The Effects of Christian Religiosity on Support for the Death Penalty versus Life without Parole

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Death Penalty versus Life without Parole

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Abstract

While numerous scholars have examined the relationship between individuals’ Christian religiosity and their support for the death penalty, empirical tests of this relationship show mixed results. In this paper, I argue that past empirical inconsistencies may be due to measurement error in the religious variables and dependent variable. Using the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, I test the effects of individuals’ religious belonging, beliefs, and behaviors on their preference for replacing the death penalty with a sentence of life without parole. I find that Roman Catholic affiliation, Biblical literalism, and more frequent practice of religious behaviors affect support for LWOP vs. the death penalty, although the effect of Catholic affiliation differs across levels of religious behavior and political ideology.
Introduction

Religion has always been a part of the debate about the death penalty in America. Some of the earliest abolitionists viewed the crusade to eliminate capital punishment as a Christian imperative, while many of their pro-death penalty opponents cited the Bible to argue that capital punishment was an acceptable exercise of state power under God’s law (Davis, 1957). The debate remains unresolved today. Numerous Christian denominations in America take positions on both sides of the issue at the aggregate level (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life), while scholars have observed individual citizens citing religion to justify their pro- or anti-death penalty attitudes (Cook & Powell, 2003; Vandiver, Giacopassi, & Gathje, 2001). Thus, historical and empirical evidence indicates that religion impacts citizens’ support for or opposition to capital punishment.

Although scholars have begun empirical efforts to understand the exact nature of the relationship between individuals’ religiosity and their attitudes toward the death penalty, results to date are mixed. Some studies demonstrate positive relationships between various measures of religion and support for the death penalty (e.g., Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel 1993; Unnever, Cullen, & Bartkowski 2006), while other studies find that the same variables generate no statistically significant relationships (e.g., Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, & Vander Ven 2000; Soss, Langbein, & Metelko 2003). Furthermore, scholars are largely hampered by data limitations that preclude the ability to include religion in studies that address the known sensitivity of individuals’ answers regarding the death penalty to factors such as question wording and variety of response options (Jones, 1994; McGarrell & Sandys, 1996). Though we have learned much about the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward the death penalty, more work is needed to fully understand the complexities of this relationship.
In this paper, I use a new dataset to explore the impact of individuals’ religiosity on their preference for the death penalty versus a sentence of life in prison without parole, a more nuanced question that has been shown to notably affect the preference distribution of respondents’ answers (Bohm, Flanagan, & Harris, 1989). First, I discuss Christian scripture and dogma and argue that the Bible provides theoretical support for both punitive and lenient attitudes. Second, I identify empirical inconsistencies in the extant literature on religiosity and attitudes toward punishment and posit that these inconsistencies may be due to measurement problems in the religious variables and death penalty dependent variable. Third, I present the results of an ordered logit analysis in which I find that Roman Catholic affiliation and engagement in religious behaviors affect support for replacing the death penalty with LWOP. Finally, I discuss my findings and propose avenues for future research.

The Bible, Dogma, and Christian Theory

The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life cites nine different major American Christian denominations and religious organizations that have adopted official policy stances in regard to the death penalty. The American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), the United Methodist Church, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the National Council of Churches oppose capital punishment, while the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the National Evangelical Association support the death penalty.

To the casual observer, it might seem strange that denominations that follow the same scripture can reach diametrically opposed positions about the death penalty. However, scholars point out that the Bible contains support for both punitive and lenient attitudes. By examining scripture and the tradition of Christian philosophers, Murphy (2003) discusses the theoretical
arguments under which strict punishment, notably the death penalty, is admissible under Judeo-Christian law. He cautions that one should not confuse the Christian mandate to love one’s neighbor as being equivalent to soft sentimentality. Consider Biblical passages such as,

He who sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed…

(Genesis 9:6)

If further harm is done, however, you will award life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stroke for stroke…

(Exodus 21:23-25)

So anyone who disobeys an authority is rebelling against God’s ordinance; and rebels must expect to receive the condemnation they deserve…. [I]t is not for nothing that the symbol of authority is the sword: it is there to serve God, too, as his avenger, to bring retribution to wrongdoers…

(Romans 13:2, 4)

each of which indicate that retributive punishment, even death, can be administered by the state as an agent of God’s will. Murphy posits, therefore, that the key to understanding Christian beliefs about punishment is to understand that forgiveness is a matter of the heart, a change in feelings towards the offender, not necessarily an action. Taken in consideration with the primary Christian concern of salvation not in this world, but in heaven, Murphy argues that it is possible to forgive an offender and still require that the offender be punished, even by death, so long as efforts have been made to save the offender’s soul.

Other scholars, however, call attention to the dominant emphasis on love and forgiveness in Christian thought and argue that interpretations of scripture that allow any form of retributive or vindictive punishment miss the spirit of the law (Boulton, 2007). Beckman (2004), for example, critiques Murphy’s (2003) analysis and highlights the fine distinction between word and deed. She cites the famous story of Jesus and the woman caught in adultery (John 8:3-11). When the crowd wanted to stone her, Jesus says, “Let the one among you who is guiltless be the first to throw a stone at her” (John 8:7). When the crowd disperses and the woman marvels that
no one has condemned her, Jesus states, “Neither do I condemn you…. Go away, and from this moment sin no more” (John 8:11). The crowd would have been fully within their rights to stone the woman according to the Hebrew law, yet Jesus not only forgave her, he commuted the punishment itself because no human is in a sufficient state of grace to pass such judgment upon another person.

Even this brief consideration of scripture and philosophy reveals that Christians have theoretical, dogmatic reasons to either support the punishments that currently exist in America’s criminal justice system or argue for their abolition or reformation in favor of more compassionate forms of legal accountability for criminal acts. Whether Christians’ religious beliefs actually lead them to greater punitiveness or leniency towards offenders is an empirical question, however, and scholars have begun to examine the relationship between Christian beliefs and attitudes towards punishment. The results that have emerged out of this growing body of literature are mixed and leave many questions unanswered.

**Empirical Inconsistencies and Challenges**

**Inconsistent Results**

Scholars in this line of inquiry have employed a number of different variables in order to measure religious beliefs and test their effects on attitudes toward punishment. These variables include Christian fundamentalism, Biblical literalism, religious salience, image of God, forgiveness, and compassion. Stemming both from the nature of fundamentalist beliefs and the fact that fundamentalists have become increasingly involved in social politics in the past quarter century (Guth, Green, Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1996; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2007), Christian fundamentalism is the most frequently employed independent variable. However, measures of fundamentalism have performed inconsistently in regard to dependent measures of punitiveness.
While some studies find relationships that link fundamentalism to variables of increased punitiveness (consistent with “eye for an eye” theory), such as support for the death penalty (Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever et al., 2006; Young, 1992), support for harsher courts (Grasmick et al., 1993), retributive ideology (Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin, & Bursik, 1992), and a perception that crimes are sinful and deserve to be punished (Curry, 1996), other studies find that fundamentalism predicts decreased support for punitive variables, such as support for harsher sentencing by courts (Unnever, Cullen, & Applegate, 2005).

Other scholars find that the effects of fundamentalism were contingent upon interactions with other factors. Borg (1997) finds that the effect of fundamentalism on support for the death penalty varies widely depending upon one’s regional identity; southern fundamentalists are more likely to support the death penalty, while non-southern fundamentalists are less likely. Similarly, other scholars find that fundamentalism decreases support for the death penalty among blacks but is either insignificant (Young & Thompson, 1995) or increases support (Unnever & Cullen, 2007a) among whites. Unnever and Cullen (2006) find a comparatively weak relationship in that fundamentalists are no more likely to support the death penalty than members of more moderate or liberal Christian denominations. In contrast, other scholars have failed to find any significant relationship between fundamentalism and support for the death penalty (Applegate et al., 2000; Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2006) or for harsher local courts (Applegate et al., 2000).

Scholars have employed several other variables to measure different facets of Christian beliefs, but most demonstrate the same inconsistency as fundamentalism. Literal interpretation of the Bible and a harsh, judgmental image of God typically generate a positive relationship with
measures of punitiveness (Bader & Johnson, 2007; Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, 2005; Unnever & Cullen, 2006), but just as frequently these variables yield inconsistent results between models and types of punishments (Bader & Johnson, 2007; Grasmick et al., 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Young, 1992; Young & Thompson, 1995) or fail to achieve statistical significance (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever et al., 2006).

Similarly, the degree to which religion is important in one’s life (i.e., religious salience) and the importance one places on compassion and forgiveness are frequently negatively related to measures of punitiveness (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1992; Unnever et al., 2005a; Unnever & Cullen, 2006), but they too generate inconsistent results (Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick & McGill, 1994) or fail to reach significance (Evans & Adams, 2003; Moon, Wright, Cullen, & Pealer, 2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever et al., 2006). In sum, these inconsistencies in the extant literature indicate that more research is needed in order to further clarify the nature of the relationship between Christian religiosity and attitudes toward punishment.

Two bodies of work may help elucidate why the study of religion and punishment opinions suffers from these empirical limitations. The first body of work concerns the measurement of the various dimensions of religiosity. The second body of work concerns the effects of the questions themselves on the nature of respondents’ answers to questions about the death penalty.

Toward More Precise Measurement of Religion

To date, criminologists have overwhelmingly relied upon Tom Smith’s (1990) fundamentalist/moderate/liberal classification scheme that is contained in the General Social
Survey’s “fund” variable as their operational definition of religious affiliation (Grasmick et al. 1992; Young & Thompson 1995; Sandys & McGarrell 1997; Britt 1998; Borg 1998; Unnever et al. 2005a, 2005b; Unnever & Cullen 2006; Unnever et al. 2006). While this measure is very frequently used by social scientists, numerous scholars argue that it is a poor measure for various reasons. First, the measure is ahistorical (Smidt, Kellstedt, & Guth, forthcoming). It implies that most religious denominations in America would choose the terms fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal as core descriptors. This is not the case. Most notably, Smith’s scheme implies that most denominations on the “conservative” end of the spectrum are fundamentalist when, in fact, fundamentalism is a comparatively small subset of evangelicalism/conservative Protestantism, a much broader religious tradition (Kellstedt & Smidt, 1996; Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robinson, Wilcox, & Woodberry, 2000; Woodberry & Smith, 1998). Second, the construction of Smith’s scheme implies an ordinal ranking between denominations when a nominal categorization is more appropriate (Steensland et al., 2000). Third, the use of the terms “moderate” and “liberal” conflates the spectrum of religious traditions with the continuum of political ideology; though a correlation does exist between the two constructs, it is far from absolute (Kellstedt, Green, Guth, & Smidt, 1996). Finally, Smith categorizes Catholics as moderates and black Protestants as fundamentalists, a coding scheme that obscures both the diversity within these religious traditions and their very real theological and cultural distinctions from dominantly white Protestant denominations (Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990; Smidt et al., forthcoming).

It is possible that the limitations of the “fund” coding scheme may partially explain the inconsistent results found in this body of literature, most notably the fluctuations of the fundamentalism variable from study to study. Due to the fact that the oft-used fundamentalism
variable is a questionable match to the distinctions between various Christian religious families in America, it generates theoretically ambiguous results. In order to overcome the weaknesses of Smith’s coding scheme, I employ the measurement strategy of Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth (Kellstedt et al., 1996; Smidt et al., forthcoming). These scholars recommend a tripartite measurement scheme that they call “the three B’s” – belonging (i.e. denominational affiliation), beliefs, and behavior. This scheme captures various facets of a respondent’s religiosity, from her beliefs in the metaphysical to her frequency of acts of devotion, like prayer and church attendance. By including a variable for each dimension of a person’s religiosity in a regression model, I am able to operationally measure the effect of each facet of religiosity on a person’s attitudes toward punishment. Criminologists already recognize the dimensions of religiosity and intuitively echoed the “three B’s” measurement scheme by employing measures of Biblical literalism (belief), church attendance, and prayer frequency (behavior) in this line of inquiry. This coding scheme simply employs more robust measures of these core constructs.

Question Wording, Response Options, and Death Penalty Opinion

The second body of literature that may help explain the inconsistencies in the study of religion and support for the death penalty is well known to criminologists. A number of scholars have demonstrated that the results one is likely to get from a survey of death penalty opinion are heavily influenced by the nature of the questions themselves. Numerous studies with various samples that employ the standard, favor-vs.-oppose death penalty question find that a majority of Americans support capital punishment (Cullen, Pealer, Fisher, Applegate, & Santana, 2002; Pew Research Center, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2006). Furthermore, this high level of support has been stable for decades.
However, studies that employ modifications to the standard, favor-vs.-oppose question often find quite different results. Jones (1994) utilized three different versions of the death penalty support question that manipulated the “don’t know” response option so that it was either absent, provided by the interviewer, or integrated into the question as a preliminary filter (i.e., “Do you have an opinion about the death penalty?”). Moving from the absent to provided to filter conditions, Jones found that the percentages of respondents favoring and opposing the death penalty dropped, while the percentage who answered “don’t know” increased dramatically.

Harris (1986) asked his respondents to clarify whether they supported the death penalty in all murder cases, in certain circumstances, or never. He found that a majority of respondents supported the death penalty only in certain circumstances; under a third of respondents supported the death penalty unequivocally. Finally, various scholars demonstrate that respondents’ mean level of support for the death penalty notably drops when they are offered the alternative punishments of life in prison without parole (LWOP) or LWOP plus work and restitution to the victim’s family (Bohm, 1991; Bohm et al., 1989; Bowers, 1993; McGarrell & Sandys, 1996; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995). These studies not only suggest that individuals’ support for capital punishment is likely to waver if they are offered a meaningful alternative punishment for offenders, the results also show researchers that their empirical results of public opinion about the death penalty are as much a product of the questions employed as they are the product of citizens’ actual beliefs.

To date, virtually all the studies that examine the impact of religiosity on support for the death penalty use the standard, favor-vs.-oppose version of the question. The one exception is Bader and Johnson (2007) who asked their respondents how strongly they favor abolishment of the death penalty by the federal government. While this question does capture policy
preferences more concretely than standard death penalty questions, it still lacks the precision of more nuanced questions that ask respondents to choose the death penalty versus other punishment alternatives. The current study addresses this gap in the literature.

**The Current Study**

I analyze data from the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, cosponsored by the University of Akron Survey Research Center and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.¹ This instrument is unique amongst nationally-representative surveys in two ways. First, it asks a full battery of questions about the respondent’s religiosity, which allows me to construct a series of robust religious variables. Second, the survey asks the respondent to describe her preference for a sentence of life without parole in contrast to the death penalty, a more nuanced measure of death penalty preference that moves beyond the simple favor-oppose dichotomy. Thus, this is the first study to examine the effects of individuals’ religiosity on their support for the death penalty versus an alternate punishment.

Although past research demonstrates that no variable in this line of inquiry exerts unidirectional effects in all circumstances, both theory and the results of a plurality of studies suggest that certain variables will have either a positive or negative relationship with support for punitive punishments. My measurement scheme is not an exact match to the variables in past work, but I expect many of my measures to exert effects comparable to other variables in the literature. For example, my measure of frequency of religious behaviors captures church attendance and is theoretically comparable to religious salience in that both measure the strength of one’s engagement with one’s religion. Thus, I expect to replicate the general trends of the literature in my study. In regard to the key explanatory variables,

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¹ I thank John Green, James Guth, Lyman Kellstedt, and Corwin Smidt for the generous use of this data.
**Hypothesis 1:** Members of Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, and black Protestant denominations as well as individuals with a higher frequency of religious practices will be more likely to agree that the death penalty should be replaced with life without parole than members of evangelical denominations as well as individuals with more traditional religious beliefs, biblical literalists, and individuals who believe that their denomination should adhere to traditional beliefs and practices.

**Method**

**Data**

The Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics is a national random sample of adult Americans conducted in 2004 with a total sample size of 4,000 cases (see Green, 2004; Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, & Green, 2006). The data is weighted to be representative of the adult population of the United States. I report the descriptive statistics and theoretically predicted sign of all variables in the appendix.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in this study is *preference for LWOP vs. the death penalty*. This variable is measured by responses to the statement, “The death penalty for convicted murderers should be replaced with life in prison without parole.” The response options to this item are strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree, and strongly disagree. I reverse coded the item so that higher scores indicate agreement that LWOP should replace the death penalty. Additionally, I also collapsed strongly agree with agree and disagree with strongly disagree in order to make a 3-point variable with response categories of disagree, no opinion, and agree; I made this choice for methodological reasons that I detail in the analysis section of this paper.
Independent Variables

The first series of independent variables measure respondents’ religious belonging (i.e., their affiliation with a particular Christian denomination). These variables are premised upon the idea that a group of religious communities share a set of beliefs that generate a distinctive worldview; it is this tradition-specific worldview that theoretically generates the effect of denominational affiliation on individual outcomes (Kellstedt et al., 1996). Numerous scholars recognize four core Christian religious traditions in America - Roman Catholics, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and black Protestants2 (Dougherty, Johnson, & Polson, 2007; Kellstedt et al., 1996; Steensland et al., 2000). Respondents were asked to identify the denomination in which they are a member, and I coded these denominations into one of the four religious tradition dummy variables. I base my categorization of the denominations into religious traditions using the categorization of Steensland et al. (2000).

For the denominations contained within the National Survey of Religion and Politics that were not contained within the dataset of Steensland et al. (2000), I followed the recommendations of Kellstedt et al. (1996) and Smidt et al. (forthcoming) who argue that evangelical Protestant denominations can be distinguished from mainline Protestant denominations by evangelicals’ dogmatic emphasis on the inerrancy of Scripture, a belief in Jesus as the only way to salvation, an emphasis on a conversion experience, and an emphasis on evangelism. Gathering information about the unclassified denominations from their websites or religious encyclopedias (Mead & Hill, 2005; Melton, 2005), I categorized the remaining

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2 “Black Protestant” measures affiliation with one of six historically-black Protestant denominations in America (see appendix). I do not code black individuals who are members of historically-white evangelical or mainline denominations as “black Protestants” because I want to separate the individual effects of one’s denominational affiliation (i.e., the influence of the denomination’s worldview on one’s attitudes) from the effects of one’s race. See Lincoln and Mamiya (1990) for a discussion of the theological and cultural differences between historically-black and dominantly-white denominations.
Protestant denominations as either evangelical or mainline. I provide the list of denominations grouped by religious tradition in the appendix.

In addition, a robust measure of denominational affiliation must account for the growing number of nondenominational evangelical Protestants in America (Smidt et al., forthcoming; Steensland et al., 2000). These are individuals who attend nondenominational (primarily evangelical) congregations. Though they will probably not provide an answer to a denomination question, their religious beliefs and level of practice are likely as robust as any respondent who provides an affiliation. It is also important to distinguish these “religiously unaffiliated” individuals from atheists, agnostics, and other individuals who do not actively practice a faith because members of each group demonstrate different political behaviors (Smidt et al., forthcoming). I classified all individuals who provided ambiguous denomination answers (i.e., “just a Protestant”) as evangelicals if they also responded that “belief in Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation” and that the Bible is “true, to be taken word for word” in response to separate belief questions; I classified ambiguous individuals as mainline Protestant if they responded that “belief in Jesus Christ is ONE way to salvation, but there are other ways as well.”

I mark denominations to which I applied this secondary classification scheme in the appendix.

The second independent variable measures respondents’ religious beliefs. This variable is a scale that is comprised of the responses to six questions that measure respondents’ certainty in the existence of God, an afterlife, and the devil, their view of God as a personal creator or impersonal force, their view of the Bible as inspired by God or a book of myths, and their level

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3 Smidt et al. (forthcoming) are clearer about the defining characteristics of evangelicalism than they are of mainline Protestantism. Though I tried adding a non-literalist view of the Bible as a distinguishing characteristic of mainliners, the resultant estimate of the proportion of mainliners in the sample did not provide a good match with the estimated proportion of mainliners in comparable work (Kellstedt et al., 1996).
of agreement with the statement that evolution is the best explanation of life on earth. I used principle components factor analysis to construct the scale so that higher values indicate more traditional religious beliefs (i.e., God as a personal creator, Bible as divinely inspired, certain the devil exists, etc.).

The third independent variable measures the extent of respondents’ religious behaviors. As with the religious beliefs scale, this variable is a scale that is comprised of the responses to six questions that measure the frequency of respondents’ church attendance, Bible reading, prayer outside of worship service, and participation in small religious groups, as well a measure of the percent of the respondents’ income that she tithes to her congregation or other religious organizations. Again, I used factor analysis to construct the scale so that higher values indicate more extensive participation in religious behaviors. The two scale variables are standardized with means of about 0 and standard deviations of about 1.

Numerous studies of religiosity and attitudes toward punishment specifically highlight the effect of interpreting the Bible literally (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever et al., 2005b; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever et al., 2006). The current data source includes two measures of the respondents’ view of the Bible, the first of which assessed whether or not the respondent considers the Bible to be divinely inspired; I use this first version in the religious beliefs scale. A second version of the question explicitly asks if the respondent believes that the Bible is “true, to be taken word for word,” “true, but not to be taken word for word,” or “true for religion, but with

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4 The evolution item is included in the religious belief scale under the assumption that the alternative belief is creationism (see Smidt et al., forthcoming).

5 The factor analysis generated a single item with an Eigenvalue of 2.339 with factor loadings of 0.555 (existence of God), 0.609 (view of God), 0.521 (afterlife), 0.732 (view of Bible), 0.670 (devil), and 0.636 (evolution). The α for the scale is 0.806.

6 The factor analysis generated a single item with an Eigenvalue of 2.894 with factor loadings of 0.820 (church attendance), 0.816 (Bible reading), 0.669 (prayer), 0.756 (small group participation), and 0.733 (tithing). The α for the scale is 0.875.
some human errors.” I constructed a dummy variable to identify *Biblical literalists*, those individuals who chose the first response option, in order to provide a direct comparison to past studies in this line of inquiry.

Finally, scholars argue that many of the current debates about theology and social issues that are being deliberated within denominations reflect an underlying question in regard to the role of the church in the modern world (Smidt et al., forthcoming). Some people argue that religious traditions should adapt their beliefs to be more compatible with modern culture, while other people argue that religious traditions should adhere to traditional beliefs and resist modernism. Smidt and his colleagues (forthcoming) posit that individuals’ opinions about this traditionalist-modernist divide may explain within-denomination variability of beliefs and attitudes toward social and political issues. In order to test for such an effect, I create a dummy variable to identify *traditionalists* who responded to three questions that their church should “strive to preserve its traditional beliefs and practices” or replied that they are aware of a traditionalist-modernist divide within their congregation and support the traditional point of view.

**Control Variables**

First, I control for the respondent’s *political ideology* because past research demonstrates that a conservative ideology is usually positively related to support for the death penalty and other punitive punishments (Payne, Gainey, Triplett, & Danner, 2004; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2005; Unnever et al., 2005b). The variable is a scale that ranges from “very liberal” through “strict moderate” to “very conservative;” higher values indicate a more conservative ideology.
Second, I address the fact that several studies find that various measures of prejudice against black individuals are related to support for punitive punishment policies (Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b; Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, 2005). Thus, I control for antipathy against minorities using respondents’ level of agreement with the statement, “minorities need governmental assistance to obtain their rightful place in America;” high values indicate stronger opposition to government assistance for minorities. This measure is admittedly shallow and does not even specify about which minorities it inquires. Though a more robust measure of racist attitudes would be preferable, this is the only applicable measure contained within the data set. Unnever and his colleagues (2006) utilized a similar measure that assessed the degree to which respondents agreed that the government should help blacks, and even this proxy measure for racism proved to be highly significant in their analysis. Thus, I include the current measure as the best available proxy noting the theoretical need for such a control.

Finally, I control for six demographic characteristics. First, I control for the respondent’s gender (male=1, female=0) because research indicates that males are more likely to support punitive crime control policies than women (Applegate et al., 2000). Second, I include a dichotomous variables for black individuals (black=1, all others=0) because extant studies suggest that blacks are less likely to support punitive punishments than whites (Young, 1992). Some data suggest that age (Evans & Adams, 2003) and level of education (Payne et al., 2004; Soss et al., 2003) are negatively related to punitive beliefs. Due to Borg’s (1997) demonstration of the conditional effects of southern identity on support for the death penalty, I include a dichotomous variable to identify respondents who are southerners. Finally, I control for the respondent’s family income based upon findings consistent with conflict theory that individuals
with higher income will be supportive of punishment as a means of controlling so-called
dangerous groups (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Soss et al., 2003).

Analytic Strategy

To analyze the effects of the independent variables on preference for life without parole
over the death penalty, I employ ordered logit maximum likelihood estimation. I use ordered
logit instead of ordinary least squares regression because the ordinal, categorical nature of the
dependent variable violates the underlying assumptions of OLS linear regression (Long, 1997).
The model sample size differs from the total survey sample size due to missing observations
within specific questions from the original data set. I ran all models using Stata version 9.

As mentioned above, I collapsed the response categories of the dependent variable from a
5-point scale to a 3-point scale in an effort to overcome violations of the parallel regressions
assumption. The Roman Catholic, religious beliefs, political ideology, age, and gender variables
all failed Brant’s Wald test at $p < 0.05$, which indicates that the effects of these variables differ
between categories of the dependent variable (Long, 1997). One possible way to overcome this
problem is to use multinomial logit instead of ordered logit because multinomial logit tests the
likelihood of choosing between each pair of response categories. However, the “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree” nature of the dependent variable response scale is truly ordinal.
There is no theoretical reason to believe that a variable will exert a different effect on a
respondent’s likelihood of responding “agree” vs. “no opinion” than on her likelihood of
responding “strongly disagree” vs. “disagree,” for example. Thus, it is probable that many
variables violate the parallel regressions assumption because of random measurement noise
between “strongly agree” and “agree” and between “strongly disagree” and “disagree.” The

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7 Stata cannot calculate a Brant test on weighted data, so I had to run the Brant test on the same model using the
unweighted data. However, there is no reason to believe that weighting the data would correct the violations of the
parallel regressions assumption detected by the Brant test.
conceptual difference between strong and “normal” agreement and disagreement may be less clear to an average citizen than it is to a scholar, particularly in regard to an issue that most people probably do not think about on a regular basis.

Collapsing the response categories between which I suspected random noise improved the fit of the ordered logit regression to the data. Only two variables failed the Brant test using the 3-point dependent variable, Roman Catholic and age. I am unconcerned with age because it is merely a control variable. The fact that the Roman Catholic variable continues to violate the parallel regression assumption is more meaningful. I reconsider the effects of Catholic denominational affiliation later in this paper.

Results

Table 1 reports the results of the ordered logit regression on the 3-point dependent variable. The results suggest that Roman Catholic affiliation, more active engagement in religious behaviors, and being African American increase the likelihood that an individual will support replacing the death penalty with life without parole. In contrast, interpreting the Bible literally, opposing government aid to minorities, having higher family income, and being male decrease the likelihood of favoring LWOP over the death penalty.

Interpreting the odds ratios, the data suggests that a standard deviation increase on a person’s score on the religious behavior index (i.e., more frequent church attendance, prayer, etc.) increases the odds that she will choose a) “agree/strongly agree” over “no opinion” or “disagree/strongly disagree” or b) “agree/strongly agree” or “no opinion” over “disagree/strongly disagree” by about 18%. Blacks are about 46% more likely to choose a more agreeable response than members of other races. On the other hand, both individuals who interpret the Bible literally and men are about 25% less likely to choose a more agreeable response than
Table 1: Results of Ordered Logit Analysis of Support for LWOP vs. the Death Penalty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust Std. Error</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td><strong>0.437</strong>*</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Behaviors</td>
<td><strong>0.166†</strong></td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>1.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biblical Literalist</td>
<td>-0.292*</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipathy Toward Minorities</td>
<td>-0.315***</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td><strong>0.102</strong></td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td><strong>0.375</strong></td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>1.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td><strong>0.299</strong></td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southerner</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 1</td>
<td>-1.527</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 2</td>
<td>-0.873</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1667.842</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, a = cannot be meaningfully interpreted

The odds ratio of the Roman Catholic variable cannot be meaningfully interpreted because the variable continues to violate the parallel regressions assumption (Long, 1997). That is, Roman Catholic affiliation does not appear to increase the odds of choosing “no opinion” over non-literalists or women. Finally, individuals become about 25% less likely to choose a more agreeable response the more strongly they disagree with the government giving aid to minorities, while increasing family income makes them about 10% less likely to agree.
“disagree/strongly disagree” by the same likelihood as the odds of choosing “agree/strongly agree” over “no opinion.” Additional analysis is needed to understand this differential effect.

Exploring Roman Catholic Opinions

The fact that Catholic affiliation seems to exert different effects between different response categories of the dependent variable suggests that the Catholic variable is concealing a wider range of causal forces. In other words, it is possible that the effects of Catholic affiliation on one’s preference for LWOP over the death penalty may be dependent upon interaction with other factors. For example, Bjarnason and Welch (2004) found that black Catholics and Catholics who attend mass more frequently were less supportive of capital punishment than white Catholics and infrequent attendees, while Republican Catholics were more likely to favor the death penalty than Democratic Catholics. These results are consistent with theory and past results. Whites, Republicans, and individuals who attend worship services infrequently or not at all tend to be more supportive of the death penalty than other Americans (Payne et al., 2004; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a; Young, 1992). Given that the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has officially condemned the death penalty (USCCB, 2005), white, Republican, and “lapsed” Catholics face a degree of cognitive dissonance in which their personal characteristics might push them to favor the death penalty while their faith tells them to reject it. Thus, the effects of Catholic affiliation may differ by race, political ideology, or level of engagement in religious practices.

In order to test this possibility, I re-ran my model and added multiplicative interaction terms between these three variables and Catholic affiliation. Table 2 reports the results of this new analysis. For the sake of space, I only report variables from the initial analysis that are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$, although all variables are controlled in the model. The results
Table 2: Results of Ordered Logit Analysis of Support for LWOP vs. the Death Penalty with Catholic Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Robust Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biblical Literalist</td>
<td>-0.288*</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipathy Toward Minorities</td>
<td>-0.313***</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.094**</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.323**</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic X Political Ideology</td>
<td>0.184*</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic X Religious Behavior</td>
<td>0.862***</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic X Black</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 1</td>
<td>-1.675</td>
<td>0.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 2</td>
<td>-1.011</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1651.772</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All variables from Table 1 also controlled for in this analysis, but only those significant at p < 0.05 shown in Table 2.

reveal that the interactions between Catholic affiliation and political ideology and religious behavior are statistically significant. The interaction between Catholic affiliation and black race is not statistically significant, but this result is likely due to the fact that only 13 respondents in the data set are African American Catholics.

Several scholars warn that interpreting interaction terms as marginal effects yields incorrect conclusions (Ai & Norton, 2003; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). Thus, in order to interpret the statistically significant interactive effects, I employ the method suggested by Long and Freese (2006, p. 423-425) in which I calculated the predicted probability of agreeing or disagreeing that the death penalty should be replaced by life without parole at each level of the constitutive variables. For ease of presentation, I present these results graphically.

Figure 1 presents the effect of the interaction between Catholic affiliation and levels of religious behavior on the likelihood of disagreeing that the death penalty should be replace by...
Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Disagreeing that the Death Penalty should be Replaced with LWOP

Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Agreeing that the Death Penalty should be Replaced with LWOP
LWOP, while Figure 2 presents the effect of the same interaction on the likelihood of agreeing with the replacement of the death penalty. The figures indicate that an increasing level of engagement in religious behaviors appears to have no significant effect for non-Catholics; regardless of their level of engagement in religious behaviors, non-Catholics are always about 55% likely to choose “disagree” or “strongly disagree” and about 30% likely to choose “agree” or strongly disagree,” holding all other variables at the mean. In contrast, level of engagement in religious behaviors appears to have a roughly linear negative relationship with the likelihood of choosing “disagree/strongly disagree” and a roughly linear positive relationship with the likelihood of choosing “agree/strongly agree” for Catholics. Catholics who do not frequently engage in religious behaviors, like attending church or praying privately, are about 81% likely to disagree and about 11% likely to agree that LWOP should replace the death penalty. In contrast, Catholics who frequently engage in religious behaviors are about 40% likely to disagree and about 35% likely to agree with replacing the death penalty.

Furthermore, the increase in the magnitude of the slope in each graph indicates that the effect of engaging in religious behaviors on the likelihood of agreeing or disagreeing that LWOP should replace the death penalty increases as one’s level of religious activity increases. That is, the effect of religious behavior differs across response categories of the dependent variable. Indeed, this differential interactive effect may partially explain why the Roman Catholic dummy variable continued to violate the parallel regressions assumption in the ordered logit analysis.

Figure 3 presents the effect of the interaction between Catholic affiliation and political ideology on the likelihood of disagreeing that the death penalty should be replaced by LWOP, while Figure 4 presents the likelihood of agreeing with the replacement of the death penalty. On the whole, the interactive effect between Catholic affiliation and political ideology is very similar
Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Disagreeing that the Death Penalty should be Replaced with LWOP

Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Agreeing that the Death Penalty should be Replaced with LWOP
to the effect of the interaction between Catholic affiliation and level of religious behavior. Again, political ideology exerts no statistically significant effect on non-Catholics’ likelihood of agreeing or disagreeing that LWOP should replace the death penalty. On the other hand, increasing political conservatism decreases the likelihood that a Catholic will disagree and increases the likelihood that she will agree with the replacement of the death penalty by LWOP. Specifically, Catholics who identify as “very liberal” are about 66% likely to choose “disagree/strongly disagree” and about 21% likely to choose “agree/strongly agree,” while “very conservative” Catholics are about 38% likely to choose “disagree/strongly disagree” and about 45% likely to choose “agree/strongly agree.” This finding seems to indicate that politically liberal Catholics favor the death penalty more than politically conservative Catholics, a result that is very theoretically unexpected. I posit different interpretations of this finding in the discussion.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In this study, I contribute to the literature on religiosity and attitudes toward criminal punishment in two primary ways. First, I employ the “3 Bs” measurement strategy created by Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth (Kellstedt et al., 1996; Smidt et al., forthcoming), which has been validated to be a stronger predictor of religious and political behaviors than Smith’s (1990) fundamentalist/moderate/liberal denomination typology (Alwin, Felson, Walker, & Tufis, 2006; Steensland et al., 2000). Second, the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics allows me to test the effects of religious belonging, beliefs, and behaviors on citizens’ support for replacing the death penalty with a sentence of life without parole, a more nuanced question that has been shown to generate very different levels of support for the death penalty than simple “support-oppose” measures (Bohm, 1991; Bohm et al., 1990; Bowers, 1993; McGarrell & Sandys, 1996;
Sandys & McGarrell, 1995). To date, no other scholar has yet tested the influence of religiosity on support for the death penalty versus an alternate punishment. Thus, my findings complement and challenge past findings based upon dichotomous measures of death penalty support.

In regard to the Christian religious independent variables, I find limited support for my hypothesis. First, I find that individuals who interpret the Bible literally are less likely to agree that the death penalty should be replaced with LWOP than non-literalists. This finding is consistent with past results that indicate a positive relationship between Biblical literalism and support for punitive punishments (Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever et al., 2005b; Young, 1992; Young & Thompson, 1995). Second, I find that individuals who engage more frequently in religious behaviors like church attendance and private prayer are more likely to agree that LWOP should replace the death penalty. This finding is also consistent with past results that find negative relationships between frequency of church attendance or other scales of religious behaviors and support for punitive punishments (Bader & Johnson, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a; Unnever et al., 2005a, 2005b). However, I note that the religious behavior scale is only marginally significant, so it is unclear whether or not this finding is robust.

In contrast, affiliation with evangelical, mainline, or black Protestant denominations; the religious beliefs scale; and the traditionalism measure all fail to achieve statistical significance. These results suggest that the past studies that found no significant effect of fundamentalist denominational affiliation according to Smith’s (1990) code on attitudes toward punishment may be accurate (Applegate et al., 2000; Baumer et al., 2003; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2006); that is, denominational affiliation may not significantly affect individuals’ opinions about punishment when the affiliation variable and statistical models are properly specified. However, it is also equally plausible to argue that denominational affiliation
does not influence an individual’s preferences on the specific policy-related question of choosing between the death penalty or LWOP. Contrasting these results with the results of Bader and Johnson (2007) provide support for the latter interpretation because Bader and Johnson found that black and mainline Protestants are significantly less likely than evangelicals to support the death penalty. In order to adequately resolve this puzzle, we need a data source that asks both global and nuanced death penalty support questions in addition to a full battery of religious belief and behavior items.

The effects of Roman Catholic affiliation on support for replacing the death penalty with LWOP are partially consistent with and partially contrary to the results of Bjarnason and Welch (2004). To reiterate, Bjarnason and Welch find that Catholics who attend mass more frequently were less supportive of capital punishment than infrequent attendees, while Republican Catholics were more likely to favor the death penalty than Democratic Catholics. I find that both higher levels of engagement in religious behaviors and an increasingly conservative political ideology make Catholics more likely to agree that the death penalty should be replaced with LWOP. The former finding is consistent with theory and past research; the latter result is not. Should we interpret these results to mean that politically liberal Catholics are more supportive of the death penalty than politically conservative Catholics? Perhaps. However, I think that we need to consider the full nuance of the dependent measure.

Although a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is certainly a more lenient punishment than the death penalty, it is still a very punitive punishment. When liberal Catholics say that they disagree that the death penalty should be replaced with LWOP, perhaps they are saying that they oppose both punitive punishments. That is, perhaps they would prefer to abolish the death penalty and replace it with a shorter prison term. The logic behind this
interpretation is that the influence of a Catholic worldview “liberalizes” the attitudes toward punishment among all Catholics. Perhaps, then, we see conservative Catholics preferring LWOP to the death penalty because their faith tells them to oppose capital punishment but their political beliefs lead them to desire strict, punitive punishment for criminals. Without additional information, I have no way to resolve this puzzle. My results reaffirm findings of very heterogeneous attitudes toward the death penalty amongst Catholic Americans, and I conclude that further research is needed to clarify the exact nature of the relationship between Catholic affiliation and attitudes toward capital punishment.

Finally, I find strong support for the argument that racism affects support for the death penalty. Even though my measure is very vague, asking only about support for the government giving aid to minorities in general, this proxy for racism is the most statistically significant variable in my entire model. Though its substantive effect of decreasing the likelihood that an individual will agree that the death penalty should be replaced by LWOP is comparable to the other variables with negative relationships, the proxy’s much greater statistical significant suggests that antipathy toward minorities matters a great deal shaping attitudes toward punishment. This result supports similar findings in past studies (Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b; Unnever et al., 2005, 2006).

Limitations

The selection of questions in the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics limited the variables that I could include in this study. First, several scholars find that the effects of religious beliefs on attitudes toward punishment are mediated by an individual’s view of human nature and attribution of blame (Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Young, 2000); that is, do individuals believe that the choice to commit a crime is driven by the social
environment in which the criminal was raised or by pure free will? Evidence indicates that individuals who hold a dispositional attribution of blame are more supportive of punitive punishments than individuals who emphasize the role of the environment in the genesis of crime. Second, several scholars find that the degree to which a person endorses the values of forgiveness and compassion affects their support for punitive punishments (Applegate et al., 2000; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever et al., 2005a). As with attribution of blame, these variables partially mediate the effects of religiosity on attitudes toward punishment. No items in the current data set measure these constructs, and so I have no way to test whether or not including these variables would affect my results. I hypothesize that their inclusion would further dilute the magnitude of the religious variables’ coefficients.

**Conclusion**

This study reaffirms the need to employ nuanced measures of opinion about the death penalty that allow respondents to qualify their support or opposition to capital punishment, especially in contrast to an alternative punishment. While my results indicate that few dimensions of a person’s religiosity affect her preference for LWOP over the death penalty, more research using robust measures (Kellstedt et al., 1996; Smidt et al., forthcoming; Steensland et al., 2000) of religion is needed to determine whether or not past findings of a relationship between fundamentalist affiliation and attitudes toward punishment are methodological artifacts of Smith’s (1990) coding scheme.
Appendix

A. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Exp. Sign</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death Penalty vs. LWOP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3946</td>
<td>2.739</td>
<td>1.284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>0.2515</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Scale</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3360</td>
<td>-9.80e-09</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>-2.872</td>
<td>1.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior Scale</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3799</td>
<td>-4.23e-09</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>-1.624</td>
<td>1.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biblical Literalist</td>
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<td>2284</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist</td>
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<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Antipathy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3935</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.138</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3658</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>1.900</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3981</td>
<td>50.267</td>
<td>17.678</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3992</td>
<td>4.078</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3705</td>
<td>6.475</td>
<td>2.199</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3953</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southerner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Protestant Denomination Responses Grouped by Religious Tradition

**Evangelical Protestant**

- Adventist Christian
- Adventist (no further specifics)
- American Baptist Association
- Amish
- Anglican Orthodox Church
- Apostolic (no further specifics)
- Assemblies of God
- Associate Reformed Presbyterian
- Baptist (no further specifics)*
- Baptist General Conference
- Baptist Missionary Association
- Brethren (no further specifics)*
- Bible Holiness
- “Born Again,” Bible, Gospel, Missionary
- Charismatic (no further specifics)*
- Christian Church
- Christian and Missionary Alliance
- Christian Reformed Church
- Churches of Christ
- Church of Christ (no further specifics)*
- Church of God – Anderson, IN
- Church of God – Cleveland, TN
- Church of God, General Conference
- Church of God, Holiness
- Church of God – Huntsville, AL
- Church of God of the Apostolic Faith
- Church of God of Prophecy
- Church of God (no further specifics)
- Church of the Nazarene
- Congregational Christian
- Congregational (no further specifics)*
- Conservative Baptist Association of America
- Conservative Congregational Christian
- Cumberland Presbyterian Church
- Episcopal, Anglican (no further specifics)*
- Evangelical Church of North America
- Evangelical Congregational Church
Evangelical Covenant Church
Evangelical Free Church – Free Church
Evangelical Friends Alliance
Evangelical Lutheran (not ELCA)
Evangelical Presbyterian Church
Evangelical (no further specifics)*
Four Square Gospel
Free Lutheran
Free Methodist Church
Free Will Baptist
Fundamentalist (no further specifics)
General Association of Regular Baptists
General Conference Mennonite Church
Grace Brethren Church
Holiness (no further specifics)
Independent Baptist (local, non-affiliated)
Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America
Interdenominational or Community Church*
“Just Christian” (no further specifics)*
Liberal or Ecumenical Protestant*
Lutheran Brethren
Lutheran (no further specifics)*
Mennonite Church
Mennonite (no further specifics)
Methodist (no further specifics)*
Missouri Synod Lutheran
Moravian Church
Nondenominational-Independent
Charismatic
Nondenominational-Independent Christian*
Nondenominational-Independent
Evangelical
Nondenominational-Independent
Fundamentalist
Nondenominational-Independent Protestant*
Nondenominational-Independent (no further specifics)*
North American Baptist Conference
Open Bible Standard
Orthodox Presbyterian

Mainline Protestant

American Baptist Churches USA (“Northern Baptist”)

Other Adventist
Other Baptists*
Other Bible, Gospel, Born Again, or Missionary Church
Other Charismatic
Other Christian*
Other Church of Christ
Other Church of God
Other Congregational*
Other Evangelical
Other Fundamentalist
Other Fundamentalist
Other Holiness
Other Lutheran*
Other Mennonite, Amish
Other Methodist*
Other Pentecostal
Other Presbyterian*
Other Protestant*
Other Reformed*
Other Nondenominational-Independent*
Pentecostal Church of God
Pentecostal Holiness Church
Pentecostal (no further specifics)*
Presbyterian Church in America
Protestant (no further specifics)*
Primitive Baptist
Reformed Episcopal Church
Reformed Presbyterian Churches of North America
Reformed (no further specifics)*
Salvation Army, American Rescue Workers
Seventh Day Adventist
Southern Baptist Convention
The Brethren Church
The Vineyard, Calvary Chapel, Church on the Rock
United Baptists
Wesleyan Church
Wesleyan Methodist
Wisconsin Synod Lutheran
Worldwide Church of God

Baptist (no further specifics)**
Brethren in Christ
Brethren (no further specifics)**
Charismatic (no further specifics)**
Church of the Brethren
Church of Christ (no further specifics)**
Congregationalist Congregational
Congregational (no further specifics)**
Disciples of Christ (Christian Church)
Episcopal Church
Episcopal, Anglican (no further specifics)**
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA)
Evangelical Lutheran Synod
Evangelical (no further specifics)**
Interdenominational or Community Church**
“Just Christian” (no further specifics)**
Liberal or Ecumenical Protestant**
Lutheran (no further specifics)**
Methodist (no further specifics)**
Nondenominational-Independent Christian**
Nondenominational-Independent Protestant**
Nondenominational-Independent (no further specifics)**
Other Baptists**
Other Brethren
Other Christian**
Other Congregational**
Other Episcopal, Anglican
Other Friends
Other Lutheran**
Other Methodist**
Other Presbyterian**
Other Protestant**
Other Reformed**
Other Nondenominational-Independent**
Pentecostal (no further specifics)**
Plymouth Brethren
Presbyterian Church in the USA
Presbyterian (no further specifics)
Protestant (no further specifics)**
Quaker, Friends (no further specifics)
Reformed Church in America
Reformed (no further specifics)**
Society of Friends
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church

** = categorized as evangelical if respondent also replied that “belief in Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation” to question 91 and replied that the Bible is “true, to be taken word for word” to question 93

* = categorized as mainline if respondent also replied that “belief in Jesus Christ is ONE way to salvation, but there are other ways as well” to question 91

Black Protestant

African Methodist Episcopal
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church
Church of God in Christ
National Baptist Convention
Progressive National Baptist Conference
References


empirical analyses. *Political Analysis, 14*, 63-82.


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