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## MOTHERS AND SONS OF GODS.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

[CONTINUED.]

### II.

The difference between the account of the creation of man in the first chapter of Genesis and that in the second was recognised by the ancient Jews and gave rise to various theories. The most important was that of Philo, who explained it by his doctrine of the Logos, or "Second God," through whom the Supreme Father created all things, and in whose image the man of Genesis i was ideally formed. Philo maintained that mortal nature could be fashioned in the image of the Supreme Father. Adam, formed in Genesis ii, he describes as "the visible man, in his likeness to the conceptual model"; that is, to the Logos-man of Genesis i,—"the incorporeal and spiritual man, in the likeness of the archetype, and as representing a higher character, the divine Logos, the first principle, the prototype, the original measure of all nature." The less learned and unphilosophical Jews, however, simply concluded that Adam had a first wife—the "female" of Genesis i—Eve being his second wife. This first wife became associated with a mysterious being, whose name, Lilith, first appears in an ancient Babylonian record, and is found in Isaiah xxxiv, 14, rendered "screech-owl" in the old version and "night-monster" in the revised version. I have explored the many curious legends of the enchanting Lilith in my "Demonology and Devil-Lore," but may here say that, according to Jewish tradition, her creation at the same time with the man (Gen. i), and without indication of inferiority, led to a quarrel between the two as to headship, which resulted in Lilith's leaving Paradise and wedding Sammaël (Satan). Eve was then created for Adam, and it was probably to assert her inferiority that the "side" of Adam was interpreted as his rib. This folk-lore could not be unfamiliar in the Ghetto at Rome, and, consequently, among the Christians. It has long been understood that the Jewish notion that it was Lilith who assumed the form of the serpent in Eden, is represented in Michel Angelo's painting in the Vatican; where the serpent has the breast and head of a woman, and there is little reason to doubt

that the woman present at the man's creation, alluded to in my previous paper, is meant for Lilith.

Eden is of Oriental origin. The wondrous garden of the Hindu deity Indra,—like Yahve, a rain-god,—is called in Sanscrit *udyan*; and there is good reason to believe that this word is related to the Persian *Heden*—the birthplace of Zoroaster. Our word "Paradise" is from the Persian (*Zend*) *pairideza*. The story of the Fall of Man, in Genesis, closely resembles that of the first man and woman, Meshia and Meshiane, in the Persian legend. There was in this (Persian) garden a sacred tree, *Hom* (related to the vine *soma*, of Hindu mythology), which was reserved by the gods, who from it derived immortality. Meshia and Meshiane were persuaded to eat of this sacred *Hom*, "tree of life," by Aeshma-deva (now Asmodeus), described in the *Zend-Avesta* as "the two-footed serpent of lies." (In John viii, 44, it is said the devil "is a liar and so is his father.")

In the Sistine Chapel the eye wanders from the panels of Lilith and Eve and Adam to the great painting of the Last Judgment. There is seen "the second Adam," as the "Lord from Heaven," consigning the wicked to hell. His face is full of wrath. Beside him is his mother, her face full of compassion, her hands crossed beneath his uplifted, menacing arm: she seems trying to restrain him. There is but one woman in all that heavenly hierarchy. The loss of that woman from Protestant altars may partly account for its hard dogmas and cruel history.

A lady told me that she once tried to console a poor Scotch woman who had lost her little boy, but the sobbing mother said: "What troubles me is that they be all men-folk up there (in Heaven) and won't know how to do for him." Protestants ridiculed the late Pope a good deal for his promulgation of the Virgin's immaculate conception, but they themselves have been steadily recalling the Madonna into their religion, and she may be seen reappearing in the Protestant pictures of Jesus, with feminine face, his hair parted in the middle and flowing down in soft locks; also in the renewed assertion of the tenderness and compassionateness of Christ, represented to the Catholic world in the Madonna. Were Michel Angelo to reappear as an English or

American artist and paint the severe and angry Christ of his Last Judgment, his picture would not be tolerated by cultured Christians.

Madonna Mary, as a mother of God, is really descended from Eve, as the mother of Cain (Yahve's son), from whom is traced the genealogy of Joseph, Mary's husband. Of course, in the first century nothing had been heard of the miraculous conception of Jesus. Paul declares Jesus to be the seed of David, and as Joseph alone—not Mary—was descended from David, the story of the conception by the Holy Ghost was evidently unknown to him. It was indeed essential that the Messiah should be legitimately descended from David, and so the New Testament genealogies have made it out. But the idea of Jesus as Messiah passed away before the idea of the Divine Man, which was essential to the inclusion of the Gentiles, who knew not any "Messiah." It was also essential to the moralisation of the new faith. The Messianic idea was an expression of Jewish aristocracy. It had nothing to do with morals. If the genealogy from Yahve to Joseph be examined, it will be seen that the continuation of the divine family in the earth is by no means associated with the preservation of virtue. Murderous Cain and Lamech, drunken Noah, mendacious Abraham, tricky Jacob, treacherous David, are eminent fruits on the family-tree of Yahve. Indeed, the aim and purport of this colony of demigods on earth would appear to be the propagation of Yahve's dominion in the world by the clan of his devotees.

Notwithstanding our demonstrations of the incredible character of the miraculous birth-legend of Jesus, it may be seen in another light. It represents, I believe, a much higher idea than the genealogical Jesus, from which it relieved the whole conception of religion. It superseded a tribal Messiah with a human-hearted, woman-born being, in whose divinity a paternal deity was represented, a Father of the whole human race. This larger and moral idea of the deity is indeed visible in some poetic passages of the Old Testament, especially in the deity who spares Nineveh, but it has not prevailed against the hard theological system, the rigid assertion of supremacy of the "chosen people."

The legend of Adam and Eve and the serpent is not alluded to in the Old Testament after its narration in Genesis, because it was imported by the Jews at a late period, and how much else they imported it is difficult to say; but they would appear to have projected into the legend of man's creation their Abrahamic and Noachian theology, according to which their tribe was both by covenant and miraculous generation the family of God. For the miraculous conception of Isaac by Sarah reappears in that of the first child, Cain, and in the first-born of God, by Mary. Whether this larger idea, surrendering tribal suprem-

acy, was evolved from Persian importations, is a question involving extended exploration of Persian scripture and analyses of Christian and Jewish apocryphal books,—such as "The Wisdom of God" and "The Book of Enoch,"—the Writings of Philo and the Enostic Books. This is not necessary for my present purpose. There is danger in pressing too far striking analogies between religious and phonetic resemblances of names, words, and legends. As fingers resemble fingers all over the world, so some similarities must be expected in religions and mythologies, though of independent development. So far as we have gone, however, there is little difficulty in distinguishing Persian elements in the Judaic-Christian system. When we enter the Zoroastrian temple we find in their natural place and relation, figures which in the Old Testament are mixed, as if in a curiosity shop. Adam and Eve are introduced, and the Fall reported, only to be referred to no more, and Satan figures only in Job, a book adapted from other lands. And, what is of great significance, important figures, which, in the Jewish mythology, are personalities, with individual interests and characters, like men and women, are in the Persian system known only by their functions. In Judaic mythology the Fall of Man does not affect the human race at all; but in Persia it is fundamental, and was so ages before it was adopted as the foundation of Christianity.

In a concluding paper I propose to give some account of the Persian Madonna, whose development anticipated by at least two thousand years the Christian Madonna.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

#### REASON.

THE difference between the two great philosophical parties of the middle ages may, in a modernised form, be characterised as follows:

The Realist recognises forms as realities of a universal nature. The samenesses in the world, the similarities and dissimilarities, the relations and the changes taking place in these relations are actual and objective. Thus the universal is real.

The Nominalist regards universals as idealities. He professes to know only single experiences and believes that he is not warranted in assuming a coherence among them. To him the samenesses which a mind discovers are not real; they are mental impositions. The regularities of laws have no objective existence, but are purely subjective conceptions, and universals are mere names.

To the Realist the universe is one whole, the bond of union being the universal in the single experiences.

To the Nominalist the universe is a sum of innumerable items, and we are not entitled to make any con-

clusion from the nature of one of them as to the nature of others.

The nominalistic position appears to be the more guarded one. But when adhered to and applied with consistency it makes knowledge itself impossible. It is in its root scepticism and leads to agnosticism.

Now the question is, can the realistic assumption be proved or not? Is the denial of the legitimacy of realistic conclusions justifiable or not?

If the universe were actually an indifferent medley of single facts, without any coherence of their own, so that all the order we see in the world has been given to it by ourselves, reality would be more correctly pictured in the animal brain than in the human mind.

The question, as to whether or not there is any universality is the problem of reason. If there were no universality there would be no reliability in reason. Reason would be of a purely ideal, of a merely subjective and illusory nature. Its application to reality would be an assumption, at best a mere working hypothesis. Thus there would be no knowledge, but opinions only, and we could, with strict consistency, not even say that if all men are mortal, Caius, being a man, must be mortal, too.

When we deny universality, we kill reason, for universality is the life-blood of reason.

How can we justify the assumption of universality?

There may be some coherence among the many single facts of our experience, but we are perhaps unable to verify it, and the coherence may be partial for all we know.

Before we enter into a discussion of the problem, let us ask: Is it at all true that experience consists of many single items, and do we not, when treating experience as such, inadvertently imply a whole theory, the consequence of which will crop out unawares afterwards? It may be true that realism begins with an assumption, but we should not be blind to the fact that nominalism also is not free of assumptions.

The truth is that experience is a coherent entirety, and the existence of single facts is due only to an analysis of experience. There is no fact unconnected with other facts, and the connections of facts are not merely incidental features. Reality can be understood only when it is conceived as a system of changes. Events are intelligible only when viewed as transformations, so that the laws of form which obtain in these transformations are universal.

Thus it appears that universality is a fact of experience as much as a sensation. Sensation is the subjective symbol for what objectively appears as matter, and the connections and forms of our sensations are the subjective aspect of the interrelations of material reality. The truth is, that not only matter is real, but its forms, also.

The problem of universality is the same as the problem of necessity, and the problem of necessity is the problem of determinableness.\* How is it that we can determine certain things? This again is the problem of reason.

The most perplexing feature of reason is its faculty of *a priori* determination. We can make certain statements with perfect assurance concerning things which sometimes we cannot even know by direct experience.

For instance, we accurately measure first the distance between two observatories, which happen to lie in the same longitude, and then the two angles at which the moon passes through the meridian. We thus have a triangle of which one side and the two adjacent angles are known, and it is easy enough to calculate from these data the distance of the moon from the earth. We can never directly measure the moon's distance by yard-sticks or tape-lines, but we can, without further experience or experiment, be sure that our calculation is correct. The moon's distance being known, we can proceed to measure the sun's distance by simply measuring the angle at which sun and moon appear on earth when the moon is exactly at the half. We again have a triangle in which three parts are known, viz., (1) the distance between earth and moon; (2) the angle at the moon as a right angle; and (3) the angle at the earth by measurement. And from these data we can calculate the hypotenuse of the rightangled triangle, which is the distance between sun and earth. In this way human reason bridges over the gap between the known and the unknown.

Reality possesses certain features which can be determined, not by experience, but *a priori*, by purely formal thought, i. e., by pure reason.

There is this peculiarity about our reasoning, that the first act determines the following acts. When we construct an equilateral triangle, we cannot help also making the angles equal; and when we construct an equiangular triangle, we cannot help making the sides equal. This is a puzzling fact to those who look upon the world as a sum of many incoherent items. It is all but inexplicable from the nominalistic standpoint. But it is only a more complex case of the fact, that when we have determined *A* to be *A*, we cannot at the same time determine it to be *not A*. By positing *A*, *A* is *A* and remains *A* in all its consequences. Only by inverting reason itself, can I say that *A* is *A* and *not A* at the same time.

What is reason?

We present as a preliminary definition the statement that reason is man's method of thinking. Noiré

\* Necessity is often regarded as a compulsion, and determinism is accordingly confounded with fatalism. "An event is necessary," means simply that it can be determined, and "to determine" means to describe with precision. All determinations are made on the supposition of the presence of certain conditions and the absence of any other factors which might interfere.

says: "Man thinks because he speaks"; and Max Müller, standing upon the same ground, adds: "No language without reason, no reason without language." We are quite willing to adopt the results of modern philology, but they are not sufficient for our present purpose. Our problem is deeper still. We accept the Noiré-Max Müller theory and may restate it as follows: Language is the organ of rational thought, and rational thought develops through the mechanism of language. Our present problem, however, is not How did human reason develop? but How is it possible that our reason can give us information about reality?

Not all processes of reasoning give us information about reality, but only such as are carried on with consistency. Thus we have to modify our preliminary definition of reason. Reason is not any process of reasoning, but a certain and quite definite kind of reasoning, and reasoning is rational only when it agrees with this one kind of reasoning. Accordingly we define reason as "the norm of reasoning."

We ask, Is there any norm of reasoning? In this form the question again reminds us of the old problem, realism *versus* nominalism. Is there any universality, generality, or necessity? Our answer is affirmative

One thing is pre-eminently characteristic of reason, viz. that there is but one reason. There are not various reasons. Reason (if it is reason at all) is the same in one man as in another man. As there is but one kind of arithmetic, so there is but one kind of reason.

Reason in the sense of "norm of reasoning" is to be used without the article. If a man gives *a* reason for his action, or if he speaks of *the* reason he has, he means the rational motives or principles by which he allows himself to be influenced. Such reasons are various and of different natures; but reason as the norm of reasoning, is no individual or particular thing or idea; its very nature is generality or rather universality. And it is a real feature of existence.

Mathematicians with great ingenuity have invented various kinds of mathematics. They have shown that Euclidean geometry is but one actual case among many possible instances. Space might be curved, it might be more than three-dimensional. But no one has yet been bold enough to propound a theory of curved reason.

And why should there not as well exist a curved logic as a mathematics of curved space? A curved logic would be a very original innovation for which no patent has yet been applied for. What a splendid opportunity to acquire Riemann's fame in the domain of logic!

We must let this fine opportunity of propounding a new and extremely original conception of reason slip away, for we are not in a disposition to make good use of it. A curved reason would be simply crooked rea-

son, for the rigid sameness of reason prevents us admitting any various kinds of reason.

The inmost nature of reason is consistency, and thus the simplest statement of rational thought is the maxim of sameness formulated in logic in the sentence  $A = A$ . The formula  $A = A$  is, as it were, the straight line of logic; but with this difference that we can imagine as possible (although not as actual) the straight lines of curved spaces, but not a logic that abandons what might be called "the axiom of consistency."

The axiom of parallels in geometry corresponds to the syllogism in logic. Inconsistent reason, a reason which does not acknowledge the truth expressed in the formula  $A = A$ , which can accept the existence and non-existence of a thing at the same time is pseudo-reason; and if pseudo-reason as a possible case by the side of actual reason were a legitimate assumption, all thinking would cease and all being would be thrown into confusion, reason would be nonsense and the world a chaos, everything would be a medley without coherence, without rhyme or reason, a vast bedlam, and reason itself would present an exceptional case, unaccountable, odd, strange, exceptional, brought about perhaps incidentally as a happy chance. But how this reason could be of any objective use would present new difficulties. For reason being only an incidental chance occurrence in our brain would have no applicability to the objects around us. Of a triangle which we construct in our mind, we can, perhaps, from three known parts, determine the other unknown parts. But it would be impossible that this mental model of a triangle should give us information about a real triangle formed by the sun, the moon, and the earth. And when information thus acquired was found to be correct, we should be confronted with an all but miraculous coincidence.

There are two classes of formal sciences, the one is characterised by geometry, the other by logic, algebra, and arithmetic. The former we have on another occasion called purely formal, the other rigidly formal, the rigidly formal being a special kind of the purely formal. The rigidly formal sciences are products of our mental operations. There is no assumption, no hypothesis, no knowledge of the actual forms of the world in it. The other formal sciences, such as Euclidean geometry, assumes that space is of a certain nature. Space is a pure form of the world; but that space is such as it is, we know through experience. We cannot by pure reason alone prove that space is tri-dimensional or that it is homaloidal.

Reason is not merely purely formal, it is rigidly formal. Reason is unequivocally determined; and when we say "all men are mortal and Caius is a man," we can by no means escape the conclusion that Caius is mortal.

The rigidly formal being in its applications strictly reliable in experience, there is no other explanation than thinking of experience as being possessed of the same nature as our thought. There is an analogy between mental operations and natural processes which proves that they are ultimately of the same kind.

When we consider the events of the world in their simplest possible conditions, we resolve it into innumerable processes of motion, as a constant shifting about. There are separations and combinations, and wherever the same separations and combinations take place there are also the same results. This sameness, which can be formulated as a law, viz., that the same produces the same is a reality, and indeed the most real reality, for it lies at the bottom of the cosmic nature of the world; it implies that existence is not a chaotic chance medley, but a cosmos permeated by uniformities and regulated by laws. All laws will in the end have to be recognised as mere corollaries to this simplest of all laws, which is nothing but the self-consistency of being. This fundamental law is by its very nature eternal and universal; it thus constitutes an intrinsic and inalienable quality of existence; and no existence can be without it. To be sure, it is a purely formal law, for it tells us nothing as to the substance, the material, the sensations, or other qualities of being, but for that reason it is not less real. The formal, indeed, is the most important part of reality, for the forms of things make the things in their individuality what they are.

The same operations which are active everywhere, separations and combinations, build up the human frame, and in the human frame also man's mind. Human reason is a structure built up by mind operations; and pure reason is a mental construction of them in abstract purity. The human mind being a part of the world, we find that the law of sameness holds good also for the products of purely mental operations: the same operations yield the same results. Moreover, there will be an agreement between the constructions of pure reason and the laws that obtain in them with the configurations of reality and the purely formal laws of the universe. This agreement was the puzzle of Kant, which led him astray into the by-paths of his transcendental idealism; and yet this agreement is nothing but the law of sameness, which he neither doubted as a logical law, nor as a feature of reality. He might, with the same reason, be puzzled because one egg looks like another.

Experience, viz., the effect of events upon sentient beings, is caused by sense impressions and consists of sensations. Every sensation is a feeling of a certain kind and form, and the various sensations are interrelated. Thus we have (1) the properly feeling

element, or the sentient or sensory part of a sensation, and (2) its formal or relational aspect.

When we consider *in abstracto* these two qualities, the purely formal on the one hand and the purely sensory on the other, we are struck by a peculiar contrast. We attribute necessity and universality to the formal, while the phenomena of the sensory exhibit such an irregularity that we can never attain to any certainty that they are the same in one case as in others.

No amount of sense-experience, be it ever so large, can justify the proposition, "because something has been so in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases that it will be the same in the thousandth case also." While, contrariwise, one case of experience of a formal consideration, for instance, that the equality of sides in a triangle constitutes an equality of the angles at its base is sufficient to establish a universal rule.

This contrast has given many a headache to Mr. Mill and his followers, but they have never solved the problem; nor can they solve it so long as they cling to the principle from which the sensational school starts, that all knowledge is and remains a mere association of single sensations; a principle which overlooks the important contrast between the formal and the material. Says Mr. Mill in his *System of Logic*, III, chap. iii, § 3:

"There are cases in which we reckon with the most unflinching confidence upon uniformity, and other cases in which we do not count upon it at all. In some we feel complete assurance that the future will resemble the past, the unknown be precisely similar to the known. In others, however invariable may be the result obtained from the instances which have been observed, we draw from them no more than a very feeble presumption that the like result will hold in all other cases. That a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, we do not doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars.

"Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception known or presumed, go such a very little way toward establishing a universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question knows more of the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the problem of induction."

He who does not see the contrast between the formal and the material, between that which imparts necessity to conclusions and the incidental features of experience, between the universal and the particular, can never arrive at scientific certainty, and he will naturally be puzzled at his own boldness when he unhesitatingly accepts some conclusion, based perhaps upon one single observation, as of universal application.

The formal sciences are systematic; they are produced by construction and can thus exhaust all possibilities of a case, while our sensory experience bears the character of the incidental; all information through the senses is only in parts. And why is that so?

We perform certain operations, for instance, in arithmetic we add and subtract, and we denote the products of our operations with certain symbols. We call  $1 + 1$  "two" (denoted by the sign "2") and  $1 + 1 + 1$  "three" (denoted by the sign "3"); and we find that the product of the operation  $1 + 1$  is the same as the product of the operation  $3 - 1$ , viz.,  $= 2$ . This is so and will be so whenever we repeat the operation; and this quality that it will always be so is called "necessity" or "rigidity."

The whole mystery of logical necessity consists in this, that exactly the same operation will always bring about exactly the same product. The same is true of all purely formal operations. Unforeseen interferences of unknown powers being excluded from this domain of abstraction, we can pronounce the verdict with absolute certainty that in this sense twice two will under all circumstances be four.

The objection has been made that twice two may be five in other worlds, but we reject this view as absurd. We willingly grant that two bacilli plus two bacilli might be five or even five hundred and more bacilli, because they might rapidly multiply during the operation. This is quite possible in the tube of the microscopist, but it is impossible in mathematics, for in the realm of abstract thought all such possibilities are excluded. There we measure or count only our mental operations. When counting our mental steps only, we cannot have made five hundred steps when we have made only four.

Having constructed in our mind systems of formal thought, such as numbers, geometrical figures, the logical categories, etc., we are in possession of schedules which serve us for reference when dealing with the real world, and their infallible rigidity is extremely useful for extending the sphere of our knowledge.

Having constructed by certain mental operations (which in their elementary forms are very simple indeed, being upon the whole nothing but a combining, separating, and recombining) we possess in the products of our formal thought an instrument that enables us to deal with single experiences and to systematise them into exact, scientific, and philosophical knowledge, in other words, we possess reason.

Reason originates by a differentiation of the formal and the sensory in experience. As soon as the formal has been separated in thought from the sensory, as soon as an animal learns to speak, to count, and to think in abstracts, it has developed reason. Reason does not rise out of the sensory element of our sensations and memory images, but out of their interrelations. Reason is the product of abstract thought-operations, and pure reason is a system of empty forms whose office it is to arrange in good order and to systematise further experience.

Reason is not an arbitrary invention, it is not the product of a hap-hazard association: reason is the method of our experience and the norm of all thinking.

Experience is the natural revelation of existence to sentient beings; reality impresses itself upon their sentience and thus forms their notions. Now we find that all the impressions of experience possess in spite of their infinite variety certain features in common, and these universal features develop in the course of the mental evolution of sentient beings into those notions which in their systematic unity are called "reason."

Reason is not purely subjective. Reason is objective in its nature. Our subjective reason, human reason, or the rationality of our mind grows out of that world-order which we may call the rationality of existence. Human reason is only the reflection of the world-reason, the former is rational only in so far as it agrees with the latter.

Reason (i. e. human reason) in its elementary beginnings consists first of the operations that take place among mental images. Mental operations are the germ of reason, and mental operations are as such the same as any other operations, the same as any process that takes place in nature. Reason is, secondly, a mental picture of certain qualities of reality; and being the picture of a universal feature of reality, it conveys information applicable to all reality. Thus reason is, thirdly, an instrument which enables us methodically and critically to deal with any kind of experience.

#### CURRENT TOPICS.

THE opening of the World's Fair on Sunday has developed among the clergy some alarming symptoms of theological hydrophobia, and their sermons are made incoherent by hysterical biting, snapping, and mad-running against the wall. They criticise the forbearance of the Almighty because he does not show his vengeance upon Chicago as he did upon the disobedient cities mentioned in the Bible. Not only did he fail to smite the people but he assisted in the desecration of the Sabbath by providing for the Sunday opening an exceedingly fine day. This was very annoying to the "divines" who not more than two or three weeks ago had suggested in their sermons and their prayers that cyclones and cholera would be better than fine weather for the Sunday opening. That the Lord should invert the old theology by favoring the Fair instead of the preachers was a grievous disappointment, and one reverend minister in Boston reminded the Creator that, "Blessings and curses have fallen upon men or nations, as they have obeyed or disregarded the laws of God." He was talking about the opening of the Fair on Sunday, and he was no doubt surprised that by some omnipotent mistake no "curses" had followed that profanation. Then he caressed the directors in a theological way and religiously sprinkled some hot coals upon their heads, calling them "dishonest men," and "anarchists in their defiance of the law." Similar delirium prevailed in the pulpits of Chicago. One doctor of divinity while preaching a "Decoration Day" sermon compared the Sunday opening of the Fair to the act of secession, and he declared that any party opposing the Sunday closing contract was a foe of the nation, whether it was the Columbian Exposition or any other organisation. Reading over those brimstone sermons, I offer an apology to my country for the cen-

asures I have sometimes passed upon its institutions, and its laws. I ought rather to be grateful for the protection it gives me against ecclesiastical wrath, that it will not allow me to be burned for heresy, nor even permit me to be fined and imprisoned for not going to church on Sundays. The thumbscrew and the rack are obsolete, but the spirit that used them is active still, and full of holy zeal.

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One humorous trait of the American character is an affected reverence for the "law," when it suits our interest or whim, and a contemptuous disregard for it when it suits neither our pockets nor our politics. We profess more and practice less obedience to the law than any other civilised people. I rebuke the large profession but not the little practice, for a free people always look with jealousy and suspicion upon the law. They respect it for its virtues only, and never merely because it is the law. We are always forcing others to take "law," as if it were some insipid medicine, not at all adapted to ourselves; and the men who advocate the closing of the World's Fair on Sundays are picturesque examples of the custom. Congress made a grant of money to the World's Fair on condition that it be closed on Sundays, and this questionable contract the advocates of Sunday closing pretend to venerate as "law." To disregard it is anarchy, treason, and rebellion. The appropriation with its conditions was nothing but a bargain between Congress and the Fair; it never was a law. If Congress should appropriate a sum of money to the Presbyterians on condition that they keep their churches closed on Sundays, the condition would not be a law; and a similar condition made with any other corporation is not law. And even if the covenant between Congress and the Fair had all the qualities of a formal statute, it is in violation of the higher law embodied in the constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." When Congress by statutory enactment recognises Sunday as a Christian festival, and appropriates money for Sabbath observance, it makes a law respecting an establishment of religion, and in doing so it violates the constitution. Any act of Congress appropriating money for keeping any place open or closed on Sundays is religious legislation forbidden by the organic law. Will not those clerical enthusiasts for "law" bestow some of their loyal devotion on the law which is higher than any act of Congress, the Constitution of the United States.

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Writing on Decoration Day, the old battle-scenes crowd upon the memory until the mental vision becomes dim in the sulphurous clouds from the great guns; the lurid panorama glides by me like the creation of a dream. As the smoke of my old army-pipe curls in the sunbeams I see again the charges and the counter-charges, the forms and faces of the men I knew; and by a weird coincidence I notice that the smoke is blue and gray. These pictures in the smoke are not altogether the work of reverie; they are the ghosts of real battles; they bring me into spiritual communion with comrades who are gone; and by irresistible association they consecrate the cause for which they died, the preservation of the American republic and the breaking of human chains. The battle crucible was hot but it burned the threat of disunion out of our politics, while it purified the nation of much dross, and redeemed the land from slavery. Therefore, I reverently accept those results as a compensation for the sacrifices and the awful experiment of war. If the standard of freedom be not lowered again the war will be worth its cost.

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A quaint mingling of pathos and comedy was the friendly meeting of Union and Confederate officers on the battle-field of Gettysburg; and the account of it is exciting by reason of its vivid personality. The pleasure of the reunion had a touch of sadness in it, because of those who fell on either side, but this was merged

at last in the delights of mutual admiration. The rough passages of history were made smooth and every general gave to every other a certificate that what he did at Gettysburg was precisely what ought to have been done. "Now tell me General Longstreet," says General Howard, "could I have done anything different? Would you not have outflanked and overrun me if I had massed my forces?" And with chivalrous politeness Longstreet said, "We would have got around you if you had done otherwise." Then General Sickles said that he had been blamed for advancing out of the general line, to which General Longstreet, still affable and indulgent, said, "I had my eye on Little Round Top, and if you had not advanced so boldly with the Third Corps, I should have gained it." "Yes," replied Sickles, "and that was the key to the position." Of course, as courtesy required, Howard and Sickles gave Longstreet a certificate absolving him from all the blame laid upon him for his mistakes, and showing that what he did was the most military thing that could possibly have been done. And so they spent the day in weaving delightful fictions for the amusement of each other, and showing by the rules of hypothetical strategy the wisdom of what they did. Conclusive, it all was, like the story of the old Greenwich pensioner, who used to explain to me when I was a boy, the battle of the Nile, illustrated by diagrams drawn with his cane upon the sand, the main part of the instruction being this, "Now, here was the French and there was we."

\* \* \*

It was unanimously agreed by all the generals at the Gettysburg picnic that General Meade committed a blunder in not advancing upon Lee after the failure of Pickett's charge, but as Meade was not present at the picnic, being, in fact, many years dead, he was not within the mutual admiration circle, and therefore no harm was done in criticising him. It was conceded by all that if Grant had been in Meade's place, Lee would never have got away. General Howard said, "Grant would have followed; so would Sheridan, and even Thomas, who was reputed slow"; and somebody asking General Longstreet, "What would Grant have done?" he confidently answered, "He would have wiped us out." It is perilous to prophecy what a certain man will do, because he may fail to do it; but there is no danger at all in telling what he would have done; and therefore they were all very safe in saying that Grant would have followed up Lee. It was easy to say that Meade committed a blunder in letting Lee retreat un molested, but in doing that he imitated General Grant's own strategy at Shiloh, which the generals at the picnic had forgotten altogether. Under precisely similar circumstances Meade and Grant acted precisely alike. Grant failed to follow Beauregard in his retreat, and Meade failed to follow Lee. In the whole history of war there is no closer parallel than those two cases make, and yet the critics of Meade metaphysically pretended to know that Grant would have followed Lee, although he did not follow Beauregard. Commanding generals are influenced by the spirit of the men around them, and there is no evidence that Meade's generals were any more anxious than he was to follow Lee from Gettysburg.

\* \* \*

The efforts of the new torism to cheapen liberty by qualifying it with adjectives and adverbs are signs of patriotic decay. Liberty is no longer welcome in good society, unless accompanied by words of limitation and restraint, like those, for instance, used on Decoration Day by the Presbyterian General Assembly. This important and influential body paused in the trial of a heretic and resolved, "that this assembly adjourn at noon to-day to convene at 7:45 o'clock p. m. as a tribute to the memory of the nation's patriotic dead who laid down their lives in behalf of our *civil and constitutional* liberty." For emphasis, I mark the restraining words in italics, to make visible the barb-wire fence used by the Presbyterian General Assembly to limit the range of liberty. Not even on Decoration Day would the five hundred clergymen who

composed that assembly condescend to speak of liberty in its broad and universal meaning; they patronised the definite abstraction called "civil and constitutional liberty," but not that sublime endowment of every individual man the inalienable right of personal freedom, which neither civil statutes nor solemn constitutions can lawfully take away. Besides, the statement in the resolution is not historically true, because at the time of the war, civil and constitutional liberty meant the liberty of the white man to own the black man and make him work for nothing, while the "nation's patriotic dead" fought for the liberty of every man to own himself. Liberty needs no "civil and constitutional" crutches to support it. Liberty, standing in its majesty the guardian of all other privileges, needs no explanation, while "civil and constitutional" liberty may mean anything within the whole range of legislation and jurisprudence from the Declaration of Independence to the Dred Scott decision. How weak, tame, and doubtful would have been the immortal speech of Patrick Henry, if he had said, "Give me *civil and constitutional* liberty, or give me death."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

#### NOTES.

MR. C. STANILAND WAKE'S interesting article on "Thought-conception" in the last number of *The Open Court* presents in a forcible manner the problems of the origin of language and of reason, which, as our contributor correctly remarks, "are identical." There is, however, one point in which it appears to me that Mr. Wake, following the authority of Mr. T. Bailey Saunders, has been misled.

Mr. Wake asks:

"But what led to the giving of particular names, or in other words, what was the principle which guided man in his conceptual work? Noiré says 'ideal intuition' by which the mind perceives the causal nexus between the object and the sound by which its meaning is expressed."

Mr. Wake adds:

"This explanation, however, in reality explains nothing. The basis of the whole process is sensuous experience, and the genesis of the concept lies in the passage from that experience to the knowledge of the object, which consists in its being named."

Mr. Wake's criticism of Noiré is most likely based upon a statement of Mr. Saunders's in the article "The Origin of Reason," where this author says:

"It is quite true that no theory can afford to dispense with assumptions. But it is also true that no theory is worth anything which presupposes the existence of that of which it seeks to show the origin. Noiré's two assumptions are these: the existence of the social instinct, and the presence of what he calls 'ideal intuition'." (*The Open Court*, p. 2534.)

Noiré is really not guilty of having made these two assumptions in the form in which Mr. Saunders states them. Noiré assumes, if it can be called an assumption, that man was a social being; that the ancestors of man were living together in hordes, and their common life produced the need of communication. There is no difficulty concerning the first assumption; "but," says Mr. Saunders, "there can be little doubt that the second assumption is quite destructive of the value of the theory as an account by the *origin of reason*.. It must be obvious at once that an *ideal intuition* is the very process which has to be explained, and that to assume it as part of the agency which gives rise to concepts is to argue in a circle."

I do not know where Mr. Saunders found Noiré's expression "ideal intuition"; this much is certain, that Noiré does not use the expression in the sense Mr. Saunders attributes to it.

Noiré is a follower of Kant, and he uses very often the Kantian term *Anschauung*. The term *Anschauung* is usually translated "by intuition"; but while the English mind understands by "intuition" some mysterious and prophet-like act of perception, the German term *Anschauung* means the immediate perception of an object by sensation. *Anschauung* is the looking at an object, or, as we have translated it in *The Monist*, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 527, an

"at-sight." The term is not used to denote the sensations of sight only, but any kind of sensation. Sensations of sound, of taste, of smell, of touch, are also called *Anschauung* in the Kantian sense of the term.

Mr. Wake says, "Ideal intuition explains nothing. The basis of the whole process is sensuous experience." Exactly so. *Anschauung*, that is, sense-experience, is the basis of all mental activity, and also the basis of the origin of language. This is Noiré's theory.

It appears to me that Mr. Saunders's and Mr. Wake's statements of Noiré's theory, as being based upon "ideal intuition," is a striking instance of how ideas, even if correctly translated, are easily perverted by the different shades of meaning which analogous words possess in different languages.

A few days ago I received a copy of Bishop Phillips Brooks's sermons, which were accompanied by the following lines:

"Because I differ so radically from *The Monist*, I have found "its views exceedingly interesting. Perhaps *The Monist* may find "it equally interesting to see how the subject looks as viewed *from the other side*. With the compliments of A 'DUALIST.'"

While expressing my sincerest thanks for the kindly spirit in which the book was sent, I must call the attention of my unknown friend, who calls himself a dualist, to the fact that Phillips Brooks is much more monistic than could be expected of an Episcopalian clergyman. He says, for instance, in his first sermon, "The Candle of the Lord":

"A man who lives like an inspiration in the city for honesty "and purity and charity, may be only the candle in whose obedient life burns still the fire of another strong, true man who was "his father, and who passed out of men's sight a score of years "ago. Men call the father dead, but he is no more dead than the "torch has gone out which lighted the beacon that is blazing on "the hill."

When our Bishop begins to preach an immanent immortality, it is a sign of the times that the Religion of Science is near at hand.

P. C.

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