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MODERN LIBERALISM.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

THERE are no longer any infidels. Infidelity has gone out of vogue and "liberality" masquerades in its place. With Herbert Spencer's *First Principles* this new cult appeared, certain only of its own uncertainty; doubting even its own doubts; whose best wisdom is not to know; and whose divinity is the unknowable.

And now, responsive to the twang of the agnostic horn, out of the kennels of intellect a pack of opinions come: free religions, ethical cultures, theosophies, high and higher criticisms, fancies of all breeds, from faiths to fictions, in full cry to join the grand battue for truth.

And when sometimes one poor little fact (which no one ever denied), has been caught, they cut off its brush and hold it jubilantly aloft, crying that they have found the truth at last.

In olden times to be an "infidel" was to be an outcast; and it was seldom without good reason that he was so, for his sentiments were sinful, his conduct corrupt, and his pranks perfidious. In the town where I lived when a boy there was an old man whom I very early learned to dread and shun as an unbeliever. Curious tales were told of him, and well do I remember with what gruesome awe we listened to recitals of his misdeeds; how with a number of others, evil as himself, after a wild debauch of blasphemy, at which they made mockery of the last supper, and fetched in and baptised a cat, he was stricken with mortal illness. He was buried, so we were told, at his own request, in a plain pine box, and with no ministry of the gospel or of any other sort at his grave.

It was all very horrible to me then, but the lesson I learned was not without its value. How is it now? There are no longer any such characters; atheists are exceedingly difficult to find nowadays, and even materialists are becoming scarcer and scarcer yearly as science advances, and the old-fashioned race of unbelievers dies off.

The modern "infidel" is usually a person of culture and refinement, despising his antetype, the blasphemer, most heartily, and more often than otherwise actuated by the noblest of endeavors—the finding of the truth.

He has a sincere concern for sincerity, an honest regard for honesty; he is patient with others' infirmities, and tolerant of others' weaknesses; he reveres reverence, honors his god (his substitute for God), and more generally than otherwise claims to be an admirer and defender of the character and ethical teachings of Jesus.

When the French aristocracy was sinking into the slime of its sensuality we are told that vice lost half its sin by losing all its grossness. Is it so with modern liberalism? What is the meaning of this tidal wave of intellect? Has it anything in common with that liberty with which Christ hath made us free?

It is fashionable to be "liberal," and one of the chief clauses of the arraignment of Christianity is that it is "illiberal, intolerant, bigoted and cruel"; that it condemns to what is called damnation those who disregard its tenets and decline its doctrines.

But the truth admits no adjective to balk its inflexible determination.

If geometry is intolerant in declaring that the three angles of a triangle are equivalent to two right angles, then Christianity is intolerant when it declares that the soul that sinneth shall surely die.

If the arithmetic is bigoted in asserting that two plus two equals four, then the Christian is bigoted who believes that strait is the gate and narrow the way that leadeth unto life.

If chemistry is cruel in the certainty of its applied formula, then the Gospel of Christ is cruel when in simple terms radiant with the certainty of divinity, it tells the world: there is but one truth, but one way, but one life.

There are some who think (knowing how often I have assailed the tenets of theology) that I do wrong to continue to call myself a Christian, and the spirit of truth,—which they recognise in some measure,—the Christian spirit. Perhaps, after all, I am wrong. Perhaps the sects have no monopoly of divine truth.

And, yet when I am asked what I call myself, I invariably reply that while I am averse to classifying myself, if I must do so I shall ask to be considered a Christian.

"Not an orthodox Christian, surely?"

"Yes," I answer, "just that, an orthodox Christian."

"But you are a liberal."

"No, I am not. I am certainly liberal, but I am not *a* liberal, and I know nothing so illogical as liberal Christianity."

There is no such thing as liberal truth, as there is no such thing as a liberal arithmetic. The truth is either true or it is untrue. If it be true, whether in mathematics or religion, it is necessarily bigoted, inevitably dogmatic.

It is always right to be liberal, even to illiberality; to be gentle with the erring, to be kind even to the criminal; but to error severity is the only gentleness; to crime destruction is the sole kindness. Merciful always to the sinner, just always to the sin.

If by "orthodox" you mean a believer in a deity of wrath, a divine being who has issued an edict of condemnation against mankind, a god personally and wilfully so unjust that he would demand obedience of an unknown and unknowable law, I certainly am not orthodox.

But if you agree with the teaching of all nature and common sense and besides these, the "Scriptures," that God is spirit, and that there does exist in and over the universe this spirit of justice, duly, accurately, inevitably, and eternally just, whose law physically, mentally, or morally, is not to be violated with impunity,—the Continuity of consequences, the Divinity in destiny, the Overruling Providence of necessity, "of purer eyes than to behold," and purer virtue than to condone iniquity, then we are both of one mind; we are both orthodox.

If by orthodox you mean that this God of wrath, this cruel Jehovah was so vindictive, so implacable, that in order to restore order to a world disordered, not by its own fault, but by his decree, a sacrifice was demanded in the person of the man Christ, and that by believing in this personal man God, and by that belief alone, the whole purpose and intent of deity, can be averted, then I tell you frankly I am not orthodox.

But if you believe that in this world of weariness there is rest; for the war of opinion, the peace of understanding; for sorrow, joy; for suffering, contentment. If by a divine atonement you mean to "crucify the flesh with its lusts," to live a life of dutiful performance for the sake, not of your own safety, but of the race, and so for God's sake. If you have learned that in so doing you have followed Christ and loved the Lord thy God and thy neighbor as thyself. If you recognise that in following this ideal you have become amenable to a higher and greater law than that of commandments,—the law of love. If you find in that great master of the art of living a true revelation of all truth.

If in Jesus you find him who brought life and immortality to light, then, I assure you, we are not far apart; we are both orthodox.

As there was geometry before Euclid, and chemistry before Priestly and Farraday, and electricity before Franklin and Volta and Edison, so there was Christianity before Christ.

Christ taught no vicarious atonement personal or peculiar to himself, but rather how we should emulate his devotion by making our own atonement in the sacrifice of ourselves for the world.

The race is our larger self, and we may be our own Christ.

Jesus never claimed to be God's only son. He was the son, as we also are sons. The creeds have foisted a fictitious assumption upon him. In trying to elevate his character, they have really degraded it. They have tried to paint the lily, to gild the gold, to daub the permanent blue of heaven with earthy cobalt.

In making the validity of his doctrines dependent upon incidents of his career they have given us something little better than mythology, and in reliance upon miracles have degraded him to the level of an ordinary necromancer.

In the story of his immaculate birth they have brought down the sweet motherhood of Mary to the grossness of a Rhea Sylvia, and in that of the bodily resurrection proclaimed, in place of the spirit of truth, a materialistic doctrine of the flesh which profiteth nothing.

Modern ritual is a fine example of the atavism of our pagan proclivities.

The principles of the Christianity of Christ have been criminally libelled by their professed friends. Instead of facts as they are known we have only guesses as they are surmised.

And here and there and everywhere, with those who think as well as with those who stifle thought, with the infidel as well as the devout, none seems to have a glimmer of an idea of the limits permissible to opinion, the boundary of the arable region of fact, and the accurate frontiers of the desert of Guessland.

The infidel has successfully abolished a hell. Can he abolish the effect of cause? He has eliminated a personal authority for legality. Can he eliminate the law?

The human God has been stricken by liberal Christians from the list of deities, as the inhuman God was by the moral sense of all men. But in either case it was the names alone that were abolished; all that those names implied in the light of science yet remains. The despotism of the sequences of fate is no less despotic than if they were edicts issued by personal and remorseless power, and the spirit of love, which was

the meaning of the man God, still remains definite and potent incarnate in him and in us.

Dare to defy the poison and decline the antidote and you inevitably perish.

It matters not by what symbols you express these omnipotent ideas; they yet remain—the changeless choice of time.

But these certain principles, which can be so readily considered and easily understood, are completely vitiated by the contamination of symbolical treatment.

Read the average journals devoted to what is commonly considered free thought, how impotent they are to effect any definite good in the way of abolishing superstition. Their columns are mainly filled with attacks, more or less coarse and scurrilous, against the observances of theology, and crude arguments current among iconoclasts,—those dealers in second-hand mind material who know how to pull down, but cannot build up.

Hardly less silly in their simple sincerity are those within the pale of some church, who yet, somewhere, somehow feel that they must cling to a ghost of something. They feel the world moving beneath them, and for fear of falling clutch at shapes of air. These sort of thinkers, various varieties of deists, Unitarians, broad churchmen, higher critics, “advanced” thinkers as they think themselves, reformers as some call them, liberal Christians in all denominations,—all engaged in vague and futile attempts to reconcile, not science and religion, but the convictions hallowed by the associations of the past with the slow-moving logic of resistless truth.

Away with man-made creeds; they are all confusion, and “God is not the author of confusion, but of peace.”

I find many who tell me that they do not understand how it is possible to do away with opinion in religion. I answer that it is not possible so long as they consider religion a matter of opinion. The world has had the Saviour of its heart; now it needs a Redeemer of its brain.

AMOS.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

NOTHING is more characteristic than the appearance of written prophecy in Israel.

It was at Bethel, at the Autumn festival. In that place where once Jacob saw in a dream the angels of God ascending and descending, where God had appeared to him and had blessed him, there was the sanctuary of the kingdom of Israel, the religious centre of the ten tribes. Here stood the revered image of the bull, under which symbol the God of Israel was worshipped. Here all Israel had gathered for thanksgiving and adoration, for festivity and sacrifice.

In distinct opposition to the harsh austerity and sombre rigor of the later Judaism, the worship of God in ancient Israel was of a thoroughly joyful and cheerful character. It was a conception utterly strange to the ancient Israelite that worship was instituted to restore the impaired relation of man to God, or that it was the office of sacrifice to bring about an atonement for sins. The ancient Israelite considered the service of God a rejoicing in God. In the sacrifice, of which God received His appointed portion, whilst the sacrificer himself consumed the rest, he sat at the table with God, he was the guest of his God, and therefore doubly conscious of his union with Him. And as ancient Israel was a thoroughly cheerful and joyous people, its rejoicing in God bore, according to our ideas, many very worldly and unrighteous traits. Revelry and tumultuous carousing marked the festivals. As on the occasion of such an autumn festival at Shiloh, the mother of Samuel poured out her heart to God in silent prayer, Eli said unto her: “How long wilt thou be drunken? put away thy wine from thee.” So that evidently drunken women were not seldom seen on such occasions. The prophet Isaiah gives us a still more drastic sketch of a celebration in the temple at Jerusalem, when he describes how all the tables were full of vomit and filthiness, so that there was no place clean. And even worse things, licentious debaucheries of the lowest sort, took place during these festivals.

The prophets recognised in these excrescences, and certainly most justly, remnants of Canaanite paganism. Israel had not only taken its sanctuaries from the Canaanites, but also its modes of worship. The contemporaries of Amos, however, considered this to be the correct and fitting worship of God, such as the God of Israel demanded from His people, and such as was pleasing unto Him.

In the year 760 such another feast was celebrated in Bethel. Revelry was the order of the day. And why should man not rejoice and give thanks to God? After a long period of direst tribulation and distress Israel had again raised itself to power. Its worst enemy, the kingdom of Damascus, had been decisively defeated, and was no longer dangerous. The neighboring nations had been subjected, and Jeroboam II. reigned over a kingdom which nearly attained the size and grandeur of the kingdom of David. The good old times of this greatest ruler of Israel seemed to have come again. Israel was the ruling nation between the Nile and Euphrates. And were not affairs in the interior of the kingdom as brilliant and stupendous as they had ever been? There were palaces of ivory in Samaria then, and houses of hewn stone without number, castles and forts, horses and chariots, power and pomp, splendor and riches, wherever one might turn. The rich lay on couches of ivory with damask cushions;

daily they slew a fatted calf, drank the most costly wines, and anointed themselves with precious oils. All in all, it was a period in which to live was a joy. Accordingly, the feast was celebrated with unwonted splendor, and untold sacrifices were offered. Men lived in the consciousness that God was on their side, and they were grateful to Him.

But just as the festival mirth was at its highest, it was suddenly interrupted. An unknown, plain-looking man of the people forced his way through the crowd of merry-makers. A divine fire gleamed in his eyes, a holy gravity suffused his countenance. With shy, involuntary respect room is made for him, and before the people well know what has happened, he has drowned and brought to silence the festive songs by the piercing mournful cry of his lamentation. Israel had a special form of poetry for its funeral dirge, a particular melodious cadence, which reminded every hearer of the most earnest moments of his life, as he had stood, weeping, for the last time at the bier of his father, his mother, wife, or some beloved child, and this form was adopted repeatedly by the prophets with great effect. Such a dirge does the strange man now intone in the sanctuary at Bethel. It is a dirge over Israel; he shouts it among the merry-makers that are crowded before him:

"The virgin of Israel is fallen,
She shall no more rise,
She is forsaken upon her land,
There is none to raise her up."

The assembly is seized with astonishment and consternation. Men inquire who the strange speaker is, and are told that he is called Amos, a herdsman of Tekoa, who has uttered such blasphemies several times before. For to predict the destruction of God's own people was the acme of blasphemy; it was the same as saying that either God was not willing or that He had not the power to protect and save His people; it was equivalent to prophesying God's own destruction; for God Himself perished with the people who served and honored Him. Yet this wondrous prophet adds to his blasphemy, insanity. It is God Himself who destroys His people Israel, Who must destroy it. He has sworn it by His holiness, by Himself, that the end is come over His people Israel.

No long time elapsed before Amaziah the priest came up and addressed the bold speaker in these words: "O thou seer, go, flee thee away into the land of Judah and there eat bread and prophesy there: But prophesy not again at Bethel; for it is the King's chapel, and the King's court."

Then Amos answered: "I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son; but I was an herdsman and a gatherer of sycamore fruit: And the Lord took me as I followed the flock, and the Lord said unto me, Go, prophesy unto my people Israel." And he now con-

cludes his general warning of evil with a personal threat to the high-priest: "Thy wife shall be an harlot in the city, and thy sons and thy daughters shall fall by the sword, and thy land shall be divided by line, and thou shalt die in a polluted land."

After Amos had fulfilled the divine charge, he returned home to his sheep and to his sycamores. But feeling that what he had prophesied was not for the present, nor for those immediately concerned, but spoken for all time, he wrote down his prophesies and made of them an imperishable monument.

Now, how did Amos arrive at this conviction, which reversed everything that at that time seemed to be the fate of Israel. When he imagines to himself the overthrow of Israel, the conquest and destruction of its army, the plundering and desolation of its land, and the captivity and transportation of its people by an outside foe, he is thinking, of course, of the Assyrians, although he never mentions the name. This lowering thundercloud had repeatedly flashed its lightnings over Israel's horizon, first in the year 876, and in the succeeding century ten times at least. At last, in 767, the Assyrian hosts had penetrated as far as Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea, spreading terror and devastation everywhere. But at the time in question the danger was not very imminent. The Assyrian empire was then in a state of the uttermost confusion and impotence. Amos's conviction, accordingly, was no political forecast. Moreover, the most important and most unintelligible point remains unexplained on this assumption. Why was this condemnation an absolute necessity, willed and enforced by God Himself? This the prophet foresaw from his mere sense of justice.

In Amos we have, so to speak, the incorporation of the moral law. God is a God of justice; religion the moral relation of man to God—not a comfortable pillow, but an ethical exaction. Israel had faith in its God, He would not leave his people in the lurch, but would assist them and rescue them from all calamity. This singular relation of Israel to its God, Amos acknowledges: "You only have I known of all the families of the earth." But what is his conclusion? "Therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities."

Amos had already clearly perceived what a greater than he clothed in these words: "To whom much has been given, of him will much be required." The outer relation in itself is entirely worthless. "Are ye not as children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel?" says God through Amos. And also God's special marks of favor, in having led Israel out of Egypt and through the desert, prove nothing; for He had also done the same for Israel's most bitter enemies. "Have I not brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt? and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir?"

True, the people are pious after their fashion ; they cannot do enough in the matter of feasts and sacrifices. But all this appears to the prophet merely as an attempt to bribe the just judge, as it was then the custom on earth for a judge in return for money to acquit the guilty and condemn the innocent. Says God through Amos :

“I hate, I despise your feast days, and I will not smell in your solemn assemblies. Though ye offer me burnt offerings and your meat offerings, I will not accept them, neither will I regard the peace offerings of your fat beasts. Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs ; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream.” “Seek me and ye shall live. . . . Hate the evil and love the good and establish judgment in the gate.”

But it is just in what God here demands that Israel is totally wanting. Amos sees about him rich voluptuaries and debauchees, who derive the means of carrying on their sinful lives by shameful extortion and the scandalous oppression of the poor and the weak, thereby storing up in their palaces oppression and tyranny. Justice is turned to wormwood and righteousness thrown to the earth ; a bribe is taken against the just, and the poor sold for a pair of shoes. And the worst of all is, that they neither know nor feel how wicked and corrupt they are ; they live carelessly and listlessly on, and have no conception of the instability of all things.

Yet no particular insight or revelation is necessary. Amos can call upon the heathen, the Philistines, and the Egyptians to bear witness to God's dealings with Israel. Even these heathen who know not God and His commandments must see that in Samaria things are done which cry out to heaven, and that Israel is ripe for death. Therefore must God Himself as an atonement for his despised sanctity and justice destroy his people. He says :

“The end for my people Israel is at hand, I can no longer forgive.”

The blooming pink on the cheek of the virgin Israel is not for the prophet a sign of health, but the hectic flush of one diseased and hastening to her end. In all the noise and tumult, the hurry and bustle, his keen ear detects the death-rattle and he intones Israel's funeral dirge. And history has justified him. Forty years afterwards the kingdom of Israel was swept away, and its people carried into captivity.

But, you may ask, is there anything so wonderful in this? Are not these very ordinary truths and perceptions that are offered to us here? That would be a serious error. As a fact, the progress which the religion of Israel made in and through Amos cannot be too highly rated. In Amos it breaks for the first time

through the bonds of nationality and becomes a universal religion instead of the religion of a single people. In analysing the relationship of God to Israel, or at least in recognising it as morally conditioned, which by the fulfilment of the moral conditions could just as well be discharged by any other people, he gave a philosophical foundation to religion, which rendered it possible that the religion of Israel and the God of Israel should not become implicated in the fall of Israel, but could be developed all the more grandly. The fall of the people of Israel was the victory of God, the triumph of justice and truth over sin and deception. That which had destroyed every other religion could now only strengthen the religion of Israel.

This progress shows itself most strongly in the conception of God. Ancient Israel had no monotheism, in the strict scientific sense. The gods of the heathen were looked upon as real beings, as actual gods, who in their spheres were as powerful as the God of Israel in His. That had now to be otherwise. Right and justice exist beyond the boundaries of Israel ; they reach even further than the might of the Assyrians. For right is right everywhere, and wrong is everywhere wrong. If the God of Israel was the God of justice, then His kingdom extended as far as justice did,—then He was the God of the world, as Amos expressed it by the name he framed for God, Zebaoth, the Lord of hosts, the God of all power and might in heaven and on earth.

National boundaries fell before this universal power of justice. When the Moabites burnt to lime the bones of an Edomite king they drew down upon themselves the judgment and punishment of the God of Israel. Justice and righteousness are the only reality in heaven and on earth. Thus through Amos the God of Israel, as the God of justice and righteousness, becomes the God of the entire world, and the religion of this God a universal religion.

Amos is one of the most marvellous and incomprehensible figures in the history of the human mind, the pioneer of a process of evolution from which a new epoch of humanity dates. And here again we see that the most important and imposing things are the simplest and apparently the most easily understood.

CHRISTIAN CRITICS OF BUDDHA.

IT IS A very strange fact that the similarities that obtain between Buddhism and Christianity have so far been of little avail in establishing a sentiment of goodwill among Christians and Buddhists, and, far from being an assistance to mission work, have proved rather a hindrance to the spread of Christianity. The reason is that most Christians (at least those who call themselves orthodox) look upon the Christian-like doctrines of non-Christian religions in an un-Christian

spirit. Our present Christianity is too much under the influence of pagan notions.

When the Apostle St. Paul came to Greece, he diligently sought for points of contact and preached to the Athenians the unknown God whom they unknowingly worshipped. In the same way the missionaries who converted England and Germany utilised as much as possible the religious beliefs of the people to whom they addressed themselves and welcomed every agreement that could be discovered.¹ Since Christians have begun to press the blind faith in the letter and have ceased to rely on the universality of religious truth, they reject all other religions *prima facie*. In their self-sufficiency they have ceased to exercise self-criticism, and have thus become blind to their own shortcomings. At the same time, they are not ashamed of looking upon the noblest virtues of pagans as polished vices, and in doing so make themselves unnecessarily offensive to all serious believers of other religions, Buddhists, Hindus, Parsees, and Mohammedans. The consequence is that as a rule only religiously indifferent people become converts for impure reasons of worldly advantages, and Christianity has made during the last centuries no progress worthy of mention.

I am not an enemy of missions, on the contrary, I believe in the practise of making a missionary propaganda for one's own convictions. Missions are a good thing, for they are an evidence of spiritual life. That church which does not missionarise is dead. And missionary work will not only bring our ideas to those to whom missionaries are sent, but will also exercise a beneficial influence on those who send them.

The worst objection that can be made to freethinkers is that they are lukewarm in missionarising. How poorly are the magazines of freethought supported. Very few freethinkers are sufficiently enthusiastic to make a bold propaganda for the faith that is in them. Most of them shrink from making pecuniary or other sacrifices for their cause. The reason is that what is commonly called freethought is not a positive faith, but consists in mere negations, and negativism has no power to rouse enthusiasm in the human heart.

While missions are a good thing they must be conducted with propriety. They must be made at the right time, in the right way, and with the right spirit. But I regret to say that upon the whole Christian missions are not always conducted in the right spirit. As an instance of the wrong spirit that animates many (I

¹ Gregory I. went so far as to advise the missionary Augustinus in an edict given in 601 A. D., not to destroy pagan temples but to change them into churches; pagan festivals were also to be retained with this modification that they should no longer be celebrated in honor of Gods or heroes, but in commemoration of analogous saints (Ep. xi, 76). This accommodation policy no doubt gave a new lease of life to many pagan customs and notions, but it has contributed not a little to the final success of Christianity. At the same time we must confess that while many superstitions thus reappeared in a Christianised form, there were also many valuable features of pagan life preserved, which might otherwise have been lost.

do not say "all") of our missionaries, I refer to the book of a man for whose intellectual and moral qualities I cherish the highest opinion.

The Rev. R. Spence Hardy, the famous Buddhist scholar to whose industry we owe several valuable contributions to our knowledge of Buddhism, has written a book, *The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists Compared with History and Science*, in which he treats Buddhism with extraordinary injustice.

It is nothing but the spirit of injustice that alienates the sympathies of non-Christian people toward Christianity.

It is strange that Mr. Hardy's unfair statements are made with no apparent malice, but from a sheer habit which has been acquired through the notion of the exclusiveness of Christianity.

In making these critical remarks I do not wish to offend, but to call attention to a fault which can and should be avoided in the future.

Spence Hardy says in his book, *The Legends and Theories of Buddhists Compared with History and Science* (pp. 138, 140):

"The tales that are told about the acts performed by Buddha, and the wonders attendant on these acts, need only be stated, in order to be rejected at once from the realm of reality and truth. . . . These things are too absurd to require serious refutation."

Mr. Hardy forgets that many "tales told about the acts performed by Jesus, and the wonders attendant on the acts," too, need only be stated, in order to be rejected at once from the realm of reality and truth. Mr. Hardy recognises the paganism of others, but he does not see that he himself is still entangled in pagan notions. What would Mr. Hardy say if a Buddhist were to write exactly the same book only changing the word Christ into Buddha and making other little changes of the same nature. Buddhists requested by a Christian missionary to believe literally in Christ's walking upon the water or being bodily lifted up to heaven, are, as much as Spence Hardy, entitled to say: "These things are too absurd to require serious refutation." Mr. Hardy protests (p. 137):

"I deny all that is said about the passing through the air of Buddha and his disciples, or of their being able to visit the Dêwa and Brahma worlds."

If history and science refute the miracles attributed in the later Buddhistic literature to Buddha, why not those attributed to Christ? And we must assume that Mr. Hardy does not deny that Christ descended to hell and that he passed through the air when carried up to heaven in his ascension.

Mr. Hardy speaks of "the errors of Buddhism that are contrary to fact as taught by established and uncontroverted science" (p. 135), but he appears to reject science whenever it comes into collision with a literal interpretation of Christian doctrines. Bud-

dhism is to him a fraud, Christianity divine revelation. He says of Buddhism (pp. 210-211, 313, 207):

"I must confess that the more closely I look into the system, the less respect I feel for the character of its originators. That which at first sight appears to be the real glory of Buddhism, its moral code, loses all its distinction when minutely examined. Its seeming brightness is not that of the morning star, leading onward to intenser radiance but that of the meteor; and not even that; for the meteor warns the traveller that the dangerous morass is near; but Buddhism makes a fool of man by promising to guide him to safety, while it leads him to the very verge of the fatal precipice. . . . The people who profess this system know nothing of the solemn thought implied by the question, 'How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?' . . . The operation of the mind is no different in mode to that of the eye, or ear, vision is eye-touch, hearing is ear-touch, and thinking is heart-touch. The man, as we have repeatedly seen, is a mere mass, a cluster, a name and nothing more. . . . There is no law, because there is no law-giver, no authority from which law can proceed."

Man is "a cluster," means that the unity of man's soul is a unification—a truth on which all prominent psychologists and naturalists of Christian countries agree with Buddha. In the same sense Hume characterised the human soul as a bundle of sensations and ideas. Man is an organism consisting of a great number of living structures, which in their co-operation constitute a well-regulated commonwealth of sentient functions. And why should there be no law if there is no law-giver? Is the law of gravity unreal because of its mathematical nature, which indicates that it is of an intrinsic necessity and requires a lawgiver as little as the arithmetical law $2 \times 2 = 4$. Is $2 \times 2 = 4$ a reliable rule only if a personal God has decreed it? The moral law is of the same kind!

Buddha regards the order of the world not as the invention of either Brahma or any other God, but as an eternal and unconditional law as rigid as the number-relations, which we formulate in arithmetical propositions. Does such a view of man's soul and the nature of the moral dispensation of life indeed annul all moral responsibility? Buddhism does not employ the same symbolical terms as Christianity, but it is not devoid of an authority of moral conduct. Mr. Spence Hardy is so accustomed to the Christian terminology, that he, from the start, misconstrues all other modes of expression.

In other passages Mr. Hardy refers to Buddha's tales in which Buddha speaks of his experiences in previous existences. He says (p. 153):

"These facts are sufficient to convince every observant mind that what Buddha says about his past births, and those of others, is an imposition upon the credulity of mankind, without anything whatever to support it from fact."

Here Mr. Hardy's naïveté can only evoke our smiles: Buddhists are no more obliged to accept the Jataka tales as genuine history, than our children are requested to believe the legends of saints or Grimm's

fairly tales. There are Buddhists who believe the Jataka tales, and there are many Christians, especially in Roman Catholic countries, who believe the legends of saints.

Speaking in this connexion of the fossil remains of extinct animals, Mr. Hardy says (p. 150):

"Of many of the curious creatures that formerly existed only a few fragments have been found. Among them are birds of all sizes, from an ostrich to a crow, and lizards with a bird's beak and feet. . . . The Himalayas contain the remains of a gigantic land tortoise. The megatherium lies in the vast plains of South America, etc., etc. . . . Now if Buddha lived in these distant ages, and had a perfect insight into their circumstances, as he tells us he had, how is it that we have no intimation whatever in any of his numerous references to the past, that the world was so different in these respects to what it is now? . . . The only conclusion we can come to is, that he knew nothing about the beasts that roamed in other lands, or the birds that flew in other skies; and that as he was ignorant of their existence he could not introduce them into his tales."

It is right that Mr. Hardy appeals to the tribunal of science against the narrowness of a belief in the letter of the Buddhistic Jatakas; but why does he not sweep first before his own door? Unfortunately, the same objections can be made to Christ, who said: "Before Abraham was I am," apparently meaning that he had existed æons before his birth. There is a great similarity between the pre-existence of Christ and of Buddha, especially when we consider the later doctrine of Amitâbha, the infinite light of Buddhahood, which is omnipresent and eternal. While Christ claims to have existed before Abraham, he gives us no information about the fossil animals that have of late been found by geologists. Ingersoll speaks of Christ in the same way as Spence Hardy does of Buddha. He says: "If he truly was the Son of God, he ought to have known the future; he ought to have told us something about the New World; he ought to have broken the bonds of slavery. Why did he not do it?" And Ingersoll concludes: "Because he was not the Son of God. He was a man who knew nothing and understood nothing." When Ingersoll speaks in these terms, he is accused of flippancy, but Mr. Hardy's seriousness is not to be doubted.

What would Christians say of a Buddhist, who, with the same logic, commenting on analogous Christian traditions, would say of Christ what Mr. Hardy says of Buddha! Mr. Hardy says:

"I have proved that Buddhism is not a revelation of truth; that its founder was an erring and imperfect teacher, and ignorant of many things that are now universally known; and that the claim to the exercise of omniscience made for him by his followers is an imposition and pretence. . . . We can only regard Buddha as an impostor."

This is strong language, and I am sorry for Mr. Hardy that he has forgotten himself and all rules of justice and fairness in his missionary zeal.

Even Buddha's broadness in recognising the good wherever he found it, is stigmatised by Mr. Hardy. He says (p. 215):

"Buddha acknowledges that there are things excellent in other religions, and hence he did not persecute. He declares that even his opponents had a degree of wisdom and exercised a miraculous power. But this very indifference about error, as about everything else, this apparent candor and catholicity, is attended by an influence too often fatal to the best interests of those by whom it is professed."

Mr. Hardy condemns "this apparent candor and catholicity" as "indifference about error," and he adds (p. 216):

"To be a Christian a man must regard Buddha as a false teacher."

Mr. Hardy, apparently intending to palliate his harsh remarks, says:

"I am here a controversialist, and not an expositor." (P. 206.)

But even as a controversialist, he should not lower himself by making unjust accusations. It is neither right nor wise; for the liberties which he takes must be granted to opponents; and if they refuse to use them, it is to their credit.

Mr. Hardy says: "These conclusions I have founded upon statements taken from the sacred writings," and rejects Buddhism on account of these errors wholesale. Nor would he permit Buddhists to discriminate between Buddha's doctrine and later additions. For, says Mr. Hardy (p. 219):

"By rejecting other parts of the Pitakas as being unworthy of credence, and yet founding upon them, and upon them alone, your trust in the words they ascribe to Buddha, you do that which no wise worshipper would do, and what you have no liberty to do as a man guided by the requirements of reason."

This is a dangerous principle for Mr. Hardy to propound, for it should be applicable to all religions, and what would become of Christianity if it had to be kept under the bondage of the letter, so that we should no longer be allowed to discriminate between truth and error, but adopt or reject at once the whole fabric. If one discrepancy of the dogmatic texture of a religion with science or with reason disposes of it as a fraud, what shall we do with Christianity?

Spence Hardy's attitude toward Buddhism is typical for a certain class of Christians whose Christianity is little more than a highly advanced paganism.

Happily there are Christians who see deeper, and they feel no animosity against Buddhism on account of its many agreements with Christian doctrines. As their spokesman we quote Prof. Max Müller who says:

"If I do find in certain Buddhist works doctrines identically the same as in Christianity, so far from being frightened, I feel delighted, for surely truth is not the less true because it is believed by the majority of the human race."

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

NOTES.

We announce with deep regret the death of Prof. Comm. Luigi Ferri of the University of Rome, Italy, editor of the *Revista Italiana di Filosofia* and author of approved and valuable philosophical works.

The Politics of Aristotle, a revised text, with introduction, analysis, and commentary, by Prof. Franz Susemihl, of Greifswald, and Mr. R. D. Hicks of Trinity College, Cambridge is announced by Macmillan & Co.

Mr. F. C. Conybeare's critical edition of Philo *About the Contemplative Life* will be published very shortly by the Clarendon Press. Mr. Conybeare strongly upholds the genuineness of the treatise, which is of paramount importance for the history of primitive Christianity.

The fourth summer session of the School of Applied Ethics will be held in Plymouth, Mass., and will open on July the 8th, continuing for five weeks. There will be in all about eighty lectures given in economics, ethics, education, and the history of religion, by some of our most prominent scholars. Complete programmes may be obtained by applying to the secretary of the school, S. Burns Weston, 1305 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Medico-Legal Society announces that it will hold a Medico-Legal Congress at or near the city of New York during the last week of August or first week of September, 1895 (time and place to be hereafter announced). A general invitation to all persons interested in the science of medical jurisprudence is extended, who may send for circulars to either H. W. Mitchell, M.D., President, 747 Madison Avenue, New York, or Clark Bell, Esq., Secretary, 57 Broadway, New York.

Macmillan & Co. have just issued a third edition of the late Prof. Stanley Jevons's *The State in Relation to Labor*. The matter has been brought up to date by the help of footnotes, and the editor, M. M. Cababé, contributes an introduction on *The Present Aspect of Some of the Main Features of the Labor Question*. Mrs. Jevons, in the *Letters and Journal* of her husband, says that this book was the result of his maturest thoughts upon the subject, his conclusion being that no hard and fast rules could be laid down for the interference or non-interference of the State with labor.

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