the five cases for the period 2002-2010. Also, HBT membership thesauri have been constructed to approximate the HBT network in each country of interest. Moreover, Islamist organization thesauri have been completed, coded and used as search terms for additional archiving of source materials. The archiving of these source materials is currently underway with expected completion in late June, 2011. At that point, the thesauri materials are to be used for measuring changes to the country-specific HBT meta-networks over time for the purpose of gauging how membership affiliations with peaceful, semi-violent and violent Islamist organizations vary as a function of repressive measures used by democratic countries.

Section 4.3: Implications

This research has clear theoretical and policy implications. If evidence is found supporting my hypotheses, it would suggest, among other things, that the use of repression by democracies does indeed facilitate further radicalization of political activists. In addition, it
would suggest network mechanisms as having explanatory power in this radicalization process. From a policy standpoint, confirmatory findings would suggest that in order to reduce the likelihood of political violence from dissenters, states should not proscribe non-violent activist groups, regardless of how radical their ideology and rhetoric appears to be. Furthermore, confirmatory findings might also suggest that in order to decrease political violence in ongoing conflicts, states might be wise to offer incentives of amnesty to violent political groups that would be willing to eschew the use of violence and pursue exclusively political routes to their goals in return; indeed, these approaches appear to have been used during the US-led war in Iraq with some amount of success, especially with respect to the once-violent Mahdi Army.
References


Cunningham, David et al., 2009. “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53: 570-597


Mayer, Jean-Francois, 2004. “Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Next Al Qaida-Really?” PSIO Occasional Paper, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Affairs Division IV.


Appendix A: Case Overviews, Sources and Coding Decisions for Democratic Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir

A Note on Sources

Academic literature on Islamist groups has grown quickly, especially in the post-September 11, 2001 policy environment. Nevertheless, available literature on the group Hizb ut-Tahrir is still mostly limited to policy research. Most of the available academic literature on HBT focuses on the group in Central Asia, where the bulk of its membership is currently based. Fieldwork by Collins (2009), for example, examines how the group has adapted to the comparatively repressive environments in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The policy research on HBT in democratic countries that I draw on is written from varying biases; work by Baran (2004) on behalf of the Nixon Center, for example, generally advocates for the group’s banning worldwide, whereas work by Mayer (2004) on behalf of PSIO is less critical. I have sought to examine these sources for consensus of fact. Moreover, I have supplemented this research with additional primary and secondary source material found in articles published by HBT itself and in newspaper accounts, respectively. These additional sources appear in footnotes, while the academic and policy sources I referred to appear in the case study references section.

Criteria Used for Coding of Democratic Repression

1: Evidence that no national legislation was considered or passed during this year that would have repressed the activities or organization of the group and evidence that law enforcement/security mechanisms were minimally or not at all used to systematically repress the activities or organization of the group during the year.

2: Evidence of proposed national legislation against group that was voted upon by a national legislative body but did not pass and/or evidence of minor law enforcement/security activities against group, such as focused government monitoring or temporary detainment without subsequent charges during the year.

3: Evidence of national legislation passed that significantly constrains group activities and/or evidence of some law enforcement/security activities against group, such as searches and
seizures of property, levying of fines, or minor prison sentences (less than one year) for violation of legislation.

4: Evidence of national legislation passed and enforced that bans the group’s presence completely and evidence of sustained law enforcement/security activities against the group, including the arrest of members and use of onerous punishments for group activities, such as long term imprisonment (greater than one year), physical torture or execution.

Case 1: HTB in Australia

Overview

According to Piggot (2010), the Australian branch of HBT (Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia, henceforth HBTA) has approximately 200 members, most of whom are university students. Piggot argues the group’s relatively small size is reflective of the small but growing Muslim community in Australia. Like other branches of HBT, HBTA rejects the Australian government and democracy, instead advocating for Shariah Law and against secularization among Muslims living in the country. The group maintains an active and regularly updated website and Facebook page and appears to regularly host official events. In 2007, the group planned to host a “Kalifah (Caliphate) Conference” in order to advocate for the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate; the conference was banned by the city of Sydney because promotional material appeared to spread anti-Semitic and anti-women material. The group successfully hosted a second Kalifah Conference in 2010, which attracted approximately 1000 attendees. The group has since promoted the success of this conference heavily, releasing several relatively well-made video documentaries covering the conference and other current events. HBTA is led by The

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group has been particularly critical of the Australian government’s mistaken arrest and terrorism charges levied against the Indian citizen Mohamed Haneef, who is a Muslim. Haneef was accused of participating in the London Subway Bombings of 2005, but the charges were subsequently dropped when his involvement was later disproven.

Evidence of Repression

Of the cases I compare, HBTA has undoubtedly experienced minimal state repression from 2002-2010. Piggot (2010) notes that HBTA “came under the scrutiny of Australian security services following the London bombings of 2005, but the government has remained satisfied that the Australian group has not ‘planned, assisted in, or fostered any violent acts…” (p. 130). Regardless, Piggot also notes that the group has been continually monitored by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (AISO) since 2005. Moreover, the group was briefly considered for proscription again in 2007 because the government remained concerned with its activities, and particularly the Kalifah Conference in Sydney (which was banned by the city, but not by the National Government). Overall however, HBTA continues to operate relatively freely in Australia without major legislation or law enforcement activities having been directed against it beyond monitoring and brief investigation.

Analysis and Coding

Based on the evidence available, it appears that HBTA has experienced relatively little repression in Australia. A narrative by Piggot (2010) and an examination of news articles associated with the group suggest that little to no repressive actions were taken against HBTA

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between 2002 and 2004; thus I have coded the level of repression for these dates as “1.” Available evidence does suggest, however, that the Australian government began to scrutinize the group further and investigate whether banning it would be warranted in 2005, following the London Subway Bombings. Specifically, the AISO’s decision to continue monitoring the group has led me to code the group’s level of experienced repression as “2” for the years 2005-2010. Additional evidence in support of this decision is the City of Sydney’s ban of the Kalifah Conference in 2007; this action was not a national-level decision (which I require for higher coding designations), but certainly indicates an enduring national wariness towards the group and thus supports corroborating assertions that the group has been continually monitored by law enforcement authorities since 2005, thus justifying the coding decision of a 2 for those years. Thus substantively, HBTA has experienced minimal repression for years 2002-2004, but did experience slightly more repression from 2005-2010.

Case 2: HBT in the United Kingdom

Overview

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s United Kingdom branch (henceforth HBTUK) is among the largest branches in the democratic West; according to Leikan & Brooke (2007), the group has over 8,500 members in the United Kingdom and is generally thought to be the primary headquarters for the broader organization’s European branches. HBTUK also runs several front and charity groups which focus their engagement on specific demographic groups, such as women, college students and children (Ahmed & Stuart, 2010). Moreover, HBTUK also hosts the broader HBT media center, known as Khalifah Publications (Schneider, 2006). Like HBTA, HBTUK takes advantage of social networking media in order to spread its message, recruit potential supporters
and present a professional visage; the group regularly updates its website\textsuperscript{10} and Facebook page\textsuperscript{11} and hosts frequent outreach events, protests and rallies. HBTUK hosted an international HBT conference in 2009 which drew over 8,000 thousand attendees (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009; Schneider, 2006). The group was led by radical cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed until Bakri left the organization in 1996 to form the more overtly anti-Western Al Muhajiroun; Al Muhajiroun was in turn banned in 2004 for violating anti-terrorism laws, but AM members have since re-organized under various splinter groups (Pantucci, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004). HBTUK’s current leadership is comprised of highly-educated professionals (Whine, 2006) and adheres to the same ideological principles as other HBT branches, advocating for a pan-Islamic caliphate while eschewing any form of participation or compromise within the United Kingdom’s democratic system (Phillips, 2008; Baran, 2004). Moreover, the group generally refuses to cooperate with other Islamist groups it deems as having sought compromise with non-Muslim political elements, though recently this has begun to change (Whine, 2006). Since experiencing greater scrutiny after the 2005 London Bombings, HBTUK’s strategy has been to focus on grievances affecting the Muslim community (ummah), such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and repression of HBT branches in Central Asia.

\textit{Evidence of Repression}

Spyer (2010) writes that throughout the 1990s and early 2000’s, the United Kingdom was perceived as safe havens for radical Islamists who had associations with violent Islamist groups such as al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria; French authorities sometimes referred to London as “Londonistan.” Since the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, the United Kingdom has cracked down on radical Islamist groups, though it

\textsuperscript{10} Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official UK website, accessed December, 2010 at: <http://www.hizb.org.uk/>.

has generally shown leniency towards HBTUK due to its nonviolent methods. As a result, HBTUK (like HBTA) was generally permitted to operate openly and freely within the United Kingdom from 2002-2003 (Ahmed & Stuart, 2010; Baran, 2004). This began to change during 2004 when the government increased its scrutiny of the more radical HBTUK splinter group, Al Muhajiroun, due to alleged links that the group had to suicide bomber Hasif Anif (Wiktorowicz, 2004). The British government banned Al Muhajiroun under anti-terrorism laws in 2004 and continued to closely scrutinize the activities of HBTUK (Pantucci, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Government scrutiny of HBTUK increased further in 2005, following the London Subway Bombings. UK authorities announced an intention to ban HBTUK 2005; however upon further investigation, it became clear that insufficient evidence was available to prove any HBTUK connections to unlawful activity (Ahmed & Stuart, 2010). Following the abandonment of government plans to ban the group in 2005, prominent politicians re-raised the issue in 2007. Ahmed & Stuart (2010) write that since scrutiny of the organization peaked in 2005, HBTUK and Islamism in general have become more tolerated as a form of religious expression and no formal actions have been taken against the group; however, they also note that UK counterterrorism policy is being reviewed, thus implying that changes could potentially limit HBTUK activities in the future. Moreover, the UK Home Office has claimed that the organization “remains under continuous review.”

Analysis


Like HBA, available evidence appears to suggest that HBTUK’s experience in the United Kingdom has been generally uninhibited. I have thus chosen to code the level of repression experienced by the group as “1” for 2002 and 2003 based on Spyer’s (2010) suggestion of UK laxity towards all Islamist groups in the early 2000s. It appears that government and law enforcement monitoring of the group increased during 2004 concurrently with investigations of Al Muhajiroun, which eventually resulted in that group’s banning. I have thus coded HBTUK’s level of repression as a “2” for 2004. Repression of the group clearly peaked during 2005, following the London Subway Bombings when the government announced its intentions to ban the group. Consistent with my coding rules regarding proposed legal action that is not inevitably implemented, I have coded the group’s experience as a “3” for 2005. Previously mentioned sources concur that since 2005, the group has experienced diminished government scrutiny, but that prominent elements of the government continue to advocate for its banning and continue to monitor its activities. Thus I code the group’s experience as a “2” for the years 2006-2010. These coding decisions were made in recognition that, despite continued unpopularity among broader British society, it appears that the group’s activities are mostly tolerated as peaceful religious expression following exoneration of any role in the 2005 London Bombings. Evidence that the group has moderated its image to some extent from 2006 onwards also appears to suggest that any future government actions against the activities of Islamist groups might be less likely to target HBTUK, although it continues to be monitored (Whine, 2006).

Case 3: HBT in Germany

Overview

Estimates of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Germany (henceforth HBTG)’s membership as of 2005 range from between about 150 and 300 (Steinberg, 2010; Schneider, 2006). Baran (2004) writes
that most HBTG members are Arab university students, which is consistent with the membership base of HBTA and, to a lesser extent, HBTUK. The experience of HBTG differs drastically from those of HBTA and HBTUK; HBTG has come under especially intense scrutiny in Germany relative to other European countries as a result of its anti-Semitic views. It was also established that one of the September 11, 2001 airplane hijackers was a former student who had connections to HBTG members (Whine, 2006; Baran, 2004). However, subsequent investigations failed to find evidence suggesting any involvement of HBTG itself in the attacks, or that HBTG members had encouraged them. Steinberg (2010) writes that before being banned in 2003, the party’s main activities were meetings at universities and the publication of a monthly magazine; he notes that since being banned, the group has generally not sponsored any public activities. HBTG does not appear to have its own Facebook page or Germany-based website, though (as I have previously discussed), the HBT international website is available in German. I was unable to find information about HBTG’s organizational or leadership structure, likely because of the group’s secretive nature. Schneider (2006) and Baran (2004) both concur that following proscription in 2003, HBTG continued to operate, but in secret. Baran (2004: 40) writes that:

“Security services have concluded that in Germany, HT [HBTG] appears as a secret society, kept up only through personal contacts, which are based on shared ideology. Following the ban, the organization does not conduct any public activities in Germany and has stopped the German edition of Explizit [HBTG’s monthly publication]. Nevertheless, HT continues to recruit and raise funds”

Schneider (2006) notes that after being banned, HBTG continued to recruit and spread its message exclusively over three German-registered websites; Germany authorities later closed

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these websites and pressed charges against the owner. Since then, HBTG has resorted to using websites registered in other countries, where the group remains legal. Schneider (2006: 74) writes that “the group also owns forums and chat rooms, in which idealistic Islamic ideology is advocated and praised.” These findings strongly suggest that since being banned in 2003, HBTG has indeed adapted by focusing exclusively on the use of informal networking routes, as formal networks are no longer available to it. Little additional information is available about HBTG in more recent years, probably due to ongoing German prohibition of its formal activities. However, in 2008, representatives of the group filed an appeal against its proscription to the European Court; it appears at time of writing that this appeal has yet to be deliberated.16

Evidence of Repression

Evidence of repressive activities against HBTG is abundant. Steinberg (2010: 464) writes that HBTG was banned from public activities by the German Interior Ministry in 2003 for acting “against the idea of international understanding,” though he argues that the more likely reason for the group’s banning was a controversial meeting that was attended by members of Germany’s right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany. Indeed, Baran (2004: 38) notes that HBTG’s ban in 2003 was made possible by “Germany’s historic circumstances and the laws passed accordingly, especially with regard to anti-Semitism.” Specifically, Germany’s “Act Governing Private Associations” gives power to national security authorities to ban organizations that “aggressively and belligerently oppose the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding” (p. 39). Thus HBTG was banned in Germany for violation of this law. Since being banned in 2003, several individual members have also been expelled from Germany, though they have not immediately been deported due to requests for political

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asylum. In addition, German assets of the group were frozen and 110 searches of HBTG member apartments in Germany occurred over the course of 2003 (Schneider, 2006; Baran, 2004). HBTG filed a lawsuit against its ban in 2004; however this lawsuit was rejected by a German court (Baran, 2004). While HBTG has been banned from participating in public activities disseminating its viewpoints in Germany, membership in the group itself is apparently not illegal.

Analysis

The evidence that I have collected clearly suggests that HBTG has experienced more repression in Germany than has HBTA in Australia and HBTUK in the United Kingdom, respectively. The group was already under intense scrutiny in 2002 due to revelations that one of the 9/11 hijackers was a former pupil of an HBTG member. Thus I have coded HBTG’s level of experienced repression as a “2” for 2002. When the group was banned in 2003, the German government took several significant repressive actions against the group, including prohibiting its public activities, searching member’s homes for evidence of further criminal activity, and planned expulsion of several members from the country. While these actions were taken, actual membership of individuals in the organization was technically not illegal. Furthermore, this state of de-facto proscription has persisted despite legal challenges both within Germany and to the higher European Court thus far. As a result, I have coded the group’s experience in Germany as a “3” for years 2003-2010, in recognition that legislation has been enacted and enforced to severely limit the group’s activities, but that individual membership in the group remains legal, and no severe penalties (such as lengthy prison sentences) have been levied.

18 Cobain, 2008 (ibid).
Case 4: HBT in Turkey

Case overview

Hizb ut-Tahrir in Turkey (henceforth HBTT) has been officially outlawed since 1967 (Baran, 2004). Despite its proscription, HBTT has never given up on establishing itself in Turkey, because Turkey is among the countries that the group seeks to establish Khalifah within (Schneider, 2006; Baran, 2004). Carkoglu & Bilgili (2010: 413)’s analysis of HBTT concludes that most members are university-educated and are “modern in their outlook and attitudes,” but that the group’s appeal is limited in the relatively secular Turkey due to their anti-systemic ideology. The group has focused its efforts on convincing Turks against supporting Turkey’s entering into the European Union (Baran, 2004). HBTT’s tactics in Turkey include leafleting and demonstrations that are organized as religious events; the official ban against HBTT has forced it to repackage much of its activity in purely religious terms in order to avoid government crackdowns (Schneider, 2006).

Evidence of Repression

All sources I have leveraged agree that HBTT is an outlawed group in Turkey that has experienced systematic repression since 1967, despite its enduring claims that it is a non-violent group. During 2003, Turkey arrested 93 HBTT members, including the group’s leader at the time; these individuals were eventually released under an amnesty law intended for members of the violent Kurdish separatist group PKK (Baran, 2004). Cakir (2004) writes that following reform of the Turkish penal code in 2004, HBTT members were no longer systematically arrested by the government because of their non-violent orientation. Other sources indicate that the Turkish government has cracked down on HBTT more recently (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009). Specifically,
the government arrested six suspected members of the group in 2008\textsuperscript{19} and over 150 suspected members of the group in 2009.\textsuperscript{20} A statement released by Turkish police claimed that arms had been seized during the more recent crackdown, thus suggesting the possibility that some group members have deviated from the organization’s official stance against violent methodologies.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Analysis}

Less information is available about the experiences of HBTT than the other country branches of HBT that I examine. However, all sources that I leverage agree that the group has experienced more repression in Turkey than in Australia, the United Kingdom or even Germany. The group’s official proscription since 1967, coupled with the Turkish penal system prior to Western reforms in 2004 suggests that HBTT experienced sustained law enforcement efforts against it, and relatively onerous punishments for members. Thus I have coded the group’s experience for years 2002 and 2003 as a “4.” Very little information exists about the group’s experiences during the years 2004-2008. I was unable to find evidence that group members were targeted or arrested; furthermore, some sources suggest that the penal reforms in 2004 led the Turkish government to a more tolerant stance towards the group because of its non-violent nature. However, the group has still remained officially banned during this entire period. Thus for years 2004-2007, I have coded the group’s experience as a “3.” I have chosen to code the group’s experiences for 2008 and 2009 as “4” due to recent claims that the government has cracked down on the group, coupled with the reported arrests of many suspected group members. Interestingly,

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claims by Turkish police that arms were seized from suspected HBTT members during these crackdowns might suggest that the relatively repressive environment of Turkey has indeed facilitated further radicalization of some HBTT members. However, I was unable to find information about inter-organizational affiliations of group members during this time.

Summary of Case Studies

Table 1: Levels of Repression Experienced by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Four Democracies from 2002-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HBT Australia</th>
<th>HBT UK</th>
<th>HBT Germany</th>
<th>HBT Turkey</th>
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<td>2009</td>
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Figure 3: Variation in Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Four Democracies from 2002-2009

Case Study References


Mayer, Jean-Francois, 2004. “Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Next Al Qaida-Really?” PSIO Occasional Paper, published by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Affairs Division IV.


