

THE OPEN COURT.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

DEVOTED TO THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.

No. 433. (VOL. IX.—50.)

CHICAGO, DECEMBER 12, 1895.

} One Dollar per Year,
} Single Copies, 5 Cents.

COPYRIGHT BY THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING Co.—Reprints are permitted only on condition of giving full credit to Author and Publisher.

THE OLD THEOLOGY AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE REV. GEORGE J. LOW.

DOES the Christian Church realise the change of front in all secular learning which has taken place in the last half-century? Does she ever consider that some adjustment is required in her teachings, to adapt them to that change of front? Does she ever think of the mischief resulting from a Bourbon policy of learning nothing and unlearning nothing?

The Christian minister,—no matter of what denomination,—if he has a soul above and beyond the welfare of his own special congregation, must needs be often troubled over the present condition of Christendom. And that, not only because it is divided into so many sects, but because so many people belong to no sect at all, and so many others, though nominally attached to some form of Christianity, in point of fact live in total disregard of all religion. In the *Forum* of June, 1892, President Hyde of Bowdoin College, writing on the "Impending Paganism of New England," draws a gloomy picture of the state of religion there. He shows that in fifteen counties over one-half of the population report themselves as not attending any church whatever; while the churches themselves are for the most part dragging out a miserable and precarious existence, their "spiritual life dependent on sporadic revivals," their financial solvency on "sewing circles, fairs, and entertainments," and their pastorates in a constant state of flux.

Similar complaints come from other writers respecting other parts of the continent, and many suggestions are made for bettering matters. "How to keep the young men in the Church," is a problem widely discussed; should we not study how to keep the elders also? For frequently the young men of the present day don't come to church because their fathers don't.

Various causes are assigned for this defection; but I fear the most serious cause of all does not receive due consideration, and that is:—a general conviction of the strained relations which exist between Christian doctrines and modern learning. The pastor who talks frankly with the people—or, rather, to whom people will frankly talk—will soon learn that there are very many, even of the regular attendants at the ser-

vices of the sanctuary, who cannot accept the doctrines propounded there. Those doctrines are, they deem, out of harmony with what they learn elsewhere. There is in them no "analogy between revealed religion and the constitution and course of nature," as it is now interpreted, but rather a great antagonism. What they hear from the pulpit seems to them irreconcilable with what they have heard from the professor's chair in the university. And seeing that nowadays all our smartest young people, of both sexes, go to the universities, the churches are in danger of losing, not only the young men, but also the young women.

It is related by some one (I think Professor Drummond) of some eminent scientist (I think Faraday), who was at the same time a devout Christian, that when his researches conflicted with his religious prejudices, he found the only way to quiet his conscience was to shut out all religious sentiment while in the laboratory, and then to equally shut out all scientific truth in his hours of devotion. Of course, such a *modus vivendi* could not thoroughly satisfy any one: it must eventually make one feel that he was a sort of theological Jekyll and scientific Hyde. But is not this double existence enacted now by many who "go to church" regularly, to satisfy their religious emotions, yet, when there, hear dogmas propounded which their intellects cannot accept?

And here let me define my position. I do not think the world would reject Christianity because of the miraculous element in it. Men in general feel the need of a revealed religion, and a revelation of any kind must needs be supernatural. Nor do I think they would reject the great facts of Christianity as contained in, let us say, the Apostles' Creed. But they cannot receive the rationale of those facts, the philosophical systems built on them—the theology of the pulpit, in short.

Christian theology, in the course of its history, has at all times been colored by the dominant philosophy of the day; and this was natural, and, indeed, inevitable. In the writings of the Post-Nicene fathers it was more than colored with Greek philosophy; it was adulterated with it. In the Reformation age the new discoveries and the "new learning" gave philosophy and theology a new direction, not only among the

reformers, but even in the Roman Catholic Church. And now—with the New Learning of this century, causing our ideas of almost everything to undergo a complete reversal—the time has come when theology should adapt itself to the changed currents of thought.

For effecting this purpose a great advantage is possessed by the Church of Rome in what she is pleased to call the "Living Voice." When the opportune time comes she can pronounce on any opinion as to whether it is "*de fide*," or only "tenable," or "temerarious," or "heretical."¹ And then, when the times change, the Living Voice can, if requisite, change its tone; as the cases of Copernicus, Galileo, and others testify. On the other hand, a great disadvantage under which most Protestant bodies labor, is the having a "written constitution," from which they dare not deviate. The more such a document enters into particulars, the more difficulty oppresses the body bound by it: for when new light acquired by science throws new light on religion, and modification is suggested—"then comes the tug of war."²

But it is pretty evident that no ecclesiastical body as yet realises the complete revolution which the new philosophy is forcing on the world of thought. There has come about a change of front—a different point of view—a reversal of what we may call the dominant idea—of all philosophy; which I would express in this wise:

1. From the time of Pythagoras until of late the dominant idea was:—

There is something lost which we are seeking to recover.

2. In modern philosophy the dominant idea is:—

There is something never yet attained towards which we tend.

The contrast between these opposing ideas may be seen by comparing, let us say, the "Phædo" of Plato with the psychology of Mr. Herbert Spencer and other moderns. We can understand, in studying the "Phædo," how the idea of "something lost" originated. Plato's insistence upon those strange flashes of "reminiscence," which we all have at times, as the grounds for maintaining the immortality (and the pre-existence) of the soul, was formerly looked upon as sound reasoning. But modern physiology has been busy picking the brain to pieces, and has accounted for those "reminiscences," or as Dr. Draper (*Conflict Between Religion and Science*, page 132) calls them,

¹ See "The Verdict of Rome on the Happiness in Hell," by Father Clarke, S. J., in the *Nineteenth Century* magazine of September, 1893.

² An illustration of this was shown in May, 1886, when the General Assembly of the South Presbyterian Church, meeting in Augusta, Ga., adopted by a vote of 137 to 13 a resolution declaring the evolution theory as applied to man unscriptural and calculated to lead to the denial of the fundamental truths of the Christian faith. While at the same time eminent Roman Catholics like Prof. St. George Mivart were propounding these doctrines with impunity. See also the *Contemporary Review* of July, 1895, for a remarkable deliverance on the subject by Sig. A. Fogazzaro.

"vestiges of ganglionic impressions." These faded flashes of memory, which some circumstance, trivial it may be, happens for a moment to redevelop in our brains, no doubt first impressed men with that idea of "something lost," which pervaded all their mythology. The story of Demeter, of Prometheus and Pandora, of the departed Golden Age, and a number of such allusions to "something lost," will occur to the classical scholar; and according to late researches all the earlier races seem to have been possessed with the same idea. Dr. Cunningham Geikie (*Hours with the Bible*, Vol. I., Chap. 7) furnishes us with numerous Aryan and Semitic myths concerning original humanity, which are looked upon by the orthodox as corroborations, by the critical as the sources, of the account in Genesis, Chapters ii. and iii. All heathen philosophy, it seems, was based on the idea of a primeval state of bliss, which was lost by some catastrophe caused by the perversity of men and the wrath of the gods. This leading thought was incorporated into the Church's theology, not by the earlier fathers, but by St. Augustine and his followers in the fifth century.

Now this idea—of a Golden Age of physical and moral perfection which has been lost—is very hard to reconcile with modern thought. For when could it have occurred? Certainly not in the Silurian or Carboniferous period; or later when the huge saurians, the

"Dragons of the prime
That tare each other in their slime,"

were the lords of nature. It could not have been in the Tertiary Age, in pre-glacial or post-glacial times. In fact, any period of time, be it ever so short, on any part of this planet, when any living being could have passed a passionless and painless existence, is inconceivable to modern thought. Nature is crowded with vestiges of the past reaching back to untold cycles; our very bodies, so physiologists say, are museums of the relics of what we once were. But these fossils, these vestiges, these relics, never indicate a Golden Age. Whether we contemplate the trilobites in the limestone, or the skeleton of the Deinosaur, or the skulls of palæolithic men, or the vermiform appendix of the human body of to-day, there is no indication of a past glory on which "Ichabod" is stamped, or which we would desire to see restored. Everything—from a scientific point of view—tends to show that we have emerged from a lower to a higher state, and not fallen from an ineffably glorious to an intolerably debased condition.

Such are the general impressions, be it remembered, on the mind of every young graduate or student (or, indeed, thinker) of to-day. And when he "goes to church," he will probably hear a sermon in which the whole Christian scheme is based, explicitly or implicitly, on a "Fall" worse than that of Prometheus:

so he naturally infers that Christianity rests on false premises. This antithesis—and not the supernatural element in the New Testament—is, I feel sure, the main cause of the impression which is abroad, (as asserted in the beginning of this article,) that Christian doctrines cannot be made to square with “the new learning.”¹

The question, then,—and it is a momentous one,—which confronts the theologian of to-day is this: Does the Christian religion so depend on the conventional story of the Fall, that the whole Gospel must stand or fall with it? By the term, “conventional story,” I mean the account as formulated by St. Augustine, adopted by most of the fathers after him, elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas and the Calvinistic reformers, and reaching its acme in Milton’s epic of “Paradise Lost.”

Dr. Draper, in the work before referred to, points out “the complete absence of the doctrines of original sin, total depravity,” etc., in the writings of the anti-Nicene fathers, and states that the result of the Pelagian controversy in the fifth century, was that thenceforth “the Book of Genesis was made the basis of Christianity.”² These statements of the sceptical philosopher are corroborated, as to the matters of fact, by the Christian theologian, Mr. Oxenham, in his work, *The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*; though a very different complexion, of course, is given by him to the development.³ But the fact remains that “the Fall” was not made the basis of Christian theology until the time of St. Augustine. Certainly the New Testament lays no stress on it; nothing like that which can be noticed in almost every page of Mr. Oxenham’s work. Even in his summing up in the last chapter he says (p. 303): “Pain, deformity, sickness, sorrow, old age are an heirloom of the Fall.” Now this is a proposition which seems to the modern student too unscientific, too untenable, not to say too absurd, to be entertained as the premise of any argument. St. Paul (Romans v. and 1 Corinth. xv.) does indeed draw a contrast between sin and death through Adam, and grace and life through Christ: but that is a very different thing. That parallel appeals to our reason, and is quite compatible with even the theory of evolution; but neither St. Paul nor any other New Testament writer dwells on the primal innocence and bliss which had been “lost.”

¹A case in point is furnished by an article entitled “The High Church Doctrine of Marriage and Divorce” in the *Contemporary* of July, 1895. It is a review of Mr. Watkins’s work on *Holy Matrimony* by Dr. Serrell. The reader of it will see how arguments based on the “State of Innocence in the Garden of Eden” strike one who is familiar with modern ideas.

²*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science*, by J. W. Draper, M.D., fifth edition, D. Appleton & Co., Chap. II., p. 57.

³The full title is: *The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement: An Historical Enquiry Into Its Development in the Church*, by Henry Nutcombe Oxenham, M.A., second edition. London: W. H. Allen & Co. The first paragraph of the Introduction is very suggestive.

Mr. Oxenham, though he insists so strongly and so constantly on the “Fall” (always with a capital “F”), yet rejects with disgust what he calls the Calvinistic, “juridical” notion of the Atonement, which reduces it to a sort of compact or bargain.¹ But it is scarcely fair to charge the reformers with the authorship of this view. Their doctrines were simply logical deductions from the propositions of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and indeed all other predestinarians, Mohammedans included.²

But while the Thomist doctors in the Catholic Church maintained that the Atonement was the consequent of the Fall, and but for it would not have occurred, nor have been needed; the Scotists maintained with their master, Duns Scotus, that the Incarnation would have taken place even if there had been no “Fall,” because Christ, the second Adam, was needed to raise mankind to a still higher state than that of the first Adam.³

The difference then on this point between the doctrines of the two schools was that (a) The Thomists held that the death of Christ was necessitated by the Fall, and the Incarnation was incidental and subsidiary to that death;—(b) The Scotists declared that the death of Christ—although its atoning value was attributable to the Fall—was a necessary incident of the Incarnation which was paramount and was decreed to take place in any event, in order that the second Adam should infuse a still higher life into the race.

We can see, then, how the Scotist doctrine, parting from the Thomist on this seemingly small issue, gives a very different aspect to the whole Gospel. To the momentous question before us it can reply: “The Christian religion does *not* depend on the conventional story of the Fall.” It can show an “analogy between revealed religion and the constitution and course of nature,” even if interpreted by evolution: for the Incarnation, as the principle of a new and higher life imparted into human nature, becomes the factor of the further evolution of humanity.

¹ See pages 209-220, 286, etc.

² That the anomalies involved in the literal and predestinarian rendering of the “Fall,” present themselves to speculative minds, in Islam as well as in Christendom, is known to all readers of Fitzgerald’s version of that Persian beretic’s poem, “The Rabbayat of Omar Kahyâm”:

“What!—Out of senseless nothing to evoke
A conscious Something, to resist the yoke
Of unpermitted pleasure, under pain
Of everlasting punishment, if broke?”

“What!—From His wretched creatures be repaid
Pure gold for what He lent us dross-allayed;
Sue for a debt we never did contract
And cannot answer? Oh, the sorry trade!”

“Oh Thou—who didst with pit-fall and with gin
Beset the road I was to travel in;
Thou wilt not with predestined Evil mesh
Me round, and then—impute my fall to Sin!”

“Oh Thou—who man of baser clay didst make,
And even with Paradise devise the Snake,” etc.

³Oxenham, *Catholic Doctrine*, pp. 193, 194.

This view is more adaptable to modern thought, and can more readily free itself from the paganising of the Biblical cosmogony, which was done by the later fathers reading into it the classical ideas of things. For, after all, what does the story of Genesis ii. and iii. teach us, when stripped of all Neo-Platonism and of mediæval and Miltonic accretions? To understand it rightly, we should bear in mind that the book, as *Butler's Analogy* says, was "evidently written in a rude and unlettered age"; and moreover, that it was written for one of those Oriental races who still revel in poetical imagery, and allegory, and figures of speech, to an extent that we matter-of-fact Westerners cannot apprehend. Well, then, reduced to plain prose the story teaches us that our original ancestors were naked, frugivorous, and ignorant of everything, even of the difference between right and wrong; and that when their "eyes were opened" to that difference a step forward was taken in the development of their faculties. (Gen. ii., 16, 17, 25; iii., 22.)

This view also disposes of all that bootless speculation concerning the "origin of evil," which perplexed the theologians and philosophers of former times.¹ For what is meant by "Evil"? If we include physical evil, such as Mr. Oxenham's list of "pain, deformity, sickness, sorrow, old age," we may say that its origin was contemporaneous with the origin of physical life: say with the first time that a speck of protoplasm was devoured by a bigger or more developed speck—or, let us say, the first time an Eozoön found itself assailed by a Protozoön: and from that time onwards, pain, death, etc., increased and multiplied with the development of organic life, for many millions of years until the advent of man. If we confine our investigations to the origin of moral evil—that is, Sin—we must first find out the origin of moral law, of which moral evil is the infraction. A certain course of action must be *ordered*, by *some* authority, before it can be accounted wrong not to pursue that course. Sin presupposes law; so argue St. Paul (Romans vii., 7-13) and St. John (1 John iii., 4). And with all due deference to Kant's philosophy, the common mind conceives that even the *Categorical Imperative* postulates an *Imperator*.

The Scotist view, then, of the point in question, always permitted, and now in favor, in the Roman Catholic Church, will doubtless be hereafter insisted upon as the one best adapted to modern thought. In the Anglican Church the famous book, *Lux Mundi*, elaborates the doctrine of the Incarnation on the lines indicated. And much as that book has shocked the religious prejudices of many, we cannot help feeling that its conclusions are not only in touch with the

change of front in modern thought, but also give force and value to St. Paul's line of reasoning in that grand passage (1 Corinthians xv., 44-49) where he dilates, not on "something lost," but on "something yet to be attained":

"That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man was of the earth, earthy: the second man is from heaven. . . . As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly."

THE DOCTRINE OF RESURRECTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE NEW CHRISTIANITY.

I TAKE pleasure in presenting in this number to our readers an article by the Rev. George J. Low, of whom Mr. Allan Pringle says that he is "the Dean Stanley of the Anglican Church of Canada."

We are glad to observe that Mr. Low does not stand alone, for the sentiments which he utters are representative of a large class of his colleagues, and his article is one symptom only among several, indicating that the clergy are awakening to the needs of the present time. The Rev. Dr. Haweis, a member of the "broad church" section of the Church of England, has published in *The Contemporary Review* for October an article in which he arraigns his brethren, more vigorously than Mr. Low, for being responsible for the degeneration of church life. He declares that the Church of England needs a new clergy. That the Church needs men whose opinions are not despised, whose fitness is not called in question, and who are up to date in scientific education. The present clergy are trained to preach a sort of thing the people decline any longer to listen to. Mr. Haweis says:

" the man in the pew thinks he has a right to remonstrate with the man in the pulpit who denounces him as an unbeliever. He may fairly say to his clergyman: 'You complain of me for not believing what you call church doctrines; how much do you believe yourself? Now, you don't actually believe that after this life, without further explanation, the population of the world will be divided into two parts, the converted and the unconverted, and that one half will go straight to heaven and be happy forever, and the other half will be sent straight to hell to be tormented forever. You don't believe that yourself, because you are not such a fool; then why do you expect me to sit in church and listen to you patiently while you preach it?' . . . I need not go through the dreary catalogue of outworn dogmas; dry rot is in the whole thing, and it is ready to crumble at a touch! It has come to this: the laity not only despise the clergy for their affirmations, but still more for their reticences, and yet few (some do) have the heart to condemn them as unscrupulous hypocrites—they are really often such nice fellows in many ways, and moral fellows, too; so as people don't like to think they are liars, and cannot quite believe they are idiots, they conclude that they are a race of men apart, and hence the witty saying has arisen, 'Society is composed of three sexes, men, women, and *clergymen*'; and this is all very well as a grim sort of joke, but it solves nothing and mends nothing. Sooner or later the question has to be asked,

¹ Which Mr. Oxenham (p. 239) calls the "one insoluble riddle of all metaphysics and all theology."

'Why keep up so many doctrinal shams, when even bishops are capable of making and accepting moderate and even helpful restatements?'"

The Rev. Mr. Haweis yearns for an intellectual reformation. The reformation of the sixteenth century was more of a moral than of a doctrinal reform. The new reformation must be mainly doctrinal. What we need is a new Christ ideal. He concludes his article as follows :

"He who will give us not only a restatement in doctrine, but the true law of subordination of the lower to the higher in the conduct of life, the life of progress in the scale of ascension ; he who will show the purity, because the fitness, of all things in due season and in ripe proportion, who will preach, with Christ and Paul, the supremacy of love, which is the loss of selfish life in the flood-tide of regenerated humanity—he will be the new priest of the near future. We will have no more mongrel philosophy ; we will have no more divided allegiance, and no more confused ideals. The dear old angels may have to go out, but the great archangels will come in ; we shall know them, and we shall follow them ; they will lead us to 'the Christ that is to be!'"

When the clergy begin to speak as boldly as Mr. Haweis, the time for a radical reformation appears to have come.

Mr. Low is a man who represents the growing intellectuality among the clergy. But, in our opinion, he does not as yet hit the real point at issue. The doctrine of the Fall is merely a side issue in the whole structure of church doctrines, and the objectionable features of the first chapters of Genesis may easily be overcome in some such way as Mr. Low points out.

We do not agree with Mr. Low that the conception of the Fall is due to the pagan influence of Greek thought after the Nicene Council. St. Paul believed in it as much as did St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas, and even Duns Scotus. After rereading the passage in St. Paul's epistle in which he contrasts Christ with Adam, considering Christ as the second Adam, we cannot help believing that the doctrine of the Fall is to him a matter of fact which he never thought of calling in question.

The main problem of modern Christianity lies in a field different from that of the doctrine of the Fall. It is not a question of one or two dogmas which collide with the scientific notions of the present day. It is founded upon a contrast between two radically different world-views. The old view cherishes the belief in the extra-mundane existence of a spiritual domain, which constantly interferes by means of miracles with this natural order of a material universe, and is a dualistic conception of the world. The new view is monistic. The two worlds—the spiritual and the material—are one. The supernatural, that is to say, the domain of spirit and spiritual aspiration, is in its germ contained in the natural, and it crops out wherever the occasion arises according to natural law. The monistic view does not deny the existence of spirit.

It only denies the existence of pure spirit or ghost, and it denies at the same time the existence of pure matter as a dead and merely inert substance. The whole world, according to the monistic world-view, is aglow with potential life, and all existence contains the possibilities of a spiritual development. The new view does not imply that the higher domain of life has dropped out of our conceptions. On the contrary, the lower is recognised as being pervaded all through by the potentiality of developing the higher. The natural can no longer be regarded as debased. It is recognised as being spiritualised all through. The world-order, such as it appears in the laws of nature, far from being a mere display of chance or an arbitrary manufacture of a demiurge is recognised in its intrinsic necessity as a part and parcel of God himself. Thus God ceases to be a mere God-individual analogous to the pagan conception of Zeus or Jupiter, but manifests himself in his superpersonal omnipresence, not only in this actual world of ours, but also as the condition of any possible world that might rise into existence.

The Rev. Mr. Low says that the difference between the old and new world-conception appears most strikingly in the doctrine of the fall of man and trusts that otherwise there is no necessity for rejecting "the other great facts of Christianity as contained in the Apostles' Creed." Such is not the case. The Apostles' Creed will have to be regarded by the church of the future as a historical document, embodying the belief of the early church, which can only be retained as a mere symbolic expression of spiritual truths which every Christian is at liberty to interpret as he sees fit. The Roman Catholic Church, which in many respects is wiser than Protestant Christianity, has judiciously refrained from enforcing a literal belief in dogma. The Roman Church leaves the question of interpretation open, and possesses, as Mr. Low recognises, the great advantage of "the living voice" of the Pope, who can, according to conditions, declare what at the present time has to be accepted or rejected. The Roman Church has actually, in this particular respect, a better chance for progress than our Protestant denominations, which unhappily are tied down to the dead letter of their various confessions of faith.

If the Apostles' Creed and the main doctrines of Christianity are to be allowed to remain, and if our reformation should consist only in the removal of one or two objectionable beliefs, the result will be little satisfactory to the educated class of mankind, for indeed the difference between the old and the new world-conception is a color-line which is very decidedly marked. If we accept at all any one or the main of the old doctrines of an extra-mundane supernaturalism, we might just as well accept the whole mass of

superstitions connected therewith. He who can make up his mind to believe in an individual God-being, a being that like a fickle man is ready to change his will as the occasion may arise, and not only can, but actually does work miracles such as are told in our sacred Scriptures, who for trivial reasons, antagonising himself, interferes with his own world-order, might just as well believe in the story of the Fall, in the creation of woman from the rib of man, or in any other Biblical legend in spite of all the refutations and explanations that science has brought forth during the last two centuries. To believe in a million miracles is not more difficult than to believe in one. If God is a personal being like man, he might as well be triune, extra-mundane, or intra-mundane; he might have created a paradise for the then innocent parents of mankind, simply that they might enjoy themselves. He might hate those who do not believe in him, so as to stop the mechanism of the solar system for a few hours for the sole purpose of having a few hundred of his enemies slain; and may be in possession of all those human, and, indeed, very human, features which are attributed to him by many of the prophets and saints of the Christian Church.

The cardinal point on which the difference between the old and the new view comes out lies, not in the fall of man, but in the resurrection of Christ. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body of Christ is the true touchstone of the old conception of Christianity and the new one. He who believes that the stone had to be rolled away from the grave, so as to make room for the resurrected Jesus, he who cannot think of immortality except in terms of a corporeal revivification of the dead bones, muscles, and nerves of the deceased, and believes that Jesus after his death descended into a place called hell, thence to rise again and re-awaken bodily from the sleep of death, is one of those who belong to the old kind of a childlike state of civilisation, whether he believes still in the fall of man or not. If Christianity would be a factor in the scientific world-conception it must undergo a radical reformation. The new Christianity must fearlessly confront the problem of the resurrection of Christ; and must allow the clergy freely to utter their opinions as to the nature of the immortality of the soul.

The paramount importance of Christianity will then be seen to be a great truth embodied in a mythological tale. Jesus indeed is not dead. When Jesus was crucified his body was, as every living body will have to be, delivered to that state of disintegration which is called "death." The body of Jesus is as much doomed to decay as any other organism, but the soul of Jesus cannot die. The soul of Jesus has become and is even to-day a living presence in the aspirations of mankind. Our whole civilisation is per-

meated by the spirit of Jesus, and he indeed will be with us and in us unto the end of the world.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body of Jesus should be replaced by a doctrine of the immortality of the soul of Jesus. The moral aspirations of Jesus must be impressed into the minds of men. He must be resurrected in every heart so as to become the dominant power of all impulses, the directive control in life, the ultimate motive of all actions. And not until our clergy will become impressed with the real significance of this central doctrine of Christianity will they be able to free themselves from the old traditional dualism that separates the doctrinal Christianity of the past from the scientific conception of Christianity of the future.

What we need is a new Christianity, or better a new conception of the old Christianity, affording a higher and a deeper, a broader and a more comprehensive insight into the facts of experience and the laws of life,—a Christianity which with all reverence towards the past will without compromise accept the truth, whatever the truth may be. And the truth cannot be obtained by a blind belief in traditional interpretations of facts or supposed facts that happened almost nineteen hundred years ago. The truth can only be found in that ever-present revelation of the Deity that surrounds us in the objective world in which we live.

The touchstone of truth is contained in the eternally repeated experiences with which every one of us is familiar. If the truths of Christianity cannot be demonstrated to be facts of our spiritual and intellectual experience, if God cannot be reduced to the features of reality from which man has developed in the slow process of evolution, according to eternal laws, we had better abandon all belief in God. If religion is not the natural response of the soul to the demands of life, we should suppress all religious aspirations. But the truth is that religion is deeply rooted in the emotional and intellectual needs of man. The difficulty is only to determine the nature of genuine religion, and to winnow the wheat from the chaff.

As the bodily organism of man is the product of a slow growth, which has to pass through many stages, as science was once represented in the wisdom of the medicine-man, as astronomy had to pass through the stage of astrology, chemistry through the stage of alchemy, so religion had to pass through the stage of mythology. The mythological Christianity of the past is still a pagan conception. The monotheism of the Church is, as held by the mass of the people to-day, philosophically considered, a polytheism in which the number of the gods is reduced to one. It is not as yet the religious ideal according to which the divine attributes of God, his omnipresence, the intrinsic

necessity and universality of his nature, are taken seriously.

The time will come and is near at hand when the churches will outgrow the paganism of their mythology. The issue cannot be avoided, nor is there any doubt about its final decision. As the fruit will ripen when the petals of the flower drop to the ground, so the truth will appear when the fairy-tale beauty of its symbolism begins to vanish.

How long it will take to Christianise Christianity, we cannot say, but this much is sure, that the new Christianity that is to come, will, like the old Christianity, emphasise the doctrine of immortality. The burning question of the religious problem lies in the domain of psychology. A better comprehension of the nature of the soul will inevitably lead to a truer comprehension of the immortality of the soul.

That there are clergymen speaking as boldly as the Rev. Mr. Haweis and the Rev. Mr. Low is a fair indication of the beginning of a new religious era that is now dawning on the horizon of our civilisation. P. C.

PURITANISM AND THE NOVEMBER PORTENTS.

BY DR. FELIX L. OSWALD.

PROFESSOR WEIL, in his history of the Chalifs, mentions a strange legend from ancient Bagdad, where, on the eve of the insurrection against the tyrant Al-mohtadi, a warning voice cried from the tombs, pre-
saging woe to the race of the Abbassides, whose descendant had silenced every other monitor.

Such portents of revolt can, indeed, not be prevented by the suppression of free speech. At the end of the fourteenth century, when the power of the Roman pontiffs was at its zenith height, and a whisper against the atrocities of the Inquisition was punished with death, the citizens of Barcelona rose against their heretic-hunters, and in Sicily, Majorca, and Northern Italy several emissaries of the Holy Office were slain like wild beasts. The resentment of the populace could not be allayed by the manifestoes of the clerical censors, and neither the wails nor the threats of our "American Press-Gag League" have obviated two portentous protests against the despotism of Sabbatarian fanatics.

In the commercial metropolis of the New World sixty-eight thousand voters deliberately renounced the fruits of a hard-won reform-fight in order to accomplish the removal, or at least the alleviation, of a yoke more intolerable than that of a robber-ring, by just as much as the loss of freedom is more grievous than the loss of coin.

"The reactionary result in this city," said the *New York World*, "was provoked by the pig-headed folly of the president of the police-board. But for the exasperating effect of Mr. Roosevelt's uncalled-for, un-

just, harsh, and oppressive execution of the Sunday laws, a union of all the anti-Tammany forces would have been as easy and triumphant as it was last year. The predicted reaction has come. Tammany triumphs in the first election after its tremendous overthrow. The result is discouraging. It impeaches the capacity of the people for self-government."

Yet the insurgents did not underrate the risks of their new alliance. They knew that they had invoked the aid of the most unscrupulous corruptionists on earth. They had strong reasons to surmise that their assistants would profit by the lessons of their recent defeat and render their stronghold practically impregnable. They could not expect the favorable conjunction for the union of the various reform-elements to recur for years. They fully expected to be plundered again. But they also knew that the same officials who had connived at the violation of so many salutary laws could probably be induced to connive at the circumvention of insane and inhuman laws. The picaroon plague had made the struggle for existence harder. The Puritan plague had robbed existence itself of its value. Better double work and picnics than half work embittered by the prospect of a blue-law Sabbath. Better a semi-annual encounter with the freebooters of Dick Turpin than a weekly scuffle with the bullies of Sir Hudibras.

The ranks of the mutineers were swelled by thousands who only a year ago had hailed the defeat of Tammany as the most auspicious event in the history of their native city, and also by numerous sympathisers of the temperance movement. The latter would have been willing to attain the triumph of their cause by the arduous path of constant agitation, but know, by sad experience, that they would miss their way under the banner of bigotry. The road to the rumshop is paved with blue laws. "For nature," says a correspondent of the *Saturday Review*, "will have her revenge, and when the most ordinary and harmless recreations are forbidden as sinful, is apt to seek compensation in indulgences which no moralist would be willing to condone, . . . and the strictest observance of all those minute and oppressive Sabbatarian regulations was found compatible with consecrating the day of rest to a quiet but unlimited assimilation of the liquid which inebriates but does not cheer."

Puritanism has not promoted the cause of temperance one step, and the alleged immoral tendency of a free Sunday is as imaginary as the supposed identity of mirth and sin. Compare the Sunday police reports of Baltimore and San Francisco, or let an Edinburgh Sabbatarian try to confirm his prejudices by a visit to Brussels, in point of holiday laws the freest city of modern Europe. Let him try to count the thousands of merry faces of recreation-seekers, streaming from

sunrise to sunset through the Porte de Hal to the Laeken Park and the Alee Verte, witness the meadow-sports, the foot-races and leaping-matches, the ball-games, *bilboquet* contests and round dances, see hundreds of well-behaved spectators crowd about the shooting-galleries and nine-pin alleys, the skittle-rings and rack-race pits, listen to the shouts of happy children, the chorus-songs of rival music-clubs, and remember the groans of drunkards weltering in the Kirk-town gutters of his native land. "Not silent all," the birthland of blue laws, not even in the shades of Holyrood Palace, "for in my ear the well-remembered gin-whoops ring," alcohol yells, mingled with the shrieks of brutal scuffles and the cat-calls of ribald roués.

"Every one," says Lecky, "who considers the world as it really exists, and not as it appears in the imagination of visionaries, must have convinced himself that in great towns public amusements of an exciting order are absolutely necessary, and that to suppress them is simply to plunge an immense portion of the population into the lowest depths of vice."

Even from a moral point of view the refugees in the robber-wigwam of Tammany may have chosen a lesser evil.

A perhaps still more suggestive sign of the times is the result of the suffrage referendum in the State of Massachusetts. The fairness of the count and of the voting-method has not been disputed. It is impossible to believe that the people of the educational champion State were biassed by fallacies, which, to use the words of Miss Alice Blackwell, have long since become an insult to the intelligence of a ten-year-old boy. The citizens of Massachusetts were not behind the mountaineers of Wyoming and Colorado in recognising the absurdity of the current anti-suffrage arguments. A very large plurality of male voters probably considered woman the moral superior of her brethren, and *on the whole* (i. e., almost in every respect except one of incidental local importance) their intellectual equal. Yet the proposition was defeated by a plurality of more than seventy-five thousand. Perhaps ninety per cent. of those adverse voters would have welcomed their sisters as political reform-factors. They recognised their economical talents, their instinctive charity, their innate love of order. But all those considerations were outweighed by the dread of an innovation, tending, through the temperance bias of the proposed new voters, to deliver the State into the hands of clerical fanatics. On the liquor-question *per se* the views of the Bay State differ not materially from those of neighboring Maine. A plebiscite has more than once proved their appreciation of reform-projects. The voters of Massachusetts did not object to the W. C. T. U., but to its Sabbatarian confeder-

ates. The curse of blue laws is felt more severely in recreation-needing cities than in rural districts abounding with the opportunities for outdoor pastimes. Now in proportion to its population, Wyoming has about the smallest number of large cities, and Massachusetts the largest. Hence the astonishing contrasts of their referenda. In other words, the alliance of Sabbatarianism has proved as fatal to the suffrage-movement as to the cause of temperance and reform.

Incidentally the November lessons have also answered the doubts on the timeliness of a Religion of Science. The dualistic conceptions of God and Nature are the most formidable obstacles in the paths of reform.

"The Cinderella of Science," says Thomas Huxley, "is constantly snubbed by her hyperphysical sisters. She lights the fire, sweeps the house, and provides the dinner, and is rewarded by being told that she is a base creature, devoted to low and material interests. But in her garret she has fairy visions out of ken of the shrews who are quarrelling downstairs. She sees the order which pervades the seeming disorder of the world, and she learns, in her heart of hearts, the lesson, that the foundation of morality is to have done, once and for all, with lying, and to give up pretending to believe that for which there is no evidence, . . . for of that firm and lively faith it is her mission to be the priestess."

And one of the most baneful of the untenable tenets which we should cease to profess is the belief in the possibility of promoting the true interests of any social, political, or moral cause by the aid of Puritanical despotism.

THE OPEN COURT

"THE MONON," 324 DEARBORN STREET.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, Post Office Drawer F.

E. C. HEGELER, PUBLISHER.

DR. PAUL CARUS, EDITOR.

TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:

\$1.00 PER YEAR.

\$0.50 FOR SIX MONTHS.

CONTENTS OF NO. 433.

THE OLD THEOLOGY AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY. THE REV. GEORGE J. LOW.....	4735
THE DOCTRINE OF RESURRECTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE NEW CHRISTIANITY. EDITOR.....	4738
PURITANISM AND THE NOVEMBER PORTENTS. DR. FELIX L. OSWALD.....	4741