

## MISCELLANEOUS.

### RENÉ DESCARTES.

(1596—1650.)

It has rarely fallen to the lot of a philosopher, pure and simple, to achieve a lasting name in science. Yet achievements in science,—and by science we do not exclude triumphs in the science of mind,—constitute in the end the only enduring title to fame. Systems of philosophy grow and become fashionable, wane and pass away, but only in so far as they contain truth,—that is, science,—do they remain permanent. Of the magnificent speculations of a Bacon, a Locke, a Berkeley, a Hume, a Kant, a Hegel, what has remained for life, so far as life touches the populace and material existence, but their inspiring influence, exerted now on a select circle only, and as the expression of a spiritual development, which, potent as it is in its silent influence, has no direct and grossly visible bearing on the world at large!

But it was reserved for Descartes to share both in the material as well as the spiritual advancement of humanity. He broke loose from the traditions of the past, as much as a man who is the product of society can, and by dint of sheer independence and originality alone, advanced the practical knowledge of the world as powerfully as he advanced the theoretical knowledge of the mind. The author of the *Géométrie*, the forerunner of Newton and Leibniz, the author of the *Discours de la Méthode*, the forerunner of Hume and Kant and of all that is lasting in modern epistemology, stands unique in the history of philosophy, if not in the history of science. The ideas which have made the world great are little ideas, little in their expression at least, and do not require ponderous volumes for their utterance. The *Discours de la Méthode*,—a work (fifty pages) which with all its faults from our modern hypersensitive point of view, our epistemologies and reaction-times, retains all the zest, the freshness, and independence of a man who dared to brave and flaunt tradition and abide by the dictates of his own reason at a time when reason was authority,—the work of a typical *Landsknecht*, alone in the battle of thought (see our frontispiece, the fierce expression and the soldier's mustachio),—the *Géométrie* (106 pages): what a wonderful influence these two little tracts, as we may call them, have had on the progress of civilisation!

Descartes was primarily a mathematician. He found in mathematics, as did Kant and Comte, the type of all faultless thought; and he proved his appreciation of his insight by the invention of a new symbolical mechanism and artifice for the application of algebra to geometry (*Analytic Geometry*, as it is now called, which,

in a growing sense, let it be said, existed before him), and by his discoveries in the theory of equations, which were fundamental in their importance. These achievements, far as they may seem from the common life, are shot through the warp and woof of our technical civilisation, and our whole existence bears their hidden impress.

Technical philosophers will be prepared to dispute the relative importance of Descartes's mathematical and philosophical works. And it remains to be said that the *Discourse on Method*,<sup>1</sup> together with Hume's *Inquiry*<sup>2</sup> and Kant's *Prolegomena*<sup>3</sup> are still, in their conciseness, their historical sequence, and rugged simplicity, the finest introductions to philosophical study that the young student of philosophy can procure.

Like Bacon, a theorist too, Descartes was unfortunate in his physical speculations. While his doctrine of vortices, as a pure matter of cosmological imagination, has been revived by modern scientists and been made the subject of exact and successful investigations, he failed to appreciate in their full extent the masterful achievements of his contemporary, Galileo, than whom no one has left a more enduring, incorrigible, and unerring imprint on science. Of the defects of Descartes's system, of his almost morbid taste for abstract and simple solutions, his contempt for history and what we now would call sociology, we will not speak here but shall conclude with some extracts on the "father of modern philosophy" from a forthcoming book on the *History of French Philosophy* by an eminent professor at the Collège de France, M. Lévy-Bruhl.

"After we have added up all the influences, both of the past and of the present, which were exercised upon him, the originality of Descartes shines out all the more conspicuously. Hegel has named him a "hero," and this hyperbole may, in a certain sense, be justified. Descartes had, indeed, no vocation of martyrdom. He was always fond of peace, and averse to vain controversy, which is a mere waste of time. But nature had endowed him with that higher sort of courage which is love of truth and devotion to science; and if the name of "hero" is befitting for the men whose exertions laid open new paths of human thought, Descartes undoubtedly was entitled to the name.

"Not only did the discovery of analytical geometry mark a decisive epoch in the history of mathematics, which it provided with an instrument of incomparable flexibility and power, but it furthermore gave Descartes a right to hope for the philosophical method he was seeking. Ought not a last generalisation to be possible, by means of which the method he had so happily discovered should become applicable, not only to the 'universal mathematical science,' but also to the whole system of truths which the weakness of our minds would permit us to reach?

"Thus was formed, in Descartes's mind, the method which he has summed up in the *Discours de la Méthode*, and which was destined to replace the ancient logic, long since useless and sterile. It is inexpedient here to explain these rules minutely. We must, however, observe that the first one, 'Never to hold a thing as true unless there is evidence of its being so,' is not, properly speaking, a precept of method. Such precepts are set forth in a subsequent set of rules, where Descartes successively prescribes analysis for splitting up difficulties, and synthesis for constructing and expounding science. But the first rule is quite different. It does not lay down a process to be used in order to discover truth. It concerns method only

<sup>1</sup>English translation by Veitch (Edinburgh, 1890).

<sup>2</sup>New Edition by Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1894).

<sup>3</sup>Bohn's Library.

in so far as method is not separated from science itself (and such indeed was Descartes's meaning). For the first step of method—or of science—must be to determine accurately by what sign we can recognise what is to be regarded as true, and what is to be set aside as being only probable or dubious. This sign is evidence. This first rule may have been suggested to Descartes, as the others were, by mathematics. Even as, in his method, he generalised the processes used for mathematical researches and demonstrations, so, in this formula, he laid down the regulating principle to which this science owes its perfection, and which was also to become the regulating principle of the new philosophy.

“Thus the famous rule ‘of evidence’ reaches far beyond the compass of a mere principle of method. Both from what it excludes and what it implies, it may be looked upon as the motto of the Cartesian philosophy. It first rejects any information grounded upon authority alone (excepting the truths of religious creed). Even though Aristotle and all his commentators should agree on one opinion, this would be no proof of its being true; and should it really chance to be so, the authority of Aristotle would count for nothing towards establishing its citizenship in science. Nothing can be admitted in science but what is evident; i. e., nothing but what is so clear and plain as to leave no possibility of doubt, or is rightfully deduced from principles which offer such evidence. The whole doctrine of scholasticism (metaphysics, logic, physics) thus stands irretrievably condemned in the lump. The so-called moral sciences which cannot attain to a degree of evidence comparable to that of mathematics, and which have to content themselves with greater or lesser probabilities, are likewise rejected by the Cartesian formula; in fact, Descartes, as has already been observed, had but little esteem for history and for sciences of erudition.

“In building up his system, he first casts aside as false (at least temporarily) all the opinions which he has hitherto held as true, and which are only probable. ‘For instance,’ he says, ‘having sometimes found my senses deceitful, I will distrust all that they teach me. As I have happened to err with regard to very simple reasoning, I will distrust the results of even the most undoubted sciences. Lastly, I may suppose that an evil genius, who is all-powerful, takes delight in making me err, even when I believe I see the truth most plainly. I will, therefore, by a voluntary effort, which is always possible, since I am free, withhold my judgment even in cases where evidence seems to me irresistible.’ Is there any proposition which is not affected by this ‘hyperbolic’ doubt? There is one, but one only. Let my senses deceive me, let my reasonings be false, let an evil genius delude me concerning things which appear to me most certain; if I am mistaken, then I am,—but this truth ‘I think, therefore I am,’ *cogito, ergo sum*, is so self-evident and so certain that the most extravagant doubt of sceptics is unable to shake it. Here then is the first principle of philosophy sought for by Descartes. And even as Archimedes requested only a fulcrum to lift the world, so Descartes, having found an indubitable proposition, set to work to erect his whole system upon it.

“The *cogito* of Descartes displaced, so to speak, the axis of philosophy. To the ancients and to the scholastics (setting theology apart), the thinking mind appeared as inseparable from the universe as from the object of its thought, while the soul itself was conceived to be the ‘substantial form’ of the living body. According to Descartes, on the contrary, the existence of the thinking mind, far from being dependent on any other existing thing, is the essential condition of every other existence conceivable to us: for if I am certain of the existence of something beside myself, with far better reason am I certain that I, who have that thought,

am in existence. The only reality I cannot possibly question is that of my own thought.

"Both the adversaries and the successors of Descartes started from this point. All the modern forms of idealism, so utterly different from the idealism of the ancients, have a common origin in the *cogito*. The tempered and prudent idealism of Locke, the Christian idealism of Malebranche, the sceptical idealism of Hume, the transcendental idealism of Kant, the absolute idealism of Fichte, and many other doctrines derived from these, which have appeared in our century, are all more or less distantly related to the principle of the Cartesian philosophy. Moreover, the conception of nature in modern science is also connected with it. For when Descartes set thought, that is, the soul, so distinctly apart from everything extraneous to itself, at the same time he made a new conception of force and life necessary in the material world.

"Descartes fully acknowledged the indispensableness of the experimental method. Anecdotes depict him to us as rising very early, in Amsterdam, in order to choose in a butcher's shop the joints he wished 'to anatomise at leisure'; or answering an inquirer who wished to see his library, 'Here it is,' at the same time pointing to a quartered calf which he was busy dissecting. In the latter part of his life he devoted little more than a few hours a year to mathematics, and not much more to metaphysics. He scarcely busied himself with anything beyond experiments in physics and physiology.

"'To meet causes half-way with effects,' is Descartes's felicitous definition of experimenting. It clearly shows the functions he ascribed to it. Were there only one way in which a certain effect might be deduced from given causes, experimenting would be unnecessary. But natural phenomena are so complex, and the possible combinations of causes are so numerous, that we may nearly always explain in several ways the production of a given effect. Which is the right way? Experience alone can decide. Let us make a distinction between ready-made science and science which is being made. To expound ready-made science the suitable order is deduction,—descent from causes to effects. But science which is being made cannot yet adopt this order; and to discover unknown laws, it must employ the experimental method, must meet causes halfway with effects.

"The philosophy of Descartes was in accord with the leading tendencies of his time. The success which attended it from the moment it appeared is a proof of its opportuneness, and it is difficult to determine whether it formed rather than expressed the spirit of the age. As has been said, the seventeenth century in France was pre-eminently the 'age of reason.'

'Aimez donc la raison; que toujours vos écrits  
Empruntent d'elle seule et leur lustre et leur prix,'

said Boileau; yet perhaps, were it not for the Cartesian philosophy, this taste for reason might not have asserted itself so earnestly, and have been so perfectly conscious of its existence.

"This philosophy of 'clear ideas' spread over all Europe. Though vigorously attacked in the eighteenth century, both as to its metaphysics and its physics, it nevertheless remained discernible in the very methods of its adversaries. Locke, Hume, Condillac, no longer understood evidence as Descartes did; but their empiricism was still as fond of clearness as his rationalism had been. Newton combated the hypothesis of 'vortices,' but he preserved the Cartesian notion of a mechanical explanation of physical phenomena. For a thoroughgoing and express negation of the Cartesian spirit we must go to the end of the eighteenth century.

"The philosophy of Descartes affords but little scope to sentiment, and still less to imagination and to the hidden and unconscious activity of the mind. It places value on evidence alone, whose vivid, but glaring light, dispels the chiaroscuro so dear to romantic writers.

"At the time when Descartes's philosophy appeared it was really necessary. It was a deliverer. It made away with superannuated doctrines, the domination of which was still heavily felt. It cleared the ground and set physics free, once for all, from the clogs of metaphysical hypotheses. Lastly it formulated problems which needed formulation. Descartes wished to furnish science not only with a powerful and flexible instrument (which Bacon had already sought), but also with an unchanging and immovable basis. Thence sprang the 'provisional doubt,' with which his method bids him begin, which obliges him to test all previously acquired informations, and which may be looked upon as the starting-point of all modern theories of knowledge. For this doubt, which successively reaches perception, imagination, reasoning power, and stops only before the immediate self-intuition of thought, is already a criticism of the faculty of knowledge. It studies it in its connexion both with the outward object and with the very mind which is thinking; in short, it heralds Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

"The philosophy of Descartes is a sort of cross-road whence diverge the chief ways entered upon by modern thought."  
T. J. McC.

### THE PARIS SOCIAL MUSEUM.

M. Joseph de Pineton, Count de Chambrun, was born in 1821. He studied law and then entered into the Government service, becoming sub-Prefect and later Prefect. In 1857 he entered parliamentary life, being a Deputy for nearly twenty years, and in 1876 became a Senator, in which body he remained for three years, retiring to private life in 1879. But it will not be as Prefect, Deputy, or Senator, that the Count de Chambrun will be remembered by his country. His name will go down to posterity as the founder and benefactor of the Paris Social Museum.

Count de Chambrun was always charitably inclined. But never satisfied with simple charitable acts, he began to seek the cause of poverty and social distress, and finally came to the conclusion that an institution, which eventually took the name of Social Museum, could do much to check pauperism and ameliorate the condition of the laboring classes. He once remarked: "My fortune is entirely due to labor and it should go back to labor,"—an allusion to his late wife, who was the daughter and granddaughter of the owners of the celebrated glass-works at Bacarat, France.

The work attempted by the Social Museum may be divided into eight different categories. The most important of these is the Consultation Department. The greatest difficulty in the way of those who take up social questions is to be exactly informed concerning the constitution and conditions of the working of different institutions at home and abroad whose aim is to improve the material and moral situation of the working classes.

When workmen wish to form a co-operative society, a mutual benefit society or the like, or when the head of a business house desires to admit his employees to a share in the profits, to establish a pension fund, etc., or when philanthropists interested in the welfare of the working classes are led to form societies for the construction of workmen's homes, etc., the initial obstacle is ignorance of how to

go to work to create and organise these various institutions. And this first difficulty surmounted, it often happens that the interested parties perceive that their organisations might be bettered, that a more scientific basis is necessary or a form more in accordance with surrounding requirements.

Here it is that the Social Museum comes into play. It stands ever ready to aid all parties,—laborers, heads of houses, societies, etc., and is prepared to furnish them gratis any information which they may need, to give them advice, and to show them what has already been done or is now being done in these same lines in France and in foreign lands.



COUNT DE CHAMBRUN.

When the question is an ordinary one, the managers of the Museum immediately furnish the desired information. But if the matter laid before the Museum is new and its solution calls for the aid and experience of specialists, it is referred to one of the appropriate standing committees for examination and a report. There are seven committees of this kind whose members are as distinguished for their competency as for their devotion to the public good. I find on them such well-known specialists as Professors Zolla, Espinas, Liesse, Paul Beauregard, Glasson, Lyon-Caen, Alix and Boutmy, and such public men—Senators or Deputies—as Waldeck-Rousseau, Jules Siegfried, Louis Ricard, Guieysse, and Ribot.

That the Museum is doing much good is shown by the statistics for a single year. During 1896, it answered three hundred and forty-two requests for information, of which number thirty-one concerned cheap dwellings for the laboring man, forty-nine co-operative stores, and twenty-four co-operative manufactories. Verbal replies to these and other questions were furnished immediately at the Museum itself to six hundred and twenty-four inquirers. Since 1896 all these figures have grown and some doubled.

The Museum has already an important library of over ten thousand volumes, under the charge of a very intelligent librarian, M. Martin-Saint-Léon, catalogued in such a way that a few minutes' glance at the cards tells the searcher all the books, pamphlets, and manuscripts, possessed by the Museum in any particular field. Though the great bulk of the volumes have to do exclusively with social questions, many sets of general periodicals, such as the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, the *North American Review*, etc., are found on the shelves. Nowhere else in Paris can such a full collection of printed matter bearing on social economy be found and the fact is gradually becoming known.

But the information to be obtained at the Museum is not limited to its committees and its library. Delegates are sent out into France and foreign countries to observe and report on social institutions and are instructed to proceed in their investigations in a strictly scientific and impartial manner. The result of their observations is made the subject of publications and lectures; aid in the replies to questions laid before the Museum and in forming *dossiers* which are deposited in the library. These missions also bring about valuable relations between the Museum and the labor and scientific centres of France and other nations.

When a strike occurs the Museum sends one or more delegates to the scene of the trouble to learn its origin, cause, and effects. Other representatives of the Museum attend congresses and make reports thereon. Thus during the single year 1896, the Museum had its agents at a half-dozen socialistic and labor congresses of various kinds held in Paris, Caen, Tours, London, and Edinburgh. In 1895 seven congresses—among them one each in London, Berne, Brussels, and Breslau—were attended by these delegates. During the long and dangerous strike at Carmaux, in Languedoc, the museum kept there for many weeks one of its agents. During 1897 and the present year, this side of the Museum's work has received still greater development.

Besides these "missions of inquiry," the liberality of Count de Chambrun has made possible "missions of study." In this latter case, the delegates are expected to examine, with absolute impartiality, into social institutions. Their aim is to be scientific and philanthropic. The subjects chosen for examination are of a kind to interest the working public and the results made known are of a nature to enlighten this same public. Missions of this sort have been sent to England, Germany, Italy, the United States, etc. Four of the Museum's specialists made a careful study a year or two ago of the labor organisations in our country.

But the Museum is not satisfied with having temporary and special agents charged with missions, it seeks also to have permanent correspondents in foreign parts. The services rendered by this last category of representatives are many. They send the Museum information concerning the social movement in their respective countries, the new institutions created there, the recent legislative measures, etc. If a question is so important as to merit special attention, a detailed report on it is made to the Museum, which is published in one of the Museum circulars or deposited in the library with the accompanying documents. In this way

there is growing up in the library a mass of valuable original documents bearing on a large number of economic questions. The Museum has now a half-dozen or more of these foreign correspondents, the American representative being Mr. W. F. Willoughby of the Washington Labor Bureau.

The information obtained by these specialists sent on missions is also presented to the public in the form of lectures delivered during the winter in the commodious hall attached to the Museum. A dozen lectures of this kind are given every year on such subjects as English Trades Unions, Peasant Associations in Germany, The Knights of Labor, Co-operation Among Italian Workingmen, How English Workingmen Organise and Hold a Congress, etc. The lectures for the last year were very well attended, though the managers are disappointed in the small number of workingmen who were present. But this is not to be wondered at when it is remembered that the Paris laboring classes hold, for the most part, views diametrically opposed to those advocated by this institution, whose aim is to preserve the present social system while reforming it, whereas the Paris laboring classes are militant socialists and revolutionists, bent on destroying what exists before building anew. Here, in fact, is the weak side of the Museum,—it is forced to be academic in spite of itself.

The Museum circulars number a score or more each year. Some five or six thousand copies are printed and are sent gratis to labor associations, co-operative societies, specialists, etc. These circulars are divided into two categories,—the first being of a more popular nature and the second being devoted to more special and technical questions. The value of these publications is shown by the fact that not a few readers subscribe annually for the whole series.<sup>1</sup>

Another series of publications issued by the Museum consists in volumes giving complete reports of the special missions already referred to, and printed under the general title *Library of the Social Museum*. So far a half-dozen volumes have appeared, including "Trade Unionism in England," and "The Carmaux Strike."

The founder of the Museum has placed at its disposal a sum of fifty thousand francs to be employed in offering prizes to meritorious workmen and for awarding a large prize of the value of twenty-five thousand francs to be competed for by the authors of essays relative to the amelioration of the lot of the laboring classes. The first class of prizes, twenty-five in number, consist of a life income of two hundred francs, accompanied by a medal, and are awarded to workmen who have spent at least thirty years with the same firm and whose life has been exemplary. The first of these ceremonies occurred in May, 1896, in the presence of the President of the Republic, several ministers, and other persons of distinction, and the last a few days ago under most distinguished auspices.

The Museum is splendidly housed in the early home of the founder, situated in the heart of the old aristocratic district of Paris, the St. Germain quarter, and this fact and the almost luxurious manner in which the big *hôtel* is furnished accentuate the *bourgeois* character of the institution. Neatly carpeted stairways, comfortable chairs in the reading-room and large lecture-hall, the electric light, uniformed doorkeepers, and the like, would naturally tend to create a suspicion in the mind of the Paris workman daily fed on collectivist literature. But all this renders more agreeable the sojourn there of students of social questions, to which class—and not a class to be overlooked—the Museum seems so far to especially address itself.

<sup>1</sup> The subscription is twenty francs, and may be sent to the address of the Museum, 5 rue Las Cases, Paris.

But the liberality of Count de Chambrun in the direction of social economy is not limited to the Museum. He has founded two chairs of social economy,—one at the School of Political Sciences in the Rue St. Guillaume and another at the Sorbonne. The latter chair is filled by M. Alfred Espinas, the scholar of Bordeaux University who has done so much to introduce Herbert Spencer to France. Professor Espinas has so far lectured on Sir Thomas More, Campanella, the philosophers and social economists of the eighteenth century, Rousseau especially; on the French Revolution as an effort to secure the happiness of the people—he is bringing out at this moment a weighty book on this subject—on St. Simonionism, on Fourier, etc. "The doctrines with which I occupy myself," remarked Professor Espinas to me recently, "have in view happiness by means of economic reforms, which is my definition of *social* economy." This lecture course is attracting more and more attention each year.

Questioned by one of his relatives as to the ruling idea of the Social Museum, Count de Chambrun said: "Ours is not a church charity nor a state charity. Both of these, in different ways, are doing good and will go on doing good indefinitely. Ours is a work of individual initiative, of free and spontaneous association. Thus, our origin is quite different from their origin. We have made a step in advance. After our effort, after those of the Church and State, there remains a fourth force Revolution. I am ready to recognise the fact and even to discuss it fairly. But the moment it quits the domain of reason and passes to that of action and violence, I prefer to kill the Devil rather than to be killed by him, and so I will strike first."

In other words, the aim of the Social Museum and its friends is to go forward and meet the difficult problem of the hour in all civilised countries,—the reconciliation of the proletariat with the present social order. In France the aggressive party of Revolutionary Socialists, who have a strong foothold even in the Chamber of Deputies, renders such a step imperative to all Frenchmen who think and who will not live in a dream, who prefer, to use the expressive words of Count de Chambrun, "to kill the Devil rather than be killed by him." In fact, the Social Museum wishes "to strike first."

PARIS, June, 1898.

THEODORE STANTON.

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### SCIENCE AND PROVIDENCE.

The Rev. Dr. Frank M. Bristol, formerly of Evanston, now pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Washington, preached a thanksgiving sermon in the presence of the President of the United States, which is characteristic of the New Orthodoxy that is slowly but surely, sometimes unconsciously, developing in the churches of this country. Dr. Bristol said in part:

"There is no chance, no accident, no fate. Law is universal. The more scientific a people become the stronger will be their belief and trust in Providence, and the less confidence will they have in luck, accidental chance, and the other absurdities. In the days of man's ignorance the providential was looked upon as the miraculous and the miraculous as the providential. But with the growth of science the miraculous becomes obsolete and unnecessary, while Providence becomes more evident and prominent in human affairs. There was a time when the greatest philosophers did not know that steam had been provided as a motive power to serve man; that electricity had been provided for a multitude of utilities. The Greeks did not know that more than seven metals had been provided for the arts, while

this age knows that from fifty to sixty have been provided. The ancients never dreamed of the possibilities of gunpowder and dynamite, the possibilities of a modern navy and the possibilities of Manila and Santiago victories by which America doth take accession by the hand and make the bounds of freedom wider yet.

"It is science, or knowledge, that brings us in touch and alliance with Providence. The more science, the more Providence. Yes, the more science, the more God in the world's history. The providential does not always mean or even imply the miraculous. God may work His will by the agencies of the laws of nature and the thoughts of men. We should not quarrel with the elegant old proposition, 'The winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators, for the ablest navigators know how to use the winds and waves and are in league with the mighty laws that govern things.'

"God is on the side of good, favoring good financing, good politics, good guns, good battleships, good discipline, good generalship, and good causes. In the olden time men and nations allied themselves with Providence by faith; to-day men and nations ally themselves with Providence by knowledge. There was a time when the people found nature in sympathy with their struggles for freedom, and the storm overthrew the Egyptians in the sea, and the sun and moon stood still in the day of battle to give a righteous cause a good chance, and the stars in their courses fought against Sisera.

"What does all this mean? Was God teaching man the necessity of mastering the elements and forces of nature and yoking them to his purpose? Was He teaching that he who has the laws of nature on his side wins, and that he who contends against the right fights against the stars, against the law and order and very constitution of things and must fail?

"Is this a less providential age than the age of Moses? Is the electric light less providential than the pillar of fire? Is a Dakota wheat harvest less providential than a shower of manna? Is a South Carolina cotton crop less providential than the quails in the wilderness? Was the discovery of America less providential than the finding of Canaan? Was the declaration of independence less providential than the decalogue of Sinai? Were the guns of Dewey and Sampson less providential than the rams' horns of Joshua, the lamps and pitchers of Gideon or the rod of Moses? Were Manila and Santiago less providential in the history of human freedom than Jericho and Ai? Is Christian civilisation less providential than was Jewish barbarism? If God ever had peculiar people He has them now. They are the product of all struggles and aspirations of the past. The men who stand before Santiago are not the product of a day or of a century; they are the rich, consummate flower of ages.

"When we compare the twelve per cent. of illiteracy with Spain's seventy-five per cent. of illiteracy we boldly say the schoolmaster won the battle of Manila and the battle of Santiago.

"'Ye shall know the truth,' said the Christ, 'and the truth shall make you free.' We are witnessing the victories of truth in passing events. It is truth, the truth of great convictions, the truth of splendid courage, the truth of free American manhood, the truth of wise and patriotic legislation, the truth of naval and military discipline, the truth of scientific warfare, the truth of correct strategy, great accuracy, perfect aim, the truth of true heroism, the truth of a just cause, that is working out the freedom of the oppressed. Thanks to the Christ who came to set the captive free and proclaim the brotherhood of man. Thanks to His servants, the teachers of the past and present, who have given themselves to the high and holy

ministry of education, by which the generations have come armed and equipped to subdue error and superstition and establish the authority and sovereignty of truth.

"Thanks to all the sons of God who in offices of state and on the fields of battle have caught the spirit of the heroic Christ."

### SYMPTOMS OF A BUDDHIST REAWAKENING IN INDIA AND CEYLON.

The Anagárika H. Dharmapála has founded a Buddhist institution at Colombo, Ceylon, which he calls the Ethico-Psychological College, and which is intended to afford a thorough education to students of Buddhism in the principles of ethics and psychology. The means were given him by a wealthy Buddhist of Ceylon, and its inauguration has been celebrated lately under the participation of all prominent Buddhists of Colombo and large numbers of visitors. Students will live in the place and give themselves up to study and contemplative self-discipline. While the institute has been set in working order, Dharmapála wants to acquire for the college the whole equipment of the modern psychological seminary such as frequently exist in American universities. But at present his funds have given out and he relies on further donations to realise his plans.

In the same place the Sanghamitta School has been put on a new footing through the efforts of the Countess M. de S. Canavarro, whom we mentioned some time ago in our columns, and who without antagonism to other religions, least of all the Christian, carries on a good work of educating Singhalese girls, and being herself quite imbued with Buddhistic thought she is much more able to reach the hearts of the people than English or American missionaries would be.

Another communication indicating a reawakening of the Buddhist faith reaches us from Calcutta, where C. C. Bose, the editor of the *Maha-Bodhi Journal*, informs us that thanks to the gift of 15,000 rupees from the Ceylon Maha-Bodhi Society to the Maha-Bodhi Society of Calcutta, they will enlarge the *Maha-Bodhi Journal*, which is published in the interest of Buddhism throughout India and serves as a centre for the Maha-Bodhi Societies of other countries, thus intending to unite all Buddhists in one great brotherhood of mutual good will and friendship, and assisting the Buddhists of all countries in the advance march of thought and civilisation. For the facilitation of their plans, they wish to buy a house in Calcutta which shall serve them as headquarters; but the sum of 15,000 rupees is not sufficient for the purpose and they want 35,000 rupees in addition, 1,000 of which have been subscribed by a distinguished Hindu gentleman of Bengal, who takes an active interest in the revival of Buddhism in his country. As the work should serve the common interest of all Buddhists, it is but fair that they expect to find assistance from Buddhists of other countries, and considering the enthusiasm which shows itself in the present revival of Buddhism they may be able to raise the sum.

We conclude this news concerning the awakening of Buddhism with the remark that it is a favorable sign of the times. It shows the increase of interest in matters of religion. Far from regarding it as a movement that will injure Christianity, we see in it an exhortation for Christians to do likewise. The old aggressiveness of Christian missions must yield to a new method of missionarising based on the proper Christian spirit of good will and mutual interest. Instead of condemning the great leaders of other religions, men like Buddha, Confucius, Mohammed, Christian missionaries must recognise those elements of truth which agree

with the teachings of their own master, and they will soon find a better response in the hearts of the followers of other faiths. They should not slur over the differences of the creeds; but they should gladly recognise that which we all hold in common, and try to understand the *raison d'être* of the differences in a brotherly spirit. Whenever other religions assert themselves in benevolent and missionary institutions, let us sympathise with their efforts and even assist them to reach the truth in their own way; for we need not worry about the truth. Let us propagate the truth as we see it, and the truth, whatever it may be, will be victorious in the end.

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#### NOTES.

This number contains a psychological analysis of a man who has been for a long time and is still in the foreground of the political and literary life of France. Whatever we may think of M. Emile Zola as an author, we must admire his love of truth which prompts him in the face of an excited nation and its biased judges to have the courage of his convictions. His writings contain many things to which we would take exception, and his ideal of art seems radically different from our own. But there is a remarkable agreement concerning the principle that should be applied to religion, which is expressed by M. Zola in the following words: "A religion grafted on science is the indicated, certain, inevitable finish of man's long march towards knowledge. And is there not already some indication of such a religion? Has not the idea of the duality of God and the Universe been brushed aside, and is not the principle of unity, *monisme*, becoming more and more evident,—unity leading to solidarity?" M. Zola comes very near the formulation of the Religion of Science as expressed in *The Open Court*, although we do not doubt that in the formulation of the details of his religion he may considerably deviate from our views. Nevertheless, the coincidence is remarkable, perhaps the more so as he is probably not a reader of our magazine.

Mr. MacDonald is well known as an indefatigable worker in the line of social and criminal sociology, and the present article is a fair and valuable sample of the methods of that tendency in modern psychology which proposes to define and characterise the soul by reaction-times, by measuring the cranium, by determining the height and weight of a person, testing the sensitiveness of his skin, photographing his hands and thumb-prints, etc., etc. In our opinion the soul is of a subtler nature, and at the same time much less inaccessible than many of our modern psychologists imagine. The soul is in our thoughts, and in order to know the nature of a man we must know what he thinks, how he meditates, and what purposes he pursues. The hopes of catching the soul in the appliances of reaction-time measurement and other physiological symptoms will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, we grant that to know the incidental characteristics of a man is also of great interest.