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STRIKES, LOCAL AND SYMPATHETIC.

BY G. KOERNER.

I CANNOT help believing that on some days during the strikes Chicago was nearly in a situation, where at least for a short period it might have become the scene of riots and outrages, such as happened at Paris under the reign of the communists and anarchists in March, 1871. A few men commit an unlawful act. A chance shot, no one knows by whom fired, may kill a bystander, perhaps a woman. The cry of deliberate murder is started. Vengeance is invoked. The crowd increases. It soon becomes a mob. Agitators fan the flames. It comes to a conflict with the police or the militia. They may be overpowered. The lives and the property of the citizens may be at the mercy of the infuriated mob. This is the time for the scum and dregs, which every large city contains, to emerge from their dens to revel in theft, arson, destruction of property and murder.

Undoubtedly our government is strong enough to put down such a rising, amounting to an insurrection. It has crushed a rebellion of such magnitude as the world had never witnessed before in a four years civil war. It would have made short work of the Chicago riots. But as the State and federal help came somewhat tardily, lives have been lost, property to the amount of many millions directly and indirectly destroyed.

The cause of all this ever to be regretted commotion was a strike of workmen engaged by a private corporation, in which really no one had any interest except the corporation and its employees. If, from representation by the laborers, by sensational articles of the press, it was asserted that justice and equity was on the side of the strikers, it was but natural that the public took some interest in this local contest, but it was purely a sentimental one. That a certain trades union should have ordered a general strike, or, rather, a boycott, on nearly all the railroads in the country that used the articles manufactured by the corporation in question, merely on account of the good feeling for the local strikers, was not only, considering the depression of business at the time, an insane but a criminal act.

Before I go farther however, I may be permitted to speak of the nature of strikes and lock-outs historically, as I wish to draw a distinction between strikes and lock-outs, holding some to be justifiable, others unwarranted and wholly illegal.

There is really no substantial difference between strikes and lock-outs. A strike has been defined a suspension of work resulting from a dispute originating in some demand of the employed; a lock-out in some demand of the employer. It is really only a question as to who takes the initiative in the stopping of the works.

Strikes, it has been asserted, were as old as the known history of the world. Justice Brown, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a highly interesting address "On the Distribution of Property," delivered before the American Bar Association at Milwaukee, August 31, 1893, mentions the *exodus of the Israelites from Egypt* as having been a protest against the oppression of capital, and to have possessed the substantial characteristics of a modern strike. If we refer to the Book of Exodus in the Old Testament one would rather come to the conclusion that it was a question of emigration. Certainly the Jews, since they had settled first in Egypt with the full consent and encouragement of the rulers of the country, had become quite unpopular, had been reduced into a sort of slavery (peonage, perhaps), and were employed to perform hard and menial work. Moses and Aaron being commissioned by the Lord, as they believed, made strenuous and repeated efforts to get permission for the Jewish people to emigrate, but did not succeed. Finally, by the Lord Jehovah punishing with various sorts of plagues the people of Egypt, they were allowed to depart. Another and perhaps a stronger motive for their emigration was the wish to go to the land of Canaan, the former abode of Abraham and Jacob. They carried the embalmed body of Abraham along with them.

Justice Brown also speaks of the removal of the plebeians to the sacred mount, driven through despair the oppression of the Patricians. It seems, however, by not to have been a question of wages so much as one of general oppression. There existed most cruel laws against people in debt, in consequence of which all the property, the person, and even the children of the

debtor, when strict payment was not made, were given over to the creditors to do with them as they pleased.

Interest was excessively high. Another cause of discontent was the failure of a fair distribution of the lands which the Roman armies had conquered from the surrounding Latin tribes, and of which armies the plebeians formed by far the greatest part. Such distribution had been promised to induce them to enlist. There was at the time of which Livy speaks a war threatening with the *Volks*, a very warlike people, and the plebeians refused to fall in line and seceded to the *Mons Sacer*.

Upon certain concessions being made, such as enlarging the authority of the tribunes of the people and others relating to civil rights, the plebeians returned to Rome. This movement comes nearer to a strike than the *Exodus*, but it was rather in the nature of a secession, for in all probability the plebeians would have attempted to organise a separate State.

Mr. U. M. Rose, of the Chicago bar, at the same meeting of the American Bar Association, read a most admirable paper on strikes and trusts. He quotes from *Livy Lib. IX*, chapter 30, of a real strike, occurring at Rome 310 years before Christ, as being the first historical account of a strike on record. The guild of flute-players, to whom belonged the privilege of playing at the public sacrifices, had been prohibited by the last censors from holding their repasts in the temple of Jupiter, went off in a body to Tibur, so that no one was left to play at the sacrifices. The religious tendency of this affair gave great uneasiness to the Senate, and they sent envoys to Tibur, requesting the authorities to send the players back to Rome. The *Tiburians* tried hard to persuade them to return, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Finally they got rid of them by a very comical ruse, making the players at a feast drunk to insensibility and packing them off to Rome; a thing easily to be done, remarks Livy, with that class of people. Upon their original demands being complied with by the Senate, they stayed at Rome, enjoying their privileges up to the time Livy wrote his histories.

We are also indebted to Mr. Rose for a quotation from *Cons. 12, Codex Lib. VII, Tit. x*, being a highly interesting ordinance in the reign of Zeno, 474 A. D. It is directed against strikers and also against trades unions, and threatened them with very heavy penalties. It is too long to be cited here, but the occasion for this rescript, as set out in it, is strikingly similar with late occurrences in our country.

There was a real strike however anterior to that of the flute-players, which is not noticed by Mr. Rose, the strike of the Athenian married women, who, believing themselves neglected and oppressed by their husbands, organised a strike, of which the high-spirited, naughty,

cynical Aristophanes gives us such a ludicrous account in his farce, *Lysistrata*. That strike turned out like a vast majority of strikes since—a dead failure.

Considering the system of slavery pervading the ancient world, what we call strikes, lock-outs, and boycotts could hardly occur to any extent. Slaves, when too heavily oppressed, and when they found men to organise and lead them, rose up in insurrection, and bloody and cruel slave-wars made Carthage as well as Rome tremble for their existence.

It is to the middle ages and up to recent times that strikes and boycotts, the latter called "*revilings*" in English and "*Ferriufserklärungen*" in Germany, became very common. The juridical records of Great Britain and of the continent of Europe abound with laws directed against these efforts of the laboring classes to escape oppression and to better their condition. Were all these laws, ordinances, and rescripts collected, they would fill volumes. As a general thing, all combined movements of workingmen of every class, trying to obtain relief from their employers, were considered as conspiracies and highly punished, even where no violence was committed, for in that case the strikers fell under the general criminal law of the land, were indicted for murder, manslaughter, riot, or insurrection. In some few of these penal statutes strikes were not denounced as unlawful, if not attended with threats or violence, but up to the present century, and even up to more recent times, they were generally considered unlawful without exception. Some of these ancient statutes threatened severe punishment to persons convicted of participating in strikes, such as cutting off their ears; in some places in Germany the punishment provided was death, often actually inflicted, as we learn from old chronicles.

In former ages life was held of much less value than now. Punishments were cruel and inhuman. That they showed little mercy to strikers and boycotters sprung from their holding that a successful strike could not possibly be without breach of the public peace, and without acts of violence, a view which even now finds some advocates.

Strikes without violence have now by custom, legal decisions, and even statutes, been made lawful, but I presume that this legality does not attach to all kinds of strikes, but only to local ones. Even before the recent disastrous strikes, which almost brought us to the verge of civil war, what were called sympathetic strikes were frequently deprecated, as being most dangerous and destructive to the welfare of the commonwealth. The great coal-strike early in the spring, not being confined to localities only, had the most deplorable consequences. Not only have perhaps a hundred thousand miners lost their wages, but they have been thrown into idleness, making them dependent on the

charity of their neighbors. The demoralising effect of such a situation can hardly be overestimated. Coal being an indispensable article for manufactories, and for transportation by rail and steamboat, the whole business of the country was interrupted. Thousands of other workmen were thrown out of employment. Not to speak of many acts of violence and even murder connected with this coal-strike.

And here I may mention quite a curious and remarkable fact to which Mr. Jos. D. Weeks, in his report to the Census Bureau, has called public attention. Alluding, as I believe, more particularly to the great strike at Pittsburg against the Pennsylvania Central, he expresses himself as follows :

"Of the utter folly of many strikes there can be no doubt. They have been doomed to defeat from their inception. They have been undertaken in defiance of all economic laws, in ignorance of the real condition of the country and without just cause. They have wasted capital and decreased the wealth of the country. They have brought hunger, misery, death ; have broken up homes, and driven men and women and little children into the very shadow of death ; and yet men, knowing that all these possibilities are before them, will deliberately enter upon strikes, will cheerfully bear all these privations, and, what is more remarkable still, in many instances, the wives of the strikers, upon whom the misery falls with the most crushing force, will be the most determined in this resolution."

After the Pullman strike and its dreadful consequences, the public voice was raised loudly against sympathetic strikes. With few exceptions, the entire press of the country condemned them. Judges on the bench, in their charges, denounced them. So did public speakers and State officials.

But I have in vain looked for a suggestion of a remedy for this crying evil. I have certainly a very kind feeling for the hard laboring classes. Strikes, I deem it, are not wholly wrong, and in the language of the report of Mr. Weeks, already mentioned :

"Even unsuccessful strikes are in many ways advantageous to the strikers. Labor has to fight for every advantage it has gained, and though it is often defeated in its struggles that are called strikes, it has not only learned in these contests how better to wage future battles, but it has so impressed employers with its strength that it has made them shy of encountering antagonists constantly growing more formidable."

Now, is there no remedy against these sympathetic or sentimental strikes, so deleterious to the whole community, including the working classes themselves ? After a somewhat careful examination of existing laws and constitutional provisions I have come to a conclusion, which with great diffidence and as a mere suggestion I venture to bring to public notice.

All strikes under the ancient common law of England, until a comparatively recent time, were considered as conspiracies, and strikers' were punished as such. Even in the United States not very many years ago the same doctrine was held. But I do strongly

insist that there should be a distinction drawn between *local* and *sympathetic* strikes. If, for instance, say in a coal district, disputes arise between coal operators and miners, and the latter strike, let the matter be settled between them without any interference on the part of legal authorities. The strike will finally end by arbitration or submission by one side or the other. Only where violence is committed or threatened let the law have its course.

In cases, however, where no trouble whatever exists in the district, or in any other place where a relationship exists between employers and employees, and no complaint has been made as to wages or other dealings, a strike arising from orders issued by leaders of trades unions or similar associations a thousand miles off and admitted by the strikers themselves, who obey those orders, to be a sympathetic strike, *should be forbidden by law even if no acts of violence are committed.*

Who has not heard during the recent strikes many strikers assert that they were very anxious to work at the wages they got, but that they were afraid of their lives and limbs if they did not stay out. In such cases it seems to me strikers should be held *individually* responsible, particularly those who as walking delegates intrude into other localities where there is no trouble. Civil actions against strikers for damages would be of no avail, nor could they, by law, be compelled to work, if they are unwilling to do so. But the law ought to declare sympathetic strikes a public offence and the strikers guilty of a misdemeanor, to be punished by fine or imprisonment upon conviction before any competent court. No State's attorney would have the least trouble in proving a strike to be a sympathetic one, as the cases are generally manifest and admitted openly by the persons concerned.

To bring about this remedial relief in many States perhaps legislative action will be required. As the legislatures of a great majority of the States are about to assemble, it is very desirable that the subject of that kind of strikes should be considered and discussed. If laws, such as here suggested, could be passed, such calamities as our country has suffered this summer might be prevented, which certainly would be a consummation devoutly to be wished.

LABOR'S CLAIMS AND METHODS.

BY VICTOR YARROS.

THE recent labor disturbances have demonstrated two things : first, that labor, although profoundly dissatisfied with its place and status in the present industrial order, has the vaguest and most nebulous ideas regarding the changes that it would introduce with the view of securing greater independence and comfort. The labor leaders, when forced to definite statements, generally hint at collectivism or Statesocialism. Among

the provisional remedies that some of them suggest compulsory arbitration is perhaps the most prominent, but it is clear that arbitrators would be at sea in the absence of any guiding principles determining the relations between capital and labor. Still, the want of a constructive platform does not operate as a bar to rebellious demonstrations against the prevailing arrangements. Though it does not know even approximately what it wants, labor is emphatic in telling us what it does not want. And here we come to the second thing which recent events have established beyond peradventure,—namely, that labor claims the right to express its condemnation of the present industrial relations in certain ways which not only the public at large, but many of our leading thinkers and publicists as well, regard as reprehensible, anti-social, and subversive of all law and justice.¹

The methods employed by organized labor in controversies with employers are well known: they comprise strikes, boycotts, tie-ups, and threats. Violence has not infrequently been resorted to, but nobody has ever claimed the *right* to use violence, and hence no discussion is needful upon this point. Violence may be instigated by despair, but it is not soberly suggested as a legitimate means of warfare by any representative of labor.

Now the public and the thinkers who condemn the methods just specified reveal a strange confusion of mind and an inability to draw proper corollaries from clear and established principles. Labor is right. The methods it employs are entirely legitimate, and, far from threatening the total destruction of society and order, labor, in asserting its right to employ those methods, upholds the first principles of social life and is entitled to the warm support and sympathy of all justice-loving and fair-minded men.

Let us briefly analyse labor's claims from the standpoint of justice and equal liberty. We need postulate nothing but the right of each to do anything that is not incompatible with the full enjoyment of the same freedom by all others. As believers in free contract, let us inquire where labor's right to make its own terms ends.

Has a workman the right to strike—to leave the service of his employer? Even legalism now fully recognises this right, the only limitation prescribed by it being such as the common law and common sense abundantly justify. This qualification is well stated in a New York newspaper thus:

"An engineer may lawfully leave the service of a railroad company, but if he choose to leave at a time when the abandonment of

his post would lead to a fatal collision, he would be extremely liable to indictment for murder. So a hod-carrier is at liberty to strike for higher wages if he likes, by giving up his present job; but he must not give it up when he has a hodful of bricks on a ladder high above the sidewalk, and let the bricks come tumbling down on the heads of the people who happen to be underneath."

Where the law is nebulous and confused is in the matter of "a conspiracy to strike." May a large number of men combine or conspire to strike with the object of injuring the employer by this cessation of work and thereby forcing him to grant certain demands? The recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeals is doubtless a gratifying advance, upon the notions of Judge Jenkins, but it certainly leaves much to be desired. It is lawful, under this ruling, to so quit service as to cripple property or hinder operations, but it is not lawful to combine and conspire to quit service *with the object* of crippling any property. In other words: a thousand employees come together, confer, discuss grievances, and resolve to strike; this is legal, despite their full knowledge that injury to the employer will result from their sudden cessation of work (since they may select a time when the employer can least afford to interrupt production). The employees are simply asserting a fundamental right; the injury to the employer is incidental and one which they need not trouble themselves about. But suppose a thousand employees come together and say: "Let us strike in order to cripple the property of our employer;" is that legal? The only difference between the two cases is that in the latter there is an *intent* to injure. If the Circuit Court of Appeals were logical, it would draw no distinction between the two cases and hold them both legal. Interpreters differ about the real significance of the decision, but there can be no question as to the verdict of morals, of justice. It is perfectly proper and moral to "so quit service as to cripple property" *provided the property is crippled by the quitting* and not by violence or threats of violence. Whether the would-be strikers conspire to injure their employer or not, is wholly immaterial; the question is—*how* do they propose to injure him? If by doing something in itself wrong,—violence, threats, etc.,—then they are guilty of invasive conduct. If, however, the injury is to be the result of acts which they have an unquestionable right to perform, such as quitting work, it does not make it a crime for them to commit the act to *avow* an intention to inflict injury *by* this innocent act.

With regard to strikes, then, the view here contended for is that bodies of men may conspire to quit service with the intent to cripple property *by* such quitting. It is not criminal to injure, or to conspire to injure, anybody; it is only criminal to injure, and to conspire to injure, in *certain ways*,—in ways involving violence and threats of violence.

¹Dr. von Holst, in the *Journal of Political Economy*, recently endeavored to prove that the claims and methods of such labor leaders as Mr. Debs, Mr. Gompers, and Mr. Sovereign are essentially revolutionary and incompatible with orderly government. He accuses organized labor of having "unfurled the banner of anarchy."

What is true of strikes generally, is manifestly true of "sympathetic strikes" in particular. Such strikes may not be wise, but they are not immoral. A man has as much right to strike out of sympathy with another man as he has out of egoistic motives.

But how about the morality of boycotting? Is it right for a man or a body of men to boycott, and to persuade others to boycott, a certain employer or combination of employers? The law is not clear on the subject, and many American editors and ministers have denounced the boycott as a vicious foreignism scarcely less revolting than bomb-throwing. This, however, is a blunder due to ignorance of the nature of invasion. Boycotting means refusing to deal or associate with a given individual. Now it is not an aggression for a man to decline to buy his provisions of this or that dealer; he cannot be stopped by the ignored dealer and called upon to give his reasons for preferring to do business with another dealer. A man has a right to choose his dealers, friends, and acquaintances, and to be governed by mere whims in his choice. It is not unjust for a workman, or a body of workmen, to say to a merchant or manufacturer: "You employ non-union men; we want all labor to be organized, and we want you to help us in this. If you refuse, we shall withdraw our *favor*, our patronage, from you (for it *is* a favor), and confer it on your competitors who are more friendly to us." Such a course is not invasive, invasion being active interference with another's rightful activity, and boycotting being essentially passive. Moreover, the would-be boycotters may publish appeals and attempt to induce, by argument and persuasion, their sympathisers throughout the country to join them in boycotting their opponent, and the persons appealed to may respond favorably and join in the boycott. None of these different classes of persons are guilty of aggression. What they do they have a right to do; what they refuse to do, they are under no obligation to do. In short, all peaceable boycotting is moral and should be legal. It *is* legal under the English law, since the passage of the act which provides that nothing which is not criminal when done by one man, shall be deemed criminal when performed by a combination of men. The American law on the subject is not settled, but to deny the legitimacy of peaceable boycotting is to traverse the fundamental principles of free society.

When, therefore, the American Railway Union, out of sympathy with strikers, instituted a boycott of Pullman cars, and appealed to all organized labor to support it, no wrong, no aggression, was committed. The aggression was in the violence used to *compel* boycotting.

But are "tie-ups" invasive? Is it right for the organized bodies of labor throughout the country to

inaugurate a "general strike" as a means of enforcing certain demands? It is, unquestionably. If striking is not criminal, the agreement of a million or more men to strike together on a certain day, cannot possibly be criminal. True, a general strike or tie-up means industrial paralysis, complete social stagnation, but this result is incidental to an assertion of an inalienable right,—the right to free contract and free industry,—and hence, paradoxical and revolutionary as may be the *sound* of the phrase, it is nevertheless absolutely and strictly true that organized labor has a perfect right to "paralyse all industry and commerce,"—great as may be the suffering entailed upon the innocent public,—by such a general tie-up as labor leaders have been threatening. The workmen *as* workmen are not under any obligation to consider the interests of third parties. They deal with their employers, and they have the right to fix their own terms,—the price of their services. If the employers refuse to pay the price demanded, the workmen may decline the offer of employment. To say that they must continue in the employment because a general strike causes great hardship to the public, is logically to imply that even if employers decline to pay any wages at all, the workmen may not quit their employment. What may seem an injury to the public is really, and, in the long run, a great advantage to it, for the maintenance of freedom is the supreme need and task.

When labor threatens to paralyse society and industry; it does not necessarily threaten to commit a crime. The *how*, the question of the *method* and manner, is the all-important one. *How* does labor propose to carry out its threat? If by violence, direct coercion, then it contemplates crime, and should be suppressed; but if it restricts itself to passive means, to cessation of work and boycotting, government may not rightfully interfere. Whether the threats and acts of labor are invasive or not, depends, not on the results of the acts, but on the methods employed. Injury is no test of aggression, since injury frequently follows acts of undoubted legitimacy.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that organized workmen have a perfect right to strike, boycott, "tie-up" industries, and even paralyse all commerce and production, provided they do not resort to violence and trespass upon person or property. "Hardship to the public" does not justify the State's interference; orders restraining peaceable strikes or boycotts are violations of fundamental rights.

It may be said that it is utterly impossible to paralyse industry by peaceable strikes. That, however, is a different question. The right to make the attempt is what has been argued.

Some writers condemn labor organisations on the ground that they are trusts and conspiracies main-

tained for the purpose of enhancing prices and controlling production. For those who favor the prohibition of capitalists' trusts and combinations, it is logical to insist upon legislative measures against labor trusts. But from the standpoint of the principles here defended, all legislation against any trusts and combinations of capital or labor is indefensible and immoral. Competition is not a duty, but a right. Capitalists are no more obliged, ethically, to compete among themselves than laborers are. Both capitalists and laborers have the right to combine and fix prices, amount of production, etc. The outcry against trusts is based on notions inconsistent with industrial freedom. All that the public can demand is a condition under which competition is possible for those who desire to compete. That is to say, legislation must not establish any monopolies and "protect" any special class from the influence of competition. A free field once secured, the contending parties may come together and agree to work in harmony.

A great deal of evil doubtless results from the operation of existing trusts and combinations, but the remedy is to be found, not in the suppression of the trusts by law, but in the abolition of those conditions which arm the trusts with power which they should not possess and which they could not possess under freedom of competition. It is protection by special legislation that makes the trusts so dangerous and powerful. In the principle of the trust there is nothing inherently mischievous. Capital has a perfect right to organise, lock-out, tie-up, and paralyse all labor by suspending operations; the capitalists are not in duty bound to employ labor or to supply the public with wares. Labor has the right to combine, boycott, tie-up, and paralyse capital by refusing to work, since it is not obliged to sell itself to capital or to take care of the public. But neither has the right to use force and to violate equal liberty, and neither is entitled to special privileges and monopolies. If the State wishes to enforce equality of freedom, let it refrain from interfering with conduct not inconsistent with equal freedom, and from enacting positive legislation which, by its injustice, breeds aggression and war.

ON THE RELATIVE EDUCATIONAL WORTH OF THE
CLASSICS AND THE MATHEMATICO-PHYSICAL
SCIENCES IN COLLEGES AND HIGH
SCHOOLS.

BY PROF. ERNST MACH.

II.

Of the lamentable conditions produced by the common method of teaching the classics, we spoke in the preceding article.

This must be changed. It is possible to get acquainted with the views of the Greeks and Romans by a shorter road than by the intellect deadening process

of eight or ten years of decliing, conjugating, analysing, and extemporisation. There are to-day plenty of educated persons who have acquired through good translations vider, clearer, and more just views of classical antiquity than the graduates of our gymnasia and colleges.¹

For us moderns, the Greeks and the Romans are simply two objects of archæological and historical research like all others. If we put them before our youth in fresh and living pictures, and not merely in words and syllables, the effect will be assured. We derive a totally different enjoyment from the Greeks when we approach them after a study of the results of modern research in the history of civilisation. We read many a chapter of Herodotus differently when we attack his works equipped with a knowledge of natural science, and with information about the stone age and the lake-dwellers. What our classical institutions *pretend* to give can and actually will be given to our youth with much more fruitful results by competent *historical* instruction, which must supply, not names and numbers alone, nor the mere history of dynasties and wars, but be in every sense of the word a true history of civilisation.

The view still widely prevails that all "higher, ideal culture," all extension of our view of the world, is acquired by philological and in a lesser degree by historical studies; still, that the mathematics and natural sciences should not be neglected on account of their usefulness. This is an opinion to which I must refuse my assent. It were strange if man could learn more, could draw more intellectual nourishment, from the shards of a few old broken jugs, from inscribed stones, or yellow parchments, than from all the rest of nature. True, man is man's first concern, but he is not his sole concern.

In ceasing to regard man as the centre of the world; in discovering that the earth is a top whirled about the sun, which speeds off with it into infinite space; in finding that in the fixed stars the same elements exist as on earth; in meeting everywhere the same processes of which the life of man is merely a vanishingly small part—in such things, too, is a widening of our view of the world, and edification, and poetry. There are here perhaps grander and more significant facts than the bellowing of the wounded Aries, or the charming island of Calypso, or the ocean-stream engirdling the earth. He only should speak of the relative value of these two domains of thought, of their poetry, who knows both.

The "utility" of physical science is, in a measure,

¹ I would not for a moment contend that we derive exactly the same profit from a Greek author by reading him in a translation instead of in the original; but the difference, the excess of gain in the second case, appears to me, and probably will to most men who are not professional philologists, to be too dearly bought with the expenditure of eight years of valuable time.

merely a *collateral* product of that flight of the intellect which produced science. No one, however, should underrate the utility of science who has shared in the realisation by modern industrial art of the Oriental world of fables, much less one upon whom those treasures have been poured, as it were, from the fourth dimension, without his aid or understanding.

Nor may we believe that science is useful only to the practical man. Its influence permeates all our affairs, our whole life; everywhere its ideas are decisive. How differently will the jurist, the legislator, or the political economist think, who knows, for example, that a square mile of the most fertile land can support with the solar heat annually consumed only a definite number of human beings, which no art or science can increase. Many economical theories, which open new air-paths of progress, air-paths in the literal sense of the word, would be made impossible by such knowledge.

The eulogists of classical education love to emphasise the cultivation of taste which comes from employment with the ancient models. I candidly confess that there is something absolutely revolting in this to me. To form taste, then, our youths must sacrifice ten years of their life! Luxury takes precedence over necessity. Have the future generations, in the face of the difficult problems, the great social questions, which they must meet, and that with strengthened mind and heart, no more important duties to fulfil than these?

But let us assume that this end were desirable. Can taste be formed by rules and precepts? Do not ideals of beauty change? Is it not a stupendous absurdity to force one's self artificially to admire things which, with all their historical interest, with all their beauty in individual points, are for the most part foreign to the rest of our thoughts and feelings, provided we have such of *our own*. A nation that is truly such, has its own taste and will not go to others for it. And every individual perfect man has his own taste.¹

And what, after all, does this cultivation of taste consist in? In the acquisition of the personal literary style of a few select authors! What should we think of a people that would force its youth a thousand

years from now, by years of practice, to master the tortuous or bombastic style of some successful lawyer or politician of to-day? Should we not justly accuse them of a woful lack of taste?

The evil effects of this imagined cultivation of the taste find expression often enough. The young *savant* who regards the composition of a scientific essay as a rhetorical exercise instead of a simple and unadorned presentation of the facts and the truth, still sits unconsciously on the school-bench, and still unwittingly represents the point of view of the Romans, by whom the elaboration of speeches was regarded as a serious scientific (!) employment.

Far be it from me to underrate the value of the development of the instinct of speech and of the increased comprehension of our own language which comes from philological studies. By the study of a foreign language, especially of one which differs widely from ours, the signs and forms of words are first clearly distinguished from the thoughts which they express. Words of the closest possible correspondence in different languages never coincide absolutely with the ideas they stand for, but place in relief slightly different aspects of the same thing, and by the study of language the attention is directed to these shades of difference. But it would be far from admissible to contend that the study of Latin and Greek is the most fruitful and natural, let alone the *only*, means of attaining this end. Any one who will give himself the pleasure of a few hours' companionship with a Chinese grammar; who will seek to make clear to himself the mode of speech and thought of a people who never advanced as far as the analysis of articulate sounds, but stopped at the analysis of syllables, to whom our alphabetical characters, therefore, are an inexplicable puzzle, and who express all their rich and profound thoughts by means of a few syllables with variable emphasis and position,—such a person, perhaps, will acquire new, and extremely elucidative ideas upon the relation of language and thought. But should our children, therefore, study Chinese? Certainly not. No more, then, should they be burdened with Latin, at least in the measure they are.

It is a beautiful achievement to reproduce a Latin thought in a modern language with the maximum fidelity of meaning and expression—for the *translator*. Moreover, we shall be very grateful to the translator for his performance. But to demand this feat of every educated man, without consideration of the sacrifice of time and labor which it entails, is unreasonable. And for this very reason, as classical teachers admit, that ideal is never perfectly attained, except in rare cases with scholars possessed of special talents and great industry. Without slurring, therefore, the high importance of the study of the ancient languages as a

¹ "The temptation," Judge Hartwich writes, "to regard the 'taste' of the 'ancients as so lofty and unsurpassable appears to me to have its chief origin 'in the fact that the ancients were unexcelled in the representation of the 'nude. First, by their unremitting care of the human body they produced 'splendid models'; and secondly, in their gymnasiums and in their athletic 'games they had these models constantly before their eyes. No wonder, then, 'that their statues still excite our admiration! For the form, the ideal of the 'human body has not changed in the course of the centuries. But with intel-'lectual matters it is totally different; they change from century to century, 'nay, from decennium to decennium. It is very natural now, that people 'should unconsciously apply what is thus so easily seen, namely, the works of 'sculpture, as a universal criterion of the highly developed tastes of the an-'cients—a fallacy against which people cannot, in my judgment, be too strongly 'warned."

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profession, we may still feel sure that the instinct for speech which is part of every liberal education can, and must, be acquired in a different way. Should we, indeed, be forever lost if the Greeks had not lived before us?

The fact is, we must carry our demands further than the representatives of classical philology. We must ask of every educated man a fair scientific conception of the nature and value of language, of the formation of language, of the alteration of the meaning of roots, of the degeneration of fixed forms of speech to grammatical forms, in brief, of all the main results of modern comparative philology. We should judge that this were attainable by a careful study of our mother tongue and of the languages next allied to it, and subsequently of the more ancient tongues from which the former are derived. If any one object that this is too difficult and entails too much labor, I should advise such a person to place side by side an English, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, and German Bible, and to compare a few lines of them; he would be amazed at the multitude of suggestions that offer themselves.¹ In fact, I believe that a really progressive, fruitful, rational, and instructive study of languages can be conducted only on this plan. Many of my audience will remember, perhaps, the bright and encouraging effect, like that of a ray of sunlight on a gloomy day, which the meagre and furtive remarks on comparative philology in Curtius's Greek grammar wrought in that barren and lifeless desert of verbal quibbles.

The principal result obtained by the present method of studying the ancient languages is that which comes from the student's employment with their complicated grammars. It consists in the sharpening of the attention and in the exercise of the judgment by the practice of subsuming special cases under general rules, and of distinguishing between different cases. Obviously, the same result may be reached by many other methods; for example, by difficult games of cards. Every science, the mathematics and the physical sciences included, accomplish as much, if not more, in this disciplining of the judgment. In addition, the matter treated by those sciences has a much higher intrinsic interest for young people, and so engages spontaneously their attention; while on the other hand they are elucidative and useful in other directions in which grammar can accomplish nothing.

¹ English: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, and the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."—Dutch: "In het begin schiep God den hemel en de aarde. De aarde nu was woest en ledig, en duisternis was op den afgrond; en de Geest Gods zweefde op de wateren."—Danish: "I Begyndelsen skabte Gud Himmelen og Jorden. Og Jorden var øde og tom, og der var mørkt ovenover Afgrunden, og Guds Aand svevede ovenover Vandene."—Swedish: "I begynnelsen skapade Gud Himmel och Jord. Och Jorden var öde och tom, och mörker var på djupet, och Guds Ande svafve öfver wattenet."—German: "Am Anfang schuf Gott Himmel und Erde. Und die Erde war wüst und leer, und es war finster auf der Tiefe; und der Geist Gottes schwebte auf dem Wasser."

Who cares, so far as the matter of it is concerned, whether we say *hominum* or *hominorum* in the genitive plural, interesting as the fact may be for the philologist? And who would dispute that the intellectual necessity of causal insight is awakened not by grammar but by the natural sciences?

It is not our intention, therefore, to gainsay in the least the good influence which the study of Latin and Greek grammar *also* exercises on the sharpening of the judgment. In so far as the study of words as such must greatly promote lucidity and accuracy of expression, in so far as Latin and Greek are not yet wholly indispensable to many branches of knowledge, we willingly concede to them a place in our schools, but would demand that the disproportionate amount of time allotted to them, wrongly withdrawn from other useful studies, should be considerably curtailed. That in the end Latin and Greek will not be employed as the universal means of education, we are fully convinced. They will be relegated to the closet of the scholar or professional philologist, and gradually make way for the modern languages and the modern science of language.

Long ago Locke reduced to their proper limits the exaggerated notions which obtained of the close connexion of thought and speech, of logic and grammar, and recent investigators have established on still surer foundations his views. How little a complicated grammar is necessary for expressing delicate shades of thought is demonstrated by the Italians and French, who, although they have almost totally discarded the grammatical redundancies of the Romans, are yet not surpassed by the latter in accuracy of thought, and whose poetical, but especially whose scientific literature, as no one will dispute, can bear favorable comparison with the Romans.

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