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DEVOTED TO THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.

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## THE DOGMA OF THE TRINITY.

BY THE REV. GEORGE J. LOV.

IN *The Open Court* of January 9 an article by the editor appears with the above caption. I agree with its main line of argument touching the fanciful views of the writer who signs himself "Francis Jay," which views remind one of the doctrine of "correspondence" propounded by Swedenborg. But as I am one of those whom the learned Editor characterises as "still in the bondage of a literal belief in the Christian dogmas," I desire to "give a reason of the hope that is in me" in the pages of *The Open Court*. I do so the more readily because it is an "Open Court"—open, I presume, to the defenders of the Christian faith as well as to its opponents; and also because it is "devoted to the Religion of Science." It will therefore, I am sure, give place to an endeavor to show that "the Catholic faith," of which the Athanasian *Quicunque* speaks, is a "faith in a religion based on the eternal laws of existence."

First, let one emphasise the distinction between "the Catholic faith" and the various theological and metaphysical systems deduced therefrom. "The Catholic faith" is a statement of certain objective facts, apart from our subjective belief in them. If the alleged facts are false, all our belief in them does not make them true; if they are true, all our disbelief does not render them false. We stake the whole Christian religion upon the truth of those objective facts, and say with St. Paul that "if Christ did not rise from the dead our faith is vain." (I Cor. xv., 17.)

We Anglicans, in common with the Roman Catholic and Greek orthodox churches, contend that "the Holy Catholic Church" (itself an objective fact) was founded in order to maintain and propagate "the Catholic faith." Whether we are right or not in our contention is not now the point at issue; I am simply stating the case. The Catholic faith deals with the two profound problems which have in all ages perplexed mankind, and which remain insoluble mysteries still. Those two questions are as to (1) the nature of the supreme being, and (2) the relation between God and man. The Catholic faith meets these two enquiries by propounding (1) the dogma of the trinity, and (2) the dogma of the incarnation. The

first of these, viz., the dogma of the trinity—with which we are at present solely concerned—is thus formulated in the *Quicunque*:

"The Catholic faith is this: that we worship one God in trinity and trinity in unity: neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance. . . . For like as we are compelled by Christian verity to acknowledge every person by himself to be God and Lord: so are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say, there be three Gods or three Lords."

Such is the answer of the Catholic church to the question as to What God is. It does not solve the mystery of the supreme being; it does not pretend to do so: that is beyond the capacity of man, and beyond the realm of science as the greatest scientific minds have confessed. If the assertion is made: "God is a spirit," that does not solve the problem; for the question then arises; "What is spirit?—Is it matter?—Is it pure energy?—Is it a *tertium quid*?" Indeed, argue as we may on the lines of pure reason, we shall inevitably find ourselves at last entangled in Kant's "paralogisms" and "antinomies." But the theologian is no worse off than the philosopher in this respect. Mr. Herbert Spencer begins his grand system of synthetic philosophy by saying that he proposes to investigate the phenomena which are the manifestations of a certain power. In his opening chapters of *First Principles* he speaks most reverently of "the power that is manifest in the universe." At the end of his investigations he sums up his whole system in these well-known phrases, that among "all the mysteries which grow the more mysterious the more they are thought about," we are reduced "to the one absolute certainty: the presence of an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed."

If this is the last word of philosophy, then we may say that the infinite and eternal energy is philosophy's god. The theist, however, conceives of infinite and eternal energy (or power) *plus* infinite and eternal consciousness (or wisdom): for the idea of a mindless power evolving mind (whether on this planet alone, or in other planets here and there throughout the universe) is unthinkable to most of us. This infinite and eternal power and wisdom is acknowledged as God by

all theists of every kind; however "transcendental" or "immanent" or "anthropomorphic" their several concepts of God may be.

But the Christian's idea of God goes beyond this. Believing (whether right or wrong is not now in question) that this infinite power and wisdom has made a certain special revelation of himself, the Christian learns therefrom to add the third attribute of goodness. And the Catholic Christian also gathers from that revelation certain facts about this infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, which facts are embodied in the dogma of the trinity as formulated in the *Quincunque* as quoted above. (See also the first Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican church.)

Now I am free to confess that if this dogma is opposed to scientific truth we must either give up the dogma or give up truth. If the authors of the *Quincunque* formulated "an irrational proposition which in contradiction of the multiplication-table made three equal to one"—then we must either concede that the alleged revelation was a false light, or we must be content to remain "irrational." But so far from this being the case, my contention is that the dogma of the trinity may be exhibited as "based on the eternal laws of existence," or in the words of Bishop Butler, that there is an "analogy between revealed religion and the constitution and course of nature."

Let us first clear the way by explaining certain terms. It must be borne in mind that the words "person" and "substance" have greatly changed their meaning since the *Quincunque* was first translated into English. The word "substance" connotes in modern language the idea of solidity, of material coherence; we speak of a "substantial" meal, or a "substantial" building, but in the language of the scholastics it meant just the opposite. By the "substance" of a man they meant his "ego," his essential being. So the word "person" formerly signified not only an individuality or concrete form, but also like the Latin *persona*, a presentment or phase. Indeed, in some respects the two words have changed places, as the following illustration may show.

Physiology tells us that the various particles of matter forming our bodies are in a constant state of flux, so that in the course of seven years all the material constituents of our bodies are renewed. Now suppose a young man returns to a place after an absence of seven years. His friends might say of him: "This is the same *person* we knew formerly, but his *substance* has changed": whereas, in former times they would have said: "Our friend's *person* has changed, but the *substance* is the same." It is only fair to bear this in mind in our discussion. But, indeed, whatever terms we use concerning the Deity—and what Mr. H. Spencer (*Retrospective Religion*)

terms "the All-Being" and "the Ultimate Reality"—must needs be inadequate. In speaking of things transcending human knowledge, we are forced, as Mr. H. Spencer says, to use "symbols," which must needs fall short of the reality. We simply do the best we can.

In the next place, let me briefly pass in review some of the latest inductions of science.

All phenomena are comprehended under two categories,—matter and motion,—as in the famous definition of evolution at the close of Chapter XVII. of *First Principles*. The word "motion," however, is now superseded by "force" or "energy." The doctrine of the indestructibility or persistence of matter has been long established. But it is only lately, comparatively, that the correlative doctrine of the persistence of force, or conservation of energy, has been received, and sundry phenomena duly ranged under their proper categories.

Under these circumstances, I ask of modern science, "What is light?" And science answers: "Light was formerly supposed to be a kind of subtle and impalpable matter; but it is now known to be force or energy." I ask again: "What is heat?" and again science replies: "Heat, like light, was once thought to be a kind of matter, and as such received the name of caloric; but it is now known to be force or energy." I ask a third time: "What is electricity?" And once more science replies: "Electricity, too, was till lately accounted as matter; we used to speak of the electric 'fluid,' but now that term is unscientific: for electricity is not matter, not a fluid, but force or energy." I then inquire: "Are these three, then, one and the same thing?" And science says: "No! Heat is quite distinct from light, and light from heat, and electricity from the other two: you must not *confound* these *persona*." And then I say: "Since each of these is distinct from the others, and yet light is energy, heat is energy, electricity is energy—are there three energies?" And science answers emphatically: "No! There is only one energy; one infinite and eternal energy, from which all things proceed!"

Strange, this paradox, this defiance of the multiplication-table! And stranger still, that one can take this theological formula, which the divines of fifteen hundred years ago gathered out of the Book of Revelation, and by merely changing terms can convert it into a scientific formula which philosophers have gathered out of the Book of Nature only within the last score of years or so!

Let us see how this theological formula would read, *mutatis mutandis*, as a scientific formula relating to light, heat, and electricity.

"For like as we are compelled by physical verity to acknowledge every *persona* by itself to be force or

energy: so are we forbidden by modern science to say, There be three forces, or three energies."

Now, I do not wish it to be understood that the God of our conception is identical with the physicist's energy. We do not worship blind, mechanical force: we do not conceive of the Supreme Being as a sort of automaton god. Still the analogy is very striking; an analogy, be it observed, undreamt of in Bishop Butler's days. And so we may well argue that "the eternal laws of existence," as interpreted by modern science, instead of showing up the Athanasian formula as nonsensical, have served to elucidate it, and warrant us in continuing "to acknowledge the glory of the Eternal Trinity, and in the power of the Divine Majesty to worship the Unity."<sup>1</sup>

#### THE CATHOLICITY OF THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.

IN COMMENT upon the Rev. Mr. Low's expositions, I would say that we, too, who believe in the Religion of Science, embrace the "catholic faith," not the Roman Catholic, nor the Greek Catholic, nor the Anglican Catholic faith, but simply and purely the "catholic faith." Catholic is that which is universally acceptable, that which no one can refuse to believe; it is objective and undeniable truth. And what is more catholic than science! Indeed, catholicity is the nature and characteristic feature of scientific statements in opposition to mere opinion, to hypothetical assumptions, to unfounded speculations and theories.

Mr. Low endorses this basic principle of the Religion of Science, for he says:

"I am free to confess that if this dogma [of the Triunity] is opposed to scientific truth we must either give up the dogma or give up truth."

There is no objection to explanations of the Trinity such as are suggested by our esteemed contributor, but we venture to submit that there are other modes of energy than heat, light, and electricity. There is mechanical motion, and, in addition, there are the vital forces which appear in physiological brain and muscle movements, being another mode of energy that is quite distinct and *sui generis*. Thus the simile is inappropriate, as it may also serve to explain a fourfold or fivefold unity. Mr. Low, following Mr. Spencer's philosophy, says:

"All phenomena are comprehended under two categories,—matter and motion,—as in the famous definition of evolution at the close of Chapter XVII. of *First Principles*."

Mr. Spencer, in the connexion referred to by Mr. Low, has forgotten to mention the third category, which is form; and it is the omission of this third category which renders matter and motion mysterious in Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Matter, Energy, and Form are three disparate entities, three universals, and yet they form an inseparable unity; each one be-

ing a definite reality and yet existing only through and in the two others. I do not say that this is the meaning of the Christian Trinity, I only use it as an illustration of what the fathers of the Church who formulated the dogma thought by a "trinity in one." And, in my opinion, this is a better explanation of the trinity of God than the enumeration of three modes of energy, for matter, energy, and form are exhaustive, as they comprise the three categories under which *all* the qualities of objective reality (not, however, the features of subjectivity) can be subsumed.

I am astonished to find that Mr. Low quotes Mr. Spencer in support of his catholic faith, for Mr. Spencer is its most outspoken enemy. And this is the difference between Mr. Spencer's and our opposition to the old faith. Mr. Spencer attacks the traditional catholic faith, because he objects as a matter of principle to any kind of catholicity, philosophical as well as religious—a position which, since Huxley, goes by the name of agnosticism, while we reject the traditional catholic faith, because we regard it, if literally understood, as pseudo-catholic; we do not deny catholicity as such; we are not negative; on the contrary, we uphold catholicity, and propose to preserve the sternness and definiteness of doctrine; but we attempt to discard the wrong metaphysics and religion, and to replace the symbol by a statement of facts.

Agnosticism denies the possibility of solving the main problems of existence; but any one who carefully and critically reads Mr. Spencer's *First Principles* will find that his agnosticism is simply due to a confusion of thought. Mr. Spencer confounds the issues of his arguments, and then complains about the unintelligibility of the subject. He is, however, easily comforted by the idea that the problem under consideration is too profound to be grasped by mortal mind. Thus a boy may stir the waters of the village pond and then declare that its depth is unfathomable.

We do not regard (as does Mr. Low) Mr. Spencer's philosophy as "the last word of philosophy;" nor can we grant that the question, "What is spirit?" is unanswerable, and that "argue as we may on the lines of pure reason, we shall inevitably find ourselves at last entangled in Kant's 'paralogisms' and 'antinomies.'" This, indeed, is exactly the work of *The Open Court*, to proclaim a new line of thought, which will supersede both the old dogmatism and the more modern agnosticism by propounding a new orthodoxy, which is the orthodoxy of provable truth. There is no true catholicism except the catholicism of science. Science is an exact and objective formulation of truth, and truth is the rock of ages upon which our religion must be built.<sup>1</sup>

P. C.

<sup>1</sup>The various problems touched upon in the present article have been repeatedly treated in *The Open Court*. On the nature of soul, mind, or spirit,

## A SYMPOSIUM ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

NEVER has the editorial management of *The Open Court* been more severely criticised than during the last fortnight. We are in receipt of a number of letters which, although written in a friendly spirit, unanimsly condemn the publication of Mr. Moncure D. Conway's article "Our Cleveland Christmas." This very storm of indignation is to us the best evidence that the public upholds the President in his policy. And even such men as ex-Governor G. Koerner, who like Professor von Holst rejects the Monroe Doctrine, would not countenance Mr. Conway's propositions. As to the non-admittance of articles which present ideas that in our opinion are utterly wrong and offensive, I beg to differ with our friends. I believe that it is always best to let everybody speak out plainly what he believes. We may feel indignant when other people passionately express views that hurt our most sacred beliefs or dearest national ideals, or even contain personal insults, but we must remember that so long as we cannot listen to a passionate argument with patience, the illusion of selfhood is still upon us and we cannot as yet be judges in our own case.

We offer here a selection of expressions on the Monroe Doctrine, and at the risk of offending our patriotic readers again, we open our symposium with an unabridged communication from Mr. W. D. Lighthall of Montreal, representing a Canadian view of the question. Undoubtedly he says many things which will tempt many of our readers to take pen in hand for a reply, but I would suggest that not every argument need be answered, nor is it necessary to refute every one-sided or otherwise erroneous statement. I request our readers to look upon Mr. Lighthall's communication more as an expression of views that are held beyond our boundary line to the North than as a challenge for controversy.<sup>1</sup> It is always wise to keep informed about the views which large classes of people hold; for convictions are facts that have to be reckoned with in life.

## The View of a Canadian.

In the article on "New Weapons of the United States Army" in last February's *Century*, the closing paragraph opens: "It is absolutely certain that the practice which has existed in this country of waiting for a declaration of hostilities before inaugurating defensive and offensive preparations can no longer be followed. 'We defeated England twice and we can do it again' is an oft-repeated boast that creates a pleasant tinkle in our ears. . . ." That this account of a boast and a desire is an accurate statement of a feeling

see the article, What Is Mind? (*Soul of Man*, pp. 23-24). For the statement that energy (be it scrutable or inscrutable) cannot be regarded as God, see *The Open Court*, No. 212, p. 2757, in a discussion of Professor Haeckel's religious conceptions. For a criticism of *First Principles*, see the editorial "Spencerian Agnosticism," in No. 212, p. 2951. Compare also the articles, "Are There Things in Themselves" and "The Metaphysical  $x$  in Cognition" (*The Monist*, Vol. II., No. 2, p. 225, and Vol. V., No. 4, p. 510).

<sup>1</sup> We restrict our reply to Mr. Lighthall to the statement that it is *not true* that "the Union Jack never appears on an American street without insult."

in the average American breast has been proved by the recent outbreak of "the Cleveland war."<sup>1</sup> Concerning the feeling in question therefore, I trust the words I say, as a descendant of men who rendered unquestionable services during both the Revolution and 1812, will be recognised as necessary reflexions of a plain-speaking friend, and that the ozone in them will not be unacceptable to those who honestly desire a reasoned patriotism. What is the origin of this intense desire, then, to "defeat England," a nation profoundly friendly? Why is it that while the American flag can be, and has been, carried from one end to the other of the British Isles with acclamations, the Union Jack never appears on an American street without insult? From long inquiry on the subject I have come to the conclusion that it is a result of the manner in which popular and school-accounts of the Revolution are written. To that period of course the national pride rightly looks back as the epoch of the origin of American liberty. But in what antiquated and laughable forms is it dressed! A critical school of American history exists, but Justin Winsor, Mellen Chamberlain, Moses Coit Tyler and their like are too slow for these dime writers. "The British" of those days figure as a parallel to the Pawnees of the other branch of popular literature—a race of red-coated instead of red-skinned brutes and pusillanimous cowards: "the British" of to-day are pictured as still unchanged in melodramatic characteristic and institutions, and still preoccupied with, not the management of the affairs of their fourth of the human race, but with designs of "descending on New York" and reimposing "monarchy" on this continent; the liberal party, "that brilliant band of the friends of liberty" as they have been called, who in Parliament fought for the cause of the colonists as being one with that of the British masses, are included as indiscriminately in the condemnation together with all their actual and spiritual descendants; no "Tory" is allowed a conscience or an argument still less a regret in his confiscations and exiles; every patriot was a white-headed boy—a full-fledged Patrick Henry, a Paul Revere, and also a Buffalo Bill;—and every "patriot" of to-day is a descendant who inherits their wrongs, their glories, and their prowess. Is this an overstatement, I ask of any candid man? The form may vary, but the substance at least is what all my good little cousins were brought up upon.

Now two serious dangers exist in the state of things which such an education produces. One is the external danger of bringing upon the country the sufferings of a criminal war. Those who have made a study of the original facts of 1776 and 1812 know a little of what that means—and they know that "the oft-repeated boast" above mentioned, is a boast without foundation. In the war of 1776 the patriots did not "defeat England" in any such sense as to flatter vanity. The conclusive testimony of Washington was that "night does not more surely follow day" than that without the immediate aid of France, the cause was lost. In 1812 the war proclaimed by Madison, was, like the Cleveland one, for political effect. As everybody knew at the time, its actual object was the conquest of Canada, whose handful of inhabitants it was thought were defenceless while England was fighting Napoleon for the liberties of the world. The war ignominiously failed in Canada. American sea commerce was totally destroyed. Washington was captured. Several American armies and generals were taken. And the number of American prisoners was enormously greater than that of their opponents. Conveniently ignoring these trifling details, the Jingo historians, inheriting their facts from the Wooden Nutmeg Age, have clothed it with some sort of glory as "the Naval War" on account of about a dozen victories of ship over ship. Unfortunately common sense insists on pursuing the

<sup>1</sup> The protests of innumerable leading persons in favor of moderation and good-feeling have, it is true, shown that the best brains and hearts are for the most part exceptions but they are obviously a minority and more or less ahead of the generation as a whole.

inquiry deeper, and a table of guns, crews, and tonnage of the vessels concerned shows that these victories were due to the simple policy of building larger ships and equipping them with from a third again to twice, the number of crew and weight of metal.

The truth was—and here is the second and greatest danger, the internal one—that the war of 1812, unlike that of 1776, was a mean war, entered into from no sober thought nor high moral motive. Armies cannot stand up to defend frippery reasons against men fighting sternly for their homes and consciences. The same principle applies most seriously to the welding of a nation situated like the United States. Citizens whose ideal of nationality is an antiquated hatred or any other outcome of a history built upon vanity, illiberality, and the idea that impatience is freedom and rashness courage, are not the right cement for the huge regions and stirring elements of the republic. Habits cannot be confined to one set of actions. Readiness to rush into wars grows on the same bough as readiness to rush into rebellions: covetousness of foreign territory is the same appetite as covetousness by one class of the rights of another; political recklessness must produce not one but many political disorders; unfairness on the outside means like unfairness within; and the refusal to study history soberly must result in heavy losses in the making of history. Surely recent events have shown that this question of common-sense education in history is worthy of the careful attention of all, and particularly of the national patriot, who ought to hold the same principles in all countries.

MONTREAL.

W. D. LIGHTHALL.

#### The View of English Authors.

. . . The present is neither the time nor the place, nor are we the persons to deal with the crisis on its technical issues, but it should not be difficult for any of us as men and women of reading and imagination, not liable to be carried away by political passion, to understand the general bearings of the case on both sides. We, on our part, are prepared to understand that the United States, as the greatest nation in America, looks with proper jealousy on the extension of European powers of influence and territory on the American continent. And you, on your part, will not fail to realise that European powers in general, and Great Britain in particular, have never made any effort to enlarge their dominions on your continent at any time within the past hundred years.

There is no anti-American feeling among Englishmen, and it is impossible that there can be any anti-English feeling among Americans. For two such nations, then, to take up arms against each other would be civil war, not differing from your calamitous struggle of thirty years ago, except that the cause would be immeasurably less human, less tragic, and less inevitable.

We ask you to join us in helping to protect that future. Poets and creators, scholars and philosophers, men and women of imagination and of vision, we call upon you in the exercise of your far-reaching influence, to save our literature from dishonor, and our race from lasting injury.—Extracts from a circular of the Society of Authors, 4 Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, W. C.

Thomas Jefferson's Letter to Mr. Rush.

[Here reproduced at the suggestion of E. P. Powell of Clinton, N. Y.]

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a settled interest distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own. While Europe is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should be to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation most of all could disturb us in this pur-

suit. She now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system of keeping out of our land all foreign powers; of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nation. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion that this will prevent war instead of provoking it. Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of anyone in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance calling itself Holy.

"But we have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire to our own Confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries bordering on it as well as all those whose waters flow into it would fill up the measure of our political well-being. Yet as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, without war; and its independence, which is our second interest, can be secured without it, I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and accepting its independence with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association at the expense of war and her enmity.

"I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions; that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country. But that we will oppose with all our means the forcible interposition of any other powers, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think it therefore advisable that the executive should encourage the British government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these letters by an assurance of his concurrence with them as far as his authority goes.

JEFFERSON."

#### E. P. Powell's Comments on Jefferson's Letter.

Here [in Thomas Jefferson's letter] we see clearly (1) that the proposition to create territorial stability on the American continents was of English origin; (2) that it recognised the *status quo* as permanent—except by the voice of the people of any State. (3) That it not only debarred the Holy Alliance from forcible interference; but it bound England and the United States to make no aggressions on their neighbors. (4) It was recognised as an advance in general international law; and we know that as such it not only settled the affairs of America but of Europe. From that date national aggression was held to be an international grievance, and has rarely occurred. (5) It was considered a movement in the behalf of peace, and not of war; and so it operated. It was a distinct alliance of the most stable elements of civilisation to hold the rest in restraint. (6) It did not in any way concern the settlement of boundaries; for the boundaries of South American States have never been fixable beyond question, except when rivers drew

the lines. Our own boundaries with Great Britain have been in dispute, and have been settled not quite to the satisfaction of either party.

Perfectly defined and absolutely distinct as the "American System" was, as the "Monroe Doctrine" it became in after years a very misty affair in the minds of the people. It reappeared as an excuse for the filibustering excursions of the Fifties. Pollard argued that "the object as well as the intention of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in Central America would but be the legitimate one of a reversion of that country to its natural destiny. . . . We are sworn by a solemn declaration of policy and by the eternal oath of American liberty. One step towards the accomplishment of this destiny, one advance toward the rearing of that great southern empire, whose seat is eventually to be in Central America, and whose boundaries are to enclose the Gulf of Mexico, was the memorable expedition of William Walker to Nicaragua. It was to found in a glorious land of promise the institutions of the South, to extend them to other inviting countries of Spanish America, and on the doubly secured foundation of those institutions and of military ideas of government to build up the great tropical empire of America." A policy of peace and non-aggression was thus expounded into a policy of aggression and territorial enlargement.

The application of historic facts to the present relations of the United States and Great Britain is easily made by every reader. If it be our duty to establish an American protectorate over the two American continents the policy is our own, and should be weighed as such. It does not devolve upon us as a duty from any principle enunciated by Canning and Jefferson, or any position assumed by Monroe and Adams.

*The Memorial of the Representatives of the Religious Society of Friends. To the President of the United States:*

We have participated with many others of our fellow-citizens in anxiety and regret at the threatened disturbance of amicable relations between our government and that of Great Britain, relative to the boundary dispute between the latter and Venezuela in South America. The efforts made by the Executive and Cabinet of the United States for months past to induce Great Britain to refer this question to arbitration meets with our cordial approbation and sympathy. We believe this is the true and Christian solution of all differences that may arise between either individuals or nations. . . . But we think our Government is liable to lose the firm ground thus assumed in its peaceful intervention between the contending parties by holding out a menace against one of them, that in case she did not accept our good offices in the mode we had prescribed, the United States would "resist by every means in its power, etc." . . . Wars, in many instances, owe their origin more to the offended pride of rulers on trivial occasions than to the invasion of the just rights or property of the combatants. . . . We feel that any occasion should be carefully avoided which might kindle the flames of animosity between two of the foremost nations of the globe, who are bound to each other by the ties of a common language and race, commercial intercourse, and Christian civilisation.

Signed by direction and on behalf of a meeting of the aforesaid representatives held in Philadelphia on the third day of the First month, 1896.

JOSEPH WALTON, Clerk.

*A Letter from a Subscriber.*

A strong impression rests on me that you made a mistake in admitting Mr. Conway's political screed, "Our Cleveland Christmas," into *The Open Court*. A delightful writer on many subjects; but like preachers generally, when they undertake to treat on political subjects, they expose the weak places in their make-up and talk nonsense. Such a paper as this is as much out of

place in a journal like *The Open Court* as garlic would be in a Charlotte Russe.

I always open my copy as soon as I reach my "den" after its arrival, and read everything in it without rising. Thence, through the week, occasional references give me the full flavor of all in it. Such an article as this of Conway's comes in like a crashing continuous discord in the rendering of a musical gem by a perfect orchestra or performer. If he will read Justin McCarthy's *History of Our Own Times*, since the accession of Victoria, he will find enough in the conduct of his beloved England to make him taste gall, without vilifying the American executive. Only the spirit of long patience can forgive him for writing and sending such an article to you. Your able review of the matter and caustic rebuke of him does credit to your head and heart; but unless you intend to turn *The Open Court* into a journal on national economics, there should have been no occasion for your reply, which hardly compensates for the admission of the article. . . . It is like profanity in a funeral sermon. You may have readers who will be in sympathy with it as to matter, time, and place; but scientific searchers after ultimate truths cannot be, and I think it will be unpleasant to many and acceptable to few. However, I will speak only for myself, on whom it jars with a painful sense of impropriety and injustice.

My great regard for you and admiration of your earnest and able work—grown into a feeling of friendship, although I never saw you—impels me to speak as I feel, but wholly in kindness.

C. H. REEVE.

*Dean Craik's Opinion.*

Christ Church Cathedral, Louisville, Ky.

*To the Editor of The Open Court:*

The admission into the columns of an American paper of an article so unfair, so partisan, and in truth so disloyal as that by Moncure D. Conway, in your issue of January 16, is entirely too much of an "Open Court" for me, and I return your subscription blank unsigned.

Even the temperate, fair, and just discussion of the same question by Prof. E. D. Cope, and your own repudiation of Mr. Conway's sentiments do not entirely clear you, in my judgment. Truly yours,

C. E. CRAIK, Dean.

*From an Octogenarian.*

*To the Editor of the Open Court:*

I write to thank you for your remarks upon "our mutual friend" M. D. Conway's "Our Cleveland Christmas." Like yourself I could not agree with Conway. You wrote as one to the manor born, while he as one that had forgotten that he was an American citizen. I cannot, however, but think that his criticisms are in some measure just—but, as I have said, I think you wrote wisely and well.

In all probability I shall not be able to read your paper many years longer, having passed my "Three score and twenty-two" years of life. Yet hope while I do live and possess my mental faculties, that I may have the privilege of reading the paper.

I trust you will excuse me for writing to you—I could not help doing so. Wishing you every success, I am sincerely yours,

M. G. WHITE.

*Remarks from Ex-Governor Koerner.*

Conway's article does not touch the real question, and his criticism of our institutions goes too far. But yet it cannot be well answered, when he denounces our system, by saying to England "You are another."

The only sensible article on the Monroe Doctrine is yours. But in your article there is, in my opinion, some misapprehension in regard to public opinion here. Nine hundred and ninety-nine

out of a thousand of our even intelligent people know nothing about the Monroe Doctrine.

I still consider it a duty to insist on a correct interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine has not been followed all along. Just the contrary. Seward asked the French to withdraw, but based it by no means on the Monroe Doctrine, which he almost repudiated in his dispatch to Motley, and in a dispatch to me, when I was Minister to Spain, which I will take occasion to publish.

As Mr. Gilman of Hopkins University is one of the Commissioners, I have read carefully what he says about the Doctrine to some extent, in his biography of Monroe, written in 1883. He is mistaken in many respects, and as this is quite important, I may write an article for *The Open Court* on that subject.

G. KOERNER,

[The article referred to has been written and will appear in the next *Open Court*.—Ed.]

The editorial position on the Monroe Doctrine has been sufficiently stated in No. 338 of *The Open Court*.

P. C.

### LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

BY AMOS WATERS.

*Theism as a Science*, by the REV. CHARLES VOYSEY, B. A., Minister of the Theistic Church in Swallow Street, Piccadilly, is a book published by Williams & Norgate, London. Its author some thirty years back was an interesting personality in the movement of religious liberalism. The Vicar of Healaugh, a Yorkshire village, he was, nevertheless, exercising the minds of the orthodox throughout the land with a series of volumes entitled *The Sling and the Stone*, which embodied the best results of criticism in relation to revelation. The sensation caused by these publications was pronounced and led to the famous heresy trial at York in 1859, when the ecclesiastical tribunal pronounced for the expulsion of the intrepid enthusiast. Mr. Voysey preached his farewell sermon to his weeping flock on the vicarage lawn, the church-doors being locked against him. An appeal to the Privy Council in 1870 was unavailing. Then it was that great things were expected of him. The promise was unfulfilled. Mr. Voysey now ministers to a small and select congregation who accept his deliverances as papal oracles, and his occasional volumes are discussed because of his interesting past. One secret of his failure has been in his jealousy of science, and his petulant ignoring of philosophy. His theism is personal and dogmatic with no aid from, or appeal to, the revelation of science.

*Theism as a Science* affirms the science of God. Reason, conscience, and love are held to unite in admission of evidence of one "superhuman Being ruling and ordering the complex forces of nature," who sits supreme as Lord and Governor of the universe. The argument of design is claimed to prove that mind and intelligence exist and work apart from, and independently of the human brain. The contemplation of a tree by a man leads up to the conviction that, as here are two different organisations, one higher because of intellect, emotion, and locomotion than the other, yet unable to create that other, so there an eye of mightier contemplation than the eye of man, an intellect and will transcending the human in greater measure than man is superior to the tree.

The argument from conscience is eloquently stated—"that voice which hushes our cry for pleasure, which will not endure a single selfish plea, but demands unquestioning obedience, and bids us fall down in the very dust before the Majesty of Duty—that voice, I say, we all in our secret hearts revere, whether or not we obey it as we should. At least we pay to it the homage of our inmost souls, and feel how great and grand it is to be its slave" (p. 54). Conscience, Mr. Voysey proceeds, conscience is the reve-

lation of what God is—for this power which compels a deliberate self-surrender brings us face to face with a Power which is absolutely transcendent over all nature, and reveals to our mind the existence of a spiritual world in and around us, to which the laws and forces of the visible world are subordinate.

Next Mr. Voysey deals with the mystery of evil—of death, pain, and sin, and appeals to our ignorance of the final purpose of God by way of reconciling evil with infinite love. Having sketched the plan of his reasoning we leave his book with a tinge of lament. Too much preaching—too little philosophy, else Charles Voysey would have been a fascinating and powerful influence in the councils of cultured liberalism.

\* \* \*

In *The Ethical Problem*<sup>1</sup> DR. PAUL CARUS finely says: "There are sometimes dark moments in our lives when we do not know how to decide, and the decision as to what is right and proper may be very difficult. In such moments we should soar above the narrowness of the present life and look down upon our own fate from the higher standpoint of eternity. Let us in such moments imagine we had died; that we are no more, and that our lives have long been ended. While our bodies rest in the grave, our deeds, our thoughts, our words continue to influence humanity. The idea of eternal rest will calm our passions and soothe our anxieties. When such peace comes over our soul, then let us confess to ourselves what we wish we had done while alive" (p. 63).

This passage in its philosophy singularly anticipates a kindred deliverance in *College Sermons*<sup>2</sup> by DR. JOWETT, the late beloved Master of Balliol, who just published:

"The considerations which have been placed before you in this sermon relate chiefly to our earthly life, and yet they may receive correction and enlargement from the thought of another. For there is an eternal element even in worldly success, when, amid all the rivalries of this world, a man has sought to live according to the will of God, and not according to the opinion of men. Whatever there was of justice, or purity, or disinterestedness in him, or Christlike virtue, or resignation, or love of the truth, shall never pass away. When a man feels that earthly rewards are but for a moment, and that his true self and true life have yet to appear: when he recognises that the education of the individual beginning here is continued hereafter, and like the education of the human race, is ever going on: when he is conscious that he is part of a whole, and himself and all other creatures are in the hands of God; then his mind may be at rest: he has nothing more to fear: he has attained to peace and is equally fit to live or die."

In the person of Jowett saint and sceptic equally contended, and the literature now accumulating around his name and revered memory remarkably proves that the fervor of the new faith happily combines with the enthusiasm of the old morality to humanly attract all cultured souls. In Mr. Lionel Tollemache's sketch of *Benjamin Jowett*<sup>3</sup> we are advised that Jowett once said of an orthodox apologist, "He is trying to pitch the standard of belief too high for the present age." In morality and ethics Jowett appealed to the age between its spirit of discordant incredulity and its remembered love of the spiritual. But no sooner had he convinced his pupils that success was desirable, than he disturbed that conviction with sceptical questioning, which led up to the loftier outlook visioned by himself and Dr. Carus in the passages quoted above. Thus the saint evolved from the sceptic. The balanced fascination of these two influences accounts largely for the love of those who knew him not, while the beauty of his soul, the power of his intellect, the brilliance of his wit, and his magnetic personal charm have made of his friends and pupils worshippers even when not disciples.

<sup>1</sup> The Open Court Publishing Company.

<sup>2</sup> John Murray, publisher.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Arnold, publisher.

It was natural, after years of excessive praise, that the voices of reaction should assail the genius of GEORGE ELIOT. But the current republications of her works<sup>1</sup> is a confounding answer to the detractors. More ardent in critical scepticism and with an austere silence anent the primal and ultimate problems of life that was impossible to Jowett, George Eliot was yet the greater pleading influence for imperious laws of conduct. In a memorable passage Mr. R. H. Hutton tells how she once on the night of a rainy June at Oxford, passionately insisted how inconceivable was God, yet how peremptory and absolute was duty. Like a shining Sibyl in the gloom she withdrew the two scrolls of promise, leaving the third only awful with inevitable fate.

Yet in the higher if not in the vulgar sense, George Eliot proclaimed immortality as insistently as the devoutest exponent of monism. Witness her aspiration to "join the choir invisible of those immortal dead who live again in minds made better by their presence." Her scorn

"For miserable aims that end in self,"

and her rejoicing

"In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,  
And with their mild persistence urge man's search  
To vaster issues,"

imply the motto of Gustav Freytag's *The Lost Manuscript*,<sup>2</sup> i. e., "A noble human life does not end on earth. It continues in the minds and deeds of friends, as well as in the thoughts and the activity of the nation." And her reverence for every form of religion implies an underlying recognition of the Supreme but Impersonal Ideal, the God of scientific revelation acknowledged of monism and reverent agnosticism.

The new edition of her works has provoked Mrs. E. Lynn Linton to characteristic and jealous depreciation. According to the lesser, the greater woman was "so consciously 'George Eliot'—so interpenetrated head and heel, inside and out, with the sense of her importance as the great novelist and profound thinker of her generation, as to make her society a little overwhelming, leaving on baser creatures the impression of having been rolled very flat indeed."<sup>3</sup>

Mr. T. H. ESCOTT, M.A.—until recently editor of the *Fortnightly Review*—in a volume of reminiscences entitled *Platform, Press, and Politics*,<sup>4</sup> amusingly sketches the order of procedure for visitors to the shrine of George Eliot:

"The etiquette dominating the premises sacred to her who wrote *Adam Bede*, and to him who tried to popularise Comte, was overpoweringly severe. The positivist himself, with an air of worshipping proprietorship, met his guests on the threshold, and with something between a nod and a sigh signified that here a hat might be left, there an umbrella deposited; or that yonder was a vase for receiving the votive flowers sacred to the goddess, which visitors often brought. Inside the chamber wherein SHE sat, a space was marked off, behind which the neophytes were not permitted to go. Initiated bystanders informed those resorting for the first time to the shrine, that only after probationary years could the rite of presentation, if ever, arrive. Pigott, the household's 'tame cat,' had of course long enjoyed this privilege. To a percentage of candidates it never came at all. Though they had seen the Sybil in her splendor, they were not permitted by her possessor to touch her garment's hem."

## CORRESPONDENCE.

### "THE HOLY SPIRIT, THE FEMALE OF THE GODHEAD."

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

The article in *The Open Court* of January 9 upon "The Holy Spirit, the Female of the Godhead," is interesting, as the editor

<sup>1</sup> Messrs. Blackwood, publishers. <sup>2</sup> Open Court Publishing Company.

<sup>3</sup> *The Woman at Home*, September, 1895. <sup>4</sup> J. W. Arrowsmith, publisher.

notes, in showing how we are constantly reverting to old methods in working out our theological problems, though it be unconsciously. This idea of the Trinity is older than Christian theology. Philo, who was a Jew of Alexandria, born 20-10 B. C., makes use of exactly this conception in treating of the nature of the Deity. Long before his time it was common among Jewish writers to speak of God as a Father, the Father of men and of the world. (Isaiah, liiii., 16; xiv., 8.) In Job and in Proverbs and still more fully in Ecclesiasticus, and Wisdom, the wisdom of God is spoken of as a person distinct from God, and is always spoken of as a female, *sophia* the Greek term for wisdom being feminine in gender. Philo carried this idea further. He not only speaks of God as the Father of the world, but he expands the metaphor of Fatherhood into that of a marriage. He conceives God as the Father and His Wisdom as the Mother, and says: "And she, receiving the seed of God, with fruitful birth-pangs brought forth this world, His visible Son, only and well beloved."

How far Philo owes his thought to Jewish sources, and how far to the conceptions of Greek philosophy, of which he was a student, I am unable to say. This conception of the Godhead was not uncommon in the time of early Christianity, and is to be found in some of the gnostic schools. While Philo used this triune metaphor, he was not a trinitarian; but it is evident that such expressions and conceptions paved the way for the subsequent trinitarianism of the Christian Church. However fast one may hold the dogma of the Trinity to-day, a study of the history of human thought shows it to be a development of one of the many attempts to explain the creation of the world, the presence of evil, and human redemption.

R. F. JOHNNOT.

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