The Role of Public Administrators in Public Policy Formulation in Nigeria

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The Role of Public Administrators in Public Policy Formulation in Nigeria

by

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B.S., Southern Illinois University, 1983

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Department of Political Science in the Graduate School, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale August, 1985
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Carbondale, Illinois

July 9, 1985
Date

TO THE GRADUATE DEAN:

I recommend that the paper by Adeniyi K. Bello
titled "The Role of Public Administrators in Public Policy
Formulation in Nigeria"
be accepted by the Graduate School as evidence of research competence
on the part of one seeking the master's degree.

I understand that this paper is being submitted as proof of a
capacity for research and its reporting.

Keith Snavely
In Charge of Research Paper

Osbin Ervin
Head of Department
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I should express my compliment to those who at various stages have influenced my professional development. As is usual in all cases, there are a large number of persons who, in the course of this program, have made significant contributions to my experience and ideas. Were I to mention their names, the list would be inexhaustible, and in a paper expressing my personal view in a sometimes controversial context, I thought anonymity might be preferred. I hope, therefore, that I shall be forgiven for not referring to them individually. I meant well.

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DEDICATION

To my families, for all they have meant to me.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Public administration in developing countries seems to be evolving a tradition of its own, making the career bureaucrat the "master" of policy and his Minister its purveyor. In Nigeria, as in other developing countries, particularly those in Africa, the bureaucracy has a near monopoly on technical expertise, and benefits from the prestige that goes to the professional expert in a society aiming toward industrialization and economic growth. Groups capable of competing for political influence or of imposing close controls over bureaucracy are few and far between, so that often it is able to move into a partial power vacuum.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The focus of this paper is the role of public administrators in public policy formulation in Nigeria. We will attempt to trace the shifts in bureaucratic policy-making roles and relationships which occurred in the First Republic period, under different military regimes, and immediately following the return to civilian rule in 1979. Although Nigerian administrators have always participated in the determination of public policy, the exercise has often fluctuated with the rising tide of political, structural, and legal changes at the federal, state and local levels. The prospect that more fundamental changes will be forthcoming in the nature and extent of administrative involvement in public policy formation and execution is
then explored in the context of past and current social, political, and economic development.

Before proceeding with this paper, however, it is important that we take note of the common administrative patterns in developing areas and the attendant ideology of development. These characteristics are considered "typical" in the sense of their prevalence or recurrence rather than their uniform and identical existence in all of these polities. We should also consider the basic expectational role usually held concerning the proper character and conduct of bureaucracies in developing countries.

The significance of administration is almost universally acknowledged among writers on the problems of development. Usually, an effective bureaucracy coupled with a vigorous modernizing elite are an essential prerequisite of development, but effective administration has been a neglected factor of development and the existing machinery for management of developments in most developing countries is grossly inadequate.

COMMON ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERNS

Knowledge of the political and administrative process in the developing countries is fragmentary and tentative. It is nevertheless possible on the basis of recent surveys of the political experience of developing nations, \(^1\) supplemented by more speculative formulations of political activity in such societies \(^2\) to identify some of the common features of the politics of development.

The basic pattern of public administration in developing areas
is imitative rather than indigenous. All countries, including those that escaped Western colonialization, have consciously tried to introduce some version of modern Western bureaucratic administration. Usually, it is patterned after a particular national administrative model, perhaps with incidental features borrowed from some other system. A country that was formerly a colony almost certainly will resemble the "parent" country administratively, even though independence has been won and political 'apron strings' have been cut. Kingsley has vividly described how "the organization of offices, the demeanor of the civil servants, even the general appearance of a bureau, strikingly mirror the national characteristics of the former colonial powers".

Perhaps the most significant and by far the most troubling of the problem of development is that of deficiencies in skilled manpower necessary for a developmental program. There are shortages of trained administrators with management capacity, developmental skills and technical competence in most developing countries. Although this usually reflects an inadequate educational system, it is not necessarily equivalent to a deficit of holders of university degrees, but of men and women sufficiently groomed in the art and craft of public administration.

Also, the bureaucracy in developing countries has a strong tendency to emphasize orientations that are dialectically opposed to effective production. That is, much bureaucratic activity is channelled toward the realization of goals other than the achievement of program objectives. Riggs refers to this as "a preference among bureaucrats for personal expediency as against public principled
interests". It may take a variety of forms, most of which are not unique by any means to these bureaucracies, but which may only be more prominent in bureaucratic behavior in a transitional setting.

In his analysis of administration in developing nations, Ferrel Heady noted that the bureaucracy of a developing country "is apt to have a generous measure of operational autonomy which can be accounted for by the convergence of several forces usually at work in a recently independent modernizing nation". Colonialism was essentially rule by bureaucracy with policy guidance from remote sources, and this pattern persists even after the bureaucracy has a new master in the nation.

IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

The developing countries share a generalized consensus of the objectives toward which change should be directed. This "ideology of development" is crucial to an understanding of the politics and administration in these countries. To begin with, it ought to be realized that developing countries are societies caught in the midst of tremendous social change, striving to reach social goals of demanding complexity and working under great pressures for early accomplishment. Put in terms of "models" of societies which are often used for purposes of analysis, they are moving from the traditional toward the modern type, from what Fred Riggs called "Agraria" toward "industria". They are in transition, no longer traditional and not yet modern, either as they view themselves or as others view them.
Nevertheless, effective administration is crucial to the materialization of the two goals of development, which are nation-building and socio-economic progress. Esman describes nation-building as "the deliberate fashioning of an integrated political community within fixed geographic boundaries in which nation state is the dominant political institution". The urge to seek national identity is probably in part a reaction to escape from colonialism, expressing a desire to emulate the nationhood of the former colonial power once independence has been gained. Actual achievement of nationhood in most of the emerging nations has not been an easy accomplishment. In the case of the democratic societies of the west, the movement toward nationalism was largely one of unifying people already speaking a single language under one government. In contrast, most of the developing countries are artificial entities in the sense that they are the products of colonial activity rather than of a pre-existing political loyalty. Their boundaries likewise are often drawn by imperial power without regard to ethnic groupings, excluding people with close cultural ties and including minority groups opposed to assimilation. These problems are especially acute in Africa, where few of what have normally been considered prerequisites of national identity exists.

The related goal of social and economic progress in the ideology of development may be equally hard to achieve, but it is somewhat more tangible and measurable. Esman identifies it as "the sustained and widely diffused improvement in material and social welfare". The desire to triumph over poverty and to distribute the benefits of industrialization generally in the society are powerful motivations
to people just becoming aware of what is possible as demonstrated by the developed nations, including those with democratic and with totalitarian political orientations.

The ideology of development sets the sights for political and administrative action, but it does not specify the exact form of the machinery for either politics or administration. As Merghani observes "... there is a general inclination toward a strong government, a strong executive, and a high degree of centralization," on the assumption that "without a strong government and a strong leadership the task of national unity and rapid economic and social transformation becomes difficult if not impossible". Beyond this, the mood is one that favors experimentation and adaptation from the successful experience of developed countries, whatever may have been the political paths followed.

DEVELOPING BUREAUCRACIES - MASTER OR AGENT

Apart from political instability, the political role of bureaucracy is probably the most consequential issue befuddling the political future of developing countries. With few exceptions, however, there is common agreement transcending differences in political ideology, culture and style, that bureaucracy should be basically instrumental in its operation, that it should serve as agent and not as master. It is universally expected that the bureaucracy should be so designed and shaped as to respond willingly and effectively to policy leadership from outside its own ranks. The idea that bureaucratic officialdom should for any extended period of time constitute the ruling class
in a political system is generally rejected. The political elite may include members of the civil or military bureaucracies, but should not consist exclusively or even primarily of bureaucratic officials. Of course, this is not the same as asserting that the bureaucracy can or should play strictly an instrumental role, uninvolved in policy making and uncontaminated by exposure to the political process. A consensus on the way things ought to be does not necessarily ensure that they will actually be that way.

A perennial concern relating to bureaucracies is the possibility that they may stray from their instrumental role to become the primary power-wielders in the political system. The political role of the bureaucracy has been a matter of continuing interest in the more developed nations, and has emerged as one of the principal issues in discussions about the political future of developing nations. There are views that represent the negative judgement regarding the implications of what is taken to be a typical bureaucratic role in developing polities; while other equally informed expressions are considered more sanguine. Those who advocate a less stringent control of bureaucracy in developing countries do not deny the tendency for the bureaucracy to occupy what seems by the standards in developed polities to be an inordinately strong position relative to other political organs, but they are inclined to regard this as inevitable, perhaps desirable, and at any rate not easily susceptible to external manipulation.

Among those who argue most vehemently against bureaucratic dominant political power positions are LaPalombara, Riggs, and Henry Goodnow. They argued that a politically dominant bureaucracy is a
pronounced potential threat to balanced political development, particularly if development is to be in the direction of representative democracy. LaPalombara feels that the difficulty in restricting bureaucracy to an instrumental role, not sufficiently embraced in even the Western democracies, which have structurally differentiated political systems, is accentuated in developing nations.

... where the bureaucracy may be the most coherent power center and where, in addition, the major decisions regarding national development are likely to involve authoritative rule making and rule application by governmental structures.12

The result in many places is the emergence of "overpowering bureaucracies," with the growth in bureaucratic power inhibiting, and perhaps precluding, the development of democratic policies. LaPalombara therefore, suggested that if democratic development is to be encouraged, a separation of political and administrative roles is required; and this calls for deliberate steps to limit the power of the bureaucracies in many of the newer states.13

Riggs, in his case study of Thailand states that transitional societies lack balance between "political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures," the consequence being that "the political function tends to be appropriated in considerable measure, by bureaucrats".14 On the assumption that the imposition of constitutional control over a bureaucracy is a difficult task as the bureaucracy becomes relatively more powerful, he recommends that deliberate measures be taken to curtail bureaucratic expansion and to strengthen potential control agencies.

Goodnow, in his study of the civil service in Pakistan, concludes
that the occupants of the higher civil service posts do indeed exert such predominant influence as to make the climate unfavorable for development of democratic institutions. He attributes this to the fact that they "fell heir to the instrumentalities of power" vacated by the colonial administrators, and were able easily to convert governmental institutions created to permit rule by a foreign bureaucratic elite to the service of a native bureaucratic elite. Goodnow concedes that they have usually taken over with some reluctance, have often been sincere in blaming the shortcomings of politicians for making this necessary, and have regarded themselves as guardians of democracy as an ultimate goal; but he feels that the urge to hold and consolidate power is deceptively strong. Therefore, Goodnow is skeptical about the prospects of a gradual transition from bureaucratic elite rule to democratic government, and foresees as more likely a power struggle between an increasingly rigid governing bureaucracy and an increasingly revolutionary opposition, which will destroy prospects for evolutionary change.

Among those who proclaim a more sanguine view of strong bureaucratic foothold in development initiation and administration are: Milton J. Esman, Ralph Braibanti, and Bernard E. Brown. Braibanti affirmed that given the high priority assigned to economic development in the new nations, during the early stages

... what virtue there is seems to reside in the bureaucracy. Economic development must be achieved in the matrix of constructing an equilibrium of bureaucratic power and political control. This must be done even though development requirements are inherently antagonistic to the political results of the very equilibrium which
will eventuate. The achievement in disequilibrium of a condition of development which the logic of popular sovereignty demands be achieved in an unattainable equilibrium is the crucial problem in political development.\textsuperscript{16}

Esman and Brown argued that rather than downgrading the system, it should be strengthened. Esman emphasized the central and growing role of administrative institutions in carrying out action programs, but he does not think that bureaucrats as a group are political risk takers, or that they are likely to contest for political leadership.\textsuperscript{17} Brown mentions the tendencies for political power to shift to the executive sector of government, and within the executive, from political officials to professional civil servants; he acknowledged that this raises a question concerning the future of democratic government, but nevertheless feels that the pressing need is to strengthen the executive branch. "The dangers of a bureaucracy that is not adequately controlled are real. They cannot be eliminated but may be reduced by trying to make bureaucracy more representative of the society, to provide built-in checks and balances".\textsuperscript{18}

This sampling illustrates the variety in judgements regarding central tendencies in evolution of the bureaucratic role in developing countries, and the difference of opinion concerning what corrective action, if any should be taken. Nearly all of these general assessments state what is considered "typical" for developing countries as a group, and do not go far in making distinctions among them. When prescriptive recommendations are made, they are directed toward improving the prospects for development along pluralistic competitive political lines, with balanced power among political institutions a feature of such development. Bureaucracy in developing countries is
for the most part, appraised from this perspective.
The public service of Nigeria derives historically from the colonial service of the United Kingdom. Although an account of that service rationale, recruitment and record are beyond my terms of reference here, it is necessary to take notice of its former presence and policies. Nigeria became independent in 1960, and changes took place at a remarkable speed. The time span since independence has been so short that it is impossible to understand the present role of public administrators without reference to Nigeria's historical development. There are several reasons for this. First, the very nature of the immediate past has led to the traditions, structuring, training and espirit of the Nigerian public services being by and large modelled on the British pattern. Secondly, given the recent date of independence, the Nigerian public services have not yet had time to rethink and re-orientate their philosophy or to infuse it—supposing such were the wish—with a tangible African content and spirit. Thirdly, because there persists within the public service a considerable measure of pride in its claim to be following in the steps of what is often acknowledged as the premier civil service (the British administrative system), Nigeria along with many other countries in Anglophone Africa, but in contrast with some other emergent states, counts among the greatest contributions to its successful process of nation-building the heritage of a sound civil service, both in the calibre and loyalty of its personnel and in no less important status as a national institution.
ADMINISTRATION IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Colonial rule has varied connotations and can be described in various terms. To some it is synonymous with exploitation; to others it is liberation in that it develops the latent abilities of colonial peoples. Further still, to some it is authoritarian; to others socialistic; however, all must agree on one point: in essence it is bureaucratic not necessarily in the way day-to-day decisions are made, but as a whole, for individual officials in the field, particularly in remote areas, exercise considerable freedom of judgement. Coleman describes colonialism in Africa as "bureaucratic authoritarianism controlled by an elite of the 'elect'. Government was regarded as 'administration' and people were the 'administrees'".\(^{19}\) It is a system of authority which is its own justification; it exists in response to decisions made elsewhere than in the political life of the people governed.

In the colonial territory, the civil servant is above politics in that neither his position nor his actions are determined by them. Thus the common heritage of all states which have emerged from colonial status is necessarily the heritage of an era during which the focus of power was the governmental bureaucracy. This situation can be and is being modified in a variety of ways in the new nations, but for all former colonial dependencies it is the inevitable point of departure for their national life. Indeed, the very existence of such "nations" as Nigeria, is itself the product of colonial bureaucracy.

Nonetheless, we cannot recount the process of colonial administration in Nigeria without reference to the principle of 'indirect rule'.
The theory of indirect rule as developed by Lord Lugard in Nigeria held that the British government should have no interest in ruling the native population directly, but should simply provide the framework of sanctions which would guarantee the continued rule of the traditional local authorities subject to certain qualifications. Such approach had two alleged advantages; (a) it was much cheaper than direct rule, and Britain was interested in keeping the costs of colonial administration to a minimum, and (b) it did less violence to the lives and psyches of the governed, which additionally helped to keep down the costs of administration, since leaving traditional ways undisturbed would make the native population more docile and thus less expensive to police; they also would be less likely to demand costly new social services.

Indirect rule reinforced the myth of the civil servant as above the political struggle. The British official could not be accused of interfering in local politics if he simply backed up the local Emir or Chief in doing the things the local ruler had always done. The local Emir or Chief himself, in theory at least, is above factional struggles, and simply applied rather than created tribal custom. Indirect rule tended, therefore, to confirm the idea of a ruling bureaucracy above the political struggle—the invisibility of the bureaucracy.

PERSISTENCE OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The British administrative practices and conventions have heavily influenced the ways in which higher civil servants have been involved
in public policy making in Nigeria. In the first place, the broadly defined role assumed by administrative officers in policy formulation and in the provision even of political advice can be seen as a legacy of a colonial system of government. In the words of Ferkiss, "executive initiative and dominance is implicit in the British parlimentary as well as the colonial tradition".21

After attainment of independence, a ministerial conception of government structure, under which appointed career officials are found in virtually all posts in the upper reaches of the hierarchy (except as ministers) and therefore control most of the key positions in the decision making process, was sustained as the prevailing model of administrative organization. This structural arrangement enabled extensive bureaucratic involvement in policy formulation, advocacy, and execution. Finally, Nigerian officials readily embraced a norm of administrative behavior which not only permits, but expects high ranking public servants will both take the initiative in developing public policy alternatives and implementation strategies and in advising their ministers "on the full implications of policy open to the Government".22

To demonstrate the extent to which Nigeria embraced the British administrative system, we only need to take a look at the officially prescribed role of the higher public servant. Although the role was greatly modified following the establishment of self-government, the principle still remained the same. In place of the former colonial pattern, the British home civil service was taken as the official model for Nigeria's public services. This is made quite clear in the following statement, taken from an official document distributed by
In a one party state, this assumption of the neutrality of the former Government of Eastern Nigeria:

The Public Service of Eastern Nigeria is an independent autonomous service established under the Nigeria (constitution) Order in Council 1960. It shall be scrupulously insulated from partisan politics, and observe the highest standards and traditions as evolved in Britain, on whose system our own has largely been modelled. It must be a disciplined, efficient and loyal service, impartial in the exercise of its duties and devoted to serving the Government in power. While essentially the executive arm of the Government it will be expected to give honest help and advice in the formulation of policy, and to ensure that approved policies are faithfully, energetically and wholeheartedly carried out.  

Although this statement refers to the entire public service, it applies more to the higher public servants than the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Sir Ivor Jennings maintains that the "task of the politician is not to govern but to supervise government, to take decisions on questions of principle submitted to him and to ensure a close relation between public opinion and the process of administration." In a one party state, this assumption of the neutrality of the civil service may be rejected, but in Nigeria the philosophy of J.S. Mill has so far largely been retained:

A most important principle of good government in a popular constitution is that no executive functionaries should be appointed by popular election; neither by the votes of the people themselves nor by those of their representatives.
Under the Whitehall model, and as adopted by Nigeria, the permanent secretary serves as the chief administrative officer and the chief advisor to the Minister. As paramount advisor, the permanent secretary is to engage in the elaboration of the policies or plans and to assist in the determination of the best means of carrying them out. The permanent secretary (p.s.) is to translate policies, coordinate ministry activities, supervise functional execution and monitor results, defend ministry budget proposals, uphold the ministry's interests in inter-ministerial meetings and in relations with other agencies and external groups, and "causing research work to be done for the ministry, seeking legal, technical and specialized advice for the ministry".  

In practice, Nigerian administrators have played more than an advisory role in the process of public policy formation. Adebayo comments, "ministerial experience in Nigeria, particularly during the civilian regime, has not largely followed the path of conventional relation between political boss and his permanent secretary". He maintains that the "average" politician, especially in the first republic; conceived of his role as approving or disapproving whatever proposals or recommendations were placed before him by his permanent secretary. Policy papers authored and initiated by permanent secretaries often formed the basis of Executive Council deliberation and sanction, and career administrators drafted and tightly controlled ministry and agency budgets. Adebayo sums it up when he says:
"policy making in Nigeria public administration from independence in 1960 until the take over by the military in January, 1966 was largely in the hands of the civil servants". In sum, higher civil servants have been central, and often dominant participants in the policy formation process since the early stages of Nigeria's political history.

REASONS OFFERED FOR THE SITUATION

An observer is likely to wonder why in Nigeria as in many other developing countries the bulk of the political heads of departments are unable to function effectively in the conventional role of policy maker. The reasons are not far fetched. Firstly, Nigeria became independent at a time when the literacy rate was low; as a result individuals with very limited educational background emerged as Ministers. It is no exaggeration to say that some of these politicians have been little better than illiterates. In terms of awareness therefore, they are not more informed than the people they were supposedly leading—the general public. A Nigerian proverb which says, in the country of the blind, one eyed man is the king, is very much relevant. The political heads notion of ministerial appointment and responsibility was that of a ceremonial head in a department whose only duty was to wear costly apparels to office, and to "sit back and wait for any files to come from the permanent secretary for his approval, and when such files are not flowing, he is likely to suspect disloyalty or inefficiency on the part of his officials".

Another reason for the failure to act decisively is to be found in the political head's role relations with members of the public. In
Nigeria, the demands made upon the politician by the less fortunate kinsmen often reach onerous proportions. The prevailing sentiment seems to be that those who have made good are expected to help those who remain behind. Thus, the Minister may spend a substantial proportion of his salary on the school fees of junior brothers or the support of elderly kinsmen living in the traditional family home. Moreover, rural relatives expect their elite 'sons' and 'brother' to help them secure government scholarships and employment. For example, a relative of a minister who finds it necessary to go to a government office will surely ask his kinsmen in politics to intercede for him with the office in question. Such 'service' greatly taxes the time of the minister and interferes with his own duties—not to mention the fact that they are an infringement upon the ethic of not using one's official position to secure favorable treatment for relatives and friends.

Tribal loyalties, much like extended family ties, do not appear to have weakened in proportion to the acceptance of new norms in other sectors of social life. The uniqueness of one's tribal groups is instilled in Nigerians at an early age, and later reinforced by the individual's own perception of the immediately obvious differences of language, religion, and custom which differentiate the various ethnic communities. The tragic events of recent years (the civil war, for instance) have given ample proof of the importance of tribal loyalties and prejudices among all sectors of Nigerian society.

Apart from the problem of personal deficiencies or drawbacks afflicting the political heads of department during the first republic, there was the pattern of decision making inherent in the system which gave civil servants the initiative in decision making. For example,
the preparation of the budget was an exercise conducted almost entirely by the civil servants. The content and formulation of budget was practically the handiwork of civil servants.³²

This sort of situation leaves no alternative but for the permanent secretary to take the initiative. After all, as Herbert Morrison once remarked, it is better that a department should be run by its civil servants than it should not be run at all.³³ Thus the political situation in Nigeria was such that a favorable situation was created for bureaucrats to gain a strong foothold in policy making during the first republic. The execution of public policies was in principle an exclusive preserve of the bureaucrats. However, some political figures showed scant regard for this convention. Allegations that First Republic ministers often interfered with details of administrative activity for political or personal purposes have been widely voiced. According to critics, ministerial intervention in the policy implementation realm "subverted professional criteria in decision making, impaired administrative efficiency, promoted frustration and resentment within the bureaucracy and further accentuated role conflicts between political and administrative class officers".³⁴

INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Before Nigeria's independence, and shortly thereafter, each of the three regions (West, East, North) was dominated by strong party government since regionalization in 1954. The enthusiasm and dynamism which motivated each party to power produced virile governments which were masters in their regions both as to policy and substance
of government. Therefore, between the period of regionalization in 1954 and the threshold of independence in 1959, the political leaders in the regions were indeed masters of policy and they dictated the pace and direction of government. Adebayo states that

introduction of the Free primary education in the Western Region; the reforms in local government system in the Eastern Region; the bold measures towards Nigerianization of the civil service in the various Regions... were all the handiwork of the political party in power in each of the Regions. 35

However, the situation turned around for the parties from the dawn of independence until the end of the civil administration in 1966. The political parties' open struggle for federal power and supremacy became pronounced and bitter, and little effort was left for party government to concentrate on affairs of public administration. The situation degenerated to a point where memoranda and policy papers presented at Executive Councils were initiated by civil servants. 36 The political heads had little or no time for the supervision of the ministry or affairs of government.

At the federal level, the situation was somewhat different, in terms of the control and influence the bureaucrats had over policy matters. The condition that presented itself at the Federal level was that of uneasy coalition government which prevented the formulation of sustained and consistent policy as a result of insufficient agreement at the political level. It is natural under this condition, that civil servants became the mainspring of policy. Administration has a way of taking advantage of weak political control and in the presence of a weak political consensus, administration tends to take over and assume control of policy. The federal permanent secretaries
enjoyed this dominant role in relation to their established functions until the military took over. As a matter of fact, this policy domination role established during the civilian administration was carried further into the military administration.

The First Republic was a short-lived period in the annals of Nigeria. Before Nigerians were able to savor the taste of independence, the country was engulfed in political internecine war that led to a state of near anomie, and the freedom we struggled for, but received on a 'platter of gold' was almost destroyed in the process. Such was the situation when the military took control on January 15, 1966.
CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY REGIMES AND DECISION MAKING

Under the military administration (1966-1979), the formal policy making authority was the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), a body composed of 24 ranking military officers including the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (long-winded title for 'Head of State'), and the Supreme Headquarters Chief of Staff. The military and civilian appointed commissioners (ministers) that served as heads of ministries make up the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and the body was responsible for overseeing policy execution and coordination of governmental programs.

The most significant feature of the military regimes is that decision making was highly personalized at the state and federal levels. The reason for this is no doubt due to the military's concept of their role in government. From the inception of the military regime in Nigeria, it was basically accepted that the task of running the government was the sole responsibility of the military, and that where the Executive Councils had been established, their role was merely advisory. This arrangement was given a constitutional sanction with the promulgation of Decree #1 of 1966 which vested all executive powers of the state in the military governors.

The military administration also introduced new innovations into the administrative structure of Nigeria, with the creation of the post of the secretary to the military government and head of the civil service (SMC) at the apex of the federal and state bureaucratic
hierarchies. The appointees possessed unrivalled access to the head of state and military governors, and by virtue of their positions served as secretary to the federal and state executive councils. The secretary to the military governors, who was often dubbed as 'super perm sec,' exercised important supervisory powers over the top ranks of the civil service. In addition, they were privileged to sit in most supreme military council meetings and also served as chief advisors to the military leadership.

More than the civilian administration was able to achieve in the short time between independence and the overthrow of government, the military administration was able to centralize control over state government operation. In achieving this, the military governors were empowered to appoint more permanent secretaries to newly created posts within their office. According to Adebayo,

... some state governments during 1966-75 had as many as seven permanent secretaries concentrated in the office of the military governor ... responsible to the governor for almost the entire range of governmental activities - economic, administrative, political, commercial and industrial. 38

In another comment on the practice, Adamolekun said that in 1977 nine permanent secretaries served as heads of cabinet office departments and units at the federal government level. 39 In sum, the practice had the effect of reconstituting a powerful secretariat office and reducing authority and range of functional responsibilities possessed by ministries and departments.

Contrary to military administrative conventions, Nigerian military leaders drew the bureaucrats even deeper into policy formulating roles. General Ironsi, Nigeria's first military leader, never appointed
civilian commissioners (he kept former surviving politicians out of
government positions entirely), and he relied heavily on the permanent
secretaries; virtually all important decisions were taken by a narrow
group of half a dozen military leaders, together with a handful of
civil servant advisors. In the absence of commissioners, General
Ironsì vested ministerial powers in the Federal Executive Council. 40
Nevertheless, the Head of the Military Government and the Federal
Executive Council delegated broad authority to promulgate subsidiary
statutes as well as extensive rule making powers to the permanent
secretaries, who acted as the de facto political heads of their
ministries.

By all accounts, the direct involvement of public servants in
policy making reached its peak during General Gowon's administration.
Lack of experience on the part of most military officers with govern-
mental processes and public decision making, coupled with a
reluctance to appoint former politicians to authoritative or advisory
posts in the new regime and the absence of any organized public
constituency, made the military administration dependent upon the
policy advice and alternatives proffered by civil servants.

Under the administration of General Gowon, policy advising,
formulating, initiating, advocating and defending was the paramount
preoccupation of the permanent secretaries. Gowon encouraged
officials to attend meetings and participate fully in SMC delibera-
tions. His style of administration was given credit as a contributory
factor to the dominant influence of federal permanent secretaries.
Gowon was reported to have relied heavily on suggestions made by
federal permanent secretaries and the secretaries to the military
governors, rather than on recommendations tendered by his commissioners or the military officers serving on the SMC.\textsuperscript{41} As an indication of the extent of the power possessed by high level public administrators, Adebayo reports that state military governors would travel to the Lagos residences of federal permanent secretaries in order to lobby for their support on matters "that might in due course come before the supreme military council, the FEC or even directly before the head of state.\textsuperscript{42}

Gowon's convention of joint authorship with the chief executive of memoranda coming before the SMC practically guaranteed that the policy memoranda advanced by public servants would not be substantially changed by the council. Moreover, 'super perm sec' and other top-level civil servants overtly usurped the powers of their ministers and dominated both the shaping and determining of government policies and the allocation of public resources. Major General Joseph N. Garba (retired) confirmed on the eve of the return to civilian rule in 1979, that during the nine years of the Gowon regime, senior civil servants literally held sway over decision making, and some of them could in fact overrule their commissioner and get away with it.\textsuperscript{43}

With the abolition of all elected political offices and civilian cabinets, administrative officers found themselves directly accountable to the military leadership. Under the Gowon regime, in particular, many career civil servants took, at least covertly, advantage of the opportunity provided by the replacement of politicians with military men (who shared common administrative values and depended upon their support and expertise), to expand their already powerful role in determining public policies. According to
Aliyu, "Decision making in all spheres of governmental activity, including the formulation and implementation of policies and allocation of resources tended to reflect the preferences and values of bureaucracy". However, Gowon's policy of more direct civil servants' involvement in running the affairs of state eventually led to dissension within officer ranks of the armed forces based on the perception that the military bore the onus of responsibility for policies primarily shaped by civil servants. Role expansion concomitantly drew top administrative officers into an increasing number of conflicts with army officers and more tightly linked their position and the reputation of the public services to the fate of the ruling military faction with whom they had forged an alliance.

The consequence of the dissension among the military hierarchy, and the general malaise in the society at the time, led to the replacement of General Gowon in a bloodless coup during one of his many trips to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting held in Kampala, Uganda in July, 1975. General Murtala Mohammed's (replaced by General Olusegun Obasanjo on February 13, 1976, after an abortive coup that claimed the life of Murtala Mohammed) regime came into power with a sense of purpose and an unprecedented dynamism -- a mission to uplift the morale of the country and to rid the public service of the so-called 'dead woods'. On the heels of the July, 1975 coup, General Mohammed removed all 12 military governors and most federal commissioners. Within a year, more than 10,000 civil servants, including high level administrative officers who had been closely linked to the Gowon regime, had been dismissed from federal and state ministries and parastatals in an unprecedented, sweeping
purge of all ranks in the public service. In the Nigerian case, widespread recognition that higher civil servants had become the dominant actors in the policy making arena only heightened their vulnerability to dismissal or involuntary retirement on grounds of corruption, inefficiency, or disloyalty. General Murtala also immediately banned permanent secretaries from Supreme Military Council and Federal Executive Council meetings unless specifically invited to attend and participate.

Nevertheless, high level public servants continued to be preoccupied with policy formulation under the new regime. Their involvement in the policy making process assumed less conspicuous forms. During this time, appointed ministers continued to lack a popular base of political support. In the absence of political parties, career officials easily resisted the demands placed on the bureaucracy by weak and fragmented interest groups. Regular, nationwide meetings of SMGs and permanent secretaries also served to enhance their policy initiating role under the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. The increasing importance placed on the kinds of professional expertise and information controlled by public administrators strengthened their strategic position in the policy formation process, although frequent rotation and relative high turnover among permanent secretaries and other high ranking administrative officers continued to place limits on their ability to claim possession of specialist knowledge and experience in situations requiring technical decisions. General Obasanjo's 1977 affirmation that the "role of the civil servants is to initiate policies and to offer professional and technical advice to the government . . ." implies the lack of fundamental changes in the
prevailing norms and expectations and indeed suggested the new administration's inadvertent return to pre-1966 administrative practices.

Further evidence that administrators continued to determine public policies throughout the military rule period is provided by an investigation of council-staff relations at the local government level. In principle, the 1976 local government reform greatly circumscribed the role of the chief administrative officer (secretary) by assigning nearly exclusive authority over local policy formulation to the council. Many local government secretaries, however, continued in the 1976-1979 period to view their roles in the familiar terms of the resident or divisional officer and, therefore, endeavored to dominate the policy making process. At the same time, many councilors remained satisfied to ratify proposals initiated and submitted by the secretary and/or department heads.
CHAPTER V

THE SECOND REPUBLIC DEVELOPMENTS AND 1979 CONSTITUTION

The new Nigerian constitution of 1979 brought into focus an endeavor to break from the past in terms of administrative structure and practices. For the first time an attempt was made to establish political control over the bureaucracy through the constitution. The Second Republic Constitution substantially undermined the formal standing of higher civil servants in both policy formulation and policy execution. Constitutional provisions (Articles 139 and 177) authorizing the appointment of special advisors to the president and the governors, as well as a secretary to the government who is expected to serve as the overall political advisor to the chief executive, added powerful non-career competitors with whom permanent secretaries and the head of service must vie when attempting to influence decision making. Special advisors hold temporary political rather than civil service appointments and serve 'at the pleasure of' the president/governor. The authority and influence of the special advisor rivals or exceeds that exercised by many federal minister/state commissioners. Furthermore, permanent secretaries no longer serve as the administrative heads of their ministries. Federal ministers and state commissioners were delegated this responsibility as the representatives of the chief executive under Articles 136 and 174 of the 1979 constitution.

Most fundamentally, the 1979 constitution altered the status of the top echelon of the public bureaucracy by allowing elected chief executives to appoint individuals from outside the career civil
service as permanent secretaries, heads of extra-ministerial departments, and secretary to the government (Articles 157, 188). With the return to civilian rule, the newly elected chief executives made sweeping personnel changes in these ranks. A number of individuals from outside the civil service (most notably from the universities) were appointed permanent secretary or secretary to the government, particularly in certain state governments, although the majority of initial appointees were civil servants. These appointments do not require legislative consent, a provision which implicitly grants the chief executive power to transfer and remove from office those individuals serving as permanent secretaries, heads of departments, secretary to the government, and head of the civil service. According to Aliyu, "the power granted to the president/governor to appoint and remove all top supervisory officials in the public bureaucracy directly has greatly circumscribed the authority of civil service commissions".48

The only constitutional restraint placed on the exercise of the president's power of appointment with respect to these offices is the requirement to "have regard to the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity". Governors must "have regard to the diversity of the people within the State and the need to promote national unity". Furthermore, "there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies" [Articles 14(3,4), 135(3), 157(5), 173(2), 188(4)]. The federal character clause (still in practice) is likely to encourage public servants in certain states to transfer to the center, to result in the recruitment of additional
candidates from outside the civil services into high-level posts, and to provide rapid avenues for advancement in individual cases.

Major variations emerged during the second republic in federal and state government appointment policies and practices, staffing patterns, and administrative rule making and interpretation. For instance, all permanent secretaries were appointed to specific offices in some states, while individuals in other states were formally appointed to the grade or cadre of permanent secretary with no office specified. Some other state governments adopted a mixed system, under which some permanent secretaries were appointed to specified offices and others undesigned posts (e.g., within the Governor's office). Considerable variations also exists in the number of permanent secretaries assigned to the Governor's office and to particular ministries. In some states, permanent secretaries were appointed to certain boards or directorates. A variety of other high-level posts were selected on the rare occasions when state governors exercised their power to appoint 'chief executives of department'. Thus, it was clear that in critical appointment and staffing matters, as well as in the distribution of public policy making roles, state governments possessed sufficient latitude in applying provisions of the 1979 constitution to embark on different approaches in response to local circumstances and preferences. The eagerness with which government pursued such opportunities gave rise to greater diversity in administrative practice within the federation and, in most states, to the creation of a "much wider band of quasi political appointments".49

Under the second republic, moreover, the primary criteria for
appointment as permanent secretary became explicitly political. According to Ray Ofoegbu, "the critical bases for appointment now are 'competence, loyalty and total commitment'. These changes constitute a decided shift away from British conventions of bureaucratic neutrality and anonymity toward the deeper politicization of top administrative ranks that characterizes the U.S. and French presidential systems of government. As a condition for holding appointment in the second republic, permanent secretaries, heads of extra-ministerial departments, and secretaries to the government are "expected to pursue with absolute commitment the manifestos, programs, and policies of the chief executive".

More explicit politicization of the top echelons of the administrative machinery under Nigeria's multi-party political system increases the likelihood that, upon assuming office in the future, newly elected presidents and governors will replace incumbent permanent secretaries and heads of departments (as well as the secretary to the government) with fresh appointees of their own choosing. One would also expect that a higher proportion of subsequent appointees to such posts will be drawn from outside the career service in situations where the civil service as a whole is perceived to have become politicized and the newly elected governor/president is a member of a different political party from the one to which the previous chief executive belonged.

By 1980, numerous conflicts and considerable confusion arose over the policy formulating role of permanent secretaries at the federal and state levels. The controversy was so serious that the then President (deposed in a military coup) felt compelled to invite all
federal permanent secretaries to his official house for briefing. On that occasion, the President again emphasized that the presidential system of government had placed new limits on the authority of civil servants. However, in a particular desperate situation, the permanent secretaries played even more prominent policy making and implementing roles. During the 25 months political impasse in Kaduna state when the majority party in the state's House of Assembly steadfastly refused to approve or confirm any of the chief executive's (the executive was from another party) nominees for commissioner, permanent secretaries performed all of the commissioner's functions. Higher civil servants continued to exercise varying degrees of influence over public policy formation in the other eighteen states. The 1979 election results offered state public servants an excellent opportunity to negotiate legislative branch acquiescence with active bureaucratic involvement in policy initiation. Many of their former colleagues, who could be counted on to be sympathetic and cooperative, had been elected to state legislatures. One preliminary study of the occupational backgrounds of persons elected to the house of assembly in several states found that the former civil servants constituted (including teachers) a majority of the legislators in some states and a plurality in others. 52

Taken together, politicization of the upper ranks of the public services and designation of ministers as chief executive officers under the second republic constitution lead one to expect that permanent secretaries increasingly will function in the capacity of deputy ministers. Since the notion of permanent secretaries acting as deputy ministers is basically consonant with prevailing
conventions and prescriptions, this trend is unlikely in itself to result in major de facto changes in the extent of administrative involvement in public policy formulation and execution. The central role which higher public servants have played in initiating alternative policy proposals and in providing programmatic and political advice, as well as the importance of ministerial participation in the direction of administrative affairs, would simply receive wider recognition and attention under this arrangement.

There has always been considerable overlap in political and administrative role performance at the upper levels of government in Nigeria. A clear cut minister/deputy definition of roles both more accurately reflects the dual nature of the functions which holders of the two posts have tended to exercise in practice and effectively underscores the critical place of hierarchical relations in the policy making process. Reinforcing the latter principle constitutes a particularly important component in efforts to prevent career administrators from reestablishing a dominant place in the policy making arena.

OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY MAKING

The conclusion that higher public servants have consistently played central roles in the formulation and execution of public policies and are likely to continue to act in these capacities in the future does not provide a complete picture of administrative policy making practice and prospects in Nigeria. This perspective can be fruitfully enlarged through further inquiries concerning the
objectives pursued by administrative decision makers and through considered assessments of the impact of their involvement.

Within the twenty-five years of Nigeria's independence, bureaucrats - especially higher level administrators - have constituted the only political institution to exercise uninterrupted influence over public policy formulation. Toward what ends have they applied their extensive and persistent influence? What results can be attributed to their action?

At critical junctures in Nigeria's young political history, federal civil servants have demonstrated their commitments to the concepts of a strong and effective central government. Public servants have been credited for playing highly visible policy shaping roles that are acknowledged to have encouraged successive military regimes to create additional states out of the subnational units that had comprised the federation. Some permanent secretaries are also credited with intervening decisively to preserve and extend the authority of the federal government vis-à-vis the states.

These actions are often mentioned in characterizing Nigerian public bureaucracy as a unifying, dynamic and effective institution dedicated to promoting political stability and national unity. But an alternative interpretation regarding the motives behind administrative actions states that higher public servants have acted primarily in selfish interests to enhance bureaucratic authority at the center of the political system. A common criticism of the bureaucratic involvement in policy making points out that the image of the Nigerian civil service

...
is full of intensive and extensive activities
determined by and directed towards the satis-
faction of the sectional and/or corporate
interests of the civil service in the
erroneous belief that what is good for the
civil service, its top members, or group of
them, is equally good for Nigeria. 55

Although details are still being worked out (I presume)
concerning the full extent of involvement, it is clear that public
servants provided vital support for other major public policy initia-
tives launched by the military. Included in this category are decree,
edicts, budget allocations affecting the ownership of business
enterprises, allocation of rural and urban land use rights, local
government jurisdictions, structure and function, wage and salary
levels, and agricultural development strategies. In each case,
independent analysts who have evaluated the impact of these measures
have discovered that government bureaucratic officers, consistently
emerged among the principal beneficiaries of policy execution and
program implementation.

For instance, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEDP)
of 1972 mandated that "by March, 1974, a range of economic activities,
then dominated to varying degrees by non-nationals, should be partly
or wholly owned by indigenes". The indigenization Degree (as it
became known) excluded aliens from the ownership of small scale
domestic business operations and required 40 percent Nigerian
participation in the 36 types of large scale manufacturing, service,
processing, and commercial enterprises listed in its second schedule
(Decree No. 3 of 1977 expanded the scope of Schedule II and increased
the indigenous equity participation requirement to 60 percent
effective December 31, 1978).
In furtherance of NEDP objectives, the federal government acquired a 40 percent share in foreign owned commercial banks and insisted that at least 40 percent of their total loans be allotted to indigenous borrowers. It was alleged that public servants obtained a large proportion of these loans and used their newly acquired capital to purchase shares in second schedule firms at highly favorable prices. Privileged access to information as well as credit enabled many public officials to secure a place for themselves under NEDP provisions at the 'core of the Nigerian emergent share owning class'. A critic charged that the decree created "a class of indigenous mandarins who combined political with economic power and influence and could, therefore be more vicious in the exploitation of the country and the common man than the foreigners they displaced".

Career bureaucrats were also alleged to have further manipulated state land allocation policies and procedures in ways that have further entrenched their elite economic standing and expanded their profit making opportunities. In recent years, public administrators have shown particular interest and success in securing highly desirable and valuable residential and commercial/industrial estate holdings in major urban centers. Personal favoritism, inside information and the ability to satisfy requirements that allocated plots of land be 'developed' (i.e., built upon) within a relatively short period of time have been effectively used by public servants to accumulate urban land use rights for residential, rental and business purposes.

Under the influence of higher civil servants, federal and state authorities generally have pursued goals and projects that are remote
from the basic needs of Nigerians, the majority of whom live in rural areas. Much of Nigeria's oil wealth has been siphoned into bureaucratic expansion, entrenchment, and enrichment. Federal, state, and local governments have incurred escalating recurrent budgetary commitments for staff salaries and emoluments as a result of relentless growth in the size of all public service ranks. Today, the federal and state services jointly employ more than 700,000 persons. In comparison, the number of established positions in the federal and regional bureaucracies totaled 71,693 in 1960. The total number of higher officers in the federal and state services also increased dramatically from an estimated 763 in 1964 to roughly 50,000 ten years later. Between 1966 and 1977, the number of public enterprises (utilities, banks, commercial and industrial operations) grew from about 70 to 300. The armed forces consisted of an additional 250,000 personnel in 1978. A nation-wide manpower survey based on 1978-79 local government estimates identified roughly 386,000 established positions at the local government level-excluding general labors as well as district, village, and hamlet heads. With the inclusion of local government staff alone, the total personnel strength of the Nigerian public bureaucracy swells to over a million—undoubtedly the largest in sub-saharan Africa. At the same time a 1977 government study of Nigeria's manpower requirements placed the level of staff vacancies for most higher and intermediate level scientific and technical posts at between 40 and 55 percent and reported a 15 to 30 percent vacancy rate in administrative and other non-technical positions.

Rapid bureaucratic expansion continues to provide ample
advancement opportunities for career public servants. In addition, the numerous vacancies and acting appointments that result from perpetual growth are cited to bolster the questionable thesis often propounded in government circles that "a shortage of experience, skilled manpower, or inadequate executive capacity, constitutes the principal constraint on Nigeria's development". It is at least equally convincing to argue that the costs associated with persistent bureaucratic expansion have foreclosed the pursuit of other development options that promise greater benefits for the majority of citizens who do not hold government jobs.

Furthermore, the proportions of the new capital investment expenditures authorized in recent years at all levels of government have been devoted to the construction of staff housing and office buildings, and to the purchase of imported, labor saving machinery and equipment used exclusively for administrative convenience. The establishment of twelve states out of the four former regions in 1967, the development of seven additional state capitals in 1976, and the creation of numerous new local government units under the 1976 reform edicts and following the return to civilian rule have required massive outlays of public funds for the employment of locally based staff, the construction of new headquarters and staff residences, and the provision of basic infrastructural facilities and elite services. Expensive 'development' projects have tended to emphasize the same kinds of recurrent overhead expenditures. Devotion to such considerations has allowed project staffs to emerge as one of the few domestic beneficiaries of the capital intensive, large scale irrigation schemes launched by the Federal Military Government in
the early 1970s for the avowed purpose of increasing domestic food production.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

The Nigerian public service is a relic of the British colonial administration in that it mimics—although imperfectly—the processes, practices and structures of the Whitehall system. When Nigeria became independent in 1960, it did not set up new administrative machinery in place of the former British system. Instead, the administrative structure set up by the colonial master influenced the patterns of administration under the new regime. The colonial tradition of neutrality of the public service gave theoretical support for the preservation of colonial administrative structures and personnel in the process of transition from dependence to independence. Indeed, the process of political change that led to independence placed political and bureaucratic power in the hands of persons of same backgrounds and loyalties. There was no split between party and bureaucracy as such, and political leaders were more dependent on the civil bureaucracy because of their monopoly of technical expertise, scarcity of competing social elites and until the 1966 coup, the political insignificance of the military forces.

Though there have been shifts in bureaucratic policy making roles and relationships at various times along the lines of political, structural and constitutional changes, the persistence of the inherited structural arrangement has enabled extensive bureaucratic involvement in policy formulation, advocacy and execution. Other factors also adduced for the consistent involvement of the bureaucrats in policy formulation (especially during the First
Republic) are the lack of basic education on the part of the political bosses, role relations with members of the public that tend to hinder bureaucratic performance, and the decision making inherent in the system.

With the advent of the military into the Nigerian politics came a deeper involvement of the bureaucrats into policy formulating roles. The lack of experience on the part of most military officers with governmental processes and public decision making, coupled with a reluctance to appoint former politicians to authoritative or advisory posts, and the absence of any organized public constituency, made the military administration dependent upon the policy advice and alternatives offered by civil servants.

During the Second Republic, an attempt was made to place political control over bureaucracy through the constitution. Several provisions of the constitution undermined the formal standing of higher civil servants in policy formulation and execution. Most significantly, the constitution altered the status of the higher public bureaucrats by allowing elected chief executives to appoint individuals from outside the career civil service as permanent secretaries. Variations also emerged in governments appointment policies and practices, staffing patterns and administrative rule making and interpretation.

Nevertheless, as a result of the widely varying roles and the consistency of their central position in policy formulation, the bureaucrats have been cited as a cohesive and effective institution dedicated to promoting stability and national unity. An alternative interpretation of their motive has characterized the institution as
being "parasitic". The higher administrative and professional officers have been accused of consistently emerging as the principle beneficiaries of policy execution and program implementation. Despite their commitment to the concept of a strong and effective central government, it is suggested that the administrators have further entrenched the elite economic standing and expanded their profit making opportunities.

THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

What is the probable future of the civil service in Nigeria? Will the civil bureaucracy continue to enjoy a virtual monopoly of actual day-to-day power and prestige in society, ruling in behalf of the one-party political or military regimes as they did in behalf of the no-party regimes of colonialism? Or will new groups emerge to threaten their status? In large part the answer depends on whether the bureaucrats can maintain their own unity. Their technical competence makes them almost indispensable. If they stick together on any basis except overt and general resistance to political directives, their position is virtually unassailable. On the other hand, if they split on age, class, ethnic or political lines, this will enable other social forces to take control, forces which would, of course, have to retain many or most civil servants in their jobs but would subject them to control from outside the civil services, in accord with nonbureaucratic norms.

One source of cleavage in the bureaucracy is a heritage of the British system, which unlike the civil service system of the United
States, makes a sharp distinction between the administrative class and other civil servants, including high-ranking technicians. Many of those who have risen as far as they can go through the technical ranks of the civil service are increasingly resentful to find their paths to further advancement blocked by what seem to be, in African context, a meaningless class distinction. The administrators (who are supposed to hold liberal arts degrees) control the positions of permanent secretary, permanent undersecretary, and the like in all departments and, unlike the technical personnel, do not remain within one department but are shifted about as the occasion and opportunities for advancement dictate. The problem is aggravated by the fact that many technicians are better trained than their administrative superiors, who are often glorified clerks carried into high posts by rapid Nigerianization of the public service.

The constraints that have been placed in recent years upon participation by career public servants in the policy making process have stemmed primarily from criticism of bureaucratic objectives and policy outcomes. Although senior public administrators have undeniably 'overreached' their conventional roles on various occasions, especially under Gowon regime, extensive bureaucratic involvement in determining public policy generally is viewed as inevitable and even informally sanctioned. The chief impetus for the backlash against the bureaucracy has been the increasingly pervasive and blatant manner in which career officials have 'discredited' themselves through virtual single-minded devotion to their own vested interests. In addition, increases in bureaucratic size, power, and pecuniary rewards have not been accompanied by noticeable improvements in the
performance of public servants or gains in public sector productivity.

As a matter of fact, neither the reputation nor the morale of public servants has recovered much since the 1975 mass purge. The sweeping purge and the new institutions introduced by the Murtala/Obasanjo administration have had no discernable beneficial long-term impact on bureaucratic performance. Adamolekun concludes that "the balance sheet of all these new measures suggests that no qualitative change has occurred in . . . the behavior and performance of the public servants".62 The military neither introduced a disciplinary (or reward) scheme systematically related to personnel behavior and performance nor replaced dismissed civil servants with a new institutional core of progressive development administrators.

In conclusion, a technically competent, sophisticated, efficient professional cadre dedicated to the competent operation of the bureaucratic organization is the sine qua non of any modern state. In the words of H. Finer,

The function of the civil service in the modern state is not merely the improvement of government; without it indeed, government itself would be impossible.63

The outcome of continued technological and social development for the role of government in society tends to indicate that such a civil service would remain an indispensable component of governments in the future. What is in dispute, however, are the proper limits of the role of the civil service in the affairs of the state, and the conditions under which the institution can more effectively serve the larger interests of its society rather than its narrow institutional interests.
In the conventional administrative thought, the civil service is an instrument for both policy and implementation of the will of the state as determined by legitimate political institutions to which the service must be both subordinate and subservient. Indeed, Max Weber warned that the subjection of the civil service to political control is necessary to prevent the institution from becoming a master rather than the servant of society as well as for ensuring the effective discharge of its functions. Fred Riggs' "strong constitutive" system has the same supervisory and control jurisdiction over civil service functioning as Weber's political authority. The modus operandi of civil service in such a system is such that would insulate it from blame when government policies misfire while allowing it a share of the credit for successful public policies.

Against the conventional wisdom is the Development Administration perspective which, in addition to the traditional role of the civil service, seeks a wider and more prominent role for it in the goal-setting processes. Identifying economic development as the goal of emergent states and attributing to their bureaucracies a capacity for initiating and managing development that is unmatched by any group of elites, development administration makes the effectiveness of the civil service contingent not upon extra-civil service control but upon unfettered opportunities to apply its creative talents and capabilities. In the words of Milton J. Esman,

The emphasis on control of bureaucracy in the context of most of the developing countries is a misplaced priority, one that might seriously retard their rate of progress. We ought to be much more concerned with increasing the capacity
of the bureaucracy to perform, and this we see as a function of greatly enhanced professional capability and operational autonomy rather than further controls.\textsuperscript{66}

Accordingly, this research paper is submitted with a view that the common influence of the administrator over policy will continue for as long as the basis and structure of politics in developing countries retains the 'culture of poverty'. To bring about changes, there must exist modernity which Lamond Tullis defined as the "process whereby men adjust themselves in terms of politics, society and culture so that they can develop their environment economically."\textsuperscript{67}
ENDNOTES


6 Heady, op. cit., p. 72.


10 Esman, op. cit., p. 60.


13 Ibid., p. 3-61.


J. Esman, op. cit., pp. 81-82.


Julius Nyerere, "We Cannot Afford the Luxury of Civil Servants Who are Neutral," The Observer, June 3, 1962.


Ibid, pp. 5-6.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid, p. 10.


51 Akinyele, op. cit., p. 239.


54 Luckham, op. cit., p. 312.


57 Olugbemi, op. cit., p. 108.


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Advisor: Dr. Keith Snavely