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Gendered social movements: A critical comparison of the suffrage and gay marriage movements
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The elections of 2008 saw the passage of several overwhelming and explicit condemnations of gay rights across the nation. Most damaging to the gay marriage movement was the successful passage of proposition 8 in California, the first time that the right to gay marriage was repealed. I argue that the continued modeling of the civil rights framework defers an analysis of the argumentative strategies of historically gendered movements such as the suffrage movement and is a disservice to the strategic potential of the marriage equality movement. The critical comparison made here between suffrage and marriage equality opens the potential for our foremothers to teach us to effectively counter gender stereotypes in the pursuit of national legislative equality.

For decades, GLBT individuals and communities have forwarded a rights-based campaign seeking political, legislative, and social legitimacy and equality. While the priorities and goals of the GLBT movement(s) have changed and shifted over the course of its existence, few issues have dominated the political thought and thrust of gay and lesbian movements more than the freedom to marry. A 1993 Hawaiian Supreme Court decision mandated that the denial of civil marriage licenses to GLBT individuals ought to be considered sex discrimination; thus sparking a now 15 year old national campaign both to protect the “sanctity” of marriage, and to realize complete legislative freedom for gays and lesbians (Cox, 1994; Hovermill, 1994; Keane, 1995; Kramer, 1997; Kersch, 1997).

The election of 2008 saw the passage of several overwhelming and explicit condemnations of gay rights across the nation. Most damaging to the gay marriage movement was the successful passing of proposition 8 in California that repealed the rights of gays and lesbians to legally marry in that state. The gay marriage movement in 2010 faces the same sorts of rights roll-back through legislative, judicial, and public proposition measures. In the face of this resistance and with the determination that marriage equality will be realized, it is imperative to evaluate the argumentative strategies of the gay marriage movement as they are articulated in public debate. One persuasive way in which the rhetorical productions of the gay marriage movement have proceeded is through the framework of the civil rights movement.

Studies of the civil rights framework are useful and insightful, but they fall short in the way of explanatory power when it comes to specifically gender-based arguments forwarded by marriage equality opponents.
Considering this movement in relation to other particularly gendered movements reveals a meaningful similarity. The trajectory of the gay marriage movement is not unlike that of the women’s suffrage movement in the United States in the late 1800s continuing until the vote was realized in 1920. While temporally different, the gender specific strategies of the suffragists reflect in the same sex marriage debate. Any emulation as a strategic tool is worth investigation. It is the unique character of gender-based movements that justify the critical comparison made here. Few scholars have archived the similarities and differences between the same sex marriage movement and the suffrage movement, surely an endless project. As such, this paper seeks to understand the similarly gender-based problems faced by both movements in an attempt to mobilize both theoretical and practical tools to aid in a more nuanced development of contemporary contestations of gender expectations particularly in terms of appropriate gender performance for marriage. In an effort to do so, a review of the gay marriage movement is appropriate.

**Literature Review**

Initially, Smith (2000) illustrates that the primary arguments in the gay marriage debate surface in two ways. First, gay marriage advocates speak about the right to marriage and other rights as civil rights, or as a sanitized “bundle of right” (p. 23). Second, and alternatively, supporters opposed to same-sex marriage claim that marriage is “a valuable, indeed necessary, cultural form central to personal identity and social cohesion” (p. 23). In this way, marriage as a cultural icon trumps marriage as simply another civil right to which all are naturally entitled. The chasm between these two arguments is insurmountable and damaging to marriage equality advocates. Against the background of the traditional moralistic condition of marriage, a more hollowed argument about rights is not persuasive to overcome historical precedence. Nevertheless, there are few persuasive claims to make against the iconic nature of marriage in the United States that does not reject the institution altogether, a particularly precarious position for GLBT activists. Smith points out that there is implicit refutation in arguments for a traditional understanding of marriage, in so far as the exclusive nature of marriage rights is grounded in moralistic and theological foundations. In this way, anti-gay marriage activism limits the strategies available in answering their arguments while overwhelming a rights-based claim with religious tradition.

Furthermore, Smith (2000) indicates that the persuasive strategies of the anti-gay marriage supporters are fundamentally more persuasive because of the focus on the traditional nuclear family. He writes

> advocates opposed to gay marriage condense their moral and cultural arguments into the figure of the “family” understood as the intact heterosexual, gender rigid, procreative family. Put simply, the only acceptable marriage is a “covenant established by God wherein
one man and one woman, united for life, are licensed by
the state for the purpose of founding and maintaining a
family. (p. 33)

Conclusions such as these work themselves into legislative and electoral
discourse on marriage and produce the current pattern of political loss for
the gay community.

Given this political loss, Smith (2000) offers some alternatives for
same-sex marriage advocates to improve their discursive productions. He
argues that to meet moralistic rhetoric one must engage in moralistic rhetoric.
He suggests that instead of defending homosexuality by examining and
refuting various objections to homosexuals’ relationships, GLBT people
need to articulate strong arguments in favor of homosexual relationships.
This moves the grounds of the debate to an offensive position for gay and
lesbian activists. He further asserts that gay and lesbian activists must stop
relying on rights-based rhetoric to advance their cause; instead they must
begin a rhetoric of judgment and commitment that articulates what material
conditions they are being deprived of and how cultural understanding can
stop their oppression.

Smith’s (2000) suggestion of a ‘rhetoric of judgment and commitment’
is not radically opposed to Jacobs’ (1993) research indicating that victimage
rhetoric may be the most effective mechanism for GLBT advocates to
achieve marriage rights. Jacobs surveys in his article the three primary
persuasive strategies of the gay marriage/gay rights movement: visibility
rhetoric, scourge rhetoric, and victimage rhetoric. Initially, visibility rhetoric
is “rhetoric that declared the existence of gays as a class to the polity” (p. 2).
Jacobs argues that the first initiation of such rhetoric was in the aftermath of
Stonewall. The riots helped to energize GLBT advocates across the country
to engage in political association. The rhetoric that characterized this time
in the movement was primarily comprised of slogans that were to function
as persuasive appeals to create a movement. Those slogans included “say
it loud, gay is proud”, “gay is good”, and “three, five, seven, nine, lesbians
are mighty fine” (p. 4). These slogans were not only a way to bring the
movement together, but also worked to help closeted GLBT persons feel
comfortable coming out.

Visibility rhetoric fizzled out by the 1970s when the rhetoric became
obsolete due to coalesced social movements underway. The mid 1970s saw a
wave of scourge rhetoric employed by the conservative right. The archetypal
enemy of the gay marriage/gay rights movement during this time was Anita
Bryant. Bryant was a former Miss Oklahoma with a singing career who
was also deeply committed to her fundamentalist Baptist beliefs (Jacobs,
p. 32). One element of her particular belief system was the conviction
that homosexuality was wrong, biblically condemned, and an evil to be
legally criminalized. As such, Bryant dedicated herself to opposing gay
rights ordinances all over the country. She is most widely known for her
opposition to a Dade County, Florida ordinance that would have prohibited discrimination against GLBT persons in housing and other sectors (p. 33). Her and other conservative uses of scourge rhetoric took the form of arguments best epitomized by her statement, “why does such an abomination to God as homosexuality exist? It’s Satan on the move” (p. 34).

Scourge rhetoric, at its heart, was moral, medical, and debasing rhetoric with the specific purpose of demonizing homosexuals. More specifically, the religious right used tactics that located homosexuals as villains intent on corrupting the American moral system. Bryant and her colleagues used strategies that cast homosexuals as child molesters at worst; at best, homosexuals were attempting to recruit young children to their ranks due to inability to procreate naturally. Furthermore, Bryant’s claims that she and others must save their children from the moral depravity that was homosexuality resonated strongly to an audience that had grown tired of the radical movements of the 1960s. According to Jacobs (1993), over 72% of Americans reported their disapproval of homosexuality directly following the assault of scourge rhetoric intermittent through out referendum campaigns. This strategy is exceedingly effective for anti-gay advocates because it is a direct answer to visibility rhetoric and the mantras the 1960s. The argument that gay is bad, a moral disease, and homosexuals want to recruit children overwhelms rapidly the argument “gay is good”.

The gay marriage/rights debate alternative here is to answer the arguments in largely religious terms. The movement at the time was not well equipped to do so. In this case, the gay rights movement maintained the ‘gay is good’ arguments. In an attempt to counter the recruiting and child molestation charges, the gay rights movement responded that it was unfair to let gay children believe that they are alone or evil. Unfortunately making the move rhetorically to address childhood sexuality was the wrong one. For a culture that already believes that sex talk is taboo, focusing on the sexuality of children reinforced the stereotypes of homosexuals recruiting and turning children into homosexuals. This strategy set back the movement at least five years according to Jacobs (p. 39).

In the 1980s the gay rights movement experienced an unlikely opening through which they could gain a substantial amount of ground they had lost in the 1970s. The Reagan administration published a surprising report that indicated that GLBT people experienced more hate crimes than African Americans, Jews, and Hispanics combined. The news media surrounding presidential reports not only increased the visibility of homosexuals, but also garnered the movement sympathy across the nation (Jacobs, p. 42). Not only was the report released from one of the least gay friendly presidents in the recent past, the report allowed the gay rights group to frame arguments in an entirely new manner. Jacobs argues that because GLBT identified people were experiencing physical crime that was recognized nationally, they could now articulate arguments in terms of tolerance instead of acceptance. Instead
of asking the American public to accept them, they could ask the American public to protect their basic right to safety that would get their foot in the door for further legal reform. Jacobs argues that this by far was the most successful persuasive strategy of the gay rights movement.

Given the success of victim rhetoric, it is Jacobs’ conclusion that the movement employs more of this rhetoric in the fight for equality. Jacobs (1993) contends that as homosexuals continue to secure minor rights to material safety they are increasing the legal acceptance of homosexuals as equal citizens. When homosexuals are recognized as equal citizens, denying them civil rights is less plausible. Furthermore, Jacobs argues that the GLBT movement must narrow their arguments into more nuanced positions with multiple options for articulation. Jacobs points out that the more nuanced the argument the more persuasive, and the more difficult it will be for the anti-gay activists to answer without having to spend time defending their own position.

Jacobs (1993) is one of many authors that advocate that the gay marriage movement/gay rights movement develop more nuanced, precise arguments to attempt to answer those forwarded by the opposition but also to generate offensive arguments that advance them in the debate. Smith and Windes (1997) explain that there are multiple sites of struggle in the debate over gay marriage. These sites are troubling because they demand each side address a number of issues and arguments simultaneously while finding innovative and specific answers. There are five arguments identified by Smith and Windes that warrant analysis. The first is the debate over a “culture war” (p. 37). The anti-gay marriage movement has the advantage when defining the gay marriage struggle as a culture war. Arguments in favor of gay marriage are minor and largely negative in this context. Those who oppose marriage equality or gay rights more generally maintain the debate as a culture war wherein gay and lesbian activists wage war on mainstream culture forcing the average citizen to accept their ‘perversion’. In this way, gay and lesbian claims to equality were not palatable against a fear of societal disaccord and depravity.

The argument against same-sex marriage here is that homosexual advocacy is by its nature an attack on culture. Homosexuals are subversive and deserve to be marginalized in this view. This exploits for persuasive purposes the already marginalized status of GLBT people. It reinforces and reminds the listeners that GLBT people are already not equal in the status quo for a reason. Ultimately, culture is a contested ground in the antigay debate but not in the marriage equality debate. Smith and Windes (1997) argue that this differential is a partial explanation as to why gay marriage advocates continue to lose debates; behind because of their marginalized status, gay marriage advocates are not adequately addressing the arguments forwarded by their opponents.

The next argument articulated by Smith and Windes (1997) that appears in the gay marriage debate is “totalitarianism” (p. 37). Both sides of the
gay marriage debate accuse each other of being Nazis. Marriage equality advocates argue that those opposed to same-sex marriage are Nazis because they demand no deviations from the norm, and expect a blind following. Anti-gay advocates point to homosexuals as an integral part of the Nazi party and often brand them with pink swastikas. Overall, the deployment of the term *Nazi* immediately calls into question legitimate state power. This argument fundamentally questions the level to which the government can be manipulated to promote the interest of the minority. As a result the argument for free expression was developed by gay marriage activists. Shortly after, the anti-gay advocates co-opted the argument stating that they have the constitutional right to freedom of religious expression which we as Americans have decided is more persuasive than rights-based claims of free expression.

The third type of argument discussed by Smith and Windes (1997) is “ideograph rights” (p. 37). According to the authors, “the pro-gay movement labels their demands as ‘gay rights’” because it would be understood to include legal protection against discrimination (p. 38). The antigay movement labels these rights “special rights” that infringe on majority rights. Further, they argue that homosexual behavior implicitly disqualifies claims to legal protection and does not deserve freedom. The equivocation here is murder or rape; as perverted acts, they do not deserve protection under the law (p. 38).

Despite the failure of civil rights discourse in the case of the gay rights movement, Smith and Windes (2000) suggest that within this argument rights-based claims have the most potential to be successful because the arguments would echo the civil rights movement rhetoric that was successful. Alternatively, they argue that those opposed to gay rights in this context are likely to be successful as well. Anti-gay rights arguments are persuasive because they can emphasize equality (no special rights) and counter one set of rights claims with another. These persuasive appeals in contemporary debate would be reminiscent of the affirmative action debates, quotas, and reverse racism. It appears, then, that the most persuasive strategies still lie on the side of the anti-gay marriage debate.

In addition to rights claims, both sides of the gay marriage debate also attempt to cast themselves as anti-establishment. Anti-establishment claims, according Smith and Windes (2000), should ideally aid gay marriage advocates, as they are in fact the numeric minority in the debate. Unfortunately, however, the anti-gay marriage activists win here as well. Specifically, arguments in favor of gay rights include attempts to “modify a society dominated by capitalism, patriarchy, heterosexism, homophobia, and religiosity,” (p. 40). As one of these ideologies is identified as problematic, dominant, or oppressive it demands a fundamental restructuring of that system. Alternatively, argument against same-sex marriage make clear that they are fighting against “the establishment, dominated by elite secular humanists” who they claim have control over television, journalism, print
media, and other forms of cultural communication (p. 40). Both groups attempt to create the other as the establishment and direct their persuasive strategies in that way. Given historical and contemporary stereotypes of homosexuals, the ability of the antigay marriage side to cast homosexuals as trying to invade their culture and recruit people to their ranks resonates particularly strongly with average Americans. So, despite the fact that approximately 5% of the population in American is likely gay they are seen as aggressively in control. To find this argument in public debates, one need look no further than September 2009, when a Republican senator from Iowa claimed on the Rush Limbaugh show that gay and lesbian activists have “bought off the media, and congressional representatives” to enforce and protect a “gay agenda”.

Most contemporary gay marriage supporters are at a stand still in terms of negotiating a public discourse surrounding the issue. While many states have passed then overturned, and then passed again GLBT rights to marriage there is no national recognition of or protection for state recognized same sex marriage or civil unions. My attempt in this paper is not to deny the important progress made in the way of securing marriage rights for GLBT individuals, or to ignore the work of activists in this fight. My hope in exploring this literature and drawing the comparisons between particularly gendered movements is to find a way for GLBT activists and individuals to articulate more accurately responsive claims against aggressively traditional gender-biased arguments. As is illustrated above, those interested in the arguments made by the gay marriage and anti-gay marriage movements have not explored the gendered questions that are necessary to answer before either side is on the same ground. To find this common ground and to begin the analysis of these two movements, a turn to the structure and operation of the suffrage movement arguments is necessary.

Framework

Aileen Kraditor (1965) categorizes types of arguments made in the suffrage movement in terms of their content, and implication for the movement. She outlines two primary argument types: arguments from justice and arguments from expediency. Arguments from justice demand the right to suffrage based on women’s shared humanity with men. Because men and women are both citizens and share the right to natural rights protection, arguments from justice say women should have the natural right to vote.

Kraditor explains that arguments from expediency negotiate the meaning of rights, or rights-based claims. Arguments from expediency require that the arguer make offensive claims in demand for rights that in so doing also describe the way in which the attainment of those rights would improve society. In this way, women made arguments from expediency that indicated the kinds of change that their vote could affect. For example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton in a speech delivered in 1904 argued that women...
should have the right to vote because their vote could reform the nature of corrupt, overzealous male politicians that were selfishly controlling the polity (Kraditor, p. 47-48).

Kraditor (1965) indicates that the early demands of the suffrage movement were primarily characterized by arguments from justice (p. 44). This is consistent with the history of early America. A relatively new America was forged based on individual freedom, natural rights, and civic participation. Under the tide of this political freedom, claims to natural rights and a common humanity played into the genre of arguments made by the founders of new male freedom. Women in many states originally had the right to vote, and those rights were slowly but steadily being repealed. Demands for equality on the grounds of natural rights, then, in the face of rights depravation seemed the most persuasive. This strategy changed at the turn of the 20th Century after all women in all states were deprived the right to vote. The question of why this change occurred seems irresolvable in the literature; however, a common explanation indicates that the introduction, or at least the increased concern about race issues as they intersected with women’s suffrage, changed the way that white women in particular articulated socially imperative reasons why they should have the right to vote (Kraditor, p. 52-53).

Because there was overwhelming fear that suffrage granted to women would mean suffrage for African American women as well, white women at the time changed their strategy to increase the distinction between themselves and African American women. This strategy initiated claims of citizenship, productivity, and public morality. Because white women were responsible for the moral rearing of young congressmen, they claimed they needed the right to vote. This argument from expediency illustrates how women had to articulate arguments and characterizations of how the vote granted to women would positively impact social mores and relationships.

These two nuanced distinctions will be used as a framework for evaluating the political and social viability of the gender based arguments forwarded by both the suffrage movement as well as the gay marriage movement. This however is not enough to articulate just how similar or different arguments forwarded both for and against each movement truly were and what the implications of those similarities or differences may be for the gay marriage movement. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1989) illustrates three primary arguments forwarded against suffragists during the movement: theology, biology, and sociology (p. 37). Theological arguments were the most fundamental to the suffrage arguments in as much as they indicted the appropriate, moral character of women. The argument was that God has a distinctive plan and place for women in the home to maintain the family unit (Campbell, p. 37). Deviations from this plan were not only sins, but ultimately immoral. As such, the performance of femininity in this context became a moral imperative. The second set of arguments forwarded against
suffragists was arguments from biology. These arguments were constructed on biological differences between the sexes assuming male superiority. So the argument looked something like: women had smaller brains and as such were the weaker sex and not fit for the responsibilities of voting. This line of argumentation further reasoned that women by virtue of their femaleness were naturally conditioned to be subservient, passive, and caretakers. The last argument made against suffragists was from sociology. Sociological arguments were predicated on the notion that women were part of a distinct social group, the family, and their job was to maintain that social unit.

All three arguments are interconnected; as such, the arguments grow slightly more complicated than the examples given above. It is because of the nuanced nature of how gender-based arguments can be made and justified that this framework for comparisons between the suffrage movement and the gay marriage movement is necessary. Few arguments in the public sphere are rooted so thoroughly in tradition, intolerance, and ignorance than questions of gender and expected and appropriate gender performance for both men and women.

Analysis

What follows is an analysis of the arguments articulated against the suffrage movements and their relationship to the arguments forwarded against marriage equality, each movements responses, followed by a close reading of the important differences between the movements. The structure reflects both Kraditor’s (1965) argumentative priorities as well as Campbell’s (1989) organization of content-based arguments.

Oppositional Arguments from Expediency

Biological/Theological. Foundational to the opposition of suffrage was the indictment on biological terms that women are by nature inferior to men. While this is fundamentally a biological argument, it is inextricable in this case from theological arguments concerning the appropriate role of women. Men and women opposed to suffrage were aggressive and successful at characterizing women as “rejecting their feminine nature, being freaks, counterfeit men, monstrosities of nature, unsexed and oversexed simultaneously, self-absorbed, and belittling the hard work of other domestic women” (Marshall, 1997, p. 132). Naturally, these arguments were contextualized in relation to men and masculinity in so far as the rejection of femininity directly threatened male masculinity. Women, at the divestiture of their femininity, transformed marriage from a religious sacrament to a partnership between two equals (Marshall, p. 138). This equalization of marriage participants crowds out male responsibility for familial care. Deposition of male power as head of the household ignites threats of male reversion to barbarianism and a regression from chivalry (discussed in detail below). This indictment of women and who they become
through activism and ultimately their right to vote is the core of the anti-suffrage movement strategies. Marshall indicates that these arguments were typically contextualized to specific situations, but indictments of a woman’s true femininity were almost always cast in terms of how the traditional role of men was displaced (p. 138). Taking this argument a step further, and turning to theological justification, many argued that the natural condition of women is subservience demonstrated in the Christian origin story of Adam and Eve, and well as countless other social positions of women articulated in biblical narratives. This positions anti-suffragists to argue that the rejection of femininity is unnatural through biblical condemnation.

Mismatched gender performances as a threat to traditionally understood roles in both marriage and the family is not lost in the gay marriage debates. In fact, GLBT individuals struggle most in shoring up support for gay marriage because of the strategies used by those opposed to gay marriage to characterize all GLBT individuals as gender confused and clinically so. Those opposed to marriage equality argue that both gay men and lesbians enact, in extremes, gender oppositional performances. Both gay men and lesbians are cast in incongruent stereotypes of GLBT individuals and women simultaneously. Specifically, gay men are cast in two opposing ways in the gay marriage debate. As discussed previously, gay men are most often characterized as hypermasculine, aggressors, savage, hedonistic, and predatory. When that stereotype does not fit the situation, gay men are otherwise stereotyped feminine, or overly effeminate. Here, they simply become women (Herman, 1997, p. 80). Alternatively, lesbians are either hypermasculine or they are victims. Lesbians first get defined as attempting to be men. In this sense, they also become aggressors, dangerous, and unnatural. They dress like, act like, and sound like men (Herman, p. 94).

If lesbians are not attempting to be men, according to those opposed to gay marriage, their homosexuality can be attributed to emotional and sexual abuse and imbalance. Marshall (1997) indicates that anti-gay marriage advocates believe that lesbians are such because men have molested them, or their mothers have molested them, or gay men have corrupted them, or there was not a fulfillment of maternal needs while they were children. The strategic positioning of lesbians in this context is not incidental; in any case, women are not agents except when they are failing mothers. Men are characterized as predatory, both gay and straight. This reinforcement of traditional gender roles undercuts the viability of lesbians to make credible arguments in the gay marriage debate. This too is not an accident, as both Herman (1997) and Sullivan articulate, lesbians may be the biggest asset to the movement. Sullivan uses lesbian commitment, monogamy, and child rearing, as examples of how gay and lesbian relationships can be both healthy and non-threatening to heterosexual relationships. Herman indicates that opposition to lesbianism is relatively benign and as such lesbians could be a powerful political asset in arguments for gay marriage/rights (p. 108). Both
of these arguments, however, generate their own set of gendered assumptions that will be addressed in the implications section below.

*Sociological.* Initially, anti-suffragists labeled those in support of the right to vote “aggressors.” Primarily, these women were characterized as preying on a democratic society. This argument accused women of demanding “extra rights” as citizens of the United States (Marshall, 1997, p. 98). Suffrage here is illustrated as an aggressive campaign imposed upon the polity by a select few women who lost their sense of place in the social order. A pamphlet released in California following a significant victory for suffrage headlined: “Should all women bear the burden of the ballot to give some women political prominence?” (Marshall, p. 98-99). While an explicit extra rights claim here is apparent, it is the enthymematic power of this argument that ultimately gives it weight. What is not said in this argument but is implicitly inferred is that women would be burdened by the extra responsibility of having a voice in their political and social lives, which seems to necessarily imply their weakness. Further, it implies the elitism of a few women over the greater good of society. This description is powerful in as much as it negates the nature of being a proper woman. The attributes of true womanhood (later termed the Cult of True Womanhood) demand that women be pious, pure, generous, domestic, dependent, submissive, as well as giving, and selfless in deference to the needs of her family (Welter, 1977). Any violation of these values violated gendered norms and performance expectations. The claim that women in the movement were elitist and demanding “special rights” was more than just a reflection of modern day anti-affirmative action arguments, but instead was an unspoken assault on the femininity and womanhood of suffragists.

In much the same vein, opponents of same sex marriage use the same label of “aggressor” and while some of the implications of this label are the same as the suffrage movement, some are distinctly and devastatingly different. An aggressor in its most benign sense in the gay marriage debate characterizes GLBT individuals as desiring extra rights or special rights. This argument is not uncommon as illustrated by the suffrage movement, the civil rights movement, and in any debates concerning affirmative action (Herman, p. 76). This claim to special rights, though, is wrapped up in the rhetorical power of the term “aggressor” when it comes to GLBT individuals. Historically, according to Herman, gay men in particular have been characterized as “hyper-masculinity out of control, aggressive, powerful, unrestrained, and predatory” despite the common assumption that gay men are gendered effeminate (p. 79-80). Specifically, gay men are not just predators of other gay men, they are particularly threatening to straight men, and young boys as well (Sullivan, 2007). In this context, gay men become predators of people not just ideologies, or democracy as was the case for suffragists. More importantly perhaps for the gender analysis here, they become predators of masculinity. Gay men are in a perpetual state of non-
masculinity. Either they are hyper-masculinized as illustrated above, or, they are feminized to the point that their masculinity is unrecognizable (Herman, p. 80-81). This strategic juxtaposition makes the attainment of masculinity impossible while also maintaining a “healthy” view of masculinity that is free from any threat or implication of homosexuality. In this sense then, the gay male as aggressor is not just about rights-based due, or material predatory concerns, but also about the protection of masculinity and the appropriate performance thereof.

An additional content-based argument forwarded by anti-suffragists was women as radicals. This is intimately connected to women as predators in the sense that females were characterized as being associated with evil and dangerous sources (Marshall, p. 100). The strategy of this label was to associate activist women with groups of people that were decidedly threatening to social mores, the democratic process, or threatened the power of the country such as socialists, anarchists, atheists, and radical labor movements (p. 100). This enabled anti-suffragists to generate a public sentiment against suffragists based on no facts, but instead to depend on already established fears of political and social instability due to external forces. These ideological associations between suffragists and socialists, atheists, etc. also functioned to insult the femininity of the women participating in the suffrage movements. Campbell (1989) explains that if women were to meet the minimum requirements of being a true woman, they have to be submissive to their husbands (imitation of men), as well as be the spiritual mainstay of the family. If suffragists are associated with external evil forces such as atheists and other radical groups they are presumably not deferring to their husbands moderate or conservative views. Equally important is the rejection of religion, and the democratic process. If suffragists were willing to associate with socialists and atheists, it calls into question the capacity for those women to be the feminine mothers to which their gender is obligated.

GLBT individuals are not strangers to the ‘radical’ label. Specifically in gay marriage debates radical has become a euphemism for Nazi (Herman, p. 90-91). Herman explains that gay marriage supporters were labeled radicals (Nazis) to characterize the movement as power hungry totalitarians forcing their homosexuality onto mainstream culture. This picture of GLBT individuals, it is worth noting, is incongruent with the anarchic savages in arguments that depict gay men as aggressors. Of course, however, the hyper-masculinity is emulated in the militaristic metaphor associated with totalitarianism. This rhetorical strategy is mutually reinforcing. It associates Nazis with GLBT individuals signifying the foundationally corrupt and diseased ideas of Nazism while simultaneously signifying GLBT individuals with a historically saturated view of conquest and world domination (Herman, p. 91). This rhetorical move does a little more than just associate the gay marriage movement with totalitarian Nazism; the choice to hail the Holocaust in relation to GLBT individuals is powerful
in erasing historical memory of the gay men and lesbians that were also systematically killed in concentration camps by virtue of their sexuality. Herman does not acknowledge this particular problem with calling on the Nazi descriptor; however, there is little arguing that associating GLBT individuals with Nazis does cultural work to highlight the differences that were the grounds for the extermination of GLBT individuals during the Holocaust. In this way, mainstream culture can fight Nazis or GLBT individuals; in either case, gay marriage activists lose.

For the suffrage movement, moving away from abstract labels such as aggressor or Nazi was a social imperative to articulate an immediate threat from suffragists. Anti-suffragists sought to paint women as irresponsible, dangerous, and bad mothers by indicting their commitment to the family. The argument that women were ignoring their responsibility to the family was both persuasive and gendered. Marshall (1997) argues that anti-suffragists’ arguments concerning the family attacked the presumed division of labor: “men protect women and the family on the battlefield and in politics, while women preserve the family at home” (Marshall, p. 109). The act of seeking suffrage itself withdrew the woman from her appropriate place in the home, it was argued, and any successful result of the movement would cement such a condition. Anti-suffragists argued that the right to vote would move women out of the home and into the corrupt location of social and political debates (Claflin, 1871). Suffragists faced a litany of attacks in this respect including: “starting sex wars, marital discord, domestic neglect, rampant individualism, disunity, rivalry, and strife” (Marshall, p. 121).

While the argument that women moving out of their domestic position would undermine the family is gendered, a more in-depth understanding of how women and men were strategically positioned in these arguments reveals that the primary concern was the risk the movement posed to role of men and masculinity. Campbell illustrates the arguments were typically characterized by male power. The family was likened to the state, and the man as the head of his own government. For women to break out of their domesticity men would have to surrender their leadership of the family state to women. Women alternatively were characterized in this context as overtly aggressive and power hungry to dominate men and the family (Campbell, p. 157). Furthermore, suffragists as responsible for sex wars hailed both a metaphor for violence, but also a serious threat of material violence. Marshall indicates that in this argument men and women opposed to suffrage argued that female dominance would lead to a regression from chivalry and into a sort of barbarianism. Men argued “we have put women on a pedestal... they will fall” (Marshall, p. 123). This argument culminated in a threat that the sight of women voting would excite the sexual brutality of men leading to uncontrollable rape and assault.

While threats of physical violence and their realization have often been the subtext of many arguments concerning the equalizing of power relations,
(see civil rights movement, Chicano rights movement, feminist movements, etc.) these arguments are particularly underscored in the context of gender-based arguments (Marshall, p. 123). Threats and actualized violence continue to be an undercurrent in the debate over same-sex marriage particularly when it comes to the corruption of the family by gay marriage. The most predominate argument from those who oppose marriage equality is borne out of the notion that marriage is for procreation. At the most fundamental level, GLBT individuals threaten the family because two same sex partners cannot naturally produce a family (Rauch, 1996).

This is not where “the assault on the family” argument ends. Sullivan illustrates that GLBT individuals are also characterized as emotionally inept, promiscuous, and lack the restraint to be monogamous. These qualities, as per traditionalists, are a basic requirement for healthy families. It is important to note that lesbians endure far less scrutiny in terms of family based arguments. ‘Lesbians as mothers’ does not necessarily violate traditional female gender roles: women are meant to care for children. As such, the Christian Right defers to the public/private distinction when it comes to the question of lesbian mothers (Herman, p. 107-108). Mothering and other issues of domesticity have historically been secluded to the private realm, while issues such as political rights are considered public realm issues. This separation has strategically marginalized important issues surrounding female security and rights in the home. Issues like marital rape, domestic abuse and the like have been chalked up to private issues to be negotiated by the family. The position this puts lesbians in, then, is of invisibility in the debate. This nuanced distinction between assumed parenting desires and capabilities not only highlights inconsistencies in the anti-gay marriage movement but also spotlights the gendered nature of many of their arguments. The reversion back to a public/private dichotomy has additional implications that are given greater attention in detail below.

Movement answers

As illustrated to this point, the suffragists and marriage equality advocates endured similar onslaughts of arguments that sought/seek to characterize activists as dangerous, unnatural, and risky social actors that threaten the normal functioning of the polity. While it is imperative to understand thoroughly the sorts and substance of arguments articulated against each of these movements, another key element in any discussion of social movements and their effectiveness is an understanding of the movements’ responses to accusations. Just as there was overwhelming overlap in the way of arguments made against each movement, their responses and/or potential responses are equally similar.

Argument from Justice. Suffragists claimed that they deserved equal rights due to the natural rights guaranteed them as humans. They reasoned
that if men and women share humanity and natural rights, then women too should have the right to vote secured. Though this strategy grows less effective in the gay marriage debate, those that support marriage equality make arguments from justice by mobilizing historical civil rights fights for equality including miscegenation, and desegregation. In the proposition 8 debate in California, many “no on 8” commercials sought to couch their arguments for gay marriage in the images, rhetoric, and history of a civil rights movement that made primarily arguments from justice. To recognize the common humanity of those who are gay and those who are not is to recognize that equal rights is a cultural民主 imperative.

Arguments from Expedience

The turn to making offensive claims about the social utility of the right to vote or the right to marry complicates the grounds from which arguments are articulated and the strategic utility of some arguments. Both movements are put in a double-bind from their social/political locations in a democratic society. They are socially positioned outside of mainstream culture so must both criticize that culture and seek its entrance. In this way, the movement activists in both cases attack the people that must act for their liberation.

Biological/Theological. As the turn of the century passed suffragists began a new wave of expedience arguments that capitalized on the xenophobia and religious intolerance of the time arguing that if women were given the vote it would offset the vote of foreigners and Catholics (Kraditor, p. 55). In this sense then, the assumption of the female vote was that it would emulate the vote of their husbands or the interests of common public morality that was presumably differentiated from that of foreigners or Catholics. This continues an implicit subservience to male power and opinion (Kraditor, p. 56). Generally, arguments from expedience, in the case of suffrage, meant the reinforcement of traditional gendered stereotypes of women in an effort to increase their freedom.

Sociological. Female ties to domesticity and the home created the conditions under which the women of the suffrage movement made arguments that capitalized on stereotypes while also advancing their rights. For example, women argued that they needed the right to vote because they were responsible for the training of young men who would later become statesmen and as such need the right to influence, politically, the home and men. On a macro level, this argument was that if women were responsible for the raising of statesmen, then they were also responsible for any failings of the state and as such should have the right to vote (Kraditor, p. 52). While this argument puts women in the position to bear the responsibility of a failed political system, it is also an effective offensive argument for suffrage.

Just as suffragists were dependent on their marginalized status to make arguments, GLBT individuals are also strapped to their position in the social
hierarchy. One argument from expediency indicates that gay marriage will help to domesticate gay male promiscuity (Bruce, 2004). According to Bruce, many argue that gay men are disease spreading hyper-sexed polygamous individuals who pose a threat to society as such. His proposition, then, is that marriage may be a sufficient solution to this particular social threat. He also indicates that it would do well for gay men and lesbians if the picture of homosexuality was not one of mass promiscuity and hyper-sexed men. This argument of course is only possible because the initial stereotype of the oversexed, diseased gay male exists. Furthermore, this argument asks gay people to emulate straight relationships. The assumption that women domesticate men is predicated on traditional gender roles, that is clear; however, the suggestion that gay men must or should be domesticated is both gendered and homophobic and implies that gay relationships should look and operate very much like straight relationships.

This strategy is particularly clear in the campaign initiated by the Human Rights Commission (HRC) generally titled “Family Matters” is the perfect exemplification of this construction. Only recently dubbed “Family Matters,” the campaign material spans over 12 years of the fight for gay marriage (hrc.org). The campaign seeks to secure equal marriage benefits for civil unions. The front of the brochure features two prominent pictures of families. A family with two male parents with two children, as well as a family with two female parents with one child is the dominating force of the brochure under a bolded statement “OUR FAMILIES MATTER” (“Family Matters”, p. 1). The text of the front of the advertisement argues for same-sex marriage benefits for these families indicating their inability to access medical benefits for their children, collect veterans’ family benefits, or family and medical leave absences from their workplaces. This particular focus constructs <family> in mirror image to the heterosexual construction of family replacing opposite sexed partners with same sexed partners. The second page of the brochure is lined at the bottom with photos of presumably gay and lesbian parents with their children. These pictures only “read” gay because they appear in this publication. If featured anywhere else, they would be indiscernible in terms of sexuality. In this way, the argument positions gays and lesbians as “all but heterosexual”—reinforcing their difference in an effort to gain access to a mainstream institution.

An additional argument from expediency forwarded by the same sex marriage movement is that lesbian relationships currently prove that same sex relationships can function healthily as well as be monogamous. Flaks, et al. (1995) reasoned that lesbian relationships are more often than not characterized by “fidelity, responsibility, devotion, and a commitment to child rearing” (p. 34). There are few if any statistics to make such a qualitative and quantitative judgment of lesbian relationships. However, given contemporary stereotypes about lesbians and women in particular, it seems safe to assume that a household comprised of two women would operate predominately in a
stereotypical feminine paradigm and as such childrearing and the like would be true. The HRC again exemplifies this particular strategy on their website (hrc.org) when discussing the benefits of civil unions. They feature the story of the Andermills from Columbus, Ohio. Wrapped in Midwest values, Dorie and Karen Andermill tell their story of becoming a loving nurturing family. Their narrative is an exemplary model of a lesbian relationship. While they have no children, they are both public service workers: a special needs school teacher and an American Red Cross employee. Their 12-year relationship represents a high functioning relationship on par with those of heterosexuals, but is cloaked in the rhetoric of heteronormativity, subbing a husband for a wife.

Ultimately, the position from which each movement can craft responses to their opponents has thus far been in part foundational reinforcing of gendered stereotypes that contribute to their initial oppression. For women, the demand and success of the suffrage movement can be attributed to arguments that at once sought to advance the political power of women but rests on social stereotypes of women. Similarly, the promotion of gay marriage in national debates seems to be predicated on an emulation of traditional heteronormative relationships—the basic components of which gay and lesbian relationships cannot meet, and the ideological condition that contributes to their oppression.

**Notable Divergences**

Overall, it is clear both from the arguments made against each movement and their answers that these two movements share at their core arguments from disadvantaged gendered positions. These similarities are exceptionally important to acknowledge and understand; however, it is also in their differences that important distinctions are found that impact the ability of those in the gay marriage movement to borrow strategies from the suffrage movement in the way of answering gendered indictments. Three primary differences are relevant to the critical comparison made here: social positions, agency, and nuance.

Initially, it is important to note that women as a social group at the time of suffrage had a higher or at least a more solidified role in the social world. Women’s necessity as a part of a moral and social order was not questioned. Women were necessary because they maintained the family, they took care of their husbands, they trained future statesmen, and they were the moral compasses of a community. Gays and lesbians do not enjoy the same or even similar social positioning. There is no presumed natural role for members of the GLBT community in a society focused on productivity (both biologically and materially). GLBT individuals cannot presume to make arguments that are predicated on social utility. Their identity as individuals and as a movement strips them of any social leverage that natural arguments (arguments from expediency) require. This difference then, is an essential one. If members
of the gay marriage movement seek to emulate gender-based responses it is imperative that they find a social and political foundation where a basic value is presumed—outside of justice based claims.

The second important difference between these two movements found throughout the literature is the direction of agency within each movement. As is evident in many of the arguments made above, in the suffrage debate few arguments were made about how women would corrupt the structure of the voting system or the government; instead, arguments were predominately made that participation in that system would corrupt women. Women, here, are the victims of corruption. However, in the case of the gay marriage debate, members of the GLBT community are characterized as undermining the institution of marriage. This argument seeks to characterize GLBT individuals as predators as explained previously in my analysis. This dichotomy however, highlights the double duty that is required of GLBT individuals in debates concerning gay marriage. They must first defend their identity in the face of homophobic claims about the personal behaviors of gays and lesbians, and then can begin a reasonable discussion of marriage to prove that they would not corrupt the institution itself. This puts gays and lesbians behind before they even start the debate.

The final difference to be discussed here is that while both movements are significantly and almost completely characterized by strict gender stereotypes and assumptions, it seems that the arguments articulated against gay men and lesbians in the way of gender are more nuanced and complicated. This does not eliminate the capacity for GLBT individuals to borrow answers or strategies from the suffrage movement, but it does complicate the nature of those arguments and their viability as legitimate responses to the unique gendered position of GLBT people. The double-bind that gay men face means that either way they perform gender they are not normal men. Either they are masculinity out of control, or they are drained of masculinity all together. They are not able to represent, in terms of oppositional arguments, normal male behavior.

Lesbians face a further gender predicament. Their intersectional identities forsake them as political actors. Given the characterization of lesbians as victims, and women as victims they are divested of nearly all personal agency. Violence or persuasion happens to them to make them homosexual, and by nature of being women they are made to be powerless, and dependent upon men. This double-bind in both cases disadvantages both sexes and GLBT individuals generally because they never begin debates on any level foundation. This may also have broader implications in terms of how each sex can articulate their specific rights to marriage. If each can not achieve normative gender performance for variant reasons their capacity to make political and legal arguments for the right marry are likely to diverge as well.

Implications and Conclusions
While this critical comparison is by no means complete in scope or content it can begin a discussion about the role of gender and gender-based arguments in social movements. The implications of this research are both practical and theoretical. In terms of practice, this research shows the similarities encountered in the way of gendered arguments in social movement and public discourse. Emerging scholarship should take the time to expand analysis of these two movements to see how these arguments more intricately relate and draw out potential locations of similarities that could benefit contemporary movement strategies, both rhetorically and organizationally. For example, if women were able to successfully forward arguments of expediency without too much damage done to negative images of women, then members of the same gay marriage movement would be well to find how this rhetoric worked to overcome dominant negative ideologies surrounding suffrage. Further, suffragists were able to claim a certain level of social responsibility for the appropriate working of the polity. Finding similar ground in the gay marriage movement may be the foundation on which national right to gay marriage may be won. Finally, a movement strategy that has been emulated in the gay marriage debate is the state by state securing of gay marriage rights, a strategy that was of service to the suffrage movement. The strategic utility for rhetorical productions in this respect is that they can be tailored to the particular voting electorate of the state in question. The persuasive claims of the gay marriage movement, then, can be particularized. However, history here is not all positive. It took a national amendment to secure the rights of women to vote, the political capital for which the gay marriage movement lacks. Finding and modeling some of the national level messages of the suffrage movement may aid that advancement of marriage equality in meaningful ways.

While this borrowing is terribly important, it is equally important to understand the complicated nature of the gay marriage debate. The gay marriage movement’s relationship to the institution to which it seeks entrance is vitally different than that of suffragists. While women did not have to defend or attack the fundamental qualities of the voting system or democracy in general, because gay marriage is seen as threatening the sanctity of the institution of marriage, the gay marriage movement faces the added burden of deconstructing the iconic construction of marriage. Understanding the ideographic nature of marriage makes the arguments from expediency that much more important. Conservatives have securely held the ground that describes marriage as a sacred religious institution that will only be corrupted on account of gays and lesbians. Gay marriage proponents must divorce marriage from its current flawless character, but must be careful in doing so as to not negate its presumed benefits. The gay marriage movement struggles in this respect. Conservative reaction to criticisms of the institution of marriage is further protectionism of the institution itself. Commenting on divorce rates as evidence of the slipping sanctity of marriage is met with
arguments about liberal excess. Ultimately, we find ourselves further shut out of such institutions through such strategies.

On a more theoretical level the questions that this research raises are two-fold: first, how can/should feminists and queers negotiate gender performance, not just as normative, but as a moral requirement? Second, does critical gender theory have a place in contemporary social movements concerning gender? Initially, the analysis above and in the research concerning this topic highlighted the religious nature of many arguments. For example, suffrage arguments about the appropriate role of women were borne out of religious beliefs about God’s role for women. In the gay marriage debate the argument is almost completely religious—homosexuality is not natural, not part of God’s plan, and an abominable sin. The only way to deduce many of these arguments is that the failure to adequately perform the gender that you were assigned by nature of your sex is immoral. Femininity and heterosexuality in this sense become moral imperatives, not simply socially rewarding. Both Foucault (1980) and Butler (1993) discuss social rewards in relation to expected social performances. While Butler focuses primarily on gender performance, the questions of power and social rewards are articulated clearly in Foucault’s discussion of the state. What their conversation of gender performance and social reward is missing is the moral expectation of such a performance. In this way, those that do not perform their gender appropriately are not only socially ostracized, but are religiously condemned—in religious exile with little hope of reentrance. Expanding Butler’s discussions of gender performance and social benefits to include an analysis of the construction of gender outlaws in relation to claims of morality and sin would add to our more complete understanding of gender, religion, and all of their intersections.

The second question: does critical gender theory have a place in contemporary social movements concerning gender? The answer, of course, is exceedingly complicated. While queer theory in general endures criticism for its abstract nature, queer theorists who discuss gender performance in particular are guilty of a disconnection from the material body. Specifically, Butler makes the most complete arguments about gender performance in relation to material reality; however, her work is difficult to apply to the analysis here. While Butler’s Bodies that matter should ideally readily apply to the question of gender performance given her analysis in “Paris is Burning,” the actual politics of gender bending in political debates is foundationally counterproductive. The religious and moral overtones, as well as the control of heteronormative political institutions at the hands of conservative men and women poses more than metatheoretical concerns for members of the GLBT community who continue to be denied material rights. To perform an alternative gender makes them immoral, not liberated in the political realm, but to perform their “appropriate” gender and maintain their identity is an impossibility. It seems that queer theory as a discipline has failed to address this political quandary as it impacts the realities and daily lives
of those involved in the gay marriage debate. As such, it is imperative that theory meet praxis on this issue. Moving theory from academic institutions to the “streets” of the movement would benefit both.

As members of the GLBT community we have much to learn from our fore mothers in the suffrage movement. They faced the complicated gender related arguments that we ward off daily in our seeking of the right to marry. As members of this movement and leaders of more diverse and open society that guarantees the natural rights of all people it is imperative that we take cues from those who have come before and successfully fought for legislative freedom, while simultaneously acknowledging that times and attitudes have changed. We must be careful to know that our arguments must become more nuanced, more directed, and more persuasive. Instead of making civil rights-based arguments, we need to expand these to include social benefits arguments. We must shift the debate away from the icon of marriage and begin a conversation about how GLBT individuals can add to the benefits of marriage. As academics we must be willing to translate our theoretical positions into practical activism, and we must be unafraid to make practical suggestions to improve the conditions of our realities. Without an effort in this direction, the grounds of this debate and those that will take place in the future concerning gender, gender performance and legislative/social/political equality will always be lost.

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