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DR. BARROWS IN PARIS.

PROSPECTS OF THE PARIS CONGRESS OF RELIGIONS ASSURED.¹

DR. BARROWS, Professor of the University of Chicago, delivered yesterday evening in the auditorium of the *Sociétés savantes* a very important and highly significant lecture. The subject announced, "Religion and Human Fraternity," was designed to bring before the public notice again the project of holding a Congress of Religions at Paris in 1900. It is well known that Professor Barrows was the organiser and President of the Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893. It was this inducement which attracted to the hall in the Rue Serpente a large and select audience, all of whom were extremely interested in the liberal ideas involved in this singular movement for religious union and conciliation, of which the World's Congresses are the most striking manifestation.

M. Leroy-Beaulieu presided over the meeting. On the platform with him were seated MM. le vicomte de Meaux, Frédéric Passy, Bonet-Maury, Lavisse, l'abbé Victor Charbonnel, Georges Picot, Théodore Reinach, Buisson, C. Wagner, and others. There were gathered around the lecturer thus a body of men of the most diverse beliefs and convictions, but all of whom had been drawn to the place by the same spirit of tolerance. Is not this grand example an augury of approaching religious peace and union, wherein all believers, and all philosophers who respect the holy workings of conscience, can be joined together by an understanding of good will, not involving fusion, and can proclaim this understanding in an immense congress?

M. Leroy-Beaulieu introduced the orator in a few simple words. He recalled his preponderant rôle in the last Parliament of Religions and remarked how he had aided the progress of mankind by this exhibition of generosity. The moral union of religions, the fraternal accord of men in the same religious aspirations—such is the new dream which is haunting the best souls of mankind, forgetful of the old and sterile quarrels of dogmatism. Of this dream America is the noble inspiration and Dr. Barrows the most valiant and tenacious apostle.

¹From *L'Eclair* of Paris. Communicated by the Abbé Charbonnel.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS OF RELIGIONS.

The orator arose. A beautiful and prophetic head, a high, broad forehead, and large, blue eyes, lighted by amiability, marked his appearance. But this was a prophet of his own country. His attitude was firm and natural; it bore testimony that the prophet when the time came could also be a man of deeds.

In correct French and with only a slight but pardonable American accent, he said that the age of religious divisions and disputes was ended, that henceforward religion should be only a bond of fraternity between man and man, and the most powerful element of peace through love. The Congress of Religions at Chicago opened a new era of religious and intellectual pacification. A second Congress at Paris in 1900 will continue the progress there accomplished.

And here the orator answered a weighty objection which has been raised in Europe. It has been asserted that congresses of this sort admit the parity and proclaim the equal value of all religions. Yes, replied Dr. Barrows, they do involve parliamentary equality, but not doctrinal equality. When the Republic of the United States invited the small Republics of South America to take part in the exposition at Chicago at the same time with the great nations of Europe, was its invitation equivalent to proclaiming the equality of all the countries of the world? Each of these countries showed what it could show of its commercial greatness, and that was all. And so it is with religious congresses. Each is assured in its doctrinal integrity without abdication or abjurement; and all affirm in common the essential principle which serves as the foundation of each individual faith. But that is not tantamount to asserting their equal value. The audience did not fail to applaud this genuinely American explanation. The lecture in other points, too, was a great success.

OPINION OF THE ABBÉ CHARBONNEL.

In the speech of Dr. Barrows, the sole topic had been that of the Congress of Religions. It appeared to us advisable, therefore, to ask Abbé Charbonnel at the close of the lecture what were his impressions, and how far the cause had progressed of which he had continued an unconquerable champion.

"You see," he said to us, "the matter is always under discussion and is being vigorously pushed. I am quite satisfied with the evening's exercises. The organisers have made their preparations without much noise, and are anxious not to give umbrage to any one and not to arouse hushed quarrels; but to be frank with you, their object has been to commence a period of effective agitation for the Congress of Universal Religions in 1900.

"The statements of Dr. Barrows, which five hundred persons have just frantically applauded, mark a beginning of opinion, and they also give us an inkling of the decisions of the powers that be. The man who in the face of difficulties as grave as those now felt in France, made a success of the Parliament of Religions in Chicago, will be able to do the same for the Congress of Religions in Paris. The idea will go its way, and nothing will stop it. Our adversaries will count in vain on inertia and on the conspiracy of silence to prevent a movement which is growing irresistible; we shall carry our campaign to the end, and that a successful one. Four years more! And during that time by defending the idea and the principle of the Congress, we shall have built it up in a manner, and by articles and lectures will have disengaged a mass of opinion. We shall have preached tolerance, liberty of conscience, the equal dignity not of religion but of religious consciences, the union of all hearts in the same glorious sentiment, and finally the sublime religion of the brotherhood of man in the fatherhood of God. And all the world can and must recognise this religion as a supreme blessing for our time of 'moral distress.'"

In fine, the Abbé Charbonnel is more convinced than ever that the year 1900 will see a Congress of Religions at Paris.

ROSMINI: CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHER.

BY ELLIS THURTELL.

ANTONIO ROSMINI-SERBATI was born in 1797. At the age of twenty-four he had conceived the purpose of passing his life in placing Christian theology upon a sound and modern philosophic basis; and with that lofty object entered the service of the Catholic Church in 1821. By 1848 he had become Minister of Education under Pio Nono. He was ever an advocate of speculative progress and practical reform, though devoted alike to the Church at large and to the person of the Pope. It is even said that one of his works was placed upon the *Index Expurgatorius*. He died in 1855.

Rosmini was a voluminous writer. He seems to have been first formally introduced to inquiring English readers by Davidson's *Rosmini's Philosophical System*, published in 1882.

In 1883 appeared a translation of what is deemed Rosmini's most important and characteristic work, by two members of the English branch of the "Society of the Brothers and Sisters of Charity," or Rosminians. This book is entitled *New Treatise on the Origin of Ideas*. The original, *Nuovo Saggio sull' origine delle idee*, was published in 1830. The edition which the translators used was the fifth Italian one, revised by the author and produced in 1851. The whole work is said by the translators to have enjoyed the direct or indirect sanction of five Popes. We will now turn to the very interesting Preface which these scholars have written, and consider the account therein given of their great master in Catholic philosophy. In dealing, as they particularly profess to do, with the main objections against his speculative scheme, they present us clearly and concisely with their own conception of the scheme, and of its author's philosophic character.

Rosmini, it will surprise most rationalists to learn, "found an answer to all his inquiries in the *Light of Reason*." And one might imagine it to be a present-day Positive or Agnostic Monist, instead of a Catholic Dualist, of whom it is said: "He had to present the entire *Scibile humanum*, both natural and supernatural, as forming but one great and magnificent whole."

His unnamed translators assert that "Rosmini exhibited all the qualities which are usually taken to denote the perfect philosopher. . . . With him education had been, and ever was, a true 'discipline in accuracy of mind.'" Again they say "it may well be claimed that a philosophical erudition as extensive, as deep, and as precise as is contained in his published works, would be sought for in vain in any other writer."

In his *Introduction to Philosophy*, it seems, Rosmini has described his first ardor for metaphysical research; how enthusiastically he read; and how resolutely he summed up the day's result at the day's end. Here too he has given us his own conception of what a philosopher's mental qualifications ought to be. It runs as follows: "In the first place he lays much stress on the absolute necessity of seeking truth and truth alone, firmly persuaded that, in itself and in its consequences, it must lead to good. Next he reminds us that whoever would devote his time to philosophy must cast aside every form of prejudice likely in the least to hinder him from discovering and possessing truth in all its fulness and distinctness. Thirdly, he dwells with special emphasis on what he terms the *liberty of philosophising*."

In confirmation of their rendering of Rosmini's views, the translators give us furthermore his very words. In answer to one who had inquired as to the best disposition and direction of the mind for the pur-

suit of philosophic truth, Rosmini wrote: "To have received a beautifully moulded soul appears to me to be undoubtedly the best of all dispositions. Next to this is elevation of mind and an unswerving consistency of thought. . . . Then must be added perfect freedom from all those fetters by which the littleness of man impedes the flight of genius. The mind must be accustomed to gaze on the ideas themselves, stripped of all the trappings of words, schemata, and methods. It must be made to recognise truth under all forms and colors, to love it under all, to abhor every school or system that would impose limits to these forms of truth, and to study profoundly the meanings of words."

All this is most admirable and might find fitting place in any treatise on the principles of naturalism. And when we come to particulars we are even more struck with the boldness and reasonableness of Rosmini's scheme and method. He had studied the history of the physical sciences and had been profoundly impressed by the advances made in modern times. These immense advances in *result* came, as he saw, from the advance in *method*. "Why," demanded Rosmini, we are actually told, "should not this method be applied to philosophy, to the internal and spiritual facts of the soul and of consciousness?"

"Like Kant, he discovered that whatever is *material* in our knowledge of things is supplied by the senses and experience; and that all in it which is purely *formal* is furnished by the mind." But, unlike Kant, he "discovered" also that the forms of the mind are reducible to one which is not subjective, "but objective and presented to the spirit from without, by God himself." This were a discovery, indeed. Would that we could, in the face of facts, correctly call it one. However, it is interesting to hear the opinion of the very able and equitable translators of this remarkable book, "that it cut up by the roots the chief errors of agnosticism, positivism, materialism, and pantheism, in all the forms in which they can present themselves."

Rosmini's philosophical objection to agnosticism is that "we cannot know phenomena without knowing something beyond them." The contrary opinion is, as he represents it, a conclusion drawn from the premise that all our ideas "come through the senses." And this premise he conceives to be a baseless one.

Now as against pure "sensism," we may admit Rosmini's point. There is no doubt that any agnosticism built upon unassisted sensationalism requires reconstruction. But neither is there any doubt that it can be reconstructed. We really owe an everlasting grudge to Condillac and his otherwise clear-sighted followers for their unfortunate one-sidedness in presenting Locke to continental thought. How far-reach-

ing this misrepresentation has been may be seen from Kant's curious confusions on the vexed question of experience. Again and again have modern naturalistic evolutionary thinkers to insist that, in their own positive opinion at any rate, the experience, through which alone, as they hold, valid ideas can come is not a matter of sensation merely; that Locke opined, and Herbert Spencer may be said to have proved, that experience is the product not of sensation only, but of reflexion also.

This being so the evolutionary philosophic naturalists are free to claim consistently that they too have the light of truth to guide them; and to assert that their reflexion is no less capable than is Rosmini's "Light of Reason" to lead towards a rightful rendering of the world's great course of being, so far as it may be decipherable by man. Through this reflective power have many minds in recent days arrived at the really revolutionary view that we *can* know phenomena without *knowing anything* beyond them. That all we can reasonably do is to *infer* what lies beyond. That therefore "what lies beyond" is no true guide for the life either of conduct or of thought. But that the sometimes despised "phenomena"—including as they do the physical, mental, emotional, and moral natures of mankind—are, whether or not the only *needed*, most certainly the only *actual* informers of how we may more or less attain to the whole, the good, the beautiful, the true.

The translators appeal to the "learned" to "take their flight to a world altogether metaphysical and eternal," and so forth. And they insist "that there is a world which only the eye of the mind, illumined by the pure, spiritual light of reason, can look upon." Let them add the light of moral sense to the light of reason—as they would no doubt be willing to do—and we may all be with them. Nay, rather, if the translators and their co-religionists were really true to these two lights would they not be *with us* ere long in their rejection of that supernatural creed which they so strangely, as it seems to us naturalists, deem congruous with the lofty philosophic principles they hold?

Perhaps the most remarkable passage in this extremely interesting Preface (beyond which we cannot now go) is that wherein its authors, Catholic thinkers though they are, assert the claims of reason over authority in the philosophic field. It must not be inferred, they say, "that Rosmini brings the principle of authority into philosophy. No one knew better than he that philosophy is the science of pure reason, that it is wholly built on reason, and that no authority, as such, can claim a place in it."

Such an admission is certainly of profound importance. And not less so is the concluding estimate of Rosmini's mind and character, which, upon this show-

ing, must have been of a singularly elevated type. "For his fellowmen, or rather for God seen in his fellowmen," his interpreters declare, "he sacrificed ease, riches, worldly ambition. The true good, the real happiness of his neighbor was the aim of his every thought and action. When he elaborated what he believed to be the system of truth, and labored to bring it to perfection, when he employed all the resources of a gigantic intellect, and a vast philosophical and theological erudition, it was simply because he was profoundly persuaded that the only way to make men better was through the truth. He held that truth understood, loved, embraced, followed unswervingly, must lead to goodness of heart, to moral perfection, and through this to rest and happiness."

A nobler view of speculative thought than this could no one hold. And it is to the fearless expression of such views that we may most confidently look for the development of those existing forces within the Church which are already disintegrating, and must eventually destroy the sectarianism of all the Churches.

OUTPOSTS OF A NEW SCIENCE.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

EVERYWHERE in the world the rushing course of human thought has worn for itself similar channels through the diversified strata of the natural formations of brain.

As in the crust of this earth we inhabit there is a great underlying primary formation, call it what you please—igneous, plutonic, or primary, in one case *a priori*, of principle; of God on the other, the two remain parallel and analogous to the student of mankind—its origin and its destiny.

Into the depths of this region, the foundation-rock of all thought, all science, all reasoning, it is not the province or purpose of this paper to seek to penetrate. We begin our investigations where practical geology begins—with the early accretions, out of which, particle by particle, age after age, were built up successively the various periods.

The seeming duality of our simile, whereby the solid strata are apparently separated, and thought compared to a river, while character is likened to the rocks of the canyon, disappears upon close and accurate investigations.

The same power gave origin to both, for the very rocks themselves were born of water and that spirit, constant and continuous in its operations, which though intermittent as old orders changed, has never ceased its manifestation while the flux of forces moved on irresistibly forward forever.

The solid rocks, strata piled upon strata, whirled and distorted, worn and wasted, disintegrated and crumbled into mould, and the living things that—

like afreets released from the seal of Solomon—have bloomed because of the soil and the rain, both can trace back their ancient genealogy to one common father, to that perfect and perpetual power of the sunbeam that came down from heaven to raise and support the low and to illumine the darkness.

Life is the child of the sun. The sunbeam is both author and finisher of all our vitalities. The primal cell, the herb-bearing seed, the animal, each after his kind, to mankind, the crowning slope of nature's supremest effort, all are one in their origin, and links in the eternal chain of causation.

Light, heat, actinity, electricity; these and all other potencies, coequal and coeval with gravitation, are but phases of that power which is, in one word, influence.

And it is this power, this influence, manifested in the material universe, which, in the lens and prism of the human organism, is transmuted into that godlike attribute, which, whether called spirit or mind or soul or consciousness, has made man in the image of God.

The radical fault of man in attempting to solve those problems commonly called of religion, has been and still is that he has always been that which he now stigmatises as "infidel"—an agnostic.

He has found himself alive in a world demanding thought as a condition of survival, and yet he has deliberately declined thought concerning that life which is, of all kinds of life, the most important for him to know about.

He has found that experience and experiment are the ultimate atoms out of which the reality of reason is made, and yet in the domain of religion has discarded both experience and experiment.

In lower truths, of daily action, of practical affairs, of arts and sciences, he demonstrates fully his faith in results, his confidence in method, and finally his implicit belief in the principles of all his dealings, but in religion, necessarily and naturally the highest of all truth, he puts aside all effort, gives up all method, and deliberately devotes himself to intellectual despair.

I once listened to a series of sermons by an eminent divine on the subject of how to serve God: how to serve Him with the hands, the feet, the lips, all the physical organs of the body, but he never discoursed upon that vastly more important matter, How to serve God with the reason.

Child as I was, when I heard those sermons I remember thinking that the good dominie had made a serious mistake in that matter.

I understand now that he made no mistake. He was like the tethered bullock, and could not graze beyond the narrow circle within whose limits he was bound. And yet he was minister in the church founded

by Him, the chiefest of whose tenets was that his word was not bound.

I am not the only one to recognise this remarkable discrepancy, and I am very far from the first who has endeavored to reconcile the conflicting and as yet seemingly irreconcilable "views" of the divine mission and of divine truth. Indeed it seems as if this modern era, these last years of the nineteenth century, are pre-eminently the age of inquiry, the epoch of doubt and uncertainty, the time of the agnostic.

To "reconcile" religion and science seems to be the aim of countless militant minds. Word has come, blown on the winds, that across the multitudinous seas of doubt lies a new world, fairer than day, rich with the spoils of time, and now countless adventurers are embarking thither.

Colons and Cabots of thought have gone forth in quest of this holy grail, and, returning, have given fanciful accounts of their wanderings, and displayed cargoes of what they claimed to be gold ore from the mines of that immaculate country, whose name is Truth.

Alas! how delusive all such hopes have been, how futile the quest; the glittering spangles have proved nothing but pyrites,—nothing but "fool's gold."

From the earliest of the historic periods until now opinion in some of its versatile and variegated shapes has dominated mankind. In every age and in all quarters of the globe, quite naturally and by a process entirely parallel to physical selection, men have coalesced into three great classes of religionists: those who accept, those who speculate, and those who deny. Acceptance is the mother of credulity; speculation of mysticism, and denial of despair.

These classifications are broad and general. Credulity may be abject fetishism or it may be a pure and perfect faith; mysticism may be and often is credulous, or it may by force of a sedulous training rise to pinnacles of philosophic heights not to be attained by either lethargic or combative intellects, while denial may and does take protean forms, some of whose conclusions lift the doubting infidel into a region where the thinker having ceased to hope for an answer to the eternal why? despair is cancelled from the equation of thoughts.

Epicurian, Stoic, and Cynic amid the groves of Greece; Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism in Asia, and in our own time and in all those countries of the West which we call and consider civilised, orthodoxy, mysticism, and infidelity have divided and subdivided the imagination.

The rainbow is the best physical analogy of this mental division; there the three primal colors, while distinct in themselves, and inviolate of themselves, blend and merge insensibly one into another.

As in the hues of the spectrum there are three regions and no defined frontier, so in religious or irreligious thought colors of character may meet and mingle and merge and overlay while yet all the while the essential elements remain fixed and fast and definite.

It is not with the history of religions this paper proposes to attempt dealing; this subject has been entered upon elsewhere, better and more fully than I could expect to do. It will, I think, be well to confine consideration to those theologies with whose general scope and purpose all are presumably familiar.

The triad of mind relations as we know them may be somewhat crudely classed (as previously) into orthodoxy, mysticism, and infidelity.

Disregarding all refinements and dispensing with verniers and micrometers of dogma, doctrine, and articles, orthodoxy means that kind of creed which believes, or claims to believe, in a personal God, a lost individual, a distinct personal individuality after death, a system of rewards and punishments, and a plan of salvation.

Broadly this will, I feel sure, pass as a sufficient definition of the system which we know as Christianity.

But where and how shall we locate our devotees of mysticism? A correct catalogue of all the fantastic fads and fancies of speculation would be as long as Groombridge's of the fixed stars, with the disadvantage that as yet right ascension and declination have no meaning as applied to the creations of the religious juggler. Spiritisms, so called, Christian sciences, faith cures, theosophies; these and countless others akin to them incubate almost daily, and their disciples increase and multiply for a while till a voracious ism—better able and fitter to survive—comes along to swallow the brood.

Of infidelity also there are countless varieties: agnosticisms, deisms, theisms, isms numberless; believers in all sorts and conditions of unbelief; men who are faithful to unfaith and those who are unfaithful to all faith.

When the colors of the mental spectrum are well defined in any single personality, belief, however peculiar, has at least the merit of being consistent, and, in a way, logical.

But how grotesque and ludicrous are those illogical minds in whom are blended confusedly all the colors of the prism, who, chameleon-like, scintillate with the hues of such phases of fancy as they chance to clamber on.

From those who have broken loose from the shackles of creed and church, and from those who yet remain ostensibly identified with some ecclesiastical organization come the same iridescent shimmers of opinion.

From orthodoxy of the Hebrew type, in which the plan of salvation is Mosaic, has come a horde of re-

formers, some of whom, continuing to hold practically the ancient creed are devoted chiefly to effecting changes in ritual, while others are, or seek to be rationalists. Of these latter by far the most extreme school of thought is that of "Ethical Culture."

Felix Adler and his coadjutors are doing a grand work, one of the grandest, best conceived, most sensible works ever originated in America. But the work is purely ethical and humanitarian. Its best endeavor seems to be to make admirable machines of humanity, but to dispense with the mechanic. Religiously it is distinctly non-atheistic, it does not positively deny a God, but practically ignores him.

Ethics is the art of the artisan; religion the art of the artist. It has to do, not with the preparation of pigments, but with color, form, and perspective.

For several years the councils of the Christian Church have been more or less distracted by that phase of "views" to be generally classed as "higher criticism." This cult originated, or acquired its present serious impetus from the editorial labors of the revisers of the Bible.

It has developed along a multiplicity of lines; has solidified some churches, proved reactionary in at least one,—the Protestant Episcopal,—even found a lever in the Roman Catholic, and certainly bids fair to rend apart, if not disintegrate, the Calvinistic communion.

The attitude of Heber Newton in the Episcopal Church is perhaps the most remarkable as illustrative of that broadness which has become the Church's boast. This eminent theologian has so adroitly held his lax theology as to be able to remain a frocked priest while distinctly, positively, and perpetually befooling his own nest with the odium of heterodoxy. For a Christian minister to write and print the statement that the Jesus Christ and the Buddha Christ were on a plane of equality may have been true, but it certainly was not orthodox.

Dr. Briggs's position is, of course, different, but it is, after all, an "infidel" position; it antagonises orthodoxy at the very point always claimed to be least liable to successful antagonism.

To make reason co-ordinate with the Church and the Book is clearly no less infidel than to find a parity between Jesus and Siddârtha.

The very substance of orthodox theology is comprised in three dicta: I. The certainty of a divine revelation; II. The infallibility of the means; III. The entire fallibility of reason.

In the Catholic Church the infallible means are found in an infallible church as interpreter of an infallible book; but Protestantism, having awakened a slumbering power, finds in liberty of conscience concerning the Book a swiftly growing monstrous Frankenstein, to destroy its infallibility.

When the tool begins to think, the hand trembles; when her ministers invoke Reason, it is only a question of time before the Church will become reasonable.

If man is nothing but a masterly mechanism, the former things—in large part still the present things—will never pass away; but if, as we are all inclined to believe, he is free, and has within him a capacity for conscious choice, they will inevitably pass away, and the present order change.

The first steps have been taken. Dr. Briggs and men like minded, while yet clinging tenaciously to some of the older hallowed associations of thought, have set the door of rationalism ajar, and most assuredly it will not be long before mankind will arrange itself both within and without the portal. Inside, the timid; outside, the bold. In the Church the conservative; in the larger Church the radical. Devoted to an ecclesiastical system, the idealists; to a cosmic system, the practical. Sooner or later the line will be sharply drawn between those who seek satisfaction in lethargy and those who seek it by action; between those who supinely want and those who grandly will; between blind faith in some things and clear-sighted faith in all things; between dogma and demonstration; between superstition and science.

The logic of the proposition is unanswerable, that if reason may be used at all in matters of religion, it may be used wholly. If minds may explore this region, the more alert, active, and indefatigable the explorer, the more certain the results of his exploration.

Numerous efforts, all more or less fallacious, and all entirely futile, have been made to "reconcile" religion and science. As men now regard religion, it is a matter whose province is altogether apart from science. It has been written: "If God himself has not revealed the truth to men, they are absolutely and hopelessly in the dark regarding it. They cannot construct any reasonable theory of it. One man's opinion is as good as another's, for nobody's is worth anything. Dogmas of the Church, based on the authority of Scripture, must be announced as something to be believed, not argued about."

So long as religions continue to be regarded as a matter of opinion, this must continue to be, as it is, unqualifiedly true.

Scientific truth has never come except in one way: experience and experiment have furnished data of facts, and by thoughtful consideration of these facts and their reactions and relations principles have been discovered, and, having been tested and found trustworthy, accepted as true by the common consent of mankind.

Inductive or deductive alike, all reasoning must necessarily be founded upon a rock of knowledge, and

knowledge is nothing more than an accurate relation between what is commonly called subjective and objective,—between the knower and the known.

But practically there is a wide difference between the inductive and deductive methods of learning. In chemistry, for instance, how futile a process of deduction would be. In that science the axioms, or "common notions," or "self-evident truths," are identical with the facts themselves, are innumerable, and the principles have only been established by ages of research, tests, and trials, and continual reconstruction of hypotheses.

There is one science all of whose operations are conditioned upon the reverse of this. In mathematics we have a confidence, a faith, if you choose, in principles, so profound, so sure, so safe, so easy, so quickly elucidated, that, like the motions of thought or light, it seems to come instantly, spontaneously, intuitively.

Chemistry shows us a river of truth, large and grand, rolling steadily towards the sea; but we realise that this broad water has come from countless affluents, and these from branches, creeks, and rivulets, and all the mighty current, far up among the distant hills, has trickled out of mossy beds from among the roots of the mountains.

Mathematics takes us directly to the source itself, to the geyser rising out of the heart of the intellect, and in its contemplation we are forced to ignore the unseen effort, which through long centuries drew up the waters from the glassy lakes and the ocean spray.

In one case faith is founded upon the toil and experiment of others; in the other case, it may be founded upon our own knowledge.

So mathematics is essentially a science of deduction; chemistry of induction.

We have ceased to have opinions concerning principles in chemistry; we never had opinions concerning them in mathematics. In both cases we have "faith"; but in one faith has been acquired; in the other it appears to be "given."

Which sort of faith does theology demand? Evidently that of the chemical order. In effect the contention of ecclesiasticism is that to the Church has been confided by supernatural power the sort typified by mathematics; that out of the mouth of apostles, prophets, and priests proceed lessons of wisdom which the multitude are to contemplate and believe, not, as they, at the source, but at a distance, devoutly faithful, faithfully credulous.

Curiously enough, however, the results in the river of truth which the religious are supposed to contemplate are distinctly ethical, while the faith that is demanded of them is purely historical.

Priests of orthodoxy inculcate rules of conduct common to all, but insist upon submission to observ-

ances and acquiescence in doctrines exceedingly variant in degree and often in kind.

There is an undoubted science of evolutionary ethics yet somewhat inchoate in the same way that there is a chemical science; but what hope is there now, or likely to germinate in the future, of a true science of religion?

Count Goblet D'Alviella says that "every serious religion consists of belief, worship, and rules of conduct." What hope does there seem to be for any "reconciliation"? Does it seem possible that science will ever be able to give affirmative answers to the queries of theology that "a personal God," a lost individual, a distinct, personal individuality after death, a system of rewards and punishments and a plan of salvation "will ever be "believed in" as chemistry is believed in or mathematics?

This expectation seems nothing but an infatuation; the gulf seems utterly impossible between religion and science, between faith and fact.

And yet, looking backward across the flood of years, how brief the time appears when all the sciences were in precisely the condition in which we now find religion. Fifty years ago there was no science of electricity; a hundred, none of geology; two hundred no chemistry, and we need only go far enough backward into the past to note the crude dawn of the earlier sciences of navigation and astronomy among the Phenicians and Chaldeans.

But the facts were in the world all the time unformulated, waiting the touch of the wand of the magician to give them life. Euclid came and geometry was "revealed." Newton was "inspired," and in like manner,—"each in his own order,"—Volta, Priestly, Davy, Humboldt, Franklin, Edison, Tesla, one by one took their places in that great Walhalla of priests of science, whose foundation and walls and dome are built of eternal truth.

The world does not require that we should abolish the historical religions; but the spirit of progress stands beckoning and bids us, as Jesus did his disciples, "Come and see!"

The science of religion must interpret nature; it must explain the personality of man, the being of God, the true character of life, and death and immortality. It must convert into terms of cause and effect the ideas of reward and punishment, translate plan and salvation and atonement, glibly used in the glossary of priestcraft, by the lexicon of truth.

The science of religion must be an exact science, not founded upon the unknown, still less upon the unknowable. It must assume nothing, condone nothing, conceal nothing. It must account for the cancer as well as the rose, for the earthquake and pestilence as well as the seed-time and harvest, for the simple

as well as the sage, and for all be so plain that even the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein.

The world is panting and athirst for truth. We are surfeited with superstition. We are tired of doubt. We want no longer the amorphous flocculence of creeds, but demand that from the solution of thought now saturated shall be precipitated a clear and perfect crystal.

The world awaits its revealer. And he shall surely come. Fear not lest we mistake his voice. There is a thrill to truth and we shall know him as on the Western plains some outpost beleaguered by savage foes, hears upon the still air far away like a horn of elfland, the faint blast of the notes of a copper clarion and the throb of rescuing hoof-beats.

'TIS NOT.

BY MATTIE McCASLIN.

'Tis not the softest couches
That give the sweetest rest,
'Tis not the richest viands
That always taste the best,
For beds of down may oft be filled
With thorns that pierce the heart,
And dainty food the sweetness lacks
That hunger can impart.

'Tis not the fairest faces
The fairest names can boast,
'Tis not the whitest fingers
That help the needy most.
Though jewels flash upon the breast,
Think not it is a sign
That other jewels, richer far,
Within it meekly shine.

'Tis not the brightest glitter
Comes from the purest gold,
'Tis not the gayest flowers
The sweetest fragrance hold,
A noble, loving heart may beat
Beneath a ragged coat;
The homliest bird is often found
To sing the sweetest note.

'Tis not the deepest coffers
The greatest wealth contain,
'Tis not the first upon the earth
The first in heaven remain.
The rich man's far-famed charity
May dwindle with the sight,
While angels with their golden harps
Sing of the widow's mite.

NOTES.

We are indebted to Abbé V. Charbonnel for the leading article of the present number which appeared in Number 2708 of *L'Éclair*, of Paris. The Abbé writes that the people of Europe become more and more interested in the idea of a Religious Parliament, and the lecture of Dr. Barrows has greatly helped to dispel the prejudices that naturally prevailed where the regulations and plans of the Chicago Parliament of Religions were only su-

pericially known. A banquet was given in honor of Dr. Barrows and the toasts given on that occasion were aglow with the spirit that animated the Parliament of Religions at Chicago.

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