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JOSEPH LOUIS LAGRANGE.

(1736-1813.)

The Open Court,
ANIMAL WORSHIP.¹

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY.

BY DR. TH. ACHELIS.

IN ORDER to understand the important part played by the worship of animals in the lower stages of religious development,—and some survivals remain even in a higher stage,—it is necessary, as in so many studies in ethnology, to rid oneself entirely of all current prejudices and assumptions with reference to the history of civilisation. Our feelings are still dominated by the cheap disdain with which Christian Wolff, in the eighteenth century, regarded such discussions, saying: "The question whether animals "have souls or not is of no particular value; wherefore it would "be great folly to quarrel much about it; as far as I am concerned "it may be disputed or not, I leave every one to his own views." Whenever this comfortable repose is disturbed by any disagreeable problems, appeal is made to all-powerful instinct, and thus everything is easily settled: men and animals are separated by a yawning and impassable gulf.² But this is by no means the case with uncivilised races; even the lower stages of civilised society often deviate considerably from this position in their estimate and views of the animal world. To them animals, being endowed plainly enough with souls,—in the strictest sense of the word the primitive man knows nothing inorganic and lifeless,—are just as much persons as are men, with sensual perceptions and intellectual pow-

¹Translated from the manuscript of Dr. Th. Achelis by W. H. Carruth, of the University of Kansas.

²The fact that a school of natural science dominated by a one-sided Darwinian influence goes to the other extreme and endeavors to obliterate this distinction as far as possible, and, in a fashion quite perilous for psychology, to judge animals entirely from the human point of view (cf. Wundt, Essays, p. 182 ff) does not affect the average standpoint, of course.
ers, including speech, only that no ordinary mortal, but the medicine-man alone, understands it. A distinguished ethnographer and traveller remarks that we must conceive the boundaries between man and beast as wholly obliterated. A given animal may be wiser or stupider, stronger or weaker than the Indian, it may have entirely different habits, but in his eyes it is a person just as he himself is; animals, like men, are united into families and tribes, they have various languages like the human tribes, but man, jaguar, deer, bird, fish, they are all only persons of various aspect and qualities. One only need be a medicine-man, who is omnipotent, and he can change himself from one person into another, and understand all the languages that are spoken in wood, air, and water.

The deeper basis of this conception lies in the fact that mankind at this stage is not yet ethical; goodness and badness exist only in the crude sense of doing to others what is agreeable or disagreeable, but the moral consciousness, and the ideal initiative, influenced neither by prospect of reward nor fear of punishment, are entirely lacking. Under these conditions how should the assumption arise of an impassable chasm between man and beast? The outward observation of the life-habits of animals, to which the Indian is restricted, can at most result in assigning man the position of primus inter pares. Furthermore, the Indian lacks our delimitation of species, in so far as they do not cross. This distinction, which is easily taught by experience, is entirely wiped out for the Indian because he lacks the knowledge of the hindrance based with us on knowledge of anatomy. If the Indian can explain anything by the crossing of various species of animals with each other, or of man and beast, nothing prevents his asserting it; on the contrary he sees it proven, and concludes at most that such things no longer happen when it is no longer necessary. To-day, our scholars tell us, there is no longer any generatio equivoca, but once there surely was such a thing (V. d. Steinen, Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasiliens, p. 351; cf. my Moderne Völkerkunde, Stuttgart, 1896, p. 373 ff).

If we go back to these rudiments of primitive psychology, we shall not be surprised when we are informed that the savages talk with their horses, that the Indians beg pardon of the bear when they are preparing to hunt him, or in the case of the rattlesnake—

1 Even as late as the Märchen—as instance bird-language—this conception remained, and accordingly is not solely a product of the imagination, as has been supposed, but rests upon the deeper foundation of primitive animism.
which, as we shall see later, is considered a peculiarly sacred animal—offer sacrifices to it and sprinkle a pinch of tobacco on its head (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, third American Edition, I., 467). Neither can it be surprising if animals are regarded as incarnations of the souls of the departed.

Ancestor-worship, this primary factor of primitive religion, demanded equally by filial duty and social considerations, continued to thrive upon this fertile soil. After their physical death powerful chiefs continue to live and act in the form of animals. Here, too, the psychological train of thought which led to this idea is plain and unmistakable, for as primitive man was impressed by the mysterious speed and the irresistible strength of certain animals, the same respectful awe necessarily led him to keep the spirit of the departed favorable to himself by appropriate worship. It is also notable that this worship is directed especially to large and dangerous animals, probably with the deliberate intention of preventing their depredations. True, in a higher stage of religious development this utilitarian consideration vanishes, as we shall presently see, and is succeeded by what one may almost call an abstract thought. In this case, a given species of animal is regarded as the dwelling of the ancestor, the tribal deity, for one is merged imperceptibly into the other, and the whole tribe takes the name of this heraldic animal, which thus at the same time gains social importance as being a member of the tribal family.

This is the significance of totemism, which is so widespread in Africa, Australia, and America. The mythical tribal ancestor is worshipped in the form of some animal in which his soul has taken up its abode, so that thenceforth the flesh of this animal may not be eaten, or at least the eating must be preceded by all sorts of conciliatory ceremonies. This belief in a common origin from such a tribal ancestor very strikingly illustrates the inviolability of the social bond guaranteed by blood relationship. Among some races (for instance, many Indian tribes, some Malays and Polynesians) this relation is still more emphasised by the belief that the dead are changed into their totem-animal, and thus united with their mythical ancestor. It will be readily seen that in this way there occurred frequent confusions of identity which are of the utmost importance in the development of the *Märchen*, as we shall see later, and, further, that we are here meeting the first elements of

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1 For details cf. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, I., 117 ff, where the legal consequences (property rights, blood-revenge, etc.) are discussed.

the doctrine, later so philosophically refined, of the transmigration of souls (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I., 469 ff).

But while in totemism legal and religious interests are mingled, and while it is often only a matter of an especial guardian-spirit, whether of an individual or of a tribe, the worship of a divinity in an animal symbol shows a purely animistic religious character which sometimes reveals a profoundly philosophical conception of the universe. This transition, hitherto generally overlooked, is to be seen in the Egyptian deification of animals, which has been misunderstood so frequently from the days of the Greek philosophers down to the present. Here, too, at first, we find the universal disposition to fetishism manifested in the care and consideration for certain species of animals widely different in different sections, so, for instance, that one "nomos" or district, used as food the animal worshipped in a neighboring district (cf. A. Wiedmann, *Religion der alten Aegypter*, München, 1890, p. 99). Just as, in a very striking scene described by Bastian, the negroes cudgel a fetish unmercifully to make it thoroughly submissive (*San Salvador*, Bremen, 1859, p. 61), so, too, the ancient Egyptians did not hesitate to resort at times to such brutal means, which, moreover, are even now employed in the case of obstinate and inefficient images of saints in some remote mountain villages of Tyrol and Bavaria.

From such a beginning the speculative priesthood developed the myth into a grand, half-pantheistic idea: the bull was the corporeal representative of Osiris, who was constantly renewed in him, just as, for instance, Buddha is renewed in the individual Dalai-Lamas in Lhassa. The very same process can be traced among the Hindoos, where the modern Brahmans worship in the sacred cow the direct incorporation of divine power, which for this very reason is imperishable and undergoes ever new incarnations. To cite a remote parallel, one might compare the great hare¹ Michabo of the Algonquins in North America, the powerful and kind creator, the discoverer of medicine and of all the arts that lead to civilisation (Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, third edition, Philadelphia, 1896, p. 194 ff, and his *American Hero-Myths*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 37 ff). In the same way the god of the Aztecs, Quetzalcoatl, or Huitzilopochtli, worshipped in the form of a hum-

¹The god is worshipped also as a rabbit, which fact Brinton explains from a confusion of the word *wakos* (rabbit) with *wadum* (daylight), for Michabo is the light-bringer, and the native American idea of god is contained in this meaning (cf. *Hero-Myths*, p. 41 ff). We shall return to this point.
ming-bird or a serpent, rose far above this connexion with fetishism to the rank of a pure symbol of divine power; he, too, was a god of light, who issues victorious from a contest with his father, Tezcatlipoca, the god of night and darkness (cf. Brinton, *Hero-Myths*, p. 68 ff). Indeed, even Christianity was not able to rid itself entirely of this primitive characteristic, as is sufficiently proven by the representation of the Holy Ghost as a dove, by the familiar symbolic beasts of the apostles, and the various animals connected with the saints, which were borrowed from German heathendom, and, despite the zealous exertions of the missionaries, only slightly altered. The saints on horseback, those primitive figures of Middle Age Catholicism, are simply inconceivable apart from the deeper connexion with the fetish-idea associated with the dragons and serpents which these Christian heroes combat (cf. Lippert, *Christenthum, Volksbrauch u. Volksbrauch*, p. 499).

The attempt has sometimes been made to find in the religious ideas of savage races an ethical dualism, such as is familiar to us in the Christian conception of the contest between God and the Devil, or as it is expressed in the conflict between Ormuzd and Ahriman in the Zend Avesta.¹

It requires but little reflexion to see that it is contrary to all psychological probability to assume, as early as this, such speculative ideas, which presume a certain maturity of moral perception. But since, on the other hand, the mythological religion of primitive races is a direct reflexion of their mode of thought and their conception of the universe, it would be strange if the common experiences of joyful or of painful nature had found no corresponding expression in their projection in mythology. Such an expression may be most keenly felt in the familiar answer of a Bushman to the question of a missionary as to what good and bad were: "Good is when I take away my neighbor's cow; bad when he steals her back." Then there is the further consideration that the savage in his helplessness and inexperience sees himself everywhere threatened with hostile attacks and surprises, wherefore it was an organic necessity that the thought and conviction of the fatal activity of evil spirits should reach a rank development in his superstitious imagination. Therefore it is by no means an accident, but rests on a mythological necessity, that the religious precepts of lower races have relatively a gloomy, demonological character, and

¹ So, too, in the myths of the Quichas, we are told of a battle between the gods of the upper and of the lower world which led the Spanish priests into a fatal error.
that most prayers deal with the prevention of impending misfortunes and protection from malicious powers of evil.\textsuperscript{1}

Even animals are drawn by the irresistible momentum of animism into this unhappy sphere, and so we find arising from these conceptions those terrible creatures of popular belief: werewolves and man-tigers. That certain exceptionally fierce wolves or tigers are man-eaters, says Tylor, is explained by the belief that the souls of depraved men enter the bodies of wild animals at night in order to prey upon their fellow-men. These are the man-tigers or were-wolves, that is, man-wolves, whose existence is still believed in by the superstitious people in India and Russia.

The circumstance of a person's growing pale, bloodless, and haggard is explained in Slavic legends by the belief in the existence of blood-sucking spirits, who haunt the patient at night, and whose terrible visits enter his consciousness during sleep. These creatures are declared to be demon-souls, living in corpses, whose veins still flow with blood for a long time after death. These are the so-called vampires (Tylor, \textit{Anthropology}, German edition, Braunschweig, 1883, p. 429; cf. Lippert, \textit{Religion der europäischen Culturvölker}, Berlin, 1881, p. 45 ff; \textit{Christentum}, etc., p. 410 ff). The essential point is again the original fetishistic idea of an object possessed by some divine power,—both the English and the German languages still show the persistence of this thought in the words possession and Besessenheit. The particular animal varies, of course, according to location; for the Germanic and Slavonic wolf the African substitutes the hyena or leopard.

We cannot here enter into the details of the cult, of the means used for warding off evil, and of the horrible psychological ideas of the people. It must suffice to establish here, too, the early connexion of psychic life in men and animals. Neither can we take up the peculiar variations of the idea of transmigration. In accordance with the original presumption which we expounded earlier, we shall not be surprised if in certain conditions such exchange takes place, for is it not between beings of essentially the same nature? But in a higher stage of philosophical development there occurs imperceptibly a change in favor of man. The incarnation in an animal's body is regarded as a direct punishment for sins committed in this life; or a tyrannical priesthood, as the Brahmans in India, set such impassable barriers between the various classes that the man of

\textsuperscript{1} Characteristic in this connexion is the remark of an African, that their God, Niankupong, was too far from them and dwelt too high for a prayer to reach him; they were satisfied with the house-spirit, who cares for the common needs of life. (Cf. Bastian, \textit{Controversen in der Ethnologie}, Berlin, 1893, III., 2.)
lower caste simply had nothing to be born into but an animal, while on the other hand the soul of the pious, by way of ever-recurring rebirths rises to the height of divine nature and perfection (cf. Lippert, *Culturgeschichte*, II., 418).

After such general explanations, which are intended to prepare for the understanding of these problems, already vague to the majority of living men, and misapprehended by them, it now becomes our task to illustrate this outline of the theory by certain concrete examples. It would, indeed, be a hopeless undertaking to try to exhaust the abundance of ethnological material. We can only present a few definite and especially characteristic examples, animals which have attained a typical significance for large race-groups, perhaps even for a considerable fraction of the human race, in a certain stage of religio-mythical development.

This is the case above all with the serpent, and next with the bull and the eagle. Before ethnology opened up the correct perspective, the worship of the serpent was often interpreted in a purely fanciful way, and confused in arbitrary speculation with alleged philosophical doctrines and druidistic priestly lore. Here, too, the initiative influences are evident: on the one hand the totemistic idea of ancestor-worship, on the other a series of material observations on the nature and habits of these animals. These are summed up by Lubbock as follows: The serpent occupies first rank among the animals worshipped; not only is it a maleficent and mysterious creature, but by its outwardly insignificant yet fatal bite, it produces the most dreadful effects in an inconceivably short time with means seemingly so inadequate, and forces the savage almost irresistibly to the assumption that he is dealing with what he regards as a divine being; there are some other less important, yet no less direct influences which have aided in a marked degree the development of this cult; the serpent is long-lived and easily kept in captivity, and thus the same individual can be preserved for a considerable period and shown to the multitude again and again at certain intervals (cf. *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 221). To these points we may add: Its rapid speed without the aid of feet, its dwelling in clefts and caves (the first burial-places), its brilliant, shimmering color, its peculiar sloughing of its skin, its sudden disappearance in subterranean depths, and again its frequenting of human dwellings, especially of that important place, the hearth-stone.

We find serpent worship, therefore, in almost every stage of social development in which mythologic ideas are manifested with
any degree of power: in Central Africa and among the reflectively inclined East Indians, among the red-skins of America\textsuperscript{1} as well as among our own ancestors\textsuperscript{2} and among the Semitic races.

Now while we can trace among primitive peoples at least the germs of the idea of eternal life through rejuvenation (as in the legend of the phœnix and in the later version of the Scandinavian midgard-serpent) they know nothing of the serpent as a symbol of evil, as it is familiar to us and particularly to the Iranians of Zoroaster's time. The only connexion with this idea to be assumed here is a slight one. The word serpent among the Dakotas, for instance, signifies the supernatural, just as in Arabic and Hebrew the corresponding word is associated with synonyms for spirit and demon (cf. Brinton, \textit{Myths}, p. 132). Here, too, as Brinton justly suspects (\textit{id.}, p. 143), the ignorance and the religious bigotry of Christian missionaries have to be taken into account, as is so often the case. Wherever they found images of this animal they fancied they saw the work of the Devil, representations of the principle of evil, which of course was not their purport in any such degree.

Not so universal, yet diffused throughout extended regions of the earth, is the worship of the bull. It seems to be limited to certain fields of civilisation, as India, Irania, and Egypt. Lippert says that the bull must once have served extensively as a fetish animal in the early stage of civilisation in Asia, and among the occidental races related in culture to Asia. It is preserved to us in this capacity for the Assyrio-Babylonian Empire by later sculptures, and in Parseeism by the easily comprehended myth that the primal bull, Kajomort, was also the first man, the progenitor of their kings and the primitive ancestor of the whole human race. In India the bull Nandi was associated with Čiva. On the other hand, the origin of the sacred character of the sacerdotal cow is somewhat different. Throughout Egypt the cow, in connexion with Hathor and other divinities, was treated as a fetish, and was therefore not butchered. But among bulls it was only an individual with certain peculiar markings which received worship at Memphis as the living image of Ptah Sokari (\textit{Culturgeschichte}, II., 408). It is well known that the Egyptian people, who were strictly trained in religion from beggar up to king, were profuse in all imaginable tokens of honor to the visible god to whom King Psammeticus built the splendid court in the Ptah temple at Memphis. His ora-

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Brinton, \textit{Myths}, etc., p. 129, ff., who correctly emphasises the significant symbolism of rejuvenation in the sloughing of the serpent's skin.

\textsuperscript{2}Cf. Schwartz, \textit{Der Ursprung der Mythologie, dargelegt an griechischer u. deutscher Sage}, Berlin, 1860, who expounds especially the significance of the storm-dragon, p. 26 ff.
ANIMAL WORSHIP.

icles commanded the utmost regard, and later monarchs, such as Alexander the Great and Emperor Titus, paid homage to him. (Cf. Wiedemann, Religion der alten Aegypter, p. 100 ff.)

Finally, among birds the chief place was given to the eagle because of his strength and swiftness and his soaring flight. Birds in general are representatives of storm and tempest,¹ and most of the Algonquins on the northwest coast of America tell of a gigantic bird the flap of whose wings produces the thunder, and the flash of his eyes the lightning. (Cf. Brinton, Myths, p. 126.) It is presumed to be familiar to all that among Germans and Greeks the highest god was accompanied by an eagle.

It happens, moreover, that the birds that live on the flesh of serpents are regarded as the enemies of the serpent-gods, who attack and generally overcome them, as in the Indian legend. Moreover in this point also there are variations of the original fetishistic principle of soul-transference and possession in the various mythologies, multiplied in the case of the individual animals. Thus we find in the first Christian community the dove, among the Polynesians the soul-transferring moa-birds² (cf. Bastian, Heilige Sage der Polynesier, Leipzig, 1881, p. 149), among the Mexicans the humming-bird, half serpent and half bird, of the god Huitzilopochtli, and among the East Indians the hawk, Garuda, representative of Vishnu.

For lack of space we must pass over other animals, such as the elephant, so revered by Buddhism, the rabbit among the Algonquins, the dog among the Persians; neither can we discuss in detail the various forms of the cult, which, of course, differed considerably in the different stages of the people’s development. Whether it is a simple child of nature, who sees in some animal his guardian spirit, and seeks to propitiate it by every possible gift, or whether it is an Egyptian priest bringing a sacrifice to the Apis-bull, which represents the divinity in bodily form, the psychological connexion is the same in both cases, even though in the latter case knowledge has advanced so far that the physical form is regarded as an unessential feature compared with spiritual power and efficiency.

And yet we must throw more light upon a point hitherto fre-

¹Cf. Schwartz, Ursprung. p. 180 ff.; Odhin also changes according to the Edda into an eagle.

²They proclaim the arrival after a great, all-devouring flood of a king, Wakea, who should come to their coast from foreign parts; they are the seat of the highest god, Tangaloa, or Tangaroa, who in this form often approaches his temples. (Cf. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, II., 191.)
quently slighted; this is the significance of animal worship as it appears in the *Märchen* and the animal fable.

Owing to insufficient investigation, there has been a disposition, prompted by illustrations from classical antiquity and certain Middle-Age subjects, to find in the fable a direct moralising value, a didactic tendency, to which it is supposed to owe its origin, whereas ethnology has proven beyond all controversy that the real soil from which sprung this fanciful growth was the primitive relation and intimacy of man with his neighbor animals—an intimacy now wholly lost to civilised man.

The astonishment expressed one day at Oxford by Prof. F. Max Müller, when he found among the Zulu tales the very same ones that we know in such abundance in our *Märchen*, is very significant. In this case, according to the assertion of the best judges, such as the missionary and linguist Bleek, no outward connexion was possible; and yet, with slight local alterations befitting the changed scene, there appeared the same type and the same elements of treatment,—another proof of the psycho-social endowment of the genus *homo sapiens*, whose mental capacity, as Peschel justly observed, is uniform even to its most curious caprices and vagaries. (*Völkerkunde*, p. 27.)

Not until later, when the simple consciousness, the unreservedly animistic conception of the world, had given way to a critical philosophical reflexion, do we meet the familiar parables which are concentrated into the phrase, *Haec fabula docet*. Traces of this rationalising treatment may be recognised, as Tylor has correctly shown, even in the rich wreath of legends that twines about the person of the North American god, Manabodzho. (*Primitive Culture*, I., 409.)

The social background of the *Märchen*, which our historians of literature, filled with dumb admiration of poetic power, have too much neglected, is emphasised by Kohler in connexion with the legend of Melusina. He says: In the interpretation of this, as of other myths, the relations of the *Märchen* to the ethnological phenomena of national life have been too much overlooked. The *Märchen* is of mythological origin, but it is the myth incorporating itself in national life which comes to light in highly poetic reminiscences in the legend. It will not suffice to try to explain the *Mär-

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1 The resemblance here is undeniable to the Polynesian god, Maui, the civilising hero of the Polynesians, who, however, like Til Eulenspiegel, is full of cunning schemes and burlesque tricks. (Cf. Bastian, *Zur Kenntnis Hawaiis*, p. 73.) But on the other hand it is certainly possible, as Brinton suspects, that in this case there have been later changes and corruptions of the original character. (Cf. *Myths*, p. 194 ff.)


The origin of the Melusina legend leads us back into the remotest antiquity. It dates back to the period when mankind still clung to totemism. A totem is, as generally known, the sign of a family, usually taken from some animal; and the clans, ranked in the main according to the matriarchal system, wore such a family sign, and were thereby distinguished from one another. Moreover, this animal sign has a deeper significance: the family wearing it bears a mystic relation to the animal; it must not kill such an animal or harm it, often not even touch it. The animal is the spirit of the family; even more, the animal is regarded as the family ancestor,—the family sprang from the animal. *(Ursprung der Melusinensage, p. 37.)*

Only on this assumption of an essential identity can the many variations of the *Märchen* and the fable be explained. Although in a more mature civilisation the world-wide gap between men and animals is undeniable, and manifests itself with a peculiarly tragic effect in the Melusina legend just referred to, yet to the childish simplicity of the Bushmen (those rare virtuosi in animal-fables!) the world of animals is the direct and faithful copy of human life and deeds. *(Cf. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, I., 690 ff.)* The discord which so often with harsh clash disturbs this harmonious fellowship of men and animals is especially heard when the higher being which for a time had assumed human form and appearance is recognised, or its origin recognised; then it is obliged to go away, while jealousy and curiosity play a fateful part, perhaps also the irresistible longing for the old supernatural life that was not restricted to the narrow limits of human existence.

Sometimes, but by no means always, there follows a reunion of the parted pair in the other world, and as a result we have the romantic wanderings across mysterious waters, to sun and moon, or to the dark under-world, in order to find the lost loved one. All these traits and variations of this prolific theme are simply inexplicable without the deeper totemistic background. And so Kohler is quite right in concluding thus: The Melusina theme is a *Mär-
chen theme that was later attached to historical persons and families, and thus became a legend. The conclusion of the Märchen is mythical, but it is not a nature-myth in the sense of a cosmic philosophy which constitutes the various factors of nature's activity into specific divinities, but a myth in the sense of an animism filling the universe with vague spiritual activity, and the myth has its roots in the animistic conception of social relations which, as totemism and Manitou-worship, dominates the childhood of nations.

The mythical element, therefore, has a closer relationship than was formerly thought to the whole social conception of life, for the social fabric is permeated with the spirit of animism, and the belief in animism is most intimately related to social as well as to individual life and its manifestations. And it is very true that the physiological and pathological phenomena of dreams, hallucinations, and nightmare have contributed much to the origin of myths, no less than the phenomena of the outer world reflected upon the imagination of races.

But it is also true that the social manifestations of the collective life-instinct, with its loving, hating, and fearing, and the strong centripetal instincts have influenced the formation of myths. And especially is it true that the love and the aversion particularly strong in man in a state of nature with regard to certain animate beings, certain animals and plants,—feelings which were intensified to the point of a sense of kinship, of passionate desire to persecute, or again, of dumb worship,—appear in popular myths. These social and ante-social manifestations of the human psyche must not be lost sight of in the study of myths and their transition into the charming form of Märchen. (Ib., p. 63.)

If we recall in closing the outline of our investigation, the conclusion is irresistible that the close connexion of men and animals was, to the simple mind of the primitive man, a fact established beyond all question. Hence any further religio-mythical exposition had inevitably to begin at this point, and, apply to this its theory of the soul, which of course had been obtained already as the result of another process. Social forces, especially primitive ancestor-worship enjoined by filial respect, added their influence to make this connexion still closer and firmer, and make it a moral obligation. Not until much later did a metaphysical priesthood take hold of this fruitful subject, expanding it in all directions, but with-

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1 As the Melusina legend shows the primitive animistic features very plainly, Kohler prefers it to the Lohengrin type, in which the original force is already relaxed (loc. cit., p. 61).
out destroying in the minds of the common people, at least, the primitive conception of a mystic, fetishistic incarnation, as seen in Egypt and India. This dualism may be traced among primitive peoples, according to Brinton, as in the peculiar myth of the great rabbit of the Algonquins. Michabo, who is worshipped in the form of this animal by the red-skins as supreme god, creator of heaven and earth, and giver of all the blessings of civilisation, has etymologically another meaning, that of “white,” and from it are derived the words for east, dawn, light, day, and morning. (Myths, p. 198.) To the simple, natural sense the animals are themselves divinities, or at least their direct and authoritative representatives, and the savage believes in their genuineness and power just as firmly as the sincere Christian in the miracles of the New Testament.

It is, therefore, a false standpoint, resulting only from our critical reflexion, to hold to the current assumption of conscious anthropomorphising in the Märchen. These animals of the fable are just as much real creatures, endowed with psychic impulses and instincts, as the animals in the constellations, whose real substances have, to be sure, faded in the course of time into the symbolic and shadowy signs of the zodiac. (V. d. Steinen, Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasiliens, p. 351 ff.) Only a purer interpretation, further removed from the sensual concept, and striving for a deeper understanding, departs from this almost unintelligible, mythological realism, and, piercing through the glittering show of the outer veil to the essence and reality of the phenomenon, endeavors to add to the manifestation the moral element hitherto wholly lacking. A fine illustration of the invincible power of truth in the human mind is given by Brinton in his account of the Inca, Yupangui, who prohibited in his realm all image-worship of the supreme god, Viracocha, declaring it to be wrong to worship the almighty creator of all things in the former manner by means of sacrifices and presents, since only spiritual service was befitting the highest of all gods. (Hero-Myths, p. 236.) But in the presence of this lofty and luminous conception of the universe, which reminds us of Christian ideas, we must not, in attempting to secure a socio-psychologic perspective, lose sight of the humbler stages of development, in which the chief part is played on the one hand by inorganic nature, with its mighty elemental forces, and on the other by animals like man in their nature and bound to him by multifarious mystic ties.