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## CHRISTIANITY AND PATRIOTISM.<sup>1</sup>

BY COUNT LEO TOLSTOI.

[CONTINUED.]

IX.

THE authority of the governments over the people now-a-days is not based on force, as it used to be in bygone times when one nationality could conquer another one and hold it in subjection by force of arms; or when the rulers surrounded themselves in the midst of an unarmed people by armed swarms of Janissaries, Opritchniks, or body-guards. The power of the government stands now and has stood for some time on what is called public opinion.

Public opinion having once created the belief that patriotism is a great moral sentiment, that it is well and proper to consider one's own government, one's own people as the best in the world, there naturally follows in its footsteps a further public opinion that it is well and proper to obey the authority of the government, that it is well and proper to serve in the army and to submit to discipline, that it is proper to give one's savings to the government in the form of taxes, that it is proper to submit to the decision of the courts, that it is proper to accept implicitly all that is declared by those in authority to be divine truth.

Once such a public opinion exists there is easily established a mighty power, possessing in our time billions of dollars, an organised mechanism of government administration, a postal service, telegraphs, telephones, well-disciplined armies, police, courts, obedient clergy, schools, even a press; and that power can easily maintain among the people the kind of public opinion which suits it best.

The power of the government rests on public opinion. Possessing that power, the government can always control public opinion through the medium of its various organs, through the personnel of the courts, the school, the church, and even of the press itself. This power is created by public opinion, and public opinion is created by the power. There seems to be no escape from this situation.

This would be actually the case if public opinion were something constant and unvarying. Then the

governments could produce any kind of public opinion they desired.

But, fortunately, the case is not so. In the first place, public opinion is not something constant, unvarying, it is not at a standstill; on the contrary, it is something variable and moving along with human progress; in the second place, public opinion not only cannot be produced at will by the governments, but it is itself that which creates the governments and gives them power or deprives them of it.

It does appear sometimes as if public opinion remained stationary, as if it wavered in certain particular instances, and went backwards again, now sweeping away a republic and putting a monarchy in its place, and again tearing down the monarchy and substituting a republic for it,—but this only appears so because we have always forced on our notice the exterior manifestations of that public opinion which is prepared artificially by the governments. But if we view public opinion in its relation to the whole life of the people, we shall see that, like the seasons of the year, it is not stationary, that it is moving along the same path as the human race, just the same as the day and the spring move along the same path as the sun, despite their retardation and wavering.

Although, judging by appearances, the situation of the European nations is in our time about the same as it was fifty years since, yet the people's relation to it is far different from what it was fifty years ago. If, as then, there exist now rulers, standing armies, wars, taxes, luxury and poverty, Catholicism, Lutheranism, etc., it is because the governments have known how to support artificially what was once real and living public opinion; formerly those very institutions were unequivocally demanded by public opinion.

If we fail to notice sometimes this movement of public opinion, the same as we fail to notice the river's current along which we are drifting, it is because the imperceptible changes of public opinion which constitute its drift, are also taking place within ourselves.

The signal peculiarity of public opinion is its continual drift. If it appears to us stationary, it is because there are always to be found men who have secured for themselves advantageous positions at a certain stage of public opinion, and who naturally do their

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Russian by Paul Berger.

best to retain that stage and to repress the appearance of the new and real public opinion, which is living in the conscience of men, although it may not as yet have found its expression. The men who seek to maintain the old public opinion and who hinder the appearance of the new, are the government and the ruling classes; and they are the ones who advocate patriotism as a condition necessary to human life.

The means which these men possess are immense, but inasmuch as public opinion is like a river which is always running and accumulating, all their efforts cannot but be futile: what is old is decaying, the young is coming into vigor.

The more the expression of the new public opinion is delayed, the more it will accumulate, and ultimately it will burst forth with greater force.

Despite the efforts of the governments to excite in the people an unnatural public opinion regarding the worth and glory of patriotism, the men of our times do not believe in patriotism, but, on the contrary, are more and more inclined to the idea of the solidarity and fraternity of nations. Patriotism does not offer the people anything but the most awful future; whereas the fraternity of the nations constitutes an ideal which is becoming more and more comprehensible and desirable to the human race. Consequently, the drift from the old to the new public opinion is inevitable. It is as inevitable as the falling off of the last dried-up leaves in the spring time and the unfolding of the young ones from their buds.

The more this change is delayed, the more imperative it becomes, the more apparent is its necessity.

As Christians and modern men, we have only to remember what we are professing, what are the moral laws that guide us in our public and private life, and then consider where patriotism is leading us to; if we do this, we shall at once see what a vast disproportion there is between our conscience and our so-called public opinion.

We have only to consider the most ordinary requirements of patriotism, which are presented to us as something very simple and natural, in order to see how much they are at variance with that public opinion which is shared by all of us. We all consider ourselves free, enlightened, humane men and even Christians, yet should William take offence to-morrow at Alexander, or should Mr. N. N. write a vigorous article on the Eastern question, or should some prince rob a few Bulgarians or Servians, or a queen get offended at something, then we all, enlightened and humane Christians, would spring up and set to work murdering men we had never seen before and to whom we were all kindly disposed. If this slaughter has not taken place yet, it is, they assure us, due to the pacific disposition of Alexander III., or because Nicolas is

about to marry Victoria's niece. Should some one else be in Alexander's place, or should Alexander happen to change his disposition, or should Nicolas marry Amalie instead of Alice, then we all, like so many blood-thirsty beasts, would up and rend each other's vitals. Such is the so-called, putative public opinion of our time; as we may discover from the fact that discussions to this effect are actually indulged in by the most advanced and liberal organs of the press.

If we, Christians of a thousand years' standing, have not cut each other's throats yet, it is because Alexander III. has not permitted it! Really this transgresses credibility.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

### APART FROM CHRISTIANISM.

BY GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.

"What is written by Moses can only be read by God."—*Bihar Proverb.*

SECULARISM differs from Christianity in so far as it accepts only the teachings which pertain to man, and which are consonant with reason and experience.

Parts of the Bible have moral splendor in them, but no Christian will allow any one to take the parts he deems true, and reject as untrue those he deems false. He who ventured to be thus eclectic would be defamed as Paine was. Thus Christians compel those who would stand by reason to stand apart from them.

To accept a part, and put that forward as the whole—to pretend or even to assume it to be the whole—is dishonest. To retain a portion, and reject what you leave, and not say so, is deceiving. To contend that what you accept as the spirit of Christianity is in accordance with all that contradicts it is to spend your days in harmonising opposite statements—a pursuit demoralising to the understanding. The Secularist has, therefore, to choose between dishonesty, the deception of others and deception of himself, or ethical principles independent of Christianity—and this is what he does:

The Bible being a bundle of Hebrew tracts on tribal life and tribal spite, its assumed infallibility is a burden, contradicting and misleading to all who accept it as a divine handbook of duty.

In papers issued by religious societies upon the Bible it is declared to be "so complete a system that nothing can be added to it, or taken from it," and that "it contains everything needful to be known or done." This is so false that no one, perceiving it, could be honest and not protest against it in the interest of others. Recently the Bishop of Worcester said: "It was of no use resisting the Higher Criticism. God had not been pleased to give us what might be called a perfect Bible."<sup>1</sup> Then it is prudence to seek a more trustworthy guide.

<sup>1</sup>Midland Evening News, 1893.

If money were bequeathed to maintain the eclectic criticism of the Scripture, it would be confiscated by Christian law. So to stand apart is indispensable self-defence. Individual Christians, as I well know, devote themselves with a noble earnestness to the service of man, as they understand his interests; but so long as Christianity retains the power of fraud, and uses it, Christianity as a system, or as a cause, remains outside the pale of respect. Prayer, in which the oppressed and poor are taught to trust, is of no avail for protection or food, and the poor ought to know it. The Bishop of Manchester declared, in my hearing, that the Lord's Prayer will not bring us "daily bread," but that "it is an exercise of faith to ask for what we shall not receive." But if prayer will not bring "daily bread," it is a dangerous deception to keep up the belief that it will. The eyes of forethought are closed by trust in such aid, thrift is an affront to the generosity of heaven, and labor is foolishness. But, alas! aid does not come by supplication. The prayer-maker dies in mendicancy. It is not reverence to pour into the ears of God praise for protection never accorded. Dean Stanley, admirable as a man as well as a saint, was killed in the Deanery, Westminster, by a bad drain, in spite of all his Collects. Dean Farrar has been driven from St. Margaret's Rectory, in Dean's Yard, by another drain, which poisons in spite of the Thirty-nine Articles; and Canon Eyton refuses to take up his residence until the sanitary engineers have overhauled<sup>1</sup> the place, which, notwithstanding the invocations of the Church, Providence does not see to. To keep silence on the non-intervention of Providence would be to connive at the fate of those who come to destruction by such dependence.

"O mother, praying God will save  
Thy sailor! While thy head is bowed,  
His heavy-shotted hammock-shroud  
Drops in his vast and wandering grave!"

True respect would treat God as though at the least he is a gentlemen. Christianity does not do this. No gentleman would accept thanks for benefits he had not conferred, nor would he exact thanks daily and hourly for gifts he had really made, nor have the vanity to covet perpetual thanksgivings. He who would respect God, or respect himself, must seek a faith apart from such Christianity.

A divine, who excelled in good sense, said: "Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the Most High. Our soundest knowledge is, to know that we know him not; and our safest eloquence concerning Him is our silence; therefore it becometh our words to be wary and few."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Westminster Gazette* London Letter, November 19, 1895.

<sup>2</sup> *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book 1., § 2.

Mrs. Barbauld may have borrowed from Richard Hooker her fine line:

"Silence is our least injurious praise."<sup>1</sup>

An earnest Christian, not a religious man (for all Christians are not religious), assuming the professional familiarity with the mind of God, said to me: "Should the Lord call you to-day, are you prepared to meet Him?" I answered: Certainly; for the service of man in some form is seldom absent from my thoughts, and must be consonant with his will. Were I to pray, I should pray God to spare me from the presumption of expecting to meet him, and from the vanity and conceit of thinking that the God of the universe will take an opportunity of meeting me.

Who can have moral longing for a religion which represents God as hanging over York Castle to receive the soul of Dove, the debauchee, who slowly poisoned his wife, and whose final spiritual progress was posted day by day on the Castle gates until the hour of the hangman came? Dove's confession was as appalling as instructive. It ran thus:

"I know that the Eternal One,  
Upon his throne devine,  
Gorged with the blood of his own Son,  
No longer thirsts for mine.  
  
Many a man has passed his life  
In doing naught but good,  
Who has not half the confidence I have  
In Jesus Christ, his blood."<sup>2</sup>

By quoting these lines, which Burns might have written, the writer is sorry to portray, in their naked form, principles which so many cherish. But the anatomy of creeds can no more be explained, with the garments of tradition and sentiment upon them, than a surgeon can demonstrate the structure of the body with the clothes on. Divine perdition is an ethical impossibility.

Christianism is too often but a sour influence on life. It tolerates nature, but does not enjoy it. Instead of giving men two Sundays, as it might,—one for recreation and one for contemplation,—it converts the only day of the poor into a penal infliction. It is always more or less against art, parks, clubs, sanitation, equity to labor, freedom, and many other things. If any Christians eventually accept these material ideas, they mostly dislike them. Art takes attention from the Gospel. In parks many delight to walk, when they might be at chapel or church. Clubs teach men toleration, and toleration is thought to beget in-

<sup>1</sup> Charles Lamb was of this opinion when he remarked: "Had I to say grace, I would rather say it over a good book than over a mutton chop." Christians say grace over an indigestible meat. But perhaps they are right, since they need supernatural aid to assimilate it.

<sup>2</sup> From a volume of verse privately circulated in Liverpool at the time, by W. H. Rathbone.

difference. Sanitation is a form of blasphemy. Every Christian sings:—

"Diseases are Thy servants, Lord;  
They come at Thy command."

But sanitation assassinate these "servants of the Lord." In every hospital they are tried, condemned, and executed as the enemies of mankind. If Labor had justice, it would be independent, and no longer hopeless, as the poor always are. Freedom renders men defiant of subjection, which all priests are prone to exercise. Secularism has none of this distrust and fear. It elects to be on the side of human progress, and takes that side, withstand it who may. Thus, those who care for the improvement of mankind must act on principles dissociated from doctrines repellent to humanity and deterrent of ameliorative enterprise.

#### Secularism Creates a New Responsibility.

"Mankind is an ass, who kicks those who endeavor to take off his panniers."

—*Spanish Proverb.*

No one need go to Spain to meet with animals who kick you if you serve them. Spanish asses are to be found in every land. Could we see the legs of truth, we should find them black and blue with the kicks received in unloosening the panniers of error, strapped by priests on the backs of the people. Even philosophers kick as well as the ignorant, when new ideas are brought before them. No improvement would ever be attempted if friends of truth were afraid of the asses' hoofs in the air.

He who maintains that mankind can be largely improved by material means, imposes on himself the responsibility of employing such means, and of promoting their use as far as he can, and trusting to their efficacy,—not being discouraged because he is but *one*, and mankind are many. No man can read all the books, or do all the work, of the world. It is enough that each reads what he needs, and, in matter of moral action, does all he can. He who does less, fails in his duty to himself and to others.

Christian doctrine has none of the responsibility which Secularism imposes. If there be vice or rapine, oppression or murder, the purely Christian conscience is absolved. It is the Lord's world, and nothing could occur unless he permitted it. If any Christian heart is moved to compassion, it commonly exudes in prayer. He "puts the matter before the Lord and leaves it in His hands." The Secularist takes it into his own. What are his hands for? The Christian can sit still and see children grow up with rickets in their body and rickets in their soul. He will see them die in a foul atmosphere, where no angel could come to receive their spirit without first stopping his nose with his handkerchief, as I have seen Lord Palmerston do on

entering Harrow on Speech Day. The Christian can make money out of unrequited labor. When he dies, he makes no reparation to those who earned his wealth, but leaves it to build a church, as though he thought God was blind, not knowing (if Christ spake truly) that the Devil is sitting in the fender in his room, ready to carry his soul up the chimney to bear Dives company. Why should he be anxious to mitigate inequality of human condition? It is the Lord's will, or it would not be. When it was seen that I was ceasing to believe this, Christians in the church to which I belonged knelt around me, and prayed that I might be influenced not to go out into the world to see if these things could be improved. It was no light duty I imposed on myself.

A Secularist is mindful of Carlyle's saying, "No man is a saint in his sleep." Indeed, if any one takes upon himself the responsibility of bettering by reason the state of things, he will be kept pretty well awake with his understanding.

Many persons think their own superiority sufficient for mankind, and do not wish their exclusiveness to be encroached upon. Their plea is that they distrust the effect of setting the multitude free from mental tyranny, and they distrust democracy, which would sooner or later end political tyranny.

These men of dainty distrust have a crowd of imitators, in whom nobody recognises any superiority to justify their misgivings as to others. The distrust of independence in the hands of the people arises mainly from the dislike of the trouble it takes to educate the ignorant in its use and limit. The Secularist undertakes this trouble as far as his means permit. As an advocate of open thought and the free action of opinion, he counts the responsibility of trust in the people as a duty.

It will be asked, What are the deterrent influences upon which Secularism relies for rendering vice, of the major or minor kind, repellent? It relies upon making it clear that in the order of nature retribution treads upon the heels of transgression, and, if tardy in doing it, its steps should be hastened.

The mark of error of life is—disease. Science can take the body to pieces, and display mischief palpable to the eyes, when the results of vice startle, like an apparition, those who discern that:

"Their acts their angels are,—if good; if ill,  
Their fatal shadows that walk by them still."

A man is not so ready to break the laws of nature when he sees he will break himself in doing it. He may not fear God, but he fears fever and consumption. He may have a gay heart, but he will not like the occupation of being his own sexton and digging his own grave. When he sees that death lurks in the frequent glass, for instance, *that* spoils the flavor of the wine.

He takes less pride in the beeswing who sees the shroud in the bottle. He may hope that God will forgive him, but he knows that death will not. He who holds the scythe is accustomed to cut down fools, whether they be peers or sweeps. Death knows the fool at a glance. To prevent any mistake, Disease has marked him with her broad arrow. The young man who once has his eyes well open to this state of the case, will be considerate as to the quality of his pleasures, especially when he knows that alluring but unwholesome pleasure is in the pay of death. Temperance advocates made more converts by exhibiting the biological effects of alcohol than by all their exhortations.

The moral nature of man is as palpable as the physical to those who look for its signs. There is a moral squint in the judgment, as plain to be seen as a cast in the eyes. The voice is not honest; it has the accent of a previous conviction in it. The speech has contortions of meaning in it. The sense is limp and flaccid, showing that the mind is flabby. Such a one has the backbone of a fish; he does not stand upright. As the Americans say, he does not "stand square" to anything. There is no moral pulse in his heart. If you could take hold of his soul, it would feel like a dead oyster, and would slip through your fingers. Everybody knows these people. You don't consult them; you don't trust them. You would rather have no business transactions with them. If they are in a political movement, you know they will shuffle when the pinch of principle comes.

Crime has its consequences, and criminals, little and great, know it. When Alaric A. Watts wrote of the last Emperor of the French:—

"Safe art thou, Louis!—for a time;  
But tremble!—never yet was crime,  
Beyond one little space, secure.  
The coward and the brave alike  
Can wait and watch, can rush and strike.  
Which marks thee? One of them, be sure,—"

few thought the bold prediction true; but it came to pass, and the Napoleonic name and race became extinct, to the relief of Europe.

Trouble comes from avowing unpopular ideas. Diderot well saw this when he said: "There is less inconvenience in being mad with the mad than in being wise by oneself." One who regards truth as duty will accept responsibilities.

It is the American idea

"To make a man and leave him be."

But we must be sure we have made him a man,—self-acting, guided by reasoned proof, and one who, as Archbishop Whately said, "believes the principles he maintains, and maintains them because he believes them."

A man is not a man while under superstition, nor is he a man when free from it, unless his mind is built on principles conducive and incentive to the service of man.

#### TYPES OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ANCIENT GREECE AND INDIA.

BY PROF. H. OLDENBERG.

IN BOTH Greece and India, societies of devotees were early formed. They gave themselves a name which served to remind them of their real or supposed founder, from Orpheus or Pythagoras, just as the "monk-disciples of the son of the Shākya" did. In close communion with each other, and separated from the masses without, they strive after a salvation which they hope to attain upon the strength of their own particular doctrine and their own particular intellectual and spiritual discipline.

True,—as one of the more recent historians of these Greek developments has already observed,—the segregation of these sectaries from the world was of a much milder character in Greece than in India, corresponding to the differences in the national characters. Among the Buddhists the religious idea takes possession of the whole life of devotees, with unlimited force and austerity. It destroys their mundane existence, with a logical consistency as thoroughly merciless as ever any idea has destroyed man's enjoyment of temporal life.

In the sacred legend, the royal scion, who afterwards becomes the Buddha, thirsting for the life spiritual, flees at night from his palace, where, recumbent upon a flower-strewn couch, his young wife lies slumbering, a young mother, beside her their first and newly born son whom the father has not yet beheld.

Possibly without any credibility in the ordinary historical sense, this legend nevertheless possesses a complete intrinsic veracity. The Buddhist, being most deeply agitated by his craving for redemption, abandons home and wealth, wife and child: they are bonds chaining him down to earthly life. He wanders from place to place, a homeless beggar.

In Greece, there is greater moderation. True, the communities searching for redemption, in Greece too, consider the present world as a place of uncleanness, of imprisonment; but there is no very great seriousness in their efforts to escape from this thralldom. Outwardly they continue to observe the duties and enjoy the pleasures of every-day life, and are satisfied with the practice of securing inwardly a release from the limitations of such a life by the secret power of the mystic doctrine and the mystic cult.

Whatever the peculiarities of the different sets of ideas evolved by these pious communities, the one feature is common to them all: this world appears to

all of them as a gloomy domain of dissension and suffering. The symbolism of the Orpheans has it that Dionysus, the divinity, is torn to pieces by Titans: the blessed unity of all Being undergoes the evil fate of disintegration.

Another Greek conception, of the sixth century B. C., discerns in the material existence of things a guilt; all heavens and all worlds, issuing from unity and infinity, having become guilty of wrong, must pay the penalty and do penance therefor, resolving themselves again into the components from which they originally came into being.

One noticeable trait is introduced into the appraisal of this existence by speculations which are traceable first of all to the great obscure Ephesian, Heraclitus. "All things are in flux,"—all being is a continuous change, self-mutation. "Into the same stream we step and yet do not step; we are and are not." This restless flux of becoming and passing away again is also characteristic of the human soul, which essentially is identical with the least corporeal of the elements, fire. As the existence of flame is a continuing death and re-generation, so the soul lives in the ceaseless production and passing away, in the ceaseless ebbing and flowing of its elements. Its apparently undisturbed continuity of identity is a deception.

True, Heraclitus himself, buoyant and active by nature, did not tint this doctrine with the gloomy color of lamentation that human destiny was therefore all aimless and made up of suffering. But to thinkers, who were inclined to look upon the continuity and constancy of a supreme eternal being as the sole satisfactory reply to their inquiries regarding the end of human life, this philosophical abstraction concerning the nature of material existence was identical with despair in its utter and hopeless emptiness. Thus, to Plato, this is a world of immaterial seeming. Verity and complete satisfaction are obtainable aloft only, in the flights beyond, where are the eternal ideas; thither the soul, fallen from its bright estate, home-sick, yearns ardently to return.

Now contrast with these Greek thoughts their counterparts in India. In the age when the way for Buddhism was being prepared, thought moves exactly in the same lines as it did with Plato, being a contrast of that which is and persists, and that which is transitory. On the one hand, the soul of the universe, the great One, ever untouched by pain; on the other hand, the world of phenomena, the realm of hunger and thirst, of care and perplexity, of old age and death. And, like Heraclitus, Buddhism too sees in this latter world a continuous flux of becoming and passing away, a never-ending concatenation of causes and effects,—the latter in their turn also becoming causes which continue to produce new effects, and so on to

infinity. Peace there is alone in the world of "the unborn, of that which has not yet come into being, has not yet been made, has not yet assumed form," in the realm of the Nirvâna.

An early Buddhistic dialogue compares life to a tree, the root of which is perishable and mutable, as are also its trunk, and branches, and leaves: who can believe that the shadow of such a tree will always remain the same and escape the fate of change? "But the unstable—is it suffering or joy?" asks Buddha of his disciples. And they answer: "Suffering, master!" Or, in the words of a stanza, oft repeated:

"All shape assumed inconstant is, unstable,  
All subject to the fate of birth and death.  
It comes to pass, and soon it vanishes.  
Blessed rest, when th' space of birth and death is done!"

Moreover, we find here exactly the same application of the aforementioned fundamental philosophical views that we do in Heraclitus. In both cases they are applied to the soul and its life. "Disciples!" says Buddha, "That which is called soul, or spirit, or reason, is ever changing and becoming something else, —ceaselessly, day and night, constantly going through the process of becoming and of ceasing to be."

A dialogue, of a later time, very remarkable in a historical regard, reproducing throughout the early Buddhistic views, treats of these thoughts in greater detail. It is the conversation of a holy man with King Milinda (the Greek Prince Menander, well-known from coins), who, it seems likely, ruled over the Northwest of India about 100 B. C. Strongly reminding one of Heraclitus, it compares life, personality, to a flame. "When, O great King, a man lights a candle, will not the candle burn through the night?"—"Yes, sire! it will burn through the night."—"How, then? O great King! Is the flame during the first watch of the night the same that it is in the second watch?"—"No, sire! . . . but the light burned the whole night, adhering to the same matter."—"So, also, O great King, the chain of the elements of things is joined together. One element is always coming into being, another is always ceasing and passing away. Without beginning, without end, the chain continues to be joined together."

The identity of the Greek and Indian ideas concerning the nature and destinies of the human soul extends still further. What are the effects upon those ideas of this all-dominant, pain-bringing law which subjects everything to the fate of coming into being only to pass away again? Both the Greek thinkers and the Buddhists alike answer this question by postulating the doctrine of the migration of the soul. Death is followed by a new birth—not necessarily in human form, both the divine and the animal are deemed possible; this re-birth is followed again by death, and this by re-birth: so that the one life is merely an infinites-

imal link in a vast chain of lives, to be bound up in which is a great misfortune.

The Orpheans symbolise the migration of the soul by means of a circle or wheel. They speak of the wheel of fate and of birth; the final end of existence seems to them to be

"To release one's self from the circle and breathe anew, freed from distress."

In the inscription of a small gold plate taken from a tomb near the ancient Sybaris, the soul of the buried person, an Orphean, for whom the claim of final release from the migration of the soul is made, exclaims:

"At last I have flown from the circle of ill, the toil-laden ring."

Imagine the rhythm of these hexameters turned into the irregular movement of the Indian *Sloka*-metre, and one might imagine himself in the very midst of the Buddhistic poetry. A Buddhist proverb says:

"Long to the watcher is the night,  
To the weary wand'rer long the road,  
To him, who will not see truth's light,  
Long is the torment of his chain of births."

And another expression, which is put into the mouth of Buddha, at the point when—his trials and struggles over—he has achieved the knowledge of salvation. He is triumphing in the fact that he has penetrated the designs of the wicked foe, those evil powers ruling terrestrial things, who unremittently are ever reconstructing the corporeal house, the body, and whom he has succeeded in putting away from himself:

"In vain the endless road  
Of rebirth I have wandered,  
In vain have sought life's builder,  
An ill is this fate of birth.

House-builder! found you are!  
You'll build no more the house.  
Your timbers are all broken,  
Destroyed the house's spires.  
The heart—escaped from earth—  
Has compassed the aim of its search."

And in the same way that the Orpheans symbolise the continuous existence of the migrating soul by means of a circle or wheel, so too the Buddhists speak of the "wheel of lives." Buddhistic pictures usually portray this wheel of existence in such manner that a stage of existence is symbolically shown between every pair of spokes, as the human kingdom, the animal kingdom, heaven, hell; beside the wheel is the form of Buddha, who, as one redeemed, stands without the revolution of existences.

In the dialogue above cited, King Milinda asks the holy man for a parable which shall give a notion of the interminable, beginningless migration of the soul. Thereupon the holy man draws a circle on the ground and asks: "Has this circle any end, great King?"—"It has not, sire!"—That is the same as the circle made by the course of births," the holy man teaches

him. "Is there then any end to its succession?"—"There is not, sire!"

And as the Orphean doctrine had it that he who was redeemed "had flown from the circle," so an early Buddhistic proverb says:

"The swan soars through the sun's ethereal pathways;  
The sorcerer flies through all the realms of space:  
So, sages, rich in wisdom, flee this world,  
The prince of death and all his powers o'erwhelming."

One brief glance more at a few of the particular traits of the doctrine of the migration of the soul, common to both India and Greece. It will be plainly seen that the fundamental similitude of ideas has had the effect of making the aspect of even the minuter details in the two religions similar.

One characteristic, very prominent among both peoples, is the very natural connexion of the doctrine of the soul's migration with the idea of moral retribution. The good and the evil which man has wrought in this life will in turn be done to him in another life, meted out to him in the blessedness of heavenly, or in the pain of infernal, worlds.

Naturally, at this point, the popular imagination—widely removed from the colorless abstractions of reflective thought—begins to play a part. Poetry drew all kinds of pictures of the horrors of the infernal world. There was a "voyage to the lower world" in poetry among the Orpheans, and another of the same name among the Pythagoreans; the Buddhistic literature is fairly overrun with innumerable, moral-pointing descriptions of the descents of holy men into the infernal regions and of the horrors there observed by them.<sup>1</sup>

Opposed to these terrors are the heavenly ecstasies. And here a characteristic appears which is emphasised strongly by the Buddhists, but visible only sporadically in Greece, although entirely the same there. Empedocles denies immortality to the gods; their longevity is great, but they are not eternal. The divinities of the Veda have in the same way ceased to be immortal to the Buddhists. Possessed of a length of life reaching beyond the grasp of all human standards of measurement, they are, nevertheless, along with others, knit into the chain of the migration of souls; and the human being who has lived a blameless life, dare hope to be born again as a god. No more lively illustration can be found in all the history of religion than this fate of the ancient gods, how an idea—having lost its original import, its own proper life—yet maintains its existence into a later age and is then by the latter animated with a new import, corresponding to the altered views of things.

As still another common Indo-Grecian character-

<sup>1</sup> We may refer here to the fine description which L. Scherman (*Materials for a History of the Indian Literature o' Visions*, 1892) has given of these phantasies.

istic of the doctrine of the migration of the soul may be mentioned, that, among both peoples, there were certain especially inspired men, who could, so it was held of them, recall the various earlier embodiments which they themselves and others had passed through. Pythagoras, of whom it was sung that

"When he with might compelled to the fullest the powers of mind,  
Easily could he th'adventures o'erscan of every existence,  
Through ten, yea, through the vista of twenty past, long human life-spans,"

is said to have related experiences and adventures from his earlier lives. Empedocles said:

"Thus have I been in former existence a youth, and a maiden,  
So, too, a shrub, and an eagle, a poor mute fish in the ocean."

Exactly so, only exaggerating the marvellous into the boundlessly wonderful, the Buddhistic religion tells how in that holy night in which he first beholds the true knowledge of salvation, as in a vision, the whole picture of his previous forms of existence, through hundreds of thousands of births, passes in review before the soul of Buddha. Tales, recording adventures of the most variegated colors from these past existences of Buddha himself, of his disciples and enemies, accompanied with lessons and applications of every sort, are among the most cherished elements of popular Buddhistic literature. Hundreds of re-births are recounted of Buddha, now as a king, again as a devout hermit, or as a courtier, or as a god, or as a lion, an ape, a fish. And it is well known how inestimable is the value of these stories and fables—since the motive of them frequently reappears, scattered over the whole earth—to the folk-lore studies of our time.

#### NOTES.

Thinking readers, and especially students interested in the methodology of science, will thank us for calling their attention to an important communication recently made by that eminent mathematician Felix Klein in No. 2 of the *Proceedings of the Royal Society at Göttingen for 1895*, entitled *The Arithmetization of Mathematics*. Those who possess *The Evanston Colloquium*, constituting the lectures on mathematics which Professor Klein delivered during the Congress of Mathematics at the World's Fair, will remember his division of the mathematical faculty into the intuitive and the logical. The article we are considering is an extension of the same idea. Professor Klein deplores the recent neglect of *Anschauung*, or geometrical imagination, in instruction and research, the cause of which, he thinks, is undoubtedly due to the predominant tendency of modern mathematics to arithmetise or numerise, so to speak, the form and results of its investigations, and he puts in a plea for the reinstatement of the geometrical intuitive faculty in its proper rights. By *Anschauung* Professor Klein understands the geometrical imaginative faculty, that intuitive sensuous grasp and feeling for mathematical and physical relations which is displayed, say, in the motor feeling which an engineer has of the dynamic relations of a construction he is executing, or in the vague sense which the skilled computer has of the convergence of infinite series with which he is dealing. He claims that mathematical intuition, living feeling, imaginative grasp, *Anschauung*, which is a prime requisite of the ideal worker in this domain, uniformly anticipates logical thought and always com-

mands a wider prospect than the purely abstract faculty. (Göttingen: Dieterich.)

Dr. Georg Cantor of Halle, Germany, sends us a reprint of a paper taken from the Italian *Rivista di Matematica* entitled *Contribuzione al fondamento della Teoria degli insiemi transfiniti*. Georg Cantor is the founder of an important but abstruse branch of formal arithmetic which deals with transfinite numbers and "*Mengen*," which here appears in Italian as "*insiemi*," a word meaning "togethers," if we may be allowed to form the plural of the hypothetical adjective-noun "together." The paper is not likely to find many students among the readers of *The Open Court*, but it is interesting as indicating the international character which science is gradually taking on, and as a reminder of the olden days when the republic of letters and science knew no national boundaries.

Among the other recent scientific pamphlets which have come into our hands are two by Prof. Jacques Loeb of the University of Chicago, entitled *Ueber den Nachweis von Contrasterscheinungen im Gebiete der Raumempfindungen des Auges* (Bonn: E. Strass) and *Limits of Divisibility of Living Matter* (Boston: Ginn & Co.). The first investigation refers to the familiar problem of the over-estimation of acute angles and the under-estimation of obtuse angles by the eye, the illusion of the convergence of Zoellner's parallels, etc. The problem is to determine whether the illusion is due to facts of contrast, which was assumed by Helmholtz. Professor Loeb is of a similar opinion, and he has adduced in this pamphlet experiments which he claims support his conclusion, describing also an apparatus for the detection of allied errors. His second pamphlet concludes "that the ultimate unit of living matter, in a given species, is not a definite quantity of matter, but that the quantity varies with the functions that we use as a criterion for living matter." Remembering the work of Professor Loeb in another field, it may be appropriate here to refer to a brochure entitled *Transplantationsversuche mit Hydra* by Georg Wetzel, which is, remotely, a continuation of Trembley's historical researches on fresh water Polyps. (Bonn: F. Cohen.)

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
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