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NOT IRRELIGION, BUT TRUE RELIGION.

"I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil."

A PAMPHLET lies before me entitled "*Religion and Science, the Reconciliation Mania of Dr. Paul Carus of The Open Court Analysed and Refuted by Corvinus.*" It is a reprint of a series of articles which appeared in the *Freethought Magazine*, published and ably edited by H. L. Green at Chicago, Illinois. Corvinus is a *nom de plume* which hides a man of obviously serious conviction and earnest intentions. The real name of the author of the pamphlet is unknown to me, and I have reason to believe that I never met him. Why he selected the pseudonym *Corvinus*, i. e. ravenlike, whether in honor of John Hunyady, the hero of Hungary and the collector of the famous library of manuscripts which was destroyed by the Turks, or of some member of the Roman family of the Valerians, who distinguished themselves as generals and protectors of literature, remains a mystery to me. May be that my critic wrote under this name that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet Horace, who said:

"Publicola atque
Corvinus, patriis intermiscere petita
Verbis foris malis—"

Which for the present purpose we venture to translate "Publicola and Corvinus mixed up their Latin and Greek pretty badly."

Identifying the negativism of his peculiar freethought with Science, and Religion with superstition, Corvinus denounces every attempt at reconciliation between Religion and Science, and condemns my expositions of a religion that would be in accord with Science as a "conglomeration of self-contradictory ideas," which display "inconsistency" and "ambiguity." He calls me a "freethinker in disguise," and contrasts such passages in which I appear as "virtually a freethinker" with others in which I maintain the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

There are plenty of misrepresentations in Corvinus's criticism, but they are apparently involuntary. It is true that I use many old words, such as Religion, God, soul, and immortality, in a new sense, but I have always been careful to explain what I mean. Had I ever tried to dodge the truth, or leave people in doubt as to my opinions, there would be some justice in the

accusations of Corvinus. The fact is that my definitions are more definite than those handed down to us by tradition.

My method of conciliation consists in showing the dogmatic believer a way out of his narrowness. I undertake to instruct him in the meaning of his religion, pointing out how he can decipher the symbols of his creed and transfigure them into exact truth. At the same time I give to the freethinker the key which will unlock the mysteries of traditional religion, and exhibit the significance of their peculiar forms, so full of beauty and comfort to the believer, and so grotesque to the uninitiated.

That Corvinus judges rashly of the work which I do, is, in my opinion, simply due to the fact that he never felt the need of a reconciliation of religion with science, and science with religion. He knows neither the real character of the religious people of to-day, nor does he understand the historical import of religion. He only knows the little circle of his own society, in which freethought prevails, and he has probably never investigated the evolution of moral ideals, which, without religion, would never have been disseminated or enthusiastically received among the masses of mankind. Morality without religion, and of course we mean here religion in the highest sense of the word, would have simply been fear of the police and nothing more.

I cannot enter here into a detailed exposition of all the misconceptions of which Corvinus is guilty; but I shall point out that he has misunderstood the most important side of my position. He sees the negations alone of my philosophy, which ally me so strongly with the freethinker party, but not its affirmations, and I would say, that if to be a freethinker means to be purely negative and to reject wholesale everything that has been established by the millennial evolution of religion, I am not a freethinker, but I am an orthodox among the orthodox; nay, an arch-orthodox, for while the old-fashioned orthodoxy claims to be a system of belief, the new orthodoxy which is implied in the Religion of Science claims to be based on a firmer foundation than mere belief. It is built upon evidence which can be refused only by those who are unable to comprehend the import of facts.

To Corvinus, all religions, and especially Christianity, are errors and unmitigated nonsense, while I see in them the development of that most important side of man's nature, which determines the character of his life. In my opinion, the very idea of "a system of pure ethics" is unscientific. Ethics is always the expression of a world-conception. Every religion and every philosophy has its own ethics. Cut ethics loose from its basis, and it remains an arbitrary system of rules without either *raison d'être* or authority. The *raison d'être* of moral commandments is the most essential part of ethics; it is the root from which morality springs, and whatever this *raison d'être* be, it is the religion of the man who owns it. If there are men who have no other *raison d'être* for moral conduct than their own personal welfare, I would say that their religion consists in the attainment of happiness. If they recognise no authority to which they bow save their own pleasure or displeasure, their God is Self. Now, it has been maintained by some freethinkers that the very nature of freethought consists in this unshackled freedom, and I would say that if their conception is truly legitimate freethought, I am no freethinker, for I believe, nay, I know, that there is a power in this world which we have to recognise as the norm of truth and the standard of right conduct; and, indeed, there are conditions in which our personal happiness may seriously come into conflict with our duties. In this sense I uphold the idea of God as being a supreme authority for moral conduct, the presence of which in life can only be denied by men whose opposition to the false dogmatism of the traditional religions leads them to deny also their truth, which is the very essence and the cause of their continued existence.

Religion, as it originates among the various nations of the world, is not the product of systematised investigation, but of race experience. It is natural that truths of great importance were, long before a scientific investigation could explain their nature, invented by instinct. Thus the Egyptians invented implements, the use of which is based upon laws utterly unintelligible in those days. In the same way moral truths were proclaimed by the prophets, who felt their significance without being able to explain them by a philosophical argumentation, and it is to the enormous practical importance of these truths that they owe their survival. To show justice and mercy to enemies appears at first sight foolish, but experience has taught that the men who insisted on this principle were right, and the belief in their divine mission became by and by established. The prophets of almost all nations were persecuted, but their doctrines survived, and led naturally enough to the foundation of institutions such as the synagogue of the Jews, the church of the Christians, the sangha of the Buddhists.

The religious conception which it is my life-work to uphold, is simple enough, yet I find that Corvinus has radically misunderstood its main significance, without which all my writing would indeed be a mere quibbling of words and an ambiguous display of old phrases, not in a new sense, but without any sense.

One instance will be sufficient to point out the misconception of Corvinus. Corvinus declares that God is with me "only an idea," implying that it is no reality. He says (p. 31):

"If God is being defined simply as abstract thought, an idea, as something *existing only in imagination and not in reality*, it is meaningless to say science is a revelation of God."

And he adds:

"Science is the achievement of man and nothing else."

In opposition to his statement I say that the idea of God is an abstract thought, but God himself is a reality. There is no abstract thought but it is invented to describe a reality.¹ If the term "God" did not describe an actual reality, it would be meaningless to speak of Science as a revelation of God. I grant that Science is "the achievement of man," but that is one side only of the truth. Far from being "the achievement of man *and nothing else*," Science is in its very essence superhuman. Man cannot invent mathematics; he must discover its theorems. He cannot make the laws of nature; he must describe them. He cannot establish facts; he must investigate, and can only determine the truth. Nor can he set up a code of morals, but he must adapt himself to the eternal moral law which is the condition of human society and the factor that shapes the human of man.

Here is the point where Corvinus radically differs from my position. He says, quoting a misunderstood passage from Haeckel:

"Constantly to speak of the moral laws of nature proves blindness to the undeniable facts of human and natural history."

Corvinus adds:

"All moral laws from their beginning in the dim past among our rude, savage-like predecessors up to the noblest conceptions of modern ethics, were conceived, proposed, and consequently established by man."

Corvinus says that "necessity gave birth to these moral laws," meaning probably by necessity "the needs of man." I accept his reply, and would say that the needs of man indicate the presence of a higher necessity, viz., of that necessity which we trace in the harmony of natural laws and in the peculiarly complicated simplicity of mathematics. This higher necessity is the ultimate *raison d'être* of the moral law, and it is a characteristic feature of that omnipotent presence which we can trace everywhere. Intrinsic

¹An apparent exception to this rule is the conception of the irrational in mathematics. The irrational is a symbol representing a function which cannot be executed. Root-extraction from -1 is as impossible as the squaring of the circle.

necessity means eternity, immutability, stern and inflexible authority—in a word, it means God.

Corvinus confounds two things: moral injunctions, and the natural law of morality. Moral injunctions are proposed and established by man in his anxiety to adapt himself to the moral law, exactly as an architect may write down the rules for building bridges so that according to the material which he uses the law of gravitation should not be infringed upon. If the architect's rules are in conformity with the natural conditions such as scientists formulate in what is called laws of nature, he will be able to build boldly and yet securely. And if the laws of legislators are based upon a correct conception of the moral law of nature, the nations who adopt them will prosper and progress.

It appears that, according to Corvinus, the moral law of nature is a nonentity, while the injunctions of law-givers are all that can be called a moral law. The fact is just the reverse. The moral law of nature is the eternal abiding reality, while the laws and injunctions of man are only its transitory and more or less imperfect expressions. The moral law of nature alone partakes of that feature which in all religions is attributed to God. It is eternal, it is omnipresent, it is irrefragable. Certainly the moral law is not a concrete object, not an individual fact, not a personal being, but for that reason it is not a nonentity. It cannot be seen with the eye, or heard with the ear, or tasted with the tongue, or touched with the hands. It is one of those higher realities which can only be perceived by the mind. The senses are insufficient to encompass it, but any normal mind can grasp it.

There was in the Middle Ages a philosophical party called the Nominalists, who denied the objective existence of ideas, declaring ideas to be mere names without any corresponding reality. Their adversaries, called the Realists, believed in the reality of ideas. And while the nominalistic philosophy was rejected, it began to flourish again and found its mightiest expression in the transcendental idealism of the great sage of Königsberg. Spencer's agnosticism is its most modern offshoot. In him Nominalism reached its final *reductio ad absurdum*. On this line of thought the whole universe has become intrinsically incomprehensible.

Corvinus is apparently a nominalist. Ideas are to him mere ideas, i. e., subjective inventions without objective reality; and science, that most methodical system of ideas, is not a revelation of objective truth, but "the achievement of man and nothing else." It is, accordingly, in the same predicament as the names of the nominalists, and he who studies science is like Hamlet in one of his erratic moods reading, as he says, "Words, words, words." Science would be mere words without any objective significance.

Now I will not quarrel with Corvinus about names. He has an inherited objection to the very word "God." I will not now apply the name God to that peculiar presence of superhuman reality which the various sciences reveal to us in parts, but I insist on its being a reality; indeed, I maintain that it is the most real reality in the world. We may call it cosmic order, or law (*Gesetzmässigkeit*), or necessity, or the eternal, or the immutable, or the omnipresent, the absolute, or the prototype of mind, or the standard of rationality, or the universal Logos, or the authority of conduct. But it exists, in undeniable objectivity. We cannot mould it or shape it, but, on the contrary, we are the products of its handiwork. Every arithmetical formula, every law of nature, every truth, is a partial revelation of its character, and there is nothing in the infinite universe but is swayed by its influence. It encompasses the motions of the infinitesimal atoms and of the grandest suns; it is the logic of man's reason and the nobility of man's moral aspirations.

It is true that I deny the existence of an individual God. In this sense I am an outspoken atheist. Nevertheless, I declare most emphatically that *God is a reality*, and indeed, God is a super-individual reality. In Mr. Corvinus's opinion this is a flat contradiction and he has no other explanation of it than by considering it as a tergiversation. He puts it down as a mania through which I try to reconcile the errors of the past with the truths of modern times. By truths of modern times he understands negations of all and any positive issues in religion, so that as soon as I attempt to formulate freethought in positive terms, which is tantamount to recognising the truth in our traditions, he decries me for pandering to popular superstitions.

In my opinion freethought has been barren because of its negativism and it is left behind the times because it has failed to come out with positive issues, and now that The Open Court Publishing Co. is propounding a constructive freethought, its work is suspected, criticised, and rejected. In spite of the negations of Corvinus, I insist that the reality of God is an undeniable fact, scientifically provable by unflinching evidence. It can be established so surely that Corvinus, as soon as he grasps the meaning of the idea, would say that it is a truism.

Philosophical materialism has so strongly affected our ideas that the average mind is incapable of believing in immaterial realities. First, the immaterial realities of natural laws were represented as personal beings, then as metaphysical essences, and now since we know that metaphysicism is untenable their very existence is denied, and, being recognised as immaterial, they are declared to be unreal. But the objective reality of form and the laws of form is exactly the truth which we must learn to appreciate.

That which the senses do not perceive, but is discernible by the mind, is not non-existent but possesses a higher kind of existence. It constitutes the unity of the universe and the harmony of its order. Without it, the world would not be a cosmos but an incoherent chaos; nature would be matter in motion, without any regularity of mechanical adjustment and the system of thought-forms which constitutes the superiority of the human mind would never have developed. Without it, Science would be mere verbiage, Religion meaningless, and ethics an impossibility.

The new philosophy which I represent—call it Monism, or the new Positivism (for it differs from Comtean Positivism), or the philosophy of science, or the new Realism—insists on the reality of form, of relations, and the significance of ideas. The soul of man is not in his blood but in his mind. He is not a mere heap of atoms. He consists of ideas. His existence is not purely material. It is also, and principally, spiritual. We grant that there is no ego-soul. There is as little a metaphysical thing-in-itself of man as there is a thing-in-itself of a watch, or of a tree, or of a natural law. But nevertheless, just as much as that combination which makes of a spring, cogs and wheels, an instrument called a watch, is not a non-entity but a reality, in the same way man's soul in spite of the non-existence of a metaphysical ego-soul is not a nonentity but a reality; and the mould into which we have been cast is that divinity of the world which was at the beginning and will remain for ever and aye.

If there is anything that deserves the name of God-head, it is this peculiar supersensible Reality, the various aspects of which are revealed in glimpses that we receive in Religion, in Ethics, and in Science. For here alone the attributes of divinity are found, viz., omnipresence and universality, immutability and eternity, intrinsic necessity and irrefragibility. It is one and the same in all its various revelations, in mathematical theorems and in ethical injunctions. There is no wisdom, but it is a comprehension of *its* truth. There is no virtue, but it is a compliance with *its* dispensations. There is no genuine piety, but it is a devotion to *its* beauty and sovereignty. If there are gods of any kind, *it* is the God of gods, and if the word supernatural has any sense, here is it applicable; for here we have the conditions for all possible worlds, and it would remain such as it is, even if nature did not exist. The simplest formulas of arithmetic as much as the noblest moral laws, which constitute the superiority of love over hate and of compassion over ferocity, hold good for this actual world of ours not less than for any possible world.

Thus we learn that if God is not wise like a sage, he is infinitely more than wise; he is that which con-

stitutes the essence of all wisdom. God is not good like a well-meaning man; he is more than a philanthropist. God is the measure of goodness and the moral law of life.

When Corvinus speaks of God he means the God-conception of average Christianity. But we can assure him that the masses are not responsible for the religion which they espouse, while many leaders in the churches are far from believing in an individual God. They may not be clear as to the nature of God. They believe in Him without comprehending his Being; but I maintain that upon the whole they have an aspiration toward a higher conception and that in the long run of the historical evolution of mankind they will more and more accept the idea of God as I conceive it now. They try to conceive the idea of God as a truly superpersonal God, and at the same time think of him still as an individual being, a huge world-ego. But I venture to say that this combination is self-contradictory. If such an individual God, a kind of world-ego, a distinct and single being, existed, if this God were a being who had been the creator of the universe and is now its governor and supreme ruler, I would say that that superpersonal God whose revelation we find in science, and whose essence is that indescribable presence of law and cosmic order, must be considered superior to him.

Suppose we call an individual God, after the precedent of the gnostics, "Demiurge" or world-architect and represent him, not as the prototype of all personality, but as an actual person like ourselves, only infinitely greater. Now, suppose that it was he who made the world as a watchmaker makes a watch, that he regulates it as we wind and set our watches, and that he owns and rules it, and keeps it in order. Must we not grant at once that the Demiurge, though infinitely greater than man, would not be the supreme Reality? He would have to obey those supernatural laws of nature which constitute their intrinsic necessity. He would not be the ultimate ground of morality and truth. There is a higher authority above him. And this higher and highest authority is the God of the Religion of Science, who alone is worthy of the name of God. The God of the Religion of Science is still the God of the Demiurge. The Demiurge could have created the world only by complying with the eternal and unalterable laws of being to which he would be not less subject than all his creatures.

Taking this ground, we say that the God of the Religion of Science alone is God, and not the Demiurge in whom a great number of the Christians of today still believe. The Demiurge is a mythical figure, and belief in him is true paganism. Monotheism in this sense is only a polytheism which has reduced the number of its gods to one single god-being. The God

whom the Religion of Science proclaims is not a single God-Being, but it is the one, the sole, the self-consistent, universal sameness of divinity that is the all-pervading condition of any possible world as a cosmic universe.

The God whom the Religion of Science proclaims is not a new God, but it is the old God proclaimed by every genuine prophet, among the Jews and also among the Gentiles, only purified of its paganism.

The philosophy of science is not an absolutely new philosophy, but only a more distinct formulation of the principles which have long been practiced among scientists. In the same way, the Religion of Science is not a radically new religion, but a religious reform which, according to the needs of the time, matures the old religions and opens a vista into the future, in which the most radical freethought is reconciled with the most rigorous orthodoxy. And this is not done by artificial phrases or by tergiversation, but by fusing religion in the furnace of science, and by sifting our religious traditions in the sieve of critique.

As the God of the Religion of Science is not a mere idea without reality, so the immortality of the soul is not purely imaginative but actual. Corvinus declares that

"It is perfectly immaterial to man as regards his own person, whether the truths and noble sentiments, which he cherished during his life, are still with mankind, after death or not, if he does not enjoy self-consciousness."

That the truth and noble sentiments which a man cherishes during his life should remain with mankind after his death is, in my humble opinion, whether or not his consciousness continues, not immaterial, but of the utmost importance. Corvinus says:

"It is preposterous to assume that the fruits of the practice of virtue will benefit him in the least if he ceases to live as a conscious being."

I make bold to say that there is no man, not even Corvinus himself, who would be so utterly indifferent about his sympathies concerning the fate of his children, of mankind in general, and above all of his aspirations. It is a fact that men who do not believe in the immortality of their individual self gladly die that their ideals may live, and, verily, our ideals are the better part of our selves; they are our spiritual life. If they continue, we can truly say that we continue to live in them.

* * *

Corvinus has recognised that there is dross in religion, and therefore, to him, religion is unmitigated superstition. Because like him I discard the dross he calls me a freethinker, but because I keep the gold he declares that I suffer from the reconciliation mania.

P. C.

THE RETURN FROM THE CAPTIVITY.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

CYRUS, the conqueror and new ruler of Babylon, at once gave to the Jewish exiles permission to return to their native land, and supported and helped them in every way. We have no reason to doubt the assertion that he provided the means for rebuilding the demolished temple from the funds of the Persian treasury, and that he ordered the sacred vessels of the ancient temple which had been plundered by the Chaldeans, so far as they still existed or were recognisable, to be returned to the homeward-bound Israelites.

The question has been raised, why Cyrus should have exhibited such sympathy for the Jewish exiles and espoused so cordially their cause, and the reason of it had been sought in a certain supposed affinity between the Ahura-Mazda religion avowed by Cyrus and his Persians, and the God-belief of the Israelites. In point of fact a certain similarity may be traced between the pure and profound Persian worship of light and the belief of the Jewish exiles in Babylon, whilst, on the other hand, to a Mazda-Yasnian, like Cyrus, the Babylonian cult must have appeared in the highest degree unsympathetic and ludicrous.

But Cyrus was not a sentimental man, and religious fanaticism was as foreign to him as to his people. We have to recognise in the liberation of the Jews merely a political action, the reason of which is very apparent. Now that Babylon had been overthrown, there existed but one powerful state bordering on the kingdom of Persia, and that was the old land of the pyramids—Egypt, which just at this time was enjoying a new lease of vigor under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis, and was taking an important part in politics. As early as the year 547 Egypt had joined a powerful coalition against the young and rising kingdom of Persia; long before, the Assyrians had fought against Egypt and temporarily subdued it, and likewise Nebuchadnezzar had waged war with this country. It lay in the logic of facts and circumstances, accordingly, that sooner or later hostilities between the two neighboring powers must break out; and therefore it was the most natural thing in the world that such a clear-sighted and far-seeing man as Cyrus should prepare for it. The restoration of Jerusalem and of Judah, then, was a mere link in the chain of these preparations. Judæa was the province bordering on Egypt, and Jerusalem the natural basis of operations for a campaign directed against the valley of the Nile. We can, therefore, well understand that it appeared desirable to Cyrus to know that a people dwelt there who was bound to him by the most powerful ties of gratitude, and on whose faithfulness and devotion he could confidently rely.

If Cyrus laid stress on the religious element and

proved himself a worshipper of the God of the Jews, his attitude in this respect simply coincides with his maxims of government, as we may show by documentary evidence. A considerable number of inscriptions concerning Cyrus exist, which he as king of Babylon ordered to be made in the old Babylonian cuneiform character, and in these Cyrus appears as the most devout servant and sincere worshipper of the Babylonian gods. He returns thanks to Merodach and to Nebo for the protection accorded to him, and grants special privileges to their temples and priests. The conduct of Cyrus towards the Jewish exiles must be considered from this twofold point of view, which does not exclude the additional possibility that in their fervid expectation of the fall of the Babylonian tyrant, the Jews took an active part in the operations and both countenanced and aided Cyrus and his Persians in their enterprise against Babylon, for which the Persians showed themselves thankful.

In the spring of the year 537 B. C. the Israelites began their homeward march. They numbered about 50,000 souls and were evidently members of all the families of the house of Judah. They were under the leadership of the Persian commissary Sheshbazzar. The government and management of internal affairs was lodged in a council of twelve confidential advisors, among whom and occupying the highest offices were Zerubbabel, the grandson of King Jehoiachin, and Joshua, the grandson of Seraiah, the last priest of the temple of Jerusalem put to death under Nebuchadnezzar.

It has often been supposed that the worldly-minded of the Jewish nation remained behind in Babylon in assured and comfortable positions, and had no desire to risk the dangers of the march, or the hardships of laying out and newly settling a devastated country. But this view is totally false and in contradiction to well-established facts. We shall soon see that the ones who remained behind, in the end really led the work of reform, and victoriously carried out the rehabilitation and completion of the religious system against the will of those who returned in 537.

Immediately on the arrival of the exiles the altar was erected on the sacred spot where once had stood the sacrificial altar of the temple of Solomon, and the autumn festival of the year 537 could therefore be celebrated with a solemn oblation to the God of Israel. Unfortunately we have only meagre and incomplete details regarding the 370 years which intervene between this event and the outbreak of the Maccabæan revolt; only isolated moments and events are at all well known to us, and these, although they throw a ray of light now and then into the dense obscurity of this period, yet oftentimes present more puzzles than they solve.

In 537 the cult was restored, but the most definite and indubitable evidence forces us to conclude that no attempt was made to rebuild the temple for seventeen years. On the other hand, highly momentous transformations must have taken place within the priesthood; for in the year 520 we suddenly find a high-priest of whom there is no premonitory trace in the Israel of the pre-exilic period, and of whom absolutely nothing is known either in Deuteronomy, or by Ezekiel. I regret that I am unable to enter more minutely into this matter, for it is as important as it is interesting. It is to be observed that in the year 520 prophecy once more awoke. And here again a great historical crisis was its origin. Cambyses, the degenerate son and successor of the great Cyrus, had indeed subdued Egypt in 525, and thus inserted the keystone in the arch of the Persian empire; but he was very near destroying it by his cruelty and tyranny. In 522 the Magus Gaumata gave himself out to be the brother of Cambyses whom the latter had secretly put to death, and called upon the Persian people to rid themselves of this monster. Cambyses marched against him, but committed suicide in Hamath in Syria, leaving no son. The Magus ruled for nearly a year unmolested, till Darius, who was directly connected with the royal house through a branch line, claimed his rights as heir, and aided by the noblest families of Persia, put the Magus to death in the autumn of the year 521. That was the signal for uprisings throughout the whole of the empire. Excitement reigned everywhere. Two full years Darius had to struggle with difficulties of every kind, till at last he succeeded in restoring order and consolidating the kingdom of Persia, a consolidation which lasted more than two centuries.

In this restless and seething period prophecy was again aroused. Suddenly Zerubbabel of the house of David appears as the Persian viceroy in Judæa. It is possible that Darius did this to win over the sympathies of the Jews, and to assure himself of their help at a period when his sovereignty was gravely threatened.

In the year 520 a bad harvest seems to have brought famine and hunger into the land; and at this crisis appeared an aged and venerable man, Haggai, who had seen with his own eyes the old temple and the old Jerusalem, and who must therefore have been in his seventies, with words of warning and exhortation. The famine had been the punishment of God for that the people dwelt in ceiled houses, whilst His house lay waste. Undaunted and unconcerned should they go to work, for a grand future was in store for this new temple, and Zerubbabel himself should be their Messiah. Saith Haggai:

“Yet now be strong, O Zerubbabel, be strong, O

Joshua, be strong all ye people, and work, for I am with you, saith the Lord of hosts . . . and my spirit remaineth among you . . . For thus saith the Lord of hosts: Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land. And I will shake all nations, and the valuable things of all nations shall come, and I will fill this house with glory. The silver is mine, and the gold is mine, and the latter glory of this house will be greater than the former, and in this place will I give peace."

And to Zerubbabel specially He saith:

"I will shake the heavens and the earth, and I will overthrow the throne of kingdoms, and I will destroy the strength of the kingdoms of the heathen; and I will overthrow the chariots and those that ride in them, and the horses and their riders shall come down, every one by the sword of his brother. In that day will I take thee, O Zerubbabel, my servant, and I will make thee as a signet: for I have chosen thee."

As we are told by Haggai, the cornerstone of the new temple was actually laid on the 24th of December, 520. We can plainly see the influence and reflexion of the ideas of Isaiah and Deutero-Isaiah in Haggai. Haggai has given us nothing of his own; yet in its simple and unpretentious style his little book has something peculiarly touching in it, and brings before us vividly and immediately the feelings and views of the time.

Contemporaneously with Haggai appeared another prophet with the same views and with the same aims—Zechariah. His book has the same subject as that of Haggai: the rebuilding of the temple and the future Messianic kingdom of Zerubbabel. But in a literary point of view Zechariah is highly remarkable and unique. He has abandoned the old style of prophecy, which was that of the discourse or sermon, and depicts in its stead visions which he has seen, and which are explained to him by an angel. Zechariah clothes his ideas in mysteriously symbolical events, which is indubitable proof that prophecy has loosed itself from its natural soil and developed into a purely literary creation. It may be compared to a book-drama of to-day. In all these productions of art the emotional and passionate elements are wanting which are to be found in the older prophetic writings, and which Haggai himself still knew how to preserve. Just as religion since Deuteronomy had become a book-religion, so now prophecy became purely literary in form. The thought of a personal and direct influence has totally disappeared.

The altered relation of the prophet towards God is also noteworthy. Whilst the older prophets feel themselves to be completely one with God, who is ever present and living in them, God now grows more

and more transcendent; the direct personal intercourse of the prophet with God ceases; an angel steps in between, who communes with him as intermediary. Zechariah has at his disposal a rich and lively fantasy, and his book is highly interesting and in its kind excellent; but it is nevertheless a clear witness of the growing deterioration of prophecy.

Especially typical of the conceptions of the time is the first of his visions. A man stands among myrtle trees, to whom come four apocalyptic riders on four horses of different colors. These horsemen have been sent to walk to and fro through the earth and bring news of what takes place. And they answer and say: "We have walked to and fro through the earth, and behold, all the earth sitteth still and is at rest." Then the angel who explains the vision to the prophet exclaims: "O Lord of hosts, how long wilt thou not have mercy on Jerusalem and on the cities of Judah, against which thou hast had indignation these threescore and ten years?"

From the revolution, from the overthrow of all existing circumstances, Israel expects the realisation of its hopes of the future, the destruction of the kingdoms of this world and the foundation of the Kingdom of God. The events of the world were followed with anxious curiosity; whenever a storm gathered on the political horizon, men believed they saw in it the signs of the great future. Thus was this unrestful and critical period of the Persian empire a time of great excitement among the Jews, and was looked upon by them all in the same way. We learn from Zechariah the remarkable fact that the Jews who had remained behind in Babylon sent at this time a golden crown to Jerusalem to be worn by Zerubbabel as the future Messiah King. It is the electrification, so to speak, of an atmosphere heavy with storm, which we feel in the Book of Zechariah.

But all hopes were in vain. Darius proved himself equal to the situation; the Persian empire stood firmer than ever, and all remained as before. In the meanwhile the building of the temple made rapid progress; the Satrap of the province, on the other side of the Euphrates, to which Judah belonged, named Tatnai, asked officially for orders. Darius expressly permitted the completion and also promised state-aid. The Satrap Tatnai took the matter up, and on the third day of March, 515, the new temple was completed after four and a half years' work.

THE BUTTERFLY.

BY PROF. WILHELM WINKLER.

ON the ruddy cheek of a ripening apple a brilliantly colored butterfly sits. It is a peacock butterfly. Playfully it opens and shuts its gorgeous wings,

on which its bright dappled eyes glitter like jewels in the sunshine.

Below, on the prickly nettle-bushes, along the rough stalks, black caterpillars are creeping, equipped with huge spines. On the branches of the garden hedge, polished angular pupæ hang, with their heads downwards, scarcely exhibiting a symptom of life. The butterfly now rises, and in rapid zigzag, now soaring, now flying, it alights on a nettle-leaf, where it lays its eggs.

Egg—caterpillar—pupa—butterfly! With marvelous instinct, the butterfly selects the spot and plant where its offspring, which it is never to see, can find the requisite conditions of life and development. The egg, so diminutive and insignificant, braves the rigor of the winter, and in the warm days of spring it gives life to the caterpillar. Like a tube constantly expanding, the caterpillar creeps along on its sixteen feet from one nettle to another, unmindful of the stinging hairs. Leaf after leaf falls under its sharp jaws.

At last the caterpillar becomes a pupa or chrysalis, and from the pupa, as from a coffin, arises the gorgeous daughter of the sun.

Like a flower endowed with life, the butterfly soars from blossom to blossom, sipping only the nectar.

Involuntarily we are reminded here of the words of the great Königsberg philosopher, Kant, who says:

“I make bold to say that the constitution of all the bodies in the heavens, the cause of their motions, in brief, the origin of the whole present structure of the universe, will be understood before the production of a single caterpillar, of a single common weed shall be clearly and perfectly explained on mechanical grounds.”¹

Certainly, no other development in nature has furnished the reflecting mind of man with more material for portentous comparisons than the development of the butterfly.

FABLES FROM THE NEW ÆSOP.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

The Neighbors.

SOMEWHERE in Argolis, near the sea, two men dwelt with their families, side by side, in cottages of much the same style and furnishing. After dwelling thus in amity for several years a day came when the two set forth as usual at dawn to provide for their families. “I go north to fish,” said one. “And I,” said the other, “go south to trap game.” So each went his own way; but by nightfall their fate (thus far strangely even) divided altogether; for the fisher who went north found no fish, and lost his net, and stumbled and fell upon the rocks and hurt his leg so badly it was a full month before he went forth again. But the

¹ *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*. 1755. Vorrede.

other who went to set traps, set them so well that he caught much game, so weighty, that on the way home he stumbled and fell; but, far from injuring him, his fall caused a rock to move, and lo! beneath it a great carbuncle, which, taking home, in a month he sold. The neighbors are not neighbors now, because nothing estranges more than change of fortune.

WHENCE?

BY J. ARTHUR EDGERTON.

I do not know. I seem a child at play
Before the viewless mystery of life,
And know not it is there: except at times
There comes to me a sense unnamable;
The veil seems just a little drawn; I see
An awful glimpse that shakes my inmost soul.
It may be but a look, a word, a face,
A strain of music, or a laugh, a song,
And all the world goes fading into dream.
I seem to feel all this has been before.
There rises up a something in my soul,
A something of unutterable age,
As old as life, aye, and as old as death,
That gazes through my eyes upon the world,
And brings a sense of loneliness, a gleam
Of fearful knowledge, then it fades away.

It was more frequent in my early years,
Before I clogged my soul with flesh and sin;
But even yet it comes to me at times;
And once—I know not what the cause—it came,
And in the frenzy burst from out my lips
The one involuntary cry, “I know”;
And then it left me helpless as a child;
The dream died from me; and I went my way
Into the world of toil and commonplace.

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